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01. EUGENIO BASBAS, TEOFILO ARAS, RUFINO ARAS, GERVACIO BASBAS, ISMAEL
ARAS, EUGENIO ARAS, SIMFRONIO ARAS, FELICIANO ARAS, ROSITA ARAS,
EUGENIO BASBAS, JR. and SPOUSES PABLITO BASARTE and MARCELINA BASBAS
BASARTE,
vs.
BEATA SAYSON and ROBERTO SAYSON, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 172660               August 24, 2011
(Summary Judgment / Judgment on the Pleadings)

FACTS:
1. Spouses Sayson filed a petition for registration of an agricultural land in Cagbatag,
Balagtas, Leyte. It was opposed by the Republic and herein petitioners. CFI ruled in favor of
spouses Sayson and approved registration under their names.

2. Oppositors filed their Appeal to the CA but CA affirmed in toto the decision of the CFI. CA
decision became final and executory and a writ of possession was issued but it was never
implemented A year after, an OCT was issued under the name of the Spouses Sayson and
an Alias Writ of Possession but the writ was not implemented in view of the refusal of Eugenio
Basbas and his son. Basbas claims that the land they occupy is not the same land subject in
the decision. They demanded a relocation survey be conducted. RTC approved the
Commissioner’s report on the relocation survey and ordered the opposite including herein
petitioners to vacate the subject property.

3. The order was, however, not implemented within 5 years from the time it became final.
Hence Sayson filed a Complaint for Revival of judgment. Oppositors filed a Motion to Dismiss
but it was denied. Oppositors then filed an Answer with Counter claim. In the answer, the
oppositors admitted that among others: (1) the land registration case was decided in favor of
the spouses Sayson; (2) the said decision became final and executory; (3) OCT was issued in
the name of the spouses Sayson; (4) there was a relocation order. But by way of special and
affirmative defenses, petitioners contended that the order sought to be revived is not the
‘judgment’ contemplated under Sec 6, Rule 39 of the ROC. Also they averred that they cannot
be made parties to be complaint of revival of judgment as they were not parties to the land
registration case (the petitioners here are heirs succeeding the original parties in this case).
Thus order sought to be revived is not binding upon them.

4. Regarding the designation/substitution of parties, the Court directs the plaintiff spouses to
make the necessary amendment and/or to submit a manifestation regarding the proper
designation of parties.

5. The spouses Sayson then filed an omnibus motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or
summary judgment. They contended that since the petitioner’s answer failed to tender an
issue, they having expressly admitted the material allegations in the complaint, a judgment on
the pleadings or summary judgment is proper.

6. RTC granted the motion for summary judgment and ruled in favor of the spouses Sayson.
CA affirmed and noted that the oppositors’ answer admitted almost all of the allegations in
plaintiff’s complaint. MR was denied.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the instant case is proper for the rendition of a summary judgment.

RULING:

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Yes. Spouses Sayson filed for registration of an agricultural land. Decision was ruled in favor
of the spouses, however, it was never enforced after 5 years from the finality of the decision.
Spouses filed a Complaint for the Revival of judgment. In the petitioners’ answer, they
admitted the following: (1) the land registration case was decided in favor of the spouses
Sayson; (2) said decision became final and executory; (3) OCT was issued in the name of the
spouses Sayson; (4) there was a relocation order. Spouses Sayson then filed an Omnibus
motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. SC ruled that judgment on
the pleadings is improper since the answer of the petitioners posed an issue. However, the
issue are not genuine issues, thus, motion for summary judgment is a proper action.

What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of
issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it
does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of
the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with
them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer
specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or
in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised
is not genuine.

02. MARILYN B. MONTEHERMOSO, TANNY B. MONTEHERMOSO, EMMA B.

MONTEHERMOSO OLIVEROS, EVA B. MONTEHERMOSO, TERESA B.
MONTEHERMOSO CARIG, AND SALVAR B. MONTEHERMOSO, PETITIONERS,
VS. ROMEO BATUTO AND ARNEL BATUTO, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 246553, December 02, 2020

(Finality of Judgment)

DOCTRINE:

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.

THE CASE:

The case arose from a complaint for cancellation of title, reconveyance, and damages.
Respondents Romeo Batuto and Arnel Batuto claimed that their property, a forty-four
thousand four hundred ten-square meter (44,410 sq.m.) piece of land was erroneously
included in petitioners' Marilyn B. Montehermoso, Tanny B. Montehermoso, Emma B.
Montehermoso Oliveros, Eva B. Montehermoso, Teresa B. Montehermoso Carig, and Salvar
B. Monteherrnoso OCT No. 5781. By Decision dated March 8, 2015, the Regional trial Court
(RTC) found merit in respondents' claim and consequently ordered the reconveyance of the
property to them. Petitioners thereafter launched a barrage of court actions all directed to set
aside the trial court's decision, viz.:

First, Petitioners appealed the trial court's decision which appeal was dismissed per Court of
Appeals' Resolution dated August 5, 2016. The same became final and executory on
September 9, 2016 and the corresponding writ of execution and writ of demolition were
issued.

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Second, Petitioner Tanny Montehermoso alone filed a petition for relief from judgment about a
year later, which the Court of Appeals dismissed under Resolution dated September 27,
2017. Petitioner Tanny's motion for reconsideration was also denied by Resolution dated April
24, 2018.

Third, Then petitioners sought to reverse the foregoing Resolutions via a petition for review on
certiorari filed with the Court which denied the same under Resolution dated August 6, 2018
for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error which warranted the
Court's exercise of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Fourth, But petitioners did not stop there. They again filed, this time, a petition for annulment
of judgment before the Court of Appeals, raising as ground the trial court's alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the case. In its assailed Resolution dated February 13, 2019, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
under Resolution dated April 10, 2019.

Finally, Petitioners, once again, are back before the Court via Rule 45, assailing the Court of
Appeals' denial of their petition for annulment of judgment.

Invariably, petitioners, for over five (5) years since the trial court rendered its Decision dated
March 8, 2015, have never stopped attacking it before different fora and through different
modes of review. This notwithstanding that the assailed decision had long attained finality on
September 9, 2016 and had already been implemented. As it was, petitioners have stubbornly
refused to respect the immutability of this judgment as they keep trifling and playing around
the judicial process over and over again. But enough is enough.

