Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ALPR Lawsuit
ALPR Lawsuit
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v.
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PETITION FOR ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
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Petitioners the South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and John Sloan petition this
Court for Original Jurisdiction pursuant to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 245, Article V,
Section 5, of the South Carolina Constitution, and Section 14-3-310 of the South Carolina Code.
A proposed Complaint is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, along with
INTRODUCTION
Without any legislative authorization, the South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division
(SLED) has created and currently operates a statewide surveillance program that relies on
photos of vehicle license plates that are stamped with the exact time and location they were taken.
Those photos are collected indiscriminately from vehicles traveling South Carolina roads and
highways. SLED stores every image it collects for three years, regardless of whether the vehicle
or owner is suspected of, or associated with, any legal wrongdoing. Federal, state, and local
agencies may search the database to generate travel and location dossiers on South Carolina
residents—the sort of information the United States Supreme Court has warned “provides an
intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through
them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150,738,105 license plate reads—up from 135,368,308 the previous year, and 26,451,216 in 2014.2
As of July 13, 2022, the database contained over four-hundred million (400,000,000) license plate
reads.3 And the database will continue to expand as municipalities add new ALPR cameras, all of
This case is not about whether such a system is wise, or how best to balance the legitimate
needs of law enforcement against individual privacy interests—those are questions for the General
Assembly to answer, as representatives of the people of South Carolina. Nor is this case about
whether SLED’s program infringes upon constitutional privacy protections. Rather, this case is
about whether an administrative agency may implement such an extensive surveillance program
without any legislative authorization, and without any concomitant restraints on how it exercises
1 Although SLED created its ALPR surveillance database years ago, Petitioners only recently
learned of its existence as ALPRs began to rapidly proliferate across the state. See Exhibit A,
Complaint [hereinafter “Complaint”], at n.2. That proliferation shed light on the SLED program
that has long operated in the shadows and escaped widespread public awareness.
2 See Complaint Exhibit 1, Freedom of Information Act Request # 2022-0118 and Response
from SLED (August 3, 2022) [hereinafter “Complaint Ex. 1, 2022 FOIA Response”], at 4;
Complaint Exhibit 6, SLED’s Response to Freedom of Information Act Request # 2015-153
(March 5, 2015), at 6.
3 See Complaint Ex. 1, 2022 FOIA Response, at 4.
4 See Complaint, at n.2.
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its discretion. The cornerstone of our constitutional system—the separation of powers—requires
legislative authorization. Established rules of administrative law require formal regulations. This
First, administrative agencies like SLED have “only such powers as have been conferred
by law and must act within the authority granted for that purpose.” Bazzle v. Huff, 319 S.C. 443,
445, 462 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1995) (citing Triska v. Dep’t. of Health & Env’t Control, 292 S.C. 190,
355 S.E.2d 531 (1987)). There is no provision in the South Carolina Code that authorizes SLED,
or any state agency, to operate a statewide ALPR program. Second, if SLED’s generic enabling
statutes could be stretched so broadly as to authorize such an expansive surveillance network, one
that depends on technology not even contemplated at the time those statutes were drafted, then
those statutes provide no constraints on SLED’s discretion and therefore run afoul of the
nondelegation doctrine. See Bauer v. S.C. State Hous. Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 232-34, 246 S.E.2d
869, 876-77 (1978). Finally, even if SLED’s ALPR program were legitimately authorized, which
it is not, SLED’s creation and implementation of the program failed to comply with the notice-
and-comment rulemaking requirements of the State Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See
Joseph v. S.C. Dep’t of Lab., Licensing & Regul., 417 S.C. 436, 454, 790 S.E.2d 763, 772 (2016);
id. at 456-66, 790 S.E.2d at 773-78 (Kittredge, J., concurring). SLED has not promulgated any
formal regulations to implement or circumscribe its ALPR program. Instead, the agency’s guiding
The lack of legislative authorization for SLED’s ALPR program stands in stark contrast to
other statewide law enforcement databases that the legislature has authorized. Take, for example,
5 See Complaint Exhibit 3, SLED Policy 13.40: Automated License Plate Recognition
[hereinafter “Complaint Ex. 3, Policy 13.40”].
