University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 10
1977
Recommended Citation
Gregory D. Soule, Attorney Misappropriation of Clients' Funds: A Study in Professional Responsibility, 10
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 415 (1977).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol10/iss3/3
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected].
ATTORNEY MISAPPROPRIATION OF CLIENTS' FUNDS:
A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY*
• The author wishes to acknowledge the information and helpful criticism provided· by
Robert Anderson, James H. Bradner, Jr. and the ABA Center for Professional Discipline,
Edmund N. Carpenter II, Norman A. Faulkner, John H. Neiman, and Eric H. Steele.
1
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility consists of Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules organized under nine Canons. The Canons express general concepts from
which the more specific Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are derived. Ethical
Considerations are "aspirational in character and represent objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive." The Disciplinary Rules, in contrast, are "manda-
tory in character ... [and] state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969).
The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates of the
ABA on August 12, 1969, and became effective for ABA members on January 1, 1970.
Forty-seven states have adopted the Code by court rule. Telephone interview with E.
Russell Twist, Director of the Department of Professional Standards, ABA (Mar. 21, 1977). ·
2
· DR 9-102(A) does not require that advances paid by clients for future costs or expenses
be maintained in a separate client trust account. One commentator has suggested that the
rule is ambiguous as to whether prepaid legal fees for specified services, as distinguished
from retainers paid merely to insure the availability of the attorney's services if needed,
must be treated as clients' money prior to performance of the legal services. Carpenter, The
Negligent Attorney Embezzler: Delaware's Solution, 61 A.B.A.J. 338, 340 (1975).
3
-ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(A):
Preserving Identity of Funds and
Property of a Client
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs
and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts main-
tained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the
lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(I) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the
lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the
lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or
law firm to receive.it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion
shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
4
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(8).
415
416 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
5
In Wisconsin, for example, almost 40 percent of the attorney discipline cases brought
before the supreme court between 1957 and 1974 involved misappropriation or commingling
of funds held for clients. Memorandum in support of motion, In the Matter of a Supreme
Court Rule Requiring Periodic Reports by Attorneys to the State Bar of Wisconsin as to
Compliance with the Clients' Trust Funds Account Rule, at 2 (Sept. 29,' 1976). Approxi-
mately 32 percent of the disciplinary cases adjudicated by New Yorlc courts between J929 and
1962 involved commingling and conversion of clients' money. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 154 (1966).
6
Once the clients' funds have been commingled with those of the attorney, there is an
increased danger that the clients' money will be used for the attorney's personal expenses or
subjected to the claims of his creditors. "The rule against commingling was adopted to
provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger
in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of the clients' money." Black v.
State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 219, 225-26, 368 P.2d 118, 122, 18 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1962).
Furthermore, the failure of the lawyer to separate his personal funds from those of his clients
gives the appearance of impropriety and reduces public confidence in the legal system and
profession. Accordingly, commingling must be discouraged even in circumstances where it
involves little risk of defalcation. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-5.
See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. White, 209 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa
1973); In re Windsor, 231 Or. 349, 373 P.2d 612 (1962); In re White, 24 N.J. 521, 132 A.2d 777
(1957).
7
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Loveland, 249 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1971); In re Banner, 31 N.J. 24,
155 A.2d 81 (1959); Clarie v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 2d 161, 246 P.2d I (1952).
8 See note 145 and accompanying text infra. The chairman of a committee appointed by
th.e Delaware Supreme Court to study and make recommendations regarding the account-
ability of attorneys for clients' funds concluded:
A thread that appeared to run through most, if not all, of the problem was the
apparent commingling by the attorney· of his own funds with those of his clients.
Attorneys initially may have felt that they were spending their own funds, though in
fact clients' funds were being diverted for personal purposes. At some point mere
negligence became blatant embezzlement.
Carpenter, supra note 2, at 338.
9 See, e.g., State v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1961), where the misappropriations were
The testimony of a state bar association president noted in the Clark Report suggests that
attorney misappropriation is usually part of a course of conduct and is not an isolated
incident. which is unlikely to be repeated. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT [the CLARK COMMITTEE], PROBLEMS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (final draft June 1970) at 18 [hereinafter dted
as the CLARK REPORT].
11
See, e.g., State v. Inglis; 160 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1964); State v. Hoffman, 157 So. 2d 137
(Fla. 1963).
12 These efforts have usually focused on the expulsion of dishonest members. See notes
19-25 and accompanying text infra. Efforts to prevent the admission of dishonest persons to
the bar have been minimal.
The bar also attempts to screen out potentially immoral or unethical practitioners in
the process of admission to the bar. However, examination into the moral charac-
ter of the applicant is uniformly of a limited and routine nature, except for those
suspected of political nonconformity .... Only a very small fraction of applicants
are rejected on character grounds.
J. CARLIN, supra note 5, at 162 n.l. .
A few courts exercising their jurisdiction over the attorney as an officer of the court have
attempted to aid defrauded clients by entertaining summary proceedings against the offend-
ing attorney. These courts have directed the attorney to pay money owed to his clients,
attached the attorney's property to cover the debt, or punished· the attorney by fine or
imprisonment. Permitting such summary proceedings is a matter of judicial discretion, and
clients have no absolute right to invoke this summary remedy. In re Long, 287 N. Y. 449, 40
N.E.2d 247 (1942); Akers v. Akers, 233 Minn. 133, 46 N.W.2d 187 (1951).
