Administrative Law Notes For LLB 3 Semester
Administrative Law Notes For LLB 3 Semester
STUDY MATERIAL
for
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Prepared as per the syllabus prescribed by Karnataka State Law University (KSLU), Hubballi
Compiled by Reviewed by
Mr. Ayush Jha, Asst. Prof. Dr. Manojkumar Hiremath, Asst. Prof.
Ms. Tilaka N.S., Asst. Prof.
This study material is intended to be used as supplementary material to the online classes and
recorded video lectures. It is prepared for the sole purpose of guiding the students in preparation
for their examinations. Utmost care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the content.
However, it is stressed that this material is not meant to be used as a replacement for textbooks
or commentaries on the subject. This is a compilation and the authors take no credit for the
originality of the content. Acknowledgement, wherever due, has been provided.
Unit-I
Definition of Administrative Law – Nature and scope – The impact and implications of the Doctrine of
Separation and the Rule of Law on Administrative Law, Classification of Administrative Action – the
necessity
Unit-II
Unit-III
Judicial power of Administration – Tests to determine when an administrative authority required to act
judicially - Doctrine of Bias – Doctrine of Audi Altrem Partem – Reasoned decision – Exceptions to
Natural Justice – Effect of non-compliance with rules of Natural Justice – grounds on which decision of
quasi-judicial authority can be challenged before Supreme Court
Unit-IV
Administrative Discretion - Grant and exercise of discretion - Judicial review of Administrative Discretion
Unit-V
(Control of Administrative Action – Judicial Control – Public Law and Private Law Remedies – distinction
Liabilities of the state in the province of Contract and Tort – Constitutional Tort Doctrine of Promissory
Estoppels – Doctrine of legitimate expectation – Doctrine of proportionality)
Unit VI-
Corporates and Public Undertakings – Control of statutory corporations and public undertakings -
Administrative deviance – Corruption and mal administration – Control mechanism
Ombudsman in India (Lok pal and Lokayukta) – Central Vigilance Commission – Parliamentary
Committees – Commission of Enquiry
Unit I
INTRODUCTION
Administrative law is a heuristic science. It is a branch of public law which is essentially anti-
authoritarian. It strives to develop a rule of law society based on fairness, reasonableness and
justice. Administrative law deals fundamentally with law relating to administration and basic
foundation of the administration.
Principles of administrative law are not extraconstitutional, they emerged from Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution. It is true to say with Holland and Maitland that administrative law is
part of Constitutional law. The general principles are relating to the organization, powers and
functions of the organs of the state legislative, executive and judicial and their relationships are
interalia are dealt with in the Constitution.
Administrative law deals with other powers and the functions of the administrative
authorities it also includes the matters relating to civil service, public departments, public
corporations, local authorities and other statutory bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions. As
Ivor Jennings rightly points out the subject matter of administrative law is public administration.
Administrative law defines and determines the organization, functions, powers and the duties of
administrative authorities.
The most significant and outstanding development of the twentieth century is the rapid
growth of administrative law. Though administrative law has been in existence, in one form or the
other, before the 20th century, it is in this century that the philosophy as to the role and function of
the State has undergone a radical change. Administrative law as is separate branch of legal
discipline, especially in India, came to be recognized only by the middle of the 20th century.
The governmental functions have multiplied by leaps and bounds. Today, the State is not
merely a police State, exercising sovereign functions, but as a progressive democratic State, it
seeks to ensure social security and social welfare for the common man, regulates the industrial
relations, exercises control over the production, manufacture and distribution of essential
commodities, starts many enterprises, tries to achieve equality for all and ensures equal pay for
equal work.
It improves slums, looks after the health and morals of the people, provides education to
children and takes all the steps which social justice demands. In short, the modern State takes care
of its citizens from ‘cradle to grave’.
All these developments have widened the scope and ambit of administrative law. Today
the administration is ubiquitous and impinges freely and deeply on every aspect of an individual's
life. Therefore, administrative law has become a major area for study and research.
Administrative law has been characterized as the most outstanding legal development of
the 20th century. It does not mean, however, that there was no administrative law in any country
before the 20th century. Being related to public administration, administrative law should be
deemed to have been in existence in one form or another in every country having some form of
government. It is as ancient as the administration itself as it is a concomitant of organized
administration.
The opening statement signifies that administrative law has grown and developed
tremendously, in quantity, quality and a relative significance, in the 20th century that it has
become more articulate and definite as a system in Democratic countries that it has assumed a
more recognizable form in the present century so much so that it has come to be identified as a
branch of public law by itself, distinct and separate from Constitutional law, if its subject matter is
of independent study and investigation in its own right then rapid growth of administer law in
modern times is the direct result of the growth of administrative powers and functions.
Earlier the state was characterized as the law and order state and its role was conceived to
be negative as its interest extended primarily to defending the country from external aggression,
maintaining law and order within the country, dispensing justice to its subjects and collecting a
few taxes to finance these activities. It was an era of free enterprise and minimum governmental
responsibility and functions. The management of social and economic life was not regarded as
government responsibility. This laissez Faire doctrine resulted in human misery.
But all the things changed with the advent of independence. A conscious effort to begin to
be made to transform this country into a welfare state the philosophy of welfare state has been
ingrained in the preamble to Indian Constitution and the directive principles stated therein. The
emergence of the social welfare concept has affected the democracies very profoundly. It has led
to state activism. There has occurred a phenomenal increase in the area of state operation it has
taken over a number of functions which were previously left to private enterprise. The state today
provides every aspect of human life, the functions of a modern state may broadly be placed into
five categories, the state as protector, provider, entrepreneur, economic controller and arbitrator.
The following factors are responsible for the rapid growth and development of administrative law:
1. There is a radical change in the philosophy as to the role played by the State. The negative
policy of maintaining 'law and order' and of 'laissez faire' is given up. The State has not confined
its scope to the traditional and minimum functions of defense and administration of justice, but
has adopted the positive policy and as a welfare State has undertaken to perform varied functions.
2. Urbanization - Due to the Industrial Revolution in England and other countries and due to the
emergence of the factory system in our country, people migrated from the countryside to the
urban areas in search of employment in factories and large-scale industries. As a result of which
there arose a need for increase in providing housing, roads, parks, effective drainage system etc.
Legislations were enacted to provide all these basic facilities and accordingly administrative
authorities were required to make rules and regulations, frame schemes for effective infrastructure
and facilities which ultimately lead to the growth of administrative law.
3. To meet Emergency Situations – Enacting legislations, getting assent from the President is all a
lengthy process, whereas it is very easy and quick to frame schemes and rules to meet any
exigency that arise in a locality. Due to the flexibility of making the rules, obviously there is a
constant growth of administrative law making in the country.
4. The judicial system proved inadequate to decide and settle all types of disputes. It was slow,
costly, inexpert, complex and formalistic. It was already overburdened, and it was not possible to
expect speedy disposal of even very important matters, e.g. disputes between employers and
employees, lockouts, strikes, etc. These burning problems could not be solved merely by literally
interpreting the provisions of any statute, but required consideration of various other factors and it
could not be done by the ordinary courts of law. Therefore, Industrial Tribunals and Labour
Courts were established, which possessed the techniques and expertise to handle these complex
problems.
5. The legislative process was also inadequate. It had no time and technique to deal with all the
details. It was impossible for it to lay down detailed rules and procedures, and even when detailed
provisions were made by the legislature, they were found to be defective and inadequate, e.g., rate
fixing. And, therefore, it was felt necessary to delegate some powers to the administrative
authorities.
6. There is scope for experiments in administrative process. Here, unlike legislation, it is not
necessary to continue a rule until commencement of the next session of the legislature. Here a rule
can be made, tried for some time and if it is found defective, it can be altered or modified within a
short period. Thus, legislation is rigid in character while the administrative process is flexible.
7. The administrative authorities can avoid technicalities. Administrative law represents functional
rather than a theoretical and legalistic approach. The traditional judiciary is conservative, rigid and
technical. It is not possible for the courts to decide the cases without formality and technicality.
The Administrative Tribunals are not bound by the rules of evidence and procedure and they can
take a practical view of the matter to decide complex problems.
8. Administrative authorities can take preventive measures, e.g. licensing, rate fixing, etc. Unlike
regular courts of law, they need not wait for parties to come before them with disputes. In many
cases, these preventive actions may prove to be more effective and useful than punishing a person
after committing of a breach of any provision of law or law. As Freeman says, " Meat inspection
and grading respond more adequately to the consumer’s needs than does the right to sue the seller
after the consumer is injured."
9. Administrative authorities may take effective steps for enforcement of the aforesaid preventive
measures, such as suspension, revocation and cancellation of licenses, destruction of contaminated
articles, etc. which are not generally available through regular courts of law.
Today in India, the administrative process has grown so much that it will not be out of place
to say that today we are not governed but administered. In this context, the Law Commission of
India rightly observed the Rule of law and Judicial review acquire greater significance in a
welfare state. The vast amount of legislation which has been enacted during the last three years by
the union and states, a great deal of which impinges in a variety of ways on our lives and
occupations. Much of it also confers large powers on the executive. The greater, therefore, is the
need for ceaseless enforcement of the Rule of law, so that the executive may not, in a belief in its
monopoly of wisdom and its zeal for administrative efficiency, overstep the bounds of its power
and spread its tentacles into the domains, well the citizen should be free to enjoy the Liberty
guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Observations of Law Commission are no less relevant today when India has adopted the
policy of liberalization, privatization and globalization in which administrative law has developed
international dimensions. Though state is now withdrawing from business, yet its functions as a
facilitator, enabler and regulator are bound to increase. Growth of new centers of economic power
which often exercise power in total disregard of the fundamental rights of people, especially of the
disadvantaged Sections of society, will put emphasis on the development of knew norms of Rule
of law and judicial review for reconciling economic growth with social justice.
In recent times a new branch of administrative law is emerging, which is popularly called
as Global Administrative Law. According to this the WTO is dictating guidelines on subsidiaries,
facilities and services to the people in different countries. The banks have also not been spared
from the interference of the WTO guidelines. Thus, it may be submitted, that due to the emerging
global administrative law, in the near future there is every possibility for the necessity to re look
into the reasons for growth of administrative law.
The main object of this law is to protect individual rights. Others place greater emphasis
upon rules which are designed to ensure that the administration effectively performs the tasks
assigned to it. Yet others highlight the principal objective of Administrative Law as ensuring
governmental accountability, and fostering participation by interested parties in the decision-
making process.
In administrative law, the term Administration is used in its broadest possible sense and
covers within its reach.
Sir Ivor Jennings defines administrative law as the law relating to administration.
A.V. Dicey
The definition is narrow and restrictive in so far as it leaves out of consideration many
aspects of administrative law, Dicey opposed the French droit administratiff and therefore his
formulation mainly concentrated on judicial remedies against state officials. Therefore, this
definition excludes the study of every other aspect of administrative law.
The American approach is significantly different from the early English approach, in that
it recognized administrative law as an independent branch of the legal discipline.
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According to Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative law is a law that concerns the powers
and procedure of administrative agencies, including especially the law governing judicial review
of administrative action.
Davis includes the study of administrative rulemaking and rule adjudication but excludes
rule application which according to him, belongs to the domain of public administration. In one
respect, this definition is proper as it puts emphasis on procedure followed by administrative
agencies in exercising their powers. It does not include the enormous mass of substantive law
produced by the agencies. An administrative agency, according to Davis, is a governmental
authority, other than a code and other than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rulemaking.
The difficulty in accepting this definition however, is that it does not include many non-
adjudicative and yet administrative functions of the administration which cannot be characterized
as legislative or quasi-judicial. Another difficulty with this definition is that it puts an emphasis on
the control of the administrative functions by the judiciary, but does not study other equally
important controls, example parliamentary control or of delegated legislation, control through
administrative appeals or revisions and the like.
Garner also adopts the American approach advocated by Casey Davis According to him,
Administrative law may be described as those rules which are recognized by the courts as law and
which relate to and regulate the administration of government.
According to Wade, administrative law is the law relating to the control of governmental
power. According to him the primary object of administrative law is to keep the powers of the
government within their legal bounds so as to protect the citizens against their abuse. The
powerful engines of authority must be prevented from running amok.
Griffith and Street, According to Griffith and Street, the main object of administrative law is
the operation and control of administrative authorities. It must deal with three aspects
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3. what are the ways in which the administration is contained within those Limits?
According to the Indian law Institute, the following two aspects must be added to have a
complete idea of present-day administrative law
According to Jain and Jain Administrative law deals with the structure, powers and
functions of the organs of administration, the limits of their powers, the methods and procedures
followed by them in exercising their powers and functions, the methods by which their powers are
controlled including the legal remedies available to a person against them when his rights are
infringed by their operation.
Thirdly, it prescribes the procedure to be followed by these authorities in exercising such powers
Fourthly, it controls these administrative authorities through judicial and other means.
The unenviable diversity in definitions of the term administrative law is also due to the
fact that a vary Administrative law specialist tries to lay more emphasis on any one particular
aspect of the whole administrative process, which according to his own evolution desires singular
attention.
Professor Upendra Bakshi of India lays special stress on the protection of the little man
from the arbitrary exercise of public power. According to him administrative law is a study of the
pathology of power in a developing society. He defines administrative law as that portion of law
which controls the abuse of powers by the administrative authorities so as to protect the rights of
individuals.
For our purposes, we may define administrative law as that branch of public law which
deals with the organization and powers of administrative and quasi administrative agencies and
prescribes principles and rules by which an official action is arranged and revealed in relation to
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individual liberty and freedom. Thus defined, administrative law attempts to regulate
administrative space, domestic and global, in order to infuse fairness and accountability in the
administrative process necessary for securing equity and inclusiveness in the domestic and world
order. It can be concluded that administrative law is that portion of law which determines the
organization, powers and duties of administrative authorities, administrative agencies, quasi
administrative authorities and the law that governs the judicial review of administrative activities.
Administrative law is not a codified, written or well-defined law like the Contract Act,
Penal Code, Transfer of Property Act, Evidence Act, Constitution of India, etc. It is essentially an
unwritten, uncodified or ‘Judge-made’ law. It has developed slowly in the wake of factual
situations before courts. In a welfare State, administrative authorities are called upon to perform
not only executive acts, but also quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. They used to deem
the rights of parties and have become the ‘Fourth branch’ of Government, a ‘Government in
miniature’. Legal scholars have compared administrative law to the rise of equity. It has its origin
in need and necessity in protecting personal rights and in safeguarding individual interests.
In few legal systems, there are statutes laying down rules, principles and procedures to be
followed by administrative agencies. But even in absence of specific enactments dealing with a
particular situation, certain fundamental rules, basic principles and minimum requirements of law
are well settled and all authorities are bound to observe them. A person adversely affected by any
action of an administrative authority has right to challenge such action in an appropriate body or a
court of law.
Apart from these legislations, the Constitution of USA is also considered as a source of
administrative law in addition to the judgments delivered by the U.S Supreme Court.
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In the UK, since there is no written Constitution, the bulk source of administrative law is
derived from the decisions delivered by the superior courts, the customary practices that are
followed in the course of administration and so on.
In India there is a written Constitution which is considered as a grund norm. Till today
there is no legislation enacted either by the parliament or state legislature exclusively on
administrative law. In the absence of legislations, the main sources of administrative law are rules,
regulations, orders, notifications, bye-laws, schemes, governmental resolutions, memorandums,
department circulars etc. There are also legislations which provide for the establishment of
tribunals. For example, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides for the establishment of
national tribunals, industrial tribunals and labour courts. There are other legislations for
establishing special courts, but all these legislations provide different procedures and different
powers for functioning of the tribunals. Therefore, for the purpose of attaining uniformity in
maintaining procedures and for prescribing powers, there is a need for comprehensive legislation
on administrative law in India.
Though in essence Constitutional law does not differ from administrative law in as much
as both are concerned with functions of the Government and both are a part of public law in the
modern State and the sources of both are the same and they are thus inter-related and
complementary to each other belonging to one and the same family. Strict demarcation, therefore,
is not possible, yet there is a distinction between the two. According to Maitland, while
Constitutional law deals with structure and the broader rules which regulate the functions, the
details of the functions are left to Administrative law.
According to Hood Phillips, “Constitutional law is concerned with the organization and
functions of Government at rest while administrative law is concerned with that organization and
those functions in motion.”
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But the opinion of English and American authors is that the distinction between
constitutional law and administrative law is one of degree, convenience and custom rather than
that of logic and principle. It is not essential and fundamental in character. Keith rightly remarks:
“It is logically impossible to distinguish administrative law from Constitutional law and all
attempts to do so are artificial.”
India has a written Constitution. While Constitutional law deals with the general principles
relating to the organization and power of the legislature, executive and judiciary and their
functions inter se and towards the citizen. Administrative law is that part of Constitutional law
which deals in detail with the powers and functions of the administrative authorities, including
civil services, public departments, local authorities and other statutory bodies. Thus, while
Constitutional law is concerned with Constitutional status of ministers and civil servants,
administrative law is concerned with the organization of the service and the proper working of
various departments of the Government.
Administrative Law deals with the powers of the administrative authorities, the manner in
which the powers are exercised and the remedies which are available to the aggrieved persons,
when those powers are abused by these authorities.
As discussed above, the administrative process has come to stay and it has to be accepted
as a necessary evil in all progressive societies, particularly in a welfare state, where many schemes
for the progress of society are prepared and administered by the government. The execution and
implementation of this programme may adversely affect the rights of citizens. The actual problem
is to reconcile social welfare with the rights of individual subjects. As has been rightly observed
by Lord Denning: “Properly exercised, the new powers of the executive lead to the Welfare
State; but abused they lead to the Totalitarian State.”
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The main object of the study of administrative law is to unravel the way in which these
administrative authorities could be kept within their limits so that the discretionary powers may
not be turned into arbitrary powers.
2. The requirements imposed by law upon the exercise of those powers; and
3. Remedies available against unlawful administrative actions. It is a harsh fact of life that
phenomenal growth of administrative power as a byproduct of an intensive form of government,
do necessary for development and growth, at the times spells negation of people’s rights and
values.
Though administrative law may not be concerned with the substantive law as such, yet, as
Griffith and Street themselves have somewhat recognized, a study of substantial law becomes
necessary for appreciating the powers of the administration and for controlling the same. For
instance, whether the principles of natural justice are to be observed by an authority or not
depends, to a great extent, upon the kind of action it is empowered to take, and to find this, one
will need to look into the statute under which it functions. Again, whether the authority has
abused its power has to be decided with reference to the substantive provisions.
Here comes the need, importance and purpose of administrative law. Administrative law
thus becomes Dharma which conduces to the stability and growth of society, maintenance of a
just social order, and welfare of mankind by reconciling power with Liberty. It seeks to channelize
administrative powers to achieve the basic aim of any civilized society, that is, growth with
Liberty. Thus, Administrative law goes beyond legalism and the presence a principled regulation
of administrative space, whether domestic or global, which can be practically regulated for the
expansion of human freedoms. Therefore, today, Administrative law represents the way of
conceptualizing and articulating a new domestic and global social economic order.
Without a good system of administrative law any society order dies because of its own
administrative weight like a black hole which is a dying neutron star that collapses due to its own
gravity. Administrative law, therefore, becomes that body of a reasonable limitations and
affirmative action parameters which are developed and operationalized by the legislature and the
courts to maintain and sustain a Rule of law Society.
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Thus, four basic bricks of the foundation of any administrative law may be identified as
1. Administrative law is a law, but it is not a law in the lawyer’s sense of the term like
property law or contract law. It is not in the realist sense of the term which includes statute
law, administrative rulemaking, precedents, customs, administrative directions, etc. It also
includes the study of something which may not be termed law in the true sense of the term
such as administrative circulars, policy statements, memorandum and resolutions, etc.
Besides this, it includes within its study higher law as well, like the principles of natural
justice. However, in India, administrative law, basically and wholly, it remains a judge
made law and, thus, suffers from the frailties and benefits from the strength of judicial
lawmaking. Consequently, personal and institutional constraints make the growth of
administrative law vulnerable to judicial meanderings and tentativeness.
2. Administrative law is a branch of public law in contradiction to private law which deals
with the relationships of individuals inter-se. Therefore, Administrative law primarily deals with
the relationship of individuals with the organized power.
3. Administrative law deals with the organization and powers of administrative and quasi
administrative agencies. The stress on the study of organization is only to the extent that it is
necessary to understand the powers, characteristics of actions, procedure for the exercise of those
powers and the control mechanism provided therein. The study includes not only administrative
agencies but also the quasi administrative agencies such as corporations, autonomous agencies,
individuals, and civil society institutions, both national and global, and the like operating in public
space and exercising public functions.
4. Administrative law includes the study of the existing principles and also of the
development of certain new principles which administrative and quasi administrative agencies
must follow while exercising their powers in relation to individuals that is the principles of natural
justice, reasonableness and fairness.
5. Administrative Law primarily concerns itself with the official action which may be
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b. Quasi-judicial action
6. One of the main thrusts of the study of administrative law is on the procedure by which the
official action is original. If the means are not trustworthy, the end cannot be just. There is a
bewildering variety in the procedure which the administrative agencies follow in reaching an
action. Such procedure may be laid down.
a. In the statute itself under which the administrative agency has been created
b. In the statute itself under which the administrative agency has been created in the
separate procedure code which a very administrative agency is bound to follow that is
Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 in the USA and Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 in
England.
However, in many more cases either the administrative agency is left free to develop its own
procedure or it is required to render its actions according to the minimum procedure of the
principles of natural justice.
7. Administrative law also includes within its study the control mechanism by which the
administrative agencies are kept within bounds and made effective in the service of the
individuals. This control mechanism is technically called the review process.
8. The study of administrative law is not an end in itself but a means to an end. The focal
point of the study of administrative law is the re consolation of power with liberty. When the
administrative process started rising after the death of laissez faire at the birth of the 20th century,
the stress on the study of administrative law was on circumscription of administrative powers. But
now when the administrative process has come to stay, the emphasis has shifted to the regulation
of administrative powers.
A satisfactory and a proper formulation to define the scope, content and ambit of administrative
law appears to be as follows:
Administrative law deals with the structure, powers and functions of the organs of administration,
the limits of their powers, the methods and procedures followed by them in exercising their
powers and functions, the methods by which their powers are controlled including the legal
remedies available to a person against them when his rights are infringed by their operation.
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1. The first limb deals with the composition and powers of organs of administration. This
proposition is subject to the qualification stated earlier that the topics falling under the public
administration or to be excluded. The term organs of administration have been used in a broad
sense and includes all kinds of public or administrative authorities.
2. The second limb refers to the limits on the powers of administrative authorities. These
limits may either be expressed or implied.
Express limits are laid down in the provisions of the parent statute. Implied limits or derived by
the courts through the interpretative process. In doing so the courts play a very creative role
because expressly limits are not usually laid down in statutory provisions and, therefore, the
courts have to imply some limits on the administration.
3. The third limb refers to the procedures used in exercising those powers. The study of
administrative law of today seeks to emphasize not only the extraneous control but also the
processes and procedures which the administrative authorities themselves follow in the exercise of
their powers. Evolving of fair procedures is a way of minimizing the abuse of vast discretionary
powers conferred on the administration. For example, natural justice forms a significant
component of administrative process today and in many situations, codes apply the concept of
fairness.
4. The fourth limb refers to the control of the administration through judicial and other
means. Under this head would fall judicial as well as extra judicial means of controlling the
administration, example Tribunals, Ombudsman etc. It also includes a redressal of individual
grievances against the administration.
The impact and Implications of the Doctrine of Separation of Power and The Rule of Law
on the Administrative law.
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The rule of law is a viable and dynamic concept and, like many other such concepts, is not
capable of any exact definition. This, however, does not mean that there is no agreement on the
basic values which it represents. The term rule of law is used in contradiction to “Rule of man and
Rule according to law”. Even in the most autocratic forms of government there is some law
according to which the powers of the government are exercised, but it does not mean that there is
the rule of law. Therefore, rule of law means that the law rules, which is based on the principles of
freedom, equality, non-discrimination, fraternity, accountability and non-arbitrariness, and is
certain, regular and predictable, using the word law in the sense of just and Lex both. In this sense
the rule of law is an idea. It is a modern name for natural law. In history, man has always appealed
to something higher than that which is his own creation.
The basic idea behind accountability is that the ruler’s rule without difference of the
people and, therefore, must be accountable to them in the ultimate analysis. Forms of
accountability may differ, but the basic idea must remain the same that the holders of public
power must be able to publicly to justify the exercise of public power not only as legally valid but
also socially just, proper and reasonable. In this manner the concept of the rule of law represents
values and not institutions and connotes a climate of legal order which is just and reasonable,
where in a very exercise of public power is chiefly designed to add something more to the quality
of life of the people. Every legislative, executive and judicial exercise of power must, therefore,
depend on this ideal for its validity. Consequently, it is the rule of law define law rather than the
law defining the Rule of law.
The doctrine of separation of powers is an animation of the rule of law and its roots also
lie in the concept of natural law because both aim at progressive diminution of the exercise of
arbitrary power necessary for protecting the life, liberty and dignity of the individual. It is an
organic flexible doctrine which can be molded to suit the requirements of governance, but it’s
inherent fundamentals and the rationality must not be compromised. That is accumulation of
power is a definition of tyranny.
According to Jain and Jain, “If the ‘Rule of Law’, as enunciated by Dicey, affected the
growth of Administrative Law in Britain, the doctrine of ‘Separation of Powers’ had an intimate
impact on the development of Administrative Law in USA.” Davis also stated, “Probably, the
principal doctrinal barrier to the development of the administrative process has been the theory of
separation of powers."
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One of the basic principles of the English Constitution is the Rule of law. This doctrine is
accepted in the US and Indian Constitution. The entire basis of administrative law is the doctrine
of rule of law. Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice in James I's reign, was the originator of this
concept. In a battle against the King, he maintained successfully that the King should be under
God and the Law, and he established the supremacy of the law against the executive. Dicey
developed this theory of Coke in his classic work the Law and the Constitution published in the
year 1885.
The concept of Rule of Law can be traced from the time of the Romans, who called it ‘Just
Law’- Jus Naturale, to the Medieval period where it was called the ‘Law of God.’ The social
contractualists, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, called the Rule of Law as the Contract law
or Natural Law and the modern man calls it as Rule of law.
The term “rule of law” is derived from the French Phrase la principe de legalite (the
principle of legality) which refers to a government based on principles of law and not of men. In
this sense la principe de legalite was opposed to arbitrary powers.
Rule of law is the supreme manifestation of human civilization and culture and is a new '
Lingua franca’ of global moral thought. It is an eternal value of Constitutionalism and an inherent
attribute of democracy and good governance.
Rule of law Embodies the doctrine of supremacy of law. It is a basic and fundamental
necessity for a disciplined and organized community.
The concept of the rule of law is an animation of natural law and remains as a historical
ideal which makes a powerful appeal even today to be ruled by law not by a powerful man.
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According to Dicey, the Rule of Law is one of the fundamental principles of the English Legal
System. In his book, ‘The Law of the Constitution’, he attributed the following three meanings to
the said doctrine:
I. Supremacy of law
II. Equality before law
III. Predominance of legal spirit.
I. Supremacy of law
Absence of discretionary power in the hands of the government officials. By this Dicey
implies that justice must be done through known principles. Discretion implies absence of rules,
hence in every exercise of discretion there is room for arbitrariness.
Explaining the first principle, Dicey stated that rule of law means the absolute supremacy
or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power or wide
discretionary power. It excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative or even wide
discretionary power on the part of the Government. According to him the Englishmen were ruled
by the law and law alone. A man may be punished for a breach of law, but can be punished for
nothing else. As Wade says the rule of law requires that the Government should be subject to the
law, rather than the law subject to the Government.
According to this doctrine, no man can be arrested, punished or be lawfully made to suffer
in body or goods except by due process of law and for a breach of law established in the ordinary
legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. Dicey described this principle as ‘the central
and most characteristic feature’ of Common Law.
22
Explaining the second principle of the rule of law, Dicey stated that there must be equality
before the law or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered
by the ordinary courts of law. According to him, in England, all persons were subject to one and
the same law, and there were no separate tribunals or special courts for officers of the
Government and other authorities.
No person should be made to suffer in body or deprived of office, property except for a
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In
this sense, the rule of law implies
b. All the persons irrespective of status must be subjected to the ordinary courts of the land
c. Everyone should be governed by the law passed by the ordinary legislative organs of the
state
3. The rights of the people must flow from the customs and traditions of the people
recognized by the courts in the administration of justice.
This principle enunciates Democratic principle of equal subjection of all persons to the
ordinary law of the land as administered by the ordinary courts. This does not mean that the law
must be the same for everybody irrespective of functions or service. Dicey’s insistence was that a
government officer must be under the same liability for acts done without legal justification as a
private individual. Does he contrast the English legal system with that of France where
government officials were protected by special rules in special administrative tribunals.
Judge – made Constitution explaining the third principle, Dicey stated that in many
countries’ rights such as the right to personal liberty, freedom from arrest, freedom to hold public
meetings, etc. are guaranteed by a written Constitution; in England, it is not so. Those rights are
the result of judicial decisions in concrete cases which have actually arisen between the parties.
Thus, Dicey emphasized the role of the courts of law as guarantors of liberty and suggested that
the rights would be secured more adequately if they were enforceable in the courts of law than by
mere declaration of those rights in a document, as in the latter case, they can be ignored, curtailed
or trampled upon. He stated: “The Law of the Constitution, the rules which in foreign countries
23
naturally form part of a Constitutional Code, are not the source but the consequences of the rights
of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts.”
This principle, in fact, does not lay down any legal rule but merely explains one aspect of
the British Constitutional system where common law is a source of fundamental freedoms of the
people. He does distinguish the British system from that of many other countries which had
written Constitutions with a chapter on individual rights. Dicey feared that if the source of the
fundamental rights of the people was any document, the right could be abrogated at any time by
Amending the Constitution this is what happened in India during 1975 emergency. When the
Supreme Court ruled that even illegal acts of the government could not be challenged in a court
because it was found that the source of personal liberty in India was Article 21 of the Constitution,
which had been suspended by the presidential proclamation, and not any common law of the
people1. This principle puts emphasis on the role of judiciary in enforcing individual rights and
personal freedoms irrespective of their inclusion in a written Constitution. Dicey feared that mere
declaration of such rights in any statute or in Constitution would be futile if they could not be
enforced. He was right when he said that a statute or even Constitution can be amended and
‘Fundamental Rights’ can be abrogated. We have witnessed such a situation during the emergency
in 1975 and realized that in absence of strong and powerful judiciary, a written Constitution is
meaningless.
He criticized the French legal system of droit-administratif in which there were distinct
administrative tribunals for deciding cases between the officials of the State and the citizens.
According to him, exemption of the civil servants from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of
law and providing them with the special tribunals was the negation of equality. Of course, Dicey
himself saw that administrative authorities were exercising ‘judicial’ functions though they were
not ‘courts’. He, therefore, asserted: “Such transference of authority slaps the foundation of the
rule of law which has been for generations a leading feature of the English Constitution.”
According to Dicey, any encroachment on the jurisdiction of the courts and any
restrictions on the subject's unimpeded access to them are bound to jeopardize his rights.
Application of Doctrine
24
In England, the doctrine of the rule of law was applied in concrete cases. If a man is
wrongfully arrested by the police, he can file a suit for damages against them as if the police were
private individuals. In Wilkes v. Wood, it was held that an action for damages for trespass was
maintainable even if the action complained of was taken in pursuance of the order of the Minister.
In the leading case of Entick v. Carrington, a publisher's house was ransacked by the King’s
messengers sent by the Secretary of State. In an action for trespass, £300 were awarded to the
publisher as damages. In the same manner, if a man's land is compulsorily acquired under an
illegal order, he can bring an action for trespass against any person who tries to disturb his
possession or attempts to execute the said order.
By administrative law Dicey mean only a single aspect of the French droit administratif,
namely administrative jurisdiction to the exclusion of ordinary civil and criminal process Dicey
admitted after 1901, that he concealed his idea of the nature and existence of administrative law
from De Tocqueville, Who himself later admitted his ignorance about the actual working of the
droit administratif, in his own days. Dicey was historically correct up to the time of 1873, when
executive law finally settled the jurisdiction of the Council d' Etat in all questions involving
administrative matters.
However, Dicey misconceived the administrative law because he thought that the French
system of administrative law is more than that. In fact, Dicey was concerned not with the whole
body of law relating to administration, but with a single aspect of it, namely, administrative
adjudication. His comparison was between the favorable position of an Englishman when in
conflict with the state in contrast to that of a Frenchman. It may be emphasized that the difference
between judicial and administrative agencies is not fundamental. Both apply the law to individual
cases and thereby exercise discretion. But if the safeguards which protect the exercise of judicial
functions are applied to administrative bodies, the quality of education will be the same. Dicey
was also not right when he said that there is no administrative law in England because even during
Dicey’s time the Crown and its servants enjoyed special privileges on the basis of the doctrine that
the King can do no wrong.
Even in the sense in which Dicey used his formulation of the rule of law, there is no
essential contradiction between rule of law and administrative law. If the central thesis of Dicey’s
formulation is the absence of arbitrariness and equality before the law then in that sense there is
no contradiction with administrative law.
25
Merits
Dicey's thesis has its own advantages and merits. The doctrine of Rule of Law proved to
be an effective and powerful weapon in keeping administrative authorities within their limits. It
served as a touchstone to test all administrative actions. The broad principle of rule of law was
accepted by almost all legal systems as a Constitutional safeguard.
The first principle (supremacy of law) recognizes a cardinal rule of democracy that every
Government must be subject to law and not law subject to the Government. It rightly opposed
arbitrary and unfettered discretion governmental authorities, which has tendency to interfere with
rights of citizens.
The second principle (equality before law) is equally important in a system wedded to democratic
polity. It is based on the well-known maxim -"However high you may be, Law is above you", and
"All are equal before the law."
Demerits
No doubt, Dicey's Rule of Law had its good points and the broad principle had been
accepted in several legal systems as a ‘necessary Constitutional safeguard’. But it has its own
limitations and pitfalls as well. It has been said that the rules enunciated by Dicey and accepted in
English legal system was the result of ‘political struggle’ and not ‘logical deductions from a Rule
of Law’.
The first rule was criticized on the ground that Dicey equated supremacy of Rule of Law
with absence of not only arbitrary powers but even of discretionary powers. According to him,
‘wherever there is discretion, there is room for arbitrariness.’ He thus failed to distinguish
arbitrary power from discretionary power. Though arbitrary power is inconsistent with the concept
of rule of law, discretionary power is not, if it is exercised properly. No modern welfare State can
work effectively without exercising discretionary powers.
Again, it cannot be said that once law ends, necessarily tyranny begins. As David said,
‘where the law ends, discretion begins.’ Exercise of discretion may mean either beneficence or
tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness. It is impossible to find a
government of laws alone and not of men in the sense of eliminating all discretionary powers.
26
The second principle propounded by Dicey was equally fallacious. Dicey misunderstood
the real nature of droit administratif. He carried an impression that administrative courts of
France, including Counseild'Etat conferred on Government officials’ special rights, privileges and
prerogatives as against private citizens. But it was not so. The French system in many respects
proved to be more effective in controlling abuse of administrative powers than the Common Law
system. Counseild'Etat technically speaking was a part of administration, but in substance and in
reality, it was very much a court. The actions of administration were not immune from the judicial
scrutiny of the Counsel, which consisted of ‘real Judges’.
Moreover, even during Dicey's time, several administrative tribunals had come into
existence which adjudicated upon the rights of subjects not according to Common Law and
procedure of Crown's Courts but according to special laws applied to specific groups. The Crown
enjoyed immunity under the well-known maxim ‘The King can do no wrong'. It was, therefore,
not correct to say that there was ‘equality before law' in strictosenso even in England.
Administrative law developed not to sanctify executive arbitrariness but to check it and
protect the rights of the people against the administration’s excesses. Therefore, the central theme
of administrative law is also the reconsolation of Liberty with the power. Administrative law and
the rule of law or not discrete series. Both aimed at the progressive diminution of arbitrariness and
fostering a discipline of fairness and openness in the exercise of public power. However, the
disease distrust of the administrative process and administrative education has been proved wrong
in French context, it is still valid in the Indian situation where administrative action is often
arbitrary and based on extraneous considerations and administrative justice is a euphemism for the
denial of justice.
As stated earlier, Dicey’s concept of the rule of law was not accepted fully in England
even in 1885 when he formulated it, as in that., administrative law and administrative authorities
were very much there. Today, Dicey’s theory of rule of law cannot be accepted in its totality.
Davis gives 7 principal meanings of the term rule of law
2. Fixed rules
3. Elimination of discretion
27
6. Preference for judges and ordinary courts of law to executive authorities and
administrative tribunals
The modern concept of the rule of law is fairly wide and, therefore, sets up an ideal for any
government to achieve. This concept was developed by the International Commission of Jurists,
known as Delhi declaration, 1959, which was later on confirmed at Lagos in 1961. According to
this formulation, the rule of law implies that the functions of the government in a free society
should be so exercised as to create conditions in which the dignity of man as an individual is
upheld. The dignity requires not only the recognition of certain civil or political rights but also
creation of certain political, social, economic, educational and cultural conditions which are
essential to the full development of his personality and the protection of his dignity. For this
purpose, the declaration puts emphasis on independence of the judiciary and effective
government.
During the last few years, the Indian Supreme Court has developed some fine Principles of
third world jurisprudence. Developing the same new Constitutionalism further, the Supreme Court
in Veena Sethi v State of Bihar2 Extended the reach of the rule of law to the poor and the
downtrodden, The ignorant and the illiterate, who constitute the bulk of humanity in India, when it
ruled that the rule of law does not exist merely for those who have the means to fight for their
rights and very often do so for the perpetuation of the status quo, which protects and preserves
their dominance and permits them to exploit a large section of the community. The opportunity
for this ruling was provided by a letter written by the free legal aid committee, Hazaribagh, Bihar
drawing its attention to unjustified and illegal detention of certain prisoners in jail for almost two
or three decades.
International Commission of Jurists divided itself into certain working groups which tried to give
content to the concept in relation to an individual area of activity in a society.
1. Committee on Individual Liberty and the Rule of law, which lays down
28
2. Committee on government and the rule of law under this the rule of law means not only
the adequate safeguards against abuse of power but effective government capable of maintaining
law and order.
Committee on criminal administration and the rule of law rule of law here means
c. Presumption of innocence
d. Legal aid
4. Committee on judicial process and the rule of law, under this the rule of law means
a. Independent judiciary
The secretary general of the United Nations in its 2004 report (5/2004/616) Describe rule
of law to contain principles of governance and the measures necessary to ensure adherence to
those principles.
29
In India, the concept of the rule of law can be traced to the Upanishads. It provides “Law
is the king of Kings. It is more powerful and rigid than Kings. There is nothing higher than law.
By its power the weak shall prevail over the strong and justice shall triumph.”
The concept of rule of law is invoked and often to convey the sense that the administration cannot
exercise arbitrary powers and that it should function according to Law.
The concept of the rule of law is an animation of natural law and remains as a historical
ideal which makes a powerful appeal even today to be ruled by law not by powerful man.
Rule of law mandates that power must be made accountable, governance progressively just
and equal, and state incrementally ethical.
1. Formalistic sense
2. Ideological sense
If used in the formalistic sense, it refers to organized power as opposed to a rule by one man
and if used in an ideological sense it refers to the regulation of the relationship of the citizens and
the government and in this sense, it becomes a concept of varied interest and contents.
In its ideological sense, the concept of rule of law represents an ethical code for the exercise of
public power in any country. Strategies of this code may differ from society to society depending
on the societal needs at any given time, but its basic postulates are universal covering all space
and time. These postulates include equality, freedom and accountability.
Equality is not a mechanical under negative concept but has progressive and positive
contents which obliged every government to create conditions; Social, economic, and political,
where every individual has an equal opportunity to develop his personality to the fullest and to
live with dignity.
Freedom postulates absence of a very arbitrary action, free speech, expression and
association, personal Liberty, and many others. These basic rights of any society may be restricted
only on the ground that the claims of these freedoms would be better by such circumscription.
30
Rule of law permeates the entire fabric of the Constitution and indeed forms one of its
basic features. The necessary element of rule of law is that the law must not be arbitrary or
irrational and it must satisfy the test of reason.3 Khanna J, has stated, “rule of law is the antithesis
of arbitrariness. Rule of law is now the accepted norm of all civilized societies.”4
A significant derivative from rule of law in the sphere of administrative law is judicial
review of administrative action to ensure that the administration acts according to law.
Absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of rule of law upon which our whole
Constitutional system is based.5 Rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. The
Supreme Court put a stamp of approval on the observations made by Douglas J, “Law has reached
its finest moments when it has freed man from unlimited discretion of some ruler... where
discretion is absolute, man has always suffered” 6 and Lord Mansfield who stated in the classic
terms, “discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not humor,
it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful.”7
The basic concept of the rule of law is not well-defined legal concept. The courts generally
would not invalidate any positive law on the ground that it violates the contents of the rule of law.
However, in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakanth Shukla,8 popularly known as habeas corpus case, an
attempt was made to challenge their detention orders during the emergency on the ground that it
violates the principles of the rule of law as the 'Obligation to act in accordance with the rule of
law.... a central feature of our Constitutional system and is a basic feature of the Constitution.'
Though the contention did not succeed and some justices even went on to suggest that during an
emergency, the emergency provisions themselves constitute the rule of law, yet if the reasoning of
on the fight opinions is closely read, it becomes clear that the contention was accepted, no matter
it did not reflect in the final order passed by the court. Therefore, despite the unfortunate order to
the effect that the doors of the court during an emergency are completely shut for the detenus, it is
gratifying to note that the concept of the rule of law can be used as a legal concept.
3
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, Air 1982 SC 1325
4
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakanth Shukla , AIR 1967 SC 207
5
S.G. Jaisinghani v. UOI , AIR 1967 SC 1427
6
United states v. Wunderlich , (1951) 352 98.
7
John W ilkies, In Re,
8
(1976) 2 SCC 521
9
(1973) 4 SCC 225
31
doctrine of basic structure of the Constitution which even the plenary power of parliament cannot
reach to amend.
