The Thirty Verses of Vasubandhu
The Thirty Verses of Vasubandhu
3.1 Introduction
This text, like the V at has also been subjected to varied interpretations by different
scholars. A few of them like P. T. Raju see the text as a classical case of metaphysical idealism
and observe that the text describes the evolution of the world from consciousness (Raju, 1953,
p.269) while there are others like Kochumuttom who believe that such an idealist interpretation
of this text has no firm logical foundations (Kochumuttom, 1982, p.127). For Kochumuttom, the
, like the other half of the V a t t at - the V at - seems more
compatible with the philosophy of realistic pluralism than with that of idealistic monism.34
Vasubandhu has not explicitly stated his intentions in writing this text. In any case, I would like
to argue that that the text, like V at , does not commit itself to the position of either realism
or idealism and its primary task seems only the analysis and description of human consciousness
and the various transformations that it undergoes. Such an interpretation of the text in terms of an
analysis of human psyche goes very well with the overall schema of the Buddhist way, where the
emphasis would always be on the alleviation of human suffering rather than on answering
metaphysical and ontological questions.
The text is more descriptive in nature, unlike the V at which consists mostly of
philosophical arguments in the form of objections and replies on the nature and scope of human
experience. a, on the other hand mainly describes the workings of consciousness as is
34
“But I m int in th t the entire system, when understood in terms of re listi plur lism, m kes better sense and
that, therefore, even those passages which apparently support idealistic monism, have to be interpreted in terms of
realistic pluralism. ” (Kochumuttom,1982,p.1).
40
understood by the Buddhist og r tradition. However, as was the case with V at , this
text also does not get itself involved with the real-ideal debate and can in no way be taken as
favoring one position over the other.
In the opening verse, Vasubandhu points out that the various usages of t a and dharma all
refer to the transformations of consciousness. The term a a in the verse35 has been variously
tr nsl ted by different s hol rs. Thus where s An ker tr nsl tes it s „met phors‟ (An ker,
2005, p.186), Sthirm ti h s tr nsl ted it s „ onstru tions or superimpositions‟ (Ch tterjee, 1980,
p.33). However, Kochumuttom has again gone into the etymological roots of the term a a
nd shown th t it n be best tr nsl ted s „us ges‟. He writes
…Now from the bove dis ussion one rrives t four me nings for the
term a a: (i) social manners (ii) (secondary) use of terms, (iii)
environs, nd (iv) ess…thus, in the end there is only one meaning of
the term a a th t is relev nt to the ontext, nd, th t is „(se ond ry)
use of terms‟. Hen e my tr nsl tion of a a as usage. Thus t a-
35
t a- a a- a a a a tat
V a- a a . ( , Verse 1)
41
dharma- a a in the text me ns „the us ges of the terms t a and
dharma.‟ (Kochumuttom, 1982, p.132)
Thus by different usages of t a and dharma are meant various concepts that are used
to refer to t a and dharma. Sthirmati, in his commentary on has given examples of
such conceptual usages that Vasubandhu is talking about. Sthiramati writes, in his -
a a
The word vividha (in the ) means various kinds (of constructions).
„ t a a ‟ st nds for imposed onstru tions like t or soul, jiva or
the living being, jantu or animal, manuja or a a or human beings
and the like. a a a a means constructions like the skandhas, the
t , the ata a ( a a a a a a) and the
like. (Chatterjee, 1980, p.33)
The terms t a and dharma can be translated as self and elements. Now in a broader
sense, the notion of self and elements stand for the wider notions of subjectivity and objectivity
respectively. Thus concepts like t a a t a a etc. belong to the category of an
epistemological subject whereas the concepts like a a ata a t etc. belong to the
category of an epistemological object. So Vasubandhu means that the various concepts that refer
to the notions of subjectivity (self) and objectivity (elements) are nothing but the transformations
of consciousness itself. Thus what we consider as a permanent self (pudgala) as well as what we
consider as external objects or elements of experience (dharma) are both not real in the true
sense but are only illusions which are formed be use of the tion of ons iousness‟s
transforming itself into various modes, subject to certain conditions. These transformations of
consciousness result in the illusions of the self as well as of the elements in the psyche of
unenlightened persons.