13 Other than North Carolina, which lias plans to establish a fund, only Utah and Wiscon-
sin have not established clients' security funds. ABA STANDING CoMMMITTEE ON CLIENTS'
SECURITY FUND, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES I (Aug. 1976). Funds have also
been established in a number of foreign countries, and also in eight Canadian provinces.
Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years Later, 55 A.B.A.J. 757, 759 (1969). ·
1 • Nine of the 29 state funds responding to an AHA-sponsored questionnaire were created
by court rule or statute. ABA STANDING COMMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND &
ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT OF THE SURVEY
oF CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, 1972-1974 [hereinafter cited as CSF SURVEY], schedule C,
col. 2 I. Afterthe accuracy of the pre-publication draft has been verified, a final draft of the
Survey will be published in the near future.
15
Twenty of the 29 state funds responding were established by state bar associations,
CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 21. ·
16
See notes 87-93 and accompanying text infra.
17
See notes 69-86 and accompanying text infra.
418 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
I. EXISTING INSTITUTIONS
18
These additional measures include minimum bookkeeping and accounting require-
ments, filing of an annual certificate by each attorney that outlines efforts to comply with the
disciplinary rules regarding client trust accounts, and limited audits or "compliance checks"
of the attorney's books and records. See notes 118-184 and accompanying text infra.
'" Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 917, 926 (1976).
20 In In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. f/J7, 180 N.E. 725 (1932), the court held:
23
E.g.., In testimony before the Clark Committee, a state supreme court justice stated,
"[t]he essential purpose of the grievance committee is to remove from the practice of law
attorneys who might harm the public and the courts." CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 98.
See also Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 925-929.
An attorney charged with champerty or excessive advertising probably does not merit
disbarment or suspension. When an attorney misappropriates client funds, however, the
misconduct strikes at the heart of the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his
client and should be viewed as one of the gravest forms of misconduct, warranting expul-
sion. State v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1961); Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 307
A.2d 677 (1973). See notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra.
24
Comment, The Objectives of Attorney Discipline: A Pennsylvania View, 79 D1cK. L.
REv. 558, 561 (1975).
The Supreme Court has observed, "The proceeding [removal of an attorney as an officer
of the court] is not for the purpose of punishment, but for the pupose of preserving the courts
of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them." Ex parte Wall,
107 U .s. 265, 288 (1882).
25
In re Melnick, 383 Ill. 200, 48 N.E.2d 935 (1943). Some courts view discipline as a
means of "vindicating the court's dignity," because an attorney has "brought contempt
upon the administration of justice." See, e.g., In re Long, 287 N. Y. 449, 454, 40 N .E.2d 247,
249 (1942). Other courts, however, describe their disciplinary functions as being for "the
welfare of the public, which is always a silent litigant in matters of this type." State v.
Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1961).
26
Some courts consider a violation to be conclusive evidence of a flaw in the attorney's
"character" that disqualifies him from further service as an attorney. See, e.g., People v.
Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 251, 124 N.E. 807, 811 (1919).
27
Leach, The New Look in Disciplinary Enforcement in England, 61 A.B.A.J. 212, 214
(I 975).
28
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1002.
29
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed, "There is only one discipline for such a
man for the protection of other possible clients, and that is to put it out of his power to
misuse his position as a member of the bar, by disbarring him from further practice."
Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 563, 167 A .. 579, 583 (1933).
420 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
30
Based on a survey of the New York City bar, one commentator concluded, "[v]ery few
violators are caught and punished by the formal disciplinary machinery of the bar. We
estimate that only about 2 percent of the lawyers who violate generally accepted ethical
norms are processed, and fewer than 0.2 percent are officially sanctioned." J. CARLIN,
supra note 5, at 170. See also Comment, supra note 24, at 582.
31
See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-1.
32
See Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 564, 167 A. 579, 583 (1933).
33
Misappropriation or misuse of a client's funds clearly falls within this class of profes-
sional misconduct. See, e.g., State v. Goldman, 127 Neb. 340,255 N.W. 32 (1934); People v.
Simmons, 341 Ill. 340, 173 N.E. 398 (1930); People v. Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 124 N.E. 807
(1919).
34
ABA CooE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble.
35
See, e.g., In re Gottesfeld, 245 Pa. 314, 317, 91 A. 494 (1914), where the court
concluded that when an attorney was convicted of conspiring to conceal- assets from a
trustee in bankruptcy, disbarment necessarily followed:
The disbarment that followed was not punitive, but protective simply. Courts can
command public confidence only as those who serve therein are themselves obser-
vant of the law which it is the duty of the courts to enforce. In his high office, the
attorney-at-law is a minister of justice; he ceases so to be when, whether in the line
of his professional work or outside of it, he prostitutes his knowledge of the law and
the skill he has acquired therein to thwart the law by deceit and falsehood.
Id. at 495.
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 421
neys, the agencies generally are not responsible for the fact that some attorneys complete_ly
422 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
escape sanction. Disciplinary personnel accord a high degree of credibility to client com-
plaints alleging misappropriation. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 41, at 206-07. As a result,
defalcation complaints are more likely to survive the initial screening by disciplinary agen-
cies which results in the summary rejection of as many as 90 percent of all client complaints.
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 982.
43
CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 169. Attorneys retained by clients seeking restitution
from a defalcating attorney must promptly report the offending attorney's misconduct. "A
lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of a Disciplinary Rule shall report
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR l-103(A).
44
See notes 69-86 and· accompanying text infra.
45
See notes 80-86 and accompanying text infra.