In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,10 in which the Supreme Court invalidated clause 4
of Article 329-A inserted in the Constitution by the 39th Amendment Act 1975. To immunize the
election disputed to the office of the Prime Minister from any kind of judicial review, Khanna and
Chandrachud JJ. held that Article 329 A violated the concept of basic structure.
It is heartening to see that the courts are making all concerted efforts to establish a Rule of
Law society in India by insisting on fairness in every aspect of the exercise of power by the state.
Some of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court are clear indicators of this trend.
In Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, the court insisted on fairness to women in police
lockup and drafted a code of guidelines for the protection of prisoners in police custody,
especially female prisoners.
Rule of law under the Constitution serves the needs of people without undoubtedly
infringing their rights. It recognizes the social reality and tries to adjust itself from time to time
avoiding authoritarian path. Rule of law under the Constitution has the glorious content. It
embodies the concept of law involved over the centuries.11 Doctrine of equality before the law is
necessary corollary to the high concept of rule of law accepted by our Constitution. One of the
aspects of rule of law is that every executive action if it operates to the prejudice of any person,
must be supported by some legislative authority.12
Under our Constitution the rule of law prevails over the entire field of administration and
every organ of the state is regulated by the rule of law. In a welfare state it is inevitable that
jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing by a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law
would lose its vitality if instrumentalities of the state are not charged with the duty of discharging
their function in a fair and just manner.13
10
AIR 1975 SC 2299
11
Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR
12
Satvant Singh Sawhney v. Ramarathanana, AIR 1967 SC 1836
32
Rule of law requires that any abuse of power by public officers should be subject to
control of Courts.14 Principles of rule of law and the due process are closely linked with human
rights protection. Such rights can be protected effectively when a citizen has recourse to the courts
of law. Failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused or prosecution violates even minimum
standards of due process of law.
Wisdom of issuing executive instructions in the matters which are governed by the
provisions of law is doubtful. Even if it be considered necessary to issue instructions in such a
matter, instructions cannot be so framed or utilized so as to override the provisions of law will
stop such a method will destroy the very basis of rule of law and strike at the very root of orderly
administration of law.
The rule of law is basic rule of governance of any civilized polity. The scheme of
Constitution of India is based on the concept of rule of law. Everyone whether individually or
collectively is unquestionably under the supremacy of law. It is only through the courts that rule
of law unfolds its contents and establishes its concept.16
Obligation to act fairly on the part of administrative authorities was evolved to ensure rule
of law and to prevent failure of justice. This is a doctrine which the quasi-judicial, authorities are
also bound to observe.
The High Court is required to enforce rule of law, it therefore cannot pass order or
direction contrary to what has been injuncted by law.17
In Indira Sawhney II v. UOI, the Supreme Court criticized the approach of the government
and held that governments today tend to violate rule of law as a matter of political convenience so
that burden of striking down unconstitutional provisions passed to the court. Such an approach of
the government was deprecated.18
13
A.K Kraipak v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 150
14
State of Punjab v. Khanchand, AIR 1974 SC 543
15
Daryao v. State of U.P AIR 1961 SC 1457
16
Arundathi Rai, AIR 2002 SC 1375
17
KSRTC v. Ashrafullah Khan, AIR 2002 SC 629
18
Indira Sawhney II v. UOI, AIR 2000 SC 498
33
Our Constitution envisages a rule of law and not a rule of men. It recognizes that,
howsoever high one maybe, he is under the law and the Constitution. All the Constitutional
functionaries must, therefore, function within the Constitutional limits. In a system governed by
rule of law, there is nothing like absolute or unbridled power exercisable at the whims and fancies
of the repository power. There is nothing like a power without any limits or constraints. That is so
even when a court or other authority may be vested with wide discretionary power, for such
discretion has to be exercised only along well recognized and sound juristic principles with a view
to promoting fairness, inducing transparency and aiding equity.19
Thus, the concept of rule of law in India is duly recognized by the Constitution and is
firmly established by judicial pronouncements.
We have adopted under our Constitution not the continental system but the British system
under which rule of law prevails. Federal structure of the Indian Constitution is founded on certain
fundamental principles. Undoubtedly, one of them being rule of law which includes judicial
review of arbitrary executive action.20
Dicey’s rule of law has been adopted and incorporated in the Constitution of India. The
Preamble itself enunciates the ideals of Justice, Liberty and Equality. In Part III of the
Constitution these concepts are enshrined as Fundamental Rights and are made enforceable. The
Constitution is supreme and all the three organs of the Government, viz. Legislature, Executive
and Judiciary are subordinate to and have to act in consonance with the Constitution. The doctrine
of judicial review is embodied in the Constitution and the subjects can approach the High Courts
and the Supreme Court for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the
Constitution. If the executive or the Government abuses the power vested in it or if the action is
mala fide, the same can be quashed by the ordinary courts of law.
All rules, regulations, ordinances, bye-laws, notifications, customs and usages are ‘laws’
within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution and if they are inconsistent with or contrary
to any of the provisions thereof, they can be declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court and by
High Courts. The President and the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are required to
take an oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. No person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law or of his property save by
19
Maya Devi v. Raj Kumari Batra, (2010) 9 SCC 486
20
State of M.P v. Thakur Bharat Singh , AIR 1967 SC 1170
34
authority of law. Executive and legislative powers of States and the Union have to be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Government and public officials are not above
law. The maxim 'The King can do no wrong' does not apply in India. There is equality before the
law and equal protection of laws. Government and public authorities are also subject to the
jurisdiction of ordinary courts of law and for similar wrongs are to be tried and punished similarly.
They are not immune from ordinary legal process nor in any provision made regarding separate
administrative courts and tribunals. In public service also the doctrine of equality is accepted.
Suits for breach of contract and torts committed by pubic authorities can be filed in ordinary law
courts and damages can be recovered from State Government or Union Government for the acts of
their employees. Thus, it appears that the doctrine of rule of law is embodied in the Constitution
of India, and is treated as the basic structure of the Constitution.
In spite of such apparently enviable position of subjects, in almost all the fields of
industry, commerce, education, transport, banking, insurance, etc. there is interference by
administrative authorities with actions of individuals, companies and other corporate and non-
corporate bodies, observes Justice Ramaswamy. From the Constitutional point of view there is
large-scale delegation of legislative and judicial powers to these administrative authorities. These
authorities have been extending their tentacles into social, economic and political domains. Wide
discretionary powers are conferred on these administrative authorities. For the purpose of national
planning, the Executive is armed with vast powers in respect of land ceiling, control of basic
industries, taxation, mobilization of labour, etc. Further, it is also erroneous to believe that
individual liberty can be protected only by the traditional doctrine of rule of law. Experience
shows that not only the Executive but even Parliament elected by the people may pass some
demonic statutes like the Preventive Detention Act, or Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971
(MISA), National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) and encroach upon the liberty of subjects.
Ultimately, as Prof. Harold Laski says: "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" and not a
particular principle or doctrine of law.
Conclusion
Thus, Rule of Law doctrine is a complicated and demanding criterion for evaluating the
legitimacy of governance in any state. Nevertheless, it cannot be a ground to ignore it if benefits
of a Constitutional democracy are to be secured for the present and future generations of people.
Recent aggressive judicial activism can only be seen as a part of the efforts of the
Constitutional codes in India to establish a Rule of Law society which implies that no matter how
35
high a person may be, the law is always above him. Court is also trying to identify the concept of
rule of law with human rights of the people. The court is developing techniques by which it can
force the government not only to submit to the law but also to create conditions where people can
develop capacities to exercise their rights properly and meaningfully. The public administration is
responsible for effective implementation of the rule of law and Constitutional demands which
effectuate fairly the objective standards laid down by law.21 A every public servant is a trustee of
society and is accountable for due effect creation of Constitutional goals. This makes the concept
of rule of law highly relevant to our context.
Thus, the concept of Rule of Law has all the merits, the only negative side of the concept
is that respect for law degenerates into the legalism from which its very rigidity works injury to
the nation.
If the rule of law hampered the recognition of administrative law in Britain for a while, the
doctrine of separation of powers had an intimate impact on the growth of administrative process
and administrative law in the United States. It has been characterized as the principal doctrinal
barrier to the development of administrative law in the USA.
Though the doctrine is traceable to Aristotle, but the writings of Locke and Montesquieu
gave it a base on which modern attempts to distinguish between legislative, executive and judicial
power is grounded. Locke distinguish between what he called
3. Federative power
Locke and Montesquieu derived the contents of this doctrine from the developments in the
British Constitutional history of the early 18th century. The theory of Separation of Powers was
enunciated by Montesquieu in his book ' The Spirit of the Laws'. Writing in 1748, Montesquieu
said;
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no Liberty; apprehensions may arise, Let’s the same monarch
are saying it should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is
21
State of Punjab v. G.S. Gill, (1997) 6 SCC 129
36
no Liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Where it
joined it without the legislative, the life and Liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
control; For the judge would be then the legislator. Where it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything, were the
same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people come out to exercise those
three powers, that of executing laws, that of exhibiting the public resolutions, and of trying the
causes of individuals.
Importance
The basic purpose of the doctrine of separation of power is to divide governance against
itself by creating a distinct centre of power so that they could prevent each other from threatening
tyranny.
The aim of the doctrine of separation of power is to guard against tyrannical and arbitrary
powers of the state. The rationale underlying the doctrine has been that if all power is
concentrated in one and the same organ or person there would arise the danger that it may enact
tyrannical laws, execute them in a despotic manner, and interpret them in an arbitrary fashion
without any external control.
1. Exclusivity principle which suggests structural division in all the three organs of state as it
is in the USA
2. Functional principle which prohibits amalgamation and usurpation but not interaction of
all the organs of state.
3. Check and balance principle, meaning, thereby, that each organ of state may check the
other to keep it within constitutional bounds.
4. Mutuality principle which aims at creating Concord not discord, cooperation not
confrontation, engagement not estrangement amongst different organs of state to create a Society
of constitutional image, which is a free, equalitarian, inclusive and the rule of Law Society.
1. Negative sense, in which this doctrine puts limits on the exercise of power by each organ
of state
37
2. Positive sense in which it not only demarcates limits but also defines the minimum
contents of power within those limits which a court can enforce to achieve constitutional values.
1. The same person should not form part of more than one of the three organs of the
government.
2. One organ of the government should not interfere with any other organ of the
government.
3. One organ of the government should not exercise the function assigned to any other organ.
It is generally accepted that there are three main categories of governmental functions –
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. Likewise, there are three main organs of the Government in a
State - Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. According to the theory of separation of powers,
these three powers and functions of the Government must, in a free democracy, always be kept
separate and be exercised by three separate organs of the Government. Thus, the Legislature
cannot exercise executive or judicial power; the Executive cannot exercise legislative or judicial
power and the Judiciary cannot exercise legislative or executive power of the Government.
On the whole, the doctrine of Separation of Powers in the strict sense is undesirable and
impracticable and, therefore, it is not fully accepted in any country. Nevertheless, its value lies in
the emphasis on those checks and balances which are necessary to prevent an abuse of enormous
powers of the executive. The object of the doctrine is to have “Government of Law rather than of
official will or whim.” Montesquieu's great point was that if the total power of the government is
divided among autonomous organs, one will act as a check upon the other and in the check liberty
can survive. Again, almost all the jurists accept one feature of this doctrine that the judiciary must
be independent of and separate from the remaining two organs of the Government, viz.,
Legislature and Executive.
38
doctrine, the legislature cannot exercise executive or judicial power, the executive cannot exercise
legislative or judicial power, and the judiciary cannot exercise the other two powers.
The form of government in the USA characterized as the presidential, is based on the
theory that there should be separation between executive and the legislature. This is different from
the system prevailing in Britain or India where the parliamentary form of government operates
and which is based on coordination of the executive and legislature
The doctrine of separation has influence over, and has itself been influenced by, the
growth of administrative law in the USA. In the face of new demands on the government to solve
we need complex socio economic problems of the modern society, new institutions have been
created and the new procedures evolved by which the doctrine of separation has been largely
diluted but the character of administrative law itself has been influenced and conditioned to some
extent by this doctrine.
By force of circumstances, administrative law has inevitably grown in the United States,
but the separation doctrine did not generate an attitude of indifference towards it, as happened in
Britain under the spell of the Dicean concept of rule of law. In the USA the attitude was that of
examination and criticism of the advisability and propriety of the new development.
The United Kingdom does have a kind of separation of powers but unlike the United
States it is informal. Blackstone’s theory of mixer government with checks and balances is more
relevant to the UK separation of powers is not an absolute or predominant feature of the UK
constitution. The three branches are not formally separated and continue to have significant
overlap.
Though No separation of powers in the strict sense of the term exists in England and the
US, it the curious fact is that this doctrine has attracted the makers of most modern constitutions,
especially during the 19th century. Thus, in France, the doctrine has produced a situation in which
the ordinary codes are precluded from revealing the validity not only of legislative enactments but
even of the actions of the administration. The void has been filtered by the establishment of
special administrative quotes.
39
In India, the doctrine of separation of powers has not been accorded a Constitutional
status. It has no place in strict sense in the constitution of India. But the functions of different
organs of the government have been clearly marked, so that one organ of the government does not
usurp the functions of another.
On a casual glance at the provisions of the Constitution of India, one may be inclined to
say that the doctrine of Separation of Powers is accepted in India. Under the Indian Constitution,
executive powers are with the President, legislative powers with the Parliament and judicial
powers with the Judiciary (Supreme Court, High Courts and subordinate courts). The President
holds his office for a fixed period. His functions and powers are enumerated in the Constitution
itself. Parliament is competent to make any law subject to provisions of the Constitution and there
is no other limitation on its legislative power. It can amend the law prospectively or even
retrospectively but it cannot declare a judgment delivered by a competent court void or of no
effect. The Parliament has also inherited all the powers, privileges and immunities of the British
House of Commons. Similarly, the Judiciary is independent in its field and there can be no
interference with its judicial functions either by the Executive or by the Legislature. The Supreme
Court and High Courts are given the power of judicial review and they can declare any law passed
by Parliament or Legislature ultra vires or unconstitutional.
In In re Delhi Laws Act case,22 Honourable Chief Justice, Kania Observe that although in
the Constitution of India there is no express separation of power, it is clear that a legislature is
created by the constitution and detailed provisions are made for making that legislature passed
laws. Is it then too much to say that under the constitution the duty to make loss, the duty to
exercise its own wisdom, judgment and patriotism in making law is primarily cast on the
legislature? does it not imply that unless it can be gathered from other provisions of the
constitution, other bodies executive or judicial are not intended to discharge legislative functions.
The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognized the doctrine of separation of powers in
the absolute rigidity but the functions of the different parts or branches of the government have
been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well said that our Constitution does
not contempt it assumption, by one organ or part of the state, of functions that essentially belong
to another.23
22
1912, re, AIR 1951 SC 332
23
Ram Jawaya Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR, 1955 SC 549
40
In the absence of specific provision for separation of powers in our constitution, such as
there is under the American constitution, some such a division of powers legislative, executive
and judicial- is nevertheless implicit in our constitution.24 In the celebrated case of Keshavananda
Bharathi,25 It was observed “Separation of powers between the legislature, executive and the
judiciary is a part of the basic structure of the constitution; this structure cannot be destroyed by
any form of amendment.
In Indira Nehru Gandhi,26 it was observed that in the Indian constitution there is separation
of powers in a broad sense only. No constitution can survive without a conscious adherence to its
fine checks and balances. A rigid separation of powers as under the US constitution or the
Australian constitution does not apply to India.
In India, not only is there a functional overlapping but there is personal overlapping also.
Taking into account these factors, some jurists are of the opinion that the doctrine of Separation of
Powers has been accepted in the Constitution of India and is a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. Separation of functions is not confined to the doctrine of Separation of Powers. It is
a part of essential structure of any developed legal system. In every democratic society, the
process of administration, legislation and adjudication are more clearly distinct than in a
totalitarian society.
But if one studies the Constitutional provisions carefully, it is clear that the doctrine of
Separation of Powers has not been accepted in India in its strict sense. There is no provision in the
Constitution itself regarding the division of functions of the Government and the exercise thereof.
Though, under Articles 53(1) and 154(1), the executive power of the Union and of the States is
vested in the President and the Governors respectively, there is no corresponding provision
vesting the legislative and judicial power in any particular organ. The President has wide
legislative powers. He can issue Ordinances, make laws for a State after the State Legislature is
dissolved, adopt the laws or make necessary modifications and the exercise of this legislative
power is immune from judicial review. He performs judicial functions also. He decides disputes
regarding the age of a judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court for the purpose of retiring him
and cases of disqualification of members of any House of Parliament.
Likewise, Parliament exercises legislative functions and is competent to make any law not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, but many legislative functions are delegated
24
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538
25
Keshvananda Bharthi v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SCC 1461
26
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299
41
to the executive. In certain matters, Parliament exercises judicial functions also. Thus, it can
decide the question of breach of its privilege and, if proved, can punish the person concerned. In
case of impeachment of the President, one House acts as a prosecutor and the other House
investigates the charges and decides whether they were proved or not. The latter is a purely
judicial function.
On the other hand, many powers which are strictly judicial have been excluded from the
purview of courts. Though judiciary exercises all judicial powers, at the same time, it exercises
certain executive or administrative functions also. The High Court has supervisory powers over all
subordinate courts and tribunals and also power to transfer cases. The High Courts and the
Supreme Court have legislative powers, they also frame rules regulating their own procedure for
the conduct and disposal of cases.
Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers is not accepted fully in the Constitution of
India, and one may agree with the observations of Mukherjea, J. in Ram Jawaya v. State of
Punjab,27 “The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognized the doctrine of separation of powers
in its absolute rigidity but the functions of the different parts or branches of the Government have
been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution
does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of functions that essentially
belong to another.
Drawbacks
Though, theoretically, the doctrine of separation of powers was very sound, many defects
surfaced when it was sought to be applied in real life situations. Mainly, the following defects
were found in this doctrine:
1. Historically speaking, the theory was incorrect. There was no separation of powers under the
British Constitution. At no point of time, was this doctrine was adopted in England. As Prof.
Ullman says, “England was not the classic home of separation of powers.” Donoughmore
Committee also observed, “In the British Constitution there is no such thing as the absolute
separation or legislative, executive and judicial powers.”
2. This doctrine is based on the assumption that the three functions of the Government, viz.
legislative, executive and judicial are independent and distinguishable from one another. But in
27
Ram Jawaya Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR, 1955 SC 549
42
fact, it is not so. There are no watertight compartments. It is not easy to draw a demarcating line
between one power and another with mathematical precision.
3. It is impossible to take certain actions if this doctrine is accepted in its entirety. Thus, if the
legislature can only legislate, then it cannot punish anyone, committing a breach of its privilege;
nor can it delegate any legislative function even though it does not know the details of the subject-
matter of the legislation and the executive authority has expertise over it; nor could the courts
frame rules of procedure to be adopted by them for the disposal of cases. Separation of Powers,
thus, can only be relative and not absolute.
4. Modern State is a welfare State and it has to solve complex socio-economic problems and in
this state of affairs also, it is not possible to stick to the doctrine.
5. The modern interpretation of the doctrine of Separation of Powers means that discretion must
be drawn between ‘essential’ and ‘incidental’ powers and one organ of the Government cannot
usurp or encroach upon the essential functions belonging to another organ, but may exercise some
incidental functions thereof.
6. The fundamental object behind Montesquieu's doctrine was liberty and freedom of an
individual; but that cannot be achieved by mechanical division of functions and powers. In
England, theory of Separation of Powers is not accepted and yet it is known for the protection of
individual liberty. For freedom and liberty, it is necessary that there should be the Rule of Law
and impartial and independent judiciary and eternal vigilance on the part of the subjects.
There are three organs of the State – the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The
function of the legislature is to enact the law; the executive is to administer the law and the
judiciary is to interpret the law and to declare what the law is.
28
AIR 1964 SC 684
43
assumed that the legislative functions are exclusively performed by the legislature, executive
functions by the executive and judicial functions by judiciary. In Halsbury's Laws of England
also, it is stated that howsoever term ‘the Executive’ or ‘the Administration’ is employed, there is
no implication that the functions of the executive are confined exclusively to those of executive or
administrative character.
1. Legislative Functions
Legislative functions of the executive consist of making rules, regulations, bye-laws, etc. It
is, no doubt, true that any attempt to draw a distinct line between legislative and administrative
functions is difficult in theory and impossible in practice. Though difficult, it is necessary that the
line must be drawn as different legal rights and consequences ensue.
In the leading case of Bates v. Lord Hailsham, Megarry, J. observed that “the rules of
natural justice do not run in the sphere of legislation, primary or delegated.” Wade also said,
“There is no right to be heard before the making of legislation, whether primary or delegated,
unless it is provided by statute.”
44
Rulemaking action of the administration partakes all the characteristics which in normal
legislative action processes. Such characteristics maybe generality, prospectivity, and a behaviour
which basis action on policy consideration and gives a right or a disability. These characteristics
are not without exception.
2. Rule decision action or quasi- judicial action- Adjudicative power -Quasi – Judicial
Functions
Judicial Functions
1. The presentation (not necessarily oral) of their case by the parties to the dispute;
3. If the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by
the parties; and
4. A decision which disposes of the whole matter by finding upon the facts in dispute and
‘an application of the law of the land to the facts found, including, where required, a ruling upon
any disputed question of law.’
Thus, these elements are present, the decision is a judicial decision even though it might
have been made by any authority other than a court, e.g. by Minister, Board, Executive Authority,
Administrative Officer or Administrative Tribunal.
The word ‘quasi’ means ‘not exactly.’ Generally, an authority is described as ‘quasi-
judicial’ when it has some of the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, but not all. In the
words of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, “the word ‘quasi’, when prefixed to a legal term,
generally means that the thing, which is described by the word, has some of the legal attributes
denoted and connoted by the legal term, but that it has not all of them” e.g. if a transaction is
45
described as a quasi-contract, it means that the transaction in question has some but not all the
attributes of a contract.
For instance, suppose a statute empowers a Minister to take action if certain facts are
proved, and in that event gives him an absolute discretion whether or not to take action. In such a
case, he must consider the representations of parties and ascertain the facts – to that extent the
decision contains a judicial element. But, the facts once ascertained, his decision does not depend
on any legal or statutory direction, for ex hypothesis is he is left free within the statutory
boundaries to take such administrative action as he may think fit: that is to say that the matter is
not finally disposed of by the process of (4) This test has, however, been subject to criticism by
jurists. It does not give a complete and true picture. It is based on a wrong hypothesis. The
Committee characterized the judicial function as being devoid of any discretionary power but
obliged to merely apply the law to the proved facts. In reality, it is not so. The courts of law also
exercise discretion. It may be more persuasive in administrative actions than in judicial functions
but the difference is of degree only. A quasi-judicial function stands mid-way between a judicial
function and an administrative function. A quasi-judicial decision is nearer the administrative
decision in terms of its discretionary element and nearer the judicial decision in terms of
procedure and objectivity of its end-product.
It is also not true that in all quasi-judicial decisions, two characteristics are common
Firstly, in many cases, the first characteristic is absent and the authority may decide a
matter not between two or more contesting parties but between itself and another party, e.g. an
authority effecting compulsory acquisition of land. Here the authority itself is one of the parties
and yet it decides the matter. It does not represent its case to any court or authority.
46
Secondly, there may be cases in which no evidence is required to be taken and yet the
authority has to determine the questions of fact after hearing the parties, e.g. ratemaking or price-
fixing. Thirdly, after ascertainment of facts, unlike a regular court, an authority is not bound to
apply the law to the facts so ascertained, and the decision can be arrived at according to
considerations of public policy or administrative discretion, which factors are unknown to an
ordinary court of law.
Today the bulk of decisions which affect a private individual come not from codes but
from administrative agencies exercising adjudicatory powers. The reason seems to be that since
administrative decision-making is also a by-product of the intensive form of government, the
traditional judicial system cannot give to the people that quantity and quality of justice which is
required in a welfare state. Administrative decision making may be defined as a power to perform
acts administrative in character comma but requiring incidentally some characteristics of judicial
traditions.
Administer do action may be statutory, having the force of law or Non statutory, devoid of such
legal force. The bulk of the administrative action is statutory because a statute or the constitution
gives it illegal force, but in some cases, it may be non-statutory, such as issuing directions to
subordinates not having the force of law, but it’s violation may be visited with disciplinary action.
Though by and large administrative action is discretionary and is based on subjective satisfaction,
however, the administrative authority must act fairly, impartially and reasonably.
In Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court observed, “It may not be possible to
frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies. Ordinarily the
executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and
judicial functions are taken away."
Thus, administrative functions are those functions which are neither legislative nor judicial
in character. Generally, the following ingredients are present in administrative functions:
47
3. An administrative authority is not bound by the rules of evidence and procedure unless
the relevant statute specifically imposes such an obligation.
6. While taking a decision, an administrative authority may not only consider the evidence
adduced by the parties to the dispute, but may also use its discretion.
9. An administrative action will not become a quasi-judicial action merely because it has
to be performed after forming an opinion as to the existence of any objective fact.
10. The prerogative writs of certiorari and prohibition are not always available against
administrative actions.
A question which arises for our consideration is whether the function performed by the
executive authorities are purely administrative, quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative in character. The
answer is indeed difficult, as there is no precise, perfect and scientific test to distinguish these
functions from one another. Administrative and quasi-judicial decisions tend to merge in
legislative activity and, conversely, legislative activity tends to fade into and present an
appearance of an administrative or quasi-judicial activity. A further difficulty arises in a case in
which a single proceeding may at times combine various aspects of the three functions. The courts
have not been able to formulate any definite test for the purpose of making such classification.
48
Yet, such classification is essential and inevitable as many consequences flow from it, e.g.
if the executive authority exercises a judicial or quasi-judicial function, it must follow the
principles of natural justice and is amenable to a writ of certiorari or prohibition, but if it is a
legislative or quasi-legislative function, natural justice has no application. If the action of the
executive authority is legislative in character, the requirement of publication, laying on the table,
etc. should be complied with, but it is not necessary in the case of a pure administrative action.
Again, if the function is administrative, delegation is permissible, but if it is judicial, it cannot be
delegated. An exercise of legislative power may not be held invalid on the ground of
unreasonableness, but an administrative decision can be challenged as being unreasonable. It is,
therefore, necessary to determine what type of function the administrative authority performs.
A quasi-judicial function differs from a purely judicial function in the following respects
1. A quasi-judicial authority has some of the trappings of a court, but not all of them;
nevertheless, there is an obligation to act judicially.
2. A lis inter parties is an essential characteristic of a judicial function, but this may not
be true of a quasi-judicial function.
3. A court is bound by the rules of evidence and procedure while a quasi-judicial authority
is not.
5. A court cannot be a judge in its own cause (except in contempt cases), while an
administrative authority vested with quasi-judicial powers may be a party to the controversy but
can still decide it.
The distinction between judicial and quasi-judicial functions rests mainly on the fact that
in deciding cases, courts apply pre-existing law whereas administrative authorities exercise
discretion. This is, however, fallacious. ‘The most that can be said is that the discretions of the
courts may differ in nature and extent from the discretions of the administrator. Nevertheless, the
asserted discretion is reduced to one of degree only.
General
49
Object
Lis
(ii) ‘quasi-Lis’
Certain administrative authorities have been held to be quasi-judicial authorities and their
decisions regarded as quasi-judicial decisions, wherein such lis was present, e.g. a Rent Tribunal
determining ‘fair rent’ between a landlord and tenant, an Election Tribunal deciding an election
dispute between rival candidates, an Industrial Tribunal deciding an industrial dispute, a Licensing
Tribunal granting a licence or permit to one of the applicants.
Quasi-lis
But it is not in all cases that the administrative authority is to decide a lis inter partes.
There may be cases in which an administrative authority decides a lis not between two or more
contesting parties but between itself and another party. But there also, if the authority is
empowered to take any decision which will prejudicially affect any person, such decision would
be a quasi-judicial decision provided the authority is required to act judicially.
50
Thus, where an authority makes an order granting legal aid, dismissing an employee,
refusing to grant, revoking, suspending or cancelling a licence, cancelling an examination result of
a student for using unfair means, rusticating of a pupil, etc. such decisions are quasi-judicial in
character.
In all these cases there are no two parties before the administrative authority, ‘and the
other party to the dispute, if any, is the authority’ itself. Yet, as the decision given by such
authority adversely affects the rights of a person there is a situation resembling a lis. In such cases,
the administrative authority has to decide the matter objectively after taking into account the
objections of the party before it, and if such authority exceeds or abuses its powers, a writ of
certiorari can be issued against it. Therefore, Lord Greene, M.R. rightly calls it a ‘quasi-lis.’
Duty to act judicially The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an
administrative act is the duty to act judicially, and therefore, in considering whether a particular
statutory authority is a quasi-judicial body or merely an administrative body, what has to be
ascertained is whether the statutory authority has the duty to act judicially.
The question which may arise for our consideration is as to when this duty to act judicially
arises. As observed by Parker, J. “the duty to act judicially may arise in widely different
circumstances which it would be impossible, and indeed, inadvisable, to attempt to define
exhaustively.”
Whenever there is an express provision in the statute itself which requires the
administrative authority to act judicially, the action of such authority would necessarily be a
quasi-judicial function. But this proposition does not say much, for it is to some extent a tautology
to say that the function is quasi-judicial (or judicial) if it is to be done judicially.
Generally, statutes do not expressly provide for the duty to act judicially and, therefore,
even in the absence of express provisions in the statutes the duty to act judicially should be
inferred from ‘the cumulative effect of the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal
provided, the objective criterion to be adopted, the phraseology used, the nature of the power
conferred, of the duty imposed on the authority and the other indicia afforded by the statute.
Since ‘fairness in action’ is required from Government and all its agencies, the recent trend
is from ‘duty to act judicially’ to ‘duty to act fairly.’ ‘Duty to act fairly’ is indeed a broader notion
and can be applied even in those cases where there is no lis. It is this concept (‘duty to act fairly’),
51
which has given rise to certain new doctrines, e.g. ‘fair play in action’, legitimate expectations,
proportionality etc.
Cases
Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani was the first leading Indian decision on the
point. Under Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance, 1947, the Provincial
Government was empowered to requisition any land for any public purpose “if in the opinion of
the Government” it was necessary or expedient to do so. It was contended that the Government
while deciding whether requisition was for a public purpose, had to act judicially. The High Court
of Bombay upheld the said contention. Reversing the decision of the High Court, the Supreme
Court held by a majority that the governmental function of requisitioning property was not quasi-
judicial, for the decision was based on the subjective satisfaction of the Government and it was
not required to act judicially.
Test
The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly
and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the
exercise of quasi-judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair
decision. In recent years, the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical
change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being
considered as a quasi-judicial power.
52
At one time prerogative remedies of certiorari and prohibition were confined to ‘judicial’
functions pure and simple of public bodies. They both are now available in relation to functions
which may be regarded as ‘administrative’ or even ‘legislative.’ As it is said, it is not the label that
determines the exercise of jurisdiction of the court but the quality and attributes of the decision.
"On the whole the test of justiciability has replaced that of classification of function as a
determinant of the appropriateness of a decision for judicial review.”
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UNIT II
INTRODUCTION
DEFINITION
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GROWTH OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION
FACTORS (REASONS) FOR GROWTH OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION
FORM OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION
DELEGATED LEGISLATION IN ENGLAND, USA, INDIA.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION.
EXCESSIVE DELEGATION
FUNCTIONS WHICH MAY BE DELEGATED (PERMISIBLE DELEGATION)
FUNCTIONS WHICH MAY NOT BE DELEGATED (IMPERMISIBLE DELEGATION)
TAXING STATUTES
SUB-DELEGATION
DELEGATED LEGISLATION (CONTROL AND SAFEGUARDS)
JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER DELEGATED LEGISLATION
1. SUBSTANTIVE ULTRA VIRUS
2. PROCEDURAL ULTRA VIRUS
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
OTHER CONTROL.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION.
54
INTRODUCTION
According to the traditional theory, the function of the executive is to administer the law
enacted by the legislature, and in an ideal state, legislative power must be exercised exclusively by
the legislators who are directly responsible to the electorate. But a trend very much is vogue at the
present time in all democratic countries is that only relatively small parts of the total legislative
output emanates directly from the legislature
The matter of the fact that apart from the “Pure” administrative function, the executive
performs many legislative and judicial function also the bulk of legislation is promulgated by the
executive as a delegate of the legislature, and it is known as the “Delegated legislation”.
In England theoretically it is only parliament which can make laws. Looking to the
legislative process however one would see that it is really the government which makes the laws
subject to parliamentary control in addition to the common law and statute law the law of land
includes a great deal of what may be termed as subordinate or delegated legislation. It comprises
orders in Council, departmental circulars, rules, regulations, schemes, bye laws, etc. made in
exercise of statutory powers.
Even in US where the doctrine of delegated legislation has not been accepted in theory
under the doctrine of separation of powers in practice the legislature has entrusted legislative
powers to the executive due to several reasons there has been rapid growth in administrative
legislation.
In India between 1973 and 1977 Parliament enacted about 300 statutes but the total
number of statutory rules and orders reached more than 25000 So it has been rightly said that the
delegated legislation is so multitudinous that a statute book would not only be incomplete but
misleading unless it be read along with delegated legislation which amplifiers and supplements
the law of land.
DEFINITION.
There is no precise definition of the expression delegated legislation. It is equally difficult
to state with certainly the scope of such delegated legislation.
According to Salmond, “The expression delegated legislation as that which proceeds from
any authority other than sovereign power and is therefore dependent for its continued existence
and validity on some superior or supreme authority”.
55
In its 1st application it means that the authority making the legislation is subordinate to the
Legislature legislative powers are exercise by an authority other than the Legislature exercise of
the powers delegated or conferred on them by the legislature itself this is known as subordinate
legislation because the power of authority which makes is are limited by the statute which
conferred the powers and consequently it is valid only insofar as it keeps within those limits.
2nd connotation the “Delegated legislation” means and includes all rules, regulations, bye
laws, orders etc.
In simple words or meaning the expression “Delegated legislation” may be given as when
the function of legislation is entrusted to two organs other than the Legislature itself the legislation
made by such organs is called delegated legislation.
Thus, the delegated legislation made by the body or person other than the sovereign in
Parliament by virtue of powers conferred by such a sovereign under the statute. The statute
enacted by the legislature conferring the legislative power upon the executive is known as the
“Parent Act” or the “Primary law”, and the rules, regulation, bye laws, orders, etc. made by the
executive in pursuance of the legislative powers conferred by the legislature are known as
“Subordinate Laws or subsidiary laws or the “Child Legislation”.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
No doubt, the twentieth century has witnessed rapid growth of delegated legislation in
almost all legal systems of the world. But that does not mean that it is a new phenomenon or that
there was no delegation of legislative power by Legislature to Executive in the past. Ever since
statute came to be enacted by Parliament, there was delegation of legislative function. The statute
of 1337 contained a clause which made it felony to export wool, unless it was ordained by the
King and his Council. In fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there was frequent use of Henry VIII
Clause. The Statute of Sewers of 1531 empowered Commissioners to make, re-make, repeal and
56
amend laws, to pass decrees and to levy cess. Thus, the Commissioners used to exercise
legislative, administrative and judicial powers at a time. Mutiny Act, 1717 conferred on the
Crown power to legislate for the Army without the aid of Parliament. In nineteenth century,
delegated legislation became more common and considerably increased due to social and
economic reforms. In the twentieth century, output of delegated legislation by executive is several
times more than the output of enactments by a competent legislature.
Many factors are responsible for the rapid growth of delegated legislation in every modern
democratic State. The function of the state has long since ceased to be confined to preservation of
the public peace, the execution of laws and defence of the frontiers. The functions of the state are
now secure and to its citizen’s objectives set in part III and IV of the Constitution. The desire to
achieve these objectives leads to intense legislative activity. The traditional theory of ‘laissez
faire’ has been given up by every State and the old ‘police State’ has now become a ‘welfare
State.’ Because of this radical change in the philosophy as to the role to be played by the State, its
functions have increased.
The parliament and the state legislatures have neither time nor expertise to deal with
technical and situational intricacies. The parliament and the state legislatures cannot visualize and
provide for new strange, unforeseen and unpredictable situations, arising out of the complexity of
modern life. Consequently, delegated legislation has become essential and inevitable.
According to the committee on the Minister’s powers, it would be impossible to produce
the amount and kind of legislation which parliament desires to pass and which the people of this
country are supposed to want, if it comes necessary to inserts in the acts of the parliament
themselves any considerable portion of what is now left to delegated legislation.
The factors responsible for the growth of the delegated legislation are
57
and capable of attending to minor matters, while the parent manages the main business.” The truth
is, that the parliament were not willing to delegate the law- making power, parliament would be
unable to pass the kind and quality of law which the modern public opinion requires.
2. Technicality
Sometimes, the subject-matter on which legislation is required is so technical in nature that
the legislator, being himself a common man, cannot be expected to appreciate and legislate on the
same, and the assistance of experts may be required. Members of Parliament may be the best
politicians but they are not experts to deal with highly technical matters which are required to be
handled by experts. Here the legislative power may be conferred on expert to deal with the
technical problems, e.g. gas, atomic energy, drugs, electricity, etc.
3. Flexibility
At the time of passing any legislative enactment, it is impossible to foresee all the
contingencies, and some provision is required to be made for these unforeseen situations
demanding exigent action. A legislative amendment is a slow and cumbersome process, but by the
device of delegated legislation, the executive can meet the situation expeditiously, e.g. bank-rate,
police regulation export and import, foreign exchange, etc. for the purpose, in many statutes, a
“removal of difficulty” clause is found empowering the administration to overcome difficulties by
exercise of the delegated power.
4.Experiment
The practice of delegated legislation enables the executive to experiment. This method
permits rapid utilization of experience and implementation of necessary changes in application of
the provisions in the light of such experience, e.g. in road traffic matters, an experiment may be
conducted and in the light of its application necessary changes could be made. Delegated
legislation thus allows employment and application of past experience.
5.Emergency
In times of emergency, quick action is required to be taken. The legislative process is not
equipped to provide for urgent solution to meet the situation. Delegated legislation is the only
convenient remedy. Therefore, in times of war and other national emergencies, such as
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aggression, break- down of law and order, strike, 'bandh', etc. the executive is vested with special
and extremely wide powers to deal with the situation. There was substantial growth of delegated
legislation during the two World Wars. Similarly, in situation of epidemics, floods, inflation,
economic depression, etc. immediate remedial actions are necessary which may not be possible by
lengthy legislative process and delegated legislation is the only convenient remedy.
6. Complexity of Modern Administration
The complexity of modem administration and the expansion of the functions of the State
to the economic and social sphere have rendered it necessary to resort to new forms of legislation
and to give wide powers to various authorities on suitable occasions. By resorting to traditional
legislative process, the entire object may be frustrated by vested interests and the goal of control
and regulation over private trade and business may not be achieved at all. The practice of
empowering the executive to make subordinate legislation within the prescribed sphere has
evolved out of practical necessity and pragmatic needs of the modem welfare State. Therefore, it’s
been the rapid growth in the delegated legislation in all the countries and it has become
indispensable in the modern administrative era.
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Direction is an expression of Administrative rule making under the authority of law or rules orders
made under they may be recommendatory or mandatory.
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to be notified by the government is a conditional legislation and such a power did not enable the
government to decide whether to bring or not to bring that provision into force. However, no
mandamus can be issued against the government to provide weather provision should be enforced
and when the government would be able to do it.
4. Nature-based classification:
Classification of the administrative rule making may be based on the nature and extent of
delegation
I. Normal delegation
(a) Positive- where the limits of delegation are clearly defined in the enabling Act.
(b) Negative- where power delegated does not include power to do certain things, i.e.,
legislate on matters of policy.
II. Exceptional delegation
Instances of exceptional delegation may be:
power to legislate on matters of principle
power to amend Acts of Parliament
power conferring wide discretion that is almost impossible to know the limits
power to make rules without being challenged in a court of law
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Such exception is known as the Henry VIII clause to indicate executive autocracy. The
King of England in the 16th century imposed his autocracy will through the instrumentality of the
parliament. Under this clause, very wide range of the powers is given to the administrative
agencies to make rules, including the power to amend and repeal the laws.
The classical illustration of Henry VIII clause is found in the Constitution itself U/A
372(2) of the Indian Constitution, where the president has been the power to adopt, amend and
repeal any law in force to bring it in line with the provision of the constitution, and exercise of
such power has been made immune from the scrutiny of the courts.
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(x) Clarify the provisions of the statute’ Act: Power is delegated to the administrative authority to
issue interpretation on various provisions of the enabling Act.
63
In Panama Refining Company vs Ryan 79 L Ed. 446: 293 US 338 (1934 ),popularly known
as the hot oil case under Section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 1933 ( NIRA) the
President was authorised by the Congress to prohibit transportation of oil in interstate commerce
in excess of the quota fixed by the state concerned. The policy of the Act was to recover
encourage National industrial recovery and to foster fair competition. The Supreme Court by the
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majority held that the delegation was invalid. According to the court the Congress had not
declared any legislative policy or standard.
In Schechter Poultry Corpn. V. United States 1935 (Sick Chicken Case) the Supreme
Court unanimously struck down Section (3) of NIA Act, 1933 which authorised the President to
approve codes of fair competition and violation thereof who was made punishable. The court held
that the discretion of the president was virtually unfettered. And this was delegation running riot.
After the two cases mentioned above the Supreme Court took a liberal view in many cases
upheld delegation of legislative power. Thus, in National Broadcasting Company v. UnitedStates,
1943 vast powers were conferred upon the Federal Communication Committee (FCC) to licence
broadcasting stations under the Communications Act, 1934 the criterion was “Public Interest,
Convenience or Necessity” though it was vague and ambiguous, the supreme court held it to be a
valid standard.
Similarly in Yakus v. United States,1944 under the Emergency Price Control Act, 1942 the
price administrator was given the power to fix such maximum price which is “in his judgement
will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purpose of the Act” administrator was
required so far as practicable to give due consideration to the prices prevailing between 1st
October and 15th October 1941 but was allowed to consider a later date is necessary data were not
available and yet the supreme court sustained the delegation, holding that the standards were
adequate and as righty observed by the majority judgement of sick chickens case was overruled.