42
The three types of transformations of consciousness are called the maturing
consciousness ( a- a a), the thinking consciousness (manana- a) and the perception
of object of consciousness ( a a- a t ). Vasubandhu then goes on to describe the nature and
working of these three types of transformations of consciousness. In the subsequent verses,
Vasubandhu drafts a brilliant exposition of his understanding of human consciousness and shows
how the entire psycho-somatic organism functions and how these transformations of
consciousness operate. It becomes very clear after carefully reading these verses that the a-
a a (transformation of consciousness) is responsible for the workings of the human psyche
and in no way is the world a transformation of consciousness, as is supposed by any form of
metaphysical idealism. Nowhere in this text does Vasubandhu comment on the ontological status
of the external world; all he is doing in this text is making us aware of the functioning of the
human psyche so that we can be aware of its dynamics, which can further help us to alleviate
suffering.
The first transformation of consciousness known as the a (maturing) is also called the
a a- a (store consciousness). This transformation of consciousness carries within it the
seeds of all past experiences of the individual. These seeds can then ripen at some appropriate
future time and result in good or bad fruits according to the law of karma. This transformation
can roughly be compared to what the psychoanalysts called the unconscious, although there are
marked differences between the two terms.36
36
Unconscious is a term that was used by Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, to refer to the mental
tivities th t go on inside n individu l, without the individu l being ons iously w re of them. These „hidden‟
mental processes, however, affect in a major way the behavior of an individual throughout her life. The unconscious
43
3. It has [within itself]
Torrent of water;
can be accessed, according to most psychoanalysts, by attending to the content of our dreams or slip of tongues or
through the use of psychoanalysis.
37
For the Buddhists, a consciousness ( a) is always intentional and hence it must be associated with some
mental concomitants ( tta ).
38
In Buddhist epistemology, these five elements are associated with every kind of consciousness and accordingly
these are known as sarvtraga (universals).
44
The store consciousness ( a a- a) is not associated with either good ( a a) or
bad (a a a) feelings. It is neutral to such feelings. It is unobscured as it is not covered by either
a a a a or the a a a a.39 It is called undefined because it can be labeled as neither
good nor bad, as is the case of the five universal concomitants like touch etc. This neutrality of
the a a- a can be attributed to the fact that it is the root consciousness underlying the
entire range of our conscious activity. In it, there is no scope for any feelings of pain and
pleasure as these cannot be conceptualized without a self. The illusion of the self however is
formed in the manana stage only. As there is no judgmental and discursive self in the a a, it is
indifferent to such feelings as those of good, bad, pain or pleasure. Vasubandhu then tries to
make us understand the notion of a a through the analogy of a torrent of water. Thus the store
consciousness is like a flowing stream of water. This flowing stream flows on uninhibited and it
can stop only when one has reached the stage of enlightenment (arhattva).
As we can see, verses 2-5 of describe the workings and nature of the first
transformation of consciousness that is the a a- a and are in no way involved with the
real-ideal debate about the nature of the world. Thus, any attempt to understand the verses as
trying to advocate either realism or idealism would be mistaken.
Verses 5-7 of the describe the second transformation of consciousness which is called
the thinking consciousness ( a a a- a). It has a a- a as its supporting
consciousness and the object of its operation is also a a. It manifests through the act of
39
“There are two factors, according to Mahayana, which cause a being to remain unenlightened and unmeshed in
a a. They are (1) The obscuration of the defilements ( a a a a) and (2) The obscuration of the wrong and
perverse view about the nature of reality ( a a a a).” (Keown, 2003, p.25)
45
thinking. Unlike a a, most of whose contents lie dormant and become accessible to our
perceptions only at a certain time, the manana manifests itself through an act of thinking only. It
operates essentially in the zone of conscious thought and hence is called an act of thinking. It is
this transformation of consciousness which is responsible for the illusion of a permanent self in
the free flowing stream of consciousness.
