BOARD OF STATE CANVASSERS FOR THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, IN THE MATTER OF THE RECOUNT OF 2022 MICHIGAN PROPOSAL #2 of 2022. NOW COMES JEROME JAY ALLEN, the undersigned, an elector in this state of Michigan identified with their full name and jurisdiction of registration below their signature and pursuant to MCL 168.880 hereby presents and files with the secretary of state this sworn, printed petition that the undersigned electors believe that there has been fraud or error committed (1) by the inspectors of election in the return made; and (2) by the county canvassing board in the canvass of votes cast upon the questions of the proposed amendment to the constitution known as proposal 2 of 2022. FURTHER that pursuant to MCL 168.865 this sworn petition sets forth the nature of the mistakes or frauds complained and identifies the city, ward, township, and precinct in which they are alleged to have occurred so that there may be a correction of the mistakes. FURTHER that pursuant to MCL 168.881(1) this petition shall be filed with the state bureau of elections. FURTHER that pursuant to MCL 168,881(6) the sum of $5,875 representing $125 per precinct for 47 precincts as the votes separating the questions were reported as greater than 0.5%. The precincts affected are listed in the attachment which identifies the county, the jurisdiction (City/Ward or Township), and the precinct (or in the case of the City of Detroit the AVCB and precinct. The following mistakes or frauds complained of have resulted in a belief by the undersigned electors that there is fraud or error which requires a recount by hand that will result in a correction of the statement of votes cast: FRAUD OR MISTAKE NUMBER 1: Configuration of voting systems is not certified to meet or exceed VVSG 2.0 by an accredited VVSG The Votes were counted by use of a ‘voting system’ that was not certified (or recertified), as configured, to the WSG 2.0 by an accredited laboratory as required by HAVA. HAVA The Help America Vote Act of 2002 earl Rn atl pblaateh prank ‘1) The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) in Section 301(a)(6) sets forth the requirements that required each state to set forth non- discriminatory standards for what constitutes a vote for each voting system that is used in the state. 2) The definition of a voting system per HAVA Section 301(b)(2)(e) includes the instructions given to a voter on how to mark the ballot. 3) HAVA created the US Election Assistance Commission with the authority to provide a regulatory process ro accredit Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTL) 4) These VSTLs are authorized to certify each voting system as configured for use as meeting or exceeding standards called the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 5) The VVSG has been in effect since 2021. 6) Michigan passed legislation that mandates the implementation of a statewide, uniform voting system and requires it to meet the requirements of HAVA (PA 91 of 2002). 7) HAVA in Section 253 Condition for receipt of Funds specifies the certification of compliance that was required by each state which included a plan for performance goals and measures and included requirements that the state would maintain the standards, The conditions were lengthy but mandatory upon receipt of funds. 8) The Federal Register with all the other states and territories published the original Michigan plan on March 24, 2004, but then Secretary of State Terri Land submitted an amended state plan dated September 27, 2005, which was published on November 9, 2005. There is no evidence that this plan has been updated subsequently on the internet or readily accessible records of the MI SOS or US EAC. On page 31 of the State Plan, the document reads: IV. Voting System Guidelines and Processes How the State will adopt voting system guidelines and processes, which are consistent with the requirements of section 301. -- HAVA §254(a)(4) Michigan has adopted legislation that mandates the implementation of a statewide, uniform voting system (PA 91 of 2002). The voting system selected will meet the requirements of Section 301 of the Help America Vote Act, including all accessibility requirements, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE IN STATE OR FEDERAL RECORDS that any Michigan voting system has been certified (or recertified) by a VSTL as meeting or exceeding the requirements of VSG 2.0 , as configured.THEREFORE, there is a belief that the voting system, as configured, is not qualified by law to accurately count the ballots and that a hand recount will result in a different vote total. FRAUD OR MISTAKE NUMBER 2: Digital Adjudication Software Furthermore, certain AVCBs have used digital adjudication software as an optional application offered by the vendors. This specific software digital adjudication application violates both HAVA Section 301(a) (6) and Michigan Election Law (MCL 168.803) as it allows for the ‘manipulation, alteration or transformation of the ballot image” to alter the voter’s mark to