General Mark Milley Transcript
General Mark Milley Transcript
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1 Go ahead, -
2 Nice to meet you.
3 investigative counsel.
4 senior investigative counsel.
5 researcher.
6 So, before we begin, General Milley, I just
7 want to describe a few ground rules.
8 You are permitted, obviously, to have your attorneys
9 present. I see that they're here with you.
10 There is an official reporter who is transcribing the
11 record of the interview. Please wait until each question is
12 completed before you begin your response. We'll try to wait
13 until your response before we ask our next question. The
14 stenographer obviously cannot record nonverbal responses,
15 such as shaking your head, so it's important that you answer
16 each question with an audible, verbal response.
17 I will be doing primarily the questions about things
18 that occurred around the election. My colleague
19 will be asking you questions about January 6th
20 in particular. We'll stop periodically and turn to members
21 of the Select Committee, who will chime in if they have
22 questions.
23 If any of our questions lead to an answer which would
24 require you to provide classified information, you should
25 stop short of providing that classified information on this
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1 You're the dash between the political and the military. It's
2 my job and the job of the Joint Chiefs to translate civilian
3 intent and orders into military language so that we can
4 actually execute operations at the strategic, operational,
5 tactical level to achieve a political effect that is desired
6 by the Commander in Chief or the American people.
7 Q Yeah.
8 A And that's an important function, is this sort of
9 translation function. So you're sitting right on the fence,
10 so to speak.
11 Q Yeah. There's a lot of noteworthy stuff in there
12 that I want to follow up on.
13 Let me just note that Congressman Schiff, I believe,
14 another member of the committee, is here.
15 One of the things in the description of your role that's
16 interesting is the concept of civilian control of the
17 military, that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
18 Army are nonuniformed officers, they're civilians, and
19 they're the ones that make the operational decisions.
20 Tell us more broadly, sort of policy-wise, why civilian
21 control of the military is so important.
22 A Well, I mean, it's built into our DNA going back to
23 the founding of the Republic. In my view, the American
24 people do not want, nor should they want, a military that is
25 not under the control -- the command and control of the
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1 good decision?
2 A Absolutely. That's the advisory role, is to make
3 sure that the decision-maker is fully informed, as best we
4 can.
5 You know, we use the term very frequently "best"
6 military advice. I would actually probably recalibrate that
7 word and say "considered" military advice or "thoughtful"
8 military advice or "rigorous" military advice. Just because
9 a guy is wearing a uniform doesn't necessarily make it the
10 best. Our greatest President, in my view, is probably
11 Abraham Lincoln, and he had hardly any military experience,
12 but he had tremendous strategic insight. And, Franklin
13 Roosevelt, a tremendous strategic leader in time of war.
14 So I think our job is to make sure that the President,
15 the Secretary of Defense, is fully informed of the military
16 costs, risks, benefits, et cetera. And a President has a
17 much wider angle of view of a given problem than just a
18 singular military view. They've got to take in all kinds of
19 other aspects that we don't necessarily consider.
20 Q Yeah.
21 Before you were in your current role, you were in the
22 chain of command and had lots of other jobs in the military.
23 Could you just sort of walk us backward chronologically,
24 prior to your role as the Chairman, other roles that you had
25 within the United States Army?
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1 Election Day."
2 So do you remember the issue that's described in that
3 paragraph, the request of the Park Police to have National
4 Guard troops supporting the Park Police during planned
5 demonstrations surrounding election day?
6 A I don't, actually. But the quote I do.
7 Q Yeah.
8 A The quote, if I remember that quote --
9 Q Yeah.
10 A -- that's in response to Congress, I think.
11 Q Okay.
12 A I'm pretty sure that -- I can't remember, was it
13 Congresswoman Slotkin maybe? But it was after -- it was
14 sometime in the summer, probably -- so you got the events of
15 Lafayette Square, right?
16 Q Yeah.
17 A So that's 1 June. And I want to say, in July, two
18 Members of Congress sent me a letter, and they also sent a
19 letter to SecDef. And I responded, and this is part of my
20 response.
21 Q I see. The quoted language was in --
22 A The quoted language -- I believe, anyway. I'm
23 pretty sure.
24 Q Yeah.
25 A And I've used that elsewhere too, but that was the
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1 Q Los Angeles.
2 A Los Angeles. And Attorney General Barr, President
3 Trump's Attorney General, was the Attorney General for
4 then-President Bush.
5 Q Yeah.
6 A And now deceased, the late Colin Powell was the
7 Chairman. And I talked to Colin Powell several times about
8 this stuff, you know, to seek out outside views.
9 So my point being is that any use of the military,
10 whether it's Guard and/or Active Duty military, should be a
11 very, very serious, considered thought.
12 And we're really looking at it in lieu of law
13 enforcement. So, just like overseas, you want to use all
14 resources. I always advise, let's make sure we use all the
15 resources -- law enforcement resources, all the police
16 forces, so your local police, your city police, your State
17 police.
18 In the case of Washington, D.C., there are something
19 like 9,000 or 10,000 cops, in addition to the Metro Police
20 and the Capitol Police and all these other 13 police forces.
21 There's a lot of cops in D.C. If a lead Federal agency,
22 perhaps the Department of Justice, had lawful control over
23 all of them, then you employ law enforcement long before you
24 employ the military.
25 Q Right. So, if you're looking at, sort of, tiered
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1 Q Yeah.
2 A And there's risk when you put folks like that --
3 when the 82nd was deployed in the D.C. riots -- in fact,
4 Keith Kellogg, right? You know that name.
5 Q Yes.
6 A He was Lieutenant Kellogg as part of the 82nd
7 Airborne Division at the time. And someone can do a
8 historical fact-check; I'm not exactly sure how many were
9 killed in D.C., but it was a fair amount, I think it's in the
10 20s or 30s, were killed on the streets of D.C. during those
11 riots in the summer of the late '60s.
12 And then we deployed the 82nd in cases of Detroit, and
13 there were other units deployed in other places.
14 So, any time you deploy the Active Duty military, I've
15 got to tell you, that situation's got to be really, really
16 bad. It should -- it should be really bad.
17 Q Right.
18 You mentioned the Insurrection Act. I'm wondering, in
19 your role as the chief military advisor to the President,
20 what would be the criteria, in your view, that would justify
21 considering the invocation of the Insurrection Act? General
22 kinds of conditions that would create a predicate for the
23 appropriate invocation of that statute?
24 A Yeah, I think, you know -- and I had these
25 discussions in the summer and so on. So what are the
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1 rioting.
2 And, okay, I get it, it's illegal, it's wrong. But, to
3 my knowledge anyway, the intent of those riots over the
4 summer -- and I might be wrong. You could find some other
5 analysis that says something different. But I don't think
6 the intent of those riots was to overturn the United States
7 Government and to destroy the Constitution of the United
8 States of America or to split the Union or to secede from the
9 Union or to declare a Confederacy or to you know, those
10 sorts of things.
11 And therein -- the size, scale, scope, plus the object
12 of the rioting or the violence, I think therein you start
13 getting more towards the definition of an insurrection.
14 Q I see. And was that the consistent view of the
15 other military commanders in the summer of 2020?
16 A Yeah, I think that's -- I think that's probably
17 fairly representative of it. None of us thought that we had
18 a generalized insurrection in what we think of the term --
19 what I think of the term "insurrection."
20 Q Yeah.
21 A There were clearly challenges, though. I'm not
22 trying to downplay it.
23 Q Yeah.
24 A There was definite violence, and it was very
25 serious. And there were a lot of Governors, a lot of phone
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25 Q Yeah.
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3 Q Yeah. And, as an advisor, I would expect that the
4 quality of the information, the intelligence you're getting
5 is crucial to providing good advice about the appropriate use
6 of military resources?
7 A A hundred percent, yeah. Absolutely. Overseas and
8 domestic.
9 Q Yeah.
10 Let me ask you just again, we're going to come back
11 to that, unless you want to jump in?
