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Scotus Summa IaIIae 1
Scotus Summa IaIIae 1
1
Contents
of
the
Summa
of
a
Scotus
Summa
Part
One
of
Part
Two.
Ia
IIae.
QUESTION
ONE:
ON
MAN’S
ULTIMATE
END.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
it
belongs
to
Man
to
act
for
an
End
Article
2:
Whether
to
act
for
an
End
is
proper
to
Rational
Nature
Article
3:
Whether
Acts
of
Man
receive
their
Species
from
the
End
Article
4:
Whether
there
is
some
Ultimate
End
of
Human
Life
Article
5:
Whether
One
Man
can
have
Several
Ultimate
Ends
Article
6:
Whether
Man
desires
everything
he
wills
for
the
sake
of
the
Ultimate
End
Article
7:
Whether
there
is
One
Ultimate
End
for
all
Men
Article
8:
Whether
all
Creatures
come
together
in
the
Ultimate
End
QUESTION
TWO:
ON
THE
THINGS
IN
WHICH
MAN’S
BLESSEDNESS
CONSISTS.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Riches
Article
2:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Honors
Article
3:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Fame
or
Glory
Article
4:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Power
Article
5:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
any
Good
of
the
Body
Article
6:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Pleasure
Article
7:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
some
Good
of
the
Soul
Article
8:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
any
Created
Good
QUESTION
THREE:
WHAT
BLESSEDNESS
IS.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
Blessedness
is
something
Uncreated
Article
2:
Whether
Blessedness
is
an
Operation
Article
2
again
Article
3:
Whether
Blessedness
is
an
Operation
of
the
Sensitive
Part
or
only
of
the
Intellective
Part
Article
4:
Whether,
if
Blessedness
belongs
to
the
Intellective
Part,
it
is
an
Operation
of
the
Intellect
or
of
the
Will
Article
5:
Whether
Blessedness
is
an
Operation
of
the
Speculative
or
of
the
Practical
Intellect
Article
6:
Whether
Blessedness
consists
in
the
Consideration
of
the
Speculative
Sciences
Article
7:
Whether
Blessedness
consists
in
Knowledge
of
the
Separate
Substances,
namely
of
the
Angels
Article
8:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
the
Vision
of
the
Divine
Essence
QUESTION
FOUR:
ABOUT
THE
THINGS
REQUIRED
FOR
BLESSEDNESS.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
Pleasure
is
required
for
Blessedness
Article
2:
Whether
in
Blessedness
Vision
is
more
Principal
than
Pleasure
Article
3:
Whether
Comprehension
is
required
for
Blessedness
Article
4:
Whether
Rectitude
of
Will
is
required
for
Blessedness
Article
5:
Whether
the
Body
is
required
for
Man’s
Blessedness
Article
6:
Whether
some
Perfection
of
Body
is
required
for
Blessedness
Article
7:
Whether
any
exterior
Goods
are
required
for
Blessedness
Article
8:
Whether
the
Company
of
Friends
is
required
for
Blessedness
QUESTION
FIVE:
ABOUT
THE
ATTAINMENT
OF
BLESSEDNESS.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
Man
is
able
to
Secure
Blessedness
Intervening
Article:
Whether
Human
Nature
is
the
lowest
of
the
Natures
capable
of
Blessedness
Article
2:
Whether
one
Man
can
be
more
Blessed
than
Another
Article
3:
Whether
Anyone
can
be
Blessed
in
this
Life
Article
4:
Whether
Blessedness
once
had
can
be
Lost
3
Article
5:
Whether
Man
can
acquire
Blessedness
by
his
Natural
Powers
Article
6:
Whether
Man
obtains
Blessedness
through
the
Action
of
some
Superior
Creature
Article
7:
Whether
any
Good
Works
are
required
for
Man
to
get
Blessedness
from
God
Article
8:
Whether
every
Man
desires
Blessedness
QUESTION
SIX:
ABOUT
THE
VOLUNTARY
AND
INVOLUNTARY.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
the
Voluntary
is
found
in
Human
Acts
Article
2:
Whether
the
Voluntary
is
found
in
Brute
Animals
Article
3:
Whether
the
Voluntary
can
exist
without
any
Act,
or
whether
there
can
exist
a
Pure
Omission
Article
4:
Whether
Violence
can
be
done
to
the
Will
Article
5:
Whether
Violence
is
cause
of
the
Involuntary
Article
6:
Whether
Fear
causes
the
Involuntary
simply
Article
7:
Whether
Concupiscence
causes
the
Involuntary
Article
8:
Whether
Ignorance
causes
the
Involuntary
QUESTION
SEVEN:
ABOUT
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES
OF
HUMAN
ACTS.