7. It [i.e. a - a- a] is associated
46
The manas, like the a a is associated with the five sarvtragas - touch, attention,
knowledge, conception and volition. These associates are of the same nature as the region ( a
t )40 in which one is born. Thus if one is born in the region of desire ( a t ), the
nature of associates would correspond to this realm only. The thinking consciousness does not
operate in a person who has attained liberation by following the path of the Buddha. It is also
absent in the state of suppressed consciousness ( a a atti) and in the supra-mundane
path ( tta a- ). These states where the manas is non operational have been very clearly
described by Sthirmati in his - a a. He writes
The arhat does not have it. Not in the stage of a a att (a force
stopping consciousness and producing the highest semiconscious dreamy
trance), nor in the tta a (or transcendental stage) (is it ever
present). (Chatterjee, 1980, p.57)
40
In Buddhism, there are three realms of existence - a a a a a a a a. The first of these, the
a a is the realm of desire and attachment and includes existence in the form of humans, animals, demons and
hell-beings. The second realm, namely the a a is the realm of form without desire and attachment. This is
inhabited by some Gods who have attained this zone through their meditations. The third realm or the a a a is
the realm which is without desire and without form. The sages who have mastered the four formless stages of
meditations are born in this zone.
47
The verses 8-16 of the deal with the third transformation of consciousness, namely the
active consciousness ( a tt - a ). Vasubandhu starts its description by saying that this
transformation is same as the perception of the sixfold object. Kochumuttom has taken this
definition as implying that Vasubandhu is talking about the presence of an external object when
he talks about the perception of the sixfold object.41 However the sixfold object is defined by
42
Sthiramati in his - a a and he sees no reason to accept the object as something
external. For Sthirmati and other Buddhists holding an idealist view of reality, the six active-
consciousnesses and their respective objects ( a a) can all be explained in terms of
consciousness only without the need of positing an object external to consciousness, and
43
elaborate arguments like a a a a etc. are given in defense of their thesis. However,
Ko humuttom t kes re list re ding while interpreting the word „obje ts‟ nd believes th t
Vasubandhu is admitting to the existence of external objects. I would again emphasize that both
Sthiramati and Kochumuttom have offered sound reasons in favor of their respective views and
no amount of argument would seem to end this debate in a decisive manner. However, what is
important to note here is the fact that without wasting time on any metaphysical debate or getting
involved in the question about the nature and ontological status of the sixfold object,
Vasubandhu moves forward to define the dynamics of a tt - a.
It is associated, similarly,
41
“Th t is, sense ons iousness involves sense nd its obje t, the l tter being in most ses n extern l thing.”
(Kochumuttom, 1982, p.140).
42
“The word „ vidh sy ‟ me ns the per eption or gr sping or the definite ognition of the six kinds of obje ts viz.
a (visual sense-data), a a (auditory sense data), gandha (olfactory sense-data), rasa (taste sense-data),
ta a (tactile sense-data) and dharma (non-sensuous)”. (Chatterjee, 1980, pp.59-60)
43
“ a a a a-niyama (invariable co-apprehension) is an argument that we can attach no sense to the notion of
physical reality existing apart from minds. Since the awareness of blue is simultaneous with the blue thing, and blue
and the awareness of blue never occur separately, we must assume that they are the s me.” (B rtley, 2008, p.128)
48
Vasubandhu further elaborates that the active consciousness ( a tt - a) is linked
with three kinds of mental factors. These are universal, specific and good mental factors. It is
also associated with primary and secondary defilements and further, it is associated with three
kinds of feelings, viz., good, bad and indifferent. It is interesting to note that the complexity of
the transformation of consciousness increases as we move from store consciousness to active
consciousness. The a tt - a seems to be most complex of them all. It is because unlike
the a a and the manas, which are relatively less complex and more stable than the a tt -
a, this a tt - a belongs to the stage of our active perceptual experience which is
always being affected by the ceaseless flux of sense data received by our senses.
The universal associates are touch, attentiveness, knowledge, conception and volition.