Spouses Aguilar v. The Manila Banking Corporation aptly held:

It is an important fundamental principle in the judicial system that every litigation must come
to an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a
litigant's rights have been adjudicated in a valid and final judgment of a competent court, he
should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party
should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be
encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants will multiply to the detriment of the administration of
justice.

The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court,
must see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the
duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the
law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse
the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants and counsels that the time of the
judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts,
far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially

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so, where, as shown in the present case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling
for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.

Verily, by the undue delay in the execution of a final judgment in their favor, respondents have
suffered an injustice. The Court views with disfavor the unjustified delay in the enforcement of
the final decision and orders in the present case. Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some
subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment
sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.

Here, petitioners should now stop making a mockery of the judicial system through their
pernicious attempts to revive the trial court's long settled and implemented decision. A
violation of this injunction will be sanctioned accordingly.

As for petitioners' counsel, Atty. Belinda M. Nagui, she is reminded of her primordial duty as
an officer of the court who must see to it that the orderly administration of justice must never
be unduly impeded. As such, she must resist the whims and caprices of her clients, and
temper her clients' propensities to litigate. Her oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior
to her duty to her client; its primacy is indisputable.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions
dated February 13, 2019 and April 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
159373, AFFIRMED.

Petitioners as well as their counsel Atty. Belinda M. Nagui or any other counsel who may take
over this case are STERNLY WARNED that any further attempt to revive this case in
whatever form and before any forum will be severely sanctioned.

03. Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner Vs. Mary Basilan, Raul Basilan, and
Benjamin Camiuit aka Benjamin Camiwet (Deceased), substituted by his surviving
spouse, Juanita Camiwet, and children, Shane Vicente, Clint Camiwet, and Lenden
Liczek, respondents
G.R. No. 229438, June 13, 2022
(Judgment obligee as purchaser)
Facts:
The herein disputed lot was mortgaged to Land Bank. Due to the registered owner’s failure to
pay her obligation, the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and eventually sold at a public
auction where petitioner won as the highest bidder. Since the owner failed to redeem the
property, the lot’s ownership was consolidated in petitioner’s favor. Land Bank then filed an
ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. The RTC granted the petition. A
demand to vacate was served to respondents. The respondents filed a petition for the
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession as agricultural lesee/farmer beneficiaries before the
DARAB. Respondents continued to plant on the disputed property, Land bank moved to cite
them in contempt. The RTC denied the motion. Subsequently, the DARAB affirmed that
respondents are agricultural lessees. This shall then facilitate land distribution as the CARL
mandated and ordered petitioner to respect peaceful possession and further directed to
execute a Leasehold Contract with respondents. Land Bank filed a motion for the issuance of
Writ of Possession before the RTC for the enforcement of the writ that the trial court

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previously issued, it maintained that respondents are caretakers of the property, not tenants
who have an adverse title over the parcel of land. The RTC denied the motion. It likewise
denied the petitioner’s MFR. Aggrieved, Land Bank filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence the petition.
Issue:
WON the CA is correct in affirming the denial of petitioner Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession?
Ruling:
Yes. In China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada, which both parties cited, This Court
dealt with a similar issue and discussed the rules:
The purchaser, therefore, in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled
to a writ of possession; and upon an ex parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon
the RTC to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. However, while this is the
general rule, as in all general rules, there is an exception. The exception and its basis were
summarized by the court in Roxas v. Buan, thus:
In extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, possession of the property may be
awarded to purchaser at the foreclosure sale during the pendency of the period of
redemption under the terms provided in Sec. 6 of 3135, as amended ( An Act to
Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or annexed to Real
Estate Mortgages), or after the lapse of the redemption period, without the need of a
separate and independent action. This is founded on his right of ownership over the
property which he purchased at the auction sale and his consequent right to be placed
in possession thereof.
This rule is, however, not without exception. Under Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which was made applicable to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgages by Sec. 6 Act No. 3135, the possession of mortgage property may be
awarded to a purchaser in extrajudicial foreclosures “unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgement debtor”
…
Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgement
debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said
adverse possession. Similarly, in extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the
foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to
the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no
longer be done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property need not
only be possessed by a third party, but also held by a third party adversely to the
debtor/mortgagor.

04. G.R. No. 216151, December 02, 2020

JESUS G. CRISOLOGO, NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, JAMES IAN YEUNG, AND MARLINA
T. SHENG, PETITIONERS, VS. ALICIA HAO AND GREGORIO HAO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GAERLAN, J.:
(Judgment obligee as purchaser)

FACTS:

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A parcel of land initially registered in the name of So Keng Koc covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-51636 situated in the City of Davao City was the subject of
various levy and attachment because of numerous collection cases filed against its owner So.
Among these cases is Civil Case No. 26, 513-98, a complaint for sum of money filed
sometime in the year 1998, by Sy Sen Ben against So and Robert Allan Limso before the
RTC of Davao City.
Subsequently, respondents Alicia Hao and Gregorio Hao negotiated with Sy and attaching
creditors of So in Civil Case No. 26, 534-98 namely, Emma Seng and Esther Sy. This
resulted in the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale involving TCT No. No. T-51636 by So in
favor of the respondents on October 7, 1998, on even date that the same property was levied.
Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nanette G. Crisologo likewise filed two collection suits
against So and Limso on September 30, 1998. The cases docketed as Civil Case Nos. 26,
810-98 and 26, 811-98 were raffled to the RTC of Davao City, Branch 15. To which the RTC
decided and ordered So and Limso solidarily liable to pay petitioner spouses Crisologo the
amount of obligation, interest, damages, and costs of suit.
With the issuance of an Entry of Judgment, the case was remanded to the RTC for
execution. By virtue of a writ of execution, the sheriff scheduled the auction sale on August
26, 2010.
Notified of the sale, the respondents filed an urgent motion to exclude TCT Nos. T-344592
and T-344593 from the auction sale, but the same was denied by the RTC. 
Despite the respondents' opposition, the auction sale proceeded in which petitioner
Spouses Crisologo emerged as the highest/sole bidder for the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-344593, and petitioners James Ian O. Yeung and Marlina T. Sheng for that covered by
TCT No. T-344592.22 Thereafter, certificates of sale dated October 10, 2010, were issued by
Sheriff Robert M. Medialdea.
On November 18, 2010, the respondents filed a Complaint for the annulment of
Certificates of Sale on TCT Nos. T-344592 and T-344593.
On November 17, 2014, the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, rendered declaring the
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale on TCT No. T-344592 and Sheriffs Certificate of Sale on TCT No.
T-344593 as VOID and the same is hereby CANCELLED.
In so ruling, the RTC held that Sheriff Medialdea should have required the petitioner
spouses Crisologo to pay the winning bid in cash and should have expressly mentioned in the
Certificate of Sale the existence of the third-party claim, as required by Sections 21 and 26,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. These, according to the RTC are mandatory and strict
requirements such that non-compliance rendered the subject Certificates of Sale void.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision having been denied by the RTC in its
Order dated January 9, 2015, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in declaring the sheriff’s certificate of sale as VOID and in
insisting that it must be paid in cash and failure to mention the existence of third-party claim
voids the title?