IN
FOUR
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
Circumstance
is
an
Accident
of
a
Human
Act
Article
2:
Whether
Theologians
should
pay
Attention
to
the
Circumstances
of
Human
Acts
Article
3:
Whether
the
Circumstances
are
suitably
Enumerated
in
Ethics
3
Article
4:
Whether
the
Principal
Circumstances
are
the
End
for
the
sake
of
which
and
those
in
which
there
is
Operation
QUESTION
EIGHT:
ABOUT
THE
THINGS
THE
WILL
IS
OF
AS
WILLED.
IN
THREE
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
the
Will
is
of
the
Good
only
Intervening
Article:
Whether
every
Act
of
Will
is
of
the
End
or
of
what
is
for
the
End
Article
2:
Whether
the
Will
is
of
the
End
only
or
also
of
what
is
for
the
End
Article
3:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
to
the
End
and
to
what
is
for
the
End
by
the
same
Act
QUESTION
NINE:
ABOUT
WHAT
MOVES
THE
WILL.
IN
SIX
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
by
the
Intellect
Article
2:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
by
the
Sensitive
Appetite
Article
3:
Whether
the
Will
moves
Itself
Article
4:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
by
an
Exterior
Principle
Article
5:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
by
Celestial
Body
Article
6:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
only
by
God
as
by
an
Exterior
Principle
QUESTION
TEN:
ABOUT
HOW
THE
WILL
MOVES.
IN
FOUR
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
naturally
to
Anything
Article
2:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
of
Necessity
by
its
Object
Article
3:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
of
Necessity
by
the
Lower
Appetite
Article
4:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
of
Necessity
by
the
Extrinsic
Mover,
which
is
God
QUESTION
ELEVEN:
ABOUT
ENJOYMENT,
WHICH
IS
AN
ACT
OF
WILL.
IN
FOUR
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
Enjoyment
is
an
Act
of
the
Appetitive
Power
Article
2:
Whether
Enjoyment
befits
only
the
Rational
Creature
or
also
Brute
Animals
Article
3:
Whether
Enjoyment
is
only
of
the
Ultimate
End.
Article
4:
Whether
Enjoyment
is
only
of
the
End
Possessed.
Intervening
Article:
Whether
the
Enjoyment
of
the
Way
and
of
the
Fatherland
differ
in
Species
QUESTION
TWELVE:
ABOUT
INTENTION.
IN
FIVE
ARTICLES.
Article
1:
Whether
Intention
is
an
Act
of
the
Intellect
or
the
Will
Article
2:
Whether
Intention
is
of
the
Ultimate
End
only
Article
3:
Whether
Anyone
can
intend
two
things
Simultaneously
Article
4:
Whether
Will
of
the
End
is
the
same
act
as
Will
of
what
is
for
the
End
4
Response:
one
must
say
[Metaphysics
5
q.1
n.8]
that
it
belongs
to
every
per
se
agent
to
act
for
an
end,
and
therefore
it
is
not
proper
or
unique
to
rational
nature.
Declaration:
the
end,
according
to
Avicenna
Metaphysics
6
ch.5,
is
the
first
of
causes,
preceding
in
its
own
causality,
which
it
exercises
in
the
soul,
the
agent
and
receptive
causes,
although
it
does
act
about
the
other
causes,
when
they
are
in
effect,
so
that
the
final
cause
itself
may
be
in
effect.
