Professional Documents
Culture Documents
348104-Article Text-501413-1-10-20190114
348104-Article Text-501413-1-10-20190114
02
ABSTRACT
International law grants states, as representatives of their peoples, the
right to use and exploit the natural resources located on their territories.
The aim of this paper is to clarify how the doctrine of peoples’ sovereignty
over natural resources is related to their right to political self-determination.
Three different perceptions of this relationship are examined. First, the
view that peoples have collective ownership rights over the natural
resources to be found on their territories is criticized and rejected.
Thereafter, it is argued that instrumentalist reasons fail to explain why a
people’s right to political self-determination implies sovereignty over
natural resources. Instead, it is suggested to consider sovereignty over
natural resources a necessary component of a people’s authority over the
territory where their right to self-determination is realized. The proposed
solution provides a sensible framework for dealing with practical issues, as
can be exemplified by post-secession conflicts over natural resources.
1. INTRODUCTION
In international politics it is widely accepted that states are entitled to use
the natural resources which are located on their territories to their own
benefit. The many conflicts over natural resources we currently witness
typically concern specific issues, such as the precise national borders
between two countries. That states have sovereignty over natural resources
– or rather the peoples represented by states – is hardly called into question
by relevant international actors. Furthermore, the assignment of special
resource rights to territorially concentrated collectives has a secure basis
in international law. Most notably, Article 1 of the two major Human
Rights Covenants from 1966 recognizes the right of peoples to political
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 29
1 Criticism of the resource privilege of states or peoples has been offered inter alia
by Pogge (2008: 202-221) and Armstrong (2015) and (2017: 132-149).
2 For an instructive discussion of how the ideal of global equality can be reconciled
with the right of peoples to political self-determination, see Armstrong (2010).
LEAP 6 (2018)
30 Frank Dietrich
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 31
3 The principle has been discussed at least since President Wilson’s famous
“fourteen points“ and has been present in the thoughts of Lenin and Stalin but was not
included in the regulations of the League of Nations.
4 Evidently, there is a tension between the right of peoples to self-determination
and the right of states to territorial integrity as it is enshrined, most importantly, in Art. 2.4
of the United Nation’s Charter. The entitlement of some part of a population, e.g. a colonial
people, to freely determine its political status is difficult to reconcile with the inviolability of
the established borders.
LEAP 6 (2018)
32 Frank Dietrich
use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their
sovereignty and is in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
charter of the United Nations.”5 For two reasons these resolutions met
resistance by the USA, Great Britain, and other highly industrialized states.
First, these states complained that the interests of prosperous economies
to have access to raw materials were not sufficiently taken into account.
Second, they were concerned about the resolutions’ potential for
legitimizing the expropriation of foreign companies and the annulment
of concessions. This worry was fueled, most importantly, by the
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, enforced by the then
socialist Iranian government in 1951 (Schrijver 1997: 37-49). The main
reason for voting against resolution 626, given by the US delegation, was
the lack of any provision for adequate compensation in the case of
expropriation (Hyde 1956: 860).
The discussion on resource rights continued during the drafting
process of the United Nations’ two major human rights covenants. In 1958
the UNGA adopted resolution 1314, which confirmed “that the right of
peoples and nations to self-determination … includes permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.” By this resolution a
special commission was established in order to “conduct a full survey of
this basic constituent of the right to self-determination.” The view that
natural resources are a basic constituent of the right to self-determination
was reaffirmed in the UNGA declaration 1803 on the permanent sovereignty
over natural resources from 1962. Primarily two provisions prompted the
Western states – with the exception of France – to vote in favor of this
resolution. First, the declaration required of states which expropriate
foreign holdings to pay the owner adequate compensation and, second, it
stated that foreign investment agreements freely entered by signatory
parties shall be observed in good faith (Schwebel 1994: 401-415).
The resolution on the permanent sovereignty over natural resources for
the first time addressed an important aspect of internal self-determination,
by commenting on the question of who is supposed to benefit from the
extraction of resources. According to par. 1, the right to dispose of a
country’s natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of
“the well-being of the people of the state concerned”. This is an important
clarification, as experience has shown that in many cases the ruling elites
5 According to Schrijver (2015: 23-24), the term “natural wealth” refers to the
resource basis as distinguished from the natural resources themselves. For instance, the
forest and the fertile soil constitute (part of) a country’s natural wealth, whereas the timber
of the trees and the tea or coffee plants count as natural resources.