They are called the universal associates because they are associated with each and every kind of
consciousness. The specific associates are described by Vasubandhu as desire, resolve, memory,
concentration and knowledge. These are called specific associates because they are tied to a
particular consciousness and the intentional objects of their association are specific and not
universal.
t t …
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The good associates are enlisted as faith, sense of shame, fear of censure, non-
covetousness, non-anger, non-ignorance, courage composure, equanimity, alertness and
harmlessness (all these are enlisted in verse 10). The primary defilements are described by
Vasubandhu as passionate attachment, grudge and stupidity.
Vasubandhu adds to the list of primary defilements he enlisted in previous verse. The list
continues with pride, false views, doubt, anger, hatred, hypocrisy, envy, jealousy, spite and
deceit.
Vasubandhu continues elaborating the primary defilements in this verse also. He adds
dishonesty, arrogance, harmfulness, shamelessness, defiance of censure, sluggishness, conceit,
unbelief and indolence to the list.
Distraction of mind,
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are the secondary defilements.
Together or separately,
In this verse, Vasubandhu says that these five sense consciousnesses originate on the
root consciousness in the same manner as waves originate on water. Just as waves on water may
arise in the form of either a single wave or a multiplicity of waves, similarly sense
consciousnesses can arise on the root-consciousness as a single consciousness (e.g. only the eye
consciousness) or a multiplicity of consciousness (in the case of simultaneous arousal of eye,
ear and smell consciousnesses).
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means only the seeds of the previous impressions which ripen at a particular moment according
to the law of karma and give us the illusion of an external.44 However, as already stated,
Vasubandhu seems in no mood to get into any such philosophical debate. He therefore proceeds
into his analysis of the human psyche.
In this verse, Vasubandhu says that the thought consciousness is active at all times in
people except in certain special cases. These cases involve the cessation of mental life (a) in a
persons who have lost the consciousness of the self ( a a-sattva), and (b) in those who are
in the state of either of the two yogic trances of a a a att or a a att .45 It
is also absent (c) in persons who are devoid of consciousness because of being in a state of
extreme sloth and (d) in persons whose accidental imbalance in the three humors of the body
(the wind, the bile and the phlegm) result in such persons getting unconscious.
44
This debate has been discussed in the second chapter of the thesis as it occurs in verse 10 and 11 of the V at .
45
“The word, a att a a means the a a a att (or a force that makes one lose the consciousness of
the self) and the a- a att (or a force that stops the consciousness and produces the highest semi conscious-
dreamy trance).” (Chatterjee, 1980, p.99)
52
Vasubandhu states that this threefold transformation of consciousness which he has just
described can also be understood as discrimination. This discrimination is between the subject
apprehender and object apprehended, since these three transformations make sense only if we
take the notion of subject and object for granted. Without the notion of subject and object,
notions like thought consciousness, defilements, active consciousness etc. do not make any
sense. All the three transformations operate in the zone of this distinction between the subject
and the object, and all such distinctions like subject/object, grasper/graspable, self/elements are
unreal constructions which do not exist in reality but are formed only by ignorance (a ) in
the form of our mental constructions (vikalpa). Therefore in the final analysis, all these
transformations are not real in the absolute sense and hence reality is perception-only.46
The store consciousness ( a a- a) contains all the seeds in itself and its such and such
transformations, i.e., the active consciousness ( a tt - a) happen because of the mutual
influence of a a and a tt - a on each other. Thus a complete perceptual act involving
active consciousness involves both
46
It must be remembered th t the l im „All this is perception-only‟ is not to be taken as the strong metaphysical
claim that all existence is nothing but perception. It simply means that all we can know is our perceptions.
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2. subsequent conceptualization of the perceptual sense-data by the impressions
stored in a a- a.
Thus, the sensation part of a perceptual act is given by the sense-object which gives rise
to the six consciousnesses, together or separately. However, such a pure sensation is
conceptualized on the basis of the existing impressions ( a or a ) in the a a. Such an act
of transformation of consciousness in turn deposits newer seeds in the store consciousness. These
seeds can then ripen in the future and act with any of the active consciousnesses to produce
further acts of active consciousness. Thus these two, namely the existing seeds in the a a and
the newer experiences by the active consciousness, mutually influence each other. It is only due
to this constant interaction between the existing seeds of a a in the a a and the newer
experiences in a tt that we can have any unit of conceptual knowledge. Any of these alone -
either store consciousness or active consciousness - is insufficient to produce knowledge and
judgment. Since a unit of knowledge or judgment occurs in the form of a subject-object schema,
therefore, Vasubandhu says that the subject-object discrimination is the result of the mutual
influence of store consciousness and active consciousness on each other.