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SLED’s DNA database. Nearly thirty years ago, the General Assembly enacted a statute
authorizing SLED to establish a statewide DNA database and prescribing specific rules for its
operation. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-600 et seq. (1994). The General Assembly also has enacted
statutes that authorize and constrain the operation of the statewide criminal justice information
center, criminal gang database, and body-worn camera database, among other programs. See S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 23-3-110 (1962); 16-8-330 (2007); 23-1-240 (2015). In addition, SLED has
programs, including the state DNA database. See S.C. Code Ann. Regs., 73-61 (1999).
Here, Petitioners request only the political process that the South Carolina Constitution
requires. SLED is South Carolina’s premier law enforcement agency. If SLED is to operate a
statewide ALPR surveillance program, then the elected representatives of the people must
authorize it.
No South Carolina court has addressed SLED’s surveillance program. This Court’s
exercise of its original jurisdiction is critical to curtail SLED’s ongoing usurpation of legislative
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioners detail the relevant factual background in their proposed verified Complaint,
which is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated here as if set forth verbatim. The operative facts
alleged are a matter of public record, and no discovery is necessary to resolve the legal questions
photos of vehicle license plates, each stamped with the exact time and location they were taken.
ALPR cameras automatically capture those photos across the state. The cameras can be: mounted
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in a permanent location (such as a highway overpass); mobile (such as a camera attached to a
vehicle); or portable (such as a trailer that can be temporarily installed). Some are owned by SLED.
Some are owned by local jurisdictions and feed images into the SLED database.
Pursuant to Article V, Section 5, of the South Carolina Constitution, and Rule 245 of the
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, this Court may exercise its original jurisdiction “[i]f the
public interest is involved.” Doe v. State, 421 S.C. 490, 497, 497 n.5, 808 S.E.2d 807, 810, 810
n.5 (2017) (quoting S.C. App. Ct. R. 245(a)). To determine whether original jurisdiction is
appropriate, the Court specifically looks to the nature of “the public interest involved and the need
for prompt resolution.” Carnival Corp. v. Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood Ass’n, 407 S.C.
This case presents issues of significant public interest that require prompt resolution. A
process and undermines the separation of the executive and legislative powers. That program is
rapidly proliferating, with the potential to cause irreversible damage to both citizens and the state
Accordingly, this case falls squarely within the line of cases in which the Court has
exercised its original jurisdiction to address unlawful executive and administrative overreach. See,
e.g., Adams v. McMaster, 432 S.C. 225, 851 S.E.2d 703 (2020) (challenging the Governor’s
allocation of federal education funding); Senate by & through Leatherman v. McMaster, 425 S.C.
315, 821 S.E.2d 908 (2018) (challenging Governor’s appointment to the Board of Directors for
the Public Service Authority); Amisub of S.C., Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Env’t Control, 407
S.C. 583, 757 S.E.2d 408 (2014) (challenging state agency’s ability to suspend administration of
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program); S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. S.C. Transp. Infrastructure Bank, 403 S.C. 640, 744 S.E.2d 521
Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 640 S.E.2d 457 (2007) (challenging legality of appointment of agency
commissioners).