The U.S. sentencing commission under the Sentencing Reforms Act 1984: The
guidelines in Mistretta v. United States, 1988 (Mistretta), sentencing guidelines were promulgated
by provided range to determine sentences for categories of offences and offenders according to
various factors specified by the commission. Mistretta who was indicated for sale of cocaine,
challenged the guidelines contending that Congress delegated excessive authority to the
commission to structure the guidelines. The Supreme Court concluded that the contention of the
petitioner that the commission had significant description in formulating guidelines could not be
disputed. It has also power to determine which crimes should be punished leniently or severely.
But that did not mean that there was a no policy. Congress well conferring power on the
commission neither delegated legislative powers to the executive nor upset the constitutionally
mandated balance of powers among the co-ordinate branches.
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relevant act or also authorised EPA to review such standard and make such revisions as may be
appropriate. The provision was challenged on the ground of excessive delegation of Legislative
powers to EPA without providing “intelligible principle” the court of appeal upheld the
contention. The Supreme Court however held the delegation valid observing that a certain degree
of discretion to the agency could be allowed referring to Mistretta, the court stated that to require
the EPL to set quality standards at the level that is ‘requite’ that is not lower or higher than is
necessary to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety, fits comfortably within
the scope of discretion permitted by a precedent.
From the above decisions it clearly emerges that the traditional theory has been given up
and the Supreme Court has also adopted a liberal approach. Thus, pragmatic considerations have
prevailed over theoretical objections.
Pre-Constitution Period
R v. Burah,1878 is considered to be the leading authority on the subject the area of Garro
Hills was removed from the jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts and by Section 9 the
lieutenant-governor was empowered to extend civil or criminal all or any of the provisions of the
Act applicable to Kashi Janata and Naga Hills in the Garros Hills and to fix the date of such
application. By notification dated 14th October 1871, the Lieutenant Governor extended all the
provisions of the Act to the district of Kashi, Jaintia and Naga hills. The applicant who were
convicted of Murder and sentenced to death challenged the notification.
The High court of Calcutta by the majority upheld the contentions of the appellant and
held that Section 9 of the Act was ultra-virus the powers of the Indian legislature. According to
the court the Indian legislature was a delicate of Imperial Parliament and therefore further
delegation that is (sub-delegation) was not permissible. On the appeal Privy Council, it was held
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that the Indian legislature was not an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament it had plenary
powers of legislation as those of the Imperial Parliament itself. It agreed that the Governor
General in Council could not, by legislation, create a new legislative power in India not created or
authorised by the council’s Act. But in fact it was a not done it was only a case of conditional
legislation, as the Governor was not authorised to pass any new law but merely to extend the
provisions of the Act enacted by the competent Legislature upon fulfilment of certain conditions.
In Jitendra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar,1949 the Bihar maintenance of public order Act
1948 was to remain in force for one year. However the power was conferred on the provincial
government to extend the operation of the Act for a further period of one year by a majority, of
the federal court held that the power to extend the operation of the act beyond the period of 1 year
was a legislative act and therefore, could not be delegated. However in a dissenting judgement,
Faysal Ali upheld the provision as the extension of the Act, for a further period of 1 year could not
amount to its re-enactment. It nearly amounted to a continuance of the Act for which the
maximum period was an contemplated by the legislature itself. It is submitted that the minority
view was correct and subsequently in SardarInder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1957 the Supreme
Court upheld a similar provision.
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1.The executive cannot be authorised to repeal a law in force and thus, the provision which
empower the central government to repeal a law already in force in the part C state was bad.
2. By exercising the power of modification, the legislative policy should not be changed and thus,
before applying any law to the part C state the central government cannot change the legislative
policy.
Importance of Delhi laws case cannot be underestimated, as on the one hand it permitted
delegation of legislative powers by the legislature to executive while on the other hand it
demarcated the extent of such permissible delegation of powers by the Legislature.
Principle formulated in this case by the seven judges give their separate opinions many a
time a question is asked whether any principal was formulated by the majority opinion answer is
not simple as there is difference of opinion amongst jurist on this point. Authors Jain and Jain are
right when they state that on two points there was a similarity in the outlook evidenced in the
opinions. One, keeping the exigencies of the Modern Government in view, Parliament and state
legislature in India need to delegate legislative power if they are to be able to cope with the
multitudinous problems facing the country for it is neither practicable nor feasible to except that
each of the legislative bodies could turn out complete and comprehensive legislation on all
subjects that need to be legislated upon. Second, since legislatures derive their powers from the
written Constitution which creates them, they could not be allowed the same freedom as the
British Parliament in the matter of delegation some limits should be set on their capacity to
delegate. The major difficulty was, and it was on this point that the judges differed where to set
the limit and what was the permissible counters within which and Indian legislature could
delegate its legislative powers.
In Hari Shankar bagla v. State of MP 1955, U/S 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act 1946 the central government was empowered to issue an order for the regulation of
production distribution of essential commodities. By Section 6, it was provided that the order
made under Section 37 have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
any enactment other than the Act. Both the Sections were challenged on the ground of excessive
delegation of legislative power. The Supreme Court held that the object of Section 6 was not to
repeal or abrogate any existing law, but to bypass the same where the provisions thereof are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The court also held that the legislative policy was laid
down in the Act and there was no excessive delegation. Thus, very broad delegation of legislative
power was judicially sanctioned.
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After the Delhi Laws Act case, in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, 1960 Supreme
Court was probably the first case in which Central Act was held ultra-virus on the ground of
excessive delegation to stop the Drugs and Magic Remedies Objectionable Advertisements Act,
1954 was enacted by Parliament to control advertisement of certain drugs. Section 3 laid down a
list of diseases for which advertisement was prohibited and authorised the central government to
include any other disease in the list. The supreme court held Section 3 as invalid as no criteria,
standards or principles had been laid down their in, and the power delegated was an guided and
uncontrolled.
In Gwalior Trade and Silk Manufacturing Company limited v. CST , 1976, under Section
82 (b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, in 1956 Parliament did not fix rate of Central sales tax but
adopted the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of goods within the appropriate state in case
such rate exceeded 10% . This Section was challenged on the ground that parliament in not fixing
the rate itself and in adopting the rate applicable within the appropriate state has not laid down any
legislative policy and had have abdicated it’s a legislative function
This Section was upheld by all the five judges, observing that sufficient guideline was
provided in the Act by the Parliament but this case is noteworthy for to diverse approaches
adopted by Kanna J. (for three judges) and Justice Mathew (for two judges) in respect of the
following: contention on behalf of sales tax department a pre-emptive argument was put forward
that, well conferring power upon a delegate to make subordinate legislation, the legislature need
not disclose any policy, principle or standard because if the legislature can prepare can repeal an
enactment, as it normally can, it retains sufficient control over the authorities making the
subordinate legislation. Khana J. (For himself, Alagiriswami and for Justice Bhagwati) rejected
the argument and reiterated that the legislature must lay down policy principle for standard for the
guidelines of the delegate.
The rule against excessive delegation of Legislative authorities flows from the sovereignty
of the people. This contemplates that it is not permissible to substitute in the matter of Legislative
policy, review of individual officers or other authorities, however competent they maybe, for that
of the popular will as expressed by the representatives of the people.
The acceptance of the view canvassed by the department would lead to starling results. If
parliament were to enact that, as the crime situation in the country has deteriorated, criminal law
to be enforced in the country it would be such as is framed by an officer mentioned in the
enactment, can it be said that there has been any excessive delegation of legislative power? to say
that if element does not approve the laws made by the officer concerned, it can repeal the same or
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the parent Act is no answer. The delegation Section was however held valid on the ground that the
Act was clearly enacted with a view to prevent evasion of the payment of Central sales tax.
The conquering judgement of Mathew J (for himself and Ray CJ) accepted the said
argument and observed that delegation involves the granting of discretionary power to another,
but ultimate power always remains with the legislature. What is prohibited is -application, that is
conferment of arbitrary power by the legislature upon a subordinate body without reserving for
itself control over that body relying upon the decisions in R. v. Burra and Cobb and Co. Ltd. V.
Kropp, Mathew J observed that legislature cannot be said to abdicate its legislative function if it
could at any time repeal the legislation and withdraw the authority and discretion it had vested in
in the delegate.
In M. K. Papiah and Sons v. Excise commr. , Section 22 of The Karnataka Excise Act,
1966 conferred on the government power to fix the rates of excise duty and Section 71
empowered the government to make rules made under the Act were to be laid before the state
legislature as soon as practicable after they had been made. Both the Sections were challenged on
the ground of impermissible delegation of legislative power. Mathew J speaking for unanimous
Court of three judges observed that the laying of the rules before the legislature was a sufficient
check on the power conferred on the delegate. The petitioners thereupon argued that the rules
would come into force as soon as they were framed and that the power of the Legislature to repeal
rules subsequently could not be regarded as a sufficient control over delegated legislation.
Rejecting this argument, justice Mathew J observed that considering the compulsions and
complexities of modern life such control must be regarded as sufficient.
This case showed after 25 years of wandering in the legal maze of its own creation, the
Supreme Court of India, like the supreme court of the United States have come round to the view
expressed by the privy council in 1878.
In Hansraj L. chulani v. Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa , the State Bar Council
framed a rule as “right to practice” legal profession and disqualified persons if they were engaged
in any other occupation. It was contended by the petitioner who was in the medical profession that
the rule was bad as there was excessive delegation of Legislative function by the legislature.
However, it was held that the rule effectuated the object, purpose and the scheme of the Act and
provided enough guidelines and was valid.
In St. John Teachers Training Institute v. National Council for Teachers Education 2003
SCC, the Supreme Court emphasised on the need and necessity of delegated legislation. It was
observed that the legislature cannot possibly foresee every administrative difficulty that may arise
in operating a statute. Delegated legislation fills those gaps and details. Rules framed by the
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executive in exercise of delegated power, however cannot supplant the law enacted by the
legislature but can supplement it. Delegated legislation made in exercise of power under the
parent Act is supporting legislation and has the force and effect, if validly made, as the Act itself.
In Bombay Dyeing and manufacturing co. Ltd. V. Bombay Environmental Action Group
2006 SCC, the Supreme Court held that presumption as regards the constitutionality of law is
available not only in case of law enacted by the Parliament or state legislature but also in case of
delegated legislation.
In M.P. High Court Bar Association v. Union of India 2004 SSC, the Supreme Court
declared that under the Constitution, the power to legislate lies with the legislature. Hence the
power to make laws, cannot be delegated by the legislature to the executive. In other words, a
legislature can neither create a parallel legislature nor destroy its legislative character. Essential
legislative function must be retained by the legislature itself as such function consists of
determination of Legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct. But it is
equally well-settled that once essential legislative functions is performed by the legislature and the
policy has been laid down, it is always open to the legislature to dedicate to the executive
ancillary and subordinate powers necessary for carrying out policy and purpose of the Act as may
be necessary to make the legislation complete, effective and useful.
EXCESSIVE DELEGATION
It is well settled that essential and primary legislative function must be performed by the
legislature itself and they cannot be delegated to the executive. Essential legislative functions
consist of determination of Legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. In other
words, a legislature has to discharge the primary duty entrusted to it. Once essential legislative
powers are exercised by the legislature, all ancillary and incidental functions can be delegated to
the executive.
As observed in Arvinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1979 SSC, the founding document of the
nation that is Constitution has created three great instrumentalities and entrusted them with certain
basic powers-legislative, executive and judicial system. Abdication of these powers by any organ
would amount to do betrayal of the Constitution itself and it is intolerable in law.
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cannot legally delegate its legislative functions to the executive as that would be unconstitutional.
In Great Britain, excessive delegation of parliamentary powers is a political concern; In US and in
India, it is primarily judicial.
Abdication
Abdication means abandonment. Abdication of sovereignty in favour of executive. When
the legislature does not legislate and entrust the primary function to the executive or to any
outside agency, there is abdication of legislative power. Abdication may be partial or total. The
power to delegate is subject to the qualifications that the legislature does not abdicate or effaces
itself by setting up a parallel legislature.
But delegation of legislative power need not necessary amount to abdication or complete
effacement. What constitutes abdication and what class of cases are covered by that expression is
always a question of fat and it cannot be defined or a rule of universal application can be laid
down.
Principles:
The question whether there is excessive delegation or not, has to be examined in the light
of three broad principles:
1. Essential legislative function to enact laws and to determine legislative policy cannot be
delegated.
2. In the context of modern conditions and complexities of situations, it is not possible for
the legislature to enact laws in detail every possibility and make provisions for them. The
legislature, therefore, has to delegate the certain functions provided it lays down legislative
policy.
3. If the power is conferred on the executive in a manner which is lawful and permissible,
the delegation cannot be held to be excessive nearly on the ground that a legislature could
have made more detailed provisions.
Test:
In dealing with the challenge to the vires of any statute on the ground of excessive
delegation, it is necessary to enquire whether the impugned delegation involved surrender of
essential legislative function and whether the legislature has a left enunciation of policy and
principle to the delegate. If the reply is in the affirmative, there is excessive delegation but if it is
in the negative, the challenge must necessarily fail.
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Statute challenged on the ground of excessive delegation must be subjected to two tests:
1. Whether it delegates essential legislative function.
2. Whether the legislature has enunciated its policy and principle for the guidelines of the
executive.
In deciding whether the legislature is enacting statute has exceeded the limits of its
authority to enunciate policy and principle, regards should be had not to mere matters of form but
to the substance of what is done.
It is submitted that the following observations of Justice Subbarao in the leading case of
VasanLal Maganbhai Sajanwala v. State of Bombay 1961 laying down correct law on the point
and therefore worth noting. The Constitution confers a power and imposes a duty on the
legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative
policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously, it cannot abdicate its functions in
favour of another. But in view of multifarious activities of a welfare state, it cannot presumably
work out all the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation. It must necessarily
delegate the working out details to the executive or any other agency.
But there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. And overburdened
legislature for one controlled by a powerful executive may unduly overstepped the limits of
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delegation. It may not lay down any policy at all. It may declare its policy in a week and general
terms, it may not set down any standard for guidance of the executive, it may confer an arbitrary
power on the executive to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for itself
any control over subordinate legislation. This self-effacement of a legislative power in favour of
another agency either in whole or in path is beyond the permissible limits of delegation.
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Sometimes, the legislature passes an Act and makes it applicable, in the first instance, to
some areas and classes of persons, but empowers the Government to extend the provisions thereof
to different territories, persons or commodities, etc., e.g., the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was
made applicable to the whole of India except certain areas, but the Government was authorized to
apply the provisions of the Act to those areas also.
Likewise, the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 was made applicable to certain specified
commodities but empowered the Central Government to declare any other commodity as an
‘essential commodity’ and to make the Act applicable to such commodity. By Section 146 of the
Indian Railways Act, 1890, the Government was authorized to apply the provisions to tramways.
This device provides flexibility to law without interfering with legislative policy. In Hamdard
Dawakhana, however, such provision was held ultra-virus.
Exclusion
There are some statutes which empower the Government to exempt from their operation
certain persons, territories, commodities, etc. Section 36 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965
empowers the Government to exempt any establishment or a class of establishments from the
operation of the Act. Such provision introduces flexibility in the scheme of the legislation. The
Legislature which is burdened with heavy legislative work is unable to find time to consider in
detail hardships and difficulties likely to result in enforcing the legislation. Such power can be
exercised by executive in public interest.
The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 has been enacted as stated in its preamble, “to provide for
fixing minimum wages in certain employments”. The Act applies to employment mentioned in the
schedule, but government is given power to add any other employment thereto and, thus, to
extend the Act to that employment. The Act lays down norms on which government may exercise
its power to add any employment to the schedule. Nevertheless, in Edward Mills Co. v. State of
Ajmer AIR 1955, the Supreme Court upheld the provision arguing that the policy was apparent on
the face of the Act which was to fix minimum wages in order to avoid exploitation of labour in
those industries where wages were very low because of unorganised labour or other causes.
(d) Suspension
Some statutes authorize the Government to suspend or relax the provisions contained
therein, e.g. under Section 48(1) of the Tea Act, 1953, the Central Government is empowered
under certain circumstances to suspend the operation of all or any of the provisions of the said
Act.
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(f) Modification
Sometimes, provision is made in the statute authorizing the executive to modify the
existing statute before application. This is really a drastic power as it amounts to an amendment of
the Act, which is a legislative function, but sometimes, this flexibility is necessary to deal with
local conditions. Thus, under the powers conferred by the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, the Central
Government extended the application of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors’ Relief Act, 1947 to
Delhi. The Bombay Act was limited in application to the agriculturists whose annual income was
less than Rs 500 but that limitation was removed by the Government.
While conferring a power on Executive to modify a statute, two factors ought to be considered:
1. The need and necessity of delegating such power, and
2. The danger or risk of misuse of such power by the executive,
It is, therefore, necessary for the legislature to formulate policy in clear and unambiguous
terms before such power is delegated to the administration.
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Framing of Rules
A delegation of power to frame rules, bye-laws, regulations, etc. is not unconstitutional,
provided that the rules, bye-laws and regulations are required to be laid before the legislature
before they come into force and provided further that the legislature has power to amend, modify
or repeal them.
1. Henry VIII clause (Removal of difficulties) Power is sometimes conferred on the Government to
modify the provisions of the existing statutes for the purpose of removing difficulties. When the
legislative passes an Act, it cannot foresee all the difficulties which may arise in implementing it.
The executive is, therefore, empowered to make necessary changes to remove such difficulties.
Such provision is also necessary when the legislature extends a law to a new area or to an area
where the socio-economic conditions are different. Generally, two types of ‘removal of
difficulties’ clauses are found in statutes.
A narrow one, which empowers the executive to exercise the power of removal of
difficulties consistent with the provisions of the parent Act; e.g. Section 34(1) of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 reads thus: “If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the
provisions of this Act, the Central Government may, by an order published in the Official Gazette,
make such provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as appear to it to be
necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty.”
Such a provision is not objectionable. According to the Committee on Ministers’ Powers,
the sole purpose of Parliament in enacting such a provision is ‘to enable minor adjustments of its
own handiworks to be made for the purpose of fitting its principles into the fabric of existing
legislation, general or local.’ Sir Cecil rightly says, “the device is partly a draftsman’s insurance
policy in case he has overlooked something, and partly due to the immense body of local Acts in
England creating special difficulties in particular areas.” By exercising this power, the
Government cannot modify the parent Act nor can it make any modification which is not
consistent with the parent Act.
Another type of ‘removal of difficulties’ clause is very wide and authorizes the executive
in the name of removal of difficulties to modify even the parent Act or any other Act. The classic
illustration of such a provision is found in the Constitution itself. Usually, such a provision is for a
limited period. This provision has been vehemently criticized by Lord Hewart and other jurists. It
is nicknamed as the Henry VIII clause to indicate executive autocracy. Henry VIII was the King
of England in the 16th century and during his regime he enforced his will and got his difficulties
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removed by using instrumentality of a servile Parliament for the purpose of removing the
difficulties that came in his way. According to the Committee on Ministers' Powers, the King is
regarded popularly as the impersonation of executive autocracy and such a clause ‘cannot but be
regarded as inconsistent with the principle of parliamentary Government.’
In Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1967, the Supreme Court was
called upon to decide the legality of such a clause. Section 37(1) the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965
empowered the Central Government to make such orders not inconsistent with the purposes of the
Act, as might be necessary or expedient for the removal of any doubts or difficulties. The Court
by a majority of 3: 2 held Section 37 ultra vires on the ground of excessive delegation inasmuch
as the Government was made the sole judge of whether any difficulty or doubt had arisen, whether
it was necessary or expedient to remove such doubt or difficulty and whether the order made was
consistent with the provisions of the Act. Again, the order passed by the Central Government was
made ‘final’. Thus, in substance, legislative power was delegated to the executive authority, which
was not permissible.
The minority, however, took a liberal view and held that the functions to be exercised by
the Central Government were not legislative functions at all but were intended to advance the
purpose which the legislature had in mind. In the words of Hidayatullah, J: “Parliament has not
attempted to set up another legislature. It has stated all that it wished on the subject of bonus in the
Act. Apprehending, however, that in the application of the new Act doubts and difficulties might
arise and not leaving their solution to Courts with the attendant delays and expense, Parliament
has chosen to give power to the Central Government to remove doubts and differences by a
suitable order.”
It is submitted that the minority view was correct and after Jalan Trading Co., the
Supreme Court adopted a liberal approach. In Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1974, a
similar provision was held constitutional by the Court. Distinguishing Jalan Trading Co., the
Court observed: “In the present case, neither finality nor alteration is contemplated in any order
under Section 34 of the Act. Section 34 is for giving effect to the provisions of the Act. This
provision is an application of the internal functioning of the administrative machinery.” It,
therefore, becomes clear that after Jalan Trading Co., the Court changed its view and virtually
overruled the majority judgment It is submitted that by using a ‘removal of difficulties’ clause, the
Government may slightly tinker with the Act to round off irregularities and smoothen the joints or
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remove minor obscurities to make it workable, but it cannot change or disfigure the basic structure
of the Act.
In no case can it, under the guise of removing a difficulty, change the scheme and
essential provisions of the Act. The Committee on Ministers' Powers rightly opined that it would
be dangerous in practice to permit the executive to change an Act of Parliament and made the
following recommendation: ‘The use of the so-called Henry VIII clause conferring power on a
Minister to modify the provisions of Acts of Parliament should be abandoned in all but the most
exceptional cases and should not be permitted by Parliament except upon special grounds stated in
a ministerial memorandum to the Bill. Henry VIII clause should never be used except for the sole
purpose of bringing the Act into operation but subject to the limit of one year.”
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Under the guise of enabling the executive to remove difficulties, the legislature cannot
enact a Henry VIII clause and thereby delegate essential legislative functions to the executive,
which could not otherwise have been delegated.
(f) Retrospective operation
The legislature has plenary power of law making and in India, Parliament can pass any law
prospectively or retrospectively subject to the provisions of the Constitution. But this principle
cannot be applied in the case of delegated legislation. Giving an Act retrospective effect is
essentially a legislative function and it cannot be delegated.
(g) Future Acts
The legislature can empower the executive to adopt and apply the laws existing in other
States, but it cannot delegate the power by which the executive can adopt the laws which may be
passed in future, as this is essentially a legislative function.
(h) Imposition of Taxes
The power to impose a tax is essentially a legislative function. Under Article 265 of the
Constitution no tax can be levied or collected save by authority of law, and here ‘law’ means law
enacted by the competent legislature and not made by the executive. Therefore, the legislature
cannot delegate the essential legislative function of imposition of tax to executive authority.
(i) Ouster of jurisdiction of courts
The legislature cannot empower the executive by which the jurisdiction of courts may be ousted.
This is a pure legislative function.
(j) Offences and Penalty
The making of a particular act into an offence and prescribing punishment for it is an essential
legislative function and cannot be delegated by the legislature to the executive. However, if the
legislature lays down the standards or principles to be followed by the executive in defining an
offence and provides the limits of penalties, such delegation is permissible.
TAXING STATUTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATION OF TAXING POWER
Power to tax is an inherent power of any state. It is also considered as an essential
legislative function. Power to tax can be exercised not only for raising revenue of the state but
also for regulating social, economic and political structure of the country. Therefore, the
delegation of taxing power by the legislature deserves special attention for stop the permissible
limits of a valid legislation of taxing power can be comprehended by analysing the following
decisions of the Supreme Court.
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1. Orient Wvg. Mills Private Ltd. v. Union of India AIR1963 SC in this case the supreme court
upheld the constitutionality of the delegation of power to the government to exempt any
exercisable item from the duty.
2. Banarasi Das Bhanot v. State of M. P. AIR 1958 SC, the delegation of power to the
government to bring certain sale transaction under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax
Act,1947 was held against the challenge of excessive delegation.
3. Devi Das v. State of Punjab 1967 SC the delegation of power to the executive to determine the
rate of tax between the maximum and minimum laid down in the enabling Act was upheld. The
terminal tax on Railway passengers Act, 1958 authorised the executive to import sales tax at rate
between 1% to 2% the court held that the discretion in fixing the tax rate is too limited to hold it to
the excessive delegation.
4.MCD v. Birla cotton spinning and weaving Mills AIR 1968 SC in this case power delegated to
the corporation to impose electricity tax without prescribing any maximum limit was held on the
ground that corporation is also representative and responsive body which stands a guarantee
against misuse of power.
5.Corpn.of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema AIR 1965 in the same manner, in this case the
constitutionality of the delegation of power to the corporation to levy a licence fee on cinema at
such a rate as may be prescribed by the corporation was upheld.
6.Cantonment Board v. Western Indian theatres Ltd. AIR 1954 the power given to the corporation
(of the city of Pune), in terms very wide, to levy “any other tax” came to be considered from the
point of view of abdication of Legislative function. The negation of this argument was based on
the key words of limitation contained therein namely “for the purpose of the Act”, and it was held
that this provide sufficient guidelines for the imposition of the tax.
7. Jullunder Rubber Goods Manufacturers Association v. Union of India 1969 SCC, the court in
this case upheld the constitutionality of Section 12 of the Rubber Act, 1947 which empowered the
rubber board to levy an excise duty either on producers of rubber or the manufacturers of rubber
goods. The court negatived the challenge of excessive delegation on the ground of inherent checks
on the exercise of such power, namely, the representative character of the board and the control of
the Central Government. The Act had provided that tax can be levied only according to the rules
made by the government subject to the laying procedure.
8. Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1979 SCC in this case, the supreme court upheld the
Constitutionality of delegation of taxing power even in the face of a board statement which was
considered as sufficient guidelines. The State of Punjab acting under Section 90(4) of the Punjab
Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 required various municipality to impose a tax of rupees 1 per
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bottle of foreign liquor. On the failure of the municipalities to take an action in the matter, the
Government of Punjab compose the same tax. The power to impose tax was challenged on the
ground of excessive delegation. The contention was rejected on the ground that the words “for the
purpose of the Act” lay down sufficient guidelines for the imposition of the tax. Section 90(2) of
the impugned Act enables the Corporation to Levy “any other tax” which the state legislature has
the power to impose under the constitution. Sub-Section (3) leaves the rate of Levy to the
determination of the State Government. Sub-Section (5) empowers the State Government to notify
the tax which the corporation shall levy. The court observed that these provisions show that the
Levy of taxes shall be only “for the purpose of the Act”, an expression which sets a ceiling on the
total Quantum that may be collected and also canalises the objects for which levies can be spent
and, therefore, it provides a sufficient guideline. Constitutionality of delegation was reinforced by
the argument of responsive and representative character of Municipal Corporation.
Applying the same principle, the supreme court in Darshan Lal Mehra v. Union of India
1992 SCC held that Section 172 (2), U P Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 as constitutional.
This Section had authorised the municipalities to impose tax mentioned in the Act “for the
purpose of Act”. The court held that the words “for the purpose of the Act” lays down sufficient
policy for the guidelines of the municipalities to impose tax and, therefore, so long as the tax has
reasonable relation to the purpose of the Act, the same cannot be held to be excessive delegation.
It may be pointed out that even in the USA, courts have made an exception in favour of
municipality on the question of constitutionality of delegated legislation.
With regard to delegation in taxing legislation, the following principles may be treated as well
settled principles.
1. The power to impose a tax is essentially a legislative function. Under Article 265 of the
Constitution no tax can be levied or collected saved by the authority of law and here law
means law enacted by the competent legislature and not made by the executive. Therefore, the
legislature cannot delegate the essential legislative function of imposition of tax to an
executive authority.
2. Subject to the above limitation, a power can be conferred on the government to exempt a
particular commodity from the levy of taxes. A power may also be delegated to bring certain
commodities under the levy of tax.
3. The power to fix the rate of tax is a legislative function, but if the legislative policy has been
laid down, the said power can be delegated to the executive.
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4. It is open to the legislature or executive to select different rates of tax for different
commodities.
5. Commodities belonging to the same category should not, however, be subjected to different
and discretionary rates in the absence of any rational basis.
6. Needs of the taxing body is not a test for determining whether the guidelines, was furnished by
the legislature in exercising power of tax.
7. The circumstances that the affairs of the taxing body (panchayats, municipality, corporations
etc.) are administered by the elected representatives responsible to the people is wholly a
irrelevant and immaterial in determining whether the delegation legislation is excessive or
otherwise.
8. Taxing statute should be construed strictly. If a provision is ambiguous, the interpretations that
favour the assesses should be accepted.
9. A distinction, however, should always be made between charging provisions and machinery
provision. Machinery provisions should be construed liberally so as to make charging
provisions effective and workable.
10. General principles of delegated legislation applied to taxing statutes also.
SUB-DELEGATION
When a statute confers some legislative powers on an executive authority and the latter
further delegates those powers to another subordinate authority or agency, it is called ‘sub-
delegation.’ Thus, in sub-delegation, a delegate delegates further. This process of sub-delegation
may go through many stages.
An important illustration of sub-delegation is found in the Essential Commodities Act,
1955. Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central Government to make rules. This can be said to
be the first-stage delegation. Under Section 5, the Central Government is empowered to delegate
powers to its officers, the State Governments and their officers. Usually under this provision, the
powers are delegated to State Governments. This can be said to be the second-stage delegation
(sub-delegation). When the power is further delegated by State Governments to their officers, it
can be said to be the third-stage delegation (sub-sub-delegation). Thus, under Section 3 of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Sugar Control Order, 1955 was made by the Central
Government (first-stage delegation). Under the Order, certain functions and powers are conferred
on the Textile Commissioner (second-stage delegation). Clause 10 empowered the Textile
Commissioner to authorize any officer to exercise on his behalf all or any of his functions and
powers under the Order (third-stage delegation).
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Object
The necessity of sub-delegation is sought to be supported, inter alia, on the following
grounds:
1. Power of delegation necessarily carries with it power of further delegation; and
2. Sub-delegation is ancillary to delegated legislation.
3. Any objection to the said process is likely to subvert the authority which the legislature
delegates to the executive.
Sub-delegation of legislative power can be permitted either when such power is expressly
conferred by the statute or may be inferred by necessary implication.
Express Power
Where a statute itself authorizes an administrative authority to sub-delegate its powers, no
difficulty arises as to its validity since such sub-delegation is within the terms of the statute itself.
Thus, in Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad, the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, 1947 provided that no suit shall be filed for the eviction of a tenant without
permission either of a District Magistrate or any officer authorized by him to perform any of his
functions under the Act. An order granting permission by the Addl. District Magistrate to whom
the powers were delegated was held Valid.
On the other hand, in Allingham v. Minister of Agriculture and fisheries, AIR 1948 under
the relevant statute, the committee was empowered by the Ministry of Agriculture to issue
directions. The committee Sub-delegated its powers to it subordinate officer, who issued a
direction which was challenged. The court held that Sub delegation of power by the committee
was not permissible and the direction issued by the subordinate officer was there for ultra-virus.
Similarly, in Ganpati Singhji v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1955 the parent Act empowered the
chief commissioner to make rules for the establishment of proper system of conservancy and
sanitation at fairs. The rules made by the Chief Commissioner, however empowered the district
magistrate to device his own system and see that it was observed. Supreme Court declared the
rules ultra-virus has the parent Act conferred the power on the Chief Commissioner and not on the
District Magistrate and therefore the action of the chief commissioner sub-delegating that power
to district magistrate was invalid.
In A K Roy v. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 the power to prosecute under the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was conferred on the State Government. The State Government in
exercise of delegated legislation namely Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958
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delegated the said power to food authority. The Food authority by issuing a notification sub
delegated the power to Food Inspector, who prosecuted the accused. The Supreme Court held that
sub delegation unauthorised and squashed the notification. “Sometimes, statues permit sub-
delegation to authorities or officers not below a particular rank or in a particular manner only. As
per settled law if the statute direct that certain acts shall be done in a specified manner or by a
specified for certain persons performance in any other manner then the specified or by any other
person that one of those named is impliedly prohibited”.
In other words, where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be
done in that way or not at all.
In Ajaib Singh v. Gurbachan Singh AIR, 1965 under the relevant statute the Central
Government was empower to make rules for the detection of any person by an authority not below
the rank of District Magistrate. Where the order of detention was passed by an Additional District
Magistrate the action was held bad again. Where the law lays down Mode, Manner or method of
exercise of power of sub delegation, it would be exercised by the said mode itself. Thus, if sub
delegation is to be made through regulations, it cannot be affected by passing a resolution.
In Barium Chemicals Limited v. Company Law Board AIR, 1967 the rules framed by the
Central Government empowered the chairman to distribute the business of board among himself
as well as other members. The chairman passed an order vesting certain powers in him alone the
Supreme Court by a majority of 3:2 upheld the said Act. In a dissenting judgement it was
observed that "The statute having permitted the delegation of powers to the board only as the
statutory authority, the power so delegated have to be exercised by the board and not by its
components".
Implied Power
What would happen if there is no specific or express provision in the statute permitting sub-
delegation? The answer is not free from doubt.
In Jackson v. Butterworth, All ER 1948, Scott, L.J. held that the method (of sub-delegating
power to issue circulars to local authorities) was convenient and desirable, but the power to sub-
delegate was, unfortunately, absent. The other view, however, is that even if there is no provision
in the parent Act about sub-delegation of power by the delegate, the same may be inferred from
necessary implication.
Griffith rightly states, “if the statute is so widely phrased that two or more ‘tiers’ of sub-
delegation are necessary to reduce it to specialized rules on which action can be based, then it may
be that the courts will imply the power to make the necessary sub-delegated legislation.”
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In United States v. Bareno,1943 the parent Act conferred on the President the power to
make regulations concerning exports and provided that unless otherwise directed the functions of
the President should be performed by the Board of Economic Welfare. The Board sub-delegated
the power to its Executive Director, who further sub-delegated it to his assistant, who in turn
delegated it to some officials. The court held all the sub-delegations valid.
Criticisms
The practice of sub-delegation has been heavily criticized by jurists. It is well established
that the maxim delegatus non potest delegare (a delegate cannot further delegate) applies in the
field of delegated legislation also and sub-delegation of power is not permissible unless the said
power is conferred either expressly or by necessary implication. The author De Smith says, “there
is strong presumption against construing a grant of delegated legislative power as empowering the
delegate to sub-delegate the whole or any substantial part of the law-making power entrusted to
it.”
Bachawat, J. in the leading case of Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board states:
“The naming of a delegate to do an act involving a discretion indicates that the delegate was
selected because of his peculiar skill and the confidence reposed in him, and there is a
presumption that he is required to do the act himself and cannot redelegate his authority.” It is also
said, ‘sub-delegation at several stages removed from the source dilutes accountability of the
administrative authority and weakens the safeguards granted by the Act. It becomes difficult for
the people to know whether the officer is acting within his prescribed sphere of authority. It also
transfers power from a higher to a hierarchically lower authority. It is, therefore, necessary to limit
in some way the degrees to which sub-delegation may proceed.’
Finally, there are serious difficulties about publication of sub-delegated legislation. Such
legislation, not being an Act of Legislature, there is no general statutory requirement of publicity.
‘Though casually made by a minor official, sub-delegation creates a rule and sets up a standard of
a conduct for all to whom the rule applies. No individual can ignore the rule with impunity. But at
the same time the general public must have access to the law and they should be given an
opportunity to know the law. In case of such delegated and sub-delegated legislation, proper
publication is lacking.
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1. The power of delegation is a constituent element of legislative power as a whole under Article
245 of the Constitution and other relative articles. Delegation of some part of legislative power
has become a compulsive necessity due to the complexities of modern legislation.
2. Essential legislative functions cannot be delegated by the Legislature.
3. Essential legislative functions mean laying the policy of the Act and enacting that policy into a
binding rule of conduct. In other words, the legislature must lay down legislative policy and
purpose sufficient to provide a guideline for administrative rule-making. The policy of law may
be express or implied and can be gathered from the history, Preamble, title, scheme of the Act
or object and reason Clause, etc.
4. After the legislature has exercised the essential legislative functions, it can delegate non-
essentials, however numerous and significant they may be.
5. In order to determine the Constitutionality of the delegation of Legislative powers, every case is
decided in the special sitting.
6. Courts travelled to the extreme in holding every broad general statement as sufficient policy of
the Act to determine the question of Constitutionality.
7. There are various forms of Administrative rule-making. However, the parameter for
determining the question of constitutionality is the same, namely the legislature must lay down
the policy of the Act.
8. Delegated legislation must be consistent with the parent Act and must not violate legislative
policy and guidelines. Delegatee cannot have more legislative powers than that of the
delegator.
9. Sub-delegation of Legislative powers in order to be valid must be expressly authorised by the
parent Act.
10. The delegated legislation in order to be valid must not unreasonable must not violate any
procedural safeguards if provided in the parent Act.
11. In determining the validity of delegated legislation, if it is within the competence of the
authority, motive of the delegated legislation is not taken into account.
12. When the law allows delegation of Administrative power by an officer to another officer
subordinate to him, he does not divest himself of all the powers. The delegating authority will
retain not only the power to revoke the grant but also the power to act con-currently on the
matters within the area of delegated authority, except insofar as it may already have bound
himself by an act of the delegate.
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13. While deciding on the constitutionality of delegated legislation, court may take into
consideration relevance of context and background in which power of rule-making has been
exercised.
14. Court has imported the principle of "proportionality" in determining the constitutionality of
delegated legislation especially in cases involving serious violation of public interest where this
new doctrine may produce better results.
15. If the parent Act is repealed, notifications issued under it would also stand repealed unless
saved by the repealing Act.
16. Rules and regulations validly made by the administrative authority become part of the parent
Act.
17. Court decision cannot be nullified by the administrative authority by changing its rules. It
would amount to contempt of court.
18. Power to repeal and amend (in essential respect) cannot be delegated.
Today the question is not whether delegated legislation is desirable or not, but it is what controls
and safeguards can and ought to be introduced, so that the rule making power conferred on the
administration is not misused or misapplied.
Justice Subbarao observes that, it is for a court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal
construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits. But the liberal
construction should not be carried by the courts to the extent of always trying to discover dormant
or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on the executive authorities. It
is the duty of the court to strike down without any hesitation any blanket power conferred on the
executive by the Legislature.
Whatever prejudices might have existed against delegated legislation in the past, today it has
come to stay. At present, in almost all countries, the technique of delegated legislation is resorted
to and some legislative powers are delegated by the legislature to the executive. It must be
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conceded that in the present-day legislative powers can validly be delegated to the executive
within permissible limits. At the same time, there is inherent danger of abuse of the said power by
executive authorities. The basic problem, therefore, is that of controlling the delegate in exercising
his legislative powers.
It has been rightly said that one has to find out a middle course between two conflicting
principles; one permitting very wide powers of delegation for practical reasons while the other
that no new legislative bodies should be set up by transferring essential legislative functions to
administrative authorities. Delegated legislation has become inevitable but the question of control
has become crucial.
The control must be introduced at two stages:
• First, at the source, i.e. the safeguards must be provided when the legislature confers the
legislative power on the executive.
• Second, some safeguards must be provided in case of misuse or abuse of power by the
executive.
Controls over the delegated legislation may be divided into three categories:
1. Judicial control;
2. Legislative control, and
3. Other controls.
1. JUDICIAL CONTROL
In India Judicial review of Administrative rule-making is subject to normal rules governing
the review of Administrative action. Nevertheless, the principles on which the Constitutionality of
a statute is judged and that of subordinate legislation are different. A subordinate legislation could
not enjoy the same degree of immunity as a legislative Act would. This judicial review of
administrative rule- making cannot be foreclosed in any manner by the enabling Act. It was held
in the State of Kerala v. Unnikrishnan 2007 SSC, Judicial review of Administrative rule-making
cannot be a foreclosed in any manner by the enabling Act.
In the State of Kerala v. KMC Abdullah and Co. AIR 1965 SC held that the validity of the rules
can still be challenged even in the face of such a phrase as "shall not be called in question in any
court" in the enabling Act.
In the same manner in General Officer Commanding-in- Chief v. Subhash Chandra Yadav,
1988 SCC, the supreme court held that an Act providing that rules made thereunder on publication
in official Gazette would be "as if enacted" In the Act, cannot take away judicial review.
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ii) In Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, 1950 certain bye laws made by a municipality were held
bad under article 19 (1)(g).
iii) In Narendra Kumar v. Union of India 1960 the Supreme Court specifically considered the
point whether the question of unconstitutionality of delegated legislation made under a valid Act,
could be raised or not. The Non- Ferrous Metal Order, 1958 was made under the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955.
In Hari Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR, 1954 the validity of Essential
Commodities Act, had been upheld. The question in Narendra now was whether the constitutional
validity of the order made under the Act could be canvassed under Art. 19(1)(g). The court held
that though law may not be unconstitutional, an order made there under may yet be challenged
under the constitution, because the law could not be presumed to authorise anything
unconstitutional.
iv) In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza AIR, 1981 is the Supreme Court declared certain regulations
pertaining to the conditions of service of air hostess in India, and undertaking of the Central
Government as discriminatory under Art. 14 of the Constitution.
v) The Bar Council made a rule under the Advocates Act, barring enrolment of a person as an
advocate if he was engaged in any other profession. The rule was declared valid as it did not
infringe Art.14 of the Constitution.
Delegated legislation does not fall beyond the scope of judicial review and in almost all
democratic countries it is accepted that courts can decide the validity or otherwise of delegated
legislation mainly applying two tests:
1. Substantive ultra vires; and
2. Procedural ultra vires.
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Substantive ultra vires means that the delegated legislation goes beyond the scope of the
authority conferred on it by the parent statute or by the Constitution. It is a fundamental principle
of law that a public authority cannot act outside the powers; i.e. ultra vires, and it has been rightly
described as the ‘central principle’ and ‘foundation of large part of administrative law.’ An act
which, for a reason, is in excess of power is ultra vires.
As Schwartz states, “If an agency acts within the statutory limits (intra vires), the action is
valid; if it acts outside it (ultra vires), it is invalid. No statute is needed to establish this; it is
inherent in the constitutional position of agencies and courts.”
