A.

 INVESTIGATION LEADING TO "POLICE REPORT" OR "COMPLAINT" AND

CRIMINAL TRIAL CULMINATING IN THE JUDGMENT

A1. INVESTIGATION BY THE POLICE

Q.1 What is an FIR?

Ans. An FIR is the First Information Report forming the "information" given

to the officer-in-charge of a Police station (Station House Officer – "SHO"

for short) regarding the commission of a cognizable offence and recorded

by the SHO under Section 154 Cr.P.C. (Vide para 11 of Apren Joseph @

Current Kunjunju v. State of Kerala (1973) 3 SCC 114 = AIR 1973 SC 1 – 3

Judges - J. M. Shelat – Ag. CJI, I. D. Dua, H. R. Khanna - JJ )..

FIR in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence

for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The

importance of the above report can hardly be overestimated from the

standpoint of the accused alone. The object of insisting

upon prompt lodging of the report to the Police is to

obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime

was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by

them as well as the names of the eye witnesses present at the scene of
occurrence. Delay in lodging the FIR quite often results in embellishment

which is a creature of afterthought. (Vide para 12 of Thulia Kali v. State of

T.N. (1972) 3 SCC 393 = AIR 1973 SC 501 – H. R. Khanna, G. K. Mitter - JJ;

Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 = 1995 Cri.L.J. 457 – Dr.

A. S. Anand, Faizan Uddin - JJ).

FIR is in the nature of a complaint or accusation, or at least information of a

crime given with the object of setting the Police in motion.

(For a detailed discussion on what is a First Information Statement and

First Information Report, please refer to the Article of Justice U.L. Bhat

published in 2014 (1) KLT – journal, page 57).

An FIR given to an officer-in-charge of a Police station ("SHO" for short) is

registered by him by recourse to Section 154 Cr.P.C. The said Section is

reproduced herebelow:-

Q.2 What is a cognizable offence and how is it different from a non-

cognizable offence?
Ans. Cognizable offence as per Section 2 (c) Cr.P.C. is an offence for which

a Police Officer can arrest the offender without a warrant. A non-cognizable

offence, as indicated by Section 2 (l) Cr.P.C is an offence for which a police

officer has no authority to arrest the offender without a warrant.

Q.3 How to find out whether the offence is a cognizable offence or not?

Ans. Column 4 of the Table given in the First Schedule to Cr.P.C. shows

whether the offences are cognizable or non-cognizable. Part I of the said

table enumerates the offences under the Indian Penal Code and Part II of

the said table shows offences under other laws. If the offence under other

law is punishable with imprisonment for 3 years and upwards, then it is

cognizable. If it is punishable with imprisonment for less than 3 years, then

it is non-cognizable.

Q.4 Why is it that the title of Section 154 Cr.P.C. uses the expression

"Cognizable case" when the body of the Section uses only the expression

"Cognizable offence"?

Ans. This is because, although an SHO can register an FIR and commence

investigation only in the case of a "Cognizable offence", if the case involves

two or more offences of which at least one is a "cognizable offence", then

there is a deeming provision in Section 155 (4) Cr.P.C that the case shall be

treated as a "cognizable case" notwithstanding that the other offences are

"non-cognizable". So, if it is a "cognizable case" an SHO can register an FIR

and there is no need for all the offences to be "cognizable offences". That

is why the title of Section 154 Cr.P.C uses the expression "cognizable

case".

Q.5 What is the object of an FIR?

Ans. The object of an FIR from the point of view of the first informant is to

set the criminal law in motion and from the point of view of the SHO is to

obtain prompt information about the alleged criminal activity before there

is time to be forgotten or embellished. (Vide Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir AIR

1945 PC 18 – Goddard, M. Nair, Porter, Simonds – JJ; Paras 31 to 36

of Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 = AIR 2014 SC 187 – 5

Judges – P. Sathasivam – CJI, Dr. B. S. Chauhan, Renjana Prakash Desai,

Ranjan Gogoi, S. A. Bobde - JJ).

The object of the FIR from the point of view of the informant is to set the

criminal law in motion. FIR does not constitute substantive evidence. It can

be used only as a previous statement for the purpose of corroborating or

contradicting its maker (not any other witness) as contemplated under

Sections 157 and 145 of the Evidence Act. (Vide para 6 of Hasib v. State of

Bihar (1972) 4 SCC 773 = AIR 1972 SC 283 – 3 Judges – J. M. Shelat, I. D.

Dua, S. C. Roy - JJ ).

The fundamental object of an FIR is that it acts as a safeguard against

embellishment, exaggeration and forgetfulness etc. Though, recording of

an FIR is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of the criminal

investigation, yet from the view of the investigating authorities it conveys to

them the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the

crime was committed, the names of the culprits and the role played by

them as well as the names of the witnesses present at the scene of

occurrence. (Vide para 26 and 24 of State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed

Shaikh Babajan (2009) 14 SCC 267 – C. K. Thakker, D. K. Jain - JJ).

The object of insisting on the lodgment of an FIR is to obtain the earliest

information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was

committed. (Vide para 15 of Ravi Kumar v. State of Punjab (2005) 9 SCC

315 = AIR 2005 SC 1929 – Arijit Pasayat, S. H. Kapadia - JJ).

Q.6 Is it not necessary that the FIR should be given by an eye-witness?

Ans. No. FIR need not be given by an eye-witness. (Vide para 21 of Hem Raj

v. State of Punjab (2003) 12 SCC 241 = AIR 2003 SC 4259 – N. Santhosh

Hegde, B. P. Singh - JJ; Para 20 of CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6

SCC 175 = AIR 2003 SC 4140 - N. Santhosh Hegde, B. P. Singh - JJ; Paras

26 and 24 of State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Shaikh Babajan (2009) 14

SCC 267 - C. K. Thakker, D. K. Jain - JJ)

Personal knowledge of the incident not necessary for lodging an FIR.

(vide Hallu v. State of MP (1974) 4 SCC 300 = AIR 1974 SC 1936 – M. H.

Beg, Y. V. Chandrachud - JJ).

Locus standi of the complainant is irrelevant. Any citizen can lodge an FIR

or file a complaint and set the criminal law in motion. A criminal proceeding

is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance.

(Vide Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 288 = AIR 1987

SC 877 – 5 Judges – P. N. Bhagwati – CJI, E. S. Venkataramiah, V. Khalid,

G. L. Oza, S. Natarajan – JJ).

Q.7 When "information" is given by an eye-witness and a hearsay witness,

who is to be preferred by the SHO ?

Ans. Eye-witness (Vide Umesh Singh v. State of Bihar (2013) 4 SCC 360 =

AIR 2013 SC 1743 – C. K. Prasad, V. Gopala Gowda - JJ).

Q.8 Is there any distinction between the expressions "informant",

"complainant" and "de facto complainant"?

Ans. Yes. In a case registered under Section 154 Cr.P.C the State is the

prosecutor and the person who lodges the information with the SHO is the

"informant". It is fallacious to call him "complainant" or "de facto

complainant". A "complainant" is the person who makes a complaint as

defined under Section 2 (d) read with Sections 190 (1) (a) and 200 Cr.P.C to

a Magistrate. (Vide para 14 of Ganesha v. Sharanappa (2014) 1 SCC 87 =

AIR 2014 SC 1198 – C. K. Prasad, Kurian Joseph – JJ).

Q.9 If the FIR is given by the accused person himself, is it admissible?

Ans. If the F.I. Statement is non-confessional, then it is admissible and will

constitute a conduct against him under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.

(Vide Agnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 119 = 1966 Cri.L.J 100

(SC) - 3 Judges – K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal, R. S. Bachawat – JJ ;

Bheru Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1994) 2 SCC 467 = 1994 KHC 1140

(SC) – Dr. A. S. Anand, Faizan Uddin - JJ. There can be situations where the
accused sets the criminal law in motion by reporting the occurrence but

hiding the fact that he is the culprit. In such cases his non-confessional

statement is admissible as an FIR.

See also para 18 of Brajendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 289 =

AIR 2012 SC 1552 – A. K. Patnaik, Swatanter Kumar – JJ.

But, if the F.I Statement is confessional, then it is inadmissible being hit by

Section 25 of the Evidence Act and can be looked into only for the limited

purpose of identifying the accused as the maker of the FIR, unless his

confession relates distinctly to "a fact discovered" within the meaning of

Section 27 of the Evidence Act. (vide Agnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar AIR

1966 SC 119 = 1966 Cri.L.J 100 (SC) - 3 Judges -– K. Subba Rao,

Raghubar Dayal, R. S. Bachawat – JJ ; Khatri Hemraj Amulakh v. State of

Gujarat (1972) 3 SCC 671 = AIR 1972 SC 922 – J. M. Shelat, H. R. Khanna -

JJ; Bheru Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1994) 2 SCC 467 = 1994 KHC 1140

(SC) – Dr. A. S. Anand, Faizan Uddin - JJ.

FIR cannot be used against a co-accused or even against the maker of it if

it is inculpatory in nature (Vide Bandlamuddi Atchuta Ramaiah and Others

v. State of A. P (1996) 11 SCC 133 = AIR 1997 SC 496 – A. S. Anand, K. T.

Thomas - JJ).

Q.10 Can a dying declaration recorded by a Police Officer under Section

32 (1) of the Evidence Act be treated as an FIR ?

Ans. Yes. Statement of the injured, in the subsequent event of her death

may be treated as FIR. (Vide para 19 of Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab

(2006) 12 SCC 283 = AIR 2006 SC 3221 – S. B. Sinha, Dalveer Bhandari -

JJ).

NOTE: The requirement that dying declarations should be recorded by a

Magistrate is only a Judge-made law. The very fact that a dying declaration

under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act is specifically excluded under sub-

section (2) of Section 162 from the interdict under Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C.,

indicates that the law envisages a dying declaration to be recorded by the

Investigating Police Officer.

In State of M.P. v. Direndra Kumar (1997) 1 SCC 93 = AIR 1997 SC 318 –

G. N. Ray, B. L. Hansaria – JJ, the real first information was of the dying

declaration given by the deceased in that case. The defense contention

that the dying declaration was improbable since the subsequently

registered FIR of a witness did not refer to the dying declaration, was not

accepted by the Supreme Court. If so, the FIR which was subsequently

registered was really hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C.

Q.11 Is the "informant" entitled to a free copy of the information as

recorded by the SHO under Section 154 (1) Cr.P.C. ?

Ans. Yes. A copy of the information recorded should be given forthwith to

the informant free of cost. (Vide Section 154 (2) Cr.P.C.). This provision is

directory and not mandatory. Hence, non-compliance of the same will not

vitiate the FIR unless resultant prejudice or injustice is shown. (Vide State

rep. by Inspector of Police, Chennai v. N. S. Gnaneswaran (2013) 3 SCC

594 = AIR 2013 SC 3673 – Dr. B. S. Chauhan, V. Gopala Gowda - JJ).

Q.12 Can the SHO refuse to record the FIR on the ground of lack of

territorial jurisdiction ?

Ans. No clear-cut answer can be given since the case-law on the point is

not uniform.

If the SHO finds that the crime was not committed within his territorial

jurisdiction, he can forward the FIR to the police station concerned. But, if

after the investigation is over, the SHO arrives at the conclusion that the
cause of action for lodging the FIR had not arisen within his territorial

jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under

Section 170 Cr.P.C. and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered

to take cognizance of the offence. (Vide paragraphs 8 to 10 of Satvinder

Kaur v. State (1999) 8 SCC 728 = AIR 1999 SC 3596 – K. T. Thomas, M. B.

Shah - JJ).

Refusal by the SHO to record the complaint alleging cognizable offence, on

the ground that the Police station concerned has no territorial jurisdiction

over the place of crime, amounts to dereliction of duty. Any lack of

territorial jurisdiction could not have prevented the recording of information

about the cognizable offence. The proper course would be to record the

information and forward the same to the Police station having jurisdiction.

(Vide State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 590 = AIR 1993

SC 2644 – Dr. A. S. Anand & N. P. Singh - JJ)

Where a Magistrate directed inquiry under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C., it was

not within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to submit a final

report stating that the cause of action for the alleged offence had taken

place outside its territorial jurisdiction. The agency could not refrain itself

from holding a proper and complete investigation. (Vide Rasiklal Dalpatral

Dhakkar v. State of Gujarat (2010) 1 SCC 1 = AIR 2010 SC 715 – Altamas

Kabir, Cyriac Joseph – JJ ).