12 No, no, no.
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2 Q Surrounding the election?
3 A Oh, yeah. Yeah. All of that. I mean, this was
4 consistent throughout the summer, but it builds up as you get
5 towards the election.
6 So my public affairs guy, in coordination with everyone
7 else's, decided it would be a good idea to go ahead and do a
8 backgrounder with a variety of news anchors to -- you know,
9 "settle the waters" is the wrong term, I suppose, but it's
10 to, you know, transmit a message of stability with the United
11 States military.
12 Again, this goes back to the military being involved in
13 domestic politics. We have no part in that. Zero. And
14 there were editorials that were calling for the military to
15 do this and do that, and there was just a lot of chatter and
16 uneasiness throughout the media, regardless of which media
17 you're watching. It was just -- it was a constant.
18 And we're on the eve of a national election, and I
19 wanted to make sure and we, the Joint Chiefs, wanted to make
20 sure that no one thought that the United States military was
21 going to get involved in an election. We're not. And we
22 were really scrupulous about making sure that we didn't, and
23 we were on alert for anything that would indicate that we
24 would.
25 Yeah. So that's what led to it.
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1 Mike Flynn.
2 He gave some comments in December after the election.
3 Specifically, in an appearance on the Newsmax network, he
4 said, "The President can take military capabilities in the
5 swing States and basically rerun the election."
6 Are you familiar with
7 A Oh, yeah.
8 Q -- those comments?
9 A Absolutely. I mean, that's an example of the
10 chatter that -- he wasn't the only one. There was other
11 stuff out there like that that was unnerving -- in my view,
12 unnerving to people, right, to the American people.
13 And I think it's incumbent upon me as a senior leader of
14 the United States military to assure people -- through media
15 is a vehicle of doing it; through Congress is another vehicle
16 of doing it -- to assure people that the United States
17 military was not going to be involved.
18 And I'm very familiar with Mike Flynn. I know who he
19 is. I've known him for a long time. And
20 Q Tell us about your relationship with General Flynn.
21 Have you worked with him before?
22 A Oh, yeah. Sure. You know, I have known Flynn for,
23 I don't know, since, probably, we were lieutenant colonels,
24 which would be the 1990s, I guess, something like that.
25 We've served together, and I know him very well and,
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1 Q Right.
2 A -- period. These are issues of domestic political
3 issues. Divisiveness between parties and arguments between
4 parties, whatever, it's all domestic politics. And the
5 military's got no role in domestic politics.
6 So, when I hear generals comment like that, it's not a
7 good thing.
8 Q Yeah.
9 The last subject that I just asked you about, the
10 ultimate usurpation of the Constitution. You were quoted in
11 one of the many books that has come out; I think it was
12 "Betrayal." When you were asked about what would've happened
13 if the President refused to leave, you said, "He would have
14 been removed by force, if necessary."
15 Was that a practical concern of yours, General Milley,
16 that the President would not leave voluntarily and that the
17 military or somebody would have some role in removing him by
18 force?
19 A Yeah, I'm not sure I actually said that. I'm not
20 sure
21 Q Okay.
22 A where that came from. But it didn't happen, to
23 begin with. And if the President -- if any President refused
24 to leave the White House, there are remedies to that that do
25 not involve the United States military.
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1 Q Uh-huh.
2 A There's Secret Service, there's FBI, there's police
3 forces, there's judges, there's the Congress, United States
4 Congress, there's the Supreme Court. There's about 14 other
5 channels. The United States military has no role in that
6 whatsoever.
7 Q I see.
8 A So I don't -- there were people who said words like
9 that
10 Q Yeah.
11 A -- and I remember reading words like that. I don't
12 know that I ever said that.
13 Q I appreciate that. Okay.
14 Let me stop and see if Ms. Cheney or other
15 members of the committee have questions on some of these
16 general topics.
17 Ms. Cheney. No. Thanks very much,
18 Okay.
19 Ms. Lofgren, is there anything
20 General Milley. "Betrayal" is the one by Jonathan Karl?
21 Yes.
22 General Milley. Yeah. Just for the record, I never
23 interviewed with him.
24 Did not. I see.
25 General Milley. Never talked to Jonathan Karl.
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1 Got it.
2 General Milley. Don't know him from Adam.
3 Thank you.
4 Other questions from the committee? Let me stop here
5 and see if -- Mrs. Luria or Mrs. Murphy?
6 Yeah, Mrs. Luria, go ahead.
7 Mrs. Luria. Good afternoon, General Milley, and thank
8 you for speaking to the committee today.
9 Since we've been talking about General Michael Flynn, I
10 had concerns, and I voiced them a few months back, especially
11 when he made comments, in addition to what we've described
12 today, that we should have a coup such as the one they had in
13 Myanmar -- I'm very concerned that he still continues to
14 receive retirement benefits, you know, in his position as a
15 general, as a retired general.
16 And I'm curious if you've ever considered, you know, in
17 any way approaching that. Because he obviously does not
18 continue to uphold his oath when he makes such statements.
19 You know, he's pretty overtly insinuated that he, you know,
20 would like to see the overthrow of the government or, you
21 know, actions taken outside of the law.
22 Do you have any comments on that?
23 General Milley. Yeah. So anyone who retires from the
24 military is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
25 for the rest of their life. And generals, you know, we take
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1 off the uniform and you're retired, but you always have the
2 title of general and you're always subject to these rules, to
3 the Code.
4 Now, there were some -- there were a couple cases during
5 the Trump administration, actually, when this came up, not
6 about Flynn but about others.
7 And on the very broadest of levels, right, I'm very
8 concerned about the, quote/unquote, "politicization of the
9 military." I'm seeing it more and more. I just saw the
10 Oklahoma Governor, the Governor of Oklahoma, fire the TAG
11 just the other day because the TAG was doing what General
12 Austin, what Secretary Austin -- the Department of Defense
13 has issued out instructions to go ahead and mandate
14 vaccinations, right? And we, the military, have been doing
15 mandated vaccinations for a long time.
16 So the TAG, the adjutant general of Oklahoma, was
17 implementing Secretary Austin's rules. The Governor of
18 Oklahoma fired him for doing that and then put in another
19 TAG. And, again, the Governor that's perfectly legal.
20 The Governor can absolutely do it. It's perfectly legal.
21 But it's another example, I would argue, of politicization of
22 the military.
23 I would argue, when two general officers, one of whom
24 was Flynn and one of whom was Allen, get up at major national
25 conventions and get behind a microphone and they start saying
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1 differences, anyway.
2 Q Yeah.
3 A And I served as the Chief of Staff in the Army
4 under Secretary Esper, and then as the Chairman under
5 Secretary of Defense Esper.
6 And I think that memo lays it out, that he took
7 different positions than the President wanted him to take. I
8 think that there was -- they -- there were people who
9 interpreted that as acts of disloyalty somehow. And, you
10 know, I think disagreement is not disloyalty, but people took
11 this stuff as disloyal.
12 So I'm not sure how anyone could say that displaying a
13 Confederate flag on military installations and Secretary
14 Esper putting out a policy that prohibits the display of
15 Confederate flags -- which is not really what his policy was.
16 What his policy was is the only flags that you can display is
17 the American flag, the Stars and Stripes, and unit flags and
18 so on.
19 So he was explicit in dealing with that issue,
20 Confederate flags. He was explicit in how he handled it.
21 There were several meetings with White House Chief of Staff
22 Meadows on it. It was a very contentious issue at the time.
23 So Secretary Esper decided that he believed -- and I
24 clearly supported him -- that a display of a Confederate flag
25 or other types of flags are divisive to the good order and
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1 sort of thing.
2 And then there was some issue, and I don't exactly
3 remember exactly what it was, but then-White House Chief of
4 Staff Kelly removed him from the White House. And I forget
5 exactly the reason. It had something to do with personal
6 conduct.
7 And then Kelly himself was removed later. And then
8 McEntee comes back into the White House. And that's where he
9 becomes the Office of Personnel and Management.
