Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 1 of 36

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JOE JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case Nos.
) 8:22-cv-02422-TDC
THINK COMPUTER CORPORATION ) 8:22-cv-02573-TDC
d/b/a PLAINSITE, )
)
Defendant. )

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND REMAND *

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS TO DATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

I. THE AMENDED NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND SECOND NOTICE OF

REMOVAL PROPERLY PLEADED DIVERSITY JURISDICTION, AND
DEFENDANT HAS SHOWN THAT DIVERSITY JURISDICTION EXISTS. . . . . . . . 10

A. Because the Notices of Removal Pleaded the Elements of Diversity

Jurisdiction, the Court Should Apply the Preponderance of Evidence
Standard to Decide Whether There is Diversity Jurisdiction Here. . . . . . . . . . . . 10

B. The Evidence Establishes that Johnson Is a Citizen of a State Diverse from

Think. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

C. The Evidence Establishes That More Than $75,000 Is in Controversy.. . . . . . . . 14

* This opposition memorandum, prepared for filing in Case NO. TDC-22-2573 after plaintiff refiled
his motion to strike and remand in that case on November 3, 2022, is the same as the one that
defendant e-filed on November 2 under Case No. TDC-22-2422, except for (1) the addition of
electronic bookmarks and cites to the prospective Joint Record created pursuant to Section II.B.2 of
the Case Management Order, and (2) the fixing of typographical errors.
 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 2 of 36

II. THE NOTICES OF REMOVAL PROPERLY BROUGHT THIS CASE TO

FEDERAL COURT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page(s)

Alexander v. Kirkpatrick,
2019 WL 4164882 (D.N.M. Sept. 3, 2019)
report and recommendation adopted, 426 F. Supp.3d 1005 (D.N.M. 2019). . . . . . . . . . 19

Amzura Enterprises v. Ratcher,

18 Fed. App’x 95 (4th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Brennan v. Stevenson,
2015 WL 7454109 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21, 22

Bunton v. Cape Cod Village,

2009 WL 2139441 (C.D. Ill. July 6, 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Burns v. Windsor Insurance Co.,

31 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir.1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Burroughs v. Palumbo,
871 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Va.1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Chek v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,

2014 WL 12680676 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Cohen v. Herick,
2015 WL 12820463 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Copak v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

2013 WL 450198 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,

574 U.S. 81 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10, 12

Dixon v. Edwards,
290 F.3d 699 (4th Cir.2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Doe Company v. Public Citizen,

749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Doe v. Chao,
540 U.S. 614 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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Doustout v. G.D. Searle & Co.,

680 F. Supp. 49 (D. Me. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,

547 U.S. 388 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

F.A.A. v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 284 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17

Food & Water Watch v. Smithfield Foods,

2021 WL 8821537 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores,

233 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Gomer v. Home Depot U.S.A.,

2016 WL 5791226 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Hacker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

2019 WL 638369 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Hall v. Coca-Cola Co.,

2018 WL 4928976 (E.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Harrison v. Wahatoyas, L.L.C.,

253 F.3d 552 (10th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Harvey v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of New York,

2008 WL 2805608 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16

Harvey-Jones v. Coronel,
196 A.3d 36 (Md. Spec. App. 2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Heyman v. Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co.,

781 Fed. App’x 463 (6th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Heyman v. Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co.,

2017 WL 3274452 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 27, 2017),
aff’d, 781 Fed. App’x 463 (6th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

In re Bigelow,
179 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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In re IFC Credit Corp.,

663 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

In Touch Concepts v. Cellco P’ship,

788 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 19

Instituto de Educacion Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ.,

209 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Johnson v. Affiliated Computer Servs.,

2011 WL 4011429 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011)
aff’d, 500 Fed. App’x 265 (5th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Johnson v. Affiliated Computer Servs.,

500 Fed. App’x 265 (5th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Johnson v. Ashmore,
2016 WL 3467052 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2016)
aff’d, 681 Fed. App’x 345 (5th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 13

Johnson v. Experian Info.,

2015 WL 7769502 (D. Md. Nov. 17, 2015),
aff’d, 670 Fed. App’x 778 (4th Cir. 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Joy Family Ltd. Part. v. United Financial Banking Cos.,

2013 WL 4647321 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier,

624 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Kay v. Ehrler,
499 U.S. 432 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Khalifa v. Shannon,
945 A.2d 1244 (Md. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Lang v. Manufacturers & Traders Tr. Co.,

274 F.R.D. 175 (D. Md. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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Lovero v. Da Silva,
28 A.3d 43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

McFadden v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n,

525 Fed. App’x 223 (4th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR,

385 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 24

Merritt v. Craig,
746 A.2d 923 (Md. Spec. App. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Momin v. Maggiemoo's Intern.,

205 F. Supp. 2d 506 (D. Md. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 11, 12, 19

Mudd v. Comcast of Maryland,

2015 WL 773017 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 15

Newman v. Spectrum Stores,

109 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Ala. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Nieto v. University of New Mexico,

727 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D.N.M. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Perez v. Sodexo, Inc.,

2021 WL 2333640 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Perry v. National Association of Home Builders of the United States,

No. THC-20-0454 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020),
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17209313522313030262. . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States,

549 U.S. 457 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Runge v. Maffei,
1996 WL 164383 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Schueller v. Wells Fargo & Co.,

2016 WL 10538996 (D.N.M. May 3, 2016)
report and recommendation adopted 2016 WL 10538997 (D.N.M. May 26, 2016) . . . . 15

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Shaw v. Dow Brands,

994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,

303 U.S. 283 (1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Stehle-Rosellini v. Allstate Corp.,

2010 WL 358519 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp.,

77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir.1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

United States v. Johnson,

2022 WL 1592445 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Wood v. Crane,
764 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS AND RULES

United States Constitution

Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 21, 22, 23
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

28 U.S.C. § 1332. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

28 U.S.C. § 1446. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 12

28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 18, 24

H.R. Rep. No. 100-889 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 391 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 11
Rule 8(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Rule 12(b)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Rule 12(b)(6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Wright & Miller, FED. PRAC & PROC. JURIS. § 3733 (rev. 4th ed.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

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After plaintiff Joe Johnson repeatedly threatened that defendant Think Computer Corporation

would be “tied up in litigation for the next year or so” if it did not accede to his meritless claim that

posting publicly available court records violates privacy rights because such records contain contact

information of litigants and their counsel, Greenspan Affirmation (“Aff.”) ¶ 8 and Exhibit E, Joint

