Challenger Disaster: Case Study & Decision-making Analysis

Alexander Oriho

Walden University

PhD. Student College of Management & Technology

Emphasis Organizational leadership & Human Resources

perspective: Policymaking and Political dynamics

"Politics [is] a strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles." Ambrose Bierce

Abstract

An examination of the political context and the factors that led to a potentially

disastrous conclusion may be gleaned from the Challenger catastrophe. Having to

accommodate the political pressures of other organizations and/or coalitions might cause

statistics and other facts to be missed throughout the decision-making process. In the wake of

the Challenger catastrophe, the public has learned that a faulty O-ring played a crucial role. A

"managerial viewpoint" rush for approval may have been the true cause of the Challenger

accident, but according to a sociologist, Diane Vaughan, outside investigators often discover

a world of engineering typified by ambiguity, dispute, deviance from design specifications

and operational norms, and ad hoc rule making. Once the public learns about this confusing

circumstance, they will understand why the project failed; after all, the engineers and

management did not follow the guidelines. However, the engineering behind a so-called

"non-accident" is never put under the microscope. Investigating non-accidents would show

the public that engineering practice, which after an accident investigation appears to be "an

accident waiting to happen," is actually "typical technology." (Vaughan 1996, p. 200)

Introduction

The explosion of the U.S. space shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986, soon after

takeoff, was caused by a failed O-ring seal in one of the solid rocket boosters. Seven crew

members perished in the accident. There were several political factors that contributed to the

Challenger accident, which had a significant impact on NASA’s need to adhere to strict

launch timetables. There was a lot of public interest in the space shuttle program since it was
considered a tremendous accomplishment by the U.S. government. There was sometimes not

enough time for comprehensive testing and inspections of the shuttles and their systems

because NASA officials felt pressured to fulfill the tight launch timetables that had been set

for the program. NASA’s relationship with Thiokol, the manufacturer of the defective O-ring

seals, was tense, and this contributed to the accident.

Thiokol was under contract to deliver the O-ring seals to NASA; therefore, the

corporation was under pressure to achieve production targets despite potential conflicts of

interest between the two agencies. There was a breakdown in communication between the

two organizations, which made it difficult for individuals to be aware of the dangers

associated with utilizing the O-ring seals.

Challenger’s demise was exacerbated by NASA’s operational environment at the time. In

order to guarantee that safety was always prioritized, NASA had to successfully manage the

space shuttle program, which was a complicated system involving many different

organizations and contractors. Additional factors that contributed to the program's demise

were financial and political constraints.

The quality of organizational decision-making often determines how fruitfully a given

procedure is implemented. The utilization of appropriate and adequate information greatly

improves the quality of decision-making. This means that making decisions is improved by

having access to appropriate knowledge and facts, which should be carefully analyzed and

considered prior to any action being performed. Any variety of issues, some of which might

be devastating, can stem from a hurried judgment made without all the necessary facts and

data. Moreover, organizational politics may sway decision-making, leading to the neglect of

relevant data and information and the shaping of the decision-making process to favor the

interests of those involved. Making sense of organizations "has never been more significant,"

write Bolman and Deal (2017). "The demands on managers' intelligence, creativity, and
agility have never been stronger" (p. 7). Therefore, the outcome of an organization’s

decision-making may not always be what its management or leader had hoped for. The

Volkswagen Group, for instance, was recently exposed for knowingly violating

environmental rules for years. Chief Executive Officer Martin Winterson lost his position as a

result of the scandal, and both VW's finances and image took a hit.

Collectively, the political elements that led to the Challenger catastrophe were the

complicated environment in which NASA operated, the need to fulfill strict launch

timetables, and the politics between NASA and Thiokol. These things led to a breakdown in

communication and a lack of openness, which in turn caused the disaster.

Space Shuttle Challenger: A Study in the Dynamics of Political Influence

Decisions on whether to conduct the first space shuttle flight on January 28 were the

central problem in the challenger case study. Engineers who had been working on a technical

difficulty for eight years finally issued a warning that launching the trip may be risky. The

management, however, did not heed the warning since it was too invested in the launch and

did not want to face the humiliation of a failed attempt. Managers learn that moving forward

is a question of personal "credibility," which comes from doing what's socially and politically

proper. Definitions of political correctness represent latent forms of authority profoundly

established in organizational patterns and structure (Frost, 1986).