what the adjudicator decides was the voter's intent. ‘The AVCBs identified by Chris Thomas and poll challengers include as the boards for the (1) County of Wayne in the Cities of Livonia and Detroit; (2) County of Oakland in the Cities of Farmington Hills, Rochester Hills, and Troy (3) County of Washtenaw, City of Ann Arbor (4) County of Muskegon, City of Muskegon (5) County of Ingham, City of Lansing and (6) County of Kent City of Grand Rapids are collectively referred to AVCBs with Adjudication Software. THERE IS A BELIEF THAT THIS SOFTWARE HAS RESULTED IN VOTES BEING COUNTED FROM BALLOTS THAT HAVE BEEN ALTERED BY THE ADJUDICATORS FRAUD OR MISTAKE NUMBER 3: Violation of MCL 168.795(2) A ballot that is voted in person improperly is to be rejected by the tabulator under Federal and Michigan Law to permit the voter an opportunity to self- correct the ballot or have it spoiled. An absentee ballot that is rejected by the tabulator is to be rejected. To reduce the risk, federal law sets forth the process to educate and instruct the elector to limit the occurrences of a ballot being filled out improperly. HAVA Section 301(a)(1). There is no process in Michigan to save part of a ballot when the ballot is rejected. MCL 168.795(2) Electronic tabulating equipment that tabulates ballots, including absentee ballots, at a central location must be programmed to reject a ballot if the choices recorded on an elector's ballot for an office or a question exceed the number that the elector is entitled to vote for on that office or question, if no valid choices are recorded on an clector’s ballot,or if, ina primary election, votes are recorded for candidates of more than 1 political party. Instead, as observed and reported on November 3, 2022, by Chris Thomas (formerly the Director of the Michigan Bureau of Elections for various Secretaries of State from 1980 to 2017 then a consultant for the City of Detroit for November 2020-2022) who during a hearing in the 3" Circuit Court for the County of Wayne in Karamo, et all v City of Detroit Clerk, Case No. 22-012-759AW, that the rest of an overvoted ballot was counted without the race which was overvoted at the Detroit AVCB using the ImageCast Central™ Software from Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. with the adjudication application. THEREFORE, there is a good faith belief that ballots that are to be rejected by law have been counted improperly at the AVCBs using adjudication software and high-speed scanning devices. FRAUD OR MISTAKE NUMBER 4: Use of Voting system in violation of MCL 168.795a HAVA Section 304 makes it very clear that the federal minimum requirements for voting systems are a minimum. States are free to have more restrictive laws on the books. MCLA 168.795a states an express prohibition on the use of an electronic voting system unless it meets three separate requirements. The third of these requirements has not been met. There is no standards or independent testing authority recognized by the national association of state election inspectors. This was confirmed in the hearing on November 3, 2022 referenced above in the testimony of Chris Thomas who opined that this law was outdated. MCL 168,79Sa (1) An electronic voting system shall not be used in an election unless itis approved by the board of state canvassers as meeting the requirements of sections 794 and 795 and instructions regarding recounts of ballots cast on that electronic voting system that have been issued by the secretary of state, unless section 797c has been complied with, and unless it meets 1 of the following conditions: (a) Is certified by an independent testing authority aceredited by the national association of slate election directors and by the board of state canvassers. (b) In the absence of an accredited independent testing authority, is certified by the ‘manufacturer of the voting system as meeting or exceeding the performance and test standards referenced in subdivision (a) in a manner prescribed by the board of state canvassers. There is no legal means to disregard this law by the executive branch. The law must be enforced until repealed or held to be unconstitutional by ajudicial branch official. The rule of law does not allow the executive branch to select which laws it will follow. However, the Secretary of State has required alll election clerks to use a voting system in violation of MCL 168.795a. THEREFORE, there is a belief that the voting system is not qualified by law to accurately count the ballots and that a hand recount will result in a different vote total, MISTAKE OR FRAUD NUMBER 5: TABULATORS CONNECTED TO THE INTERNET Michigan required all manufacturers of tabulators during procurement to assure that the tabulators would not be connected to the internet and that data would be transferred by removable storage drive to the Election Management System. This was to prevent a foreign or domestic criminal from accessing the tabulator while it is processing ballots. In reliance upon these representations, the systems lack individual cybersecurity protections