14 - LERIOU v. LONGA
14 - LERIOU v. LONGA
FACTS:
The Court held that the petitioners in their instant Omnibus Motion has not shown
any circumstance as sufficient grounds for the removal of Ms. Jane Sta. Cruz as the
court-appointed Administratrix of the estate of the late Enrique Longa.
MR and denial. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied.
CA. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decisions of the trial court. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but it was likewise denied.
Hence, the present petition.
Substantial Issue: Whether notice to the known heirs of the decedent is a mandatory and
jurisdictional requirement.
HELD: No, personal notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 is not a jurisdictional requirement, it is just a
matter of personal convenience.
In Alaban v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that personal notice under Section 4 of Rule 76
is just a matter of personal convenience. Thus:
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of
the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no
legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the
same.
Here the Order dated July 4, 2007 was published for three consecutive weeks in Balita, a newspaper
of general circulation, on the following dates. By such publication which constitutes notice to the
whole world, petitioners are deemed notified about the intestate proceedings of their father's estate.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case
and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners
were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a
consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
In Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones some of the heirs did not receive any personal notice
about the intestate proceedings, yet they were deemed notified through publication since the
intestate proceeding is in rem. The Court in Pilapil adjudged:
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so
the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the
intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate,
whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the
newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence
of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the
publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for
the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the
existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as
heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily
or involuntarily made.
This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order
of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind
this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of
the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.
Here, petitioners cannot assert their preferential right to administer the estate or that their choice of
administrator should be preferred because they are the nearest of kin of the decedent. It is worth
emphasizing that the preference given to the surviving spouse, next of kin, and creditors is not
absolute, and that the appointment of an administrator greatly depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case. The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends
on the attendant facts and circumstances.
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the
preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse.
But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another
person. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment
will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error.
In the instant case, petitioners are non-residents of the Philippines , which disqualify them
from administering the decedent's estate pursuant to Rule 78, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. We are
mindful that respondents are also disqualified by reason of their minority. In view of the evident
disqualification of petitioners and respondents and the lack of any known creditors, the parties have
no choice but to have somebody else administer the estate for them. Petitioners nominated Juan
Manuel Elizalde but failed to give adequate justification as to why Letters of Administration should
be issued in Elizalde's favor. We fully agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts in
choosing respondent-administratrix over Elizalde. Compared to Elizalde whose interest over the
decedent's estate is unclear, respondent-administratrix's interest is to protect the estate for the
benefit of her children with Enrique. Indeed, it is respondents who would directly benefit from an
orderly and efficient management by the respondent-administratrix.
Procedural issue: Whether the petitioner’s counsel can validly sign the sworn
certification against forum shopping.
HELD: No.
Rule 45, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court requires the petition to contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if
the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest
and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
In the instant case, it was not petitioners but Atty. Joseph LemuelBaquiran (Baquiran) of Sianghio
Lozada and Cabantac Law Offices who signed the certification against forum shopping despite the
absence of any showing that petitioners executed an SPA authorizing Atty. Baquiran to sign in their
behalf.
The Petition should be dismissed pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Anderson v. Ho where the Court
clarified that a certification signed by a counsel without an SPA is a valid cause for the dismissal of
the Petition.
A certification which had been signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective and
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition."