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Vicarious Civil Liability of parents and guardians for crimes or felonies of their child or ward.
Article 1161;
Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws, subject to the
provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on
Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of the Book, regulating damages

Article 2177, Civil Code;

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
That the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the
accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the
act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot
recover damages under both types of liability

Art 101, Revised Penal Code;

Civil liability for:
a. insane or imbecile
b. person under 15 years old
c. person who is over 15 but under 18 who has acted without discernment

Shall devolve upon those having such a person under their legal authority or control, UNLESS it
appears that there was NO fault or negligence on their part.
In default thereof, civil liability shall be taken from the property of the insane, imbecile or minor,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Under the Child and Youthful Welfare Code, civil liability for acts committed by a youthful
offender shall devolve upon:
1. The father or,
2. The mother or,
3. Upon the guardian,
 4. Relatives or friends of the family
There is NO civil liability for:
a. Injuries caused by mere accident
b. Failure to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause
The final discharge of a minor in conflict with the law does NOT extinguish his civil liability
resulting from the commission of the offense.
Civil liability for persons who, in order to avoid evil or injury, does an act which causes damage
to another (Subdivision 4 of Article 11)
a. Civil liability shall be in proportion to the benefit which they may have received
b. The court shall determine proportionate amount
c. When the shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
whenever damage has been caused with the consent of authorities and their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulation.

The person civilly liable is the person who was able to benefit from the act which caused damage
to another.
Who are civilly liable for acts committed by persons acting under irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear?
1. The persons using the violence or causing the fear, or if there is none;
2. The person doing the act.
Art 201, PD 603;
Article 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil liability for acts committed by a
youthful offender shall devolve upon the offender's father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
upon the mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may also
be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender.

Art 221, Family Code;

Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180[2]a
and [4]a).
LIABILITY OF FATHER OR MOTHER. It must be emphasized that the liability of the father or
mother of a minor attaches when such minor lives in their company. If a minor child is staying in
Manila while his parents are in the province, and the child commits an act or omission causing
damage to another, the parents are not liable. Minority alone of the child does not make the
parents liable for his acts. Such minority must be couple with the fact that the child is living in
the company of the father or mother.
For the tortuous act of a minor, the parents are not liable together. The law speaks of an
alternative situation where the mother is liable only in case of death or incapacity of the father.
Hence, if a minor child in the company of his parents commits a tortuous act, his father should be
sued alone. In the absence of the father or in his incapacity, the mother can be made liable
(Romano, et al v Parinas, et al., 101 Phil. 140).
SEC. 20-D, RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630
"SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. – If it has been determined that
the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an
initial contact with the child, in consultation with the local social welfare and development
officer, has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or
guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child’s nearest relative. The child shall be subjected to a
community-based intervention program supervised by the local social welfare and development
officer, unless the best interest of the child requires the referral of the child to a youth care
facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ managed by LGUs or licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by
the DSWD.
"The local social welfare and development officer shall determine the appropriate programs for
the child who has been released, in consultation with the child and the person having custody
over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to
take custody, the child may be released to any of the following:
"(a) A duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization;
"(b) A barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children
(BCPC);
"(c) A local social welfare and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD.
"If the child has been found by the local social welfare and development officer to be dependent,
abandoned, neglected or abused by his/her parents and the best interest of the child requires that
he/she be placed in a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall
execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment of the child: Provided, That if the
child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written authorization for
voluntary commitment, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be immediately
filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office (LSWDO) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, otherwise known as ‘The Child and Youth Welfare
Code’ and the Supreme Court rule on commitment of children: Provided, further, That the
minimum age for children committed to a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ shall be twelve
(12) years old."