as the tabulators were reported offline and without the capacity to go online. However, recent information has developed where certain systems have cellular modems in them. Further, Security logs from tabulators have shown that the tabulators are in fact both capable of transmitting online and are configured to transmit online and have transmitted online during the August 2, 2022, primary election. The tabulators have not changed their capabilities since August. Tabulators in the AVCB using central election software are both wired together and online. It is believed that this creates both an illegal configuration and that this creates a vulnerability to ‘hack’ the election results. Recent reports of machines reporting inaccurate results in Cherokee Kansas, DeKalb County Georgia, and Williamson County Tennessee have only been discovered by hand counting ballots. The mechanism of the errors which changed the outcome of three elections after the hand recount is unknown. There is still questions concerning how Antrim County reported in 2020 General election more votes in three precincts and misreported both the presidential election and at least one down-ballot issue. The connectivity, whether the secretary of state believes it or not, creates the opportunity that the machine can be accessed by hackers, foreign or domestic, and has created a belief that requires hand-count to correct the error in the tally.MISTAKE OR FRAUD NUMBER 6. E-poll books connected to the internet Michigan has required the use of e poll books and has required the e poll books to be air-gapped (not connected to the internet) during the tabulation of votes. During the August 2, 2022 primary an e-poll book reportedly crashed in St. Clair County and per the affidavit when the Secretary of State was contacted they said the problem was on their end and re-set the e-poll book remotely. During the November 8, 2022 General Election, it has been reported by Kate Riley from the Wayne County Board of Canvasser that many, many precincts in Detroit experienced simultaneous failure of the e- poll book which resulted in a conversation with the Secretary of State Bureau of Elections Director Brater who reported the error had been addressed by the State, that Detroit was not at fault, and that the election was secure. This is strong evidence again of connectivity. The e-poll book connectivity is a significant issue of the integrity of the elections especially when the tabulator count is required to be matched against the number in the e-poll book. Based on the connectivity of the e-poll book, there is a good faith belief that a recount will permit the board of examiners to determine how this connectivity affected the canvass. MISTAKE OR FRAUD NUMBER 6: Examination of the return shows that there is a significant deviation from the top of the tickets and the bottom of the ticket in many, many precincts which is contrary to the manner in which people vote. There is up to a 20-point difference in some precincts between the top three races and the local races. This voting has to be interpreted that the Republican voters who cast votes for local Republican candidates rejected the candidates for Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State or contrary that the Democratic Voters who cast votes in support of the top three races then rejected the Democratic Candidates down the ballot. This spread creates a belief that there have been votes that have been recorded improperly as this does not reflect normal voting behavior-especially considering the candidates and the polarizing of the two parties in this election. The canvass on the proposals is similar to the top of the ticket, As such there is a belief that the results are not genuine. This phenomenon is also reported in Arizona which is hotly contested. There is a belief that the recount will show that a hand count of the ballots will correct the mistake of fraud in the canvass.CONCLUSION ‘A recount of the November 2022 election will allow each county that is challenged to examine the paper record and hand count to comply with a lawful count of the paper ballots. While this will not address the widespread concerns about ballots being injected into the election for voters that are not real or eligible to vote, the examination of the paper record will remedy the objection raised related to the voting system being used in violation of MCL 168,795a and when the system Is not certified, as configured, be an accredited VSTL. Further, the concerns related to the voting system and the e-poll book being connected to the internet contrary to representations creating a significant risk of foreign or domestic hacking will be addressed. Finally, the board of canvassers has the ability to hand count the ballots and apply the law related to MCL 168.798(2) to save votes on a ballot that is required to be rejected by law and eliminate the digital adjudication of ballots to count only properly marked ballots. Being under oath, the following undersigned elector declare that he believes that there is fraud or mistake in the canvass of the precincts listed in Attachment A and hereby deposit the sum of money requesting a recount of the precincts listed for the correction of error. I declare under penalty of perjury that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. CEN 11/29/22 Precinct 6, Bloomfield Township Oakland County Michigan Notary Acknowledgement The State of Michigan County of Oakland Acknowledged before me in Oakland County, Michigan on 11/29/22 (the date by Aug) (name of signatory). Notary Pyblic Signature Print (Eus LApie Title in _Mpnircen My commission expires: 3 -| -0?3. Acting in Oakland County | yp sat sacar [ashy Sntecon ot AbLana.