HELD:

YES, the court erred in declaring the certificate of sale void, in insisting that it must be paid
in cash and failure to mention third-party claim voids the title.

Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.

Section 21. Judgment obligee as purchaser. — When the purchaser is the judgment
obligee, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it
does not exceed the amount of his judgment. If it does, he shall pay only the excess.
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Section 26. Certificate of sale where property claimed by third person. — When a property
sold by virtue of a writ of execution has been claimed by a third person, the certificate of sale
to be issued by the sheriff pursuant to sections 23, 24 and 25 of this Rule shall make express
mention of the existence of such third-party claim.
Contrary to the parties' submissions, the foregoing provisions are simple and clear. Basic
is the rule in statutory construction that where the words of the law or rule are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. In which case, the law or rule is applied according to its express terms;
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would either be absurd,
impossible, or would lead to an injustice.
A closer examination of Section 21, Rule 39, would reveal that there is no requirement to
pay the bid in cash. What the Rule emphasizes is that in the absence of a third-party claim,
the purchaser in an execution sale need not pay his bid if it does not exceed the amount of
the judgment, otherwise, he shall only pay the excess. By implication, if there is a third-party
claim, the purchaser should pay the amount of his bid without, however, requiring that it be
made in cash.
The mode of payment therefore does not affect the validity of the execution sale, as the
rules do not specifically state that payment be made in cash.
The Court finds no reason to nullify the Certificates of Sale. Nevertheless, it must be stated
that pursuant to the express mandate of Section 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the
certificates of sale must indicate the existence of a third-party claim. The existence of a third-
party claim must likewise be annotated upon the titles of the subject properties, so as to
protect the interest of the respondents should their claim prosper.
The basis of the purchase by the judgment obligee is the satisfaction of a debt or
obligation.
On the other hand, the main consideration of the instant third-party claim is ownership
based on another mode of acquisition or factual justification. The respondents, as third-party
claimants, who are not joined as parties in the civil action which served as basis for the
execution sale, cannot be affected thereby. Pending determination of the merit of the third-
party claim therefore, its annotation on the certificate of title is necessary in order to warn
other persons that while the subject properties have been redeemed by the petitioners in the
execution sale, the latter's right is subject to another party's claim and may be nullified should
such claim be later found meritorious.
Having lodged their claim within the time provided for by law and prior to the execution
sale, it follows that the certificate of sale as well as any title which may be issued pursuant
thereto should indicate the existence of such claim. Particularly, as registration is the
operative act that creates a lien upon the land and affords protection upon the rights of the
respondents as third-party claimants.

05. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) Vs. Maunlad
Homes, Inc.
(G.R. No. 215933 February 8, 2017)
(Terceria)

Facts:
Maunlad Homes, Inc., respondent, filed unlawful detainer case with damages against National
Power Corporation (NPC). After trial, MTCC ordered NPC to vacate the subject premises and
surrender physical possession thereof to respondent and pay reasonable compensation.
Respondent filed motion for Execution which was opposed by NPC. RTC denied motion for
reconsideration of NPC and granted the respondent’s motion for execution. Respondent then
filed an urgent motion for issuance of a Break Open Order since the sheriff who tried to
implement the writ of execution, by serving the notice of levy on the NPC Warehouse at
Barangay Lagundi, Mexico, Pampanga, was prevented by the security guards assigned
therein.
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The NPC argued that the warehouse is being used both by it and the Power Sector
Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (herein petitioner PSALM), an entity created
and existing by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001 (EPIRA Law); that the said law provides that the ownership and all generation assets,
IPP contracts and other NPC disposable assets are transferred to PSALM; and that as of the
moment, the ownership of the said items stored in the said warehouse cannot be established
with certainty as they are in the process of determining what properties may be retained by
the latter.
RTC issued a Break Open Order and Notice of Levy on execution pending appeal of
personal properties/sale of seven (7) units transformer radiator fins, one (1) unit power
transformer with Serial No. 77740395, and four (4) pieces angle bars.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit of third-party claim with the sheriff pursuant to Section 16,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and alleging that it is the owner of the levied properties
pursuant to the EPIRA Law. Petitioner also filed a Manifestation with Urgent Ex Parte Motion
for Issuance of Status Quo Order with the RTC arguing that it is the owner of the subject
properties pulled out by the sheriff by operation of law and for the nullification of the levy and
restoration of possession. RTC denied PSALM.
PSALM filed a petition for certiorari but CA dismissed it. The CA found, among others,
that contrary to the allegation of petitioner that there exists no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy obtaining under the circumstances, Section 16, Rule 3 9 of the Rules of Court
provides a more expeditious and encompassing recourse in case a property belonging to a
third person is placed under the coverage of the writ of execution and, thereafter, sold at
public auction.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing the
denial of the latter's third-party claim for being a wrong remedy.
Ruling: No, the Supreme Court speaking through Associate Justice Peralta, ruled that CA did
not err in dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari. if the property levied by virtue of a writ
of execution is claimed by a third person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of such third party claimant in
which the third-party claimant may execute an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of
the property levied, and serve the same to the officer making the levy and a copy thereof to
the judgment creditor. This remedy is known as terceria. In such separate action, the court
may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the sheriff enjoining him from proceeding
with the execution sale, which is a speedy and adequate remedy to immediately relieve
petitioner from the adverse effects of the lower court's judgment. Thus, the CA did not err in
saying that Section 16 of Rule 39 provides a more expeditious and encompassing recourse
from the denial of its third-party claim.
Wherefore, petition is denied.