So
says
Avicenna
in
his
final
chapter.
If,
he
says,
there
were
a
science
about
each
of
the
causes,
the
science
about
the
final
cause
would
be
the
more
known
among
them,
and
it
would
be
wisdom.
And
in
fact,
among
the
extrinsic
causes
the
end
causes
first;
for
it
moves
the
efficient
cause
in
idea
of
being
loved,
and
for
that
reason
and
not
otherwise
does
the
agent
cause;
therefore
all
per
se
causes
necessarily
act
for
an
end,
since
all
depend
in
their
causality
upon
it.
Otherwise,
unless
in
acting
they
intended
a
definite
end,
found
within
the
sphere
of
their
activity
and
attainable
by
force
of
the
causes,
they
would
exercise
their
proper
causality
randomly
and
vaguely,
and
per
se
causes
would
only
attain
their
effect
fortuitously;
but
this
seems
to
overturn
the
idea
of
per
se
causes;
therefore
they
come
together
in
a
certain
and
definite
scope;
from
which
it
happens
that
in
their
acts
error
does
not
happen
regularly;
although
straying
from
the
purposed
end
does
sometimes
happen
through
the
coincidence
of
contrary
causes,
which
either
impede
the
primary
effect
or
at
least
bring
it
about
that
the
effect
is
not
produced
free
of
all
numbers.
If
then
error
can
befall
causes
per
se
in
their
causing,
then
assuredly,
since
these
causes
attain
for
the
most
part
the
effect
they
are
fitted
to
produce,
they
act
for
an
end,
which
end
is
not
other
than
the
effect
caused
on
the
part
of
the
thing;
for
this
was
what,
as
first
desired,
was
moving
the
efficient
cause
to
act.
However
one
must
understand
[Metaphysics
1
q.2
n.5,
q.9
n.15,
Prol.
n.4,
Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.25,
2
d.25]
that
foreknowledge
of
the
end
does
not
exist
in
all
things
that
desire
an
end
and
tend
to
acquiring
it;
rather
the
whole
class
of
causes
per
se,
contradistinguished
from
the
class
of
purposive
agents,
does
indeed
desire
an
end
(otherwise
error
would
not
happen
there;
for
either
a
per
se
cause
would
be
cause
of
any
event
at
all
or
it
would
be
a
cause
of
nothing
of
the
sort),
and
there
is
truly
desire
of
an
end
in
this
class
even
though
it
is
not
endowed
with
knowledge
of
the
end.
To
this
end,
therefore,
it
tends
and
is
inclined
by
its
proper
nature,
as
to
that
by
which
it
can
be
perfected
with
a
secondary
perfection;
for
the
primary
perfection
of
anything
is
its
proper
form,
but
the
secondary
perfection
is
the
operation
of
desiring
or
the
tendency
of
nature
by
which
it
is
joined
to
the
extrinsic
desirable
thing.
Hence
a
heavy
object
is
subject
to
some
imperfection
to
the
extent
it
is
kept
by
violence
from
the
center.
To
this
specific
perfection,
then,
each
thing
is
naturally
inclined,
not
as
if
the
inclination
is
some
elicited
act,
but
rather
it
is
the
very
same
nature
itself
tending
to
its
proper
perfection;
and
the
nature
of
anything,
as
it
exists
prior
to
all
knowledge,
is
endowed
with
this
tendency.
Therefore
such
an
inclination
is
given
by
that
which
bestows
form,
without
which
it
would
not
desire
well-‐being
or
exercise
foresight
for
its
own
conservation.
The
whole
genus
of
natural
cause
is
therefore
determined
to
its
proper
end,
for
which
it
also
acts,
by
the
first
Intelligence
which
has
willed
this
order,
because
the
proper
end
is
intended
by
each
being,
whereby
it
may
be
completely
perfected
in
its
being.