—_|ATTACHMENT A # | COUNTY JURISDICTION | PRECINCT # 7 KALAMAZOO KALAMAZOO TOWNSHIP 3 2 KALAMAZOO OSHTEMO TOWNSHIP 2 3. KALAMAZOO PORTAGE CITY 8 4 KALAMAZOO RICHLAND TOWNSHIP 3 5 KALAMAZOO TEXAS TOWNSHIP 4 6 KALAMAZOO TEXAS TOWNSHIP 5 7 MACOMB CHESTERFIELD TOWNSHIP 4 8 MACOMB CHESTERFIELD TOWNSHIP 7 8 MACOMB CHESTERFIELD TOWNSHIP 9 10 MACOMB CLINTON TOWNSHIP 1 a1 MACOMB CLINTON TOWNSHIP 15 12 MACOMB —_ CLINTON TOWNSHIP 38 13. MACOMB HARRISON TOWNSHIP 7 14 MACOMB = MACOMB TOWNSHIP 1 15 MACOMB — MACOMB TOWNSHIP 7 16 MACOMB — MACOMB TOWNSHIP 8 MACOMB SHELBY TOWNSHIP 5 MACOMB SHELBY TOWNSHIP 18 MACOMB SHELBY TOWNSHIP 26 MACOMB SHELBY TOWNSHIP 27 MUSKEGON MUSKEGON CITY 2007 | MUSKEGON MUSKEGON CITY 4ott | MUSKEGON MUSKEGON CITY 4012 | MUSKEGON MUSKEGON CITY 4013 | MUSKEGON MUSKEGON CITY 4014 | 26 OAKLAND —TROYCITY 2 27 OAKLAND TROY CITY 3 28 OAKLAND — TROY CITY 4 | 29 OAKLAND TROY CITY 5 | 30 OAKLAND TROY CITY 7 | 32 OAKLAND TROY CITY 8 32 OAKLAND TROY CITY 8 33 OAKLAND TROY CITY 10 34 OAKLAND TROY CITY 14 35 OAKLAND TROY CITY 12 36 OAKLAND TROY CITY 14 37 OAKLAND TROY CITY 1838. 39 40 a4 a2 43 4a, 45, 46 a7. OAKLAND OAKLAND ‘OAKLAND ‘OAKLAND OAKLAND OAKLAND OAKLAND OAKLAND ‘OAKLAND OAKLAND TROY CITY TROY CITY TROY CITY TROY CITY TROY CITY TROY CITY TROY CITY TROY CITY TROY CITY TROY CITY 16 7 18 19 20 23 26ADDENDUM: Referenced Laws 168.880 Recount of votes; petition by elector on constitutional amendment or question, deadline, contents. Any elector in this state who believes that there has been fraud or error committed by the inspectors of election In the return made by said inspectors or of any county canvassing board in the canvass of votes cast upon the question of a proposed amendment to the constitution or any other question or proposition, the votes for which are canvassed by the board of state canvassers, may, not later than 2 days after final certification and determination by the board of state canvassers of the canvass of votes cast at an election, present to and file with the secretary of state a written or printed petition which shall be sworn to by the elector presenting the same and which shall set forth as nearly as may be the nature and character of the fraud or error of which the complaint is made and the counties, cities or townships or the precincts thereof in which it is believed that the fraud or error occurred, and such petition shall contain a prayer that a correction thereof be made by a recount of the votes cast therein. 168.881 Recount peti n; filing; depo: 7 refund; disposition of sum deposited. (1) A person filing a recount petition under section 879 or 880 shall file the petition with the state bureau of elections. Except as otherwise provided in this section, at the time of filing the petition, the petitioner shall deposit the sum of $25.00 for each precinct in which a recount of the votes is demanded in cash or by check or other negotiable instrument made payable to the state of Michigan. ore (6) If the vote is on a proposal and the official canvass of votes shows that the number of votes separating the "yes" votes and the “no" votes is more than 50 votes or 0.5% of the total number of votes cast on the proposal, whichever is greater, the petitioner shall deposit with the state bureau of elections the sum of $125.00 for each precinct referred to in his or her petition. 168.865 Recount petition; contents. Such petition shall be sworn to and shall set forth as near as may be the nature of the mistakes or frauds complained of and the city, ward, township, village and precinct in which they are alleged to have occurred, and shall ask for a correction thereof.HAVA Section 301(a) REQUIREMENTS.—Each voting system used in an election for Federal office shall meet the following requirements: (1) IN GENERAL.