10 And the Office of Personnel Management, its significance
11 is it deals with the civilian hiring and firing, which is not
12 my lane. As a commissioned officer, I deal with the
13 uniformed part of this thing.
14 But OPM is the organization within the White House that
15 makes all the political appointees throughout the whole
16 government, which I think there's like 4,000 or something
17 like that. So they do the hiring and firing. And it's a
18 pretty powerful office or can be a pretty powerful office.
19 Q Right. He's actually the head of the Office of
20 Personnel, Presidential Personnel, OPP?
21 A Yes.
22 Q Which is, as you said, responsible for the hiring
23 of over 4,000 Presidential appointees across the government.
24 Wa s i t you r i mp re s s i on t h a t Mr . Mc En tee wa s i mp o s i ng
25 some sort of loyalty test or fidelity to President Trump's
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Oh.
5 Q - - of extrication of - -
6 A maybe?
7 Q Maybe I'm - - the name
8 A Have I got the name?
9 Q Tell us what you recall about Mr. Patel's role in
10 the
11 A Absolutely, yes, but I'm trying to remember the
12 name of the guy.
13 Yeah, so there's a -- some of this gets into some --
14 potentially some classified areas. So --
15 Q Okay. And stay away from that on this record.
16 A I'll try to stay away from that.
17 But, anyway, there was an American that was held hostage
18 in West Africa, I t h i n k - · and he was being held by a
19 terrorist organization.
20 So we developed intelligence over a period of time and
21 so on and so forth, and we developed a rescue plan. And we
22 executed the rescue plan and successfully rescued that
23 particular individual.
24 And Kash Patel was Acting SecDef Miller's chief of
25 staff, and he was part of the, you know, part of the overall
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1 These are media reports. And then Patel and Miller are on an
2 overseas trip to Asia. And Patel gets called back, like, you
3 know -- which is unusual, right? So he gets called back.
4 And I get informed, because, you know, I get a daily report
5 of where senior leaders are, where the President, Vice
6 President, Chairman, Vice Chairman, all that.
7 So senior leaders, we get a report on where everybody is
8 at, and then I get told Patel is on his way back. And I'm
9 thinking, well, okay, emergency leave, family issue,
10 something like that. But it's not. You know, we don't know.
11 So it just struck a bell in my head, why, you know
12 and I'm looking at all these media reports, and why is this
13 guy coming back? So I didn't know. Are we going to go
14 through another change, you know, and chief of staff of the
15 Pentagon now is going to be moving somewhere else? So I
16 don't know. And it just struck me as odd at the time.
17 And then there was a series of reports that picked up on
18 him coming back -- they were in the media again -- picked up
19 on him coming back, and they were speculating about him being
20 placed in a position as the deputy CIA officer, CIA
21 Director of CIA.
22 I don't know if that was all true or not. Since then,
23 there's been a whole series of articles in the media that
24 claim that that was a likely possibility and that White House
25 Chief of Staff Meadows had a conversation with then Director
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1 Just like, you know, with the Insurrection Act, he could walk
2 outside the White House immediately and just order it.
3 So there's wide latitude. There's nothing illegal about
4 that. But when challenged, and, you know, with some logic,
5 it was rescinded.
6 Q You're anticipating my next question. But for
7 being challenged, but for people who do have seasoned
8 judgment speaking up and saying something, raising concerns,
9 there's nothing that would have prevented these personnel
10 changes, these orders from going into effect?
11 A Oh, absolutely not, I mean, but that's what we get
12 paid for. We get paid to make sure that, you know, we, you
13 know, render our advice as best we know how. And you try to
14 do that without concern about consequences to yourself. You
15 just try to do it to the best of your ability and maintain
16 your integrity to do that. So, I mean, I expect that of
17 every officer, frankly, and that's our job.
18 Q Were there times, General Milley, where you wanted
19 the President or other people close to him to know that you
20 were personally aware of, paying attention to some of these
21 kinds of insufficient process changes? I'm specifically
22 thinking of the Army-Navy game and the story that's in, I
23 think it's the --
24 A Yeah. So up at -- yeah.
25 Q Tell us about that.
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1 we're not going to do something crazy and all that, that took
2 a degree of effort.
3 And then Secretary Pompeo did his piece on that. And
4 then and White House Chief of Staff Meadows.
5 So the theme of those calls was steady in the saddle,
6 safe landing, peaceful transfer of power, all of that.
7 Q Were both Secretary Pompeo and Mr. Meadows helping
8 you steady the boat, or were there times where either of them
9 rocked the boat or made that peaceful transfer somehow more
10 uncertain?
11 A No. I would say no, they weren't helping me
12 steady the boat. I was -- my mantra of steadiness starts
13 back in the summer. I'm literally saying those words all the
14 time to my own staff, to the Joint Staff. Steady, eye on the
15 horizon. This is all domestic politics. The Nation is going
16 to get through this. We have strong institutions. We're
17 resilient and so on. And just constantly remember the oath
18 is to the Constitution, right?
19 So, no, I would say it was probably the opposite. I
20 was transmitting steady, steady, everybody steady, everybody
21 breathe through your nose, steady. And let the courts do
22 their thing. Let the legislature do their thing. It's all
23 going to be okay.
24 And I would say that Secretary Pompeo and Chief of Staff
25 Meadows were in the same place, and I think that, you know, I
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1 A Kellogg.
2 Q All talked about the President being in a dark
3 place.
4 A Yeah. I don't know if that's an exact -- at least
5 one of them said dark place. But they were all
6 characterizing the President's mood, attitude, et cetera,
7 yeah, as being in a dark place and not in a good place, not
8 in a good way.
9 Now, you know, I testified a week or two or three ago.
10 I'm not a psychiatrist. I'm not qualified to judge anyone's
11 mental health. But there was enough characterization, and it
12 was also in the media, there was stuff in the media about all
13 this stuff, that I have no doubt was being picked up
14 overseas. And people were wondering overseas. And so -- you
15 know, in terms of the stability of the United States.
16 So I was constantly carrying, trying to carry a message
17 of steadiness, both domestically and overseas.
18 Q Was it your impression from your own interaction
19 with the President or from these conversations with people
20 that had more contact that there was -- that dark place
21 stayed consistent after the election, or did it rise and
22 fall?
23 You mentioned the first couple of weeks --
24 A Yeah.
25 Q -- it was a dark place. Did it stay dark or did
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13 during the 6th. And they were with him, you know, all day on
14 the 6th, I guess
15 Q Okay.
16 A - - you know. And, as far as who contributed what
17 to whom, I don't know. I do know that Kellogg said that
18 Ivanka had a calming influence on him.
19 Q Do you remember on the 6th or days thereafter any
20 discussion of the potential implication of the 25th
21 Amendment?
22 A Yeah. So I'm not a member of the Cabinet --
23 Q Uh-huh.
24 A -- and I have no role whatsoever in the 25th
25 Amendment discussions, but there was at least one or two
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14 Q Yeah.
15 A Yeah. So --
16 Q Just describe what happened.
17 A Yeah. So the 8th, there's a couple of different
18 things. We have a planned phone call to my Chinese
19 counterpart, General Li, and I think that ends on or about
20 8:30ish or so in the morning. It's a VTC, and there's a
21 bunch of people on it. We have a Memorandum for Record that
22 you can take a look at.
23 Q Yeah. That's exhibit 38?
24 A Yeah. And so following that, at 8:37, I get on the
25 phone to report out to Pompeo and Meadows. And this is part
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1 Q It does, yeah.
2 A Yeah. So, in any event, this is my summary of all
3 that.