(NOTE: Applying the strict legal principles, the proper course for the SHO

in Rasiklal Dalpatral should have been to register an FIR and transfer the

same to the Police Station having jurisdiction to conduct the investigation

with a request to send the final report to the forwarding Magistrate and to

submit a report to that effect before the Court which forwarded the

complaint to the SHO.)

Q.13 Where a cognizable offence is committed off the coast of the State

of Kerala beyond the Indian territorial waters but within the Contiguous

Zone of India, is it correct that the Central Government alone can

investigate and prosecute the offender ?

Ans. Yes. That was the view taken by the Supreme Court in paras 93 to 95

and 114 of Republic of Italy v. Union of India (2013) 4 SCC 721 – Altamas

Kabir – CJ & Jasti Chelameswar – JJ.

Q.14 Is it not correct to say that while in the case of a "non-cognizable"

offence, the commission of the offence should be within the local limits of
the Police Station as mandated by Section 155 (1) Cr.P.C., in the case of a

"cognizable" offence, there is no such prescription ?

Ans. No, it is not correct. Even in the case of a cognizable offence, Section

156 (1) Cr.P.C. prescribes the jurisdiction of the Police Station which is co-

extensive with that of the Court for which purpose, we may have to refer to

Chapter XIII of Cr.P.C. (Vide para 5 of T.P. Nandakumar v. State of Kerala

2008 Cri.L.J. 298 (Kerala) = 2007 (4) KLT 775 – V. Ramkumar - J and para

11 of Anil Kumar v. Sindhu 2009 (2) KLT 359 – V. Ramkumar – J). The

prescription under Section 156 (1) Cr.P.C. is that the jurisdiction of the SHO

corresponds to that of the Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the police

station is located. The Cr.P.C. has fixed the jurisdiction for Courts not only

for trial but also for taking cognizance of an offence. If no jurisdiction had

been fixed for the Court for taking cognizance of a cognizable offence, then

Section 460 (e) Cr.P.C. would have been unnecessary. Likewise, the

words "Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a

Police report and to try the accused or commit him for trial" occurring in

Sections 169 and 170 Cr.P.C. also indicate that any Magistrate cannot take

cognizance of the offence. The offence can be taken cognizance of only by

that Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance and try the accused
or commit him for trial. This is fortified by Section 173 (2) (i) Cr.P.C. which

also directs the SHO to forward the Police report to the Magistrate

empowered to take cognizance of the offence. A reading of Section 190 (i)

Cr.P.C. along with column 6 of the Table at the First Schedule to the Cr.P.C.

shows that, subject to the provisions such as Sections 193, 199 (2) etc of

Chapter XIV Cr.P.C., all Magistrates of the first class are empowered to

take cognizance and try or commit for trial any accused person. In the case

of a Magistrate of the second class, there should be special empowerment.

Such being the position, my humble opinion is that the view taken

in Trisuns Chemical Industries v. Rajesh Agarwal (1999) 8 SCC 686 = AIR

1999 SC 3499 – K. T. Thomas, M. B. Shah - JJ, requires re-consideration.

Q.15 Can a Magistrate who receives a private complaint alleging the

commission of a cognizable offence, forward the complaint under Section

156 (3) Cr.P.C. to the SHO of the Police Station concerned with a direction

to treat the complaint as the FIR and to register a case and also to

investigate the case ?

Ans. Yes. Even though what Section 156 (3) envisages is only an order for

investigation, it presupposes the registration of a crime. Hence, it will be

absolutely legal for the Magistrate to forward the complaint to the SHO
with a direction to register an FIR treating the complaint as the first

information and to investigate the case. (Vide Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar

(1997) 8 SCC 476 = AIR 1997 SC 3104 - K. T. Thomas, M. B. Shah - JJ).

Q.16 In a corruption case the trap as well as the investigation was

conducted by a DySP of Police in a station where a Superintendent of

Police ("SP" for short) was available. When the charge-sheet was filed

before the Special Judge the incompetence of the DySP to conduct the

investigation was pointed out and the Special Judge directed re-

investigation by the SP and accordingly fresh investigation was conducted

by the SP. During the trial of the case when one of the prosecution

witnesses deviated from his earlier stand taken during the investigation

by the DySP, the prosecutor declared the witness hostile and attempted to

cross examine him with reference to the statement given by him to the

DySP. This was objected to by the defence contending that the initial

investigation conducted by the DySP was illegal and non est. Can the

prosecutor be allowed to proceed with the trial as attempted by him ?

Ans. Yes. The objection raised by the defense cannot be sustained. The

investigation conducted by the DySP although without sufficient authority, is

nevertheless investigation in the eye of law. It cannot be treated as non est.

(Vide para 5 of  Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat AIR 1968

SC 1323 = 1968 Cri.L.J. 1505  –  3 Judges –  G. K. Mitter, C. K.

Vaidyalingam,  K. S. Hegde  - JJ).

Q.17 Is not an FIR a substantive piece of evidence and what is its use ?

Ans. No. It is not a substantive piece of evidence and can be used to

corroborate or contradict the statement of the maker at the trial but cannot
be used to corroborate or contradict other witnesses. (Vide –

Nisar Ali v. State of U.P AIR 1957 SC 366 = 1957 Cri.L.J. 550 -3 Judges  –
P. N. Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha,  J. L. Kapur  - JJ;

Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 208 = AIR 1992 SC 1389

–  M. M. Punchhi, B. P. Jeevan Reddy – JJ;

State of Punjab v. Mohri Ram 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 632  – K. Jayachandra

Reddy - J;

Bheru Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1994) 2 SCC 467  –  Dr. A. S. Anand,

Faizan Uddin - JJ;

State of U.P. v. Babul Nath (1994) 6 SCC 29  - Dr. A. S. Anand,  Faizan

Uddin  - JJ;

State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing (1997) 6 SCC 514 = AIR 1997 SC 2780  – K.