— (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting system (including any lever voting system, optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) shall— (i) permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted; (ii) provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and (ili) if the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office— (I) notify the voter that the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot; (II) notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple votes for the office; and (III) provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted. (B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central count voting system (including in ballots), may meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by— H. R. 3295—40 (i) establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system that notifies each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an office; and (ii) providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted (including instructions on how to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error). (C) The voting system shall ensure that any notification required under this paragraph preserves the p HAVA Section 301 (a) (6) UNIFORM DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A VOTE.— Each State shall adopt uniform and nondiscriminatory standards that define what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each category of voting system used in the State.HAVA Section 301 (b) VOTING SYSTEM DEFINED.—In this section, the term “voting system” means— (1) the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used— (A) to define ballots; (8) to cast and count votes; (C) to report or display election results; and (D) to maintain and produce any audit trail information; and (2) the practices and associated documentation used— (A) to identify system components and versions of such components; (B) to test the system during its development and maintenance; (C) to maintain records of system errors and defects; (D) to determine specific system changes to be made to a system after the initial qualification of the system; and (E) to make available any materials to the voter (such as notices, instructions, forms, or paper ballots). HAVA Section 304. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. The requirements established by this title are minimum requirements and nothing in this title shall be construed to prevent a State from establishing election technology and administration requirements that are more strict than the requirements established under this title so long as such State requirements are not inconsistent with the Federal requirements under this title or any law described in section 906. 168.803 Counting and recounting of votes; intent of voter; stray marks; instructions issued by secretary of state. Sec. 803. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, the following rules govern the counting and recounting of votes: (2) If it is clearly evident from an examination of a ballot that the ballot has been mutilated for the purpose of distinguishing it or that there has beenplaced on the ballot some mark, printing, or writing for the purpose of distinguishing it, then that ballot is void and shall not be counted. (b) A cross, the intersection of which is within or on the line of the proper circle or square, or a check mark, the angle of which is within a circle or square, is valid. Crosses or check marks otherwise located on the ballot are void. (c) Marks other than crosses or check marks used to designate the intention of the voter shall not be counted. (d) A cross is valid even though 1 or both lines of the cross are duplicated, if the lines intersect within or on the line of the square or circle. (e) Two lines meeting within or on the line of the square or circle, although not crossing each other, are valid if it is apparent that the voter intended to make a cross. (F) A failure to properly mark a ballot as to 1 or more candidates does not alone invalidate the entire ballot if the ballot has been properly marked as to other candidates, unless the improper marking is determined to be 2 distinguishing mark as described in this subsection. (g) Erasures and corrections on a ballot made by the elector in a manner frequently used for this purpose shall not be considered distinguishing marks or mutilations. (h) A ballot or part of a ballot from which it is impossible to determine the elector's choice of candidate is void as to the candidate or candidates affected by that determination. (i) A vote cast for a deceased candidate is void and shall not be counted, except that a vote cast for a candidate for governor who has died, and for whom a replacement has not been made, shall be counted for the candidate for lieutenant governor of that party. (J) A ballot cast that Is not counted shall be marked by the inspector "not counted", kept separate from the others by being tied or held in 1 package, and placed in the ballot box with the counted ballots. (k) A vote shall not be counted for a candidate unless a cross or a check mark has been placed by the voter in the square before the space in which the name of the candidate has been printed, written, or placed. (2) If an electronic voting system requires that the elector place a mark in a predefined area on the ballot in order to cast a vote, the vote shall not be considered valid unless there is a mark within the predefined area. A stray mark made within a predefined area is not a valid vote. In determining whether a mark within a predefined area is a stray mark, the board of canvassers or election official shall compare the mark with other marks appearing on the ballot. The secretary of state shall issue instructions, subject to the approval of the board of state canvassers, relevant to stray marks to ensure the fairness and uniformity of determinations made under this subsection. A secretary of state's instruction relevant to stray marksshall not be applied to a ballot unless the secretary of state issued the instruction not less than 63 days before the date of the election. 