In verse 19, Vasubandhu explains how the a a keeps on running like an unending
stream and how the seeds in the store consciousness do not get totally exhausted in spite of our
continuous actions and in spite of the event of death. This is because every new action by the
moment-series deposits newer seeds in the storehouse consciousness and also the habit energies
of twofold grasping strengthens the a a. The twofold graspings are (a) the graspings of the
graspable and (b) the grasping of the grasper. These two graspings, according to Vasubandhu,
refer to the two illusions that ordinary mortals are afflicted with. The first is the illusion of the
54
object, that is, there are independently existing objects which can be known as they are in
themselves, and the second is that there is an independent subject which can also be known to us.
The habit energies of these two graspings, along with the habit energies of the
experiences that we undergo act as new seeds ( ja) and keep on filling the storehouse
consciousness. As a result, the a a never gets exhausted. Even after the previous stage of
maturation is exhausted, that is, even after the death of a person, these two factors help the a a
to enter the next stage of maturation, viz., a new birth.
These last two verses discussed above also describe the internal mechanisms of
consciousness and hence are not concerned with real-ideal debate in any way.
To [subject-object] distinction
In verses 20-22, sub ndhu t lks bout nother import nt fe ture of the og r philosophy,
that is, the a a or the three own-beings. He explains that our phenomenal experience of
the world can be understood by categorizing it into three different modes in which this
experience can be meant by us.
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experience which is based on the dichotomy of the perceiving subject and the perceived object is
known as the constructed nature ( a a ta- a va).
If the various forms of subject-object experience are what are known as the constructed
nature, the fundamental ground of these forms is the other-dependent nature ( a ata t a
a a). It is called the other-dependent nature because it does not exist by itself but depends
on external conditions for its existence, as per the law of dependent origination.
This verse clearly indicates that these three own beings are not various ontological
categories but only the way in which the phenomenal experience is meant by us. This is because
the three are not separately existing worlds but are only the various ways in which we experience
the given data which we receive through our sense faculties. Hence, the ground of experience is
only the other-dependent (paratantra) nature. When paratantra is marred by duality, what one
experiences is the constructed nature (parikalpita). Devoid of this false duality, the fulfilled
nature ( a a panna) is experienced.
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22. For that reason, indeed,
Nor non-different
is not seen,
is not seen.
Since the fulfilled nature is nothing but the other-dependent devoid of the constructed, it
is called neither different nor non-different from the other-dependent nature. Vasubandhu
clarifies the point with the example of permanence. He compares the relation between fulfilled
nature and the other-dependent nature to the relation between impermanence and an
impermanent object. One can never observe impermanence without it being instantiated by an
imperm nent obje t. However, th t does not me n th t „imperm nen e‟ (t ken s on ept) nd
an impermanent entity (taken as an object) are one and the same. Since both of them are
observed in the same ostensive particular thing (a person can be referred to for explaining both
the notion of impermanence as well as an example of an impermanent object), they cannot be
different either. The relation between fulfilled and other-dependent nature is like between
impermanence and an impermanent thing. The two are neither different nor non-different from
each other.
Unless one realizes the state of fulfilled nature, one can never know that the world of our
experience is only other-dependent nature. Without this realization, we will keep on taking the
subject-object distinction to be real and the constructed nature to be the ultimate truth of our
existence.
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3.6 The Emptiness of the Three Natures
Vasubandhu now talks about the threefold naturelessness of the three own beings. Sthirmati
rightly points out in his commentary that Vasubandhu is trying to reconcile the theory of the
triple nature of reality with the important Buddhist notion of the emptiness of the elements
( a a- at ).47
Vasubandhu says that for each of the own beings, there is a corresponding lack of own
being. Due to this reason it is known that everything is empty or there is the naturelessness of all
elements.