Unauthorized agency action “presents a threat to our civil society.” Joseph, 417 S.C. at
465, 790 S.E.2d at 778 (Kittredge, J., concurring) (from section III of the concurrence). In Joseph,
administrative rulemaking set forth in sections I, II, and III of Justice Kittredge’s concurring
opinion.” Id. at 455 n.3, 790 S.E.2d at 773 n.3; see also West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.Ct. 2587,
2608-09 (2022) (emphasizing the need for clear legislative authorization for significant agency
action). The public has a fundamental interest in ensuring that executive agencies operate within
the bounds of the law. That interest is especially prominent here, where the unauthorized agency
action at issue implicates the privacy and liberty interests of millions of South Carolinians. See
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 142 S. Ct. 661,
668 (2022) (Gorsuch, J, concurring) (“If administrative agencies seek to regulate the daily lives
and liberties of millions of Americans … they must at least be able to trace that power to a clear
An agency or executive officer cannot act without legislative authorization. See Gilstrap v.
S.C. Budget & Control Bd., 310 S.C. 210, 212-14, 423 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1992) (an agency’s
proposed budget plan “exceeded the authority granted to [the agency] by the Legislature”); State
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ex rel. Condon v. Hodges, 349 S.C. 232, 245-46, 562 S.E.2d 623, 630-31 (2002) (the Governor
exceeded his legislative authority in transferring certain funds); Hampton v. Haley, 403 S.C. 395,
409, 743 S.E.2d 258, 265 (2013) (an executive agency “violated the separation of powers by acting
beyond its statutory authority and infringing upon the General Assembly’s power to make policy
expressly conferred or necessarily implied for it to effectively fulfill the duties with which it is
charged.” Edisto Aquaculture Corp. v. S.C. Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep’t, 311 S.C. 37, 40, 426
S.E.2d 753, 755 (1993) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). When an agency exceeds
those powers, as SLED does here, its actions are invalid as ultra vires. See, e.g., S.C. Pub. Int.
Found. v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 421 S.C. 110, 123-24, 804 S.E.2d 854, 861-62 (2017) (Department
of Transportation bridge inspections in a private gated community were ultra vires because they
extensive, location-tracking database SLED has compiled. This is quite unlike the explicit
statutory authorization governing other SLED databases. For example, the General Assembly has
enacted statutes that authorize, oblige, and constrain SLED’s operation of the statewide DNA
database, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-610 et seq.; the statewide criminal justice information center,
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-15(A)(4), 23-3-110 et seq.; the collection and retention of fingerprint data,
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-40, 23-3-45, 23-3-120, 37-22-270; the sex offender registry, S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 23-3-400, et seq.; the statewide criminal gang database, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-8-330; a
non-prescription drug database, S.C. Code § 23-3-1200; and a body-worn camera database, S.C.
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SLED’s generic enabling statutes do not authorize the ALPR program. In its
communication with local law enforcement agencies, SLED has cited South Carolina Code Section
23-3-15(A)(1) as the ALPR program’s empowering statute. 6 Section 23-3-15(A)(1) vests SLED
with authority over “the investigation of organized criminal activities or combined state-federal
interstate criminal activities, all general criminal investigations, arson investigation and
emergency event management pertaining to explosive devices.” S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-15(A)(1)
(emphasis added).
This statute authorizes criminal investigations. It does not encompass the collection—and
three-year storage—of license plate data from South Carolina motorists suspected of no criminal
act, who have done nothing to warrant the attention of law enforcement. “Court[s] should give
words ‘their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or
expand the statute’s operation.’” State v. Taylor, 436 S.C. 28, 34, 870 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2022)
(quoting State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010)). “Agencies have only
those powers given to them by Congress, and ‘enabling legislation’ is generally not an ‘open book
to which the agency [may] add pages and change the plot line.’” West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.Ct.