168.795 Electronic voting system; requirements; method for rendering electronic tabulating equipment inoperable; equipping each polling place with accessible voting device. Sec. 795. (1) An electronic voting system acquired or used under sections 794 to 799a must meet all of the following requirements: (a) Provide for voting in secrecy, except in the case of voters who receive assistance as provided by this act. (b) Utilize a paper ballot for tabulating purposes. (c) Permit each elector to vote at an election all persons and offices for whom and for which the elector is lawfully entitled to vote; to vote for as many persons for an office as the elector is entitled to vote for; and to vote for or against any question upon which the elector is entitled to vote. Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, the electronic tabulating equipment must reject all choices recorded on the elector's ballot for an office or a question if the number of choices exceeds the number that the elector is entitled to vote for on that office or question. Electronic tabulating equipment that can detect that the choices recorded on an elector's ballot for an office or a question exceeds the number that the elector is entitled to vote for on that office or question must be located at each polling place and programmed to reject a ballot containing that type of an error. If a choice on a ballot is rejected as provided in this subdivision, an elector must be given the opportunity to have that ballot considered a spoiled ballot and to vote another ballot. (d) Permit an elector, at a presidential election, by a single selection to vote for the candidates of a party for president, vice-president, and presidential electors. (e) Permit an elector in a primary election to vote for the candidates in the party primary of the elector's choice. Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, the electronic tabulating equipment must reject each ballot on which votes are cast for candidates of more than 1 political party. Electronic tabulating equipment that can detect that the elector has voted for candidates of more than 1 political party must be located at each polling place and programmed to reject a ballot containing that type of an error. Ifa choice on a ballot is rejected as provided in this subdivision, an elector must be given the opportunity to have that ballot considered a spoiled ballot and to vote another ballot.(f) Prevent an elector from voting for the same person more than once for the same office. (g) Reject a ballot on which no valid vote is cast. Electronic tabulating equipment must be programmed to reject a ballot on which no valid vote is cast. (h) Be suitably designed for the purpose used; be durably constructed; and be designed to provide for safety, accuracy, and efficiency. (i) Be designed to accommodate the needs of an elderly voter or a person with 1 or more disabilities. (J) Record correctly and count accurately each vote properly cast. (k) Provide an audit trail. (I) Provide an acceptable method for an elector to vote for a person whose name does not appear on the ballot. (m) Allow for accumulation of vote totals from the precincts in the jurisdiction. The accumulation software must meet specifications prescribed by the secretary of state and must be certified by the secretary of state as meeting these specifications. (n) Be compatible with or include at least 1 voting device that is accessible for an individual with disabilities to vote in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation, including secrecy and independence, as provided for other voters. The voting device must include nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually Impaired. (2) Electronic tabulating equipment that counts votes at the precinct before the close of the polls must provide a method for rendering the equipment inoperable if vote totals are revealed before the close of the polls. Electronic tabulating equipment that tabulates ballots, including absentee ballots, at a central location must be programmed to reject a ballot if the choices recorded on an elector's ballot for an office or a question exceed the number that the elector is entitled to vote for on that office or question, if no valid choices are recorded on an elector's ballot, or if, in a primary election, votes are recorded for candidates of more than 1 political party. (3) Each jurisdiction in this state conducting an election shall equip each polling place with at least 1 accessible voting device as required under subsection (1)(n). 