Circumstances
A delegated legislation may be held invalid on the ground of substantive ultra vires in the
following circumstances:
*where the parent Act is unconstitutional
* Where parent Act delegates essential legislative functions;
*Where delegated legislation is inconsistent with general law;
*Where delegated legislation is unconstitutional
*Where delegated legislation is inconsistent with parent Act;
*Unreasonableness;
*Mala fide (Bad faith);
*Sub-delegation;
*Exclusion of judicial review;
*Retrospective effect;
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For delegation to be valid, the first requirement is that the parent Act or enabling statute by
which legislative power is conferred on the executive authority must be valid and constitutional. If
the delegating statute itself is ultra vires the Constitution and is bad, delegated legislation is
necessarily bad. Under the Defence of India Act, 1939, the Central Government was empowered
to make rules for requisition of immovable property. But the subject of requisition of immovable
property was not within the field of the Federal Legislature. On that ground, the rule was held
invalid(Tan Bug Taim v Collector of Bombay , AIR 1946).
In Chintamanrao v. State of M.P, the parent Act authorized the Deputy Commissioner to
prohibit manufacturing of bidis in some areas during certain periods. The order passed by the
Deputy Commissioner under the Act was held ultra vires inasmuch as the Act under which it was
made violated the Fundamental Right to carry on any occupation, trade or business, guaranteed by
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
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exercised strictly within the authority of law. Delegated legislation can be held valid only if it
conforms exactly to the power granted.
Under English law delegated legislation may be struck down on the ground that if it
infringes the parent Act. Thus, where, in exercise of power under the parent Act, the executive
framed certain regulations in order to discourage Asylum claims by migrants, it was held that the
regulation were ultra vires since they rendered the provisions of the Act nugatory.
This principle is accepted in India also it is well settled that the rule making power
conferred by the parent Act does not enable rulemaking authority to make a rule which may travel
beyond the scope of the Act or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to the enabling Act. If the
rule cannot be reconciled with the parent Act, it must be struck down. This principle was laid
down in Chandra Bali v. R., AIR 1952.
In Mohd. Yasin v. Town Area Committee AIR 1952 and in State of Karnataka v. Ganesh
kamath, 1983 SCC, under the parent Act, the municipality was empowered to charge fee only for
the use and occupation of some property of the committee, but the town area committee framed
bye-laws and imposed levy on wholesalers irrespective of any use or occupation of property by
them. Supreme Court held that the bye laws were beyond the powers conferred on the committee
and were ultra-virus.
In Kunj Bihari Bihari Lal vs State of H. P. 3 2000 SCC., he parent Act H.P. Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, 1972, conferred on the state government power to make rules "for carrying out
purpose of the Act". Though the Act excluded from the operation of the Act "Tea Estate", rules
(delegated legislation) sought to include tea plantation and prohibited transfer of such land. The
rule was held ultra-vires and was struck down.
Even where the power to make delegated legislation is in subjective terms and allows the
administrative agency to make rules "as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for giving effect
to the provisions of the Act", the discretion is neither unfettered nor beyond judicial scrutiny. The
court has power to decide the validity for vires of such provision.
The question when can a bye-law any other delegated legislation is said to be inconsistent
with or repugnant to the parent Act or any general law and therefore, bad. In White v. Morley 1899
Q B "A delegate is not entitled to exercise powers in excess or in contravention of the delegated
powers. If any order is issued or framed in excess of powers delegated to the authorities, such
power would be illegal or void". Channel LJ stated: “A bye- law is not bad because it deals with
something that is not dealt with by the general law. But it must not alter the general law by
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making that lawful which the general law makes unlawful; or that unlawful which the general law
makes lawful”.
Whether a particular piece of delegated legislation is in excess of power of subordinate
legislation conferred on the delegate has to be determined with reference to specific provisions
contained in the relevant statute conferring the power to make the rule regulation bye laws extra
and also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from various provisions of the
enactment.
In State of M.P. v. Bhola SCC 2003 Supreme Court upheld the validity of rule 3 of the M
P Prisoners Release on Probation Rules, 1964 providing that a prisoners convicted under Section
396 of the penal code 1860 (IPC) would not be eligible for release on probation. It was held that
classification of offenders on the basis of nature and gravity of offences cannot be said to be
arbitrary and unreasonable.
In Ajay Canu v. Union of India, SCC 1988, Rule requiring compulsory wearing of helmet
by persons driving two-wheeler would not be held arbitrary discriminatory for imposing and
reasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 (1)(d) of the
constitution.
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6. Unreasonableness
The test of unreasonableness has been, applied in Britain to the bye laws made by a
municipal corporation. The court might well take the position that the legislation never intended to
give authority to make unreasonable rules, and they are, therefore, ultra vires.
In Kruse v. Johnson 1898 2 Q B, laying down the proposition, Lord Russel, however,
gave somewhat Limited meaning to the term unreasonableness, viz., if bye laws were found to be
partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes, if they were manifestly unjust,
if they disclosed bad faith, or if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the
right of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable man, then
these can be regarded as ultra-vires on the presumption that Parliament never intended to give
authority to make such bye laws.
In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza 1981 SCC, regulations made by Air India providing for
termination of service of an air hostess on her first pregnancy has been held to be the most
unreasonable and arbitrary provision which is abhorrent to the notions of civilized society. The
ruling in Yadav v. State of Haryana AIR1987 SC, also appears to come very close to saying that
unreasonable rules would be ultra vires.
The courts however adopt a restrictive view of unreasonableness. The test is not whether
the impugned rules are reasonable, but whether these are undesirable. A court does not hold a rule
unreasonable merely because it does not like or approve the rule. A rule is held unreasonable if it
is “manifestly unjust, capricious, inequitable or partial in operation”. Rajasthan SRTC v. Bal
Mukund Bairwa 2009 SCC rule authorising a public sector undertaking to dismiss a permanent
employee just by giving him a 3 months’ notice without any hearing being given to him has been
quashed by the Supreme Court as being unreasonable and arbitrary.
It might also be pointed out that delegated legislation may also be adjudged as
unreasonable under Article 14 or 19. Art.14 is been given as expansive interpretation by the courts
to cover quite a few aspects of Administrative process.
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In Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, 1985 SCC the Apex Court ruled that
subordinate legislation does not enjoy the same degree of immunity as substantive legislation
enjoys. ‘Unreasonableness’ is one of the grounds of judicial review available to test validity of
delegated legislation. If a delegate intends to impose a condition, which is unreasonable, it cannot
be held legal or valid.
7. Mala Fide
Indian Administrative Law is based on the principle that every statutory power must be
exercised in good faith. Power to make delegated legislation cannot claim immunity from judicial
review if the power has been exercised by the rule-making authority mala fide or with dishonest
intention. It may, however, be stated that the decisions of the Supreme Court, are not consistent on
the point and there is cleavage of opinion.
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not followed. However, in Orient weaving Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1963 the Supreme Court
again adapted the Herschel Doctrine. The various High Courts have taken conflicting stands.
In State of Kerala v. Abdulla and Co. AIR 1965 SC Justice Shah and Justice Sikri made
the, following observations: "Power to frame rules is conferred by the Act upon the state
government and that power may be exercised within the strict limits of the authority conferred. If
in making a rule, the state transcends its authority, the rule will be invalid for statutory rules made
in exercise of delegated authority are valid and binding only if made within the limits of authority
conferred. Validity of a rule whether it is declared to have effect as if enacted in the Act or
otherwise is always open to challenge on the ground that it is unauthorised”.
The rule of law has always recognized power of judiciary to review legislative and quasi
legislative acts. The validity of a delegated legislation can be challenged in a court of law. As
early as 1877 in Empress v. Burah, the High Court of Calcutta had declared Section 9 of Act XXII
of 1869 ultra vires. Though the decision of the Calcutta High Court was reversed by the Privy
Council, neither before the High Court nor before the Privy Council it was even contended that
the court had no power of judicial review and, therefore, cannot decide the validity of the
legislation.
Sometimes, however, attempts are made by the legislature to limit or exclude judicial
review of delegated legislation by providing different modes and methods. Thus, in an Act a
provision may be made that rules, regulations, bye-laws made under it ‘shall have effect as if
enacted in the Act’, ‘shall be final’, ‘shall be conclusive’, ‘shall not be called in question in any
court’, ‘shall not be challenged in any legal proceedings whatsoever’ and the like.
9. Retrospective operation
It is well-settled that delegated legislation cannot have any retrospective effect unless such
a power is conferred on the rule-making authority by the parent Act. The legislature can always
legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively subject to the provisions of the Constitution. But
the said rule will not apply to administrative authorities exercising delegated legislative power.
Some statutes specifically confer power to the rule-making authority to frame rules with
retrospective effect.
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prescribed procedure, such as, holding of consultations with particular bodies or interests,
publication of draft rules or bye-laws, laying them before Parliament, etc. It is incumbent on the
delegate to comply with these procedural requirements and to exercise the power in the manner
indicated by the Legislature.
Failure to comply with the requirement may invalidate the rules so framed. At the same
time, however, it is also to be noted that failure to observe the procedural requirements do not
necessarily and always invalidate the rules. This arises out of a distinction between mandatory
requirements and directory requirements. Generally, non-compliance with a directory provision
does not invalidate subordinate legislation, but failure to observe a mandatory and imperative
requirement does. “It is a well-settled rule that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled
exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially.”
Procedural Requirements:
1. Publication
2. Consultation
1. Publication:
Object:
It is a fundamental principle of law that ‘ignorance of law is no excuse’ (ignorantia juris non
excusat). But there is also another equally established principle of law that the public must have
access to the law and they should be given an opportunity to know the law. The very justification
for that basic maxim is that the whole of our law, written or unwritten, is accessible to the public,
in the sense, of course, at any rate, its legal advisers have access to it, at any moment, as of right.
In case of an Act made by Parliament this poses little difficulty as it receives sufficient publicity
during the introduction of a Bill, printing, reference to a Select Committee and its report thereon,
reading before the House or Houses, discussion, voting, final approval of the Bill, radio and
newspaper reports thereon, etc. But this is not true in the case of delegated legislation.
Directory or Mandatory
In Harla v. State of Rajasthan, the legislation in question passed by Council was neither
published nor was it made known to the general public through any other means. The Supreme
Court, by applying principles of natural justice, held that its publication was necessary. Again, in
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Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 required all the
rules to be made under the Act to be notified in the Official Gazette. The principles applied by the
licensing authority for issuing permits for the acquisition of non-ferrous metal were not notified.
The Supreme Court held the rules ineffective.
Mode of publication:
A question may also arise about the mode, manner and method of publication. As a rule, a
distinction must be drawn between publication of delegated legislation and the mode, manner or
method of publication. Even if a requirement of publication is held to be mandatory, the mode or
manner of publication may be held to be directory and strict compliance thereof may not be
insisted upon.
Effect of publication: Once the delegated legislation is promulgated or published, it takes effect
from the date of such promulgation or publication.
2. Consultation:
One of the techniques adopted by Legislature to control exercise of power by executive
against abuse of power is the process of consultation with affected interests before delegated
legislation or statutory instrument is prepared. It is indeed a visible safeguard against possible
misuse of power by the rule-making authority.
The term ‘consult’ implies a conference of two or more persons or an impact of two or more
minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or, at least satisfactory
solution of a problem. It is a process which requires meeting of minds between the parties to
consultation on material facts to come to a right conclusion.
Object:
An important measure to check and control the exercise of legislative powers by the
executive is the technique of consultation through which affected interests may participate in the
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rule-making process. This modus operandi is regarded as a valuable safeguard against misuse of
legislative power by the executive authorities.
As Wade and Philips remark, “One way of avoiding a clash between department exercising
legislative powers and the interest most likely to be affected is to provide for some form of
consultation.”
This process of exchange of ideas is beneficial to both: to the affected interests itself insofar
as they have an opportunity to impress on the authority their point of view; and to the rule-making
authority insofar as it can gather necessary information regarding the issues involved and thus be
in a better position to appreciate a particular situation. The Administration is not always the
repository of ultimate wisdom; it learns from the suggestions made by outsiders and often benefits
from that advice. A consultative technique is useful in balancing individual interests and
administrative exigencies. The purpose is to allow interested parties to make useful comment and
not to allow them to assert their right to insist that the rule to take a particular form. It acts as an
important brake on administrative absolutism.
Mandatory or Directory
No hard and fast rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a provision
relating to consultation should be held as mandatory and when it should be regarded as directory.
As held by the Supreme Court, in absence of the legislation making it plain what the
consequences of failure to observe the statutory requirement are, the court should decide the
question keeping in view the scope and purpose of the enactment, object sought to be secured by
such consultation, intention of making such provision, effect of the exercise of power upon the
rights of persons to be consulted, etc.
In New India Industrial Corporation Limited v. Union of India, AIR1980, consultation
interest infuses law-making process with democratic forms, particularly in what is called
bureaucratic legislation. Apart from this, it is an administrative necessity for effective and
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Object of control: The underlying object of parliamentary control is to keep watch over the
rule making authorities and also to provide an opportunity to criticize them if there is abuse of
power on their part. This mechanism is described as "legislative Veto"
Since the risk of abuse of power by the executive is inherent in the process of delegated
legislation, it is necessary for the legislature to keep ‘close watch’ on the delegate. This is much
more important in view of the fact that judicial control over delegated legislation is not sufficient
enough to keep administrative agencies within the bounds of delegation and there is need and
necessity ‘political’ control in terms of policy, which Parliament may be able to exercise
efficiently. The fact is that due to broad delegation of Legislative powers and the generalized
standard of control also bold, judicial control has shrunk, raising the desirability and the necessity
of parliamentary control.
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In US the control of the Congress over delegated legislation is highly limited because
neither is the technique of “laying” extensively used nor is there any Congressional Committee to
scrutinize it. This is due to the Constitutional structure reservation in that country in which it is
considered only the duty of courts to review the legality of Administrative rulemaking. There is
even authority that is negative resolution technique so widely used in Britain would be
unconstitutional in an, American legislature.
Modes:
The legislative control can be effectively exercised by
1.Memorandum on Delegation
2.Laying procedure
•Direct general control
•Direct special control
3. Indirect Control / Scrutiny Committees
1. Memorandum on Delegation.
At the centre, the first step in the process of parliamentary control of delegated legislation is
taken at the stage of delegation. A rule of procedure of each house of parliament requires that bill
involving proposal for delegation of legislative power shall be “accompanied by a memorandum
explaining such proposals and drawing attention of their scope, and stating also whether they are
of exceptional or normal character”.
The rule is of an informational nature. The rule is celebratory so far as it goes, for the first
stage of supervision arises at the stage of delegation. The Lok Sabha committee on subordinate
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legislation has emphasized that the rule is mandatory and the memorandum attached to a bill
should give full report and effect of the delegation of power to subordinate authorities, the points
which may be covered in the rules, the particulars of subordinate authorities who are to exercise
the delegated power, and the manner in which such power is to be exercised, the purpose of the
memorandum is to focus the attention of the members of the Parliament to the provisions of the
bill involving delegation of legislative power.
The speaker may also refer bills containing provisions for delegation of legislative powers to
the committee to examine the extent of such power sought to be delegated.
2. Laying procedure
Direct but general control over delegated legislation is exercised
1. Through, debate on Act contains delegation: Members may discuss anything about delegation
including necessity, extent, type of delegation and the authority to whom power is delegated.
2. Through questions and notices: Any member may ask questions on any aspect of delegation of
legislative powers, and if dissatisfied can give notice for discussion under Rule 59 of the
Procedure and Conduct of business in Lok Sabha Rules.
3.Through moving resolutions and notices in the house: Any member may move a resolution on
motion if the matter regarding delegation of power is urgent and immediate, and reply of the
government is unsatisfactory.
4. Through vote on grant: Whenever the budget demands of ministry are presented, any member
may propose a cut and thereby bring the exercise of rule-making power by that Ministry under
discussion.
5.Through a private Member's Bill seeking modification in the parent Act, or through a debate at
the time of discussion on the address by the President to the joint session of Parliament,
members may discuss delegation. However, these methods are rarely used.
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provided that the presidential organisation plans were not to have any effect for a specified period
during which they could be honoured by the Congress through a concurrent resolution of both the
houses. Classic annulment through this process has been the rejection by the Senate of President
Truman's plan to abrogate the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, 1947 providing for a separation
of functions between the National Labour Relations Board and the independent office of General
Council.
In England the technique of laying is very extensively used because all the administrative
rule making is subject to the supervision of Parliament under the Statutory Instrument Act, 1946
which prescribes a time table the most common form of provision provides that the delegated
legislation comes into immediate effect, but is subject annulment by an adverse resolution of
either House. Other provisions for laying defer the operation of delegated legislation for a
specified period require affirmative resolution for the how is before the delegated legislation can
operate; allowed the delegated legislation to operate immediately, but require affirmative
resolution for subsequent continents in operation; postpone operation until approved by
affirmative resolution.
In India, Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd v. State of Haryana, 1979 SCC, the Supreme Court
noticed that there are three different link clauses which assume different forms depending on the
degree of control which the legislature may like to exercise namely as well as the select
committee on delegated legislation summarised the procedure under seven heads:
1. Laying without further procedures.
2. Laying subject to affirmative resolution.
3. Laying subject to negative resolution.
4. Laying in draft subject to negative resolution.
5. Laying in draft subject to an affirmative resolution.
6. Laying with deferred operation.
7. Laying with immediate effect but subject to annulment.
1.Laying with no further direction: In this type of playing, the rules and regulations come into
effect as soon as they are laid. It is simply to inform the house about the rules and regulation.
2. Laying subject to negative resolution: in this process the rule come into effect as soon as they
are placed on the table of the house, shall cease to have effect if negated by a resolution of the
house.
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3.laying subject to affirmative resolution: this technique may take two shapes:
a) that the rules shall have no effect or force unless approved by a resolution of each house of the
Parliament
b) that the rules shall cease to have effect unless approved by an affirmative resolution.
In these both processes, it is the duty of the government to move resolution.
4.laying in draft subject to negative resolution: such a provision provides that when any Act
contains provision for this type of Laying the draft rules shall be placed on the table of the house
and shall come into force after 40 days from the date of laying unless disapproved before that
period.
5. Laying in draft subject to an affirmative resolution: In this type of laying, the instruments or
draft rules shall have no effect unless approved by the house.
6.laying with deferred operation: the requirement of laying is linked with postponement of
operation of the rules and thus parliament gets more control.
7. laying with immediate effect but subject to annulment: here the rules come into force when laid
before parliament, but cease to be in operation if disapproved by it within the specified period.
This is the most common form of Parliamentary control and is known as the negative procedure.
The earliest instance of the laying provision found in India is in the Immigration Act, 1922.
Between (1929 to 1939) only 3 Act made provision for laying, namely, the Insurance Act 1938,
Agriculture Product Act, 1938 and The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 after a gap of 5 years, The
Central Excise Act and Salt Act, 1944 and the Aircraft Act, 1934 made provisions that the rules
framed there under must be laid on the table of the house. Only in a few Acts that is Insurance
Act, 1938 and Aircraft Act, 1944 provision was made for the laying subject to a negative
resolution. The negative resolution procedure differs from its counterpart in England as in India it
includes the power of modification also. Three other Act, namely, Representation of The Peoples
Act, 1951; All India Services Act, 1951 and Indian Development and Regulation Act, 1951
contain only the right of modification of the rules and not annulment. The period during which the
rules could be modified varies from 7 day to 1 month. It may be noted that in England this is a
uniform period of 40 days. The Indian Tariff Amendment Act, 1950 provides an illustration where
rules are made subject to laying with affirmative resolution.
By the delegated legislation provisions (Amendment) Act, 1983, our Parliament has amended
50 Indian statutes and inserted provisions for laying before State legislature and Parliament where
there were no much provisions and in other instances, provided for an annulment or modification
within a specified period.
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A typical clause read as follows. Every rule prescribed for sanctioned by the central
government under this Act shall be laid down as soon as maybe after it is prescribed or
sanctioned, before each house of the Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of 30 days
within which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if,
before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions
aforesaid, both houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both houses agree that the
rule should not have effect, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be
of no effect, as the case may be: so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be
without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule.
In the State of Uttar Pradesh, and identical provision is made applicable to rule making by
the U.P. Government under all the U.P and Central Acts by adopting a convenient method of
inserting it in the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904, thus, making it a rule of uniform application
without having to add or amend the individual U.P. or Central Act.
In the absence of any general law in India regulating laying procedure, the scrutiny
committee made the following suggestions:
1) All Acts of Parliament should uniformly require that rules be laid on the table of the house "as
soon as possible".
2) The laying period should uniformly be 30 days from the date of final publication of rules.
3) The rule will be subject to such modification as the house may like to make.
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8. The rules can be annulled or modified only when both houses agree.
9. In this formula, the initiative to move a resolution to annul or modify the rules has to be taken
by the members of the House. The government is under no obligation to make any initiative in
this regard.
10. In this ‘laying’ formula, there is a no time frame within which the rules have to be laid before
the houses after their promulgation. The phraseology used is "as soon as may be" after the rules
are made. In practice, often the rules are laid long after they are made. This reduces the
effectiveness of the parliamentary control over delegated legislation. The laying formula as
contained in the above provision is regarded as being of directory nature and not mandatory.
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laying is a condition precedent, the requirement of laying must be held to be mandatory and the
rules do not come into force until they are laid. In case of "negative Clause", however, the rules
come into operation immediately and the provision of laying is generally construed as directory.
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providing for uniform Rules of laying and Publication, must be passed. The committee may be
supplemented by a specialised official body to make the Vigilance of Administrative rulemaking
more effective.
OTHER CONTROLS
Over and above judicial and parliamentary controls, sometimes other controls and
safeguards are also provided. One such safeguard against the abuse of delegated power is to
properly and precisely limits the power of the delegate. Is the extent of power is not properly
defined in the parent Act and the language used is very broad, the executive authority may usurp
some powers of the Legislature and may be tempted into unjustified interference with the rights of
the individual.
The court also should interpret the provisions of the rules and regulations in such a manner
as not to give blanket powers to the executive authority. But it has also been said that it is
inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however High-placed they may be. It
is trite to say that individuals are and do become wise because they occupy the seats of power.
Good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the post. There is only a complacent
presumption that those who occupy High seats have a high sense of responsibility. The
presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant
it. In particular, in a society pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both an advise and
impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and
easily be covered by the rule of law.
It is also argued that the delegation of power should be conferred only on trustworthy
authorities, example Central Government, State governments, accept as these authorities will
exercise the power conferred on them in a reasonable manner.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 Supreme Court has observed it is true that
when the order impounding a passport is made by the central government, there is no appeal
against it, but it must be remembered that in such a case the power is exercised by the central
government itself and it can safely be assumed that the central government will exercise the power
in a reasonable and responsible manner. When power is vested in a high authority like the central
government, abuse of power cannot be lightly assumed.
In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 SCC, dealing with the power of president to
proclaim emergency, it is necessary to retreat that the court must be conscious while examining
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the validity of the proclamation that it is a power vested India highest constitutional functionary of
the nation. The court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse.
Plenary powers of law-making are entrusted to elected representatives. But in reality, the
political government, instructed by the bureaucracy gets bills passed through either by the aid or
whip or by other methods. Thus, law making has remained, more or less, exclusive prerogative of
a small cross-section of elites. It affects not only the quality of the law made by reinforces
centralised system of power. There must be, therefore be social auditing by public at large.
Constitutional legitimation of unlimited power of delegation to the executive by legislature may,
on critical occasions, be subversive of responsible Government and erosive of Democratic order.
The system of law-making, therefore needs careful and radical restructuring, if participative,
pluralistic government by the people is not to be jettisoned. As, Krishna Iyer J stated, "That
prompts us to hint at certain portents to our parliamentary system, not because they are likely now
but because society may have to pay the price someday".
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113
114
Unit III
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Quasi-judicial implies that the act is not wholly judicial and that it describes not only a
duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to the forms of judicial procedure in
performing some acts in exercise of executive power.
In Ridge v. Baldwin29 It was held that the duty to act judicially may arise from the very
nature of the function performed by the authority. The ratio in this case was approved by the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Maneka Gandhi.30
The character of a decision can be determined from the manner in which the decision is
arrived at. Whether an act is judicial or quasi-judicial or purely executive depends on the terms of
the particular rules and the nature, scope and effect of a particular power in exercise of which the
act may be done and would therefore depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular
case,'" If the statute is silent the nature of 'the decision must be inferred from the general scheme
of the act, its provisions or their objectives.
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Words like 'is of the opinion ' 'if it appears to be', considers likely to be secured'
'reasonable grounds to believe' are indicative of subjective approach. The decision is executive
even though there is a provision for appeal, or a provision making the order subject to
confirmation by some other authority. But if the decision involves a determination of issues
between a proposal and an opposition involving the respective rights of the parties, the decision is
quasi-judicial.
(ii) ‘quasi-Lis’
Certain administrative authorities have been held to be quasi-judicial authorities and their
decisions regarded as quasi-judicial decisions, wherein such lis was present, e.g. a Rent Tribunal
determining ‘fair rent’ between a landlord and tenant, an Election Tribunal deciding an election
dispute between rival candidates, an Industrial Tribunal deciding an industrial dispute, a Licensing
Tribunal granting a licence or permit to one of the applicants.
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Quasi-lis
But it is not in all cases that the administrative authority is to decide a lis inter partes.
There may be cases in which an administrative authority decides a lis not between two or more
contesting parties but between itself and another party. But there also, if the authority is
empowered to take any decision which will prejudicially affect any person; such decision would
be a quasi-judicial decision provided the authority is required to act judicially.
Thus, where an authority makes an order granting legal aid, dismissing an employee,
refusing to grant, revoking, suspending or cancelling a licence, cancelling an examination result of
a student for using unfair means, rusticating of a pupil, etc. such decisions are quasi-judicial in
character.
In all these cases there are no two parties before the administrative authority, ‘and the
other party to the dispute, if any, is the authority’ itself. Yet, as the decision given by such
authority adversely affects the rights of a person there is a situation resembling a lis. In such cases,
the administrative authority has to decide the matter objectively after taking into account the
objections of the parties before it, and if such authority exceeds or abuses its powers, a writ of
certiorari can be issued against it. Therefore, Lord Greene, M.R. rightly calls it a ‘quasi-lis.’
The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is the duty
to act judicially, and therefore, in considering whether a particular statutory authority is a quasi-
judicial body or merely an administrative body, what has to be ascertained is whether the statutory
authority has the duty to act judicially.
The question which may arise for our consideration is as to when this duty to act judicially
arises. As observed by Parker, J. “the duty to act judicially may arise in widely different
circumstances which it would be impossible, and indeed, inadvisable, to attempt to define
exhaustively.”
Whenever there is an express provision in the statute itself which requires the
administrative authority to act judicially, the action of such authority would necessarily be a
quasi-judicial function. But this proposition does not say much, for it is to some extent a tautology
to say that the function is quasi-judicial (or judicial) if it is to be done judicially.
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Generally, statutes do not expressly provide for the duty to act judicially and, therefore,
even in the absence of express provisions in the statutes the duty to act judicially should be
inferred from ‘the cumulative effect of the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal
provided, the objective criterion to be adopted, the phraseology used, the nature of the power
conferred, of the duty imposed on the authority and the other indicia afforded by the statute.
Since ‘fairness in action’ is required from Government and all its agencies, the recent trend is
from ‘duty to act judicially’ to ‘duty to act fairly.’ ‘Duty to act fairly’ is indeed a broader notion
and can be applied even in those cases where there is no lis. It is this concept (‘duty to act fairly’),
which has given rise to certain new doctrines, e.g. ‘fair play in action’, legitimate expectations,
proportionality etc.
Cases
Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani31 was the first leading Indian decision on the
point. Under Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance, 1947, the Provincial
Government was empowered to requisition any land for any public purpose “if in the opinion of
the Government” it was necessary or expedient to do so. It was contended that the Government
while deciding whether requisition was for a public purpose, had to act judicially. The High Court
of Bombay upheld the said contention. Reversing the decision of the High Court, the Supreme
Court held by a majority that the governmental function of requisitioning property was not quasi-
judicial, for the decision was based on the subjective satisfaction of the Government and it was
not required to act judicially.
Test
31
AIR 1950 SC 222
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The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly
and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the
exercise of quasi-judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair
decision. In recent years, the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical
change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being
considered as a quasi-judicial power.
At one time prerogative remedies of certiorari and prohibition were confined to ‘judicial’
functions pure and simple of public bodies. They both are now available in relation to functions
which may be regarded as ‘administrative’ or even ‘legislative.’ As it is said, it is not the label that
determines the exercise of jurisdiction of the court but the quality and attributes of the decision.
"On the whole the test of justiciability has replaced that of classification of function as a
determinant of the appropriateness of a decision for judicial review.”
When authority required to act judicially- few points for consideration as observed by the
Supreme Court of India
1. Lis inter parties- dispute b/w 2 parties. - Associated cement companies v. P.N Sharm, Bhopal
gas tragedy case
3. Express/ implied provision in the statute- Statute mandates it. - Eg: revocation of the land
allotted by the co-operative Society.
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4. The statutory authority has power to act which may be prejudicial to subject.- Keshav mills co
ltd v Union of India When authority required to act judicially?
5. An authority which possesses the powers of a court -Where authority has a power to summon
witnesses, documents, examination on oath pass orders by giving reasons.
6. Adverse effect on rights or interests of parties or disadvantageous to the interests of the public -
Manish dixit& others v State of Rajasthan
7. The very nature of function that was intended to be performed– adjudication of professional
misconduct cases by BCI members. Departmental enquiries require a judicial mind– whereas
fixation of price, issuing of license, renewal of license, public Policy matters such as issuance of
caste certificate cannot be considered Quasi- judicial function and does not require principles of
natural Justice. Auction sale by a company during its winding up proceedings (auction Purchaser
and creditor)– given by the labor commissioner in an appeal– postponement of examination
during emergent situation Acting judicially- PNJ acting fairly-Basic fairness such as consultation.
Quasi-judicial Decision
The English Courts have treated every administrative act as judicial if it adversely affected
any person's right, or as Lord Parker puts it 'entailed penalty'. The Courts for the purpose of
granting writs of certiorari or prohibition insisted the requirement of 'duty to act judicially' on the
part of the body performing the act. Whenever the Court forgot the paradoxical sense which they
invented for 'judicial' they found themselves in difficulty. To say that natural justice must be
observed when the function is judicial, and the function is called judicial when natural justice
ought to be observed is a circular argument. If every power affecting some person's right is called
judicial there is virtually no meaning left for administrative power. The term quasi-judicial was
brought into vogue as an epithet for powers which, though administrative, were required to be
exercised as if they were judicial, i.e., in accordance with natural justice. The Committee on
Minister's Powers emphasized that a judicial decision consists of finding facts and applying law,
where as a quasi-judicial decision consists of finding facts and applying administrative policy.
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on ordinary courts, save only in exceptional cases where it can be conferred on administrative
tribunals.
The nature and character of a decision whether it is quasi-judicial or only executive under
a statute depends upon the terms of the statute irrespective of the function whether it has duty and
jurisdiction to decide controversies as a judicial body. A quasi-judicial decision should be
objective, based on evidence, by determinate authority who should not have the right to delegate
such a function of a judicial character.
I. Introduction
II. Rule against bias – nemo judex non causa sua
III. Audi alteram partem –the rule of fair hearing
IV. Reasoned decisions- Speaking orders
V. Post decisional hearing
VI. Exceptions to the Rule of Natural Justice
VII. Effect of non-compliance of rules of Natural Justice
I. Introduction
Rules of Natural justice have developed with the growth of civilization, and the content
thereof is often considered as a proper measure of the level of civilization and rule of law
prevailing in the community. Natural justice implies fairness, reasonableness, equity and equality.
Natural justice is a concept of common law, and it is the common-law world counterpart of the
American “Due Process” and civil law “proportionality”.
The expressions natural justice and illegal justice do not present a watertight classification. It
is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to
achieve this purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice.32
Natural justice contents either to change with exigencies of different situations and therefore
do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike for this stuff they are neither
cast in a rigid mold nor can they be put in a legal state jacket.
32
Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557
122
Natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation,
administration and Adjudication to make Fairness a creed of life. It has many colors and shades,
many forms and shapes, and save where valid law excludes it, A place when people are adversely
affected by acts of any administrative authority. It is the bane of a healthy government, recognized
from earliest times and not a mystic testament of a judge made law. Natural justice represents
higher procedural principles developed by Judges which every administrative agency must follow
when taking any decision adversely affecting the rights of a private individual.
The Principles of natural justice are not fixed, but are flexible and variable. These principles
cannot be put in a straight jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and
circumstances of each case.33 To sustain the complaint of the violation of principles of natural
justice one must establish that he was prejudiced for non-observance of the principles of natural
justice. The principles of natural justice are not rigid, immutable or “embodied” rules, but are
flexible.
Natural justice is another name for common sense justice and is based on the natural sense of
man of what is right and what is wrong. Natural justice is not an articulation of any Saint or Sage.
Natural law has inherent rationality which is in conformity with the natural justice and may lead
to all right conclusions. Application of the principles of natural justice can improve the quality of
administrative decision, enforce rule of law and accountability in the administration and show
respect for human dignity. Thus, the basis of all positive law is natural justice.
Rules of natural justice are not codified cannons. They are principles ingrained in the
conscience of man. Justice is based at substantially on natural ideals and values which are
universal. Natural justice is not circumscribed by linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties
or logical prevarication.
The purpose of Principles of natural justice is prevention of miscarriage of justice and hence
observance thereof is the pragmatic requirement of fair play in action.34 The aim of rules of natural
justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent the miscarriage of justice.
Principles of natural justice which are judge-made rules and still continue to be a classical
example of judicial activism were developed by the courts to prevent accidents in the exercise of
outsourced power of adjudication entrusted to the administrative authorities. For some three or
33
Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) All ER 109.
34
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Bal Mukund Bairwa , (2009) 4 SCC 299
123
four hundred years, Anglo-American courts have actively applied two principles of natural justice.
However, this reduction of the concept of natural justice to only two principles should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that natural justice goes to “the very kernel of the problem of
administrative justice”. The concept entails two ideas:
i) Nemo judex in re sua, i.e., the authority deciding the matter should be free from bias-
Rule against bias -No one should be made judge in his own cause, or the rule against
bias- Nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet.
ii) Audi alteram partem, i.e., a person affected by a decision has a right to be heard- Hear
the other party, or the rule of fair hearing, or the rule that no one should be condemned
unheard.
These are the two principles now transparency and good governance may be added as a
new dimension which includes the duty to pass a speaking order.
The principles of natural justice have enriched law and Constitutions the world over.
Though the Indian Constitution does not use the expression natural justice, the concept of
natural justice divested of all its metaphysical and theological trappings pervades the whole
scheme of the Constitution. The concept of social and economic justice, in the preamble of the
Constitution, conceptually speaking, is the concept of fairness in social and economic
activities of society, which is the basis of the principles of natural justice.
The duty to act fairly is part of fair procedure, as envisaged under Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. Every activity of a public authority or those under public duty or obligation must
be informed by reason and guided by public interest. Exercise of jurisdiction by courts in
India, in this behalf is not something extra Constitutional. Now the principals of natural justice
are firmly grounded in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Article 21 of the Constitution, all that fairness which is included in the principles of
natural justice can be read into Article 21 when a person is deprived of his life and personal
Liberty. In other areas, it is Article 14 which now incorporates the principles of natural justice.
Article 14 now applies not only to discriminatory class legislation but also to arbitrary or
discriminatory state action. Because violation of natural justice results in arbitrariness,
therefore, violation of natural justice is violation of the equality clause of Article 14. This all
suggests that now the principles of natural justice are grounded in the Constitution.
124
The principles of natural justice cannot be wholly disregarded by law because this would
violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. It was for
this reason that the Supreme Court barely saved a Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act, 1888 which empowered the commissioner to get illegal constructions and
structures removed or demolished without notice by holding that Section 314 does not contain
a command, and only give discretion to the commissioner which must be reasonably
exercised.35
In H.L Trehan v. UOI,36 the Supreme Court made it absolutely explicit that even when the
authority has statutory power to take action without hearing, it would be arbitrary to take
action without hearing and, thus, violated of Article 14 of the Constitution.
In D.K Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.37, The Supreme Court further held that even where
statutory standing orders empowered the management to terminate the services of an
employee, who is denied of livelihood, without hearing, the termination of services would be
violative of Article 21 of the Constitution, as such a procedure established by law which
deprives a person of his livelihood cannot be said just, fair and reasonable under Article 21 of
the Constitution.
Principles of natural justice are attracted whenever a person suffers a severe consequence,
or a prejudice is caused to him by any administrative action.
In Dev Dutta v. UOI,38 Supreme Court held that do office rule provides for communication
35
Olga Tellies v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545
36
(1989) 1 SCC 764
37
(1993) 3 SCC 259
38
(2008) 8 SCC 275
125
of an adverse entry in the confidential report, yet even good entry is also to be communicated
if it eliminates a person from promotion. Natural justice which is a facet of Article 14 of the
Constitution overwrites all contrary rules.
It is now settled that mere breach of the principles of natural justice is not sufficient for
judicial intervention unless such breach also entails avoidable prejudice caused to the person.
Nevertheless, the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not dependent on any
statutory provisions. Wherever a prejudice is caused the principles or necessarily attracted.
II. Nemo judex in re sua, i.e., the authority deciding the matter should be free from bias.
The first principle of natural justice consists of the rule against bias or interest and is based on
three maxims:
According to the dictionary meaning ‘anything which tends or may be regarded as tending
to cause such a person to decide a case otherwise than on evidence must be held to be biased.’ A
predisposition to decide for or against one party, without proper regard to the true merits of the
dispute is bias.
The first requirement of natural justice is that the Judge should be impartial and neutral
and must be free from bias. He is supposed to be indifferent to the parties to the controversy. He
cannot act as Judge of a cause in which he himself has some interest either pecuniary or otherwise
as it affords the strongest proof against neutrality. He must be in a position to act judicially and to
decide the matter objectively. A Judge must be of sterner stuff. His mental equipoise must always
remain firm and undeflected. He should not allow his personal prejudice to go into the decision-
making. ‘The object is not merely that the scales be held even; it is also that they may not appear
to be inclined.’
If the Judge is subject to bias in favor of or against either party to the dispute or is in a
position that a bias can be assumed, he is disqualified to act as a Judge, and the proceedings will
be vitiated. This rule applies to the judicial and administrative authorities required to act judicially
or quasi-judicially.
126
Therefore, the rule against bias strikes against those factors which may improperly
influence a judge in arriving at a decision in any particular case. The requirement of this principle
is that the judge must be impartial and must decide the case objectively on the basis of the
evidence on record the dictionary meaning of the word by us also suggests that anything which
tends or may be regarded as tending to cause a such person to decide a case otherwise an evidence
must be held to be biased. In other words, predisposition to decide for or against one party without
regard to the merits of the case is bias. Therefore, if a person for whatever reason cannot take an
objective decision on the basis of evidence on record, he shall be said to be biased. A person
cannot take an objective decision in a case in which he has an interest, for, as human psychology
tells us, very rarely can people take decisions against their own interests.
Therefore, the maxim that a person cannot be made a judge in his own cause. The
Supreme Court in Crawford Bayley & Co. v. UOI,39 restated that the doctrine of rule against bias
comes into play if it's shown that the officer concerned has a personal connection or personal
interest or has personally acted in the matter concerned and or has already taken a decision one
way or the other which he may be interested in supporting. This rule of disqualification is applied
not only to avoid the possibility of a partial decision but also to ensure public confidence in the
impartiality of the administrative adjudicatory process because not only must no man be a judge in
his own cause, but also “justice should be not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly
be seen to be done”.
39
(2006) SCC 25
127
Types of Bias
1. Pecuniary bias
2. Personal bias
4. Judicial obstinacy
1. Pecuniary Bias
It is well-settled that as regards pecuniary interest ‘the least pecuniary interest in the
subject-matter of the litigation will disqualify any person from acting as a Judge.’ Griffith and
Street rightly state that “a pecuniary interest, however slight, will disqualify, even though it is not
proved that the decision is in any way affected.” Judicial approach is unanimous and this issue on
the point that any financial interest, howsoever small it may be, would vitiate administrative
action.
Dimes v. Grant Junction Canal40 is considered to be the classic example of the application of the
rule against pecuniary interest. In this case, the suits were decreed by the Vice Chancellor and the
appeals against those decrees were filed in the Court of Lord Chancellor Cottenham. The appeals
were dismissed by him and decrees were confirmed in favor of a canal company in which he was
a substantial shareholder. The House of Lords agreed with the Vice-Chancellor and affirmed the
decrees on merits. In fact, Lord Cottenham’ s decision was not in any way affected by his interest
as a shareholder; and yet the House of Lords quashed the decision of Lord Cottenham.
40
HL 26 (1852)
128
In R v. Hendon Rural Distt. Council, ex p choley41, The court in England questioned the decision
of the Planning Commission where one of the members was an estate agent who was acting for
the applicant to whom the permission was granted.
In Jeejeebhoy v. Collector42 Chief Justice reconstituted the bench when it was found that one of
the members of the winch was a member of the cooperative society for which the land had been
acquired.
The Madras high court also quashed the decision of the collector who in his capacity as the
chairman of the regional transport authority had granted a permit in favor of a cooperative Society
of which he was also the chairman.43
In J. Mohapatra44 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the text books selection committee
because some of its members were also authors of the books which were considered for selection.
laying down the law, the House of lords opined that the rule against bias has two very similar but
not identical implications.
1. If a judge has financial or proprietary interest in the case, or any party to the suit, he is
automatically disqualified to act as a judge without investigation of a real likelihood of bias or
suspicion of bias unless he makes a voluntary disclosure.
2. If a judge has no financial or proprietary interest and is also not a party to case, but his
conduct or behavior give rise to a suspicion of bias then there is no automatic disqualification
unless a real likelihood is proved.
2. Personal Bias
The second type of bias is a personal one. A number of circumstances may give rise to
personal bias. Here a Judge may be a relative, friend or business associate of a party. He may have
some personal grudge, enmity or grievance or professional rivalry against such party. In view of
41
(1933) 2 KB 696 (DC)
42
AIR 1965 SC 1096
43
Vishskapatnam Coop. Motor Transport Ltd. V. Bangaru raju, AIR 1953 Mad 709
44
(1984)4 SCC 103
45
(2000) 1 AC 119
129
these factors, there is every likelihood that the Judge may be biased towards one party or
prejudiced towards the other.