46 John W. Bryan, a past chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security
Fund, has estimated that the usual delay between the filing of the complaint and the
conclusion of the disciplinary process is from one to three years. Bryan, supra note 13, at
757. As the Clark Report recognized, the delay between the receipt of a complaint and the
entry of a court order imposing discipline is a significant problem in disciplinary enforce-
ment. The delay is attributable to the backlog of cases, the haphazard scheduling, and the
numerous stages in the disciplinary procedure which "far exceed the requirements of due
process." CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 30-38, See also Florida Bar v. Randolph, 238 So.
2d 635 (Fla. 1970), where disbarment proceedings did npt reach the court until seven years
after the initiation of the disciplinary process and over ten years from the dates of the earliest
alleged defalcations.
47
See notes 87-92 and accompanying text infra.
48
CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 168.
4" fd.
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 423
50
Since 1970, New Jersey has authorized the payment of over $1,000,000 in ·claims.
Amster, Clients' Security Funds: The New Jersey-Story, 62 A.B.A.J. 1610; 1614 (1976).
Michigan has reimbursed approximately 75 claimants since 1969, providing over $370,000.
Letter from David 0. Haughey, Chairman, Client Security Fund Committee of the State Bar
of Michigan, to the author (Nov. 15, 1976).
51
Of the 34 funds responding, 17 funds received lump sum appropriations as needed, and
10 received appropriations regardless of need. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C,
cols. 19a-19d.
The Oregon fund, for example, is authorized to draw its money from transfers by the
board of governors of other state bar funds, annual payments of up to five dollars which the
board of governors may impose on each active member of the bar;investment income of the
fund, and claims recovered against the attorneys whose clients have been reimbursed by the
fund. OR. REv. STAT. § 9.635 (1975).
52
Of the 34 states responding, 8 funds are financed by the direct assessment of state
attorneys ·or bar association members. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, cols.
19a-19d.
In Delaware, for example, the amount levied against each attorney varies with the length
of time the attorney has been a member of the bar. For lawyers- who have been in the
Delaware Bar for ten or more years, the annual assessment is $100. However, once the fund
has accumulated net assets of over $100,000, the subsequent assessment for all members is
only $10. DEL. CT. R. 32A(5).
53
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(l)(b); IOWA CT. R. 121. l(b); Mo. CT. R. 1228(b)(2); N.J. CT. R.
l:28-1(a).
For example, the court-established Iowa fund is administered by a seven person commis-
sion, which is empowered to recommend rule changes to the court concerning attorney
defalcations and to assist the court in administering Iowa's program of compliance checks.
Two of the seven commissioners must be nonlawyers. IowA CT. R. 121. l(c).
54
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(2)(f); IowA CT. R. 121. l(f); Mo. CT. R. 1228(c)(6); N.J. CT. R.
I :28-l(e). Twenty-six of the thirty-five funds responding do not permit attorneys to receive a
fee for representing a client before the trustees. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C,
col. 16.
424 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
55
See note 82 and accompanying text infra.
56
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(3); IOWA CT. R. 12l.3(d); N.J. CT. R. 1:28-4,-5; WYO. CT. R.
22(3,4).
57
See, e.g., DEL. CT. R. 32(A)(7)(a); IOWA CT. R. 121.3(i)(2); WYO. CT. R. 22(3). But see
Folly Farms I, Inc. v. Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund of the Bar of Md., No. 159 (Md.
Ct. App., filed Sept. 16, 1976), where the Maryland Court of Appeals discussed its amend-
ment of the court rules governing the clients' security fund permitting claimants whose
claims have been denied by the trustees to appeal their decision to the court. The trustees
can be reversed by the court where the trustees' decision was arbitrary and capricious, was
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, was not within the
authority vested in the trustees, was made upon unlawful procedure, or was uriconstitutional
or otherwise illegal. MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(2). See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
58
See generally Smith, The Clients' Security Fund: 'A Debt of Honor Owed by the
Profession', 44 A.B.A.J. 125 (1958); Voorhees, Clients' Security Fund in 196/: A Progress
Report, 47 A.B.A.J. 494 (1961). ,
59
Note, The Disenchanted Client v. The Dishonest Lawyer: Where Does the Legal
Profession Stand?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 382, 385 (1967).
60 ld.
61
Some courts have justified the judiciary's responsibility for attorney discipline in
analogous terms, as an effort to prevent the detrimental reliance of clients on dishonest
attorneys which may have been encouraged by collective representations of professional
competence:
By admitting [an attorney to the bar] the court presents him to the public as worthy
of its confidence in all his professional duties and relations. If afterwards it comes
to the knowledge of the court that he has become unworthy it is its duty to
withdraw that endorsement, and thereby cease to ,hold him out to the public as
worthy of professional employment.
1n re Davies, 93 Pa. 116, 121 (1880).
82
See, e.g., Amster, supra note 50, at 1613; Atkins & Kane, Clients' Security Fund
Maintains Bar's lntegrity, 44 FLA. B.J. 130, 132 (1970). But see notes 93-97 and accompany-
ing text infra.
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 425
63 The inadequacies of clients' security funds have caused several jurisdictions to con-
sider mandatory bonding of all attorneys as an alternative to the funds. See. e.g., Carpenter,
supra note 2, at 338. Bonding has been almost universally rejected, however, primarily
because of its expense. Moreover, bonding would effectively transfer the power to deter-
mine which lawyers should practice law from the bar admissions committees and the courts
to the surety companies. Manahan, Lawyers Should be Audited, 59 A.B.A.J. 3% (1973).