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 33
6 The moral responsibilities of other states with regard to governments who fail to
manage natural resources in the interests of their peoples are discussed in Wenar (2008) and
(2016: 281-334), see also Haugen (2014).
7 Art. 25 (ICESCR) and Art. 47 (ICCPR) state in unison: “Nothing in the present
Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and
utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.”
8 The wording of this principle is reiterated – with only one slight alteration – in
principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development from 1992.
9 The Brundtland report defines sustainable development as “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.”
LEAP 6 (2018)
34 Frank Dietrich
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 35
12 To be clear, a collective ownership right – as I understand the term here – does not
entitle each member of the collective to use the goods concerned at her discretion. Instead
the ownership right is held by the group as a whole: the individuals belonging to the group
or their representatives must decide jointly – by a majority vote or some other procedure – on
how to exercise this right.
LEAP 6 (2018)
36 Frank Dietrich
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 37
to raise taxes in order to finance police services. However, since they would
not assent to substantial intrusions into their private property, the state
would not obtain anything close to a collective ownership right.15
More recently, an argument has been advocated that may be understood
as a culturalist modification of Locke’s labor mixing approach. So called
liberal nationalist authors, such as David Miller (1995: 21-27, 2007: 214-230
and 2012), Chaim Gans (2003: 97-123), and Tamar Meisels (2009), have
pointed out to the formative influences the culture of a nation exerts on a
territory.16 The members of a national community employ specific forms of
agriculture, build roads and ports, and establish particular settlement
structures. These cultural activities leave a lasting imprint on the territory,
which distinguishes it from other geographical places. Persons identifying
with a national community typically have strong emotional bonds to the
area they regard as their homeland. Since the territory is shaped by their
culture and closely connected to the nation’s history, they cannot imagine
realizing their collective self-determination anywhere else.17 By analogy
with Locke, it has also been argued that the national community put the
piece of land it traditionally occupies to an efficient use. Over time, the
various cultural activities of the group add material as well as symbolic
value to the land (Meisels 2009: 97-112 and Miller 2012: 257-262).18
From a liberal nationalist perspective, the above considerations –
cultural formation, emotional attachment, value enhancement – legitimize
the claims of nations to “their” territories. It is important to note that,
contrary to Locke’s account, territorial rights are not conceived of as
collective ownership rights. Instead, national communities are thought to
have an entitlement to exert jurisdictional authority over their traditional
15 For a critical examination of Locke’s property theory of territorial rights, see Beitz
(1980).
16 It may be worth noting that the above-mentioned theorists speak of “nations” or
“national communities” instead of “peoples”. For the question under discussion – the link
between collective self-determination rights and sovereignty over natural resources – this
terminological difference seems, however, irrelevant.
17 As regards personal attachment, Miller (2007: 219) states: “The case for having
rights over the relevant territory is (…) straightforward: it gives members of the nation
continuing access to places that are especially significant to them, and it allows choices to
be made over how these sites are to be protected and managed”.
18 The theory of resource rights advocated by Cara Nine (2012: 137-141) borrows from
different aspects of Locke’s political thought. In her view, a group acquires resource rights
when it uses the resources concerned in a value-generating way, whereby she considers the
achievement of political justice the relevant value.
LEAP 6 (2018)
38 Frank Dietrich
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 39
set of rights conventionally attributed to states.21 But the reasons that can
be given for the substantiation of a territorial claim do not necessarily
apply to each of its standard components. The liberal nationalist’s
argument fails to explain why a group’s right to political self-determination
entails an entitlement to dispose of (the full range of) natural resources.
LEAP 6 (2018)
40 Frank Dietrich
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 41
disposal is largely irrelevant for its capacity to take its own decisions. In
principle, people A could be enabled to exercise its right to self-
determination by granting it a claim to the resources of people B’s territory,
and vice versa.