at 2609 (citation omitted); see also id. at 2622 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (Congress must provide a
“clear statement” authorizing the agency action, and agencies may not “seek to hide ‘elephants in
mouseholes’” of statutory authorization) (citation omitted)); Joseph, 417 S.C. at 465-66, 790
S.E.2d at 778 (Kittredge, J., concurring) (“If the executive branch, through unelected bureaucrats
and seemingly countless administrative agencies, is going to set policies having the force of law,
the judicial branch must insist on clear delegation from the legislative branch ….”). Indeed, if
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SLED’s enabling statute could be read to authorize the ALPR program, SLED would have virtually
unlimited power to create unilaterally whatever mass surveillance systems it chooses. Surely, that
Circumventing the legislative process is not simply a problem of form. It compromises the
very nature of, and reasons for, a representative government. Legislation inevitably involves
tradeoffs by the people’s elected representatives. These are not decisions for unelected
fundamental privacy rights especially require legislative authorization. See United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 429-30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving dramatic
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body
is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy
and public safety in a comprehensive way.”) (internal citations omitted)). Indeed, these same
concerns about “the emergence of new electronic technologies that increase[] the government’s
ability to conduct searches” prompted South Carolinians to add a right to privacy provision to our
state constitution. State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 647, 541 S.E.2d 837, 842 (2001).
Governance of the state’s DNA database is instructive. A statute specifically prescribes the
limited circumstances under which DNA may be collected; sets forth permissible uses of the
database; establishes confidentiality requirements; limits access to the database; creates criminal
penalties for abuses; establishes expungement procedures by which individuals can have their
DNA sample removed from the database; and conditions the continued force of the statute upon
appropriations. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-600 et seq. Over the years, the legislature has amended
the statute several times. See H.R. 3120, 2000 Leg., 113th Sess. (S.C. 2000); S. 492, 2001 Leg.,
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114th Sess. (S.C. 2001); H.R. 3594, 2004 Leg., 115th Sess. (S.C. 2004); S. 429, 2008 Leg., 117th
Sess. (S.C. 2008). To enact the latest amendments to this statute, which expanded DNA collection,
the General Assembly had to override the Governor’s veto. See S. 429, 2008 Leg., 117th Sess.
(S.C. 2008); see also Veto Message from Governor S. 429, R-429 (July 2, 2008) (expressing
concern over the “further encroachment on our civil liberties and privacy rights”). This sort of
careful legislative management of the tradeoffs in any law enforcement database is altogether
In states where ALPR databases have been legislatively authorized, the databases differ in
important ways from SLED’s. Retention periods are measured in days, not years. See, e.g., N.C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-183.32. Use is limited to the investigation of enumerated criminal and traffic
offenses. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 46-5-117(d)(V). Captured license plate data may only be
compared with specific hotlists. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-1803(b). Access to the database
is restricted to officials with specialized training. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Public Safety § 3-
509(c)(2). Privacy protections ensure that information in the database is treated confidentially. See,
e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.0777(2). Sharing license plate data with private entities is prohibited.
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 13.824 (Subdivision 2). Detailed reports concerning collection and
use must be published. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 60-3206(3). Failure to comply with
statutory requirements is grounds for exclusion of evidence. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-
1805(b)(4)(B). Individuals harmed by data breaches are armed with a private right of action. See,
7 The statutory provisions listed in this paragraph are not unique to the states cited as examples for
each provision. Different state statutory schemes often share the same types of restrictions on their
respective ALPR programs. Almost all states, for instance, impose data retention limits. Like North
Carolina, several states limit retention periods to days. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-1804(a);
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Petitioners do not presume to say what a legislatively authorized ALPR database would or
should look like in South Carolina. That is a question for our elected representatives to answer.
But SLED cannot short-circuit that process and make these policy decisions by fiat. Unless and
until our representatives speak, SLED’s creation and maintenance of its ALPR enforcement-and-
Even if SLED’s generic enabling statutes could be read so broadly as to authorize the
agency’s creation and implementation of a statewide ALPR surveillance program—a program that
both implicates the most basic privacy interests of South Carolinians and depends on technology
not even contemplated at the time the statutes were drafted—then those statutes violate the
nondelegation doctrine. Nearly 70 years ago, it already was “well settled” that the constitutional
principle of separation of powers precludes “the legislature [from] delegate[ing] its power to make
laws.” S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 594, 597, 86 S.E.2d 466, 470, 472 (1955)
(holding that a statute “authorizing the Highway Department to suspend or revoke a driver’s
agency like SLED must, at a minimum, contain “limitations” and “standard[s] to guide” the
agency’s exercise of that authority. Id. at 595, 86 S.E.2d at 470-71. As described above, supra, at
8, SLED’s generic enabling statute vests it with authority over matters such as “the investigation
Calif. Veh. Code § 2413(b); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 29-A, §2117-A(5); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 13.824
(Subdivision 3); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-5-118(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-3204(1); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 55-10-302(b). In New Hampshire, data retention is limited to 3 minutes. See N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 261:75-b(VIII).