64 There appears to be a positive correlation between public awareness of the fund and the
number of claimants. Letter from John W. Gould, Chairman, Oregon Client Security Fund,
to the author (Feb. 7, 1977).
65 Of the 34 state funds responding, 15 funds indicated that they publicized the activities of
their funds. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 17. The publicity policy of the
Florida Bar, for example, is expressly aimed at encouraging all clients who have suffered
losses to apply for reimbursement. Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel for the
Florida Bar, to the author (Jan. 31, 1977).
66 Outcault & Peterson, Lawyer Discipline and Professional Standards in California: A
Progress Report, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 686 (1973); Atkins & Kane, supra note 62, at 130.
67 Of the 34 state funds responding, nineteen funds indicated that they do not engage in
any publicity. CSF SURVEY; supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 17.
68 Two eligibility criteria require little discussion. Claims arising from misconduct that
occurred before the establishment of the fund are usually denied. E.g .. IowA CT. R.
I21.3(j)(l)(b); MD. CT. R.1228(i)(5). A few funds require that claims must be brought w_ithin
a relatively short period of limitations. Note, supra note 59, at 394.
69
While this limitation corresponds to the practice of funds in other common law coun-
tries, the Norwegian fund reimburses losses stemming from both malpractice and dishon-
esty. It has been argued that effective protection of clients requires either the creation of
funds with such expanded coverage or the institution of mandatory malpractice insurance.
Bryan, supra note 13, at 760; Interview with James H. Bradner, Jr., Assistant Director,
ABA Center for Professional Discipline (Jan. 6, 1977). Since 1971, every practicing lawyer in
Ontario. Canada, has been required to participate in a compulsory errors and omissions
426 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
insurance program, which insures every attorney against claims for negligence. Manahan,
supra note 63, at 397.
70
Such payments of fees are to be distinguished from "retainers," which are paid to an
attorney to assure his availability for possible future employment and belong to the attorney
immediately upon payment.
71
Letter from John. H. Neiman, Chairman, Iowa Client Security and Attorney Disciplin-
ary Commission, to other members of the Commission (Feb. 18, 1976).
72
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1011-13.
73
The bar associations of three states have established funds which provide awards only
for losses due to the illegal activities of bar association members. CSF SURVEY, supra note
14, at schedule C, cols. 7, 21.
74
The public is unlikely to distinguish between members and nonmembers of the state bar
associations. Bryan, supra note 13, at 758.
75
In Iowa, for example, the fund has been established by court rule and the court has
required a contribution from each attorney as a condition of maintaining the right to practice
law in the state. IowA CT. R 121.3(i)(I). Any attorney who fails to make timely payment of
the required assessment and has been served with a notice of delinquency is summarily
suspended. IOWA CT. R. 121.3(i)(7).
76
See, e.g., Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, Art. XVII; OR. REV. STAT. § 9.625
(1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. 18-1-2 (Rule 14(6)) (1953).
SPRING 1977) Attorney & Clients' Funds 427
82
See, e.g., N .J. CT. R. I :28-3(e). The New Jersey fund has had limited success in
enforcing claims against attorneys:
The primary reason is that many of these individuals have not only been disbarred
but also have spent a term in prison and are not likely candidates for remunerative
employment on their release .... Efforts are being made to improve the collecti-
bility of these claims, but the trustees are not sanguine in this area.
Amster, supra note 50, at 1613.
83
Twenty-six of the 38 funds responding require that the attorney be formally disciplined
before any award can be made to his clients. In 15 of the 29 jurisdictions responding,
conviction of a crime is sufficient grounds for permitting an award. CSF SURVEY, supra note
14, at schedule C, cols. 8, 12.
84
CLARK REPORT, supra note JO, at 191.
85
See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
86
Address by J. Stanley Mullin,- Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Se-
curity Fund, Virginia Bar Association (July 15, 1972).
N.J. CT. R. I:28-3(a)(2) provides:
If none of these events [professional discipline, criminal conviction] has occurred
or is likely to occur, an ethics committee certifies a claim to the trustees as an
appropriate matter for their consideration .... Where an ethics committee does
not act and an attorney cannot be located, is deceased or incapacitated, the trustee
may consider timely application directly provided that the trustees find that the
claim is an appropriate matter for their consideration.
87
Twenty-two of the 40 funds responding place maximum dollar limitations on their
1wards. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, cols. 23, 24.
88
Amster, supra note 50, at 1612.
89
Six of the 40 funds responding have a maximum dollar limitation of $5000 or less per
claimant. CSF SURVEY, stipra note 14, at schedule C, col. 23.
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 429
with the power, which they exercise "at their sole discretion," to
determine the amount of each reimbursement, 90 the trustees may
make awards in excess of the dollar limitations. On the other hand,
the trustees' discretionary powers are seemingly sufficient to per-
mit an award which does not fully reimburse a client's losses, even
though the losses are within the dollar limitations. 91 The client
probably has no recourse in such a case because clients' security
fund awards are usually made as a matter of grace and not as a
matter of right. 92
Several explanations have been advanced in support of the dis-
cretionary powers and the dollar limitations on awards to eligible
claimants. Provisions for trustee discretion have been justified by
the unavailability of statistical data concerning attorney defalca-
tions, which prevents the trustees from accurately estimating the
volume and magnitude of future claims and requires the trustees to
exercise restraint in making awards. 93 It has also been argued that
the dollar limitations of clients' security funds are analogous to the
maximum awards payable by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration to depositors. 94 The limitations on both FDIC and clients'
security fund awards may escape criticism because the small client
or depositor, for whom a loss in an amount that is within the
limitations would be catastrophic, is fully reimbursed. 95 Dollar
limitations are also defended as temporary provisions to protect
fledgling funds from being "bankrupted" by large claims during
their initial years of existence. 96
All of these justifications for providing less than full indemnifica-
tion have merit, yet it can be argued that the real reason for dollar
limitations and discretionary powers is the bar's reluctance to pay
the money necessary to reimburse all eligible claimants. The ABA
Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund has recently re-
90
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(7)(a); IowA CT. R. 12l.3(j)(2); MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(I); N.M.