Record (“JR”) 56, 62, he filed this suit in state court. Within thirty days of receiving a complaint

laying out this claim, the company’s owner sent a Notice of Removal to this Court; then, when

plaintiff objected (correctly) that a non-lawyer cannot file papers on behalf of a corporation, the

company retained counsel who filed first an Amended Notice of Removal and then, after plaintiff

argued that the original notice could not be amended, a new Notice of Removal—all within the

thirty-day deadline. Each notice alleged that plaintiff Johnson is citizen of Maryland, diverse from

the defendant company, and that the amount controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount set by

28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Moving to strike and remand, Johnson challenges the assertion that his citizenship is diverse,

even though he himself has sued in diversity claiming to be a Maryland citizen; he offers no evidence

that he is not a Maryland citizen. He also disputes the amount in controversy, while introducing no

evidence. This memorandum shows that the diversity and amount in controversy requirements are

met and that Johnson’s quibbles about the procedures followed by the company to effect removal

are based on miscitations of precedent and ignoring well-established principles governing removal.

The motion for remand should be denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

This action was brought by a prolific and almost-always-unsuccessful pro se litigant who

objects that a record of his litigation failures and criminal convictions—identifying him by the

names, addresses and phone numbers that he has made part of the public record by virtue of his role
 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 10 of 36

as a civil litigant acting pro se—are archived for ready access by the public. Johnson claims that

these disclosures invade his privacy and have caused him sleepless nights and emotional distress.

Defendant Think Computer Corporation (“Think”) operates, at PlainSite.org (“PlainSite”),

a court-records aggregation site that, like similar websites such as CourtListener, Pacer Monitor and

Justia, hosts the contents of the dockets of millions of lawsuits filed in courts throughout the United

States. Access to the judicial documents on PlainSite is available free of charge to all users.

Greenspan Aff. ¶ 3, JR5. Think is a Delaware corporation based in California. It is owned by Aaron

Greenspan. Id. ¶ 2, JR5.

Plaintiff Joe Johnson, a resident of Fort Washington, Maryland, Complaint ¶ 2, has been

party to more than one hundred fifty civil and criminal proceedings in state and federal courts across

the country. Id. ¶ 4, JR5-6. The judicial records from many of his cases appear in the PlainSite

database. As the records show, Johnson generally proceeds pro se in his civil cases. Because the

name, addresses, phone numbers and email addresses of both litigants and counsel must be in the

record, accessed through PACER, and because judges addressing his litigation have discussed

Johnson’s contact information in the course of resolving motions in his cases, see, e.g., United States

v. Johnson, 2022 WL 1592445, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2022), Johnson’s name, phone number,

address and email addresses appear repeatedly on PlainSite, as they do on every site that hosts and

indexes the records of his federal litigation. Greenspan Aff. ¶ 4, JR6.

In this action, Johnson contends that his right of privacy under Maryland common law and

statutory consumer laws bars Think from including this information from judicial records in a

publicly accessible website.

Although the complaint alleges that PlainSite began to host documents containing Johnson’s

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information in June 2022, and that Johnson only discovered this in that month, Johnson has known

about Think’s hosting of such information since at least 2016. In that year, and in 2018 and 2019,

Johnson submitted complaints through the PlainSite contact page objecting to the hosting of the

dockets in Johnson v. Ashmore, 2016 WL 3467052 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2016), report and

recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3406110 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2016), aff’d, 681 Fed. App’x 345

(5th Cir. 2017), and threatened to sue. Greenspan Aff. ¶¶ 8-9 and Exh. E, JR54, 67, 69, 71. On

behalf of Think, Greenspan explained that the First Amendment protects Think’s right to host

judicial records, and that the supposed privacy-based causes of action were inapplicable. Id.

Johnson never tried to explain how the First Amendment defense could be overcome but reiterated

his threat to sue, warning that if the records were not removed, “you will be subject to a civil lawsuit,

and will be tied up in litigation for the next year or so litigating this issue.” Id., JR56, 62. Johnson

sent these threats not only to Greenspan personally but also to his parents. Id., JR60. Johnson

renewed his complaints about the hosting of the data in a series of communications in May and June

2022. Id. JR 71-80.

This action began when Johnson filed a civil action on June 15, 2022 in the District Court

for Prince George’s County, Maryland. The District Court summons and complaint were never

served. Greenspan Aff. ¶ 12, JR6. On or about July 20, 2022, the Civil Action was transferred to

the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Greenspan received a document notifying Think of

this transfer, but the complaint in the case was not included. Id. On August 30, 2022, the complaint

and summons were mailed to Think, which received them on September 6, 2022. Id. ¶ 11, JR6.

The complaint alleged claims about invasion of privacy, based on both Maryland common

law and certain Maryland statutes, some of which authorize awards of attorney fees. The complaint

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sought $25,000 in compensatory damages, plus monetary relief in unspecified amounts, including

general and special damages, plus punitive damages, plus attorney fees.

Greenspan set about trying to find counsel, but the cost was exorbitant by comparison to

Think’s fairly meager revenues. Id. ¶ 13, JR8. Cognizant of the strict 30-day deadline to remove

state court lawsuits to federal court, Greenspan authored a notice of removal and sent it to this Court

by Priority Mail; he served Johnson by first-class mail, and similarly sent a notice of the filing of

removal by first-class mail to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Id. ¶ 18, JR10.

The papers reached this Court first, arriving on Friday, September 23, 2022; the Clerk placed

them on the PACER docket with the caption “Johnson v. Think Computer Corporation” and the

following notation: “filed by Aaron Greenspan o/b/o Think Computer Corporation.” On Monday,

September 26, the Clerk issued “Correspondence from Clerk to Defendant,” addressed to “Think

Computer Corporation c/o Aaron Greenspan Resident Agent.” The Court correctly construed the

Original Notice of Removal as having been filed by Greenspan on behalf of the corporation that he

owns. Description of Docket Item Number (“DN”) 1.