Second, I have argued above that the right to political self-determination
should be understood as a threshold concept, requiring only the availability
of a minimum amount of choices. If this is correct, the instrumentalist
view can only succeed with explaining why peoples need natural resources
(or other sources of income) to an extent necessary for realizing a basic set
of options. It provides, however, no reason for granting self-determining
collectives authority over the total amount of natural resources that are
located on their territories. The claims of peoples to natural resources,
which are, strictly speaking, not indispensable for exercising their rights to
self-determination, must rely on a different justification.
Third, natural resources and the chances of profiting from their
exploitation are very unequally distributed across the globe. According to
the instrumentalist interpretation, peoples are entitled to the natural
resources necessary for exercising their rights to political self-
determination. This implies that each right holder should have access to a
certain amount of valuable raw materials, even if the territory under its
control lacks significant deposits. The instrumentalist account thus
mandates the reallocation of natural resources, or of the revenues derived
from their exploitation, in order to enable less well-equipped peoples to
exert their rights to political self-determination. As a consequence, it
cannot provide a general justification for peoples’ permanent sovereignty
over the whole set of natural resources located on their state territories.
Peoples who have authority over more commodities than required for their
self-determination are duty-bound to share their resource wealth with less
fortunate right holders.
LEAP 6 (2018)
42 Frank Dietrich
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 43
25 The distinction between control rights and income rights over natural resources
has also been emphasized by Angeli (2015: 131-132) and Moore (2015: 173-176).
26 I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for urging me to clarify the
concept of control rights.
LEAP 6 (2018)
44 Frank Dietrich
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 45
29 One may think of a duty to provide the world economy with scarce resources (see
section 2) or a duty to transfer resource revenues to the global poor. The substantiation of
any such duty can, however, be expected to be much more controversial than the justification
of the harm principle.
LEAP 6 (2018)
46 Frank Dietrich
30 Although Armstrong (2017: 233-238) is not much concerned with the political self-
determination of peoples, he makes a similar point regarding the welfare of their members.
Poor societies who are required to leave (part of) their natural resources unexploited can, in
his view, legitimately claim compensation for the loss of development opportunities.
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 47
LEAP 6 (2018)
48 Frank Dietrich
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 49
foreign actor to control the use of raw materials located on the territory of
a people runs contrary to this people’s right to collective self-determination.
For instance, thwarting the goal to preserve natural habitats or traditional
buildings by mandating the extraction of coal clearly amounts to a form of
alien domination.
A second objection that may be raised to the here proposed concept of
resource sovereignty concerns the hogging of natural resources. Peoples
enjoying self-determination rights may decide against extracting raw
materials that could be used to alleviate poverty in other world regions. In
view of the plight of destitute persons, one may doubt whether peoples
who control valuable resources should be entitled to abstain from their
exploitation. In response to this concern I would like to emphasize that my
understanding of resource sovereignty does not preclude a duty to extract
natural resources. Given the adverse effects of such a duty for the political
autonomy of the people concerned, its imposition has to be supported by
weighty reasons. Whether or not the forced extraction of natural resources
can be justified ultimately depends on issues of global justice I cannot
discuss within the scope of this paper.
Moreover, it should be noted that my concept of peoples’ sovereignty
over natural resources is in principle compatible with theories of global
justice, which call for the taxation of resource ownership. Most importantly,
Hillel Steiner (1994: 266-282 and 2011) argued that states whose inhabitants
appropriated more than an equal share of the world’s natural resources
owe compensation to states whose members under-appropriated the
world’s natural resources. These states are required to pay a tax to a global
fund, which shall be based on the rental value of their territories.35
Evidently, the authorization of a global fund to levy taxes on resource
ownership would interfere with peoples’ self-determination rights.
However, the political representatives of a people would not be obliged to
effect the extraction and sale of any raw materials located on the relevant
territory. Provided that they had other sources of income enabling them to
pay the tax, they could still opt for the conservation of natural resources.36
It seems, however, worth noting that the establishment of a global fund,
as proposed by Steiner, meets with two criticisms. First, to what extent a
tax on resource ownership would diminish a people’s capacity for self-
determination depends very much on its economic situation. For poor
35 According to John Locke’s theory of just appropriation, the tax disregards any
improvements of the land and the natural resources located on it, which have been achieved
through the investment of labor.