STAT. ANN. 18-1-2 (Rule 14(a)) (1953).
91
The trustees of many funds are either encouraged or required to consider several
factors in determining the amount of an award: the degree of hardship suffered by the client,
the negligence of the client, if any, which may have contributed to the loss, and the amounts
available to the fund for payment of awards and the number and size of eligible claims that
have been or may be presented. It would seem that any one of these factors might serve as a
justification for limiting an award to an amount less than the loss suffered.
92
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(7)(b); IOWA CT. R. 121.3(j)(4); MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(2); N.J. CT.
R. I :28-3(d). But see note 57 and accompanying text supra. · ·
93
Mullin, Clients' Security Funds: Where We Are, What's Ahead, BAR EXECUTIVE KEY
HANDBOOK (Mar. 1972).
94
Smith, supra note 58, at 128. Address by J. Stanley Mullin, Chairman, ABA Standing
Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Arkansas Bar Association (June 4, 1971).
95
Interview with James H. Bradner, Jr., Assistant Director of the ABA Center for
Professional Discipline (Jan. 6. 1977).
96
Address by J. Stanley Mullin, Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Se-
curity Fund, Arkansas Bar Association (June 4, 1971).
430 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
security fund. N .J. CT. R 1:28-2. Delaware and Iowa attorneys who have been in practice for a
number of years must pay one hundred dollars annually until the assets of the fund reach a
specified amount, after which the assessment drops to ten dollars per year. DEL. CT. R.
32A(5); IowA CT. R 121.3(i).
101 Florida Bar News, Dec. 1976, at 6.
102 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS
lOS ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, Report 3 (Feb. 1959),
quoted in Note, supra note 59, at 384.
106 A former chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund has
"Although we have often called the clients' security fund a debt of honor, I truly believe that
the existing threat to our exclusive self-government makes a clients' security fund a neces-
sary supplement to our existing disciplinary procedures." Address by J. Stanley Mullin,
Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Arkansas Bar Association
(June 4, 1971). Another commentator has suggested that the disciplinary efforts .of the;
agencies of the bar are aimed at forestalling public criticism and control of the legal
profession. J. CARLIN, supra note 5, at 161.
108 E.g .. Brian E. Toland, a past chairman of the Compensation Fund Committee of the
English Law Society, has stated that the client security fund "has done more than anything
else to enhance the prestige and honour of the profession." Smith, supra note 58, at 125.
E.g .. Edmund N. Carpenter II has reported that the Trustees of the Delaware Client Security
Fund "doubt if any- goodwill has been created by their client security fund." Address by
edmund N. Carpenter II, ABA Clients' Security Workshop (Feb. 12, 1976).
10
• See,. e.g .. Bryan, supra note 13, at 758.
432 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
110
Address by Edmund N. Carpenter II, ABA Clients' Security Fund Workshop (Feb.
12, 1976).
111
This predicament was noted by Douglas Sweet, the director of Research and De-
velopment for the Michigan State Bar. "The problem is that in a way we would like to
publicize the fund but in another way it carries a degree of negativism, almost like asking
people if they know any bad attorneys." Ann Arbor News, Oct. 27, 1976, at 7, col. I.
112
Atkins & Kane, supra note 62, at 132.
113
See notes 97-100 and accompanying text supra.
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 433
114
See notes 117-47 and accompanying text infra ..
115
See notes 148-56 and accompanying text infra.
116
See notes 157-84 and accompanying text infra.
117
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(8)(3).
118
DEL. CT. R. 33(2) (adopting the DELAWARE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102, INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES No. 2 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
DELAWARE GUIDELINES); INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, bylaws imple-
menting Rule I I .02(4)(c); IOWA CLIENT SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMIS-
SION, MANUAL ON AUDIT PROCEDURES; WIS. CT. R. 256.293(2). A proposed court rule
ordering bookkeeping procedures is now before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Letter from
Carl E. Glock, Jr., to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
This article will also consider the recordkeeping rules established for Ontario and the lates•
working draft of guidelines prepared by the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security
Fund and the ABA Center for Professional Discipline entitled SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR
RULES FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND AUDIT OF FUNDS, SECURITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY
HELD FOR CLIENTS AND OTHERS BY LAWYERS (Nov. 3, 1976) [hereinafter cited as COMMIT-
TEE DRAFT).