05. PSALM vs. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.

G.R. No. 215933, February 08, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
(Terceria)

FACTS:
In this case, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. It alleged that it has no
adequate remedy available from the writs and processes issued by the RTC, and that it acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders despite the fact that petitioner
is the owner of the subject properties.

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The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for being an incorrect remedy. The CA found,
among others, that contrary to the allegation of petitioner that there exists no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy obtaining under the circumstances, Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides a more expeditious and encompassing recourse in case a property belonging
to a third person is placed under the coverage of the writ of execution and, thereafter, sold at
public auction.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the
latter's third party claim for being a wrong remedy?

HELD:
No. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and
not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the
property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's
goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a writ
of execution is claimed by a third person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of such third party claimant.

Under the above-quoted provision, the third-party claimant may execute an affidavit of his title
or right to the possession of the property levied, and serve the same to the officer making the
levy and a copy thereof to the judgment creditor. This remedy is known as terceria. The
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless the judgment creditor files a bond
approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of
the property levied on. An action for damages may be brought against the officer within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. The same section also
provides that a third-party claimant may file a proper action to vindicate his claim to the levied
property. The proper action mentioned in Section 16 would have for its object the recovery of
ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting
from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party claim and it
may be brought against the sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded
with him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor
himself. If instituted by a stranger to the suit in which execution has issued, such proper
action should be a totally separate and distinct action from the former suit.

In this case, petitioner had filed an affidavit of third-party claim with the sheriff and a motion
for issuance of status quo order with the RTC to prevent the sale of the levied properties at
public auction, nullification of the levy and restoration of the subject properties to it, which
were denied by the RTC and, consequently, the sheriff was directed to proceed with the
implementation of the issued writ of execution.

The RTC denied the third-party claim as follows:

As to the third-party claim by movant PSALM, this Court also resolves to deny the same for
lack of merit.

This Court finds that PSALM has not been able to satisfactorily establish their claim of
ownership over the subject properties.

In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya,23 We held that for the remedy of terceria to prosper, the claim
of ownership or right of possession to the levied property by the third-party claimant must first
be unmistakably established.

06. Fermin, et al., v. Esteves (Special Order of Demolition)

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ANNIE FERMIN, a.k.a. ANITA SAGACO, and AURELIO "LEO" KIGIS, Petitioners, v. HON.
ANTONIO M. ESTEVES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 5, Regional Trial
Court, Baguio City, and MARIANO TANENGLIAN, Respondents.
(Special Order of Demolition)

FACTS: Special Order of Demolition was enforced against petitioners who were not party-
defendants.

In a Civil Case for Quieting of Title, the Court ruled in favor of, herein respondent, Tanenglian.
Respondent filed a Motion for Execution, which the Trial Court granted. Then, the Trial Court
Issued a Special Order of Demolition.

However, the Special Order of Demolition allegedly included the property of Fermin and Kigis,
who were not a party to the Civil Case.

Fermin and Kigis (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Court
of Appeals.

Petitioners alleged that:

● they were deprived of their right to due process because they were never made
defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R.
● they entered into the possession and occupancy of the lands as members of an
indigenous cultural community in the honest perception and belief that the lands
formed part of their ancestral lands.
● their occupancy of the lands was not pursuant to any agreement entered into
with anyone of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R or any of the defendants'
predecessors-in-interest.
● it was not even established that their residential structures were within the area
subject of Civil Case No. 925-R.

Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the Special Order of Demolition

ISSUE: May the Special Order of Demolition be enforced against petitioners who were not
party-defendants in the Civil Case?

HELD: NO

The generally accepted principle is that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which
he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court.
Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not
against one who, not being a party in the case, did not have his day in court. Due process
requires that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against one who
did not have his day in court.

In this case, petitioners were not parties in Civil Case No. 925-R. Petitioners' allegation that
their possession did not arise from an agreement with the defendants or the predecessors-in-
interest of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R remains unrebutted by respondent. The
Special Order of Demolition only binds the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R as well
as their agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest. In the absence of
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proof that petitioners are agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest of the

defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R, the Special Order of Demolition may not be enforced
against them.

In this case, Arizo, et al. are not judgment obligors as contemplated in Section 43, Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither are petitioners indebted to Arizo, et al. It was not
even established that petitioners are in possession of the property of Arizo, et al. In fact,
petitioners alleged that it was not established that their residential structures are within the
area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R. In other words, Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which would allow the judgment obligee to recover indebtedness due to
the judgment obligor, does not apply in this case.chanrobles virtual law library

Since petitioners are not parties to Civil Case No. 925-R, respondent has to file the proper
action against petitioners to enforce his property rights within the bounds of the law and our
rules. Petitioners' right to possession, if any, should be threshed out in a proper court
proceeding.

7. Villalon Vs. Rural Bank of Agoo (Superior Lien vs. Junior encumbrance)
FACTS:
On May 18, 1998, the spouses George and Zenaida Alviar (Spouses Alviar) obtained a loan
from herein respondent Rural Bank of Agoo, Inc. (RBAI) secured by a real estate mortgage
over a residential lot and house of the spouses, the mortgage was registered with the
Register of Deeds of La Union on the same date. The loan became due and payable was
renewed for four (4) times all evidenced by a promissory note.
On July 30, 2000, the Spouses Alviar borrowed from herein petitioner Roma Fe C. Villalon
(Villalon) which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed on July 30, 2000 over the
same residential lot and house which the spouses used as collateral with RBAI. The real
estate mortgage was registered with the Register of Deeds on July 6, 2001.
For their failure to pay their loan, an extrajudicial foreclosure was resorted to by RBAI. The
foreclosure sale was reset to several dates.
Villalon also applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged realties. The
foreclosure sale was conducted on June 26, 2002, wherein Villalon was declared as the
highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale of Real Property was issued to Villalon on June 27, 2002,
and the same was registered with the Register of Deeds on July 5, 2002.
On June 16, 2004, the foreclosure sale initiated by RBAI finally pushed through. RBAI was
the highest bidder and the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued to it. On October 14,
2005, RBAI paid the requisite fees, but despite its request, the Certificate of Absolute Deed of
Sale was not issued to it.
On the other hand, a Certificate of Absolute Definitive Sale was issued on August 6, 2007 to
Villalon, who had been in physical possession of the property since its foreclosure in 2002.
Upon discovering this, RBAI filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union against Villalon and the Spouses
Alviar, claiming principally from Villalon, and alternatively from the Spouses Alviar, the amount
of P750,818.34. RBAI alleged that since the mortgage of the said real properties in its favor is
earlier than the mortgage to Villalon, then RBAI is the first mortgagee/superior lien holder,
while Villalon is only the second mortgagee/subordinate encumbrancer/subordinate lien
holder. While the second mortgagee can foreclose ahead of the first mortgagee, RBAI

