Objection 2 SLS Response District Court
Objection 2 SLS Response District Court
Appellant, Paul Bird, OBJECTS to the court’s order that Appellee file a status report to
respond to Appellant’s appeal/motion more than one month after it failed to timely respond pursuant
to FRAP Rule 27(a)(3)(A): “(A) Time to file. Any party may file a response to a motion ...The
response must be filed within 10 days after service of the motion unless the court shortens or
extends the time...” Appellant filed his appeal on August 30th, 2021. Under Rule 27(a)(3)(A)
Appellee, SLS, had 10 days to file a response, but, failed to do so. Under FRCP Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i),
the time to respond is 21 days. In either case Appellee is in default. Appellant, Paul Bird, OBJECTS
to Appellee’s untimely response and moves this court to strike said response as Movant/Appellee
has failed to prove up standing or court’s jurisdiction and is without standing.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
All officers of the District Court are hereby placed on notice under authority of the
supremacy and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the common law
1
authorities of Haines v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-421, Platsky v. C.I.A. 953 F.2d. 25, and Anastasoff v.
United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) relying on Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135
(1992), “United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996),
quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). Trinsey v. Pagliaro,
D.C. Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647, American Red Cross v. Community Blood Center of the Ozarks,
257 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 07/25/2001), In re Haines: pro se litigants (Paul Bird is a pro se litigant) are
held to less stringent pleading standards than bar licensed attorneys. Regardless of the deficiencies
in their pleadings, pro se litigants are entitled to the opportunity to submit evidence in
support of their claims. In re Platsky: court errs if court dismisses the pro se litigant (Paul Bird
is a pro se litigant) without instruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair
pleadings. In re Anastasoff: litigants’ constitutional rights are violated when courts depart from
precedent where parties are similarly situated. All litigants have a constitutional right to have their
claims adjudicated according the rule of precedent. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898
(8th Cir. 2000).
Appellee is Without Standing to File a Response Absent a Prove-up of Standing
Movant/Appellee claims on page 3, third paragraph that “the issue of [Movant’s] standing
has been repeated[ly] adjudicated...and in each and every instance the Courts have found there to be
standing to proceed by the predecessors of this secured party.” Movant/Appellee thereby concludes
that courts have the power to “find” or rule however courts wish, absent any evidence or a prove-up
by Movant that it has standing. However, this claim and conclusion is clearly false. In each of
those cases, and, in case #21-11271 Movant has failed to prove-up standing or court’s
jurisdiction as required. “Once State and Federal Jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be
proven." Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). And, “Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot
be assumed, it must be proved to exist.” Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.
The record shows that NOT ONE OF THE MOVANTS has proved-up of standing or
jurisdiction in case #03-52010-S, case #13-28238-NVA, and case #21-11271. In each said case
petitioner was denied due process. In any judicial proceeding, the moving party has the burden
2
of proof of demonstrating that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matters and parties
before it.
Movant/Appellee has failed to demonstrate its standing or that the court has jurisdiction, and
is therefore absent standing to file any response to Appellant’s appeal absent proof of standing and
jurisdiction. See the following authorities: Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) Security Trust Co.
v. Black River National Bank, 187 U.S. 211 (2002). The due process guarantee expressed in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires assurance of fundamental fairness
during legal proceedings. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This includes the requirement that
Movant prove up standing, jurisdiction and the claim of res judicata before this court or the
lower court may proceed. To proceed absent jurisdiction is a violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section
242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law. It constitutes rebellion against the Constitution
and treason.
Movant/Appellee has also claimed on page 2 that “By statute litigants in federal bankruptcy
courts may appeal to federal district courts as of right from ‘final judgments, orders and decrees,’
and certain specified interlocutory orders...” concluding that Appellant “may appeal… but only with
leave of the court.” However, Mr. Hillman has neglected to notice that the very heart of the appeal
deals with the final void judgment issued by Judge Schneider in case #03-52010-S. Void
judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity
may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need
not be attacked directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed,
City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1973). (My emphasis.)
