LAW 1106 - Statutory Construction - JD 9. 402 U.S 611 - Coates VS, City of Cincinatti - 07.01.1971 - Case Digest
LAW 1106 - Statutory Construction - JD 9. 402 U.S 611 - Coates VS, City of Cincinatti - 07.01.1971 - Case Digest
Cincinnati
402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686 (1971)
RULE:
An ordinance or statute is unconstitutionally vague when men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning.
FACTS:
Appellants, a student and four labor picketers, were convicted for violating Cincinnati, Ohio, Code of
Ordinances § 901-L6, which made it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble on any
of the city's sidewalks and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. The
convictions were affirmed by the state supreme court. On appeal,the court reversed the judgment. The
city ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it was vague, and thus violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also violated appellants, a student and four labor
picketers', First Amendment rights to free assembly and freedom of association.
ISSUE:
Was the contested ordinance unconstitutional for violating the void for vagueness doctrine?
ANSWER:
Yes.
CONCLUSION:
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1257(2), the court agreed with appellants' claim that § 901-L6 was
unconstitutional on its face as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
freedoms of assembly and association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Specifically, the court
ruled the ordinance violated due process on the ground that it was vague in that it did not specify a
standard of conduct. The court observed that conduct that annoyed some people did not annoy others,
and thus men of common intelligence were required to guess at the meaning of § 901-L6. The court
also ruled that the ordinance violated appellants' constitutional rights of free assembly and association.
The court reasoned that mere public intolerance or animosity could not be the basis for abridgment of
those constitutional freedoms.
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Coates was involved with several other individuals in a
demonstration and picketing in a labor dispute. They were later convicted for violating a Cincinnati
city ordinance prohibiting assembly on public sidewalks if the assembly annoyed other individuals.
Appellant claims that such a statute violates his right to free assembly.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An ordinance or statute that restricts First or Fourteenth Amendment rights
is unconstitutional if it is overly vague and restricts protected speech and assembly in addition to
unprotected actions.
Facts. Appellant was a student involved in a demonstration and the other Appellants were pickets
involved in a labor dispute. They were later convicted of violating a Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that
makes it a criminal offense for three or more people to assemble on any of the sidewalks of the city
and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to passers by. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld
Appellants’ convictions.
Issue. Whether the Cincinnati, Ohio ordinance making it a criminal offense for three or more people
to assemble on a public sidewalk and conduct themselves in a manner annoying to passing individuals
is a violation of Appellant’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights?
Held. Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of
assembly to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorize the
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punishment of constitutionally protected conduct. In fact conduct that annoys some people, does not
annoy others. Therefore it causes guessing as to what the meaning of the standard of conduct is.
Although the city argues that the breadth of this statue allows the prevention of lawless conduct on the
sidewalks, it could do so with an ordinance that gives reasonable specificity as to what is prohibited.
As this ordinance punishes not only lawless, unprotected conduct, and lawful protected assembly, this
ordinance is an unconstitutional restriction of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to assemble.
Dissent. Any man of average intelligence should know that some kinds of conduct are annoying and
covered by the ordinance, while others are not and not covered by the ordinance. Would prefer to deal
with the ordinance as with any criminal statute. The statute is not infirm on its face, and since no
information was given as to what conduct was charged against the Appellants, the Court is in no
position to judge the statute as applied. The fact that the ordinance confers wide discretion in a wide
range of circumstances is irrelevant when dealing with conduct at its core.
Discussion. The majority in this case clearly states that it will not uphold regulations that vaguely
limit an individual’s right to peaceful speech and assembly, even if that regulation also protects the
public against violent actions. A regulation must clearly outline what conduct is allowed, and what
conduct is prohibited if it involves restricting an individual’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The dissent prefers leaving the decision of what conduct is allowed, and what is prohibited to a jury,
while the majority believes that it is every citizens right to clearly know what conduct is allowed and
what is prohibited before they act, and not leave it up to a jury that could reach a different conclusion
depending on the members of the panel.
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