In addition to providing record keeping and accounting requirements, many of these descrip-
tions also elaborate on the requirement of DR 9-102(A) that clients' funds be deposited in "one
or more identifiable bank accounts," by specifying that the bank account must be clearly
434 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
procedures are only advisory, 119 whereas in other states the pre-
scribed accounts and accounting procedures are mandatory . 120
Some of the latter states also stipulate that attorneys engaged in
practice as a partnership or professional corporation are collec-
tively responsible for compliance with the rules to the extent that
they maintain their records on a group basis. 121 All state re-
cordkeeping requirements indicate that the attorney must retain
the records for a specified iength of time_ uz Attorneys acting as
escrow agents, executors, guardians, trustees, conservators, or
receivers may be subject to additional accounting requirements
pursuant to state law or court rules. Preferable recordkeeping
requirements attempt to free such attorney-fiduciaries from dup-
licative, and possibly contradictory, accounting requirements .123
labeled as a "trust account" and must identify the attorney or partnership. E.g., ·wis. CT. R. §
256.293(1); COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note 118, at § 1(8).
The Committee Draft also recommends that a separate fiduciary bank account be main-
tained for funds held by an attorney in his fiduciary capacity as an escrow agent, executor,
guardian, trustee, conseivator, or receiver. COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note I 18, at §
l(A)(l)(a). The recordkeeping directions for such funds require only that the bank account
be reconciled monthly and that a list of the funds in the account, the person for whom the·
funds are held, and the purpose for which the funds are being held be maintained. Id. at §
IV(B)(8).
The Delaware Guidelines and the proposed Pennsylvania rule also provide for a separate
fiduciary bank account for money held in escrow for real estate transactions which may be
maintained at the option of the attorney. A separate bank account and simpler accounting
procedures are appropriate because attorneys in this type of practice might be involved in a
relatively large number of transactions which would not· involve a continuing series of
disbursements and deposits for the same client. Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the
author (Jan. 25, 1977).
119
E.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118. See also Carpenter, supra note 2, at
340.
120
E.g., INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, bylaws implementing Rule
I l.02(4)(c); Wis. CT. R. 256.293(2).
121
E.g., COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note 118, at § III(C); PRo"POSED PA. CT. R. §
81. IOI (2). The shared responsibility parallels the joint liability of lawyers engaged in a group
practice for the misappropriations of any one of the attorneys in the firm, despite their
personal innocence, based upon their status as partners or as co-trustees of the client trust
bank account. See Blackmon v. Hale, 78 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Cal. App. 1969), vacated on other
grounds, I Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418 (1970).
122 The specified period of retention begins with the year to which the records relate,
except in the case of fiduciary records, where the retention period begins only after the
completion of the fiduciary obligation. DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 60 (five
years); IowA CT. R. 121.4(a)(3) (five years); PROPOSED PA. CT. R. § 81.101 (2)(b) (seven
years); ONT. REG. 983/74, § 19(i)(2)(b) (five years). Since these records will be used
primarily by courts either to discipline an attorney or to provide the client with a summary
remedy for the attorney's conversion, it is not necessary to establish tiine limits with
reference to any statutes of limitation. Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author
(Jan. 25, 1977). A "reasonable period" which conforms to state tax requirements for
business records for record preseivation may be established. Such a time period should
allow discovery of attorney-embezzlers before records are legitimately destroyed, and it
would not impose an additional or conflicting obligation upon attorneys. Letter from John
H. Nieman to the author (Feb. 10, 1977).
123
For example, Florida exempts attorneys from the general recordkeeping requirements
insofar as an attorney's handling of a client's funds is subject to an accounting rule imposed
by law or court rule. INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Act. XI, bylaws implement-
ing Rule I l.02(4)(c). The Delaware Guidelines were also drafted with consideration for
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 435
131
DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118.
132 /d.
133
Letter from Robert Anderson, Chief Auditor for the Law Society of Upper Canada, to
the author (Jan. 25, 1977); letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
134
See note 3 supra.
135
See note 2 supra. The Professional Ethics Committee of The Florida B~r, in interpret-
ing DR 9-I02(A), has recently decided that such payments will be presumed to be intended
by the client as the property of the attorney upon his receipt of the funds, unless there is
evidence that the prepayment was intended and was designated as a "fee security" deposit.
FLORIDA BAR COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ADVISORY OPINION No. 76-77, published
in Florida Bar News, Jan. 20, 1977, at 5, col. I. In Iowa, however, the Client Security and
Attorney Disciplinary Commission has decided that such prepayments should be retained in
trust accounts until earned. NEWS BULL. OF THE low A ST. B. Ass'N, (Aug.-Sept. 1975).
136
See note 3 supra. It is unclear whether DR 9-102(A) precludes the possibility of
treating advances for costs and expenses as clients' trust funds or merely fails to require
such treatment.
137
See note 3 supra.
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 437
138
Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
139 ONT. REG. 983/74, §§ 17-20 (The Law Society Act) (1974).
140
Id. § 18(3).
141
Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, ch. 238, § 5J(f).
142
ONT. REG. 983/74, § 18(4-8), (The Law Society Act) (1974).
143
See CLARK REPORT, supra note JO, at 173.
144 Id.
438 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
145
It has been argued that misappropriating attorneys often did not begin with a fixed
intention to embezzle and were initially unaware of any impropriety as a consequence of
inadequate accounting or commingling. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 338. However, some
commentators have insisted that the vast majority of attorney misappropriations are the
result of deliberate fraud. Letter from Charles 0. Fisher, Chairman, Clients' Security Trust
Fund of the Bar of Maryland, to the author (Feb. 3, 1977); Letter from David 0. Haughey,
Chairman, Client Security Fund Committee of the State Bar of Michigan, to the author
(Nov. 15, 1976). The truth probably lies somewhere between these two observations. When
attorneys start using client's funds, they may intentionally allow their bookkeeping to
become inaccurate and incomplete so as to obscure or excuse their misappropriation.
