JAYLO vs SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 183152-54, JANUARY 21, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners Reynaldo Jaylo (Jaylo), William Valenzona (Valenzona) and Antonio Habalo (Habalo), together with
Edgardo Castro (Castro), were officers of the Philippine National Police Western Police District placed on special detail
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

The officers were convicted by the Sandiganbayan for Homicide for the killing of Estrella, Franco, and Rolando in a
drug buy bust operation at the Magallanes Commercial Center on July 10, 1990.

The “Elma Committee” headed by Presidential Assistant for Legal and Judicial Affairs Magdangal Elma, with
Undersecretary of National Defense Leonardo Quisumbing and Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro as
members, was tasked to conduct an investigation of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the seizure of heroin
and the shooting incident.

Pursuant to its mandate to submit its findings and recommendations to the President after the completion of its
investigation, the Elma Committee recommended the prosecution of Jaylo for the killing of De Guzman, Castro for
that of Calanog, and Valenzona and Habalo for that of Manguera.

However, in three separate Amended Information dated 8 September 1992 and filed before the Sandiganbayan,
Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo, together with several John Does, were charged with conspiracy in the murder
of De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera.

The Sandiganbayan noted that the prosecution and the defense were in agreement that the four accused shot and
killed the three victims.

On the allegation that the four accused took advantage of superior strength, the court ruled that there was no
evidence showing the use of excessive force out of proportion to the defense available to the victims. In particular,
the shooting of Manguera by Valenzona and Habalo only showed numerical superiority, not superior strength.

The prosecution also failed to prove evident premeditation. It was not able to indicate the time when the four
accused determined to commit the killing; neither was it able to pinpoint the overt act demonstrating that they
adhered to their resolve to commit the crime even after the lapse of enough time "to allow their conscience to
overcome the resolution of their will."

For their part, the accused also failed to prove their defense of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office. The Sandiganbayan was not convinced that they had acted within the bounds allowed for an arrest in a buy-
bust operation.

On 30 April 2007, counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision
assailing that the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of the warrants for
the arrest of the convicted accused. The court ruled that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the judgment
had long lapsed without any of the accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the promulgation.

On June 25, 2008, counsel for the three urged the Sandiganbayan to givedue course to and resolve the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed Resolution dated 26 May 2008. The court
ruled that for the failure of the three to surrender and move for leave to avail themselves of a motion for
reconsideration within 15 days from the date of promulgation, the judgment has become final and executory, and no
action on the motion for reconsideration can be taken. It then reiterated its order to implement the warrants for the
arrest of the three.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights like filing of a motion for reconsideration provided under PD 1606

RULING:

Petitioners’ argument lacks merit.

Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus,
a party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that "[a] petition for reconsideration
of any final order or decision maybe filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or
judgment."

Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 15 days from the promulgation or
notice of the judgment, the movant must also comply with the conditions laid down in the Rules of Court, which
applies to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners insist that the right to file a motion for reconsideration under Section 7 of P.D. 1606 is a guarantee, and
no amount of Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court can operate to diminish or modify this substantive right.

Applying the Fabian v. Desiertotest, it appears indubitable that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court (ROC)
clearly applies to the Sandiganbayan.

Section 6, Rule 120, ROC as well as Section 4, Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan
merely regulates the right to file a motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606. These are mere rules of
procedure which the Supreme Court is competent to adopt pursuant to its rule-making power under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. And, contrary to the view espoused by the accused, said
rules do not take away, repeal or alter the right to file a motion for reconsideration as said right still
exists.

The Supreme Court merely laid down the rules on promulgation of a judgment of conviction done in absentia in
cases when the accused fails to surrender and explain his absence within 15 days from promulgation. The Supreme
Court can very well do this as the right to file a motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606 is not
preclusive in character. Indeed, there is nothing in P.D. 1606 which prevents the Supreme Court from
regulating the procedure for promulgation of decisions in criminal cases done in absentia.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused
to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on
the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the
remedies against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of
petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases – delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the
accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.

In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by not appearing
before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their cases. Surely they cannot later on expect to be allowed to
invoke the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction.

It is incumbent upon the accused to

Petitioners insist that the Sandiganbayan did not bother to determine whether their absence at the promulgation of
judgment was without justifiable cause. In other words, as petitioners would have it, it was incumbent upon the
Sandiganbayan to take pains to find out whether their absence at the promulgation was without justifiable cause,
and only then could the court conclude that petitioners have lost the remedies available in the Rules of Court against
the judgment of conviction.

It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the remedy by which the
accused who were absent during the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available
to them against the judgment of conviction. In order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as
follows: 1) surrender and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for their
absence, within 15 days from the date of the promulgation of judgment.

Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show that their reason for being absent at the promulgation
of judgment was justifiable. If the court finds that the reasons proffered justify their nonappearance during the
promulgation of judgment, it shall allow them to avail of the remedies. 60 Thus, unless they surrender and prove their
justifiable reason to the satisfaction of the court, their absence is presumed to be unjustified.

Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment of conviction. 1âwphi1 Neither
did they ask for leave of court to avail themselves of the remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even if
we were to assume that the failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation was due to failure to receive notice
thereof, it is not a justifiable reason. He should have filed a notice of change of address before the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed
by counsel for petitioners . While the motion was filed on 30 April 2007, it did not operate to regain the standing
of petitioners in court. For one, it is not an act of surrender that is contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, nowhere in the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was it indicated that petitioners were asking
for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, or that there were valid reasons for their
absence at the promulgation.

For the failure of petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment of conviction, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007.

In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a review of the findings and conclusions in the
Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The Decision is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment, or
reversal.63 Thus, there is no need to pass upon the issues raised by petitioners assailing it.
DOCTRINES:

Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court

SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside
the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.