4 Q Yes.
5 A And Speaker Pelosi was quite animated about the
6 situation, and my -- what I was trying to do was assure her
7 that the -- the strategic weapons systems, the nuclear
8 weapons systems, and the processes and procedures for which I
9 am charged, by the way --
10 Q Uh-huh.
11 A -- by Presidential directive and Department of
12 Defense instructions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
13 Staff is charged to make sure that we have a safe and secure
14 system for the handling of nuclear weapons. So it's within
15 my scope of duties to do this. And we have an entire, very
16 elaborate system of procedures and instructions that go all
17 the way down to the firing units. Obviously, all those
18 things are classified, but there's checks, checks, and double
19 checks in that system, as you would want there to be.
20 It's clearly recognized that the President and only the
21 President can authorize the launch, so he, alone, can
22 authorize the launch, but he doesn't launch alone. It's a
23 little phrase we use when we're training people on this whole
24 thing. So what that means is that if the President decides
25 or if there's a nuclear event conference of some kind, we
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1 Q Yeah.
2 A -- and the House, and I provided a briefing, a
3 classified briefing to the SASC on the classified reports.
4 In this session, the unclassified session, I would tell you
5 that there was a body of reporting that clearly indicated
6 that the Chinese were concerned about the United States and
7 what we were going to do. And there were words like "October
8 surprise" that were being whipped around.
9 Q And to -- sorry to interrupt you, but the basis of
10 the concern had something to do with the election --
11 A Yes, absolutely.
12 Q -- and concerns about our --
13 A Yeah. There was concern by the Chinese that the
14 United States would do something like, you know, to use our
15 language, like a wag-the-dog scenario in order to affect the
16 outcome of the U.S. election, and this was in unclassified
17 reporting.
18 Q Uh-huh.
19 A And there was some other reporting that I'm not
20 going to talk about here, but the other reporting is far more
21 important.
22 Q Uh-huh.
23 A And I'll be happy to show it to you. And, once
24 you'll see it, you'll say, hmmm. And so Secretary Esper and
25 I get together, and it was decided that we would do -- you
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8 A Yeah. Yeah.
9 Q - - post January 6th?
12 A Right.
13 Q - - despite how i t might look?
1 Q Yeah.
2 A There's no question about it.
3 Q Okay. I'm almost finished, and then we can stop
4 and go we haven't even talked about January 6th yet, and
5 I'm sorry we' re taking all your time.
6 A That's fine.
7 Q Just a couple of things quickly about - - I wanted
8 to ask you about Kash Patel. There's been some reporting
9 that there were these meeting at the Breitbart mansion, and
10 Patel would attend with Ezra Cohen and Steve Bannon. Do you
11 know anything about those associations with Mr. between
12 Mr. Patel and Cohen and Bannon and others there or elsewhere?
13 A Firsthand knowledge, no. I mean, but through media
14 reporting, there's things on YouTube. There's things on
15 social media, et cetera. There was a place I don't even
16 know if it still exists, I've never been to it, but something
17 called the Breitbart mansion --
18 Q Yeah.
19 A -- which, as I understand it, is somewhere near the
20 St ate Depa rt men t , I th i n k , pe r haps .
21 Q Uh-huh.
22 A And that had something to do with, I think, Steve
23 Bannon. I think he either rented it or owned it or something
24 like that.
25 Q Yeah.
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1 Q Okay.
2 A Yeah. It would be 2017, and it's at some event. I
3 forget what it was.
4 Q Yeah.
5 A But, anyway, he shakes my hand, and he informs me
6 that his daughter was going to West Point. I was Chief of
7 Staff of the Army. I said: Oh, that's great, Steve, you
8 know. Nice to meet you, that kind of thing. It was very
9 it was a quick "hello, how are you," nothing of substance.
10 The second time was at West Point, and I was up there
11 for some event. He was -- it might have been some sporting
12 event or something. I'm not sure what it was, but I'm up
13 there, and he was there and with his daughter, so he came up.
14 And she was a cadet, and he introduced me to her, and it was
15 just light talk. It wasn't anything substantive there.
16 Q Yeah.
17 A Those are the only two times I've ever interacted
18 with him. Now, through media reporting and reading about
19 him, yeah. A pretty interesting individual, I guess.
20 Q And in terms of the - - you said you talked a lot to
21 Mr. Meadows and Mr. Kellogg and Pompeo, people that were
22 close to the President. Did you hear any more, more
23 recently, 2020, 2021, about Mr. Bannon's connection to the
24 President and advice to the President, anything like that?
25 A No. I never -- I don't have any firsthand
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25
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2
3
4 Q Yeah.
5 A I'm not exactly sure of the full Monty. A smart
6 guy, went to the University of Pennsylvania. As I recall, on
7 the way out, he was thinking about going to the University of
8 Chicago Law School. Very -- intellectually, very sharp, very
9 intelligent. And he -- so he's S0/LIC. He's ASD S0/LIC.
10 You can maybe talk to Secretary Esper to get his view because
11 he was the ASD S0/LIC under Esper. It was my impression that
12 Secretary Esper and he didn't get along very well. I'm not
13 exactly sure what all the reasons were.
14 Q Yeah.
15 A Not my place. Then, when Secretary Esper gets
16 fired, Secretary Miller comes in, and Ezra Cohen gets
17 elevated. What's it called? It's called the DepSecDep for
18 Intelligence. So the previous guys in there was -- let's
19 see. It was Admiral Kernan was there. Admiral Maguire was
20 there. So Ezra Cohen becomes the Under Secretary of Defense
21 for Intelligence, USDI. And I forget how old Ezra is, but
22 he's pretty young. Not that that -- you know, that's not a
23 negative. It's just he's a young guy, and he's moving up
24 pretty quick.
25 So USDI has responsibility for the Secretary of Defense
156
1 counsel.
2 Q Yeah.
3 A And the NSA is far and away the world's most
4 powerful intelligence agency, and their capabilities are
5 extraordinary. And whatever the NSA does should always be
6 done legally, morally, and ethically in accordance with, you
7 know, the law, right. And I think there was a little bit of
8 concern on the part of General Nakasone, but, again, I would
9 refer you to talk to General Nakasone on that.
10 Q Yeah.
11 A But I think the IG -- I'm not -- if I'm not
12 mistaken, I think the IG's findings, I was told the IG's
13 findings were that there was nothing nefarious about the
14 hiring.
15 Q Uh-huh.
16 A So, procedurally, the hiring probably was done
17 correctly.
18 Q Yeah.
19 A I don't think that's the issue.
20 Q No. And General Nakasone immediately -- this is on
21 January 15th, 5 days before the end of the administration
22 when he's installed in a civil service position, not a
23 political appointment, as the General Counsel of NSA.
24 General Nakasone immediately puts him on leave, and he then
25 departs the Agency sometime this year. And, again, I'm just
161
1 Q Okay.
2 A -- and the releasing of certain documents and
3 uncovering this, a whole bunch of stuff like that. So what
4 exactly it was, I can't even remember. And I'm not even sure
5 I ever knew what it was, but there were concerns that Paul
6 Nakasone had that he was being told to do things that he
7 didn't think were right. And I said: Then, if you don't
8 think they're right and they're illegal and immoral and
9 unethical, you don't do them. This is not a hard proposition
10 here. And Meadows was part of that, by the way, but again,
11 you've got to get the specifics on that one. All I can do --
12 Q Okay.
13 A -- is refer you to Paul Nakasone --
14 Q I appreciate that.
15 A because he's got -- you know, they viewed -- and
16 I say they. I would probably say there's a group of
17 people -- maybe it's a Meadows, maybe it's somebody from the
18 White House, maybe it's Kash Patel, I don't know -- who think
19 that the Paul Nakasones, the Gina Haspels, the Chris Wrays,
20 the me as, quote, the deep state which is nonsense. These
21 are dedicated civil servants who have been professionally
22 protecting this country and defending this country all of our
23 adult lives.
24 But, nevertheless, there was feelings like that. And I
25 think with the case of Paul Nakasone, because of his unique
163
5 Q Okay.
6 A Just like I just had a conversation, right, so
7 there's conversations on options, courses of action, risk,
8 puts and takes, plusses and minuses, et cetera. This is the
9 normal business of a Chairman or any advisor, actually. And,
10 during the conduct of these conversations, things are said
11 conversationally, not orders. There's a difference.