168.795a Electronic voting system; approval by board of state canvassers; conditions; approval of improvement or change; inapplicability of subsection (1); intent to purchase statement; instruction in operation and use; disapproval. Sec. 795a.(1) An electronic voting system shall not be used in an election unless it is approved by the board of state canvassers as meeting the requirements of sections 794 and 795 and instructions regarding recounts of ballots cast on that electronic voting system that have been issued by the secretary of state, unless section 797c has been complied with, and unless it meets 1 of the following conditions: (a) Is certified by an independent testing authority accredited by the national association of state election directors and by the board of state canvassers. (b) In the absence of an accredited independent testing authority, is certified by the manufacturer of the voting system as meeting or exceeding the performance and test standards referenced in subdivision (a) in a manner prescribed by the board of state canvassers. (2) The vendor or representative seeking approval of an electronic voting system shall do all of the following: (a) Deposit with the secretary of state a nonrefundable application fee of $1,500.00 for a new voting system and a fee of $500.00 for an upgrade to any existing system. (b) File with the secretary of state a list of all states in which the voting system has been approved for use. This list shall state how long the system has been used in the state and shall disclose any reports compiled by any state or local government concerning the performance of the system. The vendor shall remain responsible for filing this information on an ongoing basis. (c) File with the secretary of state copies of all standard contracts and maintenance agreements used in connection with the sale of the voting system. All changes to standard contracts and maintenance agreements shall be filed with the secretary of state. (d) Pay the cost for any field test required by the board of state canvassers. (e) State the number of voters each component of the voting system can process per hour under each of the following circumstances: (i) An election in which there are 10 or fewer items to be voted on the ballot by each voter. (ji) An election in which the ballot consists of the number of items typically voted on at a presidential general election in this state. (3) The board of state canvassers shall conduct a field test of all new voting systems as part of the certification process. The field test shall involve Michigan electors and election officials in simulated election day conditions. The test shall be designed to gauge voter reaction to the system, problems that voters have with the system, and the number of voting stations required for the efficient operation of an election based upon the vendor's statement provided under subsection (2)(e).(4) The board of state canvassers shall approve an electronic voting system for use in this state only if it meets the conditions of subsection (1) except that in an emergency situation that threatens the ability of a county, city, or township to conduct a scheduled election, the board of state canvassers may approve a correction of software or firmware after testing the software or firmware performance. (5) If an electronic voting system is approved for use before January 1, 1997 by the board of state canvassers, it may be used in an election. However, if the electronic voting system has its software or firmware improved or changed, the system shall comply with the requirements of subsection (1). (6) After an electronic voting system Is approved, an improvement or change in the electronic voting system shall be submitted to the board of state canvassers for approval pursuant to this section. This subsection does not apply to the technical capability of a general purpose computer, reader, or printer to electronically record and count votes. (7) A county, city, township, village, or school district shall file "an intent to purchase statement" with the secretary of state 30 days before any purchase agreement is made to purchase a new voting system. The secretary of state shall provide all information concerning the operation of the voting system in Michigan or any other state to the local unit of government within 25 days after receiving the "intent to purchase statemen (8) The secretary of state shall instruct local election officials regarding the operation and use of an approved electronic voting system in order to carry out the purposes of sections 794 to 799a and the rules promulgated pursuant to sections 794 to 799a. (9) If the board of state canvassers determines that an electronic voting system that was approved under subsection (1) no longer meets the requirements described in that subsection, the board of state canvassers may disapprove that voting system. An electronic voting system that has been disapproved by the board of state canvassers under this subsection shall not be used in an election, unless it is reapproved by the board of state canvassers under subsection (1).