Personal bias arises from a certain relationship equation between the deciding authority
and the parties which incline him unfavorably or otherwise on the side of one of the parties before
him. Such equation may develop out varied forms of personal other professional hostility or
friendship. However, no exhaustive list is possible.
However, in practice, the tests have much in common with one another and in the vast
majority of cases; they will lead to the same result. In this area of bias, the real question is not
whether a person was bias. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore, what
the court sees is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the deciding officer was
likely to have been biased. In deciding question of bias, judges now to take into consideration the
human possibilities and the ordinary course of human conduct. But there must be real likelihood
of bias and not mere suspicion of bias before the proceedings can be quashed on the Ground that
the person conducting the proceedings is disqualified by bias.
The apprehension must be judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view
and the not on mere apprehension and vague suspicion of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable
people.
Therefore, the real test of real likelihood poses whether reasonable man, in possession of
relevant information, would have thought that bias was likely and whether the authority concerned
was likely to be disposed to decide the matter in a particular way. Therefore, the test is not what
actually happened but the substantial possibility of that which appeared to have happened. The
reason is plain enough, writes Lord Denning, justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence
is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking the judge was biased.
In State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh,46 a departmental inquiry was held against A by B. As one
46
AIR 1958 SC 86
130
of the witnesses against A turned hostile, B left the inquiry, gave evidence against A, resumed to
complete the inquiry and passed an order of dismissal. The Supreme Court held that ‘the rules of
natural justice were completely discarded and all canons of fair play were grievously violated by
B.’
In the leading case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India,47 one N was a candidate for selection
to the Indian Foreign Service and was also a member of the Selection Board. N did not sit on the
Board when his own name was considered. Name of N was recommended by the Board and he
was selected by the Public Service Commission. The candidates who were not selected filed a writ
petition for quashing the selection of N on the ground that the principles of natural justice were
violated. Supreme Court held that there was a real likelihood of bias, for the mere presence of
candidate on the selection board may adversely influence the judgment of the other member.
In Tata Cellular v. UOI,50, the tender for operating the cellular mobile telephone service in
4 Metropolitan cities filed by the son of the members of the tender evaluation committee had been
accepted. This was challenged on the basis of personal bias. Applying the principle of necessity,
as the involvement of the director general of the telecommunications and telecom authority was a
47
(1969) 2 SCC 262
48
AIR 1957 SC 425
49
(1996) 4 SCC 64
50
(1994) 6 SCC 651
131
necessary in view of Section 3(6) of the Telegraph Act 1885, the court held that the involvement
of his father as a member of the tender evaluation committee did not vitiate the selection on the
ground of bias. It may be noted in this case that the tender was based on merit through the normal
procedure full stuff therefore it is necessary to ascertain what role that person played in the
decision-making against whom biases alleged.
In G.N Nayak v. Goa University,51 a senior officer expresses appreciation of the work of a
junior officer in his confidential report. He was also a member of the Departmental promotion
committee to consider such a junior officer along with others for promotion. The committee
recommended this junior officer for promotion which was challenged on the ground of personal
bias actuated by an element of personal interest. The Supreme Court held that unless preferences
unreasonable and is based on self-interest, it will not vitiate an administrative decision.
Padma v. Hiralal Motilal Desarada52 S was a director in a special planning authority, Viz.
The city and industrial Development Corporation (CIDCO). The authority alerted plots to three
associations comprising family members or relatives of S. The supreme court quashed the
allotments on the ground of buyers holding that in such circumstances S ought to have, at least,
very specifically informed CIDCO of his relationship with the associations, and while dealing
with them should be consciously aware of that fact.
The third type of bias is official bias or bias as to the subject-matter. This may arise when the
Judge has a general interest in the subject-matter. Those cases fall within this category where the
deciding officer is directly, or otherwise, involved in the subject matter of the case. Here again
mere involvement would not vitiate the administrative action unless there is a real likelihood of
bias.
51
(2002) 2 SCC 712
52
(2002) 7 SCC 764
53
(2010) 10 SCC 539
132
According to Griffith and Street, “only rarely will this bias invalidate proceedings.” A
mere general interest in the general object to be pursued would not disqualify a Judge from
deciding the matter. There must be some direct connection with the litigation. Wade remarks that
ministerial or departmental policy cannot be regarded as a disqualifying bias.
4. Judicial Obstinacy
There may also be a judicial bias, i.e. bias on account of judicial obstinacy
In State of West Bengal. v. Shivananda Pathak55, a writ of mandamus was sought by the
petitioner directing the Government to promote him. A Single Judge allowed the petition ordering
the authorities to promote the petitioner ‘forthwith.’ But the order was set aside by the Division
Bench. After two years, a fresh petition was filed for payment of salary and other benefits in the
terms of the judgment of the Single Judge (which was reserved in appeal). It was dismissed by the
Single Judge. The order was challenged in appeal which was heard by a Division Bench to which
one Member was a Judge who had allowed the earlier petition. The appeal was allowed and
certain reliefs were granted. The State approached the Supreme Court.
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order, the Apex Court described the case of a
new form of bias judicial obstinacy. It said that if a judgment of a Judge is set aside by a superior
court, the Judge must submit to that judgment. He cannot rewrite overrule judgment in the same
or in collateral proceedings. The judgment of the higher court binds not only to the parties to the
proceedings but also to the Judge who had rendered it.
54
AIR 1959 SC 1376
55
(1998)
133
The question of departmental bias was considered by the Supreme Court in Nagaswara
Rao56, In this case, the petitioner challenged the order of the government nationalizing road
transport. One of the grounds for challenge was that the secretary of the transport Department who
gave the hearing was bias, being the person who initiated the scheme and also being the head of
the Department, whose responsibility was to execute it. The court quashed the order on the ground
that, under the circumstances, the secretary was biased and, hence no fair hearing could be
expected.
Thereafter, the Act was amended and the function of hearing the objection was given over
to the minister concerned. The decision of the government was again challenged by Nageswara
raw on the ground of Departmental bias because the minister was the head of the Department
concerned which initiated the scheme and was also ultimately responsible for its execution.
However, on this occasion the Supreme Court rejected the challenge on the ground that the
minister was not a part of the Department in the same manner as a secretary was. The reasoning of
the court is not very convincing perhaps because, as observed earlier Departmental bias is
something which is inherent in the administrative process.
When the functions of a Georgian prosecutor are combined in the same Department. It is
not uncommon to find that the same Department which initiates a matter also decides it, therefore
at the times departmental fraternity and loyalty militates against the concept of Fair hearing.
Hari K. Gawali v. Dy. Commr. of police57 this case an externment order was challenged on
the ground that Since the Police Department which initiated the proceedings and the Department
which heard under decided the case with the same, the element of Departmental bias vitiated
administrative action. The court rejected the challenge on the grounds that so long as the two
functions what it discharged about two separate officers though they were affiliated to the same
Department there was no bias.
56
AIR 1959 SC 1376
57
AIR 1956 SC 559
134
The decision of the court may be correct in the ideal perspective but it may not always
prove wise in practice it may be suggested that the technique of internal separation which is being
followed in the US and England can be profitably user in India if a certain amount of confidence
is to be developed in the minds of the people in administrative decision-making.
In Krishna Bus Service Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana58The Supreme Court however
questioned the notification of the tournament which had conferred the powers of a deputy
Superintendent of police on the general manager, how do you are not always in matters of
inspection of vehicles on the ground of departmental bias. In this case, private bus operators had
alleged that the general manager of Haryana roadways who was a rival in business in the state
could not be expected to discharge his duties in a fair and reasonable Manner and would be too
lenient in inspecting the vehicles belonging to his own Department. The reason for quashing the
notification according to the Supreme Court was the conflict between their duty and the interest of
the Department and the consequential erosion of public confidence in administrative justice.
However, where there is no such conflict between duty and interest of the Department, concept of
institutional buyers cannot be narrowly construed in view of compelling institutional constraints.
In Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country planning59 Also known as the Stevenage
case, in this case the appellant challenged the Stevenage Newtown designation order 1946, on the
ground that no fair hearing was given because the minister had entertained by us in his
determination which was clear from his speech at Stevenage when he said are you want to carry
out a dating exercise in town planning. Additional function but the problem still remains that the
bias arising from strong policy convictions may I put it as a more serious threat to fair action than
any other single factor.
Kondala Rao v. A.P. SRTC60, the court did not crash the order of minister, who had heard
the objections of private operators nationalizing road transport on the ground that the same
minister had presided over a meeting only a few days earlier in which nationalization was favored.
58
(1985) 3 SCC 711
59
1948 AC 87 (HL)
60
AIR 1961 SC 82
135
The court rejected the contention on the ground that the decision of the committee was not final
and irrevocable but merely a policy decision.
Recent trend in almost all jurisdictions is that policy by us is not considered as bias which
vitiates an administrative action. In Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. V. Sir Shahidlal Enterprise Ltd61. Court
did not allow a challenge to an administrative action on the ground of policy bias.
This type of bias is also called as Unconscious bias. All persons exercising adjudicatory
powers are human with human prejudices no matter some persons are more humans than others.
This may include class bias and personality bias.
Every person is a product of your class and inherits some characteristics of that class which may
also reflect in his decision-making process. In the same manner every person’s personality is a
combination of his biological and social heredity which determine his values and attitudes in a
way that may condition his decision-making process. The problem of unconscious by us is which
is inherent in any adjudication and cannot be eliminated unless detected by some overt action of
the authority, and if so, detected can vitiate an administrative hearing if it has a direct relation with
the decision. This may include a situation with the deciding officer openly expresses his prejudice.
The problem of bias arising from preconceived notions may have to be disposed of us an
inherent limitation of the administrative process. It is useless to accuse a public officer of bias
merely because he is predisposed in favor of some policy in the public interest.
The Supreme Court has discovered a new category of bias arising from thoroughly
unreasonable obstinacy. Obstinacy implies unreasonable and unwavering persistence, and the
deciding officer would not take no for an answer. this new category of bias was discovered in a
situation where a judge of the Calcutta High Court upheld his own judgment while sitting in
appeal against his own judgment. of course, a direct violation of the rule that no George can sit in
appeal against his own judgement is not possible, therefore this rule can only be violated
indirectly. In this case in a fresh reputation the judge validated his own order in an earlier
arithmetician which had been overruled by the division bench. What applies to judicial process
can be applied to administrative process as well.
61
(2011) 1 SCC 640
136
Conclusion:
Direct pecuniary interest, however small or slight it may be, will disqualify a person from
acting as a Judge. In case of other interests, however, the test should be of ‘reasonable likelihood
of bias.’ It must be based on reasonable apprehension of a reasonable man fully apprised of all the
facts. It is no doubt desirable that all Judges, like Caesar's wife must be above suspicion. But it
would be too much to hold that only those people who cannot be suspected of improper motives
are qualified to discharge judicial functions, else to quash decisions on the basis of suspicions of
fools or other capricious unreasonable people
A ground reality cannot be ignored that Judges are also human, and they have their likes and
dislikes, preferences and prejudices and it is too much to expect them to act as a machine
uninfluenced by worldly affairs.
II. Audi alteram partem, i.e., a person affected by a decision has a right to be heard-
‘Audi alteram partem’ is sine quo non - right of ‘fair hearing’- Rule of fair hearing
There are certain basic values which a man has always cherished. They can be described as
natural law or divine law. As a reasonable being, a man must apply this part of law to human
affairs. The underlying object of rules of natural justice is to ensure fundamental liberties and
rights of subjects. They thus serve public interest. The golden rule which stands firmly established
is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of
justice. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation; nothing more – but nothing less.
This is the second long arm of natural justice which protects the little man from arbitrary
administrative actions whenever his right to person or property is jeopardized .Thus, one of the
objectives of giving a hearing in application of the principles of natural justice is to see that an
illegal action or decision does not take place. Any wrong order may adversely affect a person, and
it is essentially for this reason that a reasonable opportunity may have to be granted before passing
an administrative order.62
The rule of Fair hearing is the basic concept of the principles of natural justice. The Omni
potency inherent in the doctrine is that no one should be condemned unheard. In the field of
administrative action, this principle has been applied to ensure fair play and justice to affected
62
BALCO Employees’ Union v. UOI, (2002) 2 SCC 333
137
persons. However, the doctrine is not the cure to all ills and the process. Its application depends
upon the factual metrics to improve administrative efficiency, expediency and to mete out justice.
The procedure adopted must be just and fair.63
Audi alteram partem means ‘hear the other side’, or ‘no man should be condemned unheard’
or ‘both the sides must be heard before passing any order.’
The second fundamental principle of natural justice is Audi alteram partem, i.e. no man should
be condemned unheard, or both the sides must be heard before passing any order. This is the basic
requirement of rule of law. It has been described as ‘foundational and fundamental’ concept. It
lays down a norm which should be implemented by all courts and tribunals at national as also at
the international level.
In short, before an order is passed against any person, reasonable opportunity of being heard
must be given to him. Generally, this maxim includes two elements:
• Notice
• Fair hearing
The term notice originated from the Latin word notitia which means being known. In its
popular sense it is equivalent to information, intelligence or knowledge. In legal sense it embraces
a knowledge of circumstances that ought to induce suspicion or belief, as well as direct
information of that fact.
Notice embodies rule of fairness and must proceed an adverse order. It should be clear and
precise so as to give the party adequate information of the case he has to meet Phil stuff time
given should be adequate for a person so that he could prepare an effective defense full stuff
denial of notice and an opportunity to respond make an administrative decision completely
vitiated.64
Before any action is taken, the affected party must be given a notice to show cause against the
proposed action and seek his explanation. It is a sine qua non of the right of fair hearing. Any
order passed without giving notice is against the principles of natural justice and is void ab initio.
63
Sarat Kumar Dash v. Biswaji Patnaik, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 434
64
Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557
138
Notice is the starting point of any hearing. Unless a person knows the formulation of subjects
and issues involved in the case, he cannot defend himself. It is not enough that the notice in a case
be given, but it must be adequate also. The adequacy of notice is a relative term and must be
decided with reference to each case. But generally, a notice in order to be adequate must contain
the following
The object of a notice is to give an opportunity to the individual concerned to present his case
and, therefore, if the party is aware of the charges or allegations, a formal defect would not
invalidate the notice, unless prejudice is caused to the individual. If the government servant is
placed under suspension and the inquiry is held at a different place from the place of his residence
and he is not able to attend the inquiry due to nonpayment of subsistence allowance, the inquiry is
vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused or not is a question of fact and it depends upon the facts and
circumstances of the case. Moreover, the notice must give a reasonable opportunity to comply
with the requirements mentioned therein. Thus, to give 24 hours’ time to dismantle a structure
alleged to be in a dilapidated condition is not proper and the notice is not valid. If the inquiry is
under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, two notices (first for charges or allegations and
second for proposed punishment) should be given. Where a notice regarding one charge has been
65
(1723) 1 Str 757
139
given, the person cannot be punished for a different charge for which no notice or opportunity of
being heard was given to him.
In State of U.P. v. Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd.,66The Supreme Court stressed that before any
notices issued, there must exist sufficient reasons for your proposal action for which notice is to
be issued. Therefore, reasons are a precondition for issuing the notice, and these must be
contained in notice. In this case a person was granted recognition certificate for dealing in certain
items. Thereafter, government decided to delete certain items from the certificate. Quoted that
sufficient reasons are a precondition before notice is issued and they should form part of the
notice. The code further emphasized that even if it is a rectification of a mistake, notice must be
given very a person would suffer a serious prejudice. Rectification cannot die vest a vested right.
In Joseph Vilanganandan v. Executive Engineer67, The court held that the notice given was
inadequate. The facts of this case where that when the appellant did not start the contract work
within time, he received a letter from the executive engineer in which other 11 to sentence was
you are, therefore requested to show cause within Seven days from the receipt of this notice why
the welcome may not we’re injured otherwise at your risk and loss through other agencies after
debugging you as a default are. The replay container his statement that the delay was caused by
the conduct of the respondent. There after the contract was cancelled and the appeal it was
debarred from all future contracts under the PWD. Washing the order, the Supreme Court held
that the words debarring you as a default are did not give adequate notice to the appellant of the
fact that he would be divided from all future contracts without PWD.
Keshav Mills Co. Ltd68, the requirement of notice will not be insisted upon as a mere
technical formality when the party concerned clearly knows the case against it, and he’s not there
by plagiarized in any manner in putting up an effective defense. Therefore in this case the court
did not crash the order of the government taking over the mill for a period of five years on the
technical ground that their parents were not issued notice before this action was taken, as at an
earlier stage a full scale hearing had already been given and there was nothing more which the
appellants wanted to know.
66
(2010) 6 SCC 222
67
(1978) 3 SCC 36
68
(1973) 1 SCC 380
69
(2002) 3 SCC 302
140
court held that where no prejudice is caused to the person on account of non-affording of an
opportunity to make representation, violation of the principles of natural justice cannot be insisted
upon. In this case house rent and city compensatory allowance were given to the employees at a
higher rate. A later date the government wanted to recover excess payment. The VC is positive the
cause of the employees although unsuccessfully. In these circumstances the court was of the view
that action taken for the recovery of excess payment without notice and affording an opportunity
to make representation did not vitiate the action.
Union of India v. Narendra Singh70, The Supreme Court made it amply clear that even if a mistake
in the decision-making process is to be corrected, which has adverse consequences for a person,
he must be given notice. In this case an erroneous promotion had been cancelled without
following the process of law. An opportunity of hearing may not be given if mistake or error is
apparent on the face of the record.
Article 21 of the Constitution requires that a detenu must be furnished with the grounds of
detention and if the grounds are vague the detention order may be crushed by the code. In other
areas of administrative action, a notice has been held to be vague if it does not specify the action
proposal to be taken or the property proposal to be acquired or the grounds on which license is to
be cancelled. Requirement of notice, mandated by statute, can be waived if it is solely for the
benefit of the individual concern.
1. Non issuance of notice or mistake in the issue of notice, or defective service of notice does
not affect the jurisdiction of the authority if, otherwise a reasonable opportunity of being hard has
been given
3. If Richard eyes has been caused by non-issuance or invalid service of notice, the
proceedings would be vitiated. But, irregular service of notice would not render the proceedings
invalid, more so if the person by his conduct has rendered service impracticable or impossible or
is otherwise aware of the proceedings or notice either actually or constructively
70
(20008) 2 SCC 750
141
2. Hearing
The second requirement of Audi alteram partem maxim is that the person concerned must be
given an opportunity of being heard before any adverse action is taken against him.
In the historic case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works,71 the defendant Board had
power to demolish any building without giving any opportunity of hearing if it was erected
without prior permission. The Board demolished the house of the plaintiff under this provision.
The action of the Board was not in violation of the statutory provision. The court held that the
Board's power was subject to the qualification that no man can be deprived of his property without
having an opportunity of being heard.
The extent of opportunity of hearing to be given is neither dependent upon the quantum of loss
to the aggrieved person nor referable to the fatness of the stake but is essentially related to the
demands of a given situation. Therefore, if a show cause notice is issued and the explanation is
considered before taking action under the statutory provisions, the rules of natural justice cannot
be said to have been violated on the ground that more opportunity should have been afforded as a
huge amount was at stake.
Disclosure of Materials
An adjudicating authority must disclose all evidence and material placed before it in the
course of proceedings and must afford an opportunity to the person against whom it is sought to
be utilized.
The object underlying such disclosure is to afford an opportunity to the person to enable him to
prepare his defense, rebut the evidence relied upon by the complainant against him and put
forward his case before the authority.
71
(1863) 143 ER 414
142
Every person before an administrative authority exercising adjudicatory powers has the
right to know the evidence to be used against him. This principle was firmly established in
Dhaksheshwari Cotton mills v. CIT,72 In this case, appellate income tax tribunal did not disclose
the information supplied to it by the Department. The Supreme Court held that the SEC was not
given a fair hearing. However, the supply of adverse material unless the law otherwise providers
in original farm is not necessary. It is sufficient if the somebody after contents of the material is
applied, provided it is not misleading. A person may be allowed to inspect the file and to take
notes whatever more is used to come up the fundamental remains the same that nothing should be
used against the person which has not been brought to his notice.
The Adjudicatory authority should afford a reasonable opportunity the party to present his
case. This can be done through writing or orderly at the discretion of the authority, unless the
statute under which the authority is functioning directs otherwise.
The requirements of natural justice are met only if an opportunity to justice are not met
even if the very person preceded against has been furnished information on which the action is
based, if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purposes. This does not mean that the
opportunity needs to be a double opportunity, that is One opportunity on the factual allegations
and another on the proposal penalty but both may be rolled into one73.
Courts are unanimous on the point that oral hearing is not an integral part of Fair hearing
unless the circumstances are so exceptional that without an oral hearing a person cannot put up an
effective defense. Therefore, where complex legal and technical questions are involved, or where
the stakes are very high, oral hearing shall become a part of Fair hearing74.
In A.K. Roy v. UOI,75Supreme Court held that if the detenu desires to examine any
witnesses, he shall have to keep them present at that point at a time and no obligation can be cast
on the Advisory Board to someone them. The board can also limit the time within which the
detenu must complete his evidence.
72
(1955)SC 154
73
S.L Kapoor v.Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379
74
State of U.P v. Dharmendar Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505
75
(1982) 1 SCC 271
143
The right to rebut adverse evidence presupposes that the person has been informed about
the evidence against him. In Dhakeshwari cotton Mills limited,76 the court quashed the order of the
tax tribunal where the information supplied by the Department against the assesses was not
disclosed to him. This does not, however, necessitate the supply of adverse material in original in
all cases. It is sufficient if the summary of the contents of the adverse material is made available,
provided it is not misleading.
The opportunity to rebut evidence necessarily involves the consideration of two factors:
Cross- Examination
Cross-examination was never considered to be part and parcel of the doctrine of natural
justice. It always depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether an opportunity
of cross-examination should be given to a party against whom proceedings have been initiated.
In Khem Chand v. Union of India,77 the Supreme Court held that an opportunity to defend
a delinquent by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him is an important right.
Regarding the right to the detenu of Cross examination before the Advisory Board, the
Supreme Court did not find it an integral and inseparable part of the principles of natural justice.
the court reasoned that firstly the question before the board is not whether that detenu is guilty
Any charge but whether there is a sufficient cause for his detention and Secondly the witnesses
would be most reluctant to testify and often it may harm public interest to disclose their identity.
The court did not agree with the contention that there can be no effective hearing without the right
of cross examination.78
Legal Representation
76
AIR 1955 SC 65
77
AIR 300 1958 SCR 1080
78
A.K. Roy v. UOI, (1982) 1 SCC 271
144
minima of Fair hearing. This detail of legal representation is justified on the ground that lawyers
tend to complicate Matters, prolong the proceedings, and destroy the essential informality of the
proceedings. It is further justified on the ground that representation through a lawyer of choice
would give an edge to that rich over the poor who cannot afford a good lawyer.
The courts in India have held that in situations where the person is illiterate, or the matter
is complicated and a technical, or expert evidence is on record, or a question of lawyers involved,
or the person is facing it rained prosecutor, some professional assistance must be given to the
party to make his right to defend himself meaningful.
In. M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra,79 The Supreme Court held that while importing
the concept of Fair procedure in Article 21 of the Constitution, held that the right to personal
liberty implies provision by the state of free legal service to a prisoner who is indigent or not, held
that the right to personal Liberty implies provision by the state of free legal service to a prisoner
who is indigent or otherwise disabled from securing legal assistance where the ends of justice call
for such service.
In Khatri v. State of Bihar,80 The Supreme Court further ruled that state is constitutionally
bound to provide legal aid to the poor or indigent accused not only at the stage of trail but at the
time of remind also. Such right cannot be denied on the ground of financial constraints or
administrative inability or that the accused did not ask for it. The Supreme Court emphasized that
it is the duty of the presiding officer to inform the accused of such right.
In Nandini Sathpathy v. P.L. Dani,81 The court held that the accused must be allowed legal
representation during custodial interrogation, and the police must wait for a reasonable time for
the arrival of a lawyer. However, the court which took the right step did not take a long stride in
holding that the state must provide a lawyer if the accused is indigent. The observation of the
court could well be inducted in the administration. In the area of criminal justice, the Criminal
Procedure Code 1973 now provides for legal aid to the accused.
An adjudicating authority must observe the principles of natural justice and must give a
reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person against whom the action is sought to be taken.
79
(1978)3 SCC 544
80
(1981) 1 SCC 627
81
(1978) 2 SCC 424
145
But in England and in Americas, it is well-settled law that in absence of statutory provision, an
administrative authority is not bound to give the person concerned an oral hearing.
In India also, the same principle is accepted and oral hearing is not regard as a sine qua
non of natural justice. A person is not entitled to an oral hearing, unless such a right is conferred
by the statute.
In M.P. Industries Ltd v. Union of India,82 Subba Rao, observed: “It is no doubt a principle
of natural justice that a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot make any decision adverse to a party without
giving him an effective opportunity of meeting any relevant allegations against him but the said
opportunity need not necessarily be by personal hearing. It can be by written representation.
Whether the said opportunity should be by written representation or by personal hearing depends
upon the facts of each and ordinarily it is in the discretion of the tribunal”.
Thus, it is well-established that the principles of natural justice do not require personal
hearing and if all the relevant circumstances have been taken into account before taking the
impugned action, the said action cannot be set aside only on the ground that personal hearing was
not given.
The principles of natural justice are flexible and whether they were observed in a given
case or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The test is that the
adjudicating authority must be impartial, ‘fair hearing’ must be given to the person concerned, and
that he should not be ‘hit below the belt.’
But at the same time, it must be remembered that a ‘hearing’ will normally be an oral
hearing. As a general rule, ‘an opportunity to present contentions orally, with whatever
advantages the method of presentation has, is one of the rudiments of the fair play required when
the property is being taken or destroyed. de Smith also says that “in the absence of clear statutory
guidance on the matter, one who is entitled to the protection of the Audi alteram partem rule is
now prima facie entitled to put his case orally.”
Again, if there are contending parties before the adjudicating authority and one of them is
permitted to give oral hearing the same facility must be afforded to the other, or where complex
legal and technical questions are involved or where stakes are very high, it is necessary to give
oral hearing. Thus, in the absence of statutory requirement about oral hearing, courts will have to
decide the matter taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case.
82
AIR 1966 SC 671
146
That ex parte evidence taken in the absence of the other party violates the principles of fair
hearing was discussed by the court in Errington v. Ministry of Health83 – whatever the information
is obtained by the administrative authority must be disclosed to the party and an opportunity to
rebut in must be provided.
In Hira Nath Mishra v. Rajendra Medical College84, In this case, 36 Girl students of a
Medical College pilot air report which is the principal regarding misbehavior of the boys in the
girl’s hostel. The inquiry committee appointed by the principle recorded the statements of the
girls, but in the absence of the appellants. That appellants were also identified by the girls through
photographs. The committee found the appearance guilty and consequently an expulsion order
was served on them. The order of explosion was challenged before the Supreme Court and one of
the grounds of challenge was that the evidence was taken behind their backs. the court rejected the
contention holding that the girls would not have ventured to make the statements in the presence
of the appellants except at a greater risk of retaliation and harassment. in this case whatever
evidence was collected behind the backs of the appearance was brought to their notice and they
were provided with an opportunity to rebut the evidence. Every case has to be decided on its own
merit.
Introduction
A ‘speaking order’ means an order speaking for itself. To put it simply, every order must
contain reasons in support of it. A reason is an essential requirement of the rule of law. It provides
a link between fact and indecision, guard against non-application of mind, arbitrariness and
maintain public confidence in judicial and administrative authorities. Reasons also serve a wider
principle that justice must not only be done; it must also appear to be done.
Importance
Object
83
(1935) 1 KB 249 (CA)
84
(1973) 1 SCC 805
147
There is no general rule of English law that reasons must be given for administrative or
even judicial decisions. In India also, till very recently it was not accepted that the requirement to
pass speaking orders is one of the principles of natural justice. But as Lord Denning says, “the
giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.” The condition to record
reasons introduces clarity and excludes arbitrariness and satisfies the party concerned against
whom the order is passed.
Today, the old ‘police State’ has become a ‘welfare State.’ The governmental functions
have increased, administrative tribunals and other executive authorities have come to stay and
they are armed with wide discretionary powers and there are all possibilities of abuse of power by
them. To provide a safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of powers by these authorities, the
condition of recording reasons is imposed on them. It is true that even the ordinary law courts do
not always give reasons in support of the orders passed by them when they dismiss appeals and
revisions summarily. But regular courts of law and administrative tribunals cannot be put at par.
In M.J. Shivani v. State of Karnataka85, the court reiterated That when the rules direct
recording of reasons it is as sine qua non, and a condition precedent for a valid order. Appropriate
brief reasons, though not like a judgment are necessary for a valid Order. normally they must be
communicated to the affected party so that he may have an opportunity to have them tested in the
appropriate forum an administrative order itself may contain reasons, or the file may disclose
reasons to arrive at the decision showing application of mind to the facts in issue.
General Propositions
1. Where a statute requires recording of reasons in support of the order, it imposes an obligation
on the adjudicating authority and the reasons must be recorded by the authority.
85
(1955) 6 SCC 289
148
2. Even when the statute does not lay down expressly the requirement of recording reasons, the
same can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.
3. Mere fact that the proceedings were treated as confidential does not dispense with the
requirement of recording reasons.
4. If the order is subject to appeal or revision (including Special Leave Petition under Article 136
of the Constitution), the necessity of recording reasons is greater as without reasons the appellate
or revisional authority cannot exercise its power effectively inasmuch as it has no material on
which it may determine whether the facts were correctly ascertained, law was properly applied
and the decision was just and based on legal, relevant and existent grounds. Failure to disclose
reasons amounts to depriving the party of the right of appeal or revision.
5. Even ‘fair play in action’ requires that an adjudicating authority should record reasons in
support of order passed by it.
6. There is no prescribed form and the reasons recorded by the adjudicating authority need not be
detailed or elaborate and the requirement of recording reasons will be satisfied if only relevant
reasons are recorded.
7. A writ court cannot interfere with an order passed by an adjudicating authority only on the
ground that the reasons recorded by such authority are inadequate or insufficient.
8. If, however, the reasons recorded by such authority are factually incorrect, legally untenable or
totally foreign or irrelevant to the issue involved in the lis, the power of judicial review can be
exercised.
9. It is not necessary for the appellate authority to record reasons when it affirms the order passed
by the lower authority.
10. Where the lower authority does not record reasons for making an order and the appellate
authority merely affirms the order without recording reasons, the order passed by the appellate
authority is bad.
11. Where the appellate authority reverses the order passed by the lower authority, reasons must
be recorded, as there is a vital difference between an order of reversal and an order of affirmation.
12. The validity of the order passed by the statutory authority must be judged by the reasons
recorded therein and cannot be construed in the light of subsequent explanation given by the
authority concerned or by filing an affidavit.
149
13. If the reasons are not recorded in support of the order it does not always vitiate the action. 14.
The duty to record reasons is a responsibility and cannot be discharged by the use of vague
general words. 15. If the reasons are not recorded, the court cannot probe into reasoning of the
order.
16. The doctrine of recording reasons should be restricted to public law only and should not be
applied to private law e.g. arbitration proceedings.
17. The rule requiring reasons to be recorded in support of the order is one of the principles of
natural justice.
18. Normally, the reasons recorded by the authority should be communicated to the aggrieved
party.
19. Even when the reasons are not communicated to the aggrieved party in public interest, they
must be in existence.
20. The reasons recorded by the statutory authority are always subject to judicial scrutiny.
The idea of post decisional hearing has been developed to maintain a balance between
administrative efficiency and fairness to the individual. This organizing tool was developed by the
Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi case86. In this case, the passport dated 1 June 1976 of the
petitioner, a journalist, was impounded in the public interest by an order dated 2nd July 1997, And
the government having declined to furnish harder reasons for its decision. She filed a petition
before the Supreme Court under Article 32 challenging the validity of the impoundment order.
The government also did not give her any pre decisional notice and hearing. One of the
contentions of the government, relevant for our purposes, was that the rule of Audi alteram partem
must be held to be excluded because it may have frustrated, purpose of impounding the passport.
Rejecting the contention, the court rightly held that though the impoundment of the passport was
an administrative action, yet the rule of Fair hearing was attracted by necessary implication, and it
would not be fair to exclude the application of this Cardinal rule on the ground of administrative
convenience.
However, the court did not outright crash the order and allowed the return of the passport
because of the special social political factors attending the case. On the contrary, the technique of
86
(1978) 1 SCC 248
150
post decisional hearing was developed in order to balance these factors against the clear
requirements of lock, justice and fairness. The code stressor that a fair opportunity of being heard
following immediately the order impounding the passport would satisfy the mandate of natural
justice. The concept of post decisional hearing in situation where pre decisional hearing is
required either expressly or by necessary implication is itself based on wrong hypothesis that
administrative efficiency and fairness to the individual Are discrete values for the stop 1 cannot
expect that a post decisional hearing would be anything more than a mere empty formalistic ritual.
The same technique of validating word administrative decision by post decision hearing
was adopted in Swadeshi cotton Mills v. UOI,87 The court validated the older of the government
for taking over the management of the company, which had been passing in violation of the Audi
alteram partem rule and which was found to have been attracted by necessary implication, as the
government had agreed to do a post decisional hearing.
In substance, it is the necessity for speed which justifies post decisional hearing at a later
stage. In emergent situations, the principles of natural justice are excluded and, therefore, if the
code comes to the conclusion that in a given situation these rules are applicable, there seems to be
no reason as to why their observance should not be insisted upon at the pre decisional stage.
In the opinion of Supreme Court, the post decisional opportunity of hearing does not sub
serve the rules of natural justice. The authority who embarks upon a post decisional hearing will
naturally proceed with a closer mind and there is hardly any chance of getting a proper
consideration of the representation at such a post decisional opportunity.88
87
(1981) 1 SCC 664
88
H.L. Tehran v. UOI, (1989) 1 SCC 764
151
Thus, in every case with a pre decisional hearing is warranted, post decisional hearing will
not validate the action except in very exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances
may include deprivation of Liberty, livelihood and property, unless dire public interest demands
otherwise. Thus, a balance between the interest of the affected individual and public interest has to
be maintained. Fact remains that at the times “To do a great right, it is permissible sometimes to
do a little wrong”.89
A recent trend of judicial decision appears to restrict its application to exceptional situations,
which require immediate action in public interest.
In the US, due process implies fair hearing with Promptitude. Therefore, pre decisional
hearing is a rule and opposed to decisional hearing is an exception. Generally, pre decisional
hearing is insisted then administrative action impairs Liberty and property interests, and post
decision hearing is allowed in case of violation of dire public interest in situations of emergency
and impracticability.
The courts have Developed three part- balancing test to determine. When pre-decisional or post-
decisional hearing is mandated. These include,
2. Risks in world in allowing pre decisional hearing, and values of the constitution involved
Called out rightly insisted on adequate compensation if an action is found contrary to law, are
status ante cannot be restored.
Post decisional hearing is thus not a violation of the principles of natural justice, but a
modification of eating special circumstances.
89
Charan Lal Sahu v. UOI, (1990) 1 SCC 613
152
Elaborating the law further, the Supreme Court observed in Canara Bank v. V. K Awasthy,
further emphasized that in judging the legal validity of post decisional hearing, legal formulations
cannot be divorced from the fact situation of the case, as the purpose of natural justice is to
prohibit accidents in administrative justice.
The word exception in the context of natural justice is really a misnomer, because in these
exclusionary cases, the rule of audi alteram partem is held in applicable not by way of an
exception to fair play in action, but because nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an
opportunity to present or meet a case.90
Such a situations where nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording a fair hearing must
be few and exceptional in a very civilized society. Principles of natural justice or ultimately
weighed in the balance of fairness and, hence, the codes have been circumspect extending these
principles to situations where it would cause more injustice rather than justice.91 For example, a
party would forfeit its right to hearing if undue advantage obtained is protracting the proceedings
somehow and nullifying the objectives . Thus, where a teacher of the now they have Italia was
dismissal on gross moral turpitude without giving exhaustive hearing for central civil services
(classification, control and Appeal) Rules, the court held termination valid on the ground that
fairness cannot be made counterproductive.92
Though the rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram
partem, have no definite meaning and connotation in law, and their content and implications are
well-understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these
rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the
90
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI
91
Karnataka Public Service Commission v. B.M. vijayashankar, (1992) 2 SCC 206
92
AvinashNagra v. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samithi (1997) 2 SCC 534
153
same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can
they be put in a legal straight-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible.
These rules can be adopted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the
constitution of the tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such
tribunal is governed. There are, however, situations which demand the exclusion of the rules of
natural justice by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on.
One thing should be noted. Inference of exclusion of natural justice should not be readily made
unless it is irresistible, since the courts act on presumption that the legislature intends to observe
the principles of natural justice and those principles do not supplant but supplement the law of the
land. Therefore, all statutory provisions must be read, interpreted and applied so as to be
consistent with the principles of natural justice.
154
A complicated and somewhat difficult question is: What is the effect of breach or
contravention of the principles of natural justice? Does it go to the root of the matter rendering
a decision void or merely voidable?
Courts are unanimous that a decision rendered in violation of the rule against bias is
merely voidable and not void. The aggrieved party may thus Waive his right to avoid the
decision, as where timely objection is not made even though there is full knowledge of the
buyers and the right to object to it. However, there is fundamental disagreement amongst
courts and jurists As to the effect of a breach of the rule of Fair hearing on any decision. prof.
H.W.R Wade Ease of the view that breaches of the rules of natural justice must have the effect
of producing void decisions. But D.M.Gordon Argues that procedural breaches can never
render a decision void as jurisdictional error. At first prof. De Smith Appears so how agreed
with him but later on he changed his stance.
A voidable order is an order which is legal and valid unless it is set aside by a competent
court at the instance of an aggrieved party. On the other hand, a void order is not an order in
the eye of law. It can be ignored, disregarded, disobeyed or impeached in any proceeding
before any court or tribunal. It is a stillborn order, nullity and void ab initio.
So far as India is concerned, it is fairly well settled and courts have consistently taken the view
that whenever there is violation of any rule of natural justice, the order is null and void.
155
superannuation age was passed without affording an opportunity to the employee, or where a
passport of a journalist was impounded without issuing notice; or where a liability was
imposed by the Commission without giving an opportunity of being heard to the assesse; the
actions were held to be a nullity and orders void ab initio.
The same principle applies in respect of bias and interest. A judgment which is the result
of bias or want of impartiality is a nullity and the trial 'Coram non judice'.
Test
It would not be correct to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice,
an order passed is always null and void. The validity of the order has to be tested on the
touchstone of prejudice. The ultimate test is always the same, viz. the test of prejudice or the
test of fair hearing.
One thing, however, must be noted. Even if the order passed by an authority or officer is ultra
vires, against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, null and void, it remains operative
unless and until it is declared to be so by a competent court. Consequent upon such declaration, it
automatically collapses and it need not be quashed and set aside. But in absence of such a
declaration, even ex facie invalid or void order remains in operation de facto and it can effectively
be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the competent court.
In India, the supreme court in Nawab khan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat93categorically held
that an order which infringes a fundamental, passed in violation of the Audi alteram partem rule,
is a nullity. The appellant in this case had been prosecuted and convicted for disobeying an
externment order which was later held invalid for want of hearing. The Supreme Court
emphasized that an externment order passed in violation of the rules of natural justice is of no
effect, and its violation is no offence because such a determination is a jurisdictional error going
to the very roots of a determination.
In Swadeshi Cotton mills94, The operational principle laid down by the court is that an order
password in violation of the rules of natural justice is not such a nullity, non est which cannot be
reviewed by a post decisional hearing it is certainly contrary to the holding of the court in Nawab
khan.
93
(1974) 2 SCC 121
94
(1981) 1 SCC 664
156
In A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak,95 The court favored the proposition that any action in violation
of the principles of natural justice is a nullity. The court held that an action in violation of the
principles of natural justice is a nullity and the trial “Coram non judice”.
Similarly, in Yunus Khan, the court held that if there is a violation of the principles of natural
justice at the initial stage which render proceedings null and void, such proceedings cannot be
validated at the appellate stage even if fairness of that appeal its authorities beyond a dispute. In
this case in a disciplinary proceeding authority which initiated proceedings was also as a witness
accepted inquiry report and imposed punishment. The Supreme Court held the proceedings as
void however even when an action is void it is valid until it is declared wild by a quote and cannot
be ignored.
Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that whenever an order is struck down as invalid, being
violated of the principles of natural justice, there is no final decision on the case and therefore
proceedings are left open. All that is done is that the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect
is vacated, but the proceedings are not terminated. The administrative authority may start the
proceedings de novo.
Judicial and executive functions are basically the same in their character involving some
mental process. Both are overlapping. Courts have certain administrative functions and 'the
executive has certain judicial functions. The distinction is very subtle.
95
(1988) 2 SCC 602
157
Until the Supreme Court's decision in State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei, it was thought
that an executive order is non-reviewable. The question in issue was the determination of the age
of an Assistant Surgeon working in a government hospital. The Government contended that it was
exercising executive function. The contention was rejected and the Court held that 'if there is
power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the
exercise of the power'.93
In Jay Engineering Works v. State of West Bengal," the Government directed that the
police officers should not interfere in the disputes between the employers and the employees in
industrial undertakings. It has the effect of directing the police not to exercise their powers under
the Criminal Procedure Code, involving Commission of cognizable offences. A Bench of five
Judges,95 of the Calcutta High Court unanimously quashed the order of the Government and
directed the Police to act according to the statutory powers. Thus, an order purely executive was
quashed.
The Supreme Court itself has said in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, that "the dividing
line between an Administrative power and quasi-judicial power is quite thin and it is being
gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or quasi-
judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the frame-work of the law
conferring that powers, the consequences ensuing the exercise of that power and the manner in
which that power is expected to be exercised."
The Court further emphasized that "the requirement of acting judicially in essence is
nothing but a requirement of acting justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously". The
authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions must record reasons in support of their orders.