Apparently, the Original Notice of Removal did not reach the state court until Monday,

September 26. Noted as having been filed first on the state court docket was a First Amended

Complaint from Johnson that arrived on the same day, JR3, which added several new claims based

on the fact that PlainSite had labeled Johnson a “vexatious litigant,” which the amended complaint

alleged to be defamatory and retaliatory. Judges in this district and elsewhere have previously

criticized Johnson’s pursuit of frivolous pro se litigation. Johnson v. Experian Info. Sols., 2015 WL

7769502, at *6 (D. Md. Nov. 17, 2015), aff’d, 670 Fed. App’x 778 (4th Cir. 2016); Johnson v.

Affiliated Computer Servs., 2011 WL 4011429, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011), aff’d, 500 Fed.

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 13 of 36

App’x 265 (5th Cir. 2012).1

The First Amended Complaint sought both damages and injunctive relief. The damages

claims included “an amount in excess of $75,000, as and for compensatory and punitive damages

plus; b) An award of general and special damages . . . ; c) An award of punitive damages . . . [and]

an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees.” This document appears in the PACER docket of

Case No. 8:22-cv-02573-TDC as DN 1-4. After this amended complaint was filed in the state court

docket, that court filed the notice of Greenspan’s filing of the Notice of Removal in federal court.

Johnson Motion to Remand, Exh. 1, JR3.

The following day, September 27, the state court filed on the docket a Second Amended

Complaint that it had received from Johnson. Motion to Remand, Exhibit 1, JR3. This amended

complaint closely resembled the First Amended Complaint, except for changes in the relief

requested. This complaint still sought issuance of an injunction, but the prayer for monetary relief

was rephrased as follows (at page 16): “in an amount that does not exceed $70,000, as and for

compensatory, punitive, general, special and statutory damages but in an amount to be determined

at trial for the Defendant’s wrongful acts; and in an amount to be determined at trial for the

Defendant’s reprehensible and outrageous conduct, and to deter the Defendant’s future reprehensible

and outrageous conduct; plus b) An award of costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in this

action.” The state court docket does not explain why that court permitted the filing of a Second

Amended Complaint the day after the state court received and filed the notice that the case had been

1
Under section 391 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a “vexatious litigant” is
anyone who, over a period of seven years, files five or more unsuccessful lawsuits either through
counsel or pro se, or who tries to relitigate, pro se, a claim previously adjudicated against him.
Johnson plainly qualifies under either prongs.

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 14 of 36

removed, despite the prohibition in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).

Meanwhile, after having mailed the original Notice of Removal materials, Greenspan made

contact with Think’s undersigned counsel. Greenspan Aff. ¶ 21, JR11. On September 28, Think

filed an Amended Notice of Removal in this Court in Case No. 8:22-cv-02422-TDC, alleging that

defendant is a citizen of Delaware and California while plaintiff is a citizen of Maryland.2 Regarding

the amount in controversy, the Amended Notice of Removal alleged as follows (DN 6):

5. . . . The Complaint alleged compensatory damages of $25,000 plus general,

special, and punitive damages, as well as costs and reasonable attorney fees.
* * *
8. As set forth in the Circuit Court Complaint, Plaintiff seeks $100,000.00 or more
in damages, in that he pleads claims for $25,000 in compensatory damages, plus
general and special damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees, in his claim
against Defendant. Consequently, the amount in controversy in the Circuit Court
Complaint exceeds the sum of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.

On September 30, Johnson filed a motion to remand this case to state court, DN 10; later that

day, Johnson filed a letter requesting leave to file a motion to remand. DN 11. Even later that same

day, Johnson filed a letter requesting leave to move to strike the Amended Notice of Removal,

contending that because the original removal was a nullity, it could not be amended. DN 12. On

October 4, pursuant to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), the state court noted that the case

had been removed and closed its file pending a possible ruling on the motion for remand.

Think’s counsel observed on October 4 that the state court docket indicated that two amended

complaints had been filed. Edwards Affirmation ¶ 3, JR145. Because Johnson did not serve either

amended complaint on Think, Greenspan Aff. ¶ 22, JR11, and the Prince George’s Circuit Court had

2
For clarity, the notice filed on September 23 is referenced in this memorandum as the
“Original Notice of Removal.” The amended notice of removal filed on September 28 is cited as
“Amended Notice of Removal,” and the new notice filed on October 6 is “Second Notice of
Removal.”

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 15 of 36

not yet implemented electronic docket access, counsel had to send someone to the state court clerk’s

office to retrieve the documents. Edwards Aff. ¶ 3, JR145-146. After seeing those documents, and

in an effort to avoid unnecessary motion practice about the Original and Amended Notice of

Removal, Think, through counsel, filed a new notice of removal on October 6, 2022. Id. ¶ 4, JR146.

That case was docketed as 8:22-cv-02573-TDC.

On October 20, the Court held a Case Management Conference to discuss plaintiff’s

proposed motion to strike the Amended Notice of Removal. Although Johnson initially insisted that

he had not sought damages “anywhere near” the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold, he omitted to

mention the prayer for relief in the First Amended Complaint, which contained the phrase “in excess

of $75,000.” Instead, when pressed, he took the position that the operative complaint was the

Second Amended Complaint, which lowered his amended damages claim from “in excess of

$75,000” to $70,000. Johnson did not respond to the Court’s expression of concern that after the

remand to state court he was seeking, he might again increase his damages demand, and he did not

address the value of the injunctive relief he was seeking. The Court set a briefing schedule for

Johnson’s planned motion to remand and suggested to Johnson that he drop his objection to the fact

that the Original Notice of Removal had been filed by a non-attorney in light of the fact that it was

admitted that this was improper, but that the error had been corrected. Plaintiff has now filed a

motion to strike and to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The lengthy citations of non-binding precedent that fill Johnson’s brief obfuscate the simple

rules governing notice of removal and the fact-finding process by which courts determine whether

a case has been properly removed. When the Court applies those rules to the facts and circumstances

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 16 of 36

here, it should deny the motion to remand.

A defendant seeking to remove a case filed in state court based on diversity jurisdiction need

only allege, in general terms per Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the parties are

citizens of different states (or, one a citizen of a state and one a foreign citizen) and that the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000. If those allegations are properly challenged within 30 days of

removal, the defendant has the burden of proving complete diversity. Because, however, the

Fourteenth Amendment provides that any citizen of the United States is a citizen of the state in

which he resides, that burden is easily carried here: Johnson has at least thrice filed lawsuits in

federal court alleging diversity jurisdiction, including a suit filed this summer in which he alleged

that he is a citizen of Maryland.