Movant/Appellee also claims on page 2 that “’exceptional circumstances justify a departure
from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment,’
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay...Exceptional circumstances should be found to exist only where (1)
the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) there is substantial ground for a difference of
opinion on the issue resolved and (3) interlocutory appeal would materially advance the termination
of the litigation. In re Pawlak, 520 B.R. at 182.” Denial of due process, proceeding absent
jurisdiction after challenge of same, and treason by the judge involve “controlling questions of law”
3
and “there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion” regarding the requirement that Movant
must prove-up standing and jurisdiction AND must prove up the claim of res judicata. “A party who
asserts the defense of res judicata, or estoppel by judgment, has the burden of proving it and must
show that the right in question was determined on the merits in the former judgment. And, if the
judgment itself leaves the matter uncertain then it must be proved by other evidence.” (My
emphasis). Tennessee Supreme Court decision of Garrett v. Corry Foam Products, Inc., 596
S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1980). In addition to being an admitted criminal (see attached affidavit of Robert
McKee), Mr. Hillman is a LIAR as shown herein. He would have this court believe that courts can
rule however they wish absent proof of standing or jurisdiction; that Petitioner’s appeal is not from
a final judgment (case #03-52010-S) when it IS.
Mr. Hillman’s claims are bare statements of counsel which this court may not consider.
“This finding of a continuing investigation, which forms the foundation of the majority opinion,
comes from statements of counsel made during the appellate process. As we have said of other un-
sworn statements which were not part of the record and therefore could not have been considered
by the trial court: ‘Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered by us in the
disposition of [a) case.’ UNITED STATES v. LOVASCO (06/09/77) 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52
L. Ed. 2D 752.”
This court has invited Movant/Appellee, clearly without standing, to “construe” matters
related to Appellant’s appeal, and to respond despite its failure to timely respond resulting in default
and despite its failure to prove-up standing and court’s jurisdiction. This constitutes a violation
of Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 242, and a denial of Petitioner/Appellant’s right to due process.
Pursuant to the requirement that the court be fair and impartial, court may not ignore
default by Movant/Appellee; may not side with Appellee; may not deny Appellant due process
by refusing to address the subject matter of Appellant’s appeal, nor may it consider Appellee’s
motions, or arguments after the lower court’s failure/refusal to prove up subject matter
jurisdiction and Movant’s/Appellee’s failure to prove-up standing and its claim of “res
judicata.”
4
Considering Movant’s/Appellee’s failure to prove-up its standing and its claim of res
judicata, Appellee’s claim that it is the “secured party creditor” is a FALSE claim as it has failed to
prove it is the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17(a)(1) “Designation in General. An action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Its claim that Paul Bird’s appeal is just
“to delay a State foreclosure proceeding” is a LIE as Appellee (SLS) is absent the note, absent a
valid chain of title and absent authority to conduct such a proceeding. Mr. Robert “So What”
Hillman, Esq., Appellee’s attorney, is a self-confessed criminal (see attached unrebutted affidavit of
Robert McKee). Mr. Hillman has made no attempt to prove-up his client’s standing or court’s
jurisdiction, which are the issues before this court in the matter of Paul Bird’s appeal. Mr. Hillman
will stop at nothing to procure the cooperation of this court in aiding and abetting SLS’s frauds
upon the court, and its theft of Paul Bird’s home through wrongful foreclosure.
The record of case #03-052010, case #13-28238-NVA, and case #21-11271 show that
Movants failed to prove-up standing; the record shows that the judge in each case ignored Movant’s
failure and continued to presume subject matter jurisdiction it did not have in violation of Title 18,
U.S.C., Section 242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law.
Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review
This court must candidly admit that there are no relevant facts submitted by Appellee:
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC never entered the note or chain of title in support of claims against
Paul Bird and therefore had no factual material to site on the record and appellate courts lack
jurisdiction to review a void judgment for factual considerations. This court’s de novo review is limited
to inquiry of whether when jurisdiction was challenged, party asserting jurisdiction (SLS) was able to
verify jurisdiction and prove up its claim of res judicata by submitting the original note and a valid
chain of title as required.