36 For a proposal to combine Pogge’s and Steiner’s theories by taxing the use and the
ownership of natural resources, see Casal (2011a and 2011b).
LEAP 6 (2018)
50 Frank Dietrich
peoples it may be difficult, if not impossible, to pay the tax unless they
exploit (part of) their natural resources, whereas rich peoples may still be
able to decide in favor of resource conservation. Hence, in terms of self-
determination destitute peoples would be unfairly burdened by a global
fund. Second, the imposition of a tax on consumption, as advocated by
Pogge, would provide sensible incentives for a sustainable use of natural
resources. By contrast, a tax on resource ownership would not encourage
peoples to refrain from the exploitation of natural resources. Consequently,
establishing a global fund would fail to meet the challenges of
environmental degradation and global warming (Casal 2011a: 317-320 and
Pogge 2011: 336-337).37
37 For a rejection of this criticism, see Steiner (2011: 332-333); for a response to
Steiner’s defense, see Casal (2011b: 354-355).
38 The few authors who have dealt with questions of distributive justice that arise in
the wake of secession have not specifically elaborated on natural resources (Dietrich 2014
and Catala 2017).
39 According to the Vienna Convention on State Succession of 1983, agreements of
the predecessor state and the newly independent state regarding state property (Art. 15.4) or
state debts (Art. 38.2) “shall not infringe the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every
people over its wealth and natural resources”. See also Zimmermann (2007).
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 51
control rights over the natural resources that are found within its borders.40
If the rump state still had decision making power over the use of these raw
materials, the self-determination right of the newly constituted people
would be seriously impaired. For the reasons given above, the population
of a separatist state might be unable to pursue its specific aims if a third
party would be entitled to require the extraction or preservation of natural
resources located within its borders. However, income rights are not a
precondition for collective self-determination and, therefore, not implied
in peoples’ sovereignty over natural resources. Contrary to international
law, a newly created state is not necessarily entitled to the full amount of
intakes, which can be generated from the natural resources located on its
territory.
By limiting the concept of resource sovereignty to control rights,
important interests of the rump state’s population can be taken into
account. Both parts of the now divided country may have made large
investments in the development of raw material deposits situated in the
break-away region. If the exploitation of resources was made possible by
joint efforts of the “divorcees”, the population of the rump state has a
legitimate claim to benefit from the gains. Consequently, the inhabitants
of the separatist state are bound to share their resource revenues in a fair
manner with their former fellow-citizens. The duty to transfer an
appropriate part of the resource revenues to the rump state is, however,
limited in two respects. First, the citizens of the rump state are not entitled
to benefit from the utilization of raw materials that were still undeveloped
or undiscovered at the time of secession. Since their claim to receive some
part of the earnings is based on their contribution to the exploitation, it
cannot extend to these resources. Second, the duty of the separatist state
to share its resource revenues with the rump state will presumably decrease
over time. The exploitation of raw materials requires ongoing investments
in the technological equipment and the infrastructure that need to be
maintained and modernized. The higher the expenditures of the separatist
state are, the more diminishes the relative weight of the rump state’s former
contributions. Hence, the share of the resource revenues to which the
citizens of the rump state are entitled will usually shrink in the course of
time.41
To the first-mentioned qualification it may be objected that the citizens
LEAP 6 (2018)
52 Frank Dietrich
of the rump state had a legitimate expectation to benefit in the future from
the exploitation of still undeveloped or undiscovered raw materials located
on the separatist territory. Therefore, one may argue, they should receive
an appropriate share of the earnings that will be generated from these
resources. Here it is important to recall that I only consider cases when the
population of the break-away regions had a moral right to create an
independent state. Although the inhabitants of the remaining regions may
not have reckoned with the secession, they have not been wronged by it.
