Consti Digest
Consti Digest
Makalintal v. COMELEC
FACTS:
This pertains to the petition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine
Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that
he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it
that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the
President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
HELD:
Lonzanida vs COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May
1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation was contested and resulted to declaring his opponent winning the election
and ordered Lonzanida to vacate the office. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida
again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for disqualification
on the grounds that it is a violation of the three-term rule. COMELEC granted the
petition. Petitioner filed a petition challenging the validity of the COMELEC resolution.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1, 1998 is
considered full term of office for the purpose of three-term rule
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a full term of office for two
reasons, he cannot be considered elected as the proclamation was void and he also did
not voluntary renounce office, but was involuntary severance from office.
The petition is granted and the resolution of the COMELEC declaring petitioner
Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set
aside.
G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the
assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of
advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow
the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes
for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of
NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as
provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was
promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is
beyond judicial determination.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.
Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the
expanded jurisdiction of the court.
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon
Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the
elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,
solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of
an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and
NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover,
the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that
"no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.
The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission
subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest
technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available
funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned
conditions were found to have not been substantially met.
Resolution 6712 was null and void.
ISSUE: W/N Presidential’s immunity from suit can shield the President from being haled
to court
HELD: Dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from
suit.
YES.
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
Immunity can be classified either by: a. extent i.e. absolute or qualified or b. duration i.e.
permanent or temporary
Extent:
Absolute immunity is granted to a government official who has proven that his actions
fell within the scope of his duties, and that his actions are discretionary rather than
ministerial – conduct or the action performed must not involve insignificant or routinely
office work but rather the challenged action must involve personal judgment. It attaches
to the function instead of the office.
Qualified immunity was initially given to a government official who was able to prove
that at the time of commission of the act complained of, he possessed a good faith that
his actions were lawful – subjective element determined with the two-tier test:
If the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was clear at the time of the
alleged wrongful action
Whether the official should reasonably have known the action was contrary to law
Duration:
Permanent or the immunity for speech or debate – immunity from liability in law suits
that arise out of the performance of public duties of democratic deliberation
Temporary or congressional immunity from arrest – to legislators from litigating even
private suits while “at Session” of Congress as public officers
Estrada v. Desierto (G.R. No. 146
710-15, March 2, 2001): Being a former President, President Estrada no longer enjoyed
immunity from suit
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006): Improper to implead
President Arroyo in a consolidated petition disputing the factual bases for Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 declaring a state of national
emergency and called out the Armed Forces of the Philippines in her capacity as
Commander-in-Chief to maintain law and order throughout the country and to suppress
acts of lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion.
Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. No. 183871, February 18, 2010): Court upheld
the exclusion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, maintaining that presidential
immunity from suit despite not being expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution and
declared that the President could not be sued during her tenure in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo against military, police personnel and the Office of the
Ombudsman and including President Arroyo.
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011): Court ruled that
RTC had erred in holding that Presidential immunity could not be invoked in amparo
proceedings
While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the
1981 constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our version of
presidential immunity unique. Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, provided for immunity at two distinct points in time: 1. Immunity during the
tenure of the President 2. Thereafter. Framer’s intended during tenure.
Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. It is not intended to
immunize the President from liability or accountability.
Rationale for the grant of immunity stated in Soliven v. Makasiar (G.R. No. 82585,
82827, 83979, November 14, 1988): To assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions fee from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.
Rationale expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of
his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that
the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided
by law and that is by impeachment.
Passage in Soliven was made only to point out that it was the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in
the President’s behalf and that it was the President who had gone to court as the
complainant
If the Court were to first require the President to respond to each and every complaint
brought against him, and then avail himself of presidential immunity on a case to case
basis, then the rationale for the privilege – protecting the President from harassment,
hindrance or distraction in the discharge of his duties – would very well be defeated.
Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except
an ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must 1st be allowed to end his
tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.