Doctrine of Political Question

Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on
the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in
the mills of constitutional law.

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for
a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question. Our leading case
is Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957), where this Court, through former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary
has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine
what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions
of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is
section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension
thereof x x x."

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of
the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this
Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Clearly, the Court
cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Reference:  
Estrada vs Desierto, GR 146710-15 (2001 – En Banc)

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The OSG submits that the cases filed by petitioners involve the resolution of purely political
questions which go into the wisdom of the law: they raise questions that are clearly political and
non-justiciable and outside the power of judicial review.[103]

The political question doctrine is "no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review"[105] under the expanded definition of judicial power of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Section 1, Article VIII thereof authorizes courts of justice not only " to settle actual
case controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In determining whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government, the Court is guided
primarily, by the Constitution, and secondarily, by existing domestic and international law, which
set limits or conditions to the powers and functions conferred upon these political bodies.[106]
Thus, when a case is brought before the Court with serious allegations that a law or executive
issuance infringes upon the Constitution, as in these consolidated cases, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the Court to settle the dispute.[107] In doing so, the Court is "not
judging the wisdom of an act of a coequal department, but is merely ensuring that the
Constitution is upheld."[108] And, if after said review, the Court does not find any constitutional
infringement, then, it has no more authority to proscribe the actions under review.[109]

Reference:  
CoTeSCUP vs Secretary of Education, GR 216930 (October 09, 2018 - En Banc) Constitution,
Filipino, Panitikan Subjects

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of
judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government."  37 Even so, this should not be construed as a
license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with
ours.