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claimed that the proceeds of the sale should be used to satisfy first the loan obtained from the
first mortgagee.
ISSUE: Whether or not RBAI can enforce its first lien or superior lien over the property on the
basis of its prior mortgage as against Villalon, the second mortgagee or junior encumbrancer.
RULING: Yes, In Hidalgo v. La Tondeña, the Court held in the main decision that a mortgage
created much ahead in point of time, but registered later than a levy of execution similarly
registered, is preferred over the said levy.
In the case at bar, it is clear that RBAI's mortgage was first constituted over the unregistered
real properties of the Spouses Alviar on May 18, 1998 and was, likewise, registered with the
RD on the same day. On the other hand, Villalon's mortgage over the said properties was
executed on July 30, 2000 and registered with the RD on July 6, 2001. Considering that
RBAI's mortgage was created and registered much ahead of time than that of Villalon, RBAI's
mortgage should be preferred. Thus, the proper foreclosure of the first mortgage by RBAI
gave, not only the first mortgagee, but also subsequent lienholders like Villalon, the right to
redeem the property within the statutory period.

08. A.M. No. P-14-3246               October 15, 2014

[Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3580-P]

ATTY. RICO PAOLO R. QUICHO, representing Bank of Commerce, Complainant,

vs.
BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., Sheriff IV, Branch 98, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Respondent

(Execution of Judgments for Money).

The Facts

The present case stemmed from the Alias Writ of Execution issued on March 9, 20 I 0 by
Branch 98 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-89-3580, the
validity of which was then pending determination in the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 91285. Pending its resolution, Atty. Quicho sought the relief of Reyes as Sheriff
of RTC, whom he claimed exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the Alias Writ of
Execution on December 9, 2010 at the main office of Bank of Commerce and on December
17, 2010 in another BOC branch in Lipa City, Batangas.

In his sworn Letter-Complaint, dated December 27, 2010,2 Atty. Quicho alleged that the
procedure observed by Reyes in implementing the alias writ violated the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court (Manual). He cited the Manual which provides that "[i]f the
judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other
mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the
properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment."

He asserted that as the holder of the assets and properties of Traders Royal Bank (TRB),
which was the judgment obligor in Civil Case No. Q-89- 3580 and whose assets were the
subject of the alias writ, BOC was given the option to choose which property to be
surrendered to satisfy the judgment. It was only when BOC was unable to exercise the option
that Reyes was allowed to levy on other properties. He added that BOC was forced to
surrender under protest a real estate property situated in Barangay Manggahan, Paranaque

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City, to satisfy the judgment and preserve its other properties from being wrongfully levied by
Reyes. He argued that Reyes did not give BOC a chance to exercise that option. Instead of
accepting the said property, Reyes blow-torched the locked grill door of BOC’s cash vault in
Lipa City and forcibly took the money deposits of its clients as well as its computers. Atty.
Quicho further claimed that Reyes sowed terror by bringing with him agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who were in full-battle gear and carrying high-powered
firearms, with members of the Philippine National Police (PNP); and that Reyes ignored the
pleas of the BOC officers who asked him to spare the computers as taking them would cripple
the bank’s operations. Atty. Quicho concluded that these illegal acts of Reyes warranted his
relief as sheriff of the RTC.

Reyes insisted that he did not abuse his authority when he implemented the writ. He was
constrained to seek the aid of the NBI as the PNP refused to provide police assistance. He
claimed that the NBI agents were not in full battle gear, and that the PNP members, who
earlier declined to give assistance, were only posted outside the bank to maintain peace and
order. He used acetylene torch to gain access to the bank’s main vault as he was left with no
other option but to use reasonable force to get the cash inside, otherwise, he would be
accused of being remiss in the performance of his duties. He only levied the computers and
monitors, and left the two (2) servers in order not to affect the banking operations.

Reyes argued that there was no basis to order his relief or suspension as Sheriff as he merely
performed his ministerial duty to implement the alias writ of execution.

OCA Report and Recommendation

The Office of the Court Administrator found sufficient grounds to hold Reyes administratively
liable for his overzealousness in implementing the alias writ of execution.

ISSUE:

WETHER OR NOT respondent Sheriff Reyes be found GUILTY of Grave Abuse of

Authority relative to his implementation of the Alias Writ of Execution

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

Time and again, the Court has declared that the highest standard of professionalism in the
performance of judicial tasks is demanded from every court personnel. The Court expects
every court personnel to perform his/her duties promptly, with great care and diligence,
having in mind the important role he/she plays in the administration of justice.10

Reyes, in his Comment, had admitted that he refused to accept the real estate property
offered by the BOC to settle the judgment award because he believed that it was not allowed
under the law and also because it was offered late.

Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure as to how execution of
judgments for money is enforced. It reads:

SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –

(a) Immediate payment on demand.- The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for
money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount
stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash,
certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment

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acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the
judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment.

xxx

(b) Satisfaction by levy. – If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in
cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature
whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution
giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied
upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option,
the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if
the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

xxx

(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. – The officer may levy on debts due the judgment
obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions
and other personal property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of
third parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or
having in his possession or control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The
garnishment shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
(Emphasis supplied)

Under the rule, the duties of a sheriff are: (1) to first make a demand from the obligor for the
immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and of all lawful fees; (2)
to receive payment in the form of cash, certified bank check payable to the obligee, or any
other form of payment acceptable to the latter; (3) to levy upon the properties of the obligor,
not exempt from execution, if the latter cannot pay all or part of the obligation; (4) give the
obligor the opportunity to exercise the option to choose which property may be levied upon;
(5) in case the option is not exercised, to first levy on the personal properties of the obligor,
including the garnishment of debts due the obligor and other credits, i.e., bank deposits,
financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal properties not capable of
manual delivery or in the possession or control of third parties; and (6) to levy on real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.11

From the aforecited provisions, it is clear that the sheriff shall demand from the judgment
obligor the immediate payment in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods
immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which of his property can be
levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or when he is absent or cannot be
located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any,
and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment.12 In this case, BOC exercised its option, although belatedly, by offering a parcel of
land located in Paranaque City. The Court notes that a second petition for certiorari
questioning the subject writ of execution was filed by BOC with the CA on November 8,
2010. The said petition was dismissed in the CA Resolution promulgated on November 26,
2010. On December 9, 2010, BOC filed its motion for reconsideration. Pending resolution of
the motion for reconsideration or on December 17, 2010, the notice of levy was served with
BOC at its Lipa City Branch. BOC offered under protest its real property in Paranaque City to
settle the judgment sum. The motion for reconsideration was, however, denied by the CA on
February 9, 2011.

Yet, Reyes ignored BOC’s option to surrender the said property. He insisted and pursued to
levy on cash and other personal properties of the BOC despite the said offer. Such act indeed
constituted a clear violation of the Rules.

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Even on the assumption that BOC waived its right to exercise the option by belatedly offering
its real estate property as satisfaction for its obligation, still, it would not exonerate Reyes from
liability.

Considering that BOC’s offer was not exercised immediately as strictly required by the
prescribed procedure under the Rules, Reyes was confronted with a crucial issue that should
have been threshed out. The nature of his function as sheriff being ministerial, he had no
discretion or authority to decide the legal question involved. As aptly ruled by the OCA, Reyes
was duty-bound to seek clarification from the judge who issued the writ to determine whether
the offer was acceptable under the circumstances. Instead of consulting Judge Cabochan
who was in the best position to resolve the matter, Reyes acted on his own and rejected the
offer outright.

As an officer of the court, he should have known the proper action to take when questions
relating to the writ require clarification.5 Regrettably, he failed in this regard.

Reyes’ claim that he did not act arbitrarily in serving the writ believing that his act was correct
and in accordance with law cannot be a valid defense. It is of no moment whether he
executed the writ in good faith because he is chargeable with the knowledge on what is the
proper action to observe in case there are questions in the writ which need to be clarified and
to which he is bound to comply.

Reyes also admitted having blow-torched the cash vault and taken the cash as well as the
computers of BOC’s Lipa City branch, but the Court rejects his explanation that he was
constrained to use such force to get the cash inside the vault, for him not to be accused of
being remiss in his duty.

Clearly, there was no legitimate reason for him to resort to a drastic act of using acetylene
torch on the iron grills in order to have access to the bank’s main vault. He was even escorted
by the Regional Director of the NBI with his agents carrying high-powered firearms which
served no apparent purpose but to cause fear and terror among the bank employees and the
clients. Indubitably, such use of force and influence in the enforcement of the writ was totally
unnecessary.

Moreover, Reyes’ act of taking the bank’s computers cannot be justified. As held in Equitable
PCI Bank v. Bellones,the sheriff can not arbitrarily levy on property essential to the work or
business of the judgment obligor. He should have heeded the repeated pleas of BOC’s
officers to spare the computers so as not to hamper its banking operations.

It is observed, however, that Reyes’ act of rejecting BOC’s offer cannot be considered as one
brought about by his ignorance of the law, but is apparently due to his overzealousness in
implementing the alias writ of execution. The Court, thus, agrees with the OCA that Reyes’
actuation only amounted to grave abuse of authority.

Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who

under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or
other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.

Evidently, the liability of Reyes was proven by substantial evidence, which is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
such being the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.19

Reyes should be reminded that by the very nature of his duties, a sheriff performs a very
sensitive function in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound to know the basic rules
relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should, at all times show a high
degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties. As an agent of the law, he is
therefore called upon to discharge his duties with due care and utmost diligence. He cannot
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afford to err in serving court writs and processes and in implementing court orders lest he
undermines the integrity of his office and the efficient administration of justice. 

Sheriffs play an important part in the administration of justice. Being in the grassroots of our
judicial machinery they are indispensably in close contact with litigants, hence, their conduct
should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of
a court or justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel.

09. HEIR OF FAUSTINA BORRES v HON. JULIUS L. ABELA

Void Judgement
G.R. NO. 131023, July 17, 2007
(Void Judgment)