Ramaswamy, D. P. Wadhwa - JJ;

Para 5 of  Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar (2002) 9 SCC 147 = AIR 2002 SC

1949 –  R. P. Sethi, D. M. Dharmadhikari - JJ;

Para 15 of  Ravi Kumar v. State of Punjab (2005) 9 SCC 315 = AIR 2005 SC

1929  –  Arijit Pasayat, S. H. Kapadia – JJ  ;

Para 18 of  Ashram v. State of M.P. (2007) 11 SCC 164 = AIR 2007 SC

2594  –  S. H. Kapadia,  B. Sudershan Reddy - JJ;

Paras 16 and 18 of  Viswanathan v. State (2008) 5 SCC 354 = AIR 2008 SC

2222  –  S. B. Sinha, V. S. Sirpurkar – JJ;

Para 38 of  Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra (2009)

10 SCC 773  – D. K. Jain,  R. M. Lodha -  JJ).

Paras 11 and 12 of  Kirender Sarkar v. State of Assam (2009) 12 SCC 342 =

AIR 2009 SC 2513 –  Dr. Arijit Pasayat, Dr. Mukundakam Sharma – JJ.

FIR can be used only for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting the

maker thereof. (Vide  Babu Singh v. State of Punjab (1996) 8 SCC 699 = AIR

1996 SC 3250  – Faizan Uddin,  G. B. Pattanaik -  JJ).

FIR cannot be used to discredit the testimony of any person other than the

maker of the FIR. (Vide  Andrews v. State of Kerala (2002) 10 SCC 126 –  G.

B. Pattanaik, M. B. Shah – JJ  ).

Where the informant did not support the prosecution case and was declared

hostile, it does not follow that the FIR would loose all its relevancy and

cannot be looked into for any purpose. Although it is not a substantive piece

of evidence it is certainly a relevant circumstance of the evidence produced

by the Investigating Agency. (Vide paras 13 and 14 of  Bable @ Gurdeep

Singh v. State of Chattisgarh (2012) 11 SCC 181 = AIR 2012 SC

2621  –  Swatanter Kumar,  Ranjan Gogoi - JJ).

FIR being the earliest version, is of importance in appreciating the evidence

of witnesses, though it is not a piece of substantive evidence. (Vide –

Ladha Shamji Dhanani v. State of Gujarat 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 20 = AIR

1992 SC 956  –  K. Jayachandra Reddy,  R. C. Patnaik - JJ;

Para 15 of  Kalyan v. State of U.P. (2001) 9 SCC 632 = AIR 2001 SC 3976  –

M. B. Shah,  R. P. Sethi  – JJ  ;

Budh Singh v. State of U.P. (2006) 9 SCC 731 = AIR 2006 SC 2500  –  S. B.

Sinha, P. P. Naolekar – JJ  ;

Para 9 of  Mahmood v. State of U.P. (2007) 14 SCC 16 = AIR 2008 SC 515  –

Altamas Kabir,  B. Sudershan Reddy -  JJ;

Para 11 of  Sujoy Sen @ Sujoy Kumar Sen v. State of W.B. (2007) 6 SCC 32

= 2007 Cri.L.J. 3727  – S. B. Sinha,  Markandey Katju  - JJ;

Ramesh Maruti Patil v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1994 SC 28 = 1994

Cri.L.J. 8  –  M. M. Punchhi, S. C. Agrawal – JJ).

Where the examination of the first informant has been dispensed with by

consent, FIR would become part of the prosecution evidence. (Vide  Malkiat

Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341 = 1991 KHC 1169 (SC) –  3

Judges  – A. M. Ahmadi, V. Ramaswami,  K. Ramaswamy  - JJ).

FIR by itself cannot be the basis for deciding the culpability of the assailants

in every case. (Vide  Shrimant Yankappa Dhramatti v. State of Karnataka

1994 Supp. (3) SCC 332 = 1994 SCC (Cri) 1723 –  K. Jayachandra Reddy, J.

N. Ray – JJ  ).

Q.18 Does the Cr.P.C. contemplate two modes of registering an FIR ?

Ans. Yes. The first is the duly signed FIR under Section 154 (1) Cr.P.C. given

by the informant to the SHO. The second mode of registering the FIR is the
one which is registered by the Police itself under Section 157 (1)

Cr.P.C  otherwise  than by way of information from an informant under

Section 154 (1) Cr.P.C. (Vide para 97 of  Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014)

2 SCC 1 = AIR 2014 SC 187 –  5 Judges –  P. Sathasivam – CJI,  Dr. B. S.

Chauhan, Renjana Prakash Desai, Renjan Gogoi, S. A. Bodbde - JJ).

NOTE:  A case where a Police party detects a cognizable offence while on

patrol duty and submitting a  suo motu  report regarding the offence and

registering an FIR will be the second kind of FIR referred to above.

The chance recovery made in  State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994) 3 SCC

299 = AIR 1994 SC 1872 –  S. Ratnavel Pandian,  K. Jayachandra Reddy

–  JJ,  was one such case.

Similarly, in  State v. V. Jayapaul (2004) 5 SCC 223 = 2004 Cri.L.J. 1819  –

Ruma Pal,  P. Venkatarama Reddy -  JJ,  is yet another case wherein

dissatisfied with the discreet information received, the Police Officer himself

conducted a probe and later on  suo motu  figured himself as the first

informant.

Q.19 Should not the FIR contain all the details pertaining to the

occurrence and the ingredients of the offence?

Ans. No. The law does not require the mentioning of all the ingredients of

the offence in the FIR. It is only after completion of the investigation that it

may be possible to say whether any offence is made out on the basis of the

evidence collected by the investigating agency. (Vide para 22 of  CBI v.

Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 = AIR 2003 SC 4140 –  N. Santhosh

Hegde,  B. P. Singh -  JJ).

An FIR is not an  encyclopedia  which must disclose all the facts and details

relating to the offence reported. A first informant need not necessarily be an

eye-witness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all the aspects of the

offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given

must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. (Vide –

Para 20 of  CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 = AIR 2003 SC

4140  N. Santhosh Hegde,  B. P. Singh  - JJ;

Para 7 of  Surjit Singh @ Gurmit Singh v. State of Punjab 1993 Supp. (1)

SCC 208 = AIR 1992 SC 1389  –  M. M. Punchhi, B. P. Jeevan Reddy - JJ;

Para 66 of  State of U.P. v. Krishna Master (2010) 12 SCC 324 = AIR 2010

SC 3071  – Harjit Singh Bedi,  J. M. Panchal -  JJ;

Paras 20 and 21 of  Budh Singh v. State of M.P (2007) 10 SCC 496  –  S. B.