12 Q Yes.
13 A If they're orders, I've got to execute them or I --
14 or not, right, and then we're in a different place. So,
15 during these conversations, things are said by a variety of
16 people
17 Q Uh-huh.
18 A -- that I think are either illegal, immoral,
19 unethical, or inappropriate, and I say that. And I say: No,
20 we can't do that. That's illegal or that's immoral or that's
21 unethical. We're the United States military. We don't do
22 things like that. These are just general gistings of
23 conversations that occurred. So trying to use the power of
24 persuasion, the power of argument and debate. You know,
25 you're all lawyers. You're all familiar with all of that, in
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1 [5:33 p. m.]
2 BY
1 BY
2 Q So I think what would be best in the next hopefully
3 an hour or so, we'll go over the preparations of DOD, the
4 letter from Mayor Bowser, the steps taken in the days before.
5 A This is on the 6th? Preparation.
6 Q Ending with the 6th, yes.
7 So let me just start with you mentioned that the Joint
8 Chiefs had been tracking the violence --
9 A Yes.
10 Q daily violence, and that you would receive an
11 update every day about that.
12 When did that begin?
13 A Right shortly after the 1st of June. It was during
14 the summer turmoil.
15 Q And was that requested by yourself?
16 A Oh, yeah. We stood up a crisis management team.
17 So within the procedures of the Joint Staff -- actually, I've
18 been the Chairman since 1 October, right? When the Turks
19 came across the border of Syria, which I think I forget what
20 date it was, but it was shortly after I had become the
21 Chairman, from that date forward we have had at least a
22 crisis management team stood up on the Joint Staff to deal
23 with something, and in some cases we had more than one.
24 So we stood up a crisis management team that was
25 dedicated to monitoring domestic unrest and to ensure that we
178
1 thing.
2 BY
1 call Chris Wray, say: Hey, Chris, are you tracking this?
2 This is like the former President. I don't know who this guy
3 is, but someone just tweeted or chatted or whatever they did.
4 So it's a chatter sort of thing. But we, the Department
5 of Defense, and I had lawyers plus the intel guys, like, no,
6 no, no, we're definitely not collecting and we're going to
7 do it. I said: That's absolutely right, do it procedurally
8 correct, rely on law enforcement. So those are the agencies
9 that we did.
10 Q So it sounds like FBI as well as local police
11 monitoring you said also?
12 A And a key one was Metro Police.
13 Q And how is this information -- it's coming through
14 the crisis management team.
15 A It's coming through the crisis management team and
16 Ken Rapuano was getting a lot of this stuff.
17 And we have written reports. I'll never forget the
18 one I got this one after 6 January, because I kept seeing
19 in the media FBI Field Office Norfolk had a report that
20 predicted all this stuff, right? And I said: Well, if they
21 had it I never saw it. I want to see it.
22 And it took me a couple days, but I insisted that I get
23 the actual FBI report. And they actually sent it to me. And
24 I read it, and it was fascinating. I don't know if you saw
25 it. Have you seen that?
186
6 Q Yes.
7 A The Patriots, the Rebels, and the whatever i t is.
8 ~ Cowboys.
9 BY
10 Q Cowboys.
11 A You saw that. I looked at that and I said: That's
12 interesting. It would have been nice to see that beforehand.
13 But, in any event, that's a field office of Norfolk. That's
14 not main FBI. That map, though, speaks volumes, so -- in my
15 opinion, in my professional opinion.
16 Q I believe this is the map that you're talking
17 about, which is attached to something else, but I can show it
18 to you to make sure we're talking about the same one that I
19 think was attached to this.
20 A I can see it from here. It's got an arrow coming
21 from New England, coming down I-95, the Patriots.
22 Q I think this might be the one. We can mark it.
23 A Yeah, that's it. Yeah. That's the same map.
24 So that to me was fascinating. It could have been done
25 by anybody. It takes no special training to do that. But
187
1 two times in which the Proud Boys -- there might have been
2 other groups -- showed up in Washington, D.C., and there was
3 a series of fights, street fights that night. I don't know
4 if you remember this, but there's a series of these fights
5 that go on. And that was clicking -- those were clicking
6 indicators and warnings to me.
7 So tweets go out. Guys show up. Street brawls. This
8 gets to the comment about, you know, brown shirts and all
9 that kind of stuff.
10 So you got these street fights between groups of people
11 that have varying political views. They're happening in the
12 Nation's Capital. And that was -- I'm like, whoa, what's
13 happening here? So my radars are going up a little bit.
14 Having said that, again, totally could be handled by law
15 enforcement, and they did handle it. So these are groups of,
16 you know, five, ten roaming around the streets, getting in
17 street brawls. Metro PD handled it. Chief of police didn't
18 require any support. But we were witting of it and it was
19 just another set of data points.
20 Then, as you get closer, there's a series of tweets
21 talking about the 6th of January. You know, come to the 6th.
22 And, you know, you've got the tweets. They're all out there
23 in the public space. And it was obvious to me that there's
24 sort of this call to come to the 6th.
25 And then we went into these series of meetings to try to
191
1 at me. I was like, whoa. And I think that number came from
2 the Metro Police chief, actually. But you can check it.
3 Anyway, very, very large crowds, right? And as we get
4 closer, these crowds are -- the estimations of these crowds
5 are growing, based on police estimates of what they think
6 they're going to deal with. So --
7 Q Before we go into those interagency calls, I just
8 want to go back to what you said about the Proud Boys.
9 Now, did you hear about the Proud Boys through any of
10 the law enforcement agency updates, or is that from your own
11 data miner?
12 A No, no. These were reports that we were getting
13 from the law enforcement
14 Q Okay.
15 A -- the crisis team and all that. And they
16 were tracking the various organizations that the police are
17 telling us, you know.
18 Q And we'll look at --
19 A It wasn't just Proud Boys.
20 Q Before we move off of this, there was some
21 reporting in Peril that described that you were on high alert
22 about some of these things that you were seeing on data
23 miner.
24 A That's what I'm describing to you. High alert,
25 that's probably someone else's words. But high alert is
193
1 our Alamo, this is our cause, this is your last chance, this
2 is it, you know, it's time for the revolution. I mean, all
3 this kind of really, really vitriolic language.
4 In hindsight, it all is crystal clear. At the moment, I
5 expected street fights. In fact, the head of Proud Boys gets
6 arrested, if I'm not mistaken, gets arrested by somebody as
7 he was trying to come into the city. And I expected what we
8 saw in the fall, only I thought it was going to be a lot more
9 and bigger, broader, a lot more fighting on the street than
10 in the summer.
11 Q In hindsight, was there an emphasis -- overemphasis
12 on counterprotesters and protesters versus -- without
13 understanding what the crowd's intent might have been, in
14 terms of looking at what happened in November and in
15 December?
16 A You mean overemphasis on the extreme groups?
17 You mean BLM and Antifa?
18 Correct.
19 General Milley. Not by me and not by us, not the
20 military. You know, to me it's -- we were calling balls and
21 strikes. I don't think there was an overemphasis on either
22 side.
23 I clearly saw, I think, and this isn't an overemphasis,
24 I saw the greater threat coming from the Proud Boys, Three
25 Percenters, that kind of group, right, only because they were
196
1 What are all these things that they have? Because that
2 didn't happen by accident. There's no way that happened by
3 accident. That is planned, it's coordinated, and in some way
4 somehow it was synchronized. I don't know how. I don't know
5 who. Hopefully, you guys have better luck.
6 BY
1 happened?
2 Q It's unclear.
3 A It's close to -- it's not the 6th. It's not the
4 5th.
5 Q There's a meeting on the 3rd of January, the
6 evening, at the White House.