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of organized criminal activities,” “combined state-federal interstate criminal activities,” and “all
general criminal investigations.” Thus, the legislature has limited SLED’s general authority to
criminal matters. Yet, SLED is collecting the time-stamped, geo-located data of South Carolinians
for whom there is no suspicion of unlawful conduct whatsoever. If the organic statute’s
program with merely the potential to aid criminal investigations, then the limitation to criminal
matters is hollow. SLED’s generic enabling statute would be the very type of blank check that the
nondelegation doctrine proscribes, giving SLED unrestrained power to create mass surveillance
Even if SLED’s organic statutes could be read to authorize the agency’s ALPR surveillance
program, and even if this Court determined such a vague delegation of authority did not violate
the nondelegation doctrine, SLED’s implementation of the program violates the state’s
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310 et seq. SLED is an
“agency” under the terms of the APA. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-10(1) (defining agencies as
“each state board, commission, department, executive department or officer … authorized by law
to make regulations or to determine contested cases”). As such, the APA requires SLED to provide
the public with notice and an opportunity to comment before promulgating any regulation. See
The APA defines “regulation” broadly: “Regulation means each agency statement of
general public applicability that implements or prescribes law or policy or practice requirements
of any agency.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-10(4). “Whether a particular agency creates a regulation
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or simply announces a general policy statement depends on whether the agency action establishes
a ‘binding norm.’” Joseph, 417 S.C. at 454, 790 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting Home Health Serv., Inc. v.
S.C. Tax Com’n, 312 S.C. 324, 328, 440 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1994)). “[W]hen there is a close question
whether a pronouncement is a policy statement or a regulation, the agency should promulgate the
ruling as a regulation in compliance with the APA.” Id. (citation and alteration omitted).
regulation subject to the APA’s requirements. See Complaint Ex. 3, Policy 13.40. By its plain
terms, the Policy establishes binding “guidelines” with which all users of SLED’s ALPR systems
must “abide.” Id. at 1; see also id. at 3-4. Specifically, Policy 13.40 regulates who may use ALPR
systems, id. at 3 (Subsection C), how the systems may be used, id. at 2-3 (Subsections A and C),
and who may access SLED’s ALPR database, id. at 4 (Subsection E). It also establishes a binding
rule for SLED’s retention of images generated by ALPR systems. Id. at 4 (Subsection F) (“SLED
will maintain data and images submitted to [SLED’s database] for a period of three years.”).
If there were any doubt as to whether Policy 13.40 establishes a “binding norm,” municipal
police departments themselves have stated their express understanding that the SLED policy is
binding on them. For example, Myrtle Beach Police Department Regulation # 276 provides that
the department “shall adhere to SLED policy and guidelines related to the storage and/or retrieval
of ALPR data as per South Carolina Law Enforcement Division Policy Statement 13:40,
Finally, SLED’s policy, and the program implemented pursuant to it, bind the public
generally: individuals cannot escape the ALPR cameras while traveling on many South Carolina
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roads, nor can they prevent their data from being stored in the database for three years. See
generally Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding that a technological change to TSA’s airport screening protocol was a regulation requiring
Accordingly, SLED was required to provide notice and an opportunity for public comment
before implementing its ALPR surveillance program. SLED has undertaken notice-and-comment
its DNA database (SLED Regulation 73-61, specifying standards for sample collection,
identification, and testing, among others); breathalyzer testing (SLED Regulations 73-3, 5); and
Uniform Crime Reporting (SLED Regulation 73-30). See S.C. Code Ann. Regs. Ch. 73, available
at https://www.scstatehouse.gov/coderegs/Chapter%2073.pdf.