Judicial Control
*Violation of Natural Justice- Non-Issuance of notice, Sufficient time, rule against bias
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* Abuse of discretion
If an order is purely executive the practice of the courts until recently has been not to
interfere with the executive discretion. But the recent trend permits a court to question even an
executive order and if necessary, to quash it, if it involves evil consequences.
The distinction sought to be drawn between executive and a quasi-judicial decision is quite
unclear. The same decision may he from one point of view be regarded as executive and in
another point of view regarded as quasi-judicial.
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Unit IV
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION- GRANT AND EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
160
Introduction
With the abandonment of laissez faire and advent of the modern philosophy of a “welfare”
and “social service” state, the administrative organ, in practically every democratic country, is
performing more and more functions. The main tasks of the administrative organ are no longer
merely police or political; it performs vast regulatory and managerial functions.
The administrative powers are of varied types. They range from such simple matters as
registration of births and deaths, to regulate of a business activity, acquiring property for a public
purpose and detaining a person on the subjective satisfaction of the executive. The administrative
powers also include such important powers as of investigation, seizing or destroying the property
of an individual without hearing in the interest of public health, safety and morality.
But providing such vast powers may also be the cause for abuse. The broader the
discretion, the greater the chance of its abuse. In the words of Justice Douglas of the U.S.
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Supreme Court. “Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered... Absolute discretion... is
more destructive of freedom than any of man’s other inventions”.
It thus becomes necessary to devise ways and means to minimise the danger of absolute
discretion, so that injustice is not done to any single individual. It is not possible for this purpose
to depend merely on the good sense of administration itself to use its power properly, for broad
power always breeds the danger that will wielder will get power drink. Courts have to play a
major role in the process of controlling the functioning of the administration. In this connection
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution play a significant role. The courts
control the exercise of discretion by the administration and for this purpose have evolved several
norms.
“Discretion is a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between right and
wrong, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and
not to do according to their wills and private affections.”
Discretion in a lay person’s language can mean choosing from amongst the various
available alternatives without reference to any predetermined criterion, no matter how fanciful
that choice may be. A person writing his will has such discretion to dispose of his property in any
manner, no matter how arbitrary or fanciful it may be. But the term “discretion” when qualified by
the word "administrative” has somewhat different overtones. ‘Discretion’ in this sense means
choosing from amongst the various available alternatives, but with reference to the rules of reason
and justice and not according to personal whims. Such exercise is not to be arbitrary, vague and
fanciful but legal and regular.
Lords Halsbury in Sharp v. Wakefield96 observed: “Discretion means when it is said that
something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that something is to be done
according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion ...according to law
and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be
exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought
to confine himself”.
96
1891 AC 173
162
Conferring discretion
Rarely does the legislature enact a comprehensive legislation complete in all details. More
often the legislation is sketchy or skeleton, leaving many gaps and conferring powers on the
administration to act in a way it deems "necessary" or “reasonable" or if it “is satisfied” or “is of
opinion”. Rarely does the legislature clearly enunciate a policy or a principle subject to which the
executive may have to exercise its discretionary powers. Quite often, the legislature bestows more
or less an unqualified or uncontrolled discretion on the executive. Administrative discretion may
be denoted by such words or phrases as “public interest”, “public purpose”, “prejudicial to public
safety or security”, “satisfaction," “belief, “efficient”, “reasonable” etc.
163
attitude is that, more often than not, the administration is required to handle intricate problems
which involve investigation of facts, making of choices and exercise of discretion before deciding
upon what action to take. Thus, the modern tendency is to leave a large amount of discretion with
various authorities. Statute book is now full of provisions giving discretion of one kind or the
other to the government or officials for various purposes. The need for ‘discretion’ arises because
of the necessity to individualize the exercise of power by the administration, i.e. the
administration has to apply a vague or indefinite statutory provision from case to case.
There are following good reasons for conferring discretion on administrative authorities:
(a) The present-day problems which the administration is called upon to deal with are of complex
and varying nature and it is difficult to comprehend them all within the scope of general rules;
(b) Most of the problems are new, practically of the first impression. Lack of any previous
experience to deal with them does not warrant the adoption of general rules’
(c) It is not always possible to foresee each and every problem but when a problem arises it must
in any case be solved by the administration in spite of the absence of specific rules applicable to
the situation’,
(d) Circumstances differ from case to case so that applying one rule mechanically to all cases may
itself result in injustice.
From the point of view of the individual, there are several disadvantages in the
administration following the case to case approach as compared to with the adoption of a general
rule applicable to all similar cases.
First, whereas case to case decisions operate on the past facts, a general rule usually avoids
retroactivity and operates in future so that one has prior notice of the rules and thus may regulate
his conduct accordingly. In case to case approach, the individual may be caught by surprise and
may not be able to adjust his affairs in the absence of his ability to foresee future administrative
action.
164
Second, the case to case approach involves the danger of discrimination amongst various
individuals; there arises a possibility of not getting like treatment under like circumstances.
Third, the process is time consuming and involves decision in a multiplicity of cases. Also,
there is a danger of abuse of discretion by administrative officials.
1. The law conferring discretion may itself seek to lay down the elements and standards
which the authority has to apply in exercising its discretion and selecting a course of
action. This means that the degree of discretion should be restricted by law itself as far as
possible, or, in other words discretion should be properly “confined and structured”.
2. If a statute leaves a large amount of discretion in the hands of administration, the
administration itself lay down criteria with respect to which the discretion is to be
exercised. It would help in predicting administrative decision in individual cases, thus,
making individual’s rights somewhat certain and reducing chances of abuse of
administrative discretion. It would also help in uniform application of the law in a large
number of cases which may have to be handled, especially when a number of parallel and
co-equal administrative authorities have to cope with cases arising under a particular
scheme.
3. To some extent administrative discretions and norms of practice can be used, instead of the
rules, for the purpose of achieving uniformity in discretionary decisions, but these should
be resorted to only when the scheme is too much in an experimental stage and constant
adjustment may have to be made for some time to come otherwise rules are preferable to
directions as they can be enforced judicially.
But it needs to be emphasized that while laying down standards make the discretion somewhat
less than absolute, no amount of rules or directions can really eliminate the need for discretion
because administration functions in a very broad area and individual cases and situations are
bound to arise which may fall outside the guiding norms and the administration will have to take
some decision therein. Not all acts of the administration can be bound by fixed rules. Many a
time, it may not be possible to prescribe it intelligible standards for the administration to follow.
All these considerations make it inevitable that discretion be vested in the administration to take
care of individual cases. But it also brings in the question of judicial and other control over
discretionary powers.
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No Unfettered discretion
Discretionary power by itself is not pure evil but gives much room for misuse. Therefore,
remedy lies in tightening the procedure and not in abolishing the power itself. Thus, today
question is not whether discretionary powers to administrative authorities is desirable or not but
what controls and safeguards can be introduced so that unfettered or unqualified discretion could
not be conferred and discretionary powers could not be misused by government officials. It thus,
becomes necessary to devise ways and means to minimise the danger of absolute discretion. To
achieve such an objective, a multi-pronged strategy has to be adopted. Courts have to play a major
role in this process.
While the notion of “unfettered discretion" is acceptable to the English Courts due to the
operation of the doctrine of sovereignty of Parliament, it would be inconsistent with the
constitutional framework of judicial control in India. The Indian Constitution guarantees certain
Fundamental Rights to the people which constitute a limitation on the legislative and executive
powers of the government and consequently, these rights provide an additional dimension of
control over administrative discretion. The courts in India, in addition to controlling the exercise
of administrative discretion on the same ground as the courts in England, also use Fundamental
Rights to control discretionary powers of administrative authorities in two ways;
(i) The courts may declare a statute unconstitutional if it seeks to confer too large a
discretion on the administration. Fundamental Rights in India thus afford a basis to the
courts to control the bestowal of discretion to some extent, by testing the validity of the
law in question on the touchstone of Fundamental Rights.
(ii) The courts may control the actual exercise of discretion under a statute by invoking
certain fundamental Rights, especially Article 14.
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and ‘the equal protection of laws’. This constitutional provision condemns discrimination; it
forbids class legislation, but permits classification founded on intelligible differential and having a
rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act in question. Article 14 is
buttressed by Article 15 expressly prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste,
sex or place of birth, Article 16 states positively that there shall be equality of opportunity in
matters of public employment. ‘Unfettered discretion’ is liable to be used in a discriminatory
manner and this is offensive to Article 14.
“in the case of unchanneled arbitrary discretion, discrimination is writ large on the face of it. Such
a discretion patently violates the doctrine of equality, for the difference in the treatment of persons
sets solely on the arbitrary selection of the executive”
In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, in order to speed the trial for certain offences,
Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 conferred discretion on the State Govt,
to refer any offence for trial by the special court. Since, the procedure before the special court was
stringent in comparison with that for normal trials, the respondents asserted its unconstitutionality
on the ground that it violates the equality clause in Article 14. The court held the law invalid on
the ground that the use of vague expressions like “speedier trial", confers a wide discretion on the
Government and can be a basis of unreasonable classification. The Act was held violative of
Article 14 because it had empowered the government to select any case or a class of cases or
offences to be tried by the special courts. This unfettered discretion is likely to be branded
discriminatory and therefore, contrary to Article 14.
97
AIR 1952 SC 75.
98
AIR 1967 SC 1836.
167
"It is significant to note that the entire development of administrative law is characterised by a
consistent series of decisions controlling and structuring the discretion conferred on the state and
its officers. The law always frowns on unanalysed and unfettered discretion conferred on any
instrumentality of the state and it is the glory of administrative law that such discretion has been
through judicial decisions structured and regulated.”
The preceding discussion shows that the court would enquire whether the statute contains
the policy or principles for guiding the exercise of discretion by the executive in the matter of
classification and if it does not the statute is liable to be invalidated as having conferred
“unfettered” discretion to discriminate between persons or things similarly situated.
So long as the policy itself is not discriminatory36 legislation would be upheld if its
purpose or policy to guide the exercise of discretion is manifest. On that basis Preventive
Detention Act, Minimum wages Act, Industrial Dispute Act, Suppression of Immoral Traffic in
women and Girls Act etc. have been upheld. However, even if the legislation is valid an
administrative action purportedly authorised by the legislation could be discriminatory and
99
AIR 1999 SC 230.
100
AIR 1987 SC 877.
168
invalid. Though, the principle is clear and well established that unguided or arbitrary power
cannot be conferred on the administration, yet its application by the courts to various factual
situations faces difficulties.
In Manohar Lal v. State of Maharashtra,101 Section 187. A of the Sea Customs Act gave
wide discretionary power to the authorities to either refer a case of smuggled goods to a
magistrate or to look into the matter themselves. The court upheld the validity of the statute on
ground that as this discretion is to be exercised by senior officers that will stand as a guarantee
against its misuse.
In Summan Gupta v. State of J & K (2000) with a view to encourage national integration
certain state governments agreed as a matter of policy to reserve certain seats in medical colleges
for outside candidates nominated by the respective state government on a reciprocal basis. The
Supreme Court struck down the vesting of power of nomination in the state governments as the
nomination was left to their unlimited discretion and uncontrolled choice. In Monarch
Infrastructures v. Commr. Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation, the Municipal Corporation had
invited tenders for appointment of agents for the collection of Octroi. However, one of the
eligibility condition was deleted after the expiry of the time for submission of tenders but before
opening thereof.; Thereafter, tender was awarded to one who did not fulfil the deleted condition.
The Supreme Court held award of tender arbitrary and discriminatory.
However, if a statute confers wide powers but contains procedural safeguards, then it can
be upheld as valid. Thus, in Tika Ramji v. State of U.P. (1956) Section 15 of the U.P, sugarcane
Act, 1953 gave to the cane commissioner, after consulting the factory and cane grower’s co-
operative society, power to reserve any area and assign any area for the purpose of supply of cane
to a factory. An appeal against such an order lay to the government. The power given to the
commissioner was held not bad under Article 14 as it was well defined and contained safeguards
against its exercise in a discriminatory manner. Organo Chemicals Industries v. Union of India,102
is an important case on this area. Section 14-B of the1 employees ‘Provident Funds Act’, 1952
provides that where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the fund, the
Central Provident Fund Commissioner may recover from the employer such damages, not
exceeding the amount of arrears, as he may think fit to impose. Before imposing damages, the
employer is to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The broad power given to the
101
AIR 1971 SC 1511.
102
AIR 1979 SC 1803.
169
commissioner was upheld by the Supreme Court mainly because the law in question was social in
nature and beneficial to the labour. However, the court adopted the following formal arguments to
uphold the commissioner’s vast power to impose damages. The power is to be exercised
according to natural justice and, as such, he has to make a speaking order; such an order is subject
to Art. 226, so that perversity, illiteracy, extraneous influence, mala fides and blatant infirmities
straight away get caught and correct”. In, awarding damages he usually takes, into consideration,
as he has done here, various factors viz. the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency
of defaults and the amounts involved.” Again in Gopikishan v. Assistant Collector of Customs,103
the power of assistant Collector of Customs to order search of the premises of a person if had
reason to believe that the person had in his possession goods liable to be confiscated was upheld
as he was required to send forthwith a copy of any record made by him to the collector, and he
could be prosecuted if he took action without “having reason to believe”
The Supreme Court may read the procedural requirement of hearing into a statute to save it
from unconstitutionality under Article 14. Thus, in State of Mysore v. Bhat, where a law
authorised the competent authority to declare an area a slum area, to declare houses unfit for
human habitation and declare a slum area as a clearance area the court read natural justice into the
law to uphold it under Article 14. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India104, Section 10(3) of the
passport Act, 1967 empowered the Central Government to impound a passport of a person in
public interest. There was no appeal against the order of the government and the words “in the
interests of the general public" were appeared to be vague and undefined. But the court upheld the
provision by reading the requirement of natural justice and because the words in question could
not be characterised as vague and undefined as these very words are to be found in Article 19(5).
These words provide sufficient guidelines to the government and its power cannot be regarded as
unguided and unfettered, the reasons for impounding the passport are to be recorded in writing
and copy thereof is to be given to the affected person save in certain exceptional circumstances;
the power is vested in a high authority, and according to the court when power is vested in a high
authority like the Central Government, abuse of power cannot be legally assumed.”
Although Article 14 has established itself as the constitutional basis for demanding judicial
review in a way that is familiar to American lawyers i.e. that discretion be structured by rules
standards and policies, the degree of judicial review exercised on this basis has swung between
two extremes of a pendulum. In some cases the courts have rejected the standards provided by the
103
AIR 1967 SC 1298.
104
AIR 1978 SC 597.
170
statute as “vague and uncertain” and condemned the enabling Act as having conferred unguided
discretion while in other cases they have handed the executive a free hand by saying that a
discretion vested in a high ranking officials is presumed to be exercised bona fide. Sometime they
have accepted even a vague policy as is sufficient for the purpose when the same has been given
in the preamble of the statute concerned or in general objective of the statute.
Thus, in State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali, the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 which
authorised the state government to direct a special court to try “any offence or cause” under
procedure substantially different from the ordinary criminal procedure to determent of the accused
declared in its preamble that the object of the Act was” to provide for the speedier trial of certain
offences”. It was held that the necessity for a “speedier trial” was too vague and uncertain to form
a rational basis of classification. By contrast speedier trial related to the object of the statue such
as “public safety" and ‘maintenance of public order in a dangerously disturbed area’ has been
accepted a sufficiently certain.
In re Kerala Education Bill case,105 the Kerala Education Bill gave broad powers of control
to the Kerala Government over private schools in the state, as for example, power to recognise
newly established schools, power to take over any category of schools in any specified area
through a notification. These provisions were challenged as being discriminatory on the ground
that they were capable of being exercised “with an evil eye and unequal hand". The Supreme
Court held that the clauses of the bill had to be interpreted and read in the light of the general
policy laid down in the preamble namely to provide for better development of education in the
State. Article 14 has thus proved to be a valuable tool in restraining what has been termed in
English law “unfettered discretion”. Thus, the courts have demanded that discretion must not be
arbitrary. Absence, of standards, policies and principles to guide the exercise of “absolute
discretion” is liable to render the resultant administrative action open to challenge.
S.2 Preventive Detention Act was in question– make order if it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent him from acting prejudicially to the interest of the nation.
105
AIR 1958 SC 956.
171
Held: no court can sit in place of detaining authority and can decide whether or not it would have
come to the same decision as the authority. Authority’s satisfaction could not be substituted for
court’s satisfaction. Court cannot question the grounds of subjective satisfaction.
In Arora v. State of UP, Arora’s land was acquired u/LAA for construction of a factory for
manufacturing textile machinery parts. Arora challenges – he himself wanted to erect a factory
and land intended to be used for one public purpose cannot be acquired for another public
purpose. It was held: requirement of the ‘public purpose’ is satisfied and it is for the Govt to
decide whether or not to acquire.
S. 10(1) Industrial Disputes Act was in question – Govt can refer an ID for adjudication by LC if
it is of the opinion that ID existed or apprehended
Held: making reference is administrative but factual existence and expediency of making
reference is discretionary u/s.12 if Govt declines to make reference it has to quote reasons but
propriety, correctness, adequacy or satisfactory character of reasons cannot be questioned.
The main grounds for reviewing the administrative discretion, may be classified as under:
(A) Ultra-Vires;
(C) Proportionality
106
AIR 1951 Mad 191
172
(E) Irrationality
(J) Malice
A. Ultra-Vires
The doctrine of ultra-vires states that a person or authority acting under statutory power can do
only those things which are statutorily authorised. In case of failure to do so, the doctrine permits
the courts to strike down the decision made by the bodies exercising the public functions.
Doctrine denotes that an authority can only do things permitted by the statute to be done and
things which are not expressly conferred by the stature are forbidden to be done.
In the light of the spirit of the ultra-vires, the courts have been empowered to scrutinize and
find out whether action taken by the authority was within the jurisdiction or it has travelled
beyond the scope of its authority. It is an important feature of administrative law jurisprudence.
The essence of this doctrine is that a person or a body acting under a statutory power or authority
can be allowed to do things which the statute permits to him to do and anything done beyond the
power conferred in this behalf would be without jurisdiction and consequently the decision would
be ultra-vires.
The object of the doctrine of ultra-vires is the protection of the people against the
administrative authorities whenever they go against the spirit of the statute and exercise the
powers conferred on them contrary to the law contained in the statute.
Lord Salbome opines that the doctrine of ultra-vires ought to be reasonably, and no
unreasonably understood and applied, and that whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to,
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or consequential upon, those things which the legislature has authorised, ought not (unless
expressly prohibited) to be held, by judicial construction, to be ultra-vires.
It is also important to make a mention here that the notion of implied power has been
permitted by the courts to free the administration from the shackles of an overtly strict ultra-vires
doctrine.
“The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears
mandatory - in as much as it used the word 'shall' as in the present case - or merely directory
cannot be resolved by laying down any general rules and depends upon the facts of each case and
for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The
purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in
making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to person resulting from
whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other
provision dealing with the same object and other consideration which may arise on the facts of a
particular case, including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in
arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory.”
The principle of ultra-vires can also be invoked if the administrative authorities do not
follow the procedure laid down in the Act. If the procedure is violated, rules may be declared in
valid. In determining the validity of the rules on this ground, the courts look into the spirit, rather
than the letter of the law. The Supreme Court has ruled in Khoday Distillaries Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka,108 that the act of the administrative authority can be struck down if it is manifestly
unreasonable and arbitrary. The test of reasonableness plays a significant part in the governance of
the country. It can always be pointed whether the authority has a reasonable ground exercising
judgement.
It may be mentioned here that the principle of ultra-virus requires statutory powers to be
exercised in good faith and on correct ground. The presumption in that the legislative authority
107
AIR 1965 SC 895
108
(1996) 10 SCC 304.
174
cannot have intended to authorise unreasonable action which is therefore, ultra-vires and void.
The court is concerned only in the acts of legal powers. Acts, if valid themselves, produce legal
consequence. Doctrine of ultra-vires is comprehensive and can cover virtually all situations where
statutory power is exercised contrary to some legal principle where a public authority is held to
have acted for improper motives or irrelevant considerations, its actions are ultra-vires and void.
B. Abuse of Power
It has been seen that administrative bodies do not exercise their discretionary power for the
purpose intended to by the legislature. It may also happen that the statute under which the powers
are conferred on the administrative authorities may not be an authorised delegation. It is also
generally found that the powers are exercised on irrelevant consideration or sometime there
appear some errors of law in the discharge of its function. All these factors amount to the abuse of
discretionary powers and become ground for judicial review.
There is no denying the fact that administrative decisions involve an element of discretion
which is supposed to be exercised on relevant and not on irrelevant or extraneous considerations.
It implies that the power conferred on administrative authority by a statute on the consideration
relevant to the purpose for which it is conferred. If the statute mentions no such consideration,
then the power is to be exercised on consideration relevant to the purpose for which it is conferred
on the authority concerned. Therefore, if the authority concerned pays attention to, or takes into
account wholly irrelevant or extraneous circumstances, events or matters, then the administrative
action is ultra-vires and bound to be quashed.
The court may by looking into the purpose and provisions of the Act, assess whether
extraneous or irrelevant consideration have been applied by the administration. It is interesting to
175
note that the ground of irrelevant consideration may be taken up in case of prerogative power. It is
now judicially recognised that the prerogative powers are capable of abuse as are the other
powers. So, there are cases where prerogatives have many times been restricted by the judicial
decision. Lord Green M. R. in a landmark case Associated Provincial Picture Homes Ltd. v.
Wednesbury Corp.,109 ruled that an authority exercising discretion must adhere to some principles:
which include : (a) take all relevant factors into account; (b) exclude all irrelevant factors from its
consideration; (c) reach the decision which is neither perverse nor irrational.
It is also evident from the scrutiny of cases that the judiciary has ruled that discretionary
powers must be exercised for proper purposes given in the conferring statute. The courts have a
duty to determine the cases within their jurisdiction and properly brought before them and that
administrative bodies, in general, have a duty to exercise their statutory discretion one way or the
other when circumstances for the exercise of those discretions arise. The statutory body must be
guided by relevant considerations.
The judicial trend discloses that every action of the administrative authority becomes invalid if
it, in exercise of its discretionary powers, ignore the relevant consideration. The courts have ruled
that an authority must take into account the consideration which a statute prescribes expressly or
impliedly. In case the statute does not prescribe any considerations but confers powers in a
general way, the court may still apply some relevant consideration for the exercise of the power
and quash an order because the concerned authority did not take these into account.
Supreme Court of India in a landmark case of Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay
Kumar.110 has held that the authority in which the discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise
that discretion but not exercise it in any particular manner, in general, a discretion must be
exercised by the authority to which it is committed. The authority must genuinely address itself to
the matter before it. It must not act under the dictate of other body or disable itself from exercising
a discretion in each individual cases. It must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it
do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant
consideration and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote
purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act
arbitrarily or capriciously. The courts have ruled that discretion may be improperly fettered
because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account.
109
(1948) 1KB 223
110
(2003) 4 SCC 579
176
If the statutory authority exercises discretion for a different purpose the actions taken may be
quashed on the ground to have exercised that power for improper purpose. It may be specifically
submitted here that there is a distinction between improper purpose and mala-fide exercise of
power. The distinction is that the mala-fide purpose may include ill-will, malice or oblique motive
while these may be absent in the former one.
Warrington, L.J., quoted in Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab,111 "It may be also possible to prove
that an act of public body, though performed in good faith and without the taint of corruption, was
so clearly founded an alien and irrelevant ground as to be outside the authority conferred upon the
body and therefore inoperative.
It is implied that the legislature confers the discretion upon the administrative authority
with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and the objects of the Act, the
policy and objects of Act must be determined by taking into consideration, the provisions of the
Act as a whole. It is not possible to draw hard and fast line, but if the administrative authority, by
reason of its having misconstrued the Act or for any other reason so used its discretion as to
thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act, the court would certainly provide
protection to the persons aggrieved.
The judiciary has made it abundantly clear in many cases that every discretionary power
vested in the executive should be exercised in a just, reasonable and fair manner. In exercising
that power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, considering impartially the
objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with principles of natural
111
AIR 1964 SC 72.
112
State of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan, AIR 1989 SC 1223.
177
justice. Authority cannot permit its decisions to be influenced by others as this would amount to
abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authority's discretion that is
exercised but some else.
If an authority hands over its discretion to another body, it acts ultra-vires and would plainly
be contrary to the nature of the powers conferred upon the authority. The Apex Court in Suman
Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, has held that exercise of all administrative powers must be
structured within a system of controls informed by both relevance and reason in relation to the
object which it seeks to serve and reason in regard to the manner in which it attempts to do so.
Court taking serious note of the rights of the individuals has ruled that it is improper and
undesirable to expose the precious rights like right to life, liberty and property to the vagaries of
the individual’s whims and fancies. The presumption that those who occupy high posts have a
high sense of responsibility is neither legal nor rational. Absence of guidelines cannot be defended
on the ground that discretion is vested in high authority.
The court may review an administrative decision where there has been an error of law on the face
of the record or where such errors are obvious. It is imperative to submit here that error must not
necessarily be a flagrant one, or relate to a simple or established principle of law, but that the error
must be readily ascertainable by the supervising court and not one that can be ascertainable by
supervising court and not one that can be ascertained by a detailed examination of all the evidence
that was before the deciding agency.
“Judiciary has an inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior tribunals, not in an appellate capacity
but in a supervisory capacity. This control extends not only to seeing that the inferior tribunals
keep within their jurisdiction but also to seeing that they observe the law. The control is exercised
by means of power to quash determination by the tribunal which, on the fact of it, offends against
the law. The court does not substitute its own views for those of tribunals as a court of appeal
would do. It leaves to the tribunal to hear the case again, and in proper case may command it to do
so.”
113
(1952) 1 All.ER 122
178
The error of law must be on the face of record which would mean that all those documents
which appear therefrom to be the basis of decision must reveal the error in apparent form. The
court will grant review if it was satisfied that there was an error of law on the face of record.
Action for declaration can be brought successfully if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court
that there was present an error of law. It remains true to say that error of law on the face of record
is a ground for review by a supervising court only in respect of decision by an inferior authority
acting judicially. Judicial review on the grounds of an "error on the face of record" is not to be
likely made available where the administrative authority refused to give or refrains from giving
reasons for its decision.
It may be mentioned here that errors of law must take several forms. The authority may
wrongly interpret the word to which the legal meaning has been attributed. What is apparent is
that judicial review is available for errors of law but not on error of fact as court in such case
cannot seek an appeal and decide the correctness of findings or correctness of the facts ascertained
by the administrative authority. The court is entitled only to correct the error of law which can be
corrected by the writ of certiorari. The error on the face of record means the decision has been
made wrongly in law and the decision was acting within the jurisdiction. Error of law takes place
when the decision maker acts contrary to the requirement of legality or, he has broken one of the
rules for lawful decision-maker.
The courts in India, alike England, have invoked judicial review in cases where the
decisions of the administrative authorities were tainted by the errors of law. The sheet-anchor of
judicial review of administrative action is the 'error of law'. It has been noticed that at present
judicial thinking in India is tending towards expanding the scope of the concept of 'error of law'. A
consequence of great importance of this judicial approach is that courts can extend their control
over statutory authorities and can vitiate the decisions in case on error of law is found apparent on
the face of record. It is seen that the error of law apparent on the face of record has always been
the best ground for certiorari being granted.
The error of law in the decision of determination is in itself amenable to a writ of certiorari
but it must be a "manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings" i.e. when it is based on
the clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. It may however, be mentioned here that
it is a patent or self-evident error of law which can be corrected by certiorari, but not a mere
wrong decision. An error of fact, however, grave it may appear, cannot be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. What is evident in that error of law must be self-evident.
179
“An error of law which is apparent on the face of record can be corrected by a writ but not an
error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. The only case where a finding of fact might be
impugned on the ground of error of law apparent on the face of record are: (i) erroneously
refusing to admit admissible and material evidence, (ii) erroneously admitting inadmissible
evidence which influenced the finding, and (iii) a finding of fact based on no evidence.”
The principle is that when a power entrusted to a person in circumstance indicating that trust is
being placed in his individual judgement and discretion, he must exercise that power personally
unless he has been expressly empowered to delegate it to another. The very object of conferring a
power on a particular administrative body is that power must be exercised by the authority alone
and must not be delegated to other authority or official.
(a) Where an authority vested with discretionary powers affecting private rights, empowers
one of its committees or sub-committees, members or office to exercise those power
independently without any supervisory control by the authority, the exercise of power is
likely to be held invalid.
(b) A bye-law by which a local authority hands over its own regulatory powers to an official
by vesting him with virtually unrestricted discretion, may be called as an authorised
delegated legislation and may be held to be void.
(c) Degree of control maintained by the delegating authority over the acts of the delegates or
sub-delegates may be material factors in determining the validity of the delegation.
(d) It is improper for an authority to delegate wide discretionary power to another authority
over which it is incapable of exercising direct control, unless it is expressly empowered so
to delegate
(e) Where the exercise of discretionary power is entrusted to a named officer, another officer
cannot exercise his power in his stead unless express statutory provisions have been made
to this effect.
114
AIR 1964 SC 477.
180
(f) Where power to sub-delegate has been conferred by statute, the delegation must be
conveyed in an authorised form to the designated authority and must identify sufficiently
what are the functions thus delegated instead of leaving he sub-delegate to decide the
ambit of his own authority.
(g) A delegate must exercise its jurisdiction within the four comers of this delegation, failing
which the act done by the administrative authority becomes unauthorised hence a ground
for judicial review.
When a statute confers powers on an authority to apply a standard as the case in administrative
discretion, it is expected of it to apply it from case to case, and not fetter its discretion by
declaration of rules or policy to be followed uniformly in all the cases.
It is submitted here that an authority entrusted with the discretionary power must exercise
the same after considering individual cases. Instead if, authority-imposed fetters on its discretion
by adopting fixed rules of the policy to be applied in all cases coming before them is failure to
exercise discretion on the part of that authority. What is desirable from the authority is that, it
must consider the facts of each case, apply its mind and decide the same. Pronouncement of a
general rule to be applied to all cases irrespective of different facts will certainly amount to
imposing fetters on the discretion by self-imposing rules of policy. It is not advisable to lay down
any rigid rule for guiding the discretion. Free discretion given by the statute would, thus be
fettered if the discretion is not allowed to be exercised in accordance with the fact of each case.
Any order passed by the administrative authority may be declared bad, if it imposed fetters
on its discretion by self-imposed rules of policy. If the government while making the policy
decision, shuts its ears to the merits of the individual cases, the action taken cannot be sustained at
all. Generally speaking it is in the fitness of things that an authority entrusted with a discretion
must not, by adopting a rule or policy disable itself from exercising its discretion in individual
cases.
115
1977 CrLJ 1523
181
“Generalization on matters which rest on discretion and the attempt to discover formulae
of universal application when facts are bound to differ from case to case frustrates the very
purpose of conferring discretion”.
It may, however, be made clear that there are many cases where imposition of fetters on
discretion by self-imposed rules or policies can be justified. The only requirement is that when a
general policy is adopted, it must be considered on the basis of the facts and the merit s of each
case. Lord Reid has rightly noted that an administrative authority, having a discretion may
formulate a policy or make a limiting rule as to the future exercise of this discretion, if it thinks
that good administration requires it, provided the authority is always willing to listen to anyone
with something new to say.
Halsbury Laws of England, while elucidating the correct principle of law on the fetters of
discretionary powers states that a public body clothed with statutory discretion may formulate
general rules or principles of policy to guide itself as to the manner of exercising its own
discretion, in individual cases, provided such rules of principles are legally relevant to the exercise
of its power, consistent with the purpose of the enabling statute and not arbitrary or capricious.
Nevertheless, it must not disable itself from exercising a genuine discretion in a particular case,
directly involving individual interest. The authority must be prepared to consider making an
exception to the general rule if the circumstances of the case warrant special treatment.
C. Proportionality
The doctrine of proportionality is emerging as a new ground of challenge for judicial review
of administrative discretion. It is a recognised general principle of law evolved with a purpose to
maintain a proper balance between any adverse effects which its decision may have on the rights,
liberties or interests of persons and the purpose it pursues. The doctrine of proportionally
endavours to confine the exercise of discretionary powers of administrative authority to mean
which are proportioned to the object to be pursued.
The courts while invoking the doctrine of proportionality may quash the exercise of powers in
which there is not a responsible relationship between the objective which is sought to be achieved
and the means used to that end.
The Supreme Court, in Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh116 while invoking the principle of
116
(2004) 2 SCC 590
182
proportionately has held that "it is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate
with the gravity of the misconduct and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of
misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution."
The courts may apply the principle of proportionality as a protection against imposition of
cruel and unusual punishment. The state may impose punishment, the effect of that punishment
must not be grossly disproportionate to what would have been appropriate. In assessing where the
sentence is grossly disproportionate, the court may consider the gravity of the offence, the
personal characteristics of the offender and particular circumstances of the case in order to
determine what range of evidence would have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate or deter the
particular offender or to protect the public from him.
The Supreme Court of India while expounding the spirit of principle of proportionality, has
ruled that a restriction imposed on the fundamental rights can be struck down if it is
disproportionate. To sum-up, the courts applies the doctrine of proportionality to evaluate whether
there has disproportionate interference with the individuals' rights and interests and declares the
action as illegal if the courts finds it contrary to this principle.
The fact is that all powers exercised by the public authorities are liable to be misused. The
courts are, therefore, vigilant to check the misuse of public power which is the subject matter of
judicial review. It is the doctrine of ultra-vires that confines the public authorities to the power,
granted by the statute. The courts are concerned to see that not only whether power exercised
exists but also whether it has been exercised reasonably.
It is for the court to see that the discretionary power conferred on an administrative authority
is exercised by that authority reasonably. If the power is exercised unreasonably, there is an abuse
117
(1948) 1 KB 223.
183
of power and the action of the authority will be ultravires. The rule of unreasonableness denotes a
general description of the things that must not be done. A person entrusted with a discretion must
direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the maters which he is bound to
consider. He cannot exclude from his consideration the matters which are relevant to what he has
to consider. If he does not obey these rules, he may be said to have been acting unreasonably.
The rule of reasonableness does not consider extraneous matters as the basis of their decisions.
The reasoning faculty of the authority must be exercised objectively and his order must reveal this
thinking process in dealing the reasons for his discretion. Exercise of discretion judiciously is
clearly opposite to capricious or arbitrary exercise of power. The rule of reason predicates that
administrative discretion necessarily be exercised reasonably and objectively. Unreasonableness,
such as considering extraneous factors, disregarding relevant factors, ignoring statutory objective,
vitiate the order.
Gajendra Gadkar, J. has opined in the landmark case of Pukhraj v. Kohi,118 “that the courts
cannot sit in appeal over the decision of administrative office. All that the court can consider is
whether there is a ground which prima-facie justifies the said reasonable belief.” If a decision of
administrative authority on a competent matter is so unreasonable, that no authority could even
have come to it, then the court can interfere, but to prove a case of that kind would require
something overwhelming, Thus, the reasonableness could, therefore, mean not what the court
considers unreasonable, but a decision which the court thinks that no reasonable body would have
come to this conclusion. There must be some material on the basis of which reasonable belief can
be founded for giving decision.
Similarly, Grover J. has rightly stated in that there can be no manner of doubt that words
'reason to believe' suggest that the belief must be that of honest and reasonable person, based upon
reasonable ground and the administrative authority may act on circumstantial evidence but not on
mere suspicion, gossips or rumour. The administrative authority would be acting without
jurisdiction if the reason for its belief that the conditions are satisfied does not exist or is not
material or relevant to the belief required by the law. The court can always examine this aspect,
though the declaration or the sufficiency of the reasons for the belief cannot be investigated by the
court.
Wednesbury Principles
118
AIR 1962 SC 1559
184
• These are the principles laid down by Court of Appeal in Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp.
• The plaintiffs were the owners and licensees of a cinema house. defendants were the
licensing authority for that area, the Wednesbury Corporation.
• The Wednesbury Corporation had the power under The Cinematograph Act to grant
licenses in any area for cinematograph performances.
• Under the Sunday Entertainments Act, had the power to allow a licensed place to be open
and used on Sundays, “subject to such conditions as the authority thinks fit to impose”.
• The Wednesbury Corporation granted the license to the plaintiffs on the condition that no
children under 15 years, whether accompanied by an adult or not, should be admitted to
Sunday performances.
• Court held, in order to overturn the order of corporation court must be satisfied that
• The corporation, in making that decision, took into account factors that ought not
to have been taken into account, or
• The corporation failed to take account factors that ought to have been taken into
account, or
• The decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would ever consider
imposing it. (Wednesbury unreasonableness)
E. Irrationality
The term 'irrationality' and 'unreasonableness' are often used interchangeably. However,
irrationality may be said to be only one facet of unreasonableness. A decision is said to be
irrational if it is unreasoned; if it is lacking ostensible logic or comprehensible justification. The
term irrationality has reference to those decisions which are made in arbitrary fashion. 'Absurd' or
perverse decisions may be presumed to have been decided in a fashion that the reason are simply
unintelligible. Mostly there is an absence of logical connection between the evidence and
ostensible reasons for the decision or there is absence of evidence in support of the decision.
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Irrationality may be inferred from the reasons. When reasons are required by statute or law,
those reasons must be both adequate and intelligible. The failure to non-consideration of reasons
may vitiate the decision if the aggrieved can show the substantial prejudice resulting from a
failure on the part of the decision maker to demonstrate how an issue of law had been resolved or
a disputed issue of fact decided or by demonstrating some other lack of reasoning which raised
substantial doubt over the decision making process.
Judicial review may lie on the ground of irrationality where the existence of a set of facts is a
condition precedent to the exercise of power or when the decision maker has taken into account
something which is wrong or where he has misunderstood the facts on which the decision depends
or where there is no evidence for a finding upon which a decision depends or where the evidence,
taken as whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting finding of facts.
The Supreme Court of India in a landmark case of Indian Railway Construction Company Ltd.
v. Ajay Kumar,119 has held that judicial review is open in cases of irrationality. While quoting Lord
Diplock, the Apex Court has endeavoured to explain the meaning of irrationality as a decision
which is so outrageous in its defiance to logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person
who had applied to the question to be decided could have arrived at. The court ruled that a
decision can be said to be irrational if it is not based on the material of the case and is so
outrageous as to be in total defiance of logic and moral norms.
F. Procedural Impropriety
The administrative authorities are required to adhere to some procedure for arriving at the
administrative decision. Procedure 'deals with the structure' of decision making and not the quality
or impact of the decision themselves. The significant aspect of the procedural justice is to provide
the opportunity for individual to participate in the decision that affects them.
Another important concern of the procedural justice is to promote the quality, accuracy and
rationality of decision-making process. Both aspects of procedural justice aim at enhancing the
legality of that process.
Both aspects of justice i.e. substantive justice and procedural justice - are important in the field
of administrative law. Substantive justice ensues that the decisions of administrative authority are
kept within the bounds of the conferred powers whereas procedural justice affords individual a
119
(2003) 4 SCC 579
186
fair opportunity to influence the outcome of a decision and deals with issues such as requirement
to consult, to hear representation and to hold hearing. According to John Rawls, "The rule of law
requires some form of due process designed to ascertain the truth. The precepts of natural justice
are to ensure that the legal order will be impartially and regularly maintained.''
It may be submitted here that entire concept of procedural fairness has flown out of the
expression of natural justice. It is an established fact that the procedure which deals with the entire
scenario of decision-making by administrative authority derives its authority from the ultimate
source called as 'Nature'. It was with the passage of time that the term natural justice became
identified with the two constituents of a fair hearing:
(a) That parties should be given proper opportunity to be heard and to this end should be given
due notice of the hearing (audi altarem partem).
(b) That a person adjudicating should be disinterested and unbiased (nemo judex in causa sua)
The first principle of natural justice aims at to govern the conduct of administrative
authority in the exercise of their disciplinary functions invested with the authority to adjudicate
upon the matters involving civil consequences to individuals. It implies that the public authorities
must either give the person notice that they intend to take the matter into their consideration with a
view to coming to a decision, or if they have come to a decision, they propose to act upon it, and
to give him an opportunity of showing cause why such step should not be taken.
Significance of the principle of natural justice read with the doctrine of audi altarem
partem is that is prima facie imposes on administrators, an obligation to act fairly. When the
mandatory procedure is set out in a statute, the administrative authorities are required to follow it,
failing which the decision taken will be vitiated.
It is evident from the analysis of the cases that there is an implied presumption that
procedural fairness is required whenever the exercise of a power adversely affects an individual's
rights created by statute. The latest trend discloses that the duty to afford procedural fairness is not
to be limited to the protection of legal rights in the strict sense but also to more general interests of
which the interest in pursuing a livelihood and in personal reputation.
Another aspect of procedural impropriety is that the decision maker should not be biased or
prejudiced in a way that precludes fair and genuine consideration being given to the argument
187
advanced by the parties. Bias can be defined as an operative prejudice whether conscious or
unconscious and aims at preventing hearing fi-om being a shame or a ritual or a mere exercise in
symbolic reassurance. It not only concern to prevent the distorting influence of actual bias but also
to protect the integrity of decision-making process by ensuring the circumstances should not give
rise to appearance or risk of bias.
G. Jurisdictional Error
The term jurisdiction means authority to decide. Where an authority is empowered or required
to inquire into question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision its findings cannot be
impeded collaterally or on an application of judicial review but are binding until reversed on
appeal. It may be submitted here that where a court has jurisdiction to entertain an application, it
does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion, whether it was wrong in law or
fact. it does not lose its jurisdiction even if its conclusion on any aspect of its proper field of
inquiry is entirely without evidential support. The question whether administrative authority has
jurisdiction, depends not on the truth or falsehood of act into which it has to inquire or upon the
correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and its determinable at the
commencement, not at the conclusion of inquiry. The administrative authority empowered to
determine the issue has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact relating to that
question, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction by determining any of those questions incorrectly.