The second nature, again, does not come into being by itself,
47
“If paratantra re the entities qu subst n e only then how is it th t in the „ t ‟, it is so said that all elements are
without ny essen e, without ny origin nd without ny de y.” (Ch tterjee, 1980, p.122)
58
without a fixed essence. Its naturelessness is called the utpatt a at (naturelessness
with reference to the origin) of the paratantra.
25. That from which all elements have their ultimate reality,
That is itself the state [in which one realizes the meaning]
of perception-only, too.
The fulfilled own being is the one in which all elements have their ultimate reality. Since
this nature is the fulfilled one and here consciousness is residing in perception-only, there arises
no question of any essential nature of this state since it is beyond linguistic descriptions which
are part of the subject-object duality. Hence nothing can really be said about this state and so it is
also devoid of any essential nature. This is called the a a t a- a at of a a a
(naturelessness of elements in their absolute state of existence).
In the preceding verses, Vasubandhu defined the three own beings which are nothing but
the ways in which we encounter the phenomenal experience that is given to us. Thus,
Vasubandhu is dealing with epistemological categories here and he makes no claim for or against
the existence of the world dependent or independent of consciousness.
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In verses 26-30, the mystical aspects of the come to the forefront. In verse 26,
Vasubandhu is trying to explain how one can be sure that one is residing in the state of
perception-only. The paradoxes that such a realization of perception-only involves again suggest
that any conventional reading of the cannot do justice to the subtleties and depth that
this text contains. In the final verses, the importance of taking the perception-only realization
from theory to praxis as well as the hurdles and logical inconsistencies that might be encountered
in such a move have been discussed by Vasubandhu. This is another reminder of the fact that in
the Buddhist tradition, philosophy and praxis are strongly interwoven and any philosophy which
is separated from the practical conduct of a seeker is incomplete. Thus, the job of a Buddhist
philosopher and his philosophical arguments/texts is only to supplement the path of praxis which
it does by making us understand the nature of the phenomena. A philosophy which is purely
formal and does not respond to these issues is of no use. Ontology or metaphysics is pursued in
such a tradition only to form a suitable basis for epistemology or psychology which is of obvious
importance for any student of Buddhism since it is only an understanding of the mental
framework that can help us understand ourselves and the cause of our sufferings in a better way.
In verse 26, Vasubandhu states that until an individual realizes the fact that every form of
experience is just perception-only, her consciousness will keep on operating in the illusion of
subject/object, grasper/graspable or knower/known dichotomy. This two fold nature of
knowledge, considered the bedrock and foundation of the entire epistemological schema in
modern philosophy, is not wh t n be lled „re l‟ in the Buddhist tr dition.
The real/ideal debate presupposes this dichotomy of subject apprehender and object
apprehended as real. This is because the question whether the world is real or ideal is relevant
only in a framework of knowledge in which the notion of subject/object, knower/known etc. are
taken as real. Hence when this subject/object dichotomy is itself regarded as unreal and false
mental construction, the real-ideal debate loses its epistemological foundation. Such an
epistemology, in which the subject-object distinction is called unreal may seem too primitive to
be classified in any western epistemological schema and this is exactly the point that I am trying
to make here. The opinion that Wittgenstein held for philosophy in relation to natural sciences
can be used as an analogy to understand the nature and scope of this text.48 Thus the entire field
48
“Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word "philosophy" must mean something whose place is
above or below the natural sciences, not beside the natural sciences).” (Wittgenstein, 1922/1999, p.52)
60
of discourse of these texts is something that can be placed above or below philosophy, but not
besides it. Hence, there is no scope for a real-ideal debate in this text.
of perception-only
of mere perception-only
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realizes that there are no external objects but perception-only, and the illusion of the object goes
away, the other pole of this dichotomy, that is the independently existing subject, also falls away.
These two dichotomies, viz. subject/object, grasper/graspable etc. are created by the mind. Once
these dichotomies fall away, there is no subject who can make the judgment - “this is per eption-
only” - since all linguistic judgments necessarily involve the subject/object structure. Thus in the
true state of realization of perception-only, there is neither subject nor object but only the
realization of the ceaseless flow of consciousness.