Sinha,  Markandey Katju - JJ;

Paras 9 and 12 of  Gunnana  Pentayya v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC

59  –  Dr. Arijit Pasayat, Dr. Mukundakam Sharma - JJ;

State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S Husain (2008) 1 SCC

213 = AIR 2008 SC 155  – S. B. Sinha, Harjit Singh Bedi - JJ;

Paras 12 and 15 of  Ramesh Baburao Devaskar v. State of Maharashtra

(2007) 13 SCC 501 = 2008 Cri.L.J. 372  –  S. B. Sinha, Harjit Singh Bedi - JJ).

Informant is not expected to disclose all minute details of the occurrence in

the FIR. (Vide para 23 of  Mahadev Laxman Sarane v. State of Maharashtra

(2007) 12 SCC 705 = 2007 Cri.L.J. 3209 –  B. P. Singh, Harjit Singh Bedi -

JJ).

Failure to mention in the FIR the visibility at night or the existence of electric

light, is not fatal. (Vide –

Shakti Patra v. State of W.B 1981 Supp. SCC 24 = AIR 1981 SC 1217 –  3

Judges  –  S. Murtaza Fazl Ali,  Baharul Islam, A. Varadarajan - JJ;

Para 9 of  Chittarmal and Moti v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 2 SCC 266 = AIR

2003 SC 796  – Santhosh Hegde,  B. P. Singh -  JJ).

Omission to mention vital details in the FIR. Held:  First informant was falsely

introduced by the prosecution as an ocular witness. (Vide  Govind Narain v.

State of Rajasthan (1993) 3 SCC 343 = AIR 1993 SC 2457  – Dr. A. S. Anand,

N. P. Singh - JJ).

Q.20 What is the manner of proving an FIR?

Ans. Mere production of the document is not enough. Contents of the same

have to be proved by examining witnesses. FIR by itself is not an item of

evidence without actual proof of the facts stated therein. (Vide para 14

of  Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank (2009) 2 SCC 570  –  S. B.

Sinha, Cyriac Joseph - JJ).

Q.21 Can a General Diary Entry ("GD Entry" for short) disclosing the

commission of a cognizable offence be treated as an FIR?

Ans. Yes. (Vide para 16 of  CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 =

AIR 2003 SC 4140  -  N. Santhosh Hegde,  B. P. Singh  - JJ).

NOTE:-  All information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in

the registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and

meticulously reflected in the General Diary maintained under Section 44 of

the Police Act, 1861 and the decision to conduct a "preliminary inquiry" must

also be reflected  therein. (Vide paras 69, 70 and 72 of  Lalita Kumari v. Govt.

of UP (2014) 2 SCC 1  =  AIR 2014 SC 187 –  5 Judges –  P. Sathasivam –

CJI,  Dr. B. S. Chauhan, Renjana Prakash Desai, Ranjan Gogoi, S. A. Bobde -

JJ).

Q.22 Can a telephone message received by the SHO regarding the

commission of a cognizable offence be treated as an FIR?

Ans. Where the telephonic information recorded in the daily diary book

disclosing a cognizable offence treated as the FIR in the case. (Vide  Sunil

Kumar v. State of MP (1997) 10  SCC  570 =  AIR  1997 SC 940  –  M. K.

Mukherjee,  B. N. Kirpal - JJ).

The officer-in-charge (PW 18) first received telephonic message from a

camp about the riot and he immediately visiting crime scene and starting

investigation. Thereafter PW 2 lodging a complaint which was treated as

FIR. Held:  that the telephonic message was the FIR and the subsequent
statement of PW 2 was to be treated as a statement under Section 161

Cr.P.C and liable to be used only for contradicting PW 2. (Vide para 15

of  Ashok Debbarma @ Achak Debbarma v. State of Tripura (2014) 4 SCC

747 = 2014 Cri.L.J 1830  –  K. S. Radhakrishnan, Vikramajit Sen - JJ).

If the telephonic information received is incomplete without any details

regarding the identity of the accused or the victims, nature of injuries

caused, name of the culprits etc, such information cannot be treated as an

FIR. (Vide para 32 of  Ravishwar Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand (2008) 16

SCC 561 = AIR 2009 SC 1262  – S. B. Sinha, Cyriac Joseph – JJ).

A vague and cryptic telephonic message cannot be treated as an FIR since

its object is only to get the police to the scene of crime and not to register

FIR. (vide paras 100 to 110 and 303 (3) of  Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu

Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 = AIR 2010 SC 2352 -  P.

Sathasivam, Swatanter Kumar - JJ).

A cryptic telephonic information given by an unknown person informing the

death of an unknown person to the police cannot be treated as an FIR. (Vide

–
Paras 33 to 37 of  Surajit Sarkar v. State of WB (2013) 2  SCC  146

=  AIR  2013 SC 807 –  Swatanter Kumar,  Madan B. Lokur -  JJ;

Para 12 of  Animireddy Venkata Ramana v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of

AP (2008) 5  SCC  368 =  AIR  2008 SC 1603 –  S. B. Sinha, Harjit Singh Bedi -

JJ;

Para 9 of  Mundrika Mahto v. State of Bihar (2002) 9  SCC  183 =  AIR  2002

SC 2042  – U. C. Banerjee,  Y. K. Sabharwal  – JJ  ;

Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (1994) 2  SCC  685 = 1994 Cri.L.J.

3067  – Jayachandra Reddy,  N. P. Singh -  JJ;

State of UP v. P.A Madhu (1984) 4 SCC 83 = AIR 1984 SC 1523 -  3

Judges  –  Murtaza Fazl Ali, A. Varadarajan, Sabyasachi Mukharji - JJ;

Para 52 of  Anand Mohan v. State of Bihar (2012) 7 SCC 225 =  2013 Cri.L.J.