"SEC. 20-A. Serious Crimes Committed by Children Who Are Exempt From Criminal
Responsibility. – A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age
and who commits parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where
the victim is killed or raped, robbery, with homicide or rape, destructive arson, rape, or
carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or offenses under Republic Act No.
9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) punishable by more than twelve (12) years
of imprisonment, shall be deemed a neglected child under Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and shall be mandatorily placed in a special facility within the youth care faculty or
‘Bahay Pag-asa’ called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC).
"In accordance with existing laws, rules, procedures and guidelines, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment and placement under the IJISC shall be filed by the local social welfare
and development officer of the LGU where the offense was committed, or by the DSWD social
worker in the local social welfare and development officer’s absence, within twenty-four (24)
hours from the time of the receipt of a report on the alleged commission of said child. The court,
where the petition for involuntary commitment has been filed shall decide on the petition within
seventy-two (72) hours from the time the said petition has been filed by the DSWD/LSWDO.
The court will determine the initial period of placement of the child within the IJISC which shall
not be less than one (1) year. The multi-disciplinary team of the IJISC will submit to the court a
case study and progress report, to include a psychiatric evaluation report and recommend the
reintegration of the child to his/her family or the extension of the placement under the IJISC. The
multi-disciplinary team will also submit a report to the court on the services extended to the
parents and family of the child and the compliance of the parents in the intervention program.
The court will decide whether the child has successfully completed the center-based intervention
program and is already prepared to be reintegrated with his/her family or if there is a need for the
continuation of the center-based rehabilitation of the child. The court will determine the next
period of assessment or hearing on the commitment of the child."

"SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. – A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to
fifteen (15) years of age and who commits an offense for the second time or oftener: Provided,
That the child was previously subjected to a community-based intervention program, shall be
deemed a neglected child under Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall undergo an
intensive intervention program supervised by the local social welfare and development officer:
Provided, further, That, if the best interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a youth
care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall execute a written
authorization for the voluntary commitment of the child: Provided, finally, That if the child has
no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written authorization for voluntary
commitment, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by the
DSWD or the LSWDO pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended."

"SEC. 20-C. Exploitation of Children for Commission of Crimes. – Any person who, in the
commission of a crime, makes use, takes advantage of, or profits from the use of children,
including any person who abuses his/her authority over the child or who, with abuse of
confidence, takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of the child and shall induce, threaten or
instigate the commission of the crime, shall be imposed the penalty prescribed by law for the
crime committed in its maximum period."

"SEC. 20-D. Joint Parental Responsibility. – Based on the recommendation of the multi-
disciplinary team of the IJISC, the LSWDO or the DSWD, the court may require the parents of a
child in conflict with the law to undergo counseling or any other intervention that, in the opinion
of the court, would advance the welfare and best interest of the child.

"As used in this Act, ‘parents’ shall mean any of the following:
"(a) Biological parents of the child; or
"(b) Adoptive parents of the child; or
"(c) Individuals who have custody of the child.
"A court exercising jurisdiction over a child in conflict with the law may require the attendance
of one or both parents of the child at the place where the proceedings are to be conducted.
"The parents shall be liable for damages unless they prove, to the satisfaction of the court, that
they were exercising reasonable supervision over the child at the time the child committed the
offense and exerted reasonable effort and utmost diligence to prevent or discourage the child
from committing another offense."
"SEC. 20-E. Assistance to Victims of Offenses Committed by Children. – The victim of the
offense committed by a child and the victim’s family shall be provided the appropriate assistance
and psychological intervention by the LSWDO, the DSWD and other concerned agencies."

1. SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE, G.R. No. L-14414 April
27, 1960

Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single from wounds caused by
Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant. At the time, Gumersindo Balce was also
single, a minor below 18 years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result of Carlos
Salen’s death, Gumersindo Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to
imprisonment and to pay the heirs of the deceased an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00.
Upon petition of plaintiffs, the only heirs of the deceased, a writ of execution was issued for the
payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was
insolvent and had no property in his name. Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant,
father of Gumersindo, the payment of the indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but defendant
refused, thus causing plaintiffs to institute the present action.

After trial, the court sustained the theory of defendant and dismissed the complaint with costs.
Hence the present appeal.