The jurisdiction impliedly denotes that the administrative authorities are required to discharge
their functions under the statute. The administrative body can decide only such question as it is
authorised to decide under the statute concerned and that it has no power to dub any provision of
the statute as ultra-vires. The court have held that the administrative authority cannot go into the
question of validity of substantive law or procedure laid down in the statute or the rules framed
thereunder since it itself is creature of statute. Prof. K. C. Davis has said that it is difficult to
prescribe straitjackets looped with chained as uniform for the administrator, however, he suggests
that jurisdiction should be structured, confined and checked through judicial review. In essence,
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the doctrine of ultra-vires permits the courts to strike down decision made by administrative
bodies exercising public functions, if they exceed the jurisdiction provided in the statute under
which they exercise their powers.
where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants jurisdiction of doing such acts or
employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. The express grant of statutory
powers carries with it, by necessary implications, the authority to use all reasonable means to
make such grant effective- Chief Executive Officer and Vice-Chairman, Gujarat Marketing Board
v. Haji Dand Haji, (1996) 11 SCC 223.
Exceeding Jurisdiction
The cardinal principle of administrative law is that an authority entrusted with a discretion
must not, in the purported exercise of its discretion, act under the dictation of another body. All
authorities entrusted with statutory discretion must be guided by consideration of public policy,
and in some context, the policy of existing government will be a relevant factor in weighing those
considerations, but this will not absolve them from their duty to exercise their individual
judgement.
The decision of the administrative authority vested with discretionary powers has to be
quashed where it surrenders its discretion to another person. P. F. Cooperative Society v.
Collector Thanjavour, AIR 1975 Mad 81: “This, in law, would amount to non-exercise of its
power by the authority and will be bad in the eyes of law.”
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There is, however, a difference between seeking advice or assistance and being dictated to.
Advice or assistance may be taken so long as the authority concerned does not mechanically act
on it, and itself take the final decision in the matter before it. The discretion may be exercised by
the authority concerned genuinely without blindly and mechanically acting on the advice.
Similarly, in Indian Railway Construction Company v. Ajay Kumar,122 the Supreme Court of India
struck down the order passed by the administrative authority on the ground that it had acted under
120
AIR 1964 SC 1573
121
AIR 1952 SC 16
122
(2003) 4 SCC 579.
190
the dictation of a superior authority and had therefore, surrendered its discretionary power to the
dictation of other authority and had not acted independently.
In Muni Survarat Swami Jain S. M. P. Singh v. Arjun Mathuran Gaikwad,123 the Apex Court
while expounding the scope of the term 'acting under dictation' has held that if the authority in
whom the discretion is vested does not act independently and passes an order under the instruction
and dictation of other authority, the court would intervene in the matter, quash the orders and
issue a mandamus to that authority to act on its own in accordance with a spirit of powers vested
in it by the statute.
I. Non-application of Mind
It is an established rule that the authority vested with the discretionary power ought to exercise
that power after applying its mind to the fact and circumstances of the case in hand. If this
condition is not complied with, its action or decision will be bad and the authority will be deemed
to have failed to exercise its discretion in accordance with the intention of the legislature
contained in the statute.
The discretion must be exercised after applying mind to facts and circumstances and not in a
mechanical manner. This may happen because the authority has only taken one view of its
powers, or has been lazy or casual, or because of over reliance on subordinates.
(a) When the authority fails to apply its mind to vital facts. When the authority might have
acted mechanically
(b) without due care and caution and without a sense of responsibility in the exercise of its
discretion.
(c) When the authority may not have complied with condition precedent laid down in the
statute itself for the exercise of that power.
(d) When the authority might have abdicated its powers to someone else or it may have acted
under the dictation of its superior.
(e) The authority may have imposed fetters on the exercise of its discretionary power.
123
(2006) 8 SCC 590.
191
The Supreme Court has rightly ruled in Abdul Razak Abdul Wahab v. Commissioner of
Police,124 that the fact of non-awareness of the administrative authority is a strong ground to
establish that the subjective satisfaction could not be arrived by the authority on the consideration
of relevant material. The Apex Court has laid emphasis on the fact that care should always be
taken to avoid mere copying of the words from the statute while making an order.
The court has reminded the fact that ordinarily and generally in a large number of cases, the
authority merely apprehends the dispute and do not go into the details of the material facts of the
case and arrive at a decision without the application of mind.
The analysis of the judgements of the Apex Court disclose that the judiciary has always laid
emphasis on the aspect that the authority vested with the discretionary power must exercise that
power with due care and caution after applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case.
Failure to exercise discretion in the absence of application of mind is illegal and liable to vitiate it
in the eyes of law. Justice Hidayatullah also took the same viewpoint in Barium Chemical Ltd. V.
Company Law Board,125 and observed: "No doubt the formation of opinion is subjective but
existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as the sine quo non for action must be
demonstrable. If the action is questioned on the ground that no circumstances leading to an
inference of the kind contemplated by the Section exists, the action might be exposed to inference
unless the existence of the circumstance is made out.”
J. Malice or Malafide
It is, undoubtedly, a settled principle that every power must be exercised in good faith. There
is a condition implied in the statute which creates power, namely that the power shall be used
bonafide for the purpose which it is conferred. Every action of the public authority is expected to
be supported by reason and good faith, objectivity, genuine satisfaction, reason and rationales. It
is not only the power but the duty of the court to ensure that all authorities exercise their powers
properly, lawfully and in good faith. If the powers are exercised with oblique motive, in bad faith
or for extraneous or irrelevant considerations, there is no exercise of power known to the law and
action cannot be termed as, action in accordance with law.
AIR 1967 SC 295; See Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee (1945)Nandlal v. Bar Council of Gujarat (1981), Jagannath v.
125
192
It is imperative to submit here that there is always a condition implied in the instruments
which create power that they shall exercise these powers for the purposes, for which they are
conferred in bonafide belief. Fundamental to the legitimacy of public decision making is the
principle that official decision must not be infected with motives such as fraud, dishonesty,
malice, personal self-interest, motive, etc.
1. Malice in Fact
2. Malice in Law
High degree of proof is required for review due to malice and mere allegations do not suffice. in
the absence of sufficient material, the court will not interfere, however, mala-fide exercise of
statutory power conferred on an authority is liable to be struck down if it is established by the
party who has alleged it so. (Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India, (2009) 2 SCC 592.)
The factors which are important in proof of mala fides:
A decision based on malice is always expected to be directed 'ad hominem' i.e. where a bye
law or order is made specially to thwart an individual for his cause. Malice may arise out of
personal or political animosity towards those who are directed by its exercise.269 The personal
animosity towards a party disqualify an adjudicator. To be true, malafide denotes ill will, corrupt
motive, dishonest intention in relation to the exercise of the statutory power. Strictly speaking, a
power is said to have been exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal enmity
towards those who are affected by its executions achieve an object other than that for which
authority believes the power to have been conferred. [See Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab (1964)]
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It is added here that the principle of mala fide cannot be alleged against the government
policies and the action taken by the administrative authorities in pursuance of the government
policies cannot be declared illegal, arbitrary or ultra-vires.
The decision given by the administrative authority is always open to challenge at the instance of
the aggrieved party if the power is exercised by it ostensibly for the purpose for which it was
conferred. The doctrine of colourable exercise of powers denotes an idea that the power exercised
by the administrative authority ostensibly for the authorised and but really to achieve some other
purpose. The courts have used this idiom to denounce an abuse of discretion which speaks that
under the 'colour' or 'guise' or power conferred for one purpose, the authorities seek to achieve
something else which is not authorised to do so under the law in question. The transgression made
by the authority in the guise of the colourable exercise of power vested in it may be patent,
manifest, or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and if be this latter class of the
cases that the expression 'colourable legislation' has been applied in many judicial
pronouncements. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although, a legislature in passing a
statute purports to act within the limit of is power, yet in substance and in reality, it transgresses
those powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears on proper examination to be a mere
pretence or disguise. (See Ashok Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 1792)
It may be pointed out here that if a lawful object is chosen as a colour or guise for doing
something other than genuinely achieving that object, the action would be termed as colourable
exercise of power and it cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as it is mala-fide exercise of the
power. [See State of Bihar v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 762].
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Unit V
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Introduction
It is an eternal principle of modern democratic Govt. that “the governing power wherever
located must be subject to the fundamental constitutional limitations.” Parliament’s inability to
exercise control over administrative powers essentially calls for control by judiciary. Parliament
could theoretically exercise this control, but in practice it could not, since it did not have the time.
Hence it became the duty of the Judges, though unelected, to become representatives of the people
and ensure that executive authorities do not abuse their powers, but instead use it in the public
interest.
But Judges too are not supposed to act arbitrarily. Hence a body of legal principles was
created (largely by Judges themselves in their judgments and not by Parliament) on the basis of
which Judges had to exercise their powers of judicial review of administrative action on settled
principles but not arbitrarily.
The objectives of judicial control over administrative actions are twofold: Control
Mechanism to curb administrative abuse of power, and remedies and relief to the person affected
by administrative action.
In Tata Cellular v. Union of India126 the Supreme Court laid down the following basic principles
relating to administrative law:
(2) the Court does not sit as a court of appeal over administrative decisions, but merely reviews
the manner in which the decisions were made;
(3) the Court does not have the expertise to correct administrative decisions. If a review of the
administrative decisions is permitted it will be substituting its own decision without the necessary
expertise, which itself may be fallible;
(4) a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for the administrative functioning.
(5) however, the administrative decision can be tested by application of the Wednesbury principle
of reasonableness, and must be free from arbitrariness, bias or mala fides.
126
(1994) 6 SCC 651
196
Statutory controls
Statutory controls are given in the statute (or rules or regulations made under the statute).
Any executive action in violation of the same will be declared illegal by the courts, by applying
the ultra vires doctrine.
Thus, where the London County Council had statutory powers to purchase and operate
tramways, it was held by the House of Lords that it had no power to run omnibuses, which was
not incidental to the running of tramways4 Similarly a local authority with the power to acquire
land other than "park, garden or pleasure house" acts in excess of jurisdiction in acquiring land
which is part of a park (White and Collins v. Minister of Health).127
An executive authority may also act unlawfully if it fails to perform a duty imposed upon
it by statute such as maintenance of civic services (e.g. sewerage, drainage, water supply, etc.) by
the Municipalities or other local bodies whose duty under the statute is to maintain such services.
Here also a mandamus will issue from the courts to compel such authority to perform its statutory
duty.
Where the statute delegates a power to a particular authority, that authority cannot sub-
delegate that power to another authority or person unless the statute permits such sub-delegation.
Difficulty, however, arises in the matter of what is called "subjective discretion" conferred
by the statute. An instance of such subjective discretion is where the statute says that an executive
authority can take such decision "as it deems fit". Another example is where the statute says that
action can be taken or order passed where the authority has "reasonable grounds to believe" to
take that action or pass such order e.g. Section 132 of the Income Tax Act which confers power
on the Commissioner of Income Tax to order search and seizure where he has "reason to believe"
that some person is concealing his income.
127
(1939) 2 KB 838
197
"If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or
association, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained."
The detenu Liversidge challenged the detention order passed against him by the Secretary
of State. The majority of the House of Lords, except Lord Atkin, held that the Court could not
interfere because the Secretary of State had mentioned in his order that he had reasonable cause to
believe that Liversidge was a person of hostile origin or association. Liversidge8 was delivered
during the Second World War when the executive authority had unbridled powers to detain a
person without even disclosing to the Court on what basis the Secretary had reached to his belief.
However, subsequently, the British courts accepted Lord Atkin's dissenting view that there must
be some relevant material on the basis of which the satisfaction of the Secretary of State could be
formed. Also, the discretion must be exercised keeping in view the purpose for which it was
conferred and the object sought to be achieved, and must be exercised within the four corners of
the statute.
Sometimes a power is coupled with a duty. Thus, a limited judicial review against administrative
action is always available to the courts.
Non-statutory controls
(c) Proportionality
Promissory estoppel
128
1942 AC 206
198
The government can enter into a contract just like any other individual or entity. Today,
state officials make promises to individual parties who enter into commitments on the basis of
these promises, only to find that the government’s discretion cannot be relied upon. The defence
of statutory provisions provide sufficient umbrage for the government to go back on promises.
Therefore, in this time of escalating administrative and executive facets of the State, the doctrine
of promissory estoppel has gained considerable importance in the field of administrative law.
The foundation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in India, as such, was laid down in the ratio
of Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay.129 Chandrashekar Aiyer
J., in this case, expressed the following view:
“But even otherwise, that is if there was merely the holding out of a promise that no rent
will be charged in the future, the Government must be deemed in the circumstances of this case to
have bound themselves to fulfil it. Courts must do justice by the promotion of honesty and good
faith, as far as it lies in their power”.
Nevertheless, it was in the case of Union of India vs. Anglo Afghan Agencies130 that there
was a manifest depiction of the newfound stress on the principles of equity under the doctrine.
The Government of India announced certain concessions with regard to the import of certain raw
materials in order to encourage export of woollen garments to Afghanistan. Subsequently, only
partial concessions and not full concessions were extended as announced. The Supreme Court
applied the rule of estoppel based on equity and maintained that such promises may bind the
Government even in the absence of constitutional formalities prescribed for government contracts.
The Anglo Afghan case depicted a judicial trend. The key to this trend was to be found in the
following statement of the Supreme Court:
“If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards of conduct for the people and public
bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted”
129
1952 SCR 43
130
1968 SCR (2) 366
199
However, the judicial attitude in the matter of applying promissory estoppel in the post
Anglo Afghan period with respect to applying promissory estoppel against administrative
remained ambivalent. The doctrine was applied in some cases, and not in others.
It was in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v Uttar Pradesh131 that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel was expounded afresh and given its most liberal interpretation by the Supreme Court. In
this case, the Government of U. P. notified a sales tax exemption for three years to all new
industrial units with a view to increase industrial progress. The appellant company wanted to avail
of the exemption by setting up a hydrogen plant for Vanaspati manufacturing. In answer to the
appellant company’s enquiry, the Director of Industries confirmed the tax concession as
announced by the government. The appellant company thereupon took steps towards getting
finances for the project and the necessary machinery. The Chief Secretary and advisor to the
government made a further oral assurance about the exemption from sales tax as well as gave a
written confirmation. Later, the government announced only partial sales tax concessions. The
appellant agreed to these concessions. At an even later date, however, the government rescinded
the concessional rates and the appellant company challenged it. The facts necessary for invoking
the doctrine of promissory estoppel were, therefore, clearly present and the Government was
bound to carry out the representation and exempt the appellant from sales tax in respect of sales of
Vanaspati effected by it in Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of
commencement of the production. The Government was held bound to the principle of promissory
estoppel to make good the prosecution made by it.
The importance of equity was emphasised as it was held that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel was not really based on the principle of estoppel and instead was evolved by equity in
order to prevent injustice.
It was pronounced that there was no reason why the doctrine should be given only a
limited application by way of defence and that it could be the basis of cause of action. In addition,
Justice Bhagwati stated :
“The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision, that where the
Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and,
in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held
bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the
instance of the promise, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the
131
1979 AIR 621
200
promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the
Constitution.”
Another important aspect of the doctrine of promissory estoppel that was argued in this
case was the complexity that arose with the conflicting doctrine of executive necessity. The
doctrine of executive necessity prevents the government from contracting with another party to
refrain from exercising its statutory functions. Since the term ‘statutory functions’ is a very broad
one, this is a major constraint to the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to
government contracts.
It was held that the doctrine could not be defeated on the plea of executive necessity or
freedom of future executive action. There is, however, much controversy regarding this particular
decision as there is a conflicting decision in the case of Shri Bakul Oil Industries v State of
Gujarat.132 In that case, the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 49 (2) of
the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 exempting wholly or partly from payment of sales tax or
purchase tax, as the case may be, certain specified classes of sales and purchases in order to
stimulate wider distribution of industrial units in rural areas. The appellant company set up a plant
for decorticating and crushing cotton and groundnut seeds for manufacture of oil. The plant and
the appellant company satisfied all the requirements laid out in the notification. When the
appellant company applied for the exemption, the government rejected the offer and amended the
notification saying that this particular category of plants is sufficiently well distributed in rural
areas. The appellant company challenged the rejection in Court. The doctrine of promissory
estoppel was not applied and it was held that the government was not estopped from amending the
notification.
Though the facts are almost similar, the decisions in these two cases are in conflict with
each other. This presents a divergence of opinion. In recent times, there has been a leaning
towards the decision in Shri Bakul Oil Industries v State of Gujarat because there has been an
increasing tendency of the Courts to apply the doctrine of executive necessity in cases involving
changes in public policy. This virtually makes the doctrine of executive necessity an effective
defence against the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
132
1987 AIR 142
201
The doctrine of legitimate expectation belongs to the domain of public law. It is proposed
to give relief to the people when they are not able to justify their claims on the basis of law. As
they had suffered a civil consequence because their legitimate expectation had been violated.
Lord Denning first used the term ‘legitimate expectation’ in 1969 and from that time it has
assumed the position of a significant doctrine of public law in almost all jurisdiction. In India, this
doctrine had been developed by the court in order to check the arbitrary exercise of power by the
administrative authorities. According to private law a person can approach the court only when his
right based on statute or contract is violated, but this rule of locus standi is relaxed in public law to
allow standing even when a legitimate expectation from a public authority is not fulfilled. This
doctrine grants a central space between ‘no claim’ and a ‘legal claim’ wherein a public authority
can be made accountable on the ground of an expectation, which is legitimate. For example, if the
Government has made a scheme for providing drinking water in villages in certain area but later
on changed it so as to exclude certain village from the purview of the scheme then in such a case
what is violated is the legitimate expectation of the people in the excluded villages for tap water
and the government can be held responsible if exclusion is not fair and reasonable. Thus, this
doctrine becomes a part of the principles of natural justice and no one can be deprived of this
legitimate expectation without following the principles of natural justice.
In the bulk of the administrative law the doctrine of legitimate expectation is also a fine
example of judicial creativity. Nevertheless, it is not extra-legal and extra-constitutional. A natural
habitat for this doctrine can be found in Article 14 of the Constitution which abhors arbitrariness
and insists on fairness in all administrative dealings. It is now firmly established that the
protection of Article 14 is available not only in case of arbitrary ‘class legislation, but also in case
of arbitrary ‘State action’. Thus, the doctrine is being hailed as a fine principle of administrative
jurisprudence for reconciling power with liberty. (Food Corporation of India V. Kamdhenu Cattle
Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601).
In India the first reference to the doctrine is made in State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan
Pillai133 In this case, the government had issued a sanction to the respondents to open a new
unaided school and to upgrade the existing ones. However, after 15 days a direction was issued to
keep the sanction in abeyance. This order was challenged on the ground of violation of the
principles of natural justice. The court held that the sanction order created legitimate expectation
133
AIR 1989 SC 49
202
in the respondents which was violated by the second order without following the principles of
natural justice which is sufficient to vitiate an administrative order.
The doctrine was also applied in SC and WS Welfare Association v. State of Karnataka,134
in this case the government had had issued a notification notifying areas where slum clearance
scheme will be introduced. However, the notification was subsequently amended and certain areas
notified earlier were left out. The court held that the earlier notification had raised legitimate
expectation in the people living in an area, which had been left out in a subsequent notification,
and hence legitimate expectations cannot be denied without a fair hearing.
Thus, where a person has legitimate expectation to be treated in a particular way, which falls
short of an enforceable right, the administrative authority cannot deny his legitimate expectations
without a fair hearing. Legitimate expectation of fair hearing may arise by a promise or by an
established practice.
The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corp.135 got the
opportunity of laying down the meaning and scope of this doctrine. Explaining the meaning of the
doctrine and the legitimacy of the doctrine when it arises, the court held that, “time is a threefold
present: the present as we experience it, the past as a present memory and future as a present
expectation. For legal purpose, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different
from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right.
However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may
look to them to fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertible expectation and a
mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope cannot amount to a
legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on
the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in a natural and regular
sequence. Again, it is distinguishable from a mere expectation. Such expectation should be
justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify
into a right and, therefore, it does not amount to a right in a conventional sense.”
In this case in the absence of any fixed procedure for fixing price and quantity for the
supply of food grains, the Government adopted a dual pricing system i.e., lower price for big
suppliers and higher price for small suppliers in the public interest in order to break the cartel.
134
(1991) 2 SCC 604
135
(1993) 3 SCC 499
203
The Court held that there is no denial of legitimate expectation, as it is not based on any
law, custom or past practice. The court said that it is not possible to give an exhaustive list
wherein legitimate expectations arise but by and large they arise in promotion cases, though not
guaranteed as a statutory right, in cases of contracts, distribution of charges by the government
and in somewhat similar situations.
The court also held that legitimate expectation gives sufficient locus standi to the applicant
for judicial review. The doctrine is to be confined mostly to a right of fair hearing before a
decision, which results in negating a promise, or withdrawing an undertaking is taken.
Under articles 32 and 226, the Supreme Court and high courts have the power to issues
directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari. The rights to be enforced through such writs must be against the
State, except in the case of the writ of habeas corpus, which may be issued even against a private
person who might have detained another person illegally.
204
Article 32, which itself is fundamental right, is invoked for the enforcement of
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. Whereas the high courts have the
power to issue writs not only for the enforcement of the fundamental rights but also 'for any other
purposes'. The jurisdiction of the high courts under Article 226 is wider in scope than the Supreme
Court under Article 32.
Traditionally, the phrase 'for any other purpose' has been interpreted to mean, enforcement of any
statutory or Common Law rights. The proposition that purely contractual matters cannot be
enforced through writ jurisdiction is no more accepted as a general proposition. Over the years,
the judicial interference with respect to the contractual matters of the government has been on
increase to ensure fairness in actions. For instance, claim under an insurance policy or
arbitrariness in distribution of largess by the State through contract can be enforced in the high
courts through writ petitions.
The jurisdictions under Articles 32 and 226 are concurrent and independent of each other
so far as fundamental rights are concerned. There is choice of forum. One may move either the
Supreme Court under article 32 or an appropriate high court under article 226. The position,
hitherto, has been that a petitioner seeking to enforce fundamental right can come straight to the
Supreme Court without going to the high court first. The Supreme Court's power to provide
appropriate remedy is not discretionary but a matter of right. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar
Union v. Union of India136Chandrachud, C.J., said:
“The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 32 is an important part of the basic
structure of the Constitution because it is meaningless to confer fundamental rights without
providing an effective remedy for their enforcement, if and when they are violated.”
The jurisdiction of high courts to entertain writ petition is discretionary. It is far more
discretionary in respect of 'any other purposes'. The legal position in this respect has been
summarized in T. P. Mahajan v. Union of India137 in the following words:
“The power of the High Court to act under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary.
It is a supervisory power, which is to be contrasted with an appellate power. While appeal is a
matter of right, the collateral attack on administrative action under Article 226 is not so.”
136
1981 AIR 344
137
(1973) 1 S.L.R. 436
205
The courts in India have developed rules and norms to regulate writ jurisdiction. There are
various grounds on which the high court may refuse to entertain a writ petition. For instance, the
high court would have to scrutinize the conduct of the petitioner. If he comes to court with
unclean hands, the High Court may refuse to entertain his petition. For, the high court is acting in
the exercise of its extraordinary original jurisdiction only with a view to granting expeditious
relief in the interest of justice. It cannot be compelled to entertain writ petitions when it is of the
view that the interests of justice do not favour such a course.
Other grounds on which writ petition may be refused are as follows: (i) Res judicata (ii)
Inordinate delay (iii) Exhaustion of alternative remedies (iv) If involved a question of disputed
facts or interpretation of law within jurisdiction.
Kinds of Writs
Habeas Corpus
Habeas Corpus is a Latin term which may be translated into English in some such form as “you
must. have the body”. Writ of habeas corpus is used primarily to secure the release of a person
who has been detained unlawfully or without any legal justification. By means of this writ an
individual, who has been deprived of his personal liberty by any executive act, may have the
validity of such act tested, before a superior court. The object of the writ is to ascertain whether
there is any legal justification for the detention of the person in custody.
A detention becomes unlawful not only where there is no law to justify it but also where
procedure prescribed by the law which authorities the detention has not been followed, and, in
determining whether such procedure has been complied with, the court applies a strict standard
not only in interpreting the terms of the statute but also in exacting a strict compliance with the
requirements, so interpreted, in fact.
Shastri C.J., in Ram Narayan v. State of Delhi138 observed “Those who feel called upon to
deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their
duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the form and rules of the law. That has not been done
in this case. The petitioners now before us are, therefore, entitled to be released, and they are set at
liberty forthwith.”
138
(1953) SCR 652
206
The efficacy of the writ of habeas corpus, depends to a large extent, on the operative part
of the law under which the freedom of an individual has been curtailed. As for example, the
preventive detention law gives power to the executive to detain a person in preventive detention in
its discretion and thus the scope left for the courts to review the validity of such a detention is very
restricted. Habeas corpus cannot be granted where a person has been committed to custody under
an order from a competent' court when prima facie the order does not appear to be without
jurisdiction or wholly illegal.
The purpose for which the writ of habeas corpus may be issued may include;
(i) testing the regularity of detention under preventive detention laws and any other law;
(ii) securing the custody of a minor; (iii) securing the custody of a person alleged to be a lunatic;
(iv) securing the custody of a marriage partner; (v) testing the regularity of detention for a breach
of privilege by the House; (vi) testing the regularity of detention under court martial; (vii) testing
the regularity of detention by the executive during emergency, etc.
Besides, these traditional grounds for which the writ of habeas corpus may be issued,
Krishna Iyer J. in Sunil Batra II v. Delhi Administration,139 opened new vistas for the issuance of
this writ. Batra II case arose out of a letter written by a convict to one of the judges of the
Supreme Court alleging inhuman torture to a fellow convict. Krishna Iyer J. treated this letter as a
petition of habeas corpus filed on behalf of Prem Chand though the letter had not demanded his
release from the jail. The learned judge followed a series of American cases,304 employing the
writ of habeas corpus for the neglect of state penal facilities like overcrowding, understaffing, in
sanitary facilities, brutality, constant fear of violence, lack of adequate medical and mental health,
censorship of mail, inhuman isolation, segregation, inadequate or non-existent rehabilitative or
educational opportunities. The writ was also issued when a ban was imposed on law students to
conduct interviews with prisoners for affording them legal relief.
The writ is issued to the authority which has the aggrieved ‘r person in its custody. A
prayer for the writ may be made by the prisoner himself or in case he is unable to do so, by
someone else on his behalf.
Quo-Warranto
Quo Warranto means, “by warrant or authority". it is a judicial order issued by the
Supreme Court or a High Court by which any person who occupies or usurps an independent
139
AIR 1980 SC 1579
207
public office or franchise or liberty, is asked to show by what right he claims it, so that the title to
the office, franchise or liberty may be settled and any unauthorised person ousted. The writ of quo
warrant is used to judicially control executive action in the matter of making appointments to
public offices under relevant statutory provisions. The writ is also used to protect a citizen from
the holder of a public office to which he has no right. Furthermore, it tunes the administration by
removing inefficient and unqualified personal and imposters from public offices. Thus, the writ of
quo warranto gives personal and imposters from public officers Thus, the writ of quo warranto
gives the judiciary a weapon to control the executive, the legislature statutory and non-statutory
bodies in matters of appointments to public officers. Conversely, it protects a citizen from being
deprived of a public office to which he had a right. The writ calls upon the holder of a public
office to show to the court under what authority he is holding the office, the court may restrain
him from acting in the office and may also declare the office to be vacant.
Conditions:
a) Office must be a public office- The Madras High Court in Anand Bihari v. Ram Sahai,140
held that a public office is one which is created by the Constitution or a statute and the
duties of which must' be such in which the public is interested.
b) Public office must be substantive in nature- A substantive office is one which is permanent
in character and is not terminable at will. In R. v. Speyer,141 the word ‘substantive’ was
interpreted to mean an “office independent of title".
c) The Person must be in actual possession of the office- Mere declaration that a person is
elected to an office or mere appointment to a particular office is not sufficient for the issue
of quo warranto unless such person actually accepts such office.
140
AIR 1952 Mad. 31
141
(1916)1 K B 595.
208
d) The office must be held in contravention of Law- There must be a clear violation of law in
the appointment of a person to the public office. If there is a mere irregularity, quo
warranto will not lie.
Mandamus
Mandamus literally means a command. “It commands the person to whom it is addressed
to perform some public or quasi-public legal duty which he has refused to perform and the
performance of which cannot be enforced by any other adequate legal remedy...” where any
tribunal inferior court or body of persons charged with the performance of a public duty do not
discharge that duty, mandamus lies to compel him to do it.”
Thus, the function of the mandamus is to keep the public authorities within the limits of
their jurisdiction while exercising public functions. However, a writ of mandamus cannot be
issued to direct the government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something
which is contrary to law.
Mandamus can be issued to any kind of authority is respect of any kind of function
administrative, legislative, quasi-judicial, judicial. The Supreme Court in Mansukhla lVithaldas v.
State of Gujarat,142 has observed that mandamus which is a discretionary relief under Article 226
is requested to be issued inter alia, to compel performance of public duties which may be
administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. In Birender Kumar v. Union of India,143 when the
Telephone of the applicant was wrongly disconnected in spite of his paying his dues regularly, the
Calcutta High Court directed the telephone authorities to restore the connection within a week.
142
AIR 1997 SC 3400.
143
AIR 1983 Cal, 273
209
Conditions:
a) There must be public law duty- Mandamus is used to enforce the performance of public
duties by public authorities. Mandamus is not issued when the government is under no
duty under the law. Mandamus cannot be issued to enforce administrative direction which
do not have the force of law, hence it is discretionary that the authority accept it or reject
it. But where the administrative instructions are binding mandamus would lie to enforce
them.
b) Petitioner must have a right to enforce the duty- To maintain a petition for mandamus, the
petitioner must show that he has a right to compel the government to act in a particular
manner. In the absence of any such right, mandamus cannot be issued.
c) There had been a demand and refusal- For the issue of mandamus against an
administrative authority the affected individual must demand justice and only on refusal he
has a right to approach the court. Thus, a writ of mandamus does not lie in the absence of
demand and justice. (State of Haryana v. Channan Mal AIR 1976 SC 1654).
d) The Writ petition is filed bonafide and is good faith- the courts have held that the law is
well settled that they will not interfere at the instance of a person who does not approach
the court with clean hands an abuse the process of the court.
‘Certiorari' is a late Latin word, being the passive form of the word ‘certiorari’ meaning to
'inform'.
It may be defined as a judicial order operating by the Supreme Court or High Court to any
Constitutional, statutory, or non-statutory body or person, requiring the records of any action to be
certified by the court and dealt with according to law.
Similarly, writ of prohibition is a judicial order issued by the Supreme Court or a High
Court to any constitutional, statutory or non-statutory agency to prevent these agencies from
continuing their proceedings in excess or abuse of their jurisdiction or in violation of the
principle’s of natural justice or in contravention of the law of the land.
These writs are designed to prevent the excess of powers by public authorities. Therefore,
these writs are corrective in nature. Certiorari and Prohibition are much in common, both in scope
and the rules by which they are governed. Both are issued on similar grounds. But there is no
fundamental difference between the two. Certiorari is issued to quash a decision already made and
210
so it is issued at a stage when the proceedings have terminated and the authority has given a final
decision to quash the decision. Prohibition is issued when the matter has not been disposed of but
is being considered by the body concerned. The function of prohibition is to prohibit the body
concerned from proceeding with the matter further. Thus, prohibition is issued at a stage when the
proceedings are in progress to forbid the authority from continuing the proceedings.
Grounds:
Article 227(1) gives to high courts the power of superintendence over all courts and
tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. A high court may
call for returns or make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and
proceedings of these courts and tribunals. The court may also prescribe the forms in which
officers of such courts and tribunals shall keep books, entries and accounts. Thus high courts have
power of superintendence not only with respect to judicial but also administrative matters. The
court under article 227 does not sit in appeal and is not concerned with decision but with the
decision-making process.
The scope of Article 227, in some respects, is wider than Article 226. A High Court may
exercise jurisdiction suo moto under article 227 but not so under Article 226. Also, under Article
226, High court merely quashes the decision of a tribunal but under Article 227, it can issue
directions as to manner in which it would proceed or it can pass such a decision or direction as the
inferior court or tribunal should have passed. But this distinction between writ jurisdiction and
power of superintendence is narrowing down.
In the landmark case, Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh144 the Supreme Court not
only sent the matter of dismissal of employee back to the tribunal but also imposed punishment on
144
AIR 1983 SC 454
211
the delinquent employee in proportion to the gravity of misconduct. However, jurisdiction under
Article 226 can be exercised against administrative and quasi-judicial actions whereas under
Article 227, it can be exercised against judicial and quasi-judicial functions. The wider
interpretation of quasi-judicial bodies would bring into it various administrative bodies as well.
Under Article 136, the Supreme Court, in its discretion, can grant special leave to appeal
to it from any judgment, decree, determination sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. The court's jurisdiction under Article 136 is
of an exceptional nature. It is to be used only in an extraordinary and exceptional situation
whenever there is a miscarriage of justice. Some of the circumstances in which the court interferes
under article 136 are excess of jurisdiction, failure to exercise jurisdiction, error of law, violation
of principles of natural justice or accepted principles of jurisprudence, etc. Again, in the matter of
findings of fact the court interferes only in special circumstances, e.g., complete lack of evidence.
The law of injunction has been provided for by the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter,
the Act), and is also regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in India.
212
Declaration
It may be defined as a judicial remedy which conclusively determines the rights and
obligations of public and private persons and authorities without the addition of any coercive or
directory decree. It is a discretionary remedy and may be refused if it would be infructuous, or if
an adequate alternative exists or on other equitable consideration.
Conditions:
Whenever any person has been wronged by the action of an administrator, he can file a
suit for damages against such authority. Such a suit is filed in the civil court in the first instance
and its procedure is regulated by Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The requirement of two months’
notice is mandatory under Section 80 of CPC, unless waived by court under special
circumstances. The principles governing the calculation of quantum of damages are the same as
that of private individuals.
Liability of Government
Introduction
In England, the Government was never considered as an ‘honest man.’ It is fundamental
to the rule of law that the Crown, like other public authorities, should bear its fair share of legal
liability and be answerable for wrongs done to its subjects. The immense expansion of
governmental activity from the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards made it intolerable
for the Government, in the name of the Crown, to enjoy exemption from the ordinary law. English
law has always clung to the theory that the King is subject to law and, accordingly, can commit
breach thereof. As far as 700 years ago, Bracton had observed: “The King is not under man, but
under God and under the law, because it is the law that makes the King.” Though theoretically
there was no difficulty in holding the King liable for any illegal act, there were practical problems.
Rights depend upon remedies and there was no human agency to enforce law against the King. All
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the courts in the country were his courts and he could not be sued in his own courts without his
consent. He could be plaintiff but never be made defendant. No writ could be issued nor could any
order be enforced against him. As ‘the King can do no wrong’, whenever the administration was
badly conducted, it was not the King who was at fault but his Ministers, who must have given him
faulty advice. But after the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, the Crown can now be placed in the
position of an ordinary litigant.
In India, history has traced different path. The maxim ‘the King can do no wrong’ has
never been accepted in India. The Union and the States are legal persons and they can be held
liable for breach of contract and in tort. They can file suits and suits can be filed against them.
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
Constitutional Provisions
Contractual liability of the Union of India and States is recognized by the Constitution
itself. Article 298 expressly provides that the executive power of the Union and of each State shall
extend to the carrying on of any trade or business and the acquisition, holding and disposal of
property and the making of contracts for any purpose. Article 299(1) prescribes the mode or
manner of execution of such contracts. It reads:
‘All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall
be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and
all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be
executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he
may direct or authorize.’
Requirements
Reading the aforesaid provision, it becomes clear that Article 299 lays down the following
conditions and requirements which must be fulfilled in contracts made by or with the Union or a
State:
1. Every contract must be expressed to be made by the President or the Governor (as
the case may be);
2. Every contract must be executed by a person authorized by the President or the
Governor (as the case may be); and
3. Every contract must be expressed in the name of President or the Governor (as the
case may be).
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Written Contract
A contract to be valid under Article 299(1), must be in writing. The words ‘expressed to be
made’ and ‘executed’ in this article clearly go to show that the must be a formal written contract
executed by a duly authorized person. Consequently, if there is an oral contract, the same is not
binding on the Government. This is not a mere formality but a substantial requirement of law and
must be fulfilled. It, however, does not mean that there must be a formal agreement properly
signed by a duly authorized officer of the Government and the second party. The words
'expressed' and ‘executed’ have not been literally and technically construed.
In Union of India v. N.K. (P) Ltd., the Director was authorized to enter into a contract on
behalf of the President. The contract was entered into by the Secretary, Railway Board. The
Supreme Court held that the contract was entered into by an officer not authorized for the said
purpose and it was not a valid and binding contract. Expression in the name of President
(Governor)
The last requirement is that such a contract must be expressed in the name of the President
or the Governor, as the case may be. Thus, even though such a contract is made by an officer
authorized by the Government in this behalf, it is still not enforceable against the Government if it
is not expressed to be made on behalf of the President or the Governor.
In Bhikraj Jaipuria, the contracts entered into by the Divisional Superintendent were not
expressed to be made on behalf of the Governor-General. Hence, the Court held that they
we’re not enforceable even though they were entered into by an authorized person.
Non-compliance: Effect
The provisions of Article 299(1) are mandatory and not directory and they must be
complied with. They are not inserted merely for the sake of form, but to protect the Government
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Formerly, the view taken by the Supreme Court was that in case of non-compliance with
the provisions of Article 299(1), a suit could not be filed against the Government as the contract
was not enforceable, but the Government could accept the liability by ratifying it. But in
Mulamchand v. State of M.P, the Supreme Court held that if the contract was not in accordance
with the constitutional provisions, in the eye of the law, there was no contract at all and the
question of ratification did not arise. Therefore, even the provisions of S. 230(3) of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 would not apply to such a contract and it could not be enforced against the
government officer in his personal capacity.
Quasi-contractual Liability
The provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution [Section 175(3) of the Government of
India Act, 1935] are mandatory and if they are not complied with, the contract is not enforceable
in a court of law at the instance of any of the contracting parties. In these circumstances, with a
view to protecting innocent persons, courts have applied the provisions of Section 70 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 and held the Government liable to compensate the other contracting party on
the basis of quasi-contractual liability. What Section 70 provides is that if the goods delivered are
accepted or the work done is voluntarily enjoyed, then the liability to pay compensation for the
enjoyment of the said goods or the acceptance of the said work arises. Thus, where a claim for
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compensation is made by one person against another under Section 70, it is not on the basis of
any subsisting contract between the parties, but on the basis of the fact that something was done
by one party for the other and the said work so done has been voluntarily accepted by the other
party. Thus, Section 70 of the Contract Act prevents ‘unjust enrichment.’ Before Section 70 of the
Contract Act is invoked, the following conditions must be fulfilled:
• A person must have lawfully done something for another person or deliver something to him;
• He must not have intended to do such act gratuitously; and
• The other person must have accepted the act or enjoyed the benefit.
If these three conditions are fulfilled the section enjoins on the person receiving benefit to pay
compensation to the other party.
In Quasi-contractual Liability:
The provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution [Section 175(3) of the Government of
India Act, 1935] are mandatory and if they are not complied with, the contract is not enforceable
in a court of law at the instance of any of the contracting parties.
In these circumstances, with a view to protecting innocent persons, courts have applied for
provisions of Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and held the Government liable to
compensate the other contracting party on the basis of quasi-contractual liability. What Section 70
provides is that if the goods delivered are accepted or the work done is voluntarily enjoyed, then
the liability to pay compensation for the enjoyment of the said goods or the acceptance of the said
work arises. Thus, where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under
Section 70, it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between the parties, but on the basis of
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the fact that something was done by one party for the other and the said work so done has been
voluntarily accepted by the other party. Thus, Section 70 of the Contract Act prevents ‘unjust
enrichment.’ Before Section 70 of the Contract Act is invoked, the following conditions must be
fulfilled:
• A person must have lawfully done something for another person or deliver
something to him;
• He must not have intended to do such act gratuitously; and
• The other person must have accepted the act or enjoyed the benefit.
If these three conditions are fulfilled the section enjoins on the person receiving benefit to
pay compensation to the other party.
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Contract of Service
A contract of service between State and a private person is not governed by Article 299 of
the Constitution. At the initial stage of appointment in Government service, no doubt, there is a
contract between the parties. There is an offer and acceptance of employment. But once a person
is appointed, he/she acquires a status and the relationship no more governs by a contract, but by an
appropriate Legislation or Rules under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution.
In the leading case of Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court stated: “It is true that Article 311 imposes constitutional restrictions upon the
power of removal granted to the President and the Governor under Article 310. But it is obvious
that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of
service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different,
something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship
voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and in the
enforcement of these duties’ society has an interest.
In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which
powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties
concerned.”
Unconscionable Contracts
If a contract between an individual and a Government contains a clause which is arbitrary,
unreasonable, unconscionable or opposed to public policy. It cannot be enforced by a court of law.
Thus, a condition in a service contract that service of a permanent employee can be
terminated by paying three months’ salary cannot be enforced. Similarly, a provision in a contract
of service empowering the employer to terminate services of an Air Hostess on her first pregnancy
must be held to be extremely arbitrary, unreasonable and abhorrent to all notions of civilized
society. Again, en messe termination of all Government Counsel without assigning any reason is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution even if the action is in accordance with a term of the
contract. On the same principle, all allotments made in favour of several persons granting licence
to run petrol pumps cannot be cancelled. Even in contractual matters, the Government cannot act
unreasonably.
Statutory Contracts
Article 299 of the Constitution applies to a contract made by the Government in exercise
of executive powers and not in exercise of statutory powers. Thus, there is a distinction between
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contracts entered into between Government and a private party in exercise of ‘executive powers’
and in exercise of ‘statutory powers’ of the State. The rights and liabilities of the parties in a
contract entered into between Government and an individual in exercise of the executive powers
of the State are governed by Article 299 of the Constitution but the rights and liabilities of the
parties in a contract government by a statutory provisions are governed by the relevant statute
under which such contract is entered into. Article 299 of the Constitution has no application to
such contracts.