FACTS

On July 6, 1992, the Borres heirs, represented by Atty. Villarruz, filed a complaint for partition
and accounting against Mrs. Radjaie. The action also sought the cancellation of TCT No. T-
24150 and the declaration of the property as commonly owned by Mrs. Radjaie and the
Borres heirs. The case was raffled to Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City then
presided by Judge Alovera.
For her alleged failure to file an answer, Mrs. Radjaie was declared in default. On October 8
and December 10, 1993, the Borres heirs presented their evidence ex-parte.
In a Decision allegedly promulgated on January 30, 1995, Judge Alovera ordered the
cancellation of TCT No. T-24150 and declared the subject property as commonly owned by
Mrs. Radjaie and the Borres heirs. On January 31, 1995, Judge Alovera retired from the
judiciary having reached the mandatory age of retirement.
On January 9, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Delano F. Villarruz, issued an order for the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the January 30, 1995 Decision. Subsequently,
possession of the subject property was turned over to the Borres heirs.
On March 5, 1996, Mrs. Radjaie filed a petition for relief assailing the January 30, 1995
Decision and the January 9, 1996 Order. She alleged that she was never served with
summons; that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person; that the proceedings
in Civil Case No. V-6186 are null and void; and that the January 30, 1995 Decision was
penned by Judge Alovera after his retirement and was never entered in the book of
judgments. She prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and "that
disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in the perfidious
anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice."
On March 29, 1996, Judge Abela was appointed as the new Presiding Judge of Branch 17.
On June 14, 1996, he issued a resolution nullifying the January 30, 1995 Decision and the
January 9, 1996 Order. Further, he ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction upon the
filing of a bond and directed the Borres heirs to surrender possession of the subject property
to Mrs. Radjaie. Hence this petition.
The Borres heirs claim that the January 30, 1995 Decision has become final and executory;
that Judge Abela does not have the authority to nullify said decision; and that the proper
remedy is an action for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the January 30, 1995 Decision has become final and executory?
HELD
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NO. It is clear that the proceedings in Civil Case No. V-6186 were attended with irregularities.
The hearing on December 10, 1993 was simulated; the January 30, 1995 Decision was
penned by Judge Alovera after he retired; and the decision was never entered in the book of
judgments as mandated in the rules. Thus, petitioners' contention that the decision has
become final and executory lacks merit.'
Under the circumstances, the Borres heirs cannot claim rights under the decision nor can they
insist on its binding character. In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals the Court held that adecision
penned by a judge after his retirement cannot be validly promulgated; it cannot acquire a
binding effect as it is null and voId. Qoud ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non
convalescit.
In like manner, a decision penned by a judge during his incumbency cannot be validly
promulgated after his retirement. When a judge retired all his authority to decide any
case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon also "retired" with him. In other
words, he had lost entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to
his retirement, x x x
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at
bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic,
Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that
void decision is deemed nonexistent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to
appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, the Court held that:
"x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be
given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal
or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create
rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to
enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalId. In
other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would
be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position
they were in before the trial."
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it
may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."
The petition is dismissed.

10. G.R. No. 213197, October 21, 2015

REMEGIO A. CHING, Petitioner, v. SAN PEDRO COLLEGE OF BUSINESS

ADMINISTRATION, Respondent.

(Res Judicata)

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the review of
the January 27, 2014 Decision2 and the June 27, 2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
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(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 128243 which reversed the December 11, 2012 Omnibus Order 4 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Calamba City, Laguna (RTC), in RTC SEC Case No. 92-
2012-C, dismissing the complaint for Prohibition Against Nuisance and Harassment Suits filed
by San Pedro College of Business Administration (SPCBA) on the ground of res judicata.

Factual Antecedents

Respondent SPCBA is a domestic non-stock and non-profit corporation, formerly known as

the Laguna College of Business Administration. Its original incorporators and members were
petitioner Remegio A. Ching (Remegio), Edgardo A. Ching, Elmer A. Ching, Leoncia A.
Ching, and Jolanda A. Apostol. In a letter, dated September 19, 2001, Remegio tendered his
irrevocable resignation stating that there is no existing property or money accountability that
may be attributable to him.

To SPCBA, the tenor of Remegio's resignation was not only as a trustee and treasurer, but
also as its member. For said reason, he was paid the amount of P20,000,000.00 representing
the buy-out price of his interest in SPCBA.

On June 10, 2010, Remegio filed an intra-corporate case before the RTC for the inspection of
corporate books.  He sought the recognition of his right to inspect the corporate books of
SPCBA as its member, alleging that his resignation letter covered his trusteeship and
treasurership positions only and not his membership in SPCBA.

After the trial, the RTC agreed with Remegio. In the February 14, 2011 Decision, the RTC
explained that plaintiff (Remegio) is entitled to the right of inspection as a member of
SPCBA. It was not shown that plaintiff is motivated by ill motives in exercising the said right
nor the demand is for an illegitimate purpose, he merely seeks to know the present financial
condition of SPCBA.

As to defendant's contention that plaintiff ceased to be a member of SPCBA, RTC Court finds
otherwise, Defendant failed to present sufficient documents to show that plaintiff ceased to
be a member of SPCBA in the manner and for causes provided in the articles of incorporation
or the by-laws.

Anent the allegation that plaintiff was paid in the amount of Twenty Million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) in settlement of his proprietary interest in SPCBA, the defendant failed to
support such contention. No documentary evidence was presented to prove such fact. Neither
was there any evidence presented to show that such alleged receipt was for plaintiff to
relinquish his member ship in SPCBA.

SPCBA then went to the CA seeking the reversal of the aforecited disposition. On March 1,
2011, SPCBA filed a "notice of appeal, the Court denied the petition for its failure to show any
reversible error on the part of the CA. The Court likewise denied with finality its motion for
reconsideration.

Earlier, on February 16, 2012, SPCBA's Board of Trustees held a joint meeting. Through its
Board Resolution,12 issued on the same date, it resolved to "affirm and/or confirm the previous
removal of Mr. Remigio A. Ching, not only as Trustee and Treasurer, but also as a Member of
the Corporation, primarily due to the payment unto said Mr. Remegio A. Ching, the buy-out of
sum of Twenty Million Pesos, for all his rights as Trustee, Treasurer and Member of the
Corporation.

On April 4, 2012, the judgment of the Court, which effectively affirmed the conclusions of the
RTC in SEC Case became final and executory per the Entry of Judgment  issued by the
Deputy Clerk of the Court.

On April 26, 2012, SPCBA filed a complaint against Remegio. It asked that he be declared
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legally and/or validly removed as trustee, treasurer and member pursuant to with no more
right to demand an inspection or get copies of the books of accounts, financial statements,
minutes of meetings, and resolutions of the board; and that he be ordered to refrain from filing
a nuisance and/or harassment suit against SPCBA.

In essence, through its complaint, SPCBA sought to prevent Remegio from filing a nuisance
and/or harassment suits against it and for the RTC to affirm/confirm his removal as a member
on the basis of the February 16, 2012 Board Resolution.

On the matter of his membership in SPCBA, Remegio countered that res judicata had already
set in following the decision rendered by the RTC in Case No. 86-2010-C. Accordingly, he
espoused the theory that the issue on his membership could not be made an issue again in
SEC Case No. 92-2012-C.

The RTC agreed with Remegio on this point. Thus the RTC ruled that the principle of res
judicata already barred SPCBA from claiming that he was not a member of SPCBA.