Statement of the issue
George L. Russell’s failure to review or address the subject matter of Paul Bird’s appeal or
to report the charge of Michelle Harner’s treason, or to acknowledge the lower court’s clear lack of
jurisdiction after its failure to prove-up same, reveals an ever more venal federal “judiciary” which
5
delights in denying pro se litigants remedy in the form of relief from void judgments obtained in
phony, sham court proceedings. (See pages 10-14 of the Appeal).
Argument and authorities
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and as such have no inherent jurisdictional
authority, no inherent judicial power whatsoever. Courts of limited jurisdiction are empowered
by one source: SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADINGS – meaning one of the parties appearing
before the court (in this case the Movant) must literally give the court its judicial power by
completing jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and may only
exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so. A party seeking to invoke a federal
court's jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. See Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (U.S. 01/02/1856), SECURITY TRUST COMPANY v. BLACK RIVER
NATIONAL BANK (12/01/02) 187 U.S. 211, 47 L. Ed. 147, 23 S. Ct. 52, McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936), HAGUE v. COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION ET AL. (06/05/39) 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423, UNITED STATES
v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO. (12/07/77) 434 U.S. 159, 98 S. Ct. 364, 54 L. Ed. 2d 376,
CHAPMAN v. HOUSTON WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION ET AL. (05/14/79) 441 U.S. 600,
99 S. Ct. 1905, 60 L. Ed. 2d 508, CANNON v. UNIVERSITY CHICAGO ET AL. (05/14/79) 441 U.S.
677, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 60 L. Ed. 2d 560, PATSY v. BOARD REGENTS STATE FLORIDA (06/21/82)
457 U.S. 496, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 73 L. Ed. 2d 172, MERRILL LYNCH v. CURRAN ET AL. (05/03/82)
456 U.S. 353, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 72 L. Ed. 2d 182, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457.
Objection to This Court’s Complicity in Michelle Harner’s and Appellee’s Fraud
Appellant objects to this court inviting Appellee to respond after its time to respond had
expired, and, absent a prove-up of its standing and the lower court’s jurisdiction. Appellant has
reported to this court his objection to the rampant and outrageous fraud perpetrated by Judge
Harner’s court, and Judge Russell has become complicit by failing to report said fraud. Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1, judges who do not report the criminal activities of other judges become
principals in the criminal activity. The record shows that Movant failed to rebut or respond to Mr.
Bird’s motion to challenge Movant’s standing. Rather than compelling Movant to prove-up
6
standing, Judge Harner elected to aid and abet Movant’s fraud upon the court by denying Bird’s
motion, and by failing/refusing to prove-up her court’s subject matter jurisdiction as required
pursuant to the ruling that “once State and Federal Jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be
proven.” Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). And, “Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot
be assumed, it must be proved to exist.” Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.
And, “Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction
asserted." Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York, 37 F Supp.
The the record of case #21-11271 shows that Judges Harner and Catliota have failed to
prove-up court’s subject matter jurisdiction as required, have perjured their oaths of office, have
vacated the bench, sided with Movant, SLS, and have proceeded absent jurisdiction, thereby aiding
SLS’s criminal attempt to steal Paul Bird’s home under color of law. This constitutes acts of
treason. By failing to report these acts of treason, which are obvious and a matter of record, and
by failing to take action on Mr. Bird’s unrebutted charges of treason, Judge Russell has become
complicit in said treason, and must recuse himself. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1, judges who do
not report the criminal activities of other judges become principals in the criminal activity.
Memorandum of Law
“3. (a). This finding of a continuing investigation, which forms the foundation of the
majority opinion, comes from statements of counsel made during the appellate process. As we have
said of other un-sworn statements which were not part of the record and therefore could not have
been considered by the trial court: "Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered by
us in the disposition of [a) case." UNITED STATES v. LOVASCO (06/09/77) 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.
Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, Under no possible view, however, of the findings we are considering
can they be held to constitute a compliance with the statute, since they merely embody conflicting
statements of counsel concerning the facts as they suppose them to be and their appreciation of the
law which they deem applicable, there being, therefore, no attempt whatever to state the ultimate
facts by a consideration of which we would be able to conclude whether or not the judgment was
warranted. GONZALES v. BUIST. (04/01/12) 224 U.S. 126, 56 L. Ed. 693, 32 S. Ct. 463. No
instruction was asked, but, as we have said, the judge told the jury that they were to regard only the
7
evidence admitted by him, not statements of counsel, HOLT v. UNITED STATES. (10/31/10) 218
U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct. 2, Care has been taken, however, in summoning witnesses to
testify, to call no man whose character or whose word could be successfully impeached by any
methods known to the law. And it is remarkable, we submit, that in a case of this magnitude, with
every means and resource at their command, the complainants, after years of effort and search in
near and in the most remote paths, and in every collateral by-way, now rest the charges of
conspiracy and of gullibility against these witnesses, only upon the bare statements of counsel. The
lives of all the witnesses are clean, their characters for truth and veracity un-assailed, and the
evidence of any attempt to influence the memory or the impressions of any man called, cannot be
successfully pointed out in this record. TELEPHONE CASES. DOLBEAR v. AMERICAN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY. MOLECULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY V. AMERICAN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY. AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY V. MOLECULAR
TELEPHONE COMPANY. CLAY COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE COMPANY V. AMERICAN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY. PEOPLE'S TELEPHONE COMPANY V. AMERICAN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY. OVERLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY V. AMERICAN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY. (PART TWO THREE) (03/19/88) 126 U.S. 1, 31 L. Ed. 863, 8 S. Ct.
778. Statements of counsel in brief or in argument are not sufficient for motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D. C. Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647. Factual statements or
documents appearing only in briefs shall not be deemed to be a part of the record in the case, unless
specifically permitted by the Court – Oklahoma Court Rules and Procedure, Federal local rule
7.1(h). Claim of damages, to be admissible as evidence, must incorporate records such as a
general ledger and accounting of an alleged unpaid promissory note, the person responsible
for preparing and maintaining the account general ledger must provide a complete
accounting which must be sworn to and dated by the person who maintained the ledger. See
Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v.
Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28
Conn. L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000), and Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc.
8
513 A.2d 1218, 201 Conn.1 (1986), and Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Ill. Dec. 890,
516 N. E.2d 1045 (3Dist. 1987).
Conclusion
Appellant moves the court to acknowledge that Movant/Appellee has failed to prove up
standing, court’s jurisdiction or its claim of res judicata as required, has failed to timely respond,
and therefore to enter default against Appellee, and to grant relief as set forth in Appellant’s appeal.
This appeals court has had more than seventy five days to read Appellant’s appeal and to review the
record of case #21-11271 to determine that the lower court failed to prove-up jurisdiction after
challenge of same; proceeded without jurisdiction despite strenuous objections from Petitioner Bird;
that the lower court “conditionally” allowed Movant’s attorney, Mr. McQueen, to speak at the July
21st, 2021 hearing despite Movant’s failure to prove-up standing or its claim of “res judicata,” and
despite additional objections by Mr. Bird regarding court’s clear lack of jurisdiction and Movant’s
clear and obvious lack of standing. To wit: Each alleged assignment in the alleged chain of title was
of the deed of trust, not the note. Pursuant to the ruling in Carpenter v. Longan – 83 U.S. 271
(1872), assignment of the deed of trust alone is a nullity.
Dated: November 18, 2021
9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Paul C. Bird, Sr., certify that on this ___ day of November 2021 a copy of the foregoing
document, OBJECTION TO APPELLEE’S OUT OF TIME RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S
APPEAL. MOTION TO STRIKE SAID RESPONSE PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE 27(a)(3)(A), AND UNDER FRCP RULE 12(a)(1)(A)(i)
THE TIME TO RESPOND IS 21 DAYS; MOTION FOR DEFAULT. APPELLEE HAS FAILED
TO PROVE UP STANDING OR COURT’S JURISDICTION AND IS THEREFORE ABSENT
STANDING, and Affidavit of Robert McKee filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, were served upon the following parties via U.S.P.S. Certified Mail, Restricted
Delivery.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing
statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
___________________________
Paul C. Bird, Sr.
10