Although bookkeeping requirements are useless as guides for dishonest attorneys, the
requirements may serve as the basis for disciplining such attorneys, who might otherwise
have avoided a stiff penalty for defalcation by claiming their inadequate records as an
excuse. Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel for the Florida Bar, to the author
(Jan. 31, 1977).
146
Cf., Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) (illustrating how
legal standards serve as guides and models, in addition to defining the minimum perform-
ance required to constitute compliance with mandatory rules).
147
The chairman of the committee which drafted the Delaware Guidelines noted: "We
suggested books and records ... [so] that those who wanted to be extra safe [could be surel
that by having these specific books and records they were certainly complying with the
Guideline." Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
148
Generally, judges or attorneys who are full-time employees of a government agency or
a business corporation are not required to file a report because they do not handle the funds
of individual clients. E.g., low A CT. R. 121.3(i)(4). Similarly, such attorneys are often either
exempted from an obligation to contribute to a clients' security fund or are allowed to make
a reduced payment. E.g., low A CT. R. 121.4(b)(l).
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 439
rules regarding client trust accounts .149 Some states require that
every attorney or partnership submit answers to a questionnaire
which asks whether adequate records of clients' funds are main-
tained and whether a separate clients' trust bank account is
kept. 150 The questionnaire also requests the attorney to list the
banks where clients' accounts are maintained and to disclose the
name and number of such accounts. 151 If an attorney fails to submit
a certificate or to answer a questionnaire, he may risk summary
suspension from the bar. 152
In addition to requiring attorneys to file a combined certificate
a.rid questionnaire, Ontario requires that each attorney employ a
public accountant to examine the attorney's records. The accoun-
tant does not conduct an in-depth audit, but is only required to
ascertain whether the records on their face appear to comply with
the Ontario bookkeeping regulations . 153 The report of the accoun-
tant does not purport to be an audit. In fact, because the accountant
does not verify the accuracy of the records by contacting the
attorney's clients, inspect the files of the attorney apart from the
records that the attorney furnishes for his investigation, or check
on the sufficiency of internal controls, the report offers only
slightly more protection than the attorney's own certificate of
compliance. 154
The self-certifying nature of these provisions suggests that ques-
tionnaires and certificates of compliance are not designed primarily
to expose embezzling attorneys. The principal functions of these
requirements seem to be to notify attorneys of their professional
responsibilities and to encourage them to satisfy these duties.
Thus, the success of a certificate requirement in generating attor-
ney compliance depends upon the expectation that most attorneys
will establish a separate bank account for clients' funds and will
149
E.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA
BAR, Art. XI, bylaws implementing Rule I 1.02(4)(c); N.M. Sur. CT. RULES GOVERNING
DISCIPLINE, Rule l l(b); PROPOSED PA. CT. R. § 81. 103.
150 DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; WIS. CT. R. 256.293(2).
151
DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; low ACT. R. 121.4(b)(l). While New Mexico
does not require a listing of banks and account names and titles, it does require attorneys to
describe the actual records maintained for clients' funds in sufficient detail so that the
function of each record can be understood. Attorney's Certification of Records Form, as
authorized by N.M. SUP. CT. RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINE, Rule l l(b).
152 The Iowa rules, for example, provide for the summary suspension of any attorney who
fails to submit a questionnaire, provided that a notice of delinquency has been served upon
him thirty days prior to his suspension. IowA CT. R. 121.3(i)(7). Once suspended, the
attorney may be reinstated only upon a showing that his prior failure to comply was not
willful and that he has subsequently filed the questionnaire answers or certificate. low A CT.
R. 121.3(i)(9).
153 Form 3 Report, as authorized by ONT. REG. 983/74, § 20(2) (The Law Society Act)
(1974).
154
Telephone interview with Robert Anderson, Chief Auditor of the Law Society of
Upper Canada (Mar. 18, 1977).
440 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
155
The questionnaire should include a written authorization to be signed by the attorney
that will permit disciplinary officials to inspect the bank accounts claimed by the attorney in
his answers to the questionnaire.
156
Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
157
See, e.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; INTEGRATION RULE OF THE
FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule I l.02(4)(b); low A CT. R. 12l.4(a); Mo. CT. R. BVIS; N.J. CT.
R. l:28-6(a); Wis. CT. R. 256.293(2).
158
INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule I l.02(4)(a).
159
Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel of the Florida Bar, to the author
(Jan. 31, 1977).
160
According to the chairman of the Maryland Clients' Security Fund, the "good cause"
requirement was intentionally designed "to allow the disciplinary agencies to discover a
possible pattern of defalcation when only the tip of the iceberg is visible." Letter from
Charles 0. Fisher to the author (Feb. 3, 1977).
SP.RING 1977) Attorney & Clients' Funds 441
ing the cursory "blitz" and "sP9t" audits, the staff auditors have. become specialists in this
field. Hence, they require less direction than outside accountants and know where to look
for evidence of financial irregularities. Staff auditors are also more adept at preparing audit
reports which laymen can understand and are better witnesses at disciplinary hearings.
Letter from Robert Anderson to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
442 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
166
IOWA AUDIT MANUAL, ·supra note 124, at 2.
167
Once subjected to an audit, an attorney may be informally stigmatizei, by his peers
even though his books and records are found to be in compliance with the requirements. By
using both compliance checks which are conducted on a random basis and regular audits
which are based on complaints, no suspicions of guilt are likely to arise from the fact that an
attorney has been audited. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 340."