Generally speaking, the expectation of an actor A that some other actor B
will not choose an option to which she is entitled cannot ground a moral
claim against B. A may perhaps have good epistemic reasons, given her
experience or knowledge, not to anticipate B’s decision. However, A is not
normatively justified in expecting B to forego a morally permissible
action.42 Hence, if the secession was legitimate, the rump state’s population
cannot substantiate a claim to benefit from the exploitation of undeveloped
or undiscovered resources.
Finally, the question needs to be addressed whether a separatist state
has compensatory duties even if it terminates the exploitation of profitable
resources. The citizens of the rump state may have made large financial
contributions to the development of some raw materials and may, therefore,
feel entitled to a fair share of the revenues that would have been generated
had the secession not occurred. In my view, in the situation described
compensatory claims are for two reasons unwarranted. First, the separatist
state might be compelled to continue the exploitation of resources in order
to be able to meet its financial obligations. The forced extraction of natural
resources might make it extremely difficult, or even impossible, to realize
important societal goals. Consequently, the self-determination right of the
newly constituted people would be severely undermined by the rump
state’s monetary claims.43 Second, it is generally assumed that sovereign
states may reassess and change their energy policies over time. Thereby
they do not incur compensatory duties against taxpayers for lost profits,
although they may have contractual duties towards private investors.
Given that the secession was legitimate, the same moral criteria must apply
to the newly independent state as to any other state. Hence, the separatist
state can be under a duty to share its resource revenues (to a diminishing
degree) with the rump state, but it need not make compensatory payments
if it decides to end the extraction and to forego potential gains.
42 For a brief discussion of the distinction between justified epistemic and justified
normative expectations, see Meyer and Sanklecha (2014: 370-372).
43 As explicated in section 3.3, the forced extraction of natural resources is likely to
have a more negative impact on a people’s capacity for self-determination than the forced
conservation of natural resources.
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 53
5. CONCLUSION
In the penultimate section, I have examined three possible explanations
for the close connection between a people’s right to political self-
determination and its permanent sovereignty over natural resources as
established in international law. I have, first, argued against the attribution
of property rights (or similarly acquired jurisdictional rights) to the
collectives concerned and I have, second, criticized an instrumentalist
view of the relationship between natural resources and political self-
determination. Instead, I have proposed to understand peoples’ sovereignty
over natural resources as an aspect of their territorial authority, which
is a necessary precondition for actualizing the right to political
self-determination.
Based on this interpretation, an important distinction between control
rights and income rights can be established. A self-determining people is
– within the limits set by the harm principle – entitled to decide on the
utilization or conservation of the natural resources located on its territory.
However, it has not necessarily a claim to the full amount of intakes that
can be generated from the exploitation of these resources. The restriction
of income rights allows for reconciling the permanent sovereignty of
peoples over natural resources with demands of global justice. In addition,
as I have shown in the last section, the here defended interpretation
provides a sensible answer to resource conflicts that may arise in the wake
of secession. If the population of a rump state has made a significant
contribution to the development of natural resources situated in the
LEAP 6 (2018)
54 Frank Dietrich
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Angeli, O., 2015: Cosmopolitanism, Self-Determination and Territory. Justice with
Borders, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Armstrong, C., 2010: “National Self-Determination, Global Equality and Moral
Arbitrariness”, The Journal of Political Philosophy 18: 313-334.
— 2015: “Against ‘Permanent Sovereignty’ over Natural Resources”, Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 14: 129-151.
— 2017: Justice and Natural Resources. An Egalitarian Theory, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Auty, R. M., 1993: Sustaining Development in the Mineral Economies. The Resource
Curse Thesis, London: Routledge.
Banai, A., 2016: “Self-Determination and Resource Rights: In Defence of Territorial
Jurisdiction over Natural Resources”, Res Publica 22: 9-20.
Barboza, J., 2011: The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law, Leiden,
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Beitz, C. R., 1980: “Tacit Consent and Property Rights”, Political Theory 8: 487-502.
Buchanan, A., 2004: Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Moral Foundations
for International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Casal, P., 2011a: “Global Taxes on Natural Resources”, Journal of Moral Philosophy
8: 307-322.
— 2011b: “Rejoinder to Pogge and Steiner”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 8: 353-365.
Catala, A., 2017: “Secession and Distributive Justice”, Philosophical Studies 174:
529-552.