So
nature
acts
for
an
end,
not
foreknown
by
itself
but
by
something
else;
and
because
for
the
most
part
7
nature
does
not
err
in
its
operations,
rightly
is
the
work
of
nature
said
to
be
a
work
of
intelligence.
And
although
the
brutes
foreknow
what
is
useful
for
them,
and
flee
and
avoid
what
is
harmful,
yet
they
are
said
to
be
of
their
own
nature
moved
and
drawn
by
objects
shown
to
them,
and
they
do
not
deal
with
these
objects
by
a
power
of
lordship
over
them
so
as
to
be
able
to
embrace
or
to
resist
them.
For
this
reason,
only
purposive
agents
are
dominated
by
intellective
appetite
so
as
to
act
or
not
act
for
a
foreknown
end
as
it
pleases
them.
Therefore
any
per
se
cause
acts
for
an
end,
but
natural
causes
are
determined
to
their
proper
ends
by
their
forms,
as
they
are
bidden
to
be
inclined
or
to
desire
by
the
Maker
of
forms.
But
causes
that
act
through
intellect
and
will,
although
they
are
not
able
to
refuse
the
end
or
the
good
in
itself,
are
able
nevertheless
not
to
will
it,
and
even
to
hate
other
things
that
are
ordered
to
the
per
se
good.
It
is
not
therefore
proper
or
unique
to
rational
nature
to
act
for
an
end;
which
is
what
was
to
be
made
clear.
Article
Three:
Whether
Acts
of
Man
receive
their
Species
from
the
End
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.41
n.2ff.,
4
d.6
q.5
n.2,
Quodlibet
q.19
n.9]
one
must
say
that
acts
of
man
do
receive
their
species
from
the
end.
Declaration:
by
the
term
‘acts
of
man’
we
do
not
understand
any
acts
at
all
of
man,
or
acts
coming
somehow
or
other
from
man;
for
by
this
term
are
not
expressed
fortuitous
acts
of
men,
or
acts
that
happen
from
imagination
alone,
as
to
stroke
one’s
beard,
or
pick
up
a
straw
form
the
ground,
and
the
like;
but
we
intend
by
this
term
to
signify
only
acts
that
proceed
from
the
impulsion
of
free
choice
and
that
are
caused
by
a
man
through
his
intellect’s
knowing,
and
his
will’s
intending,
the
end
for
the
sake
of
which
and
because
of
which
he
proceeds
to
action
or
produces
those
acts.
So
a
human
act
essentially
involves
respect
to
an
agent
who
has
it
under
his
commanding
power
and
indifference
to
be
able
to
do
the
act
or
its
contrary
or
even
to
do
neither.
But
a
man
when
acting
by
free
choice
not
only
foreknows
the
end
but
also
intends
the
end
by
which
he
is
moved;
therefore
this
end
is
what
bestows
on
the
act
its
proper
species.
Indeed,
when
such
an
end
is
removed,
there
can,
to
be
sure,
be
an
act
of
a
man
but
in
no
way
a
human
act;
for
when
the
end
is
removed,
the
act
will
either
be
caused
by
imagination
or
be
fortuitous;
it
is
from
the
end,
then,
that
an
act
precisely
has
it
that
it
is
elicited
by
the
knowing
intellect
and
by
the
appetitive
power
proceeding
to
act
from
love
of
the
end;
most
truly,
then,
do
these
acts
of
man
receive
their
specific
idea
from
the
end.
–
For
a
fuller
understanding
of
this
matter
[Oxon.
Prol.
q.4
n.13,
2
d.7
n.11,
d.40,
Quodliber
q.18
n.8],
one
needs
to
know
that,
over
and
above
the
natural
goodness
with
which
any
positive
thing
is
endowed
according
to
its
greater
or
lesser
degree
of
being,
the
first
moral
goodness
or
malice
that
can
be
present
in
human
acts
is
insofar
as
the
will,
by
its
act,
focuses
on
an
appropriate
or
inappropriate
object
either
according
to
the
dictate
of
right
reason
so
as
to
be
good
or
against
right
reason
so
as
to
be
called
inappropriate
and
evil
(and
not
merely
because
the
object
is
naturally
appropriate
to
such
an
act,
as
light
is
to
vision).
