Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Republic vs. Obercido
Republic vs. Obercido
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a
definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question
of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision 1
dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23 and its Resolution 2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph
of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 3
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She,
Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue,
San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for
legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent's situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and
not of judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to
his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed
before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition — Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and
for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent,
praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also
ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell
on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent
of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As
so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses
who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses
of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted
and made into law only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. 11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of
the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties
appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,
the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization
of respondent's wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that
the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he
is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 20-22.
2. Id. at 27-29.
3. Id. at 21-22.
4. Id. at 105.
5. Id. at 106-110.
6. Id. at 110.
7. Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
8. Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364
SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November
1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
9. Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
10. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
13. Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA
33, 38.
14. Garcia v. Recio , G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
15. Id. at 451.