2644 –  A. P. Patnaik, Swatanter Kumar – JJ  ;

Para 10 of State of A.P v. V.V.Panduranga Rao (2009) 15 SCC 211 = 2009

Cri.L.J. 2972 –  Dr. Arijit Pasayat, Asok Kumar Ganguly - JJ).

Q.23 What is the procedure for registering an FIR?

Ans. Going by the wording of Section 154 (1) Cr.P.C, when

"information"  relating to the commission of a "cognizable offence" is given

either orally or in writing to the officer-in-charge of a Police station,  the same

shall be entered  in the FIR Book (FIR Register) by giving a unique annual

number to each FIR as mandated by Section 154 (1) Cr.P.C. A gist of the FIR

is to be simultaneously mentioned in the General Diary ("GD" for short

maintained under Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861). This is a  mandatory

duty  of the SHO who has no freedom or option not to register an FIR. (Vide

paras 48, 57 to 67, 61, 63 and para 111 (i), (iv), (viii) of  Lalita Kumari v. Govt.

of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 = AIR 2014 SC 187  -  5 Judges  –  P. Sathasivam –

CJI,  Dr. B. S. Chauhan, Renjana Prakash Desai, Ranjan Gogoi, S. A. Bobde -

JJ  ).

Q.24 Is not the SHO entitled to carry the FIR Book with him to the place of

occurrence ?

Ans. No. FIR Book is to be kept in the Police Station at all times. If the SHO

gets information about the commission of a cognizable offence, he should

make an entry in the General Diary and proceed to the place of occurrence

and record a complaint from the place of occurrence. (Vide  Sevi v. State of
T.N. 1981 Supp. SCC 43 = AIR 1981 SC 1230  –  O. Chinnappa Reddy,

Baharul Islam – JJ  ).

Q.25 Is not the duty of the SHO to supply copy of the FIR to the informant,

mandatory and will not failure to supply copy, vitiate the investigation ?

Ans. Section 154 (2) Cr.P.C. obliging the SHO to give a copy of the

information recorded under Section 154 (1) Cr.P.C. free of cost to the

informant, is not mandatory but is only directory. It is only if prejudice or

injustice has been caused due to the infraction of the said provision, will the

Court quash the proceedings. (Vide  State v. N. S. Gnaneswaran (2013) 3

SCC 594 = AIR 2013 SC 3673 –  Dr. B. S. Chauhan & V. Gopala Gowda –

JJ  ).

Q.26 Supposing the SHO refuses to register an FIR, what is the remedy of

the informant?

Ans. Supposing the SHO refuses to record the "information"  received under

Section 154 (1) Cr.P.C and to register an FIR, the person aggrieved may

send, in writing and by post, the substance of such "information", to the

Superintendent of Police of the District ("DSP" for short). The DSP, if

satisfied that such "information"  discloses the commission of a cognizable

offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to

be made. (Vide  Section 154 (3) Cr.P.C.).

When alternative remedies under Sections 144 (3) read with 36, 156 (3) or

200 Cr.P.C. are available to the aggrieved person, High Courts should

discourage writ petitions and petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Vide paras

27 and 28 of  Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409 = AIR 2008 SC

907 –  A. K. Mathur,  Markandey Katju  – JJ  ).

Q.27 Can the SHO conduct a verification or inquiry before registering an

FIR?

Ans. Even though registration of an FIR by the SHO upon receipt of

"information"  relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is a must,

in certain category of cases there is a Judge-made law that the SHO need

not straightaway register an FIR. He can conduct

a preliminary  verification (preliminary inquiry) to find out whether the

information reveals the commission of a cognizable offence or not. (Vide

paras 49, 72, 73, 114, 120.6 of Lalita Kumari (Supra.)  and Ramdev Food

Products Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2015) 6 SCC 439 = AIR 2015 SC
1742 – 3 Judges - T. S. Thakur,  A. K. Goel,  R. Banumathi - JJ.  The following

are those category of cases: -

 Where the information received does not disclose a cognizable

offence. (para 118 of  Lalita Kumari  (supra).

 Where the dispute is a matrimonial/family dispute.

 Where the offence is a commercial offence.

 Where the case is a medical negligence case. (paras 115, 116).

 Where it is a corruption case. (para 117).

 Where there is abnormal delay/laches (say over 3 months in reporting

the matter) in initiating criminal prosecution without satisfactory
explanation for the delay. (para 120.6).

The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of

the information received but only to ascertain whether the information

reveals any cognizable offence. (Vide para 120.3).

NOTE By Justice VRK: I have my reservations regarding the scope of

preliminary inquiry as held in Lalita Kumari. That will be dealt with

separately while examining the Judge-made law of preliminary inquiry.

(In Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (Central Act 16/ 2018)

a new provision as Section 17A has been inserted in the P.C. Act 1988 with

effect from 26-07-2018. It says that no police officer shall conduct an

"enquiry", "inquiry" or "investigation" into an offence relatable to any

recommendation made or decision taken by a  public servant, without the

previous  approval  of the authority competent to grant prosecution sanction

under Section 19 of the P. C. Act. The expressions "enquiry" and "inquiry"

have not been defined. In the State of Kerala, at the Government level, the

expression "enquiry" is understood as Vigilance Enquiry at the departmental

level and the expression "inquiry" including preliminary inquiry is the one

ordered by the Special Court.)

Q.28 Can there be more than one FIR (a second FIR) registered in respect

of the same case ?

Ans. The case-law on the point is given below:-

(a) There can be no second FIR and no fresh investigation on receipt of

every subsequent information relating to the same cognizable offence or the

same occurrence which gave rise to one or more cognizable offences. The

SHO has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence which was

reported in the FIR but also other connected offences which are found to

have been committed in the course of the same transaction or in the same

occurrence and file one or more reports as provided under Section 173

Cr.P.C. Even if after the conclusion of investigation pursuant to the filing of

the FIR and submission of the final report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C., the

SHO comes across any further information pertaining to the same incident,

he can, with the leave of the Court, make further investigation under Section

173 (8) Cr.P.C. (Vide  T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 = AIR

2001 SC 2637  – Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, S. N. Phukan - JJ).

NOTE By Justice VRK:  (In para 68 of  Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of

Punjab (2009) 1 SCC 441 = AIR 2009 SC 984 –  S. B. Sinha,  Aftab Alam –

JJ,  it has been observed that for conducting further investigation under

Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C., express permission of the Court is not necessary).