Dam-De Jong D., 2015: International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dietrich, F., 2011: “Changing Borders by Secession: Normative Assessment of
Territorial Claims” in The Ashgate Research Companion on Secession, ed. A.
Pavkovic´ and P. Radan, Aldershot: Ashgate, 81-95.
— 2014: “Secession of the Rich: A Qualified Defense”, Politics, Philosophy &
Economics 13, 62-81.
Feinberg, J., 1984: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 1: Harm to Others,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 1986: “Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming”, Social
Philosophy & Policy 4: 145-178.
Fleischacker, S., 2013: “Owning Land versus Governing a Land: Property,
Sovereignty, and Nationalism”, Social Philosophy & Policy 30: 373-403.
Gans, C., 2003: The Limits of Nationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gümplová, P., 2014: “Restraining Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources”,
Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia 53: 93-114.
Haugen, H. M., 2014: “Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination and Self-Governance
over Natural Resources: Possible and Desirable?”, Nordic Journal of Applied
Ethics 8: 3-21.
LEAP 6 (2018)
Natural Resources, Collective Self-Determination, and Secession 55
Hayward, T., 2006: “Global Justice and the Distribution of Natural Resources”,
Political Studies 54: 349-369.
Hyde, J. N., 1956: “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources”,
The American Journal of International Law 50: 854-867.
Kolers, A., 2012: “Justice, Territory and Natural Resources”, Political Studies 60:
269-286.
Locke, J., 1960 [1689]: Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Meisels, T., 2009: Territorial Rights, 2nd ed., Heidelberg et al.: Springer.
Meyer, L. and Sanklecha, P., 2014: “How Legitimate Expectations Matter in Climate
Justice”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 13: 369-393.
Miller, D., 1995: On Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 2007: National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 2012: “Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification”, Political Studies 60: 252-
268.
Miranda, L. A., 2012: “The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource
Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development”,
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 45: 785-840.
Moore, M., 2015: A Political Theory of Territory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nine, C., 2012: Global Justice and Territory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pereira, R. and Gough, O., 2013: “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
in the 21st Century: Natural Resource Governance and the Right to Self-
Determination of Indigenous Peoples under International Law”, Melbourne
Journal of International Law 14: 1-45.
Pogge, T., 2008: World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities
and Reforms, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press.
— 2011: “Allowing the Poor to Share the Earth”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 8: 335-
352.
Rawls, J., 1999: The Law of Peoples, Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University
Press.
Raz, J., 1986: The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Risse, M., 2012: On Global Justice, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Ross, M. L., 2015: “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?”, Annual
Review of Political Science 18: 239-259.
Schrijver, N., 1997: Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Balancing Rights and Duties,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— 2010a: Development without Destruction. The UN and Global Resource
Management, Bloomington (In.): Indiana University Press.
— 2010b: “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources”, Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, http://mpepil.com.
— 2015: “Fifty Years Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” in Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, ed. M. Bungenberg and S. Hobe, Heidelberg
et al.: Springer, 15-28.
Schuppert, F., 2014: “Beyond the National Resource Privilege: Towards an
International Court of the Environment”, International Theory 6: 68-97.
Schwebel, S. M., 1994: Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
LEAP 6 (2018)
56 Frank Dietrich
Simmons, A. J., 1992: The Lockean Theory of Rights, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
— 2001: “On the Territorial Rights of States”, Philosophical Issues 11: 300-326.
1994: An Essay on Rights. Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell.
— 2011: “The Global Fund: A Reply to Casal”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 8: 328-334
Stilz, A., 2016: “The Value of Self-Determination”, Oxford Studies in Political
Philosophy 2: 98-127.
Venables, A. J., 2016: “Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has it Proven
so Difficult?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 30: 161-183.
Wellman, C. H., 2005: A Theory of Secession. The Case for Political Self-Determination,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wenar, L., 2008: “Property Rights and the Resource Curse”, Philosophy & Public
Affairs 36: 2-32.
— 2016: Blood Oil. Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules that Run the World, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Zimmerman, A., 2007: “State Succession in Other Matters than Treaties”, in: Max
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, http://mpepil.com.
LEAP 6 (2018)