To most students of modern philosophy, the above verses may seem nonsensical or
mystical claims which have nothing to do with the way philosophy should be done and is done in
modern times. This is because it is impossible to imagine how such a state would be where one
realizes that all is perception-only. If there is no subject who knows, then who is the one who is
realizing perception-only? What would be the status of objects in such a state? Unanswered
questions like these really seem to put a philosophical deadlock on this text. I believe this
happens because in this part of the text Vasubandhu is clearly leaving the philosophical plane
and entering the religious/spiritual plane - a plane which is quite unlike philosophy and is
marked by mystique and paradox. This again brings out the non-philosophical nature of the text.
The final two verses describe the state of realization where one has attained the state of
an arhat by being settled in the knowledge of perception-only.
Vasubandhu says that the true state of perception-only is the state of supramundane
knowledge and in this state, there is neither the subject apprehender nor the object apprehended.
In order to explain this state, Vasubandhu says that such a state is obtained by a a a tt
which in turn is obtained when the two illusions of a a a a (causes of affliction) and a
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a a a (obstacles that cover up the object of knowledge) are removed. The two a a a are
removed by following the way of the Buddhas. This removal of the a a a results in a total
change in the psychological being of an individual, called the revulsion at the basis ( a a
49
a tt ) in the Yogacara tradition.
Such a state is described by Vasubandhu as the pure source reality (tat at ) which is
incomprehensible, auspicious and unchangeable. It is bliss itself as well as the emancipated body
called the truth body of the great sage.
49
The revulsion at the basis ( a a a tt ) happens when through the removal of two kinds of obstructions
( a a a ), the store consciousness stops depositing any new seeds in the form of various vikalpas in it. With the
new seeds of duality not entering the a a and the old ones slowly diminishing with time, there comes a stage when
the a a is free of each and every impression of duality and ons iousness tt ins tot l freedom. Su h st ge of
tt inment is lled the revulsion t the b sis in the og r tr dition.
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V t - t at - a- a t - a a
t - a a at t a t a- a . (Vimsatika Verse22)
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V at a - All this is perception-only - because of being read out of context has already
generated so much confusion that Vasubandhu is more often than not seen as an idealist and the
other aspects of his philosophical genius are overlooked. Alhough he has shown his skills as an
ingenous philosopher in texts such as the a a a t a a- - a a a or the
V a , still I would insist that these particular texts contain more than an exercise in
armchair philosophy. They pave a path towards self realization and in this path philosophical
tools and analysis are used in order to make things and concepts clear to the reader. In spite of all
this, if one still believes that Vasubandhu has categorically described the ontological nature of
the world – whether real or ideal - or even assumes that his primary interest lies in settling this
issue, one is definitely rrying the r ft over one‟s he d. 51
I gree with Ko humuttom‟s thesis th t sub ndhu is not giving n ide list
interpretation of the world in the a. However, the important point to notice is that neither
is he affirming the existence of extra mental thing in itself. Thus Vasubandhu is not advocating
realism either. He can be read in a realist way, but that would just be a reading and not an
expli it l im. In my opinion, sub ndhu‟s m in on ern, espe i lly in a is to get the
seeker out of the dichotomy of subject-object so that he can know himself as a stream of
consciousness, get rid of the false notion of the self and hence put an end to his suffering. In such
a schema, the question whether the external objects exist or not is an unnecessary metaphysical
question which he would have anyways liked to avoid.
Thus the thrust of the perception-only doctrine is to show how the mind constructs our
world, not in an ontological but in a psychological way. The key here is the removal of
psychological suffering, and not the aquisition of ontological knowledge.
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The parable of the raft appears in the a a tta of the a a a. In this parable, Buddha
compares his teachings with a raft. Just as after crossing a river with the help of the raft, a wise man leaves the raft
on the shore nd does not rries it over one‟s he d while w lking off the shore, in simil r w y, Buddh s ys th t
his te hings should not be psy hologi lly rried over in one‟s mind once they have served their purpose of
showing a path towards an end to suffering.
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