7 A It didn't happen there. This is before that.
8 Q Let me just clarify one thing, though, from this
9 January 3rd call. As you probably are aware, there's some
10 public reporting that we've spoken to Mr. Donoghue and
11 Mr. Rosen about these events as well.
12 It's their recollection from that January 3rd call that
13 you asked DOJ to be the lead agency and the Acting Attorney
14 General at that time said: No, not at this time, January
15 3rd.
16 A That's right.
17 Q Do you remember that?
18 A Absolutely. Yes. So, I mean, it's like, hey,
19 someone's got to -- I'm just an advisor -- someone's got to
20 get the rose pinned on them, someone's got to be in charge,
21 because this is a big deal and you've got all these forces,
22 et cetera.
23 And it didn't take a rocket scientist to figure out the
24 numbers of people coming in, whether it's 25,000 or 45,000.
25 Someone has got to be in charge of this thing, right? So I
206
1 it says: You're set for the 6th and all that and you got a
2 plan and, you know, protect my people and all that. Right?
3 And I'm silent. I'm just listening and I'm like, hmm.
4 And Miller says: Oh, yeah, yeah, we're good, we're
5 squared away, we got capability and all that.
6 And that was it. And then the meeting is over and we
7 all go our ways, right?
8 So I walk out. I'm walking out with Secretary Miller.
9 And I said to Secretary Miller, I said: What was all that
10 about at the tail end? I said: That's, you know -- we have
11 a significant crowd showing up. What are you guys talking
12 about?
13 Oh, nothing, we're good, you know, we're set. We got
14 the -- we've gone around, we've coordinated with the police,
15 and that's all.
16 I said: Okay, fine. Because that is what I knew was
17 true, and he just reinforced what I already knew to be true.
18 Was there anything else behind any of that? I don't
19 know. I'm not going to ascribe anything to that. It just
20 was an odd set of comments at the tail end of a meeting that
21 had nothing to do with domestic stuff.
22 Q Did the President mention how many protesters he
23 was expecting?
24 A Yeah. Well, he did. That was part of it. I
25 forget how many he said, but it was a lot. I forget. I
213
1 it goes up from him to the Army, and then Army flips it over
2 to Ken Rapuano, and this analysis on exactly what we want.
3 But the issue was define exactly -- and this is very common.
4 So people oftentimes say: I want blank amount of
5 troops. That's not the best way to do it. The best way to
6 do it is here's the task and purpose we need you to
7 accomplish, then we'll come back to you with an offer of how
8 many troops it takes to do that course of action. And then
9 you work it out, right?
10 So that's what was going on. There's this
11 back-and-forth between the Army and the Mayor on exactly
12 scoping the mission, making sure we understood the task and
13 purpose. But in addition to that comes rules of engagement
14 and authorities, and that's really important.
15 So that's one of the big lessons over the summer, is
16 making sure that the Department -- and only the Secretary of
17 Defense or the Secretary of the Army can do that, because
18 that constitutes authorities -- establishes very clear,
19 unambiguous rules of engagement, rules on the use --
20 actually, rules of engagement are overseas. I should say
21 rules on the use of force.
22 So rules on the use of force is what's used in domestic
23 when the military is used in domestic. So that all has to
24 get worked out.
25 And then -- and I forget what the date was, but we wrote
215
1 Make sure it's safe with the caveat of protect my people, was
2 that protect -- make it safe for the people who were showing
3 up?
4 A I think, yeah, sure, the people who were, quote,
5 "protesting." I think that's what it was meant. And I think
6 the -- again, I don't want to get into mind reading. Well,
7 I'll give you a comment from Robert O'Brien, for example, on
8 one of these phone calls.
9 Robert O'Brien, where Norquist says, in one of these
10 phone calls, Norquist says words to the effect like the
11 greatest threat is going to be an assault on the Capitol,
12 O'Brien says in one of these phone calls, the greatest threat
13 is going to come from Antifa and Black Lives Matter
14 assaulting the protesters.
15 So, you know, different, and both are potentially
16 legitimate views. But one guy who's hanging out in the White
17 House, he says that during one of these calls. Was that the
18 view of the President? The President never used the words --
19 in front of me -- didn't use the words protect the protests,
20 protect my people, protect the MAGA crowd, protect that
21 against Black Lives Matter or Antifa.
22 But I would assert that that was pretty much what -- my
23 guess is that is what they thought the threat was, that they
24 thought that there were anti-protesters, I guess, or
25 counterprotesters that were going to stir things up or
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1 [6:32 p.m.]
2 BY
3 Q Before we move off the topic of the meeting itself,
4 you talked us through a little bit about the unique position
5 of the D.C. National Guard and the chain of command. You
6 went through that
7 A Yeah.
8 Q -- at the beginning. On January 6th, or let's just
9 say on January 3rd, did Secretary Miller have all the
10 authorities he needed to authorize the D.C. National Guard?
11 A Totally. Well, sure. I mean, the President, yes,
12 obviously. But the SecDef has all the -- all the authorities
13 of the Secretary of the Army, the SecDef has. All the
14 authorities of the Secretary of Defense, the President has.
15 So, yes, the Secretary of Defense, acting or otherwise, has
16 complete authority over these forces.
17 Q Was there any additional authority that Secretary
18 Miller needed on January 6 from the President to deploy the
19 D.C. National Guard?
20 A Not at all. No. I mean, he has -- like I said, he
21 can the Secretary of Defense legally has an enormous
22 amount of authority over the deployment and employment of
23 military forces, whether it's domestically or
24 internationally. Now, should they do that absent
25 Presidential knowledge or approval? No, they shouldn't, and
220
1 prepositioned agency
2 A Sure.
3 Q -- or
4 A No, I think there should.
5 Q Who should it be?
6 A If it's a natural disaster, those sorts of things,
7 I think FEMA is the logical choice. But if it's anything to
8 do with law enforcement
9 Q Yeah.
10 A -- I would argue that it's one of two choices:
11 It's either the Department of Justice or Homeland Security.
12 Q Uh-huh.
13 A I -- personally I would lean towards Justice
14 because they've got a lot of cops, and they are -- they're an
15 organization that, by culture and design, is law enforcement.
16 That's what they do, and the Attorney General is the head law
17 enforcement officer of the United States. So my bias would
18 be towards the Department of Justice.
19 Q Got it. I appreciate that. Thank you.
20 BY
21 Q Just getting back to this, when -- from your
22 conversations on January 3rd and January 4th, those two
23 interagency calls, was it clear to you that DOJ
24 A And I would -- not to interrupt. I'm sorry.
25 Q No problem.
226
1 Esper?
2 A You'd have to ask the guys who wrote it. But
3 they're all Secretaries of Defense, former Secretaries of
4 Defense, and I think they are clearly speaking to the
5 current -- at that time the current Secretary of Defense. It
6 says it right in the letter, so they're speaking to him. But
7 then it said not just him. It said all political appointees,
8 officers, and civil servants, so they're talking to all of us
9 from you know, they're talking to everybody. But yeah,
they but they named him.
11 Ms. Cheney, do you have anything, or
12 anyone else, on this?
13 Ms. Cheney. I don't. Thanks, -
14 BY
15 Q On January 4th, there was an interagency call
16 around 4 o'clock, and I think this was the last interagency
17 call before the 6th itself. And, again, the usual DOD, DOJ,
18 DHS are all present on this call. Was there any concern
19 raised about the security preparations or permits? You
20 mentioned it earlier.
21 A I think I might have raised it. It might be in the
22 report somewhere. I did. And I did it also, I think -- I
23 might have done it -- I can't remember if I did it for the
24 6 t h o r i f I d i d i t f o r t he i n a ug u r a t i on , one o r t he o t he r o r
25 maybe both . I - - a g a i n , I ' m an adv i so r , so I th i n k I s a i d
233
1 about.
2 Q This is in a Senate report where Christopher Miller
3 was interviewed, and he said, on that January 4th call, he
4 recognized that the tone and rhetoric of the more aggressive
5 demonstrators had changed in the last couple months. And
6 that, while he didn't have any indicators of an assault on
7 the Capitol, he recognized that January 6th was a critical
8 day in many of these conspiratorial-minded folks, and it
9 could be pretty dramatic.