Since the State is a legal entity and not a living personality, it has to act through human
agency, i.e. through its servants. When we discuss the tortuous liability of the State, it is really the
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liability of the State for the tortious acts of its servants that has to be considered. In other words, it
refers to when the State can be held vicariously liable for the wrongs committed by its servants or
employees. Vicarious liability refers to a situation where one person is held liable for act or
omission of another person. Thus, the master may be held liable for the torts committed by his
servant in the course of employment.
. Socialisation of Compensation
There is no reason why this doctrine should not be applied to the Crown in respect of torts
committed by its servants. In fact, if the Crown is not held vicariously liable for such torts, the
aggrieved party, even though it had sustained a legal injury, would be without any effective
remedy, inasmuch as the government servant may not have sufficient means to satisfy the
judgment and decree passed against him.
Constitutional Provisions
Under Article 294(b) of the Constitution, the liability of the Union Government or a State
Government may arise ‘out of any contract or otherwise.’ The word 'otherwise' suggests that the
said liability may arise in respect of tortuous acts also. Under Article 300(1), the extent of such
liability is fixed. It provides that the liability of the Union of India or of a State Government will
be the same as that of the Dominion of India and the Provinces before the commencement of the
Constitution (if this Constitution had not been enacted).
In State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati, a jeep was owned and maintained by the State of
Rajasthan for the official use of the Collector of a district. Once the driver of the jeep was
bringing it back from the workshop, after repairs. By his rash and negligent driving of the jeep a
pedestrian was knocked down. He died and his widow sued the driver and the State for damages.
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held the State vicariously liable for the rash and
negligent act of the driver.
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The court after referring to the P & O Steam Navigation Co. did not go into the wider
question as to whether the act was a sovereign act or not. But it held that the rule of immunity
based on the English law had no validity in India.
The Court, in subsequent cases, decided to look into the matter of whether the act was
sovereign or not. The principle which emerges is that if the function involved is a ‘sovereign
function’, the State cannot be held liable in tort, but if it is a ‘non-sovereign function’, the State
will be held liable. But the difficulty lies in formulating a definite test or criterion to decide to
which category the act belongs. In fact, it is very difficult to draw a distinction between the two.
‘The watertight compartmentalization of the State's functions into sovereign and non-sovereign or
governmental and non-governmental is unsound and highly reminiscent of the laissez faire era.’
The test whether the act in question could have been performed only by the government or
also by a private individual is also not helpful in deciding the issue. In a welfare State, the
governmental functions have increased and today, not all the functions performed by the
Government are sovereign functions; e.g. commercial activities like the running of the Railways.
It is also said that if the act in question is statutory, it may be regarded as a sovereign
function, but it is a non-sovereign function if it is non-statutory. But this test is equally defective.
An activity may be regarded as sovereign even though it has no statutory basis (power to enter
into a treaty with a foreign country) and conversely, it may be regarded as non-sovereign even
though it has a statutory basis (running of Railways).
Moreover, sometimes a particular act may be held to be a sovereign function by one court
but non-sovereign by another. For example, running of the Railways was held to be a sovereign
function by the High Court of Bombay, but non-sovereign by the High Court of Calcutta and this
may lead to further uncertainty in law.
Further, the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity has no relevance in the modern age
when the concept of sovereignty itself has undergone drastic change. The old and archaic concept
of sovereignty no longer survives. Sovereignty now vests in the people. Hence, even such actions
of the Government which are solely concerned with relations between two independent States are
now amenable to scrutiny by courts. Sometimes the distinction between sovereign and non-
sovereign functions is categorized as regal and non-regal functions. The former is confined to
legislative, executive and judicial power whereas the latter can be characterized as analogous to
private company. In the former, the Government is not liable but, in the latter, it is liable.
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Again, the concept of public interest has also undergone change. No legal or political
system today can place the State above law and can deprive its citizens of life, liberty or property
by negligent acts of its officers without providing any remedy. Even if the governmental functions
can be classified into one or the other category, the principle is unsatisfactory from yet another
viewpoint. Generally, in a civil action in tort, the principal idea is to compensate the aggrieved
person and not to penalize the wrongdoer or his master. And if in compensating the aggrieved
party, the wrongdoer or his master has to pay damages, the resultant burden on the latter is merely
incidental and not by way of penalty or punishment. It is, therefore, absurd and inhumane to hold
that the Government would not be liable if a military truck supplying meal to military personnel
struck a citizen, but it would be liable if such an accident occurred when the truck carried coal to
an army headquarters.
In Challah Ramakonda Reddy v. State of A.P, It was held that plea of sovereignty was not
applicable, where there was a violation of Fundamental Rights of the Citizens.
In Neela bhathi Behra v. State of orissa, the court held that a claim in public law for
compensation for violation of Human rights and Fundamental freedoms, the protection remedy for
enforcement and protection of such a right, is distinct from and in addition to the remedy in
private law damages for torts. The court expressly held that Principle of sovereign immunity does
not apply to the public law remedies under Article 32 and 226 for the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights.
The distinction between public and private law and the remedies under the two has been
emphasised in Common Cause, A registered society v. UOI, It was held that “where public
functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of Fundamental rights or the
enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the public law
notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under private law.”
Conclusion
Recent judicial trend is, undoubtedly, in favour of holding the State liable in respect of
tortious acts committed by its servants. In cases of police brutalities, wrongful arrest and
detention, keeping the under-trial prisoners in jail for long periods, committing assault or beating
up prisoners, etc. the courts have awarded compensation to the victims or to the heirs and legal
representatives of the deceased. As a matter of fact, the courts have severely criticized the
inhuman attitude adopted by the State officials.
The Law Commission also stated: “The old distinction between sovereign and non-
sovereignfunctions should no longer be invoked to determine liability of the State.”
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UNIT VI
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY
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Introduction
No statute or court has ever attempted or been asked to define the expression‘public
corporation.’ It has no regular form and no specialized function. It is employed wherever it is
convenient to confer corporate personality. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, John Marshall
stated: “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in the
contemplation of the law. Being the mere creature of the law, it possesses only those properties
which the Charter of its creation confers on it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence. Those are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was
created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression be allowed,
individuality; properties by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered the
same, and may act as a single individual.”
JUDICIAL CONTROL
Since a public corporation is a legal entity it can sue and be sued. It is a body corporate
having perpetual succession and a common seal. Legal proceedings may be taken by or against a
corporation in its corporate name. It is a distinct and separate entity from the Crown or the
Government. Jurisdiction of courts over a public corporation is the same as it is over any private
or public company except that the powers of the former depend on the provisions of a special
statute while the powers of a company are derived from the terms of its Memorandum of
Association. In some statutes an express provision is made enabling a corporation to be sued. But
even in the absence of such a provision, a corporation can be sued like any other person. In fact,
when any statute refers to a ‘person’, it includes a corporation also.
Accordingly, a public corporation is liable for a breach of contract and also in tort for
tortious acts of its servants like any other person. It is liable to pay tax unless expressly exempted
and cannot invoke the exemption granted to the State under Article 289 of the Constitution of
India. It is bound by a statute. It cannot claim ‘Crown privilege.’
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Illustrative Cases
So far as Indian courts are concerned, they have always adopted a liberal view and have
interfered wherever justice required such interference.
Thus, if an action of a public corporation is illegal, arbitrary or unreasonable, the court would
quash and set it aside. Even in case of grant of largess, jobs, government contracts, issue of quotas
and licences, etc. such corporations and companies have to act in accordance with law. In cases of
acceptance of tenders, enhancement of rates of taxes and fees, irrational or discriminatory actions
cannot be allowed. In cases of employees of such corporations mill government companies,
though they are not ‘civil servants’ under Part XIV of the Constitution and, therefore, not entitled
to protection under Article 311thereof, the general principles of service jurisprudence are applied
to those employees. Nevertheless, in ‘unequal fights between giant public sector undertakings and
petty employees’ the courts have safeguarded the interests of employees. Again, the courts have
also criticized the attitude of such corporations whenever they had adopted an attitude of typical
private employer's unconcealed dislike and detestation.
Apart from enforcing statutory regulations and granting relief of declaration and
reinstatement in service to employees of corporations, by invoking the provisions of equality
clause enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the regulations framed by
such corporations were also declared illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional by the courts. In LIC
of India v. CERC the Supreme Court held that in prescribing terms, conditions and rates of
premium while issuing policy, the corporation must act reasonably and fairly. The eligibility
conditions must be just and reasonable.
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Governmental Control
As the judicial control over public corporations is not effective, it needs to be supplemented
by other controls. Government also exercises some control and supervision over such corporations
as the custodian of public interest in different ways.
Finance
The Government exercises effective control over a public corporation when such
Corporation is dependent on the Government for finance. A statute may require previous approval
of the Government for undertaking any capital expenditure exceeding a particular amount. It may
also provide to submit to the Government its programme and budget for the next year and to
submit the same in advance. It may also impose a condition on the corporation to take consent of
the Government before borrowing money or may insist for issuance of bonds and debentures to
secure payment made by the Government to the corporation. The Comptroller and Auditor
General exercises control in the matter of audit or accounts submitted by public corporations.
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the control of the Government which may cancel, suspend or modify as it may think fit any action
taken by the Corporation.
Institution of enquiries
A statute may also enable the Government to order enquiries into the working of the
corporation in certain circumstances. Such power may work as a check against any deviation from
the norms of functioning of the corporation.
Directives
An important technique involved to reconcile governmental control with the autonomy of the
undertaking is to authorize the Government to issue directives to public undertakings on matters
of 'policy' without interfering with the matters of day-to-day administration. A statute may
empower the Government to issue such directives as it may think necessary on questions of policy
affecting the manner in which a corporation may perform its functions. The corporation will give
effect to such directives issued by the Government. A statute may also provide that in case 'any
question arises whether a direction relates to matter of policy involving public interest, the
decision of the (Central) Government thereon shall be final.’
It is no doubt true that such directions should relate to questions of policy and should not
be routine administrative instructions in the day-to-day working of the corporation. But it
is very difficult to draw a dividing line between matters of 'policy' and 'day-to-day' working of a
public corporation and by this method, the Government can exercise effective control over public
corporations. But unfortunately, in practice, the Government hardly exercises its power to issue
policy directives.
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between the rules and the regulations, the rules would prevail and the regulations will have to give
way to the extent of inconsistency with the rules made by the Central Government.
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL
Public corporations are created and owned by the State, financed from public funds and
many a time they enjoy full or partial monopoly in the industry, trade or business concerned. They
are expected to exercise their powers in the public interest. It is, therefore, necessary for
Parliament to exercise some degree and mode of control and supervision over these corporations.
The methods adopted to exercise such control are numerically four.
Statutory provisions
All public corporations are established by or under statutes enacted by Parliament or State
Legislatures. The powers to be exercised by such corporations can be defined by them. If any
corporation exceeds or abuses its powers, Parliament or the State Legislature can dissolve,
supersede or even abolish the said corporation. Even though this type of control is not frequently
employed, it is a salutary check on the arbitrary exercise of power by the corporation. Parliament
also exercises effective control through technique of ‘laying.’
Through this traditional method, the members of Parliament put questions relating to the
functions performed by public corporations to the Minister concerned. But this method
has not proved to be very effective because of the authority of public corporations in their
fields.
Accordingly, broad principles subject to which questions relating to these undertakings
can be asked, have been laid down, namely, questions relating to policy, an act or omission on the
part of a Minister, or a matter of public interest (even though seemingly pertaining to a matter of
day-to-day administration or an individual case), are ordinarily admissible. Questions which
clearly relate to day-to-day administration of the undertakings are normally not admissible. A
more significant and effective method of parliamentary control is debate on the affairs of a public
corporation. Usually, this method is followed when annual accounts and reports regarding the
corporation are placed before Parliament for discussion in accordance with the provisions of the
statute concerned. There is no general obligation on the part of all corporations to present their
budget estimates to Parliament. Estimates Committee, therefore, recommended that corporations
should prepare a performance and programme statement for the budget year together with the
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previous year's statement and it should be made available to Parliament at the time of the annual
budget.
Parliamentary Committees
This is the most effective form of parliamentary control and supervision over the affairs
conducted by public corporations. Parliament is a busy body and it is not possible for it to go into
details about the working of these corporations. Parliament has, therefore, constituted the
Committee on Public Undertakings in 1964. The functions of the Committee are to examine the
reports and accounts of the public undertakings, to examine the reports, if any, of the Comptroller
and Auditor-General on the public corporations, to examine in the context of the autonomy and
efficiency of the public corporations, whether their affairs are being managed in accordance with
sound business principles and prudent commercial practices.
The recommendations of the Committee are advisory and, therefore, not binding on the
Government. Yet, by convention, they are regarded as the recommendations by Parliament itself,
and the Government accepts those recommendations; and in case of non-acceptance of the
recommendations of the Committee, the ministry concerned has to give reasons therefor.
Conclusion
No doubt, parliamentary control over the public corporations is "diffuse and haphazard",
yet it is the duty of Parliament to ensure that if a corporation is exercising too great a measure of
freedom, it should be brought to heel. The whole purpose of establishing an autonomous
undertaking is to make it free, in its daily working from detailed scrutiny by members of
Parliament. But since the functions carried on by these undertakings are of public concern and to
be performed in public interest, Parliament cannot completely absolve itself of its controlling
function. It is, therefore, necessary that leaving the matters relating to day-to-day administration to
the corporations, there must be overall supervision in important policy matters by Parliament.
CONTROL BY PUBLIC
In the ultimate analysis, public corporations are established for the public and they are
required to conduct their affairs in the public interest. In the ultimate analysis, public enterprises
are owned by the people and those who run them are accountable to the people. It is, therefore,
necessary that in addition to judicial, parliamentary and governmental control, these corporations
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must take into account public opinion. There are different means of representation of the
'consumer' or public interest.
Consumer Councils
These are bodies established under the authority of the statute constituting the corporations
concerned with the object of enabling "consumers" to ventilate their grievances, or make their
views known to the corporations. The outstanding examples of consumer councils are to be found
in the electricity and gas industries. The difficulty about these councils is that the members of the
general public have neither the technical knowledge nor a keen interest in the affair of certain
consumer councils; e.g. Gas or Electricity Consumer Councils. These councils may make
recommendations to their area boards, but there have been very few occasions when alterations of
policy decisions have resulted.
In some cases, Parliament has arranged for members of certain public corporations to be
nominated by local authorities and other bodies interested in the functions of the particular
corporation. Thus, members of Hospital Management Committees are appointed by the Regional
Hospital Board after consultation with local health authorities, executive councils and other
officials, as required by the statute. Sometimes, such consultation is made mandatory. Some
statutes also provide that certain members of a council must possess particular qualifications.
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A serious problem affecting the Indian Polity is that of corruption in the administration this is the
decision-making process by the administration and gives rise to all kinds of vices. Incorruptibility
is an essential requirement of public confidence in the administration of government departments.
A word made therefore decide on the subject of law and the machinery to fight administrative
corruption in the case of S. A. Kiri v. Union of India AIR 1985. The supreme court said that "no
employee of a nationalised bank or any other public sector cooperation should engage himself in
collecting donations for any trust or other organisations from persons with whom he comes into
contact in the course of is employment. Such a practice is likely to lead to harmful results because
"in the world of Commerce quid pro quo and not charity is the rule".
Any system of government, improvements of the grievance redressal machinery have always
increased the attention of the people. Even in Parliamentary form of Government, where the rules
rule with the consent of the people the need for a viable grievance redressal machinery cannot be
overemphasized actualities of our times have proved false the assumption that the system of
responsible government provides for a built-in continuous review of the activities of the
administration to stop the growth of party discipline and the millions of partition attitudes in
asserting partition attitudes in asserting in asserting grievances and defending the performance of
the government by ministers tend to create an unfavourable atmosphere for the proper
consideration of individuals Complaints against the administration this system no matter how so
ever ineffective completely says when inter alia and corruption filter and corruption filter from the
top it was against this factor of that the establishment of the that the establishment of the CVC
was recommended by the committee on prevention of corruption. The Santhanam committee first
of the committee known after the name of its chairman was appointed in 1962. It recommended
establishment of a CVC has the highest authority at the head of the existing anti-corruption
organisation consisting of the Directorate of gender complaints and redress, the Directorate of
vigilance and Central police organisation. The recommendations of the Santhanam committee
were accepted by the government and dash, the CVC was established on a non-statutory basis
under the resolution dated 11th February 1964.
The committee has recommended that the commission should be concerned with two major
problems facing the administrations, namely
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b) ensuring just and fair exercise of Administrative powers vested in various authorities by
statutory rules are by non-statutory executive orders.
The CVC was attached to the ministry of home affairs of the Government of India. Nevertheless,
it is independent in its functioning in the same sense the Union Public Service Commission
UPSC. Is and no order, direction or instruction can be issued by the Ministry so as to interfere
with its independent operation. The central Vigilance commissioner was appointed by the
president for a term of 6 years for till he attains the age of 65 years whichever is earlier. Therefore
the central Vigilance commissioner, like other civil servants, do not hold of face at the pleasure of
the president he can be removed or suspended from the office by the president on the ground of
miss behaviour, but only after the Supreme Court has held an enquiry into his case and
recommended action against him. His responsibilities include the operation of the Vigilance
machinery and coordination of the work of vigilance officers subordinate to him.
The committee has recommended to measure matters to come within the purview of the
commission, that is, cases of corruption and cases involving maladministration to stop payment
accepted the recommendations of the committee as regards corruption but not maladministration,
because the latter problem was big enough to require a separate machinery by itself, and if the
commission was bird and with the additional responsibility former administration along with
corruption, it would dilute its effectiveness in dealing with cases of corruption. The Central
Government increases the status and functions of central Vigilance Commission as follows:
1. The powers and functions were set out in the resolution under which it is established. Exercise
to general control and supervision over the vigilance and anti-corruption work carried down in
various Ministries, departments and public undertakings. It has been given jurisdiction and power
to conduct an enquiry into transactions in which public servants are suspected of impropriety and
corruption including misconduct, misdemeanour, lack of integrity and malpractices against civil
servants.
2.The commission was assisted by the CBI in its operations. CBI in its operations. The CVC has
taken a serious note of the growing occupation of the CBI with work other than vigilance. Thus,
when the CBI is extensively used for non-corruption investigation work such as drug trafficking,
smuggling and murders it hampers the work of the CVC.
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3.The CVC also advises the Home Ministry on the necessity of departmental disciplinary action
against public servants where prima facie charges of corruption and misconduct are established.
But how effective this institution has proved in uprooting corruption depends on various factors,
the most important being the earnestness on the part on the part the part of the government,
citizens and Institutions to clean public life.
4.Whenever complaints are received by the commission's it refers them either to the CBI or the
concerned Ministry department for investigation. These bodies after investigation have to send
their report to the commission for advice. The commission may drop a complaint at the initial
stage itself if it considered as it to be the vague or if the allegations contained there in a not
verifiable. Just during the year 1976, out of 665 complaints, 492 were dropped by the commission
itself and the remaining 173 were forwarded to the CBI and the concerned Ministries or
departments for investigation. departments for investigation.
The commission does not does investigate the complaint successful. It has to depend on other
organisations for the purpose. However, there is one exception. The chief technical examinations
organisation attached to the commission conducts technical examination of public works during
checking of bills of contractors, contracts and throws.
c) cases received direct from public sector undertakings and statutory corporations, etc.
6. The commission has power to required that oral enquiry in any departmental proceedings
should be entrusted to one of the Commissioner for departmental enquiries. It Overseas the
enquiry is conducted by the Commissioner and here the commission has two major functions:
2. To tender advised to the disciplinary authorities for taking action on the reports of the
Commissioners.
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7. All chief Vigilance commissioner are required to furnish to the commission for its assessment a
resume of the Vigilance work done in their organisation with special emphasis on preventive
vigilance.
8. The commission suggest changes in the procedure for practice where it appears that the existing
procedure or practice a force scope for corruption or misconduct. Decommission me also initiate
review of Administrative procedure and practice in so relates to the maintenance of integrity in the
administration.
9. The commission discharges miscellaneous functions such as conducting orientation courses for
Vigilance officers and courses in the conduct of departmental proceedings review of vigilance
arrangements in ministries and departments public undertakings, advise in matters relating to
interpretation of law and procedures governing departmental proceedings, etc.
Over the years, the independence of the CVC has also been seriously compromised originally
the CVC seriously compromised originally the CVC had been equated with the UPSC and its
chairman had a six years term. However, later on it was reduced to 5 years which was further
reduced to 3 years in 1977 with a provision for 2 years extension at the pleasure of the
government. UC Agarwal who deleted office on 7th July 1987, after a period of 3 years, was not
only refused extension of 2 years but the office remained vacancy for about one year when C G
Somaiah, former home secretary was appointed in 1988 Foster it is discouraging to note that the
CVC has mentioned in its 1982 annual report 41 cases where the government did not accept its
advice of imposing major penalty on erring officials in various units of the central sector. The
commission has suggested premature retirement has the legitimate handle to be used for weeding
out the corrupt among the public servants in higher positions. The commission in its 1982 report
also suggested that in cases where prosecution cannot be launched due to lack of evidence and
other reasons, corrective and deterrent action should be taken at the stage of confirmation or the
crossing of efficiency. In its 1986 report, the commission has reacted sharply to the government
decision to Limit its roll over public sector undertakings where the problem of corruption is by no
means negligible.
In its efforts to check corruption in public life and to provide good governance, the supreme
court commended measures for far-reaching consequences valid disposing a PIL petition on the
CBI v Shukla Jain Hawala. The three judges bench separated for measure investigating agencies
from the control over the executive. This Agencies are CBI, enforcement Directorate of revenue
intelligence department and the CVC. The Court has shifted CBI under the administrative control
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of the CVC. The CVC, until now, was under the home ministry interested with the task of
bringing to book cases of corruption and sunrise wrong doings and suggesting departmental
action. Now the CVC is to be the umbrella agency and would co-ordinate the work of three other
investigating arms. The code for the directed that the CVC should be made a statutory body and
its head is to be selected by a three men high powered panel consisting of the Prime minister, the
Home minister and the Leader of the opposition.
In order to give effect to the views of the Supreme Court the government issued and Ordinance on
25th August 1998. However, this measure had diluted the views of the Supreme Court by putting
one view against the other. Therefore, what ought to have been visualised as a reformative step
had begun to be seen as a clever bureaucratic register.
2. Making prior permission of the competent authority mandatorily before starting investigation
against government officers above the rank of joint secretary and high-ranking officers of
Nationalised banks and public sector undertakings.
3. Making the secretary personal ex-officio member. Objections were also raised against Article
21 of the ordinance which had authorised the commission to make rules but in consultation with
the government.
It was when the Supreme Court expressed concern over these aspects of the ordinance in the
hearing relating to its validity that the government decided to Amend the Ordinance and does on
27th October 1988 the Central Vigilance Commission Amendment Ordinance was issued. The
commission was made a four-member body and its membership was open to others besides
bureaucrats. In the same manner, the single directive of prior permission was deleted and the
membership of secretary personnel, Government of India was given a statutory status. It is too
early to comment on the functioning of the reconstituted statutory CVC but one thing in certain
that no Commission can uproot corruption which has trunk so deep in the body politic. It can only
act as a facilitator and proper length in the absence of a strong political will.
Union of India v. Alok Kumar 2010 SCC, the supreme court held that unless the rules so require,
advice of the CVC, is not binding. The CVC to enable the disciplinary authority to proceed in
accordance with. The system in the absence of any specific rule, that seeking advice and
implementing thereof is mandatory, it will not be just and proper to presume that there is prejudice
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to the officer concerned. even in the cases where action is taken without consulting the vigilance
commission, necessary will not vitiate the order of the removal passed after enquiry by the
departmental authorities.
The Disciplinary proceedings against government servant taken under the Services Rules,
framed by the Government under Art. 309 of the Constitution. Besides, public servant can also be
prosecuted for bribery and corruption in criminal court. with a view to expedite such trials, The
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (replaced by Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) (PCA)
make certain provisions. As it is in the interest of public that corruption be eradicated, so also it is
in the public interest that honest public service should be able to discharge the duties free from
false frivolous and malicious accusations.
In Mohammad Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC, the supreme court has
emphasized two significant aspects of sanction for prosecution. First, any case instituted without a
proper sanction must fail as the entire proceeding are rendered void ab initio. Therefore, the
prosecution must prove that valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority.
secondly, the sanctioning authority must be satisfied that a case for sanction has been made
without constituting the offence. The constituting authority at time of giving sanction must be
aware of the fact constituting the offense and must apply its mind. The grant of sanction is not an
ideal formality. It is a sacrosanct act which affords protection of the government servants against
frivolous prosecution.
All the facts constituting the offence constituting the offence must be placed before the
sanctioning authority and it should then arrive at the satisfaction. However, the accused facing
prosecution for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 cannot claim any immunity on the ground of want of sanction, if he is
ceases to be a public servant on the date on which the court took cognizance of the said offence.
But the position is different wear Sec. 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has application.
In the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2005 SCC, it has been held
that protection under Section 197 is available only when the alleged act done by public servant is
reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty.
In State of Maharashtra v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1982, Nayak filed a complaint a complaint against
chief minister and Antualy charging him with offence under Sections 161 and 185 of Penal Code
and Section 5 of the PCA. The Supreme Court ruled that the complaint was not maintainable
without the requisite sanction of the government under Section 6 of the PCA the court also stated
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that the sanction must be given by the Governor in his Individual discretion and not on the advice
of the Ministers. for the interest of democratic government and its functioning, the Governor must
act in such as a case on his own. The court said when there is to be a prosecution of the Chief
Minister, the Governor would, while determining whether sanction for such prosecution should be
granted or not under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as a matter of propriety
necessary act in his own discretion and not on the advice of the Council of Ministers. This will
advance the cause of justice.
In another case on the same facts as mentioned above the Supreme Court answer on another
important question is a private complaint in respect of offences committed by a public servant
cognizable by the court? The court answered the question in the affirmative arguing as follows:
Under PCA, the state government has power to appoint special judges to try specified offences
against public servants. the special judge has exclusive jurisdiction to try these offences against
public servant. The judge follows the procedure set out in the Cr.P.C for trial of warrant cases.
The underlying idea of having special judges is to expediate such trials. It was felt that to fight
corruption it was necessary to take corruption cases out of the maze of ordinary criminal cases
handled by Magistrate. a special judge has the status of the sessions judge. such as Court is one of
the original criminal jurisdictions subject to the control of the High Court. The special judge can
take cognizance of the specified offences upon a complaint or upon a police report or upon his
coming to known in some manner of the offence have been committed.
Antulay's case is important because it is the first formal criminal trial on private complaint of a
public man on charges of corruption, for acts done during his tenure of his office. There have been
in the past many occasions when such charges were levelled against state ministers. Such cases
were treated mostly on an ad hoc basis without involving any set pattern to deal with such
matters. some ministers resigned their office after adverse remarks were made against them in the
court decisions. In such cases, enquiry officers were appointed under administrative decisions to
assess whether there was any prima facie evidence against the concerned minister in some cases,
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formal enquiry Commission under the Commission of Enquiry Act, were appointed to probe into
the charges of corruption and misuse of power. Even when such a Commission reported that there
was prima facie evidence against the Minister, hardly any follow-up action by way of prosecution
in a criminal court was undertaken. the difficulty in the situation is that such enquiries are
undertaken under the auspicious either of the centre of the government taking office in the
concerned state after the old government quits office into whose action the enquiry is instituted,
and soon the matter of enquiry gets embroiled into political controversy.
The above case is of the great public importance because an Ex Chief Minister is being
prosecuted for the first time on a private complaint. but this cannot serve as a model for the future.
It needs great effort, tenacity and resource on the part of the individual to launch a prosecution of
this type, and not many can mobilize search resources. Nor can the matter of containing
corruption and abuse of power be left solely in the hands of the government for political
considerations come into the picture. No ruling party likes take action against its own members
for corruption and misuse of power. In addition to these two channels, third channel is also
necessary to contain the malady, namely a strong and independent ombudsman system having
Constitutional sanction so that its autonomy is not compromised in practice. But even such an
institution may fail to deliver the goods unless it gets a strong political backing and support in its
efforts. It needs to be emphasized that corruption and misuse of power by holders of higher
officers constitute serious malady affecting public interest as such factors distort the whole
process of policy and decision-making and a strong mechanism is needed to fight the same.
OMBUDSMEN IN INDIA
Ombudsman means a delegate, agent, officer or commissioner. Gender defines ombudsman as “an
officer of parliament, having as his primary function, the duty of acting as an agent for parliament,
for the purpose of safeguarding the citizen against abuse or misuse of administrative power by the
executive.” Administrative law provides for control over the administration by an outside agency,
strong enough to prevent injustice to the individual, at the same time leaving the administration
adequate freedom to enable it to carry on effective government. In every progressive system of
administration, there is need of a mechanism for handling grievances against administrative fault
Ombudsman is one of such machinery.
The parliamentary and judicial control on the administrative action is very week, except there is a
statutory provision for an administrative tribunal. There is no means for handling grievance
against misconduct, inefficiency, delay, negligence, etc. against the officials. The natural remedy
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open to the aggrieved person, in such cases, is for him to persuade the minister if he is accessible
to the aggrieved person, or to draw his attention by raising question in parliament to which he is
responsible, but in practice it is difficult. Even the parliamentary remedy is also not adequate. It
was felt necessary to have alternative or additional institution to control wrong decision,
maladministration or corruption of public officials. The ombudsman is one of such principle
alternatives provided for.
Origin of Ombudsman
Ombudsman first introduced in Sweden by King Charles XII on 18th century. It is also
practiced by Finland in 1919, Denmark in 1953, Norway in 1963, New Zealand in 1962, US 1960
and UK 1967.
Meaning of Ombudsman
According to Garner, he is an officer of parliament having as his primary function, the duty of
acting as an agent for the parliament for the purpose of safeguarding the citizen against abuse or
misuse of administrative power by the executive.
Characteristics of ombudsman:
1. Independence - It is a body that assists with fair and expeditious resolution of complaints
in an impartial confidential and independent manner.
2. Impartiality and fairness - It works impartially
3. Credibility - It maintains its Credibility
4. Confidentiality
According to Professor S.K Agrawal, the term ombudsman refers only to institute, which have
three basic and unique characteristic which are as follows –
i) Ombudsman refers to an independent and non-partisan officer of the legislature who supervise
the administration.
ii) He deals with specific complaints from the public against administrative injustice and
maladministration.
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iii) He has the power to investigate, criticize and report back to the legislature, but not to reserve
administrative action.
Ombudsman is a watchdog of the administration or the protector of the little man, ombudsman
inquires and investigates all complaints made by the citizen against the abuse of discretionary
power, mal-administration inefficiency and take appropriate actions. For that purpose, very wide
power has been given to him, he has access to departmental files. The complainant is not required
to lead any evidence before the ombudsman to prove his case he is empowered to grant relief to
the aggrieved person. His function is to satisfy himself whether the complaint is justified or
unjustified. He can act even suo-moto. These powers are not limited like the powers of civil court,
he is responsible and responsive to people.
Nature/Status of an ombudsman is judge or lawyer or a high officer and his character, reputation
and integrity are above board. He is appointed by the parliament and sets out the reaction of the
citizen against the administration. He makes his own recommendation to eliminate the cause of
complaints. Ombudsman is thus a strong position to redress individual grievances arising out of
bad administration. Status Generally, the Ombudsman is a judge or a lawyer or a high officer and
his character, reputation and integrity are above board. He is appointed by Parliament and thus, he
is not an officer in the administrative hierarchy. He is above party politics and is in a position to
think and decide objectively. There is no interference even by Parliament in the discharge of his
duties. He makes a report to Parliament and sets out reactions of citizens against the
administration. He also makes his own recommendations to eliminate the causes of complaints.
Very wide publicity is given to those reports, all his reports are also published in the national
newspapers. Thus, in short, he is the 'watchdog' or 'public safety valve' against maladministration,
and the "protector of the little man".
Defects
1. It is argued that this institution may prove successful in those countries which have a
comparatively small population, but it may not prove very useful in populous countries,
like U.S.A. or India, as the number of complaints may be too large for a single man to
dispose of.
2. It is also said that the success of the institution of Ombudsman in Denmark owes a great
deal to the personality of its first Ombudsman Professor Hurwitz. He took a keen interest
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in the complaints made to him and investigated them personally. Prestige and personal
contact would be lost if there are a number of such officers, or if there is a single officer
who has always to depend upon a large staff and subordinate officers.
3. According to Mukherjea, J., in India this institution is not suitable. He describes it as "an
accusatorial and inquisitorial institution a combination unprecedented in democracy with
traditions of independent judiciary". It is an 'impracticable and disastrous experiment'
which will not fit into the Indian Constitution.
Conclusion
In a democratic Government, it is expected that the subjects have adequate means for the
redress of their grievances. Since the present judicial system is not sufficient to deal with all
cases of injustices, an institution like Ombudsman may help in doing full and complete justice
to aggrieved persons. But Ombudsman is not a "panacea for all the evils of bureaucracy." His
success depends upon the existence of a reasonably well-administered State. He cannot cope
with the situation where administration is riddled with patronage and Corruption. Indian
Parliament so far has not enacted any Act though a proposal to constitute an institution of
Ombudsman (Lokpal) was made by the Administrative Reforms Commission as early as in
1967. Some States, however, have enacted Statutes and appointed Lokayukta.
The word "Lokpal" is derived from the sanskrit word "loka" meaning people and "pala" meaning
protector or caretaker. Together it means "protector of people". The aim of passing such a law is it
to eradicate corruption at all levels of the Indian polity. For a nation to develop it needs to have an
extremely well organized and meticulously planned organization. A failure of the administrative
set up reflects on the holistic growth of the state, the biggest reason for the failure of the
administration can be attributed to the ill effects of corruption. The growth of the country has been
plagued by corruption and it has extended its wings through-out the entire administrative set up.
To root out the menace of corruption the institution of "ombudsman" came up and has played a
great role in fighting administrative malpractices.
Historical Background
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by the king to act as an invigilator to look into the functioning of a war time government. From
1713 the duty of this ombudsman was to mainly ensure the correct conduct of royal officials. The
institution of the ombudsman was firmly incorporated into the Swedish Constitution from 1809.
It was defined as the parliamentary body supervising judges, government and other officials, and
ensuring their compliance with laws and other legal regulations. The embedding of the
ombudsman in the constitution was completed by a further law specifying in greater detail the
scope of his activities and his legal authority. The institution of the ombudsman developed and
grew most significantly in the 20th century. Ombudsman institutions were on the increase
especially in the period after the Second World War when almost a hundred of them were
established. The institutions took varied forms and modifications depending on the historical,
political and social background of the given country.
In India the ombudsman is known as Lok pal or Lokayukata. The concept of Constitutional
ombudsman was first proposed by the then Law minister Ashok Kumar Sen in parliament in the
early 1960s.The term Lok pal and Lokayukta were coined by Dr. L. M. Singhvi as the Indian
model of ombudsman for the redressal of public grievances, it was passed in Lok Sabha in the
year 1968 but it was lapsed with dissolution of Lok Sabha and since then has lapsed in the Lok
Sabha many times.
There are several deficiencies in our anti-corruption systems because of which despite
overwhelming evidence against the corrupt, no honest investigation and prosecution takes place
and the corrupt are hardly punished. The whole anti-corruption set up ends up protecting the
corrupt.
1) Lack of Independence - most of our agencies like CBI, state vigilance departments, internal
vigilance wings of various departments, Anti-corruption Branch of state police etc are not
independent. In many cases, they have to report to the same people who are either themselves
accused or are likely to be influenced by the accused.
2) Powerlessness- Some bodies like CVC or Lokayuktas are independent, but they do not have
any powers. They have been made advisory bodies. They give two kinds of advice to the
governments “to either impose departmental penalties on any officer or to prosecute him in court.
Experience shows that whenever any minister or a senior officer is involved, their advice is rarely
followed.
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3) Lack of Transparency and internal accountability - In addition, there is the problem of internal
transparency and accountability of these anti-corruption agencies. Presently, is there any separate
and effective mechanism to check if the staff of these anti-corruption agencies turns corrupt. That
is why, despite so many agencies, corrupt people rarely go to jail. Corruption has become a high
profit zero risk business. There is absolutely no deterrence against corruption.
The Lok pal and Lokayukta Act, 2013 seeks to provide for the establishment of Lok pal for the
Union and Lokayukta for States to inquire into allegations of corruption against certain public
functionaries and for related matters. The act extends to whole of India, including Jammu &
Kashmir and is applicable to "public servants" within and outside India. The Act mandates for
creation of Lok pal for Union and Lokayukta for states. The Bill was tabled in the Lok Sabha on
22 December 2011 and was passed by the House on 27 December as The Lok pal and Lokayuktas
Bill, 2011. It was subsequently tabled in the Rajya Sabha on 29 December. After a marathon
debate that stretched until midnight of the following day, the vote failed to take place for lack of
time. On 21 May 2012, it was referred to a select Committee of the Rajya Sabha for consideration.
It was passed in the Rajya Sabha on 17 December 2013 after making certain amendments to the
earlier Bill and in the Lok Sabha the next day. It received assent from President Pranab Mukherjee
on 1 January 2014 and came into force from 16 January.
The institution of Lok pal is a statutory body without any constitutional backing. Lok pal is a
multimember body, made up of one chairperson and maximum of 8 members. The person who is
to be appointed as the chairperson of the Lok pal should be either the former Chief Justice of India
or the former Judge of Supreme Court or an eminent person with impeccable integrity and
outstanding ability, having special knowledge and expertise of minimum 25 years in the matters
relating to anti-corruption policy, public administration, vigilance, finance including insurance
and banking, law and management.
Out of the maximum eight members, half will be judicial members. Minimum fifty per cent of the
Members will be from SC / ST / OBC / Minorities and women. The judicial member of the Lok
pal should be either a former Judge of the Supreme Court or a former Chief Justice of a High
Court. The non-judicial member should be an eminent person with impeccable integrity and
outstanding ability, having special knowledge and expertise of minimum 25 years in the matters
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The members are appointed by the president on the recommendation of a selection committee.
The selection committee is composed of the Prime Minister who is the Chairperson; Speaker of
Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha, Chief Justice of India or a Judge nominated by
him / her, and One eminent jurist.
The jurisdiction of the Lok pal will include the Prime Minister except on allegations of corruption
relating to international relations, security, the public order, atomic energy and space and unless a
Full Bench of the Lok pal and at least two-thirds of members approve an inquiry. It will be held
in-camera and if the Lok pal so desires, the records of the inquiry will not be published or made
available to anyone. The Lok pal will also have jurisdiction over Ministers and MPs but not in the
matter of anything said in Parliament or a vote given there. Lok pals jurisdiction will cover all
categories of public servants. Group A, B, C or D officers defined as such under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 will be covered under the Lok pal but any corruption complaint against
Group A and B officers, after inquiry, will come to the Lok pal.
However, in the case of Group C and D officers, the Chief Vigilance Commissioner will
investigate and report to the Lok pal. However, it provides adequate protection for honest and
upright Public Servants. Also any person who is or has been in charge (director / manager/
secretary) of anybody / society set up by central act or any other body financed / controlled by
central government and any other person involved in act of abetting, bribe giving or bribe taking.
1) The Lok pal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 provided for Lok pal at the centre having jurisdiction of
trying cases of corruption against all Members of Parliament and central government employees.
The Lokayuktas have functions similar to the Lok pal, but they function on a state level.
2) The office of the Lok pal and Lokayuktas deals with charges of corruption against any public
official and includes the office of the prime minister of the court but with reasonable safeguards.
Both the Lok pal and the Lokayukta deal with charges of corruption against the government and
its employees, in fact they even conduct investigations and based on the findings from such
investigations they conduct trials.
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3) The Act lays down the provision to set up a Lokayukta and its set of powers for each state
without clearly defining the extent of the same, this has led to various different Lokayuktas being
setup, some with more power than the others. In order to create uniformity a proposal to
implement the Lokayukta uniformly across Indian states has been made. The Act provides that all
states set up office of the Lok pal and/or Lokayukta within one year from the commencement of
the said Act on the other hand, Lok pal will consist of a chairperson and a maximum of eight
members, of which 50% will be judicial members, 50% members of Lok pal shall be from
SC/ST/OBCs, minorities and women.
4) The newly enacted Lok pal Act provides for confiscation and attachment of any property of any
government official which he or she has come to own through corrupt practices and the same can
be done during pendency of proceedings against the said official.
5) The Lok pal Act mandates that all public officials should furnish the assets and liabilities of
themselves as well as their respective dependents. In fact, the said Act even guarantees protection
to any government official who acts as a whistle blower and as an ancillary a Whistle Blowers
Protection Act has also been enacted.
2) If it has referred a case to CBI, the investigating officer in such case cannot be transferred
without approval of Lok pal.
3) Powers to authorize CBI for search and seizure operations connected to such case.
4) The Inquiry Wing of the Lok pal has been vested with the powers of a civil court.
5) Lok pal has powers of confiscation of assets, proceeds, receipts and benefits arisen or procured
by means of corruption in special circumstances
6) Lok pal has the power to recommend transfer or suspension of public servant connected with
allegation of corruption.
7) Lok pal has power to give directions to prevent destruction of records during preliminary
inquiry.
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The institution of Lok pal has been a land mark move in the history of Indian polity, The Lok pal
and Lokayukta act 2013 has offered a productive solution to combat the never-ending menace of
corruption.
The institution of Lok pal has tried to bring a much-needed change in the battle against corruption
in the administrative structure of India but at the same time there are loopholes and lacunae which
need to be corrected. Firstly, it is not free from political influence as the appointing committee
itself consist of a parliamentarian, there is no criteria to decide who is an eminent jurist or a
person of integrity and thus, this appointment can easily be manipulated. Further, the act provides
no concrete immunity to the whistle blowers. The provision for initiation of inquiry against the
complainant if the accused is found innocent will only discourage people from complaining. Also,
there is no full proof way to determine whether the person who is appointed as the Lok pal will
remain honest throughout.
The biggest lacuna is the exclusion of judiciary from the ambit of the Lok pal. The Lok pal is also
not given a Constitutional backing. There are no adequate provisions for appeal against the Lok
pal. The powers, composition and scope of Lokayuktas do not find any mention of the act. There
is a long way to go to ensure transparency and crusade against corruption are still on and yet to
reach its destination.