The CA reversed the RTC order. The CA reasoned out that there was a marked difference in
the causes of action between SEC Case No. 92-2012-C and SEC Case No. 86-2010-C,
which rendered the principle of res judicata inapplicable. It stated that SPCBA introduced in
SEC Case No. 92-2012-C a fact which did not exist at the time the prior case was filed and
terminated; that the issuance of the February 16, 2012 Board Resolution declaring the
expulsion of Remegio from SPCBA arose only after the filing of Case No. 86-2010-C; and that
the said fact did not occur and could not have occurred in the first case. This gave SPCBA a
new cause of action under Section 91 of the Corporation Code pertaining to termination of
membership or expulsion of a member from a non-stock corporation. Following the rule
that res judicata only applied to facts and conditions as they existed at the time judgment was
rendered and to the legal rights and relations of the parties fixed by the facts so determined,
the CA granted SPCBA's prayer to deny Remegio his affirmative defense of res judicata.
Thus, Aggrieved, Remegio moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

The question before this Court is whether or not the CA erred in not affirming the
application by the RTC in SEC Case No. 92-2012-C of the principle of res judicata. YES

Held:
Petitioner Remegio rejects the reasoning of the CA and invokes the applicability of res
judicata principle considering that in both cases, the same parties were involved and the issue
on his membership in SPCBA, as presented in SEC Case No. 92-2012-C, had already been
litigated and fully disposed of in SEC Case No. 86-2010-C.

In response, SPCBA averred that the CA carefully and cautiously evaluated SEC Case No.
92-2012-C vis-a-vis SEC Case No. 86-2010-C and correctly ruled that res judicata did not lie

At the onset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the claim of SPCBA, the question essentially
raised by Remegio was clearly one of law. The issue does not refer to factual matters. Rather,
it concerns the interpretation and application of the legal principle of res judicata. This is a
legal question, which this Court has jurisdiction to pass upon in a Rule 45 petition.

On the merits, the Court finds that res judicata exists and should bar SPCBA from raising the
question of Remegio's membership in SEC Case No. 92-2012-C.

The issue on Remegio's membership, as finally settled in Case No. 86-2010-C, is res judicata

The principle of res judicata, which literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted

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upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment," is of common law in origin. It has
developed through time from court decisions as a method to protect a person from being
vexed twice for the same cause. That once a final judgment has been rendered, the same
becomes conclusive and binding.

Res judicata is commonly understood as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action.

In this case, SPCBA's rejection of the claim that res judicata exists is based on the lack of one
of the aforementioned requisites, that is, the lack of similarity between the causes of action of
the first and second cases. While SEC Case No. 92-2012-C was based on the invocation of
its right to be protected against harassment suit and its right to remove members, SEC Case
No. 86-2010-C was based on the claim of Remegio to exercise his right to inspect the books
of the corporation. Thus, to SPCBA, without that similarity, no res judicata can set in.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court
is REINSTATED.

11. Madarang vs. Morales, 725 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 199283 June 9, 2014
(Relief from Judgment)

Facts:
On January 9, 2001, Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot
located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City.
The Spouses Morales alleged that on March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor and Luciana
Bartolome loaned P500,000.00 from them. The period to pay lapsed without the Spouses
Bartolome having paid their loan. After demand, the Spouses Bartolome only paid part of the
loaned amount.
In the meantime, the Spouses Bartolome died. The Spouses Morales, thus, filed a complaint
for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo
Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome.
The Spouses Morales sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented herself as Lita
Bartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend money to the Spouses Bartolome.
In their answer, defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage
covering the Bago Bantay property, specifically, the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the
instrument.
December 22, 2009, the trial court ordered defendants to pay the Spouses Morales
P500,000.00 plus 7% interest per month and costs of suit within 90 days but not more than
120 days from entry of judgment. Should defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property
shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
Defendants received a copy of the trial court’s decision on January 29, 2010.
On February 8, 2010, defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
decision which was denied by the trial court in its order dated May 25, 2010. Defendants
received a copy of the May 25, 2010 order on June 24, 2010.

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On August 11, 2010, defendants filed a notice of appeal. In its order dated August 13, 2010,
the trial court denied due course the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
According to the trial court, defendants, through their counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon,
received a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24, 2010. This is
evidenced by the registry return receipt on file with the court. Consequently, they had 15 days
from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to appeal the trial court’s decision. However, they
filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-day period to
appeal.
On September 24, 2010, defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, blaming their 80-
year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They
argued that Atty. Tugonon’s failure to appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake
and an excusable negligence due to their former lawyer’s old age.
In its order dated April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment.
The trial court held that the petition for relief was filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the
trial court’s decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether the petition for relief of judgment was properly denied by the trial court?
Ruling:
YES.

This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time. However, the
trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality
of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear
that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order.
The period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-month period. Section
3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.—A petition provided for in
either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60)
days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered,
or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting
the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
(Emphasis supplied)
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly
complied with. A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is
dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the
public policy of immutability of final judgments.
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary
periods: (a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment,
order or other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) within a fixed period of six (6) months from
entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is
required because provision for a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on
the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental
principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in
order at last to put an end to litigation.

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It should be noted that the 60-day period from knowledge of the decision, and the 6-
month period from entry of judgment, are both inextendible and uninterruptible. We
have also time and again held that because relief from a final and executory judgment
is really more of an exception than a rule due to its equitable character and nature,
strict compliance with these periods, which are definitely jurisdictional, must always
be observed. (Emphasis in the original)
In this case, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the trial court’s decision on
January 29, 2010. They filed a motion for reconsideration and an amended motion for
reconsideration. Although petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and amended motion
for reconsideration, these motions were pro forma for not specifying the findings or
conclusions in the decision that were not supported by the evidence or contrary to law. Their
motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period to appeal.
Petitioners cannot argue that the period to appeal should be counted from August 11, 2011,
the day petitioners personally received a copy of the trial court’s decision. Notice of judgment
on the counsel of record is notice to the client. Since petitioners’ counsel received a copy of
the decision on January 29, 2010, the period to appeal shall be counted from that date.
Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010.
Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a
petition for relief from judgment.
Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the
petition for relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. The
trial court should have denied the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.

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