THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 206529, April 23, 2018 ]

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
There can be no case for illegal termination of employment when there was no termination by the employer. While, in
illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show just cause for termination of employment, such a
burden arises only if the complaining employee has shown, by substantial evidence, the fact of termination by the
employer.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the
assailed November 29, 2012 Decision[2] and March 26, 2013 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
124993 be reversed and set aside.

The assailed Court of Appeals November 29, 2012 Decision found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
National Labor Relations Commission in rendering its January 11, 2012 Decision,[4] which affirmed Labor Arbiter
Renell Joseph R. Dela Cruz's (Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz) October 11, 2011 Decision.[5] Labor Arbiter Del a Cruz's
Decision dismissed petitioner Renante B. Remoticado's (Remoticado) Complaint for illegal dismissal after a finding
that he voluntarily resigned. The assailed Court of Appeals March 26, 2013 Resolution denied his Motion for
Reconsideration.

Remoticado's services were engaged by Typical Construction Trading Corporation (Typical Construction) as a
helper/laborer in its construction projects, the most recent being identified as the Jedic Project at First Industrial Park
in Batangas.[6]

In separate sworn statements, Pedro Nielo (Nielo), Typical Construction's Field Human Resources Officer, and two
(2) of Remoticado's co-workers, Salmero Pedros and Jovito Credo,[7] recalled that on December 6, 2010, Remoticado
was absent without an official leave. He remained absent until December 20, 2010 when, upon showing up, he
informed Nielo that he was resigning. Prodded by Nielo for his reason, Remoticado noted that they were "personal
reasons considering that he got sick."[8] Nielo advised Remoticado to return the following day as he still had to report
Remoticado's resignation to Typical Construction's main office, and as his final pay had yet to be computed.[9]

Remoticado returned the following day and was handed P5,082.53 as his final pay. He protested, saying that he was
entitled to "separation pay computed at two (2) months for his services for two (2) years."[10] In response, Nielo
explained that Remoticado could not be entitled to separation pay considering that he voluntarily resigned. Nielo
added that if Remoticado was not satisfied with P5,082.53, he was free to continue working for Typical Construction.
However, Remoticado was resolute and proceeded to sign and affix his thumb marks on a Kasulatan ng Pagbawi ng
Karapatan at Kawalan ng Paghahabol, a waiver and quitclaim.[11]

On January 10, 2011,[12] Remoticado filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Typical Construction and its owner
and operator, Rommel M. Alignay (Alignay).[13] He claimed that on December 23, 2010, he was told to stop reporting
for work due to a "debt at the canteen"[14] and thereafter was prevented from entering Typical Construction's
premises.[15]

In a Decision[16] dated October 11, 2011, Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz dismissed Remoticado's Complaint for lack of merit.
He explained that Remoticado's employment could not have been illegally terminated as he voluntarily resigned.[17]

In its January 11, 2012 Decision,[18] the National Labor Relations Commission denied Remoticado's appeal.

In its assailed November 29, 2012 Decision,[19] the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the National Labor Relations Commission. In its assailed March 26, 2013 Resolution,[20] the Court of Appeals denied
Remoticado's Motion for Reconsideration.

Undeterred by the consistent rulings of the Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relations Commission, and Labor
Arbiter Dela Cruz, Remoticado filed the present Petition.[21]

For resolution is the issue of whether petitioner Renante B. Remoticado voluntarily resigned or his employment was
illegally terminated in the manner, on the date, and for the reason he averred in his complaint.

The Petition lacks merit.

Determining which between two (2) alternative versions of events actually transpired and ascertaining the specifics of
how, when, and why one of them occurred involve factual issues resting on the evidence presented by the parties.

It is basic that factual issues are improper in Rule 45 petitions. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
[22]
 only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The rule, however, admits of exceptions.
In Pascual v. Burgos:[23]
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions tiled under Rule 45. This court is
not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final,
binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt" when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings
of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.

However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present, there
are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this court involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal
cases.[24] (Citations omitted)
No exception avails in this case.

Quite glaring is the sheer consistency of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relations
Commission, and Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz.

Not only are these findings uniform, but they are also sustained by evidence. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled
that there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission.

II

It is petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relations Commission, and Labor Arbiter Dela
Cruz are all in error for failing to see that Typical Construction failed to discharge its supposed burden of proving the
validity of his dismissal. He asserts that such failure leaves no other conclusion than that his employment was illegally
terminated.[25]

It is petitioner who is in error.

It is true that in illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to prove that termination of employment
was for a just cause. Logic dictates, however, that the complaining employee must first establish by substantial
evidence the fact of termination by the employer.[26] If there is no proof of termination by the employer, there is no
point in even considering the cause for it. There can be no illegal termination when there was no termination:
Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish
by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question
as to the legality or illegality thereof.[27]
Petitioner here insists on his version of events, that is, that on December 23, 2010, he was told to stop reporting for
work on account of his supposed indebtedness at the canteen. This bare insistence, however, is all that petitioner
has. He failed to present convincing evidence. Even his basic narrative is bereft of supporting details that could be
taken as badges of veracity. As the Court of Appeals underscored, "[P]etitioner only made a general statement that
he was illegally dismissed . . . He did not state how he was terminated [or] mentioned who prevented him from
reporting for work."[28]

III
In contrast with petitioner's bare allegation are undisputed facts and pieces of evidence adduced by respondents,
which cast serious doubt on the veracity of petitioner's recollection of events.