As for the amount in controversy, when a lawyer-signed pleading alleges damages in a

specified amount, judges in this district have long accorded that allegation a presumption of

correctness and required a removing defendant to establish to a legal certainty that the stated amount

of damages is incorrect. But when the complaint seeks damages in an unspecified amount, the

defendant must show the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. And when

some monetary claims are alleged specifically, and some generally, the defendant meets the

requirements by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the multiple forms of monetary

relief could add up to more than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B); Dart Cherokee Basin

Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014); Momin v. Maggiemoo’s Intern., 205 F. Supp. 2d

506, 509-10 (D. Md. 2002).

In considering motions to remand in cases where the plaintiff has sought a non-specific

amount of punitive damages, courts have calculated the amount in controversy by using ratios of

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punitive to compensatory damages based on what ratio is allowed by due process considerations and

by the state courts in question. Moreover, when injunctive relief is sought, the Fourth Circuit values

that relief from the perspective of the plaintiff or the defendant, whichever is higher. Finally, when

a plaintiff responds to removal by reducing the amount of damages sought in order to manipulate the

selection of the forum, that change does not destroy federal jurisdiction. Each of Johnson’s

complaints meets the amount in controversy requirement when the value of the requested monetary

and injunctive relief is added to the specific amounts of damages alleged.

Finally, the bulk of the arguments in Johnson’s motion papers are addressed to the fact that

non-attorney Greenspan filed the initial notice of removal, despite the Court’s suggestion that he

omit that issue. Longstanding authority holds that a notice of removal may be freely amended so

long as the amendment is submitted within thirty days after the defendant receives the complaint (or

other documents) showing the basis for subject matter jurisdiction supporting removal. After that

thirty days expires, defective allegations of subject matter jurisdiction that existed at the time of

removal may be amended, but new grounds for jurisdiction may not be added by amendment. The

amendment here was offered within the initial thirty-day period, and in any event the defect in the

initial removal was not jurisdictional. Although non-parties may not remove lawsuits, here, where

the 100% owner of the defendant company submitted the removal notice, the Court correctly

interpreted the Original Notice of Removal as having been made on behalf of the defendant

company. And the company, through counsel, promptly embraced the removal, both by submitting

an Amended Notice of Removal and then by submitting a de novo removal notice after Johnson

claimed, incorrectly, that a defective removal notice cannot be amended.

Insisting simultaneously that removal was both a “nullity” and irrevocably binding, Johnson

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relies on a number of cases holding that, once final judgment has been entered in a state court, the

case cannot be removed to federal court as an indirect way of seeking review of the state court

judgment. But no case holds that a new notice of removal cannot be filed after the original notice

is challenged. Indeed, successive removals are common when developments in the state court reveal

that the amount in controversy is met. Even if Johnson were correct that his original complaint did

not meet the amount in controversy requirement, then the October 6 Second Notice of Removal was

filed just one day after defendant first obtained Johnson’s unserved First and Second Amended

Complaints, each of which plainly meets the amount in controversy requirement.

ARGUMENT

I. THE AMENDED NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND SECOND NOTICE OF REMOVAL

PROPERLY PLEADED DIVERSITY JURISDICTION, AND DEFENDANT HAS
SHOWN THAT DIVERSITY JURISDICTION EXISTS.

A. Because the Notices of Removal Pleaded the Elements of Diversity

Jurisdiction, the Court Should Apply the Preponderance of Evidence
Standard to Decide Whether There is Diversity Jurisdiction Here.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a defendant seeking to remove a case filed in state court need

only file a notice containing a ‘short and plain statement’ alleging that the elements of federal

jurisdiction have been met. The sufficiency of the notice is judged by the same standard as a

complaint filed by a plaintiff: “Congress, by borrowing the familiar ‘short and plain statement’

standard from Rule 8(a), intended to ‘simplify the ‘pleading’ requirements for removal’ and to clarify

that courts should ‘apply the same liberal rules [to removal allegations] that are applied to other

matters of pleading.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014),

quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, p. 71 (1988). Here, the Original Notice of Removal, the Amended

Notice of Removal, and the Second Notice of Removal docketed as Case No. 8:22-cv-02573-TDC,

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 19 of 36

all meet the Rule 8 standard for alleging diversity jurisdiction by alleging that plaintiff is a citizen

of Maryland, that defendant is citizen of Delaware and California, and that the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000. No more was required from each notice of removal.

Citing Maggimoo’s, Johnson argues that the Court is required to accept his allegation of

$25,000 in compensatory damages in his initial complaint unless Think proves, to a legal certainty,

that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction have been met. Memorandum Supporting Remand

(“Remand Mem.”) at 18. What Maggiemoo’s actually says does not support Johnson’s argument:

[A] pleading containing a specified demand of damages and signed by a lawyer [i]s
due deference and a presumption of truth. [T]he defendant’s burden [is] a ‘heavy
one’ and the legal certainty standard was therefore appropriate. . . . If, on the other
hand, a plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a specific amount in damages, a
defendant need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.

205 F. Supp.2d at 509-510

The opinion quoted Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996) and cited

Burns v. Windsor Insurance Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094 (11th Cir. 1994) on the basis for the heavy

presumption, then went on to discuss circumstances similar to this case:

This case presents the court with a hybrid situation in which the amount in
controversy is neither entirely specified nor unspecified. Although plaintiffs allege
a specific amount of damages in their complaint, they also request and are entitled
to attorneys’ fees, which are, as yet, undetermined. The exercise of federal
jurisdiction in this case turns on whether an award of attorneys’ fees will exceed six
thousand dollars. Thus, the court will apply the preponderance of the evidence
standard in determining whether defendant has met its burden as to that portion of the
amount in controversy.

205 F. Supp.2d at 510.

Maggiemoo’s has been widely cited in this district as setting the proper evidentiary standard, see,

e.g., Mudd v. Comcast of Maryland, 2015 WL 773017, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2015).

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 20 of 36

Dart Cherokee similarly places on the removing defendant the burden of establishing the

prima facie amount in controversy by pleading it in the notice of removal:

When a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s

amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the
plaintiff or questioned by the court. . . If the plaintiff contests the defendant’s
allegation, § 1446(c)(2)(B) instructs: ‘[R]emoval ... is proper on the basis of an
amount in controversy asserted’ by the defendant ‘if the district court finds, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds’ the
jurisdictional threshold. This provision, . . . clarifies the procedure in order when a
defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged. In such a case, both
sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence,
whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.

