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People v. Mamac
People v. Mamac
SYNOPSIS
In an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, herein
appellant was accused of raping Bernadette U. Enguito on two separate
occasion. The informations were respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
35,662-95 and 35,663-95, respectively. After a joint trial, the trial court found
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No.
35,662-95 and death in Criminal Case No. 35,663-95. Appellant did not contest
his conviction in Criminal Case No. 35,662-95, but in view of the penalty
imposed in Criminal Case No. 35,663-95, the case was forwarded to the Court
for automatic review.
The Supreme Court found the imposition of death penalty not proper. The
Court ruled that a reading of the information would reveal that the appellant
was only charged with simple rape under the first circumstance provided in
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The information simply provides that
appellant used threat and intimidation and of abuse of his moral ascendancy
over the victim to carry out the crime charged. Nowhere in the information can
any allegation be found of relationship and minority or the use of deadly
firearm. Since the qualifying circumstances were not proved, the appellant
cannot be sentenced to death. The judgment of the court a quo was affirmed,
subject to the modification that the appellant shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua only, and not death. ETHaDC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
PUNO, J : p
In two informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 15, 1 Modesto C. Mamac was accused of raping Bernadette U. Enguito
on two separate occasions. The informations were respectively docketed as
Criminal Case No. 35,662-95 and Criminal Case No. 35,663-95.
After a joint trial, the trial court found Mamac guilty beyond reasonable
doubt on both indictments. 2 Accordingly, it sentenced him as follows: LLjur
Appellant did not contest his conviction in Criminal Case No. 35,662-95.
Only Criminal Case No. 35,663-95 is before this Court on automatic review.
The information in Criminal Case No. 35,663-95 dated August 21, 1995
reads: 3
"That on or about August 16, 1995, in the City of Davao,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above-mentioned accused did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of intimidation, that is by then and there
threatening and intimidating Bernadette Enguito by killing her should
she not agree to submit herself to his criminal design and by his moral
ascendancy over said Bernadette Enguito, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge of said
Bernadette Enguito against her will and consent. LibLex
Contrary to law."
The records reveal that Bernadette 4 was sleeping inside their house
located at Toril, Davao City at 9 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1995 when
appellant came and woke her up. To rouse Bernadette from her sleep,
appellant poked her with a long stick while she was lying alongside her brother
and sister. When she opened the window to check, Bernadette saw appellant
outside brandishing a bolo. Appellant then menacingly ordered Bernadette to
go out of the house and brought her towards the Lipada River. Upon reaching
the bank of the river, appellant commanded Bernadette to take off her clothes
while pointing the bolo at her. Bernadette complied in fear. Then with appellant
sticking the bolo at Bernadette's neck, appellant forced himself upon
Bernadette despite the latter's resistance and plea. Bernadette was only
sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the sexual attack. llcd
We clarify first that Bernadette categorically stated in open court that she
went out of the house because appellant threatened to kill her family. 11 With
the display of the bolo and the utterance of foreboding words by appellant, it is
easy to understand why Bernadette left the safety of their house. Fear simply
overwhelmed Bernadette. She twice stressed that she was afraid when
appellant ordered her to go out of the house. 12
Be that as it may, we do not agree with the trial court's imposition of the
penalty of death upon appellant. It appears that the trial court considered
appellant as Bernadette's step-grandfather. On the other hand, the Solicitor
General 16 justifies the imposition of the death penalty because of appellant's
employment of a deadly weapon to consummate the rape. cdll
Rape with the use of a deadly weapon was introduced in Article 335 by
Republic Act No. 4111 17 on June 20, 1964 and the rape of a minor by a relative
was introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 18 on December 31, 1993. Both types
of rape were recognized as qualified rape in People vs. Tabugoca. 19
A reading of the information will reveal that appellant was only charged
with simple rape under the first circumstance provided in Article 335.
Unadorned of its auxiliary words, the information accuses appellant of
employing threat and intimidation and of abusing his moral ascendancy over
Bernadette to carry out the rape. The information does not contain any
allegation of relationship and minority nor the use of a deadly weapon. The
information therefore does not charge appellant with qualified rape and he
cannot be sentenced to death. LibLex
We have held that the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
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relationship to the offender is a special qualifying circumstance which should
be alleged in the information to warrant imposition of the death penalty. 20
Minority and relationship are treated as special qualifying circumstances and
not merely as aggravating circumstances because they increase the imposable
penalties by degrees. 21
Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if
not alleged, a qualifying aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged
in the information. 22 It must be properly pleaded in order not to violate the
constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him. 23 Needless to state, appellant will be denied
due process if after being charged with simple rape, he is convicted of its
qualified form punishable with death. 24
We hasten to add that appellant is not a step-grandfather of Bernadette.
Appellant himself admitted that he co-habited and lived with the maternal
grandmother of Bernadette without the benefit of marriage. 25 The word "step,"
when used as prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to
blood relationship and is indicative of a relationship by affinity. 26 Since no
relationship by affinity can be established between Bernadette and appellant,
appellant cannot be considered as the step-grandfather of Bernadette.
At the most, appellant can be described as the common law husband of
Bernadette's grandmother. As such, appellant is not a "parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent" of Bernadette. 27 In a similar
case, we ruled that courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law
which are not embraced by it to the end that no person who is clearly not within
the terms of statute can be brought within them. 28 Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. LLjur
Footnotes
1. Presided over by Judge Jesus V. Quitain.