Despite the engineers’ warnings, they pushed on with the mission so they wouldn’t

fail the country. All sorts of excuses were offered, including the fact that they couldn’t wrap

up the launch mission on time since there had been no such contact on January 27. Many

managers (Dalton, 1959; Jackall, 1988; Ritti and Funkhouser, 1982) want to move up and get

promoted, so it's important for them and their organizations to learn how to play the political

game well.
In this case, management utilized their authority to disregard the engineers’ warning and

proceed with the launch nonetheless.

According to Jackall (1988), the business world is a "moral labyrinth" full of secret

societies, power struggles, egotistical rivalries, and hidden agendas. His advice is to "search

for the inevitable conflict of interests behind the bouncy, happy surface of corporate life,"

meaning that "intelligent and ambitious managers resist the lulling cliches of unity while they

invoke them with enthusiasm" (p. 37). Corporate ethical crises in recent years have given

credence to the long-held belief that market morals are worthless. Unfortunately, this led to a

catastrophe in the end.

Consequences of NASA and Thiokol Engineers’ Intra-Organizational Politics

The shuttle disaster may be traced back to bad decision-making at NASA, which was

mostly caused by the politics between NASA and Thiokol. When NASA set out to do

something, they intended to see it through to completion. The first space shuttle launch was

eagerly anticipated. However, the space shuttle itself was built by engineers at Thiokol, who

had been struggling with an O-ring leak for years. To this day, they have not decided whether

it is safe to launch the machine. NASA was determined to meet their deadline. Managers at

NASA, under extreme time constraints, gambled by proceeding with a launch they had been

advised was unsafe, although they knew that doing so would be a violation of agency policy.

It was because of this that NASA disregarded the engineers’ safety warning. They saw it as

an obstacle that would prevent them from succeeding. However, Thiokol engineers fought

against NASA’s decision to accelerate the shuttle's build time. Mistakes were made because

of internal political tensions, and the shuttle was launched despite the risks. In the end, this

caused a catastrophe that killed seven people and wrecked the space shuttle. As a result of

these disclosures, authorities took notice. They began looking at the political, economic, and

organizational factors that led up to the tragedy in 1986, a time when they had already begun
to explore the shadowy side of organizations. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky

Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA is the product of this investigation (Vaughan,

1996).

Damage to NASA’s Ecosystem from the Challenger Accident

NASA was a government agency in the United States that worked with private

companies and individuals, such as Thiokol and Marshall engineers and astronauts. All of

NASA's ecology was severely disrupted by the accident, rendering its efforts to develop a

space shuttle useless. There were six deaths at the space flight center because of a tragedy

caused by a project that used up a lot of government funds, engineering expertise, and the

efforts of space flight professionals. The incident also sparked a round of finger-pointing

between several parties, most notably between Thiokol’s upper management and its

engineering staff. Because of their training, engineers can easily adapt to the corporate

culture in which they work. Production pressure, cost-cutting, and a lack of resources are all

things that engineers might anticipate in the workplace. Price and security are constantly at

odds (Zussman, 1985). Decisions are typically reached by a process of compromise known as

"satisficing," not "maximizing" (Simon, 1957). In a capitalist society, NASA had to fight for

a share of the federal budget even though it was not a business looking to maximize profits.

As a result of the calamity, it was clear that the ecosystem had collapsed (Matthew et al.,

2014).

Potential for averting catastrophe thanks to competent management

It is the responsibility of managers to make choices that affect the direction of the

company. Even in this case, the managers’ top priority was accomplishing the mission’s

stated objectives, and the organization's top priority was the safe and timely launch of the

space shuttle. They had the authority to avert the calamity since they were the key decision-

makers. Managerial acceptance of the machine's usefulness was expected to be based mainly
on the engineers' assessment of its merits. Launches proceeded despite the agency's limited

resources being allocated to "more critical" issues, and a permanent remedy for the O-rings

was routinely postponed. Management and engineering professionals' agreement on what

constitutes an "acceptable risk" is evidence of the intersection between professional

engineering's tenets and those of the workplace.