574 U.S. at 88.

In this case, as in Maggiemoo’s, the Court must assess a hybrid situation based on the original

complaint, because that complaint limited only the compensatory damages to $25,000, but also

sought an unspecified amount of general damages, an unspecified amount of punitive damages, and

an unspecified amount of attorney fees. The First Amended Complaint sought more than $75,000

in compensatory damages, and the Second Amended Complaint sought injunctive relief in addition

to $70,000 in monetary relief. As shown below in Part I(C), defendant’s evidence meets the standard

described in Dart Cherokee and Maggiemoo’s. Indeed, Johnson has submitted no evidence in

support of his motion to remand.3

B. The Evidence Establishes that Johnson Is a Citizen of a State Diverse

from Think.

Johnson has devoted two pages of his memorandum to arguing that Think should be required

to “prove” that his citizenship is “truly diverse” from Think’s. For the most part, his papers dance

3
If Johnson supplements his motion to remand by submitting evidence on the existence of
diversity jurisdiction, Think would seek leave to pursue discovery to pierce any such evidentiary
claims.

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 21 of 36

around the question of his own citizenship, coyly saying only that the burden of proof rests on

defendant, and that “the existence of citizenship cannot be inferred from allegations of mere

residence,” Remand Mem. at 20. He never outright disputes the allegation in the notice of removal

that he is a citizen of Maryland, but says, in passing, that a reading of his complaints “reveals that

this case lacks complete diversity.” Id. That assertion is false.

First of all, the Original Notice of Removal, the Amended Notice of Removal, and the

Second Notice of Removal, whose allegations stand unless properly controverted by Johnson, each

specify that Johnson is a citizen of Maryland. Johnson’s Complaint alleged his past residence in

Maryland, ¶ 2, and defendant’s evidence shows that he has lived there for many years. See

Greenspan Aff., ¶ 14 and Exh. G and H, JR105-108. The evidence submitted by Think shows that

Johnson both is a citizen and a resident of Maryland.

First of all, on three separate occasions, Johnson has relied on his Maryland citizenship as

a basis for asserting diversity jurisdiction state-law claims, in two of those cases against lawyers

who represented parties adverse to himself; these statements are admissible against Johnson as

statements by a party. He did this in Johnson v. Ashmore several years ago, when he told the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Texas that he was a “citizen of another State” as a

basis for suing two lawyers for their roles in a civil lawsuit that Johnson had brought against their

clients. See Greenspan Aff. ¶¶ 7, 10 and 15 and Exhibit F, JR85, 102. He could not have been a

citizen of the (unspecified) other state, for diversity purposes, unless he was also a citizen of the

United States.4 In the underlying case, Johnson had originally sued based on diversity of citizenship,

4
Even if Johnson were a foreign citizen, his citizenship would be diverse with Think under
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and the final clause of Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 2.

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 22 of 36

but after he lost, he sought to undo the dismissal with prejudice by contending that his own pleadings

had not sufficiently alleged complete diversity because, he contended, he had reason to believe that

the defendant LLC was a citizen of Maryland. Johnson v. Affiliated Computer Servs., 500 Fed.

App’x 265, 266 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). Johnson also invoked diversity jurisdiction to sue an

Assistant United States Attorney and an FBI agent for allegedly deliberately engaging in wrongful

prosecution, relying on the allegation that he is a “citizen of Maryland.” Id. ¶ 15, and Exh. I., JR9,

111, 130. It is at the very least fair to infer that Johnson was a citizen of Maryland when he sued

Think just one month earlier and remained a citizen of Maryland at the time of Think’s removal in

September, particularly considering that his Maryland residence has been continuous for many years.

This evidence, as well as Johnson’s refusal to present any evidence to the contrary, show that

diversity of citizenship is satisfied.

C. The Evidence Establishes That More than $75,000 Is in Controversy.

The First Amended Complaint, which seeks “in excess of 75,000” in damages as well as

injunctive relief, plainly meets the amount in controversy requirement. So, too, do the original

complaint and, if the court considers it, the Second Amended Complaint.

Beginning with the original complaint, even if the pleading of $25,000 in compensatory

damages is taken at face value (a matter discussed below), the original complaint also sought

unspecified amounts of special or general damages, of punitive damages, and of attorney fees. To

determine the amount in controversy, these separate amounts are quantified and added to the

compensatory damages.5

5
As discussed at the Case Management Conference, because Johnson has proceeded pro se
to this point, he cannot receive an award of attorney fees despite his evident legal training. Kay v.
Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 (1991). In theory, Johnson might retain counsel as he has done in several

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 23 of 36

The punitive damages claim alone brings the amount in controversy past $75,000. “Notably,

[the proponent of jurisdiction] does not have to prove that [plaintiff] has actually sustained damages

in excess of the jurisdictional threshold; it need only show that damages potentially in excess of the

threshold are in controversy .... [t]he ‘jurisdictional fact ... is not whether the damages are greater

than the requisite amount, but whether a fact finder might legally conclude that they are.” Mudd v.

Comcast of Maryland, 2015 WL 773017, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2015) (bracketed material and

elipses in original), quoting Joy Family Ltd. Part. v. United Financial Banking Cos., 2013 WL

4647321 at *7 n. 13 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2013).

When an unspecified amount of punitive damages is pleaded, “courts permit removing parties

to rely, for estimation purposes, on reasonable multipliers / percentages.” Hacker v. Aetna Life Ins.

Co., 2019 WL 638369, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2019). “These ratios / multipliers do not signify

arbitrary, random choices . . . . Instead, [they] receive consistent support in the case law.” Id. See

also Heyman v. Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co., 781 Fed. App’x 463, 472-73 (6th Cir. 2019), affirming

Heyman v. Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3274452, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 27, 2017).

Consequently, when the claim for compensatory damages ranges from $15,000 to $25,000, an

allegation of an unspecified amount of punitive damages can lift the case above the minimum

amount in controversy. Schueller v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2016 WL 10538996, at *7 (D.N.M. May

3, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 10538997 (D.N.M. May 27, 2016); Chek

v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2014 WL 12680676, at *3-4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2014); Copak v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 450198, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2013); Stehle-Rosellini

v. Allstate Corp., 2010 WL 358519, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2010); Harvey v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in

other cases.