10 A Yeah. I think that's a fair account.
11 Q And did you share that concern?
12 A Absolutely.
13 Q And was that -- was there a discussion on this
14 January 4th call about these concerns that were raised?
15 A Yes. I mean, that was the whole point of these
16 calls was to go over the interagency procedures and processes
17 and the disposition of the police forces and the National
18 Guard or anybody else in order to make sure that there was a
19 safe and secure environment on the 6th.
20 Everyone knew. I can't imagine anybody in those calls
21 that didn't realize that on the 6th was going to be the
22 certification of an intensely contested election, and there
23 were large crowds coming into town, and they were coming in
24 to protest. And everybody knew there was a probability, more
25 than a possibility, a probability of violence.
236
1 got streets, you know. They were very -- it was the Capitol
2 Police that responded to the October, November, December
3 timeframe when those street fights were happening. We can
4 take care of all that. Park Police: We've got no issues at
5 the -- on the parks, et cetera, et cetera, but -- yeah.
6 So we threw it out there. I mentioned it, again, in an
7 advisory role for people to think it through, and the folks
8 that are in charge of the Cabinet members said, thank you
9 very much for your interest in domestic affairs, and that's
10 it.
11 Q At the end of that call, did you feel reassured and
12 confident with the security plan going into January 6th?
13 A I felt confident in the sense that the police
14 forces all said that they could handle it, right. So I
15 think -- and I'd have to go back and ask someone
16 else who's in the meeting. I think I went down the list of
17 the police guys on the call and asked the question. Either I
18 or Rapuano or maybe Miller did. Some -- someone of us went
19 right down that list, and all the agencies are on there, and
20 are you good, are you good, do you got what you need? Do you
21 need anything else from Department of Defense and all that
22 kind of stuff. We were pretty rigorous about that because I
23 lived through the summer, the previous summer, and all the
24 acrimony associated with it, right. And, you know, you learn
25 from that sort of stuff.
238
1 Q And --
2 A I mean, I became even more rigorous. I was off the
3 charts rigorous when it came to the inauguration.
4 Q At some point during that call, do you remember
5 going through what the numbers were of the law enforcement
6 who responded during the summer?
7 A The numbers of the law enforcement that responded.
8 Q Each agency.
9 A I remember calling off the numbers that I had. And
10 I said I don't know if it was to Rosen or just to the
11 group, and it might have been in the beginning. I
12 reviewed -- in the military, we have a term called "order of
13 battle." Order of battle is the list of the friendly forces
14 or the enemy forces that you have. So I went through the
15 police order of battle because I wanted to make sure that we
16 had an appreciation of how much police force is available in
17 the District of Columbia. And I said things like: Okay,
18 Metro Police, you got 2,500 guys on your rolls from chief
19 down to patrol man, and you're using how many, that kind of
20 thing. Again, trying to be collegial as possible.
21 But, group by group by group, and Secret Service, FBI,
22 the, you know, Park Police, the Federal police throughout the
23 Federal b LI i l d i ngs , the BLI re a LI of Pr i sons , al l these g LI y s . We
24 did the same thing for the inauguration. And it was: How
25 many guys you got? How many guys you got? How many are you
239
1 Q -- but not --
2 A I thought he said it.
3 Q I think there's an issue of the semantics of what
4 it means, but this clear-cut designation they don't believe
5 occurred.
6 A If it went well, you were. If it went bad, you
7 weren't.
8 Q So exhibits 17 and 18 are some of the memos that
9 you mentioned earlier. I just want to briefly talk about
10 them.
11 You mentioned that you -- Secretary Esper had had
12 written a memo after the summer protests.
13 A Which exhibit are you on now?
14 Q Exhibit 17. This is the January 4th memo --
15 A Okay.
16 Q -- from Acting SecDef Chris Miller.
17 A Yes. This is the redone version of the Esper memo.
18 Q I want to talk about some of these control measures
19 and what was borne out of some of the lessons learned from
20 the summer protests. Obviously, there was --
21 A Well --
22 Q Go ahead.
23 A I can go bullet by bullet if you want.
24 Q That's fine.
25 A Okay. So, again, the summer was a pretty
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1 take off, the helicopters take off, no. Not going to do it.
2 Next one, same thing. That's the same. That's kind of
3 a repeat of the previous one on the helicopters. Not using
4 any helicopters. So, police, you want helicopters, you've
5 got helicopters too. So if you really need a medevac, you've
6 got medevac. You've got police medevac. You've got life
7 flights and all that kind of stuff, right?
8 If it's beyond the capability of the police, demonstrate
9 to us that you've used all your assets, then we'll bring in a
10 helicopter. But we're not going to make the same mistake of
11 flying medevac helicopters over the city of Washington, D.C.,
12 and the Capitol and have rotor wash blowing down on people
13 and people think that, you know, it's the apocalypse showing
14 up. We're not going to do that again. So these are lessons
15 learned.
16 Conduct searches, seizures, arrests. No. That's not
17 what we do. That's what cops do. That's not what we do.
18 That's posse comitatus.
19 Seek support from any non-National Guard units. So, no,
20 we're not going to go outside and get the 82nd Airborne
21 Division to roll into D.C. No. It's D.C. Guard. This is
22 your city.
23 If we need additional help because of the situation and
24 the Mayor asks for it or one of these other police agencies
25 asks for it through request, then, obviously, we're going to
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1 we're seeing.
2 And what we're doing is we're spinning up the force.
3 We're spinning up the D.C. Guard and the neighboring States'
4 Guards. Federal forces -- the only Federal forces available
5 is the Old Guard at Fort Meyer, which they have a secondary
6 mission for the defense of the Washington -- the District of
7 Columbia area.
8 But, anyway, so this all happened pretty quickly at this
9 point.
10 Q So -- and I'm not going to go through every single
11 call, but just taking it from that 3:04 VOCO until the
12 National Guard arrives at 5:20.
13 A Yes.
14 Q Can you just generally describe what is occurring.
15 And the big picture question here is, as Ms. Lofgren asked
16 you, there's scrutiny about the delay and the length of time
17 it took for the D.C. National Guard to come. And I'm just
18 wondering if you could just explain to us what was going on
19 in that 2-hour, 20-minute timeframe before they were able to
20 actually establish the perimeter.
21 A Well, I mean, you have to issue out orders. The
22 Guard has to be alerted. They have to marshal. They have to
23 assemble at the Armory. They have to be issued equipment.
24 They have to be issued orders and instructions. They have to
25 be told what their rules of use of force are.
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1 make sure that these kids are -- not kids -- these troops are
2 properly briefed, and they're equipped properly, and they
3 have their orders, and they know what they're doing, they
4 know where they're going, they know the condition, the
5 situation.
6 So that's what the Secretary of the Army I think was --
7 he and his chain were doing to make sure that those Secretary
8 of Defense orders were being followed through.
9 Q Was there any hesitation by DOD leadership to
10 deploy the D.C. National Guard?
11 A None. No.
12 And that's -- and so the picture I'm trying to paint is
13 at 1430, right?
14 Now, if you go back to the 31st of December and the 1st
15 and 2nd and 3rd and 4th, that's a different set of
16 conditions.
17 Once the events are happening and this insurrection and
18 riot is going on, and there's now an appreciation of the
19 situation based on, you know, film footage on TV, right, and
20 reporting, the meeting starts at 1430, it's less than 15 or
21 20 minutes before the Secretary of Defense is making
22 decisions based on recommendations of the Secretary of the
23 Army and me and others, which is, you know, in the world of
24 the Pentagon, that's pretty fast decisionmaking.
25 Now, beforehand, that's different. That's a
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1 different
2 Q Well, let's talk about what could have happened
3 beforehand that would have increased the response time.
4 A Well, what could have happened you know, the
5 world is always full of could haves, should haves, would
6 haves, right? So what could have happened was a better
7 intelligence picture, a better understanding of the domestic
8 threat environment, the groups that were coming in.