168 Although Iowa has recommended the Delaware Guidelines to its attorneys, see notes
124-33 and accompanying text supra, it has only required the maintenance of records which
show the disbursements, the receipts, and the balance for each client. low A AUDIT MAN-
UAL, supra note 124, at l, 2.
169 The Iowa Audit Manual sets out the principal steps for the auditor to follow:
Usually, the auditor will first examine the lawyer's trust account by reconciling the
ledgered client account balances with the trust account check book and bank
statement. He should make at least a cursory examination to make certain that
trust account checks are not being written to cover personal or business expenses
of the lawyer. If the bank statement reflects any overdrafts, an explanation is
required. If the clients' accounts reflect debit balances outstanding for any length
of time the auditor may ask for an explanation or ask to see the files .... In
addition, a review should be made of the general office receipts journal to see if
clients' funds are being improperly treated.
IowA AUDIT MANUAL, supra note 124, at l, 2.
170
Id. at 4.
1111d.
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 443
172
335 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court held that because the records requested by investigating
authorities were required to be kept pursuant to federal regulation and were therefore
"public" in nature, a defendaflt could not withhold the records from an authorized agency
request based on his fifth amendment privilege.
173
Andresen v. Bar Ass'n, 269 Md. 313, 305 A.2d 845 (1973), cert. denied, 414 u:s. 1065
(1973). But see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 °(1967), where the Court held that the
imposition of discipline on an attorney, who refused to respond to inquiries into his
professional conduct on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate him, violates the
attorney's constitutional rights.
174
In Wisconsin, for example, there is no client privilege as to a communication relating
to an attorney's·breach of his duty to his client. Wis. CT. R. § 905.03(4)(c). In Parry-Jones v.
Law Soc'y, 1 Ch. App. 1 (1967), the court stated:
The law implies a term into a contract whereby a professional man is to keep his
clients' affairs secret and not to disclose them to anyone without just cause ....
[But] the contract between solicitor and client must be taken to contain this
implication: the solicitor must obey the law, and, in particular, he must comply
with the rules made under the authority of statute for the conduct of the profession.
If the rules require him to disclose his client's affairs, then he must do so.
175
The proposed Wisconsin rules, for example, stipulate that the attorney's records will
not be disclosed except upon order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, or for use as evidence
in a disciplinary hearing if the attorney has failed to comply with DR 9-102. Disciplinary
agency personnel who make unauthorized disclosures of attorney records are subject to
punishment. Wisconsin Clients' Trust Funds Accounts Compliance Rules, Wisconsin B.
Bull. at 56 (Aug. 1976).
176
Florida, for example, makes the following provision for the protection of clients:
[N]otice of such intended use shall be given to any client involved, if practicable,
unless such client is already aware of such intended use, and upon good cause
shown by such client the admission of the same shall be under circumstances as
shall be reasonably calculated thereafter to protect the confidence of such client.
... Permissible_ means of protection shall not prejudice the respondent or accused
attorney, and may include but are not limited to excision, in camera production,
retention in sealed envelopes or similar devices.
INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule 1J.04(4)(c). See also CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6087, Rule 120.
444 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415
compliance checks of the required records was considered recently by the Pennsylvania Bar
Association, but only the bookkeeping and certificate proposals were finally recommended
to the Supreme Court for promulgation as court rules. Interview with Carl E. Glock, Jr.,
Chairman of the Pennsylvania Committee which drafted the proposed rules (Oct. 14, 1976).
180 Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
often involves the funds of more than one client. For example, the Ontario Clients' Security
Fund, from its inception in 1953 until the end of 1976, has made awards to 958 clients on
account of only 104 former solicitors. Letter from Robert Anderson to .the author (Jan. 25,
1977).
183 IOWA CLIENT SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, 1974 ANNUAL
REPORT 7
The Iowa Audit Procedures Manual closes with the reminder that "the vast majority of
lawyers are honest, but some are dilatory, and some do not keep sufficient records. Hence, a
part of the job of the auditor is to assist in educ&ting the lawyer." low A AUDIT MANUAL,
supra note 124, at 4.
SPRING 1977] Attorney & Clients' Funds 445
III. CONCLUSION
184
Address by Kenneth Jarvis, Q.C., Joint Meeting of the ABA Standing Committee on
Clients' Security Fund and the National Organization of Bar Counsel (Aug. 4, 1973); letter
from Robert Anderson to the author (Jan. 25, 1977); letter from John H. Neiman to the
author (Feb. 10, 1977). Mr. Neiman indicates in his letter that the Iowa auditors, when asked
for advice about effective auditing procedures, usually take a "soft pedal" approach,
suggesting possible approaches without any dogmatic assertions about a "single, correct"
way to keep accounts.
185
CLARK REPORT, supra note 25, at I.
186
The Clark Report warned that "[t]he profession does not have much time remaining to
reform its own disciplinary structure .... Public dissatisfaction is increasing .... We will
compound our own cure or someone else will mix up a dose that will curl our hair." CLARK
REPORT, supra note 25, at 8-9. Recently, the ABA Standing Committee on Professional
Discipline warned tht if the profession did not deal with the matter of the attorney discipline
system in federal courts, Congress may authorize the U.S. attorneys, who are also court-
room adversaries of the private bar, to take over discipline enforcement in the federal
courts. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1977, at 5, col. I.
187
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974).
446 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415