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 24 of 36

City of New York, 2008 WL 2805608, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2008). By contrast, when the

compensatory damages are in the low four figures, the ratio of permissible punitive damages that

would be needed to bring the amount in controversy above $75,000 will likely be too great to justify

removal. Food & Water Watch v. Smithfield Foods, 2021 WL 8821537, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2021);

Bunton v. Cape Cod Village, 2009 WL 2139441, at *3 (C.D. Ill. July 6, 2009). Indeed, a Justice

Department study shows that the median award of punitive damages in cases in the state courts is

$64,000, and that the median amount of punitive and compensatory damages combined in the great

majority of cases, where the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was three to one or less, was

$100,000. Greenspan Affidavit, Exhibit J, JR136.

Looking specifically at Maryland caselaw, punitive damages awards affirmed on appeal may

often run above $50,000, and ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages above two to one

are not uncommon. Harvey-Jones v. Coronel, 196 A.3d 36, 46 (Md. Spec. App. 2018) (collecting

cases and affirming award of $200,000 even though compensatory damages were only $10,000);

Khalifa v. Shannon, 945 A.2d 1244, 1247, 1268-69 (Md. 2008) (collecting cases and affirming 2.22

to 1 and 2 to 1 punitive damages); Merritt v. Craig, 746 A.2d 923, 926 (Md. Spec. App. 2000)

(holding that $150,000 in punitive damages was not excessive in light of $42,265 in compensatory

damages). Here, where the claimed compensatory damages in the original complaint are $25,000,

the unspecified punitive damage claim is alone sufficient to put the amount in controversy over

$75,000.

Moreover, the general and special damages in an unspecific amount must also be aggregated.

General damages, such as for loss of reputation and injury to feelings, need not be alleged in detail

and are generally available as a remedy for privacy torts. F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 295-96

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(2012); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 621 n. 4 (2004). The allegations of such injuries set forth in the

original complaint with respect to each cause of action—”loss of interest in privacy, deprivation of

his seclusion, emotional distress, loss of sleep, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, and

embarrassment, financial los[s]es, fraud, identity theft, other losses, and damages to be proven at

trial,” Complaint ¶¶ 7, 17, 27, 41—could easily provide a basis for an award of general damages of

$10,000 or more.

As for the Second Amended Complaint, that complaint cannot be considered at all in

determining diversity jurisdiction. Although Johnson sent the Second Amended Complaint to the

Circuit Court, he never served it on Think, Greenspan Aff. ¶ 22, JR11, and he did not file any

Certificate of Service with that Second Amended Complaint, Edwards Aff. ¶ 5, JR146. This

omission was fatal because, under Maryland law, the failure to file a certificate of service can result

in the paper being retroactively deemed “not filed.” Lovero v. Da Silva, 28 A.3d 43, 52 (Md. Ct.

Spec. App. 2011). Even if a court clerk initially accepts the paper, that omission must be corrected

once the error is noted, and the error is jurisdictional. Thus, in Lovero, when a notice of appeal that

was filed without a certificate of service, the notice of appeal was stricken retroactively and the

appeal dismissed for lack of a timely appeal. Id. Here, too, because Johnson filed his Second

Amended Complaint but never served it, that complaint should not be considered for purposes of

his remand motion.6

Moreover, Johnson’s Second Amended Complaint would not deprive the Court of diversity

jurisdiction in any event, for several reasons. First, the filing of a post-removal amended complaint

6
Although federal procedural law governs the filing of documents in federal court under Erie
principles, state law should be used to assess whether a document was properly filed in state court.

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 Case 8:22-cv-02573-TDC Document 19 Filed 11/09/22 Page 26 of 36

that reduces the amount in controversy below the statutory threshold does not impair diversity

jurisdiction. In Touch Concepts v. Cellco P’ship, 788 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2015); citing St. Paul

Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938); Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, 233 F.3d

880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000); Lang v. Manufacturers & Traders Tr. Co., 274 F.R.D. 175, 181 (D. Md.

2011) (“[E]ven if the plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by amendment of his

pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite amount, this does not deprive the district court of

jurisdiction.”). This Court applied that rule in Perry v. National Association of Home Builders of

the United States, No. THC-20-0454 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020). https://scholar.google.com/scholar

_case?case=17209313522313030262, flatly refusing to allow a plaintiff to secure a remand by

amending her complaint to reduce the damages demand. At most, such post-removal amendments

leave district courts with discretion on whether to send the case back to state court. Courts generally

display healthy skepticism when a post-removal amendment, or even an affidavit or stipulation, is

offered with the evident intention of manipulating the forum to defeat the jurisdictional choice that

Congress has afforded to diverse defendants sued for more than the amount in controversy. In Touch

Concepts, 788 F.3d at 101 (such amendments “raise forum-manipulation concerns that simply do

not exist when it is the plaintiff who chooses a federal forum and then pleads away jurisdiction

through amendment,” quoting Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474 n. 6 (2007));

Gomer v. Home Depot U.S.A., 2016 WL 5791226, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2016) (“If parties were able

to defeat jurisdiction by way of post-removal [amendments], they could unfairly manipulate judicial

proceedings.”).

That exception holds particular force here, because the Second Amended Complaint was filed

in state court after that court docketed the notice that the Notice of Removal had been filed,

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acknowledging that the case had been removed to federal court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d),

filings in state court after removal are nullities. Perez v. Sodexo, Inc., 2021 WL 2333640, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2021); Alexander v. Kirkpatrick, 2019 WL 4164882, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 3, 2019),

report and recommendation adopted, 426 F.Supp.3d 1005 (D.N.M. 2019). The last operative state

court complaint is the First Amended Complaint, which was filed in state court after the initial

Notice of Removal was first filed in federal court, but before the notice of that filing was filed to the

state court docket; during that period, the state court retains concurrent jurisdiction with the federal

court. Burroughs v. Palumbo, 871 F. Supp. 870, 872 (E.D. Va.1994); Doustout v. G.D. Searle &

Co., 680 F. Supp. 49, 50 (D. Me. 1988).

It is simply not credible that the amount of damages went down from more than $75,000 in

compensatory damages alone, plus general and punitive damages, as of September 26 when the First

Amended Complaint was filed, to under $70,000 in compensatory plus general plus punitive

damages just a day later. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2), the pleading of a specific amount of

damages, even in “the initial pleading,” is entitled to deference only if it is made “in good faith.”