(b) The legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same

accused in respect of the same case. But, when there are rival versions in

respect of the same episode, they could necessarily take the shape of

different FIRs and investigation also can be carried on under both of them

and by the same agency. (Vide  Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi (2002) 1 SCC

714 = AIR 2002 SC 441  –  K. T. Thomas, S. N. Phukan – JJ).

(c) After the first FIR was recorded on the basis of the statement made by

the deceased when he was alive, it was not necessary to record a second

FIR which had a nexus with the injuries, upon the death of the deceased. But,
simply because the SHO made a mistake by recording a fresh FIR, it would

not weaken the prosecution case and the entire investigation on the basis of

the fresh FIR will not be defective especially when no prejudice is caused to

the accused. (Vide  Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P. (2010) 14 SCC 444 = AIR

2011 SC 604  – P. Sathasivam,  Anil R. Dave  – JJ  ).

(d) If an FIR was recorded on the basis of the statement of a witness,

another FIR is not admissible. (Vide paras 35 and 37 of  Subramanian v.

State of T.N. (2009) 14 SCC 415 = 2009 Cri.L.J. 3002  – S. B. Sinha, Cyriac

Joseph – JJ).

(e)  Two FIRs filed in respect of the same incident. Second FIR quashed by

the Court. Held  :  that pursuant to the quashing of the second FIR charge-

sheet filed on the basis of investigation conducted on the allegations in the

second FIR cannot survive. Direction of the High Court that the charge-sheet

arising out of the second FIR is to be read along with the first FIR, is not

sustainable. (Vide  Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254  – P.

Sathasivam,  Dr. B. S. Chauhan  – JJ).

(f) Lodgment of two FIRs impermissible in respect of one and the same

incident. A second FIR registered on the basis of a direction issued by the

Magistrate under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. would be maintainable, if after

examining the involvement of number of accused persons and the nature of

allegations, what emerges is that the second FIR was registered under a

different spectrum and that the allegations made were distinct and separate.

(Vide  Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P. (2013) 5 SCC 148 = AIR 2013 SC

3614  – K. S. Radhakrishnan,  Dipak Mishra  - JJ).

(g) What was forwarded to the jurisdictional Magistrate was the FIR

registered on the basis of the second complaint lodged by the complainant.

Quashing of the later FIR would amount to setting at naught the criminal law

which had already been set in motion. Hence, the later FIR will prevail.

(Vide  Kasaiah D. v. Sunkara Srinivasulu 2013 Cri.L.J. 1186 = 2013 KHC

2347  (Andhra)  –  Pinaki Chandra Ghose  – CJ,  Vilas V. Afzulpurkar - J.

(h) Tests to determine the registration of two FIRs, explained:

1. There cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence.

2. In order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs, the Court has to

rationalize the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply

the test of "sameness" to find out whether both FIRs relate to the

same incident and to the same occurrence and are in regard to

 incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or

relate completely to two distinct occurrences.

3. If the incident is separate, even where the offences are similar or

different, a second FIR can be registered.

4. Where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall

within the ambit and scope of the first FIR, then also a second FIR can

be registered.

(Vide  Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2013) 6 SCC 384 = 2013 Cri.L.J. 776

= 2013 (1) KLT 549  –  Swatanter Kumar, Madan B. Lokur – JJ  )

(i) Second FIR cannot be registered in respect of the same occurrence and

would be hit by Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. But subsequent registration of an FIR

giving details of the occurrence after receipt of a cryptic telephonic

information about the occurrence, is not a second FIR and will not be hit by

Section 162 Cr.P.C. (Vide  Yanab Sheikh @ Gagu v. State of W.B. (2013) 6

SCC 428 = 2012 KHC 4759  (SC) –  K. Jayachandra Reddy, G. N. Ray – JJ.

Where the Police already had information about the occurrence, the

complaint which was treated as FIR would be hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C.
(Vide  Paresh Kalyandas Bhavsar v. Sadiq Yakubbhai Jamadar (1993) 3 SCC

95 = AIR 1993 SC 1544 –  A. S. Anand,  N. P. Singh  – JJ).

Where the Police had started investigation during night, a report of the

incident lodged by a witness on the following morning can only be treated as

a statement under Section 161 (3) Cr.P.C. and not as an FIR. (Vide paras 37

to 39 of  Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 4 SCC 392 = AIR 1995 SC

1219  – Dr. A. S. Anand,  M. K. Mukherjee  – JJ).

Where a complaint was prepared after due deliberations, consultations and

discussions, it cannot be treated as an FIR and would be hit by Section 162

Cr.P.C. (Vide  State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 590 = AIR

1993 SC 2644  - Dr. A. S. Anand, N. P. Singh – JJ).

When the FIR before Court is shown to have been subsequently fabricated

and brought into existence long after the occurrence, the defense can argue

that the entire prosecution case will collapse. (Vide  Marudanal Augusty v.

State of Kerala (1980) 4 SCC 425 = AIR 1980 SC 638 –  S. Murtaza Fazl Ali,

A. D. Koshan - JJ; Sevi v. State of T.N. AIR 1981 SC 1230; Mohar Singh v.

State of Rajasthan AIR 1988 SC 2912 -  O. Chinnappa Reddy, Baharul Islam

– JJ  ).
(j) What was held in  T.T. Antony  v. State of Kerala AIR 2001 SC 2637  was

that any  further complaint by the  same complainant or others  against the

same accused,  subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under

the Cr.P.C. because an investigation in this regard would have already

started and further complaint  against the same accused  will amount to an

improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint and hence will

be prohibited under Section 162 Cr.P.C. The said prohibition noticed

in  Antony's case,  does not apply to a counter – complaint by the accused in

the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the

incident. (Vide para 17 of  Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash (2004) 13 SCC 292 =

AIR 2004 SC 4320 –  3 Judges –  N. Santhosh Hegde, S. B. Sinha, A. K.

Mattur- JJ). It cannot, therefore, be said that  Antony's case  has precluded

an aggrieved person from filing a counter –case. (Vide para 16 of  Upkar

Sing (Supra.)