9 In hindsight, some of this stuff is readily -- you can
10 see it in hindsight, some of it. You can't see all of it,
11 but you can see some of it. And you can now uncover threads
12 on these various social media sites. You can uncover -- I'm
13 sure, sooner or later, you guys are going to uncover
14 communications between someone that is organizing, planning,
15 and synchronizing this.
16 Like I said it up front, in my personal opinion, for
17 what it's worth, something of this magnitude, something of
18 this size and scope, and as those events unfold, and looking
19 at -- physically looking at video and what happened, I find
20 it not credible that that happened organically and just sort
21 of spontaneously happens. I'm not buying it.
22 Do I have evidence of otherwise? No. But I'm seeing it
23 on TV, and I've seen the reports afterwards. And I think, my
24 hypothesis is, is that -- and this is based on, you know,
25 40 years of military experience.
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1 When 25, 35, or whatever the number is, when groups that
2 large get together, and there is an event like what we saw,
3 with people with radios, and it sure looks to me, you know,
4 like it was coordinated.
5 And I think that you are likely, at some point, you're
6 going to discover some sort of linkages and connecting of
7 these dots.
8 And some of these people have experience in the
9 intelligence world. They're familiar with how to do certain
10 things with cutouts, with layers of cutouts, how to organize
11 things on communication channels that are not readily
12 accessible, and so on and so forth.
13 So you'll find it, sooner or later. It wasn't an
14 accident.
15 Q In terms of what else could have helped that day,
16 on the intel piece
17 A Yeah.
18 Q - - all the chatter that's there - -
19 A Yeah.
20 Q - - what would have, in your viewing at i t now,
1 [7:44 p.m.]
2 BY
1 Q At 3:13.
2 A No. Afterwards, yeah, somebody showed me to that
3 after the fact. At that point, that's -- you know, it was a
4 little too late.
5 Q I know you --
6 A But I didn't see it, though, at the time.
7 Q I know you stated earlier that you did not speak to
8 the President at all that day. Was there any desire for you
9 to speak to the President in the sense of asking him to put
10 out a statement to quell the violence that was going on?
11 A No. Not necessary, by me.
12 I was dealing at that point with a crisis situation.
13 The Secretary of Defense was making the decisions, based on
14 recommendations I was giving him, very quickly.
15 I had conversations with the Vice President, three of
16 them; Meadows, a couple of them; O'Brien; Speaker Pelosi;
17 Leader McCarthy; Senator Schumer; Steny Hoyer. I was called
18 by, I don't know, a dozen or more Members. But those calls
19 were leadership calls. And there were multiples of those; it
20 wasn't just one. So we're dealing with that all day long.
21 And, you know, I didn't -- I was not in the mood, sort
22 of thing. I wanted to just deal with that.
23 I knew at that point that the people to deal with at
24 that point is Miller, Vice President, Meadows if necessary I
25 guess. But there were no orders that anyone needed to give
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1 attendance.
2 Q Yeah.
3 A At the front row of tables like this, I'm sitting
4 here, Acting Secretary of Defense Miller is sitting there,
5 Kash Patel is sitting there. The incoming administration
6 people are all sitting in rows back there. Around the table,
7 over there is the Director of the FBI --
8 Q Yeah.
9 A -- there is the chief of police, the Metro Police,
10 Capitol Police, et cetera. All the security -- over here is
11 the Guard, the National Guard, Secretary of the Army. All
12 the key players for security of the military district of
13 Washington are there. Representatives of the Mayor's office
14 are there. Representatives from the Hill, from Speaker
15 Pelosi, Leader McCarthy's office I don't know if McCarthy
16 had a person there -- but Schumer's people had some people
17 there.
18 This was, I don't know, 300, 400 -- you guys were
19 there -- 300 or 400 people were there. It was all being
20 videotaped. It's a national security special event. The
21 lead Federal agency is the Secret Service. And, I mean, it
22 was very rigorous. It was a couple days. We did this twice,
23 actually.
24 Q Yeah. And
25 A So, yes, I said those words or words to those
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1 There were
2 different people at different places.
3 But the Vice President himself did not express concern
4 of his own safety, but he was asked about that, and he
5 confirmed that he was okay.
6 Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
7 And you also said that, after January 3rd, you never
8 spoke to or saw the President again. But I would assume
9 you know, there were still 2 weeks remaining in the
10 administration after that -- that on a regular basis within a
11 2-week period, how many times would you normally say you
12 would've spoken to the President?
13 And, secondly, you know, he's still the President for
14 2 weeks, and there are a lot of, you know, military
15 operations and things that you were concerned with and
16 monitoring and, I suppose, wanted to discuss with him. Was
17 there any impact, the fact that for the final 2 weeks of the
18 administration you didn't have any direct communications with
19 him?
20 General Milley. I had no direct communications with him
21 during that period of time. Impact? Well, nothing happened,
22 so I guess the answer would be there was no impact. Nothing
23 bad happened overseas or any of that kind of stuff, nothing
24 requiring a Presidential decision. Could there have been?
25 Sure. But there wasn't.
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1 how many times, but a lot, saying those words to him and
2 Pompeo and O'Brien and Gina and the whole bunch. I mean,
3 yeah, so I was repeating that. Those were constant themes.
4 And I would say that, with Meadows, he wasn't, you
5 know he didn't say anything to me about, hey, we're going
6 to stay in power, and, no matter what happens, we're going to
7 stay past the 20th, or any of that kind of stuff. He didn't
8 mention any of those words to me. And I think he kind of
9 knew where I was, and we were going to have a peaceful
10 transition of power. This thing's over. The Vice President
11 certified -- you know, did whatever he did, and the
12 legislature certified the election.
13 In fact, we put out a --- we put out a memo on the 12th,
14 signed by all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It
15 was a memo to the force, because there were military folks,
16 retired, and, actually, I think there were some that, maybe
17 one or two, that were Active, and there were some Reservists,
18 et cetera. But there were military folks involved, in one
19 way or another, with the events of the 6th. And we wanted to
20 speak with one voice.
21 So I got the chiefs together -- I personally wrote that
22 memo, got the chiefs together in my office, and I said:
23 Well, we can do this one of a couple different ways. But I'm
24 going to put a memo out to the force. And I can sign it
25 myself as the Chairman, I can sign it on behalf of the entire
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1 know, but -- no. I think you guys will kind of sort that
2 out, one way or another. But, no, there's no statements made
3 to me by anyone that Meadows conspired with or tried to set
4 conditions in order to stay past the 20th. That's to me,
5 personal knowledge. No, that didn't happen.
6 Mrs. Luria. Okay.
7 Well, thank you again, General Milley.
8 General Milley. Thanks, Congresswoman.
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2 Mrs. Luria, Ms. Cheney, anything else?
3 If not, then, General Milley, I'll just give you the
4 last word.
5 Is there anything that we haven't asked you that you
6 think we should know or anything else important that you want
7 to ensure the select committee focuses on or learns of?
8 General Milley. Well, first of all, thank you for what
9 you're doing. Right? I think it's -- I personally think,
10 not only as a general but an American citizen, what you're
11 doing is important work. And I want you to -- I think it's
12 really important that we as a country get to the truth. I
13 think truth matters here. And that's not going to be easy,
14 and it's difficult, and it's controversial. And, you know,
15 but I think it's important. And I thank you for what you're
16 doing and all of you are doing.
17 And I commit to you that, if you have follow-on
18 questions, like I said, we have, I don't know, 6 or 10 linear
19 feet worth of, like, documents and stuff like that, you know,
20 typical Pentagon stuff. So we've got tons of stuff. Most of
21 it is not germane to, I think, what you're looking for, but
22 who knows. Maybe it is. I don't know. We'll give you
23 anything and everything that we have. We have means and
24 mechanisms of transmitting classified materials. That's not
25 a problem. We can do that, too.
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