But the Second Amended Complaint is not the initial pleading, and it is apparent that Johnson was

reducing his damages claim for the sole purpose of defeating Think’s statutory right to defend this

case in federal court based on the damages that Johnson pleaded in his original and First Amended

Complaints. Such manipulative pleading is the opposite of good faith, and that fact alone deprives

Johnson of any benefit of having this assertion of the monetary relief being given a presumption of

validity.

Moreover, unlike the circumstances described by Judge Blake in Maggiemoo’s, and by the

appellate decisions on which that opinion relied, Johnson is not a lawyer; to the contrary, he is a

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many-times-convicted liar and forger who has shown no compunction about deceiving judges when

he considers it to be in his personal interest to do so. See Greenspan Aff. ¶ 5 and Exh. A to D, JR6,

13-51. The Court should disregard entirely his assertion that he is seeking only $70,000 in monetary

relief, and in any event, because the total amount in controversy must include the value of the

injunction that he seeks, the Court should deny the motion to remand to state court.

Finally, the post-removal Second Amended Complaint would not destroy diversity

jurisdiction, because the damages claim must be aggregated with the claim for injunctive relief.7

And Fourth Circuit law is clear that the value of an injunction for amount in controversy purposes

is established by the larger of two figures: the injunction’s worth to the plaintiff or its cost to the

defendant. JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier, 624 F.3d 635, 639 (4th Cir. 2010), citing Dixon v. Edwards,

290 F.3d 699, 710 (4th Cir.2002). It cannot be doubted that the injunction that Johnson seeks is

worth more than $5,000 to him. After all, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that relative to

the initial complaint, Johnson suffered an additional $45,000-$50,000 worth of damages incurred

for alleged defamation during the brief period of three weeks between September 9, 2022 and the

date of the Second Amended Complaint. Assuming the veracity of these claims, it follows that

issuance of an injunction barring any further continued publication of supposedly private information

and supposedly defamatory content must be worth far more than $5,000.

Nonetheless, in Brennan v. Stevenson, 2015 WL 7454109, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2015), a

lawyer sued a blogger for a single count of defamation based on a single online article accusing the

lawyer of “harassing and doxxing trans women on websites,” seeking $70,000 in damages as well

7
The Court pointed out at the Case Management Conference that the language of the prayer
for relief in the Second Amended Complaint reflects some ambiguity about whether the $70,000
claim is limited to compensatory damages or includes punitive damages as well.

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as injunctive relief. The court remanded the case, deciding that the defendant’s assertion that the

injunction’s value must be worth at least $5000.01 to the plaintiff or inflict at least $5000.01 worth

of harm on the defendant was too “speculative” to be considered in assessing the value of the

requested injunctive relief, and that, because the First Amendment provides no protection for

defamatory speech, the defendant could assert no value in her continued publication of that speech.

In contrast, here, the claims are not only for defamation but also for a variety of privacy torts, and

Johnson seeks to suppress not just a single item of Think’s web site but every entry on that web site

that pertains to Johnson and that reflects his contact information and his litigation conduct, as well

as judicial findings of his criminal conduct over the past dozen years. Indeed, Johnson does not only

seek injunctive relief against specific statements who falsity and mens rea might be addressed during

the merits litigation, and thus be determined to be unprotected by the First Amendment. His claim

is for a broad injunction against anything “otherwise defamatory or harassing,” Second Amended

Complaint ¶ 61, which would effectively bar Think from ever saying anything about Johnson lest

it be held in contempt based on a retroactive determination of what was defamatory or harassing.

Such an injunction would be worth much more to Johnson, and impose much more harm on Think,

than the injunction sought by Brennan against Stevenson.

Moreover, injunctive relief cannot be granted unless a court weighs the relative harms and

finds that the potential harm to the plaintiff clearly outweighs the burden on the defendant. eBay Inc.

v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). Johnson has alleged not only damage to his

reputation, a somewhat speculative form of harm, but also claims financial losses, identity theft and

loss of credit, which are specific monetary harms that would undoubtedly increase (assuming the

veracity of his allegations) over the several years following the date of removal and that the

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injunction for which he prays would prevent. Moreover, the burden on the defendant in a case

involving speech is a prior restraint, so the value to the plaintiff in obtaining that relief must be quite

substantial. To the extent that Brennan stands for the proposition that the value to a plaintiff from

suppressing the speech of a defendant cannot amount to as little as $5000.01, the Court should not

follow it.

Additionally, the First Amendment values at stake in this case reflect not only Think’s free

speech, but also the public’s ready access to judicial records, which the Fourth Circuit has held is

rooted in the First Amendment. Doe Company v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265 (4th Cir. 2014).

Consequently, to be entitled to injunctive relief, the value to the plaintiff must outweigh not only

Think’s First Amendment rights but the public interest in allowing unimpeded public access to

judicial records.

As a result, even if the Second Amended Complaint is entitled to any consideration at all on

the motion to remand, the Court should find that it meets the amount in controversy threshold.

II. THE NOTICES OF REMOVAL PROPERLY BROUGHT THIS CASE TO FEDERAL

COURT.

The initial notice of removal was submitted by Aaron Greenspan on behalf of the defendant

company, of which he is the 100% owner. Recognizing that an owner cannot file in the name of his

company unless the owner is a lawyer, the company retained counsel and filed the Amended Notice

of Removal. Johnson contends that a notice of removal that is filed by a corporation’s owner cannot

be amended, but he is wrong for two separate reasons.

First, contrary to Johnson’s contention that a notice of removal filed without jurisdiction

cannot be amended, “Removal petitions may be freely amended for thirty days after a defendant

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receives a copy of the state court complaint.” Shaw v. Dow Brands, 994 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir.

1993), accord 14C Wright & Miller, FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3733 (rev. 4th ed.); Cohen v.

Herick, 2015 WL 12820463, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2015); Newman v. Spectrum Stores, 109 F.

Supp. 2d 1342, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Runge v. Maffei, 1996 WL 164383, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2,

1996). It is only after that thirty days that the ability to amend is limited to fixing defective

allegations of jurisdiction contained in the original notice. E.g., Hall v. Coca-Cola Co., 2018 WL

4928976, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2018). “The upshot,” the Fourth Circuit has explained is that

“after thirty days, district courts have discretion to permit amendments that correct allegations

already present in the notice of removal. Courts have no discretion to permit amendments furnishing

new allegations of a jurisdictional basis.” Wood v. Crane, 764 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2014); see also

McFadden v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 525 Fed. App’x 223, 233 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, the

amendment was offered within the first thirty-day period and hence is “freely allowed” even if

Johnson were correct that the defect in the Original Notice of Removal was jurisdictional.