It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the
acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no
fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those
conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised
Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil
liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a
minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason
the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that
case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides:
"The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages
caused by the minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this provision does not
apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this
Court which cover equal or identical cases.

2. LINDAY PALEYAN vs CARLOS BANGKILI G.R. No. L-22253 July 30, 1971

Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos Paleyan, who was killed by defendant Carlos
Bangkili. At the time of the commission of the offense Carlos Bangkili, a minor of 19 years, was
living with his mother, defendant Victoria Bangkili. As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan and
of the wounding of another victim, Carlos Bangkili was accused of the crime of homicide with
less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 898 of the Court of First Instance of Mountain
Province. On November 21, 1960, upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced accordingly, but the
decision made no pronouncement as to the civil indemnity which should be paid to the heirs of
the deceased. On April 3, 1961 the plaintiffs filed the present action for damages against Carlos
Bangkili and his mother, Victoria Bangkili.
The trial the court a quo rendered its decision i n dismissing the complaint against Victoria
Bangkili the trial court held that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code Victoria Bangkili
could not be held civilly liable for the criminal act of her minor son, who was already 19 years of
age at the time he committed the offense; and that Article 2180 of the New Civil Code was not
applicable for it covers only obligations arising from quasi-delicts and not to those arising from
crimes. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider the dismissal of the complaint as against defendant
Victoria Bangkili, and upon denial of the motion instituted the instant appeal.
While the decision in Salen v. Balce referred to the subsidiary liability of the father whose son
had been sentenced to pay civil indemnity in the criminal case, the reasons given by this Court in
applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code hold true with greater cogency in this case, where the
allegations in the complaint show that herein appellee was sued directly under the said provision,
in that she "failed and neglected to exercise the proper care and vigilance over her ward and
minor child and as a consequence of such failure and neglect, the said Carlos Bangkili committed
the wrongful act herein complained of." Even more to the point is the case of Araneta vs.
Arreglado, supra. There the minor Dario Arreglado entered a plea of guilty on a charge of
frustrated homicide, but the court suspended proceedings pursuant to Article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code in view of the fact that he was only 14 years of age. A civil suit was thereafter filed
by the offended party against the said accused and his parents for the recovery of damages. The
ruling of the lower court holding the said parents liable was affirmed, although with some
modification as to the amount awarded.
The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this case, but submits that its
application should be relaxed, considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19
years of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense,
however, and does not exempt the appellant from her responsibility as parent and natural
guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent
"observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." There is no such
proof in this case.

Thee judgment appealed from is reversed with respect to defendant-appellee Victoria Bangkili,
and she is hereby adjudged liable solidarily with her

co-defendant

3. CRESENCIO LIBI vs IAC, G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after
she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of
January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter
persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid
him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria
Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted
with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio
Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused
her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to
commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of
their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell
may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot
Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.

The parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case gainst the parents of Wendell to recover damages
arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the
court below rendered judgment in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the
evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit.

On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against
defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari.

Based on the autopsy, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. But, he found no burning or
singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general
characteristics of contact or near-contact fire.

In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of
the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever
knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had)
a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his
sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in
his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent.

CA holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’
complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from
committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible
to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but
learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed.
The Court agrees with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable
for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their
minor son. The Court takes this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination
therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.

Thus SC are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor
children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code.

SC hereby ruled that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused
by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or
a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners
liable for damages arising therefrom.

Petition is denied.

4. MACARIO TAMARGO vs CA, G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, y petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent,
and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted
without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November
1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning
the trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had
lost their right to appeal.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor
child, Adelberto Bundoc.

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious

liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person
is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with
whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is
made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their
parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption
was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested
in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is,
before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and urge
that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for
adoption was filed.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability
for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child
living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however,
to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,
would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the
instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at
the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,

were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.