It is not disputed that the establishment identified as Bax Canteen, to which petitioner owed P2,115.00, is not owned
by, or otherwise connected with any of the respondents, or with any of Typical Construction's owners, directors, or
officers. There was also no showing that any of the two (2) respondents, or anyone connected with Typical
Construction, was prejudiced or even just inconvenienced by petitioner's indebtedness. It appears that Bax Canteen
was merely in the proximity of the site of Typical Construction's Jedic Project. Petitioner failed to show why Typical
Construction would go out of its way to concern itself with the affairs of another company. What stands, therefore, is
the sheer improbability that Typical Construction would take petitioner's indebtedness as an infraction, let alone as a
ground for terminating his employment.[29]

The waiver and quitclaim bearing petitioner's signature and thumbmarks was d9Jed December 21, 2010,[30] predating
petitioner's alleged illegal termination by two (2) days. If indeed petitioner was told to stop reporting for work on
December 23, 2010, it does not make sense for Typical Construction to have petitioner execute a waiver and
quitclaim two (2) full days ahead of the termination of his employment. It would have been a ludicrous move for an
employer that is purportedly out to outwit someone into unemployment.

The waiver and quitclaim could very well have been antedated. But it is not for this Court to sustain a mere
conjecture. It was for petitioner to allege and prove any possibility of antedating. He did not do so. In any case, even if
this Court were to indulge a speculation, there does not appear to be any cogent reason for antedating. To the
contrary, antedating the waiver and quitclaim was an unnecessary complication considering that any simulation of
resignation would have already been served by petitioner's mere affixing of his signature. Antedating would just have
been an inexplicably asinine move on the part of respondents.

What is most crucial is that petitioner has never disavowed the waiver and quitclaim.[31] It does not appear also that
petitioner has accounted for why this document exists, such as by alleging that he was coerced into executing it.

Jurisprudence frowns upon waivers and quitclaims forced upon employees. Waivers and quitclaims are, however, not
invalid in themselves. When shown to be freely executed, they validly discharge an employer from liability to an
employee. "[A] legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the
courts as the law between the parties."[32] In Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation v. Ativo:[33]
It is true that the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by employees who have been inveigled or
pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities and frustrate just
claims of employees. In certain cases, however, the Court has given effect to quitclaims executed by employees if the
employer is able to prove the following requisites, to wit: (1) the employee executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily;
(2) there is no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable; and (4) the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Our pronouncement in Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission on this matter cannot be more explicit:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what
he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized
as a valid and binding undertaking.[34] (Citations omitted)
Petitioner's barren tale of his employer's order for him to stop reporting for work is hardly the requisite "clear proof
that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person."[35] Indeed, courts and tribunals should not be
so gullible as to lend validity to every waiver and quitclaim confronting them. However, neither should they be so
foolhardy as to believe a complaining employee's narrative at the mere sight or mention of a waiver or quitclaim.

IV

Petitioner here would have this Court rule in his favor when he does absolutely nothing more than entreat the doctrine
on an employer's burden to prove just cases for terminating employment. It is as though this invocation was a magic
spell that would win the day for him regardless of whether or not he is able to discharge his primordial burden of
proving the occurrence of termination. This Court cannot fall for this. The task of adjudication demands more than
convenient conclusions obtained through handy invocations. Rather, it requires a meticulous appraisal of evidence
and legal bases.
Petitioner is utterly wanting, both in evidence and legal bases. This Court cannot be so witless as to rule in his favor.
With an utter dearth of proof in petitioner's favor, the consistent findings of the Court of Appeals, the National Labor
Relations Commission, and the Labor Arbiter must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed November 29, 2012 Decision and
March 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124993 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

June 19, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 23, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in
the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on June 19, 2018 at 10:10 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V.
LAPITAN
  Division Clerk of Court

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 13-36.

 Id. at 214-226. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by Associate
[2]

Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Danton Q. Bueser of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[3]
 Id. at 241-242. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by Associate
Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Danton Q. Bueser of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

 Id. at 62-69. The Decision, docketed as NLRC LAC No. 11-003025-11 (NLRC RAB-IV-03-00317-11-L), was
[4]

penned by Commissioner Napoleon M. Menese and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and
Commissioner Teresita D. Castillon-Lora of the Second Division, National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.
[5]
 Id. at 72-80.
[6]
 Id. at 65.
[7]
 Id. at 66 and 76-77.
[8]
 Id. at 65.
[9]
 Id.
[10]
 Id.
[11]
 Id. at 65-66.
[12]
 Id. at 76.
[13]
 Id. at 15.
[14]
 Id. at 73.
[15]
 Id. at 215.
[16]
 Id. at 72-80.
[17]
 Id. at 79.
[18]
 Id. at 62-69.
[19]
 Id. at 214-226.
[20]
 Id. at 241-242.
[21]
 Id. at 13-36.
[22]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
[23]
 Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/171722.pdf> [Per J. Leonen,
Second Division].
[24]
 Id. at 10-11.
[25]
 Rollo, pp. 22-28.
[26]
 Doctor v. NII Enterprises, G.R. No. 194001, November 22, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/november2017/194001.pdf> 9 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division] citing MZR
Industries v. Colambot, 716 Phil. 617, 624 (2013).
[27]
 Id.
[28]
 Rollo, p. 223.
[29]
 Id. at 223-224.
[30]
 Id. at 66.
[31]
 Id. at 221.
[32]
 Talam v. National Labor Relations Commission, 631 Phil. 405, 423 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division], citing
Veloso and Liguaton v. DOLE, et al., 277 Phil. 230 (1992) (Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[33]
 625 Phil. 102 (2010) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
[34]
 Id. at 107-108.
[35]
 Rollo, pp. 222-223.