(k) Where the second occurrence is nothing but a fallout of the first

occurrence, the two separate complaints lodged and FIR registered can be

clubbed together and one charge sheet can be filed. (Vide  C. Muniappan v.

State of Tamilnadu (2010) 9 SCC 567  – G. S. Singhvi,  Dr. B. S. Chauhan

-  JJ).
(l) The principle that second FIR in case of offences relating to the same

transaction is impermissible as laid down in  T.T.Antony (2001) 6 SCC

181,  has never been diluted in any subsequent judicial pronouncements.

Situations not covered by the above rule are –

(a) a second FIR is permissible in case of "cross-cases", and

(b) a second FIR is permissible if the offences disclosed were not part of the

first FIR nor can they be said to form part of the same transaction as

covered in the first FIR nor can they be said to be arising as a consequence

of the offences covered in the first FIR. (Vide para 56 of  Amitbhai

Anilchandra Shah v. CBI (2013) 6 SCC 348 = 2013 Cri.L.J. 2313 –  P.

Sathasivam, Dr. B. S. Chauhan - JJ).

(m) Just because a second FIR regarding the death of the deceased has

been recorded, the accused cannot take advantage of the same in the

absence of any prejudice having been suffered by him and in the absence of

any fresh investigation pursuant to the second FIR and there is no allegation

that the facts stated in the second FIR were incorrect or malicious or that

there was any oblique motive behind the further information due to the death

of the victim as a result of septicaemia. (Vide para 14 to 21 of  Chirra Shivraj

v. State of A.P. (2010) 14 SCC 444 = AIR 2011 SC 604  – P.

Sathasivam,  Anil R. Dave -  JJ).

(n) If the State police did not make a fair investigation and left

out the  conspiracy aspect  of the matter from the purview of its

investigation, as and when the same surfaced, it was open to the State

Government by virtue of its power of supervision vested in it in terms of

Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861 and which power is unrestricted by Section

36 Cr.P.C (or to the High Court), to direct further investigation in terms of

Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C in respect of an offence which is distinct and

separate from the one for which the FIR had already been lodged. The

second FIR would be maintainable not only because there were different

versions and new discovery was made but also the second FIR lodged by the

CBI was on a wider canvas involving conspiracy of a large number of

persons. (Vide paras 44 to 53, 57, 58 and 67 of  Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State

of Punjab (2009) 1 SCC 441 = AIR 2009 SC 984  –  S. B. Sinha, Aftab Alam –

JJ;  Varshaben Kantilal Purani v. State of Gujarat (2019) 11 SCC 774 = 2019

KHC 7328  (SC) – 3 Judges -  Dr. A. K. Sikri, Ashok Bhushan, Ajay Rastogi –

JJ. )
(o) Where the first FIR has been suppressed, the subsequent report cannot

be treated as an FIR. (Vide  Gopal Singh v. State of M.P. (2010) 6 SCC 407 =

2010 Cri.L.J. 3435  (SC)  –  H. S. Bedi, A. K. Patnaik – JJ.)

(p) Where the SHO deliberately did not register the FIR on receipt of the first

information about a cognizable offence, subsequently registered an FIR after

due deliberation, consultation and discussion, such FIR will be hit by Section

162 Cr.P.C. (Vide  State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu 1994 Supp. 1 SCC 590 =

AIR 1993 SC 2644  – A. S. Anand, M. P. Singh - JJ).

Q.29 Are the Police bound to register an FIR as if in a cognizable offence,

in the case of a missing person?

Ans. Yes. Very often State Police Acts or allied statutory measures provide

for the registration of an FIR by the SHO in "man missing cases". The

relevant provision in the Kerala Police Act, 2011 is Section 57 which directs

the State Police to attempt to locate missing persons after registering any

information received in the same manner as in the case of a cognizable

offence and to take immediate action to locate the missing person. The said

provision in the Kerala Police Act has been highlighted by a Division Bench

of the Kerala High Court in  Anil Kumar V.R. v. Sathi Kumari 2012 (1) KLT

641 = 2012 (1) KHC 531  (DB) –  Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, C. T.

Ravikumar - JJ. The said decision has also directed that in case the missing

person has been finally traced out, the police shall not release him. He shall

be produced before the Magistrate having jurisdiction and the Magistrate

will decide whether the missing person should be allowed to go or not. The

Division Bench also clarified that it is not for the police to decide whether the

missing person was under illegal detention or not and that the judiciary

alone can decide that question.

Q.30 Where it is alleged that the FIR was ante-timed, what are the tests to

find out the same ?

Ans. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local

Magistrate. The second external check which is equally important is the

sending of the copy of the FIR along with the dead body for inquest and its

reference in the inquest report. (Vide  Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994)

5 SCC 188  –  Dr. A. S. Anand, Faiizan Uddin – JJ;  Paras 15, 16 and 21

of  Sudarshan v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 12 SCC 312 = 2014 Cri.L.J.

3232 –  Dr. B. S. Chauhan,  A. K. Sikri  - JJ).

Who among the following described the 'Preamble' as the "horoscope of

our sovereign democratic republic"?
K.M.Munshi
Who described the Preamble of the Constitution as an 'Identity Card' of the
Constitution?
N.A.Palkhiwala
In which of the following cases, Supreme Court held that Preamble cannot
be amended?
Berubari Case
In which of the following cases, Supreme Court held that Preamble can be
amended without altering its basic features?
Kesavananda Bharati case
In Tinsukia Electricity Company Vs. State of Assam, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the term "socialist", used in the Preamble to the
Constitution of India, means a State whose basic policy is to ….
prohibit concentration of wealth and uplift the living standards of people
In the Case of Good Governance India Foundation & Anr. Union Of India &
Anr.(2010), Supreme Court dismissed the petition against the use of the
word, ………………… in Preamble to the Constitution
Socialist
Which of the following cases it was said by the Supreme Court in 2005
that: "It is well accepted by thinkers, philosophers and academicians that
if JUSTICE, LIBERTY, EQUALITY and FRATERNITY, including social,
economic and political justice, the golden goals set out in the Preamble of
the Constitution, are to be achieved, the Indian polity has to be educated
and educated with excellence".
P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [(2005) 6 SCC 537]
The ideals of 'liberty, equality and fraternity' in the preamble is inspired
by?
French Revolution