The only criteria for determining the launch date were a successful analysis of the

machine’s performance and consensus among the relevant parties about its security. Without

the engineers’ signature, they could never give the green light to anything. When engineers

voiced their last concerns, it was expected that management would take them seriously.

Managers and engineers, both of whom worked for NASA, shared the same lexicon of terms

and concepts because of the organization's culture, which in turn shaped how each team

interpreted the circumstances surrounding their missions. However, engineers frequently

have a better understanding of a machine's inner workings than their superiors, but they chose

to continue with the flight. This merely suggests that the catastrophe could have been avoided

had the managers given the final warning any consideration. NASA and Morton Thiokol's

upper management and decision-makers prioritized public approval and showmanship over

the launch crew's and passengers' safety. NASA saw that fewer and fewer people were

engaged in and excited about the space shuttle program. Leaders and decision-makers could

have significantly contributed to the 1986 catastrophe, and groupthink theory may shed light

on this.

Groupthink is described as "a process of incorrect decision-making that develops as a

result of significant demands among group members to establish an agreement." (2017)

(Gruman, J. A., Schneider, F. W., & Coutts, L. M.). Following the explosion, the Rogers

Commission investigated the reasons, and one of the "possibly catastrophic" pieces was a

rubber part known as an O-ring. "The O-ring was known to be sensitive to cold and could
only operate above 53 degrees," according to the article, "Challenger Explosion: How

Groupthink and Other Causes Led to the Tragedy." "The temperature on the launch pad that

morning was 36 degrees." How was the launch cleared with this knowledge from NASA and

Morton Thiokol? Was it a lack of communication across the groups, a tactic to chase down

declining publicity, the outcome of significant internal and external pressure on the group, or

all three?

Business Use of the Data

The data shows how critical it is to value everyone's input in a company. It’s meant as

a cautionary tale for managers, reminding them not to get carried away with their positions of

authority and to constantly weigh the pros and drawbacks of their options with the help of a

wide range of experts. Decisions made by managers should always be based on facts and

data, not on the manager's ego or personal feelings. As an alternative, people need to

constantly make judgments based on facts and evidence. The impacts of groupthink may be

little or large, but it's crucial to know about it and strive to prevent it. Janis (1983) suggested

ways to combat groupthink. The prescriptions focus on helping a group analyze all relevant

facts and courses of action to avoid rushing to a poorly informed and reasoned conclusion.

Maybe if NASA and Morton Thiokol followed Janis' advice for preventing groupthink or

analyzed all the material before rushing towards the launch, the outcome might have been

different. NASA focused on a safer future in space after the Challenger catastrophe by

improving communication and safety management. Consider how to prevent groupthink the

next time you're in a group to avoid making bad judgments.

Conclusion

The Challenger's failure was due to organizational and managerial errors. NASA

relied heavily on its contractors for technical expertise before the catastrophe. Third parties

did much of the company's engineering and design. This dependence on third-party
contractors affected the safety of the space shuttle program since serious safety flaws were

more likely to be overlooked. NASA management had a strict launch schedule and was under

pressure to meet political and budgetary goals. Due to pressure, the launch went forward

despite Morton Thiokol's concerns. There wasn't enough time to examine the risks of

launching in cold weather. It is also known that the tragic loss of life that occurred because of

the Challenger accident was caused by a confluence of organizational, administrative, and

political blunders that created the conditions for the accident to take place.

The disaster brought to light the significance of considering the interaction between

ecosystems and organizational politics when making decisions. It also serves as a reminder to

organizations that they must place safety as their top priority and ensure that there are

sufficient checks and balances in place to prevent safety from being compromised. An

example of bad decision-making is the Challenger catastrophe. In this case, the managers

with the most say in the matter failed to do the proper thing because they ignored relevant

data. Avoiding rash choices requires basing judgments on as much evidence as possible.

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