Second, the defect was not jurisdictional. The cases that Johnson cites all involve third parties

whose interests were allegedly affected by the state court complaint, or who asserted that they should

properly have been made co-defendants. In contrast, the Original Notice of Removal here was filed

by the 100'% owner of the defendant company, who suffers injury-in-fact when a lawsuit is filed

against his property, and who was trying to ensure that his company could defend its First

Amendment rights in federal court. JR9-11. Although Greenspan could not file the removal notice

for his company because he is not a lawyer, the cases consistently hold that filing on behalf of a

company by a non-lawyer official or owner is not jurisdictional. See In re IFC Credit Corp., 663

F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2011); Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871, 873-74 (5th Cir. 2004);

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Harrison v. Wahatoyas, L.L.C., 253 F.3d 552, 556-57 (10th Cir. 2001); Instituto de Educacion

Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 209 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000); In re Bigelow, 179 F.3d

1164, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1999). Instead, these cases indicate that such a filing can be accepted so

long as the corporation promptly appears by counsel. This principle was endorsed by the Fourth

Circuit in an unreported decision. Amzura Enterprises v. Ratcher, 18 Fed. App’x 95, 101 (4th Cir.

2001). Indeed, the consistent practice of the federal courts, when an appearance is attempted for a

corporation by a non-lawyer officer, is for the court to warn the company that it cannot appear

without counsel and that a default, if the corporation is a defendant, or a dismissal, if the entity is a

plaintiff, will ensue unless counsel appears. See Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871,

873-74 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, Think did not wait to be warned, but promptly retained counsel and

filed the Amended Removal Notice less than a week after the Original Notice of Removal was filed.

Third, once counsel saw that Johnson had objected to any amendment of the Original Notice

of Removal, they sought to simplify the case procedurally by filing the Second Notice of Removal

on October 6, 2022, obtaining a new case number. Johnson objects to that notice as well, pointing

to the fact that the Circuit Court closed its file pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) on October 4, 2022.

But Johnson cites only a series of district court decisions that involve a very different scenario than

what transpired here. In those cases, a party that had litigated in state court and had a final judgment

entered against it—in most cases, a foreclosure or a child-support order—removed the state court

case to federal court, in effect seeking to pursue an appeal from the state court judgment, in defiance

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Those suits could have been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (describing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as

jurisdictional), but most of those courts held that the case could not be removed.

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By contrast, here, the closure did not represent the end of the case, but only a temporary one

based on removal, pending a possible remand from federal court in the event of a successful motion

to remand. The case or controversy between the parties remains alive, and hence there remains a

case that can be removed.8 Moreover, if Johnson were right that the Original Notice of Removal was

a jurisdictional nullity that did not give this Court jurisdiction to allow an Amended Notice of

Removal, then it follows that the removal to this Court could not have had the effect of ousting the

jurisdiction of the state courts. Johnson cannot have it both ways: either this Court has jurisdiction,

divesting the state court of jurisdiction, or the state court retained jurisdiction and the case could still

be removed within the first thirty days.

Indeed, even if Johnson were right that the initial complaint did not meet the amount in

controversy requirement, and that the original Notice of Removal could not be amended, his First

Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint, which Johnson portrayed at the Case

Management Conference as stating his current claims against Think, plainly are removable once the

value of the injunctive relief that Johnson seeks is added to the “over $75,000 in damages” and

“70,000 in damages,” respectively, that they seek. But on Johnson’s argument, Think cannot remove

the case because the district court temporarily closed its file on October 4, and will not be able to

remove the case unless the Court grants the motion to remand, even if that occurs long after Think’s

30-day removal deadline expires. No legal principles or precedents demand that inequitable result.

Finally, Think would have filed its Second Notice of Removal before October 6 had Johnson

not engaged in the abusive practice of filing his First and Second Amended Complaints without

8
In Nieto v. University of New Mexico, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D.N.M. 2010), one of the
postjudgment cases that Johnson cites, Remand Mem. at 15, the court said that if the case or
controversy remains alive in a closed case, the case is subject to removal. Id. at 1193-1194.

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serving Think.9 Not only was no Certificate of Service filed with either amended complaint,

Edwards Aff. ¶ 5, JR146, but Think has still not received either amended complaint by mail from

Johnson. Greenspan Aff. ¶ 22, JR11. Think has these documents because it checked the state court’s

docket in preparation for filing the Second Notice of Removal (which requires a listing of the state-

court filings) and then hired a contractor to go to the state court clerk’s office to retrieve them.

* * *

Both the Amended Notice of Removal and the Second Notice of Removal provide an

appropriate basis for the Court to maintain federal jurisdiction. If the Court chooses to maintain one

case and dismiss the other, and then grants Think’s planned motion to dismiss, Johnson will

inevitably argue on appeal that the Court chose the wrong one and that the entire matter should be

sent back to the state court. Defendant therefore urges the Court to maintain this proceeding based

on both case numbers.

CONCLUSION

The motion to remand to state court should be denied. The Court should schedule a Case

Management Conference to discuss Think’s requested motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2) and

12(b)(6).

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Paul Alan Levy

Paul Alan Levy (DC Bar 946400)
Public Citizen Litigation Group
1600 20th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 588-7725

9
As of October 17, 2022, Prince George’s County has finally adopted electronic filing and
access for attorneys via the Maryland-wide MDEC web-based portal.

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[email protected]

/s/ Oliver L. Edwards

OLIVER L. EDWARDS (#17006)
Law Office of Oliver Edwards LLC
9919 Rogart Road
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
Voice: 301-841-8050
Fax: 301-273-1020

November 9, 2022 Attorneys for Defendant

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date I am causing this memorandum and proposed order to be served on

the plaintiff Joe Johnson by filing it by ECF, which will in turn effect service on Johnson. The

affidavits and exhibits filed with the nearly identical motion in Case No. THC-22-2242 are not being

refiled at this time, but will be filed with the Court in both hard and soft copy as part of the Joint

Record as provided by the Case Management Order.

/s/ Paul Alan Levy

November 9, 2022

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