SLED’s failure to engage in that same process here exacerbates the dearth of legislative
authorization for this program. Under the APA, formal regulations must be submitted to the
General Assembly for legislative approval or disproval, with few (inapposite) exceptions. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 1–23–120 (2015); Joseph, 417 S.C. at 461, 790 S.E.2d at 776 (Kittredge, J.,
concurring) (noting that, “[i]n South Carolina, to preserve some semblance of the separation of
powers we once held sacred, an administrative agency may not make law without legislative
oversight and approval”). Yet rather than promulgating and submitting ALPR regulations to the
legislature, SLED has tried to govern its entire statewide ALPR program with what it calls an
internal policy. By failing to subject its ALPR program to the lawful regulatory process, SLED
has insulated itself further from legislative review, foreclosed the availability of either post hoc
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In sum, SLED continues to operate its ALPR program without any legislative authorization
or compliance with the most basic principles of administrative rulemaking. This ongoing attack on
the doctrine of separation of powers makes this a matter of great public significance.
II. The Issues This Case Presents Are Urgent and Require Prompt Resolution.
The questions of significant public interest that this case raises require prompt resolution;
SLED’s unlawful and unaccountable surveillance program presents an ongoing, and growing,
violation of the South Carolina Constitution and administrative law. As with other cases over
which this Court has exercised its original jurisdiction, this case concerns illegitimate government
action with the potential to cause irreversible damage to both citizens and the state, including
through the expenditure of unrecoverable taxpayer dollars. See supra, at 5-6 (listing cases); see
also Am. Petroleum Inst. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 382 S.C. 572, 677 S.E.2d 16 (2009), holding
modified by S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. Lucas, 416 S.C. 269, 786 S.E.2d 124 (2016); Sloan v. Wilkins,
362 S.C. 430, 608 S.E.2d 579 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Am. Petroleum Inst. v. S.C.
Dep’t of Revenue, 382 S.C. 572, 677 S.E.2d 16 (2009). The scope of this illegal government action
and its potential for damage are rapidly expanding as SLED’s ALPR surveillance system
Finally, how the Court decides these issues will provide critical guidance for future state
programs that may rely on a host of other emerging surveillance technologies, such as facial
recognition, stingrays (used to track cell phone contacts and location), spyware, and drones.9 State
agencies need prompt and clear judicial guidance on what authorization is required to deploy these
9
See, e.g., Matthew Feeney, Facial Recognition Technology is Getting Out of Control, CATO INST.,
(Mar. 9, 2020), available at https://www.cato.org/commentary/facial-recognition-technology-
getting-out-control; Adam Bates, Stingray: A New Frontier in Police Surveillance, CATO INST.,
(Jan. 25, 2017), available at https://bit.ly/3WvjNsH.
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technologies going forward. Litigating those issues in the trial courts would prevent their prompt
resolution and cause prolonged legal uncertainty for law enforcement. At the same time, citizens
need judicial assurance that vast statewide law enforcement programs involving new surveillance
Only swift and final judicial disposition can mitigate these harms and provide the necessary
guidance. Swift resolution is possible here, as the case presents only legal questions that do not
require further factual development and discovery. The issues are questions of constitutional law
and statutory interpretation. There is no question as to whether SLED’s ALPR program exists. The
only question is whether that program is authorized by law. That issue is well-positioned to be
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant this Petition for Original Jurisdiction and
Respectfully submitted,
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(212) 992-6950
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
* Application for admission
pro hac vice forthcoming
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