This
then
is
the
first
moral
goodness
or
malice,
which
is
therefore
said
to
be
so
in
genus;
not
because
the
goodness
or
malice
is
generic,
since
in
fact
it
is
specific
with
ultimate
specificity,
but
rather
because
it
is
as
it
were
material
with
respect
to
any
further
goodness
in
the
genus
of
morals,
which
goodness
or
malice
depends
on
8
other
special
circumstances
that
do
not
concern
the
work
or
the
act
of
the
one
acting,
but
arise
rather
from
the
extrinsic
ordering
of
the
one
acting.
The
end,
therefore,
which
gives
species
to
the
act,
is
not
the
end
intended
by
the
one
acting
that
is
extrinsic
to
the
action,
but
rather
the
end
that
is
so
far
intrinsic
to
the
freely
elicited
act
that
it
altogether
coincides
with
the
act’s
object,
and
this
object,
or
end,
if
it
is
appropriate
to
the
agent,
will
be
good
but
if
not
bad.
Article
Four:
Whether
there
is
some
Ultimate
End
of
Human
Life
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.19;
cf.
Ia
q.2]
one
must
reply
that
it
is
altogether
impossible
to
proceed
to
infinity
in
ends,
and
that,
therefore,
among
all
the
things
desirable
to
rational
and
intellectual
nature,
there
is
one
essentially
and
simply
supreme
desirable
thing,
and
the
same
is
the
ultimate
end
of
such
nature.
Declaration:
for
either
an
essential
order
in
desirable
things
is
laid
down
or
let
this
order
be
denied.
For
to
someone
who
concedes
this
essential
order
it
is
evident
that
a
stand
must
be
made
at
some
supreme
desirable
thing.
But
if
an
essential
order
is
denied,
the
intended
conclusion
is
still
attained;
because
any
given
thing
is
essentially
supreme.
But
this
hypothesis
is
impossible
and
foreign
to
all
truth,
because
no
process
in
accidentally
ordered
things
can
go
on
to
infinity
save
in
virtue
of
something
essentially
superior
to
that
whole
set
of
diverse
things.
Now,
that
this
supreme
desirable
thing,
where
we
say
that
a
stand
has
necessarily
to
be
made
in
the
order
of
desirable
things,
must
be
intensively
infinite,
embracing
every
possible
degree
of
goodness
and
desirability,
is
proved
from
this:
anything
which
infinity
is
not
repugnant
to
is
not
simply
supreme
unless
it
is
formally
infinite;
infinity
is
not
repugnant
to
the
desirable
or
will-‐able,
since
it
[sc.
being
desirable]
is
either
perfection
simply
or
convertibly
accompanies
some
perfection
simply;
for
this
idea
[sc.
desirability]
belongs
to
the
whole
of
being,
and
anything
such
is
perfection
simply;
but
infinity
is
not
repugnant
to
perfection
simply.
–
From
this
result
I
again
infer
the
conclusion
as
follows:
if
something
desirable
or
will-‐able
can
be
infinite,
and
the
infinite
cannot
be
exceeded,
then
something
will-‐able
can
be
simply
supreme;
and
if
can
exist,
it
does
in
fact
exist;
for
if
it
did
not
actually
exist
and
it
can
exist,
it
could
not
exist
save
from
something
else
diverse
in
essence,
and
so
it
would
not
be
supreme
in
some
perfection
simply;
on
the
contrary
this
excellence
would
have
to
be
attributed
to,
and
would
indeed
be
found
in,
that
other
thing
from
which
it
received
existence.
To
give
a
fuller
and
more
exact
understanding
of
what
has
been
said,
and
a
richer
clarification
of
the
solution,
we
say
[Oxon.
4
ib.
n.20]
that
that
thing
alone
and
precisely
is
supremely
desirable
and
will-‐able
which
is
to
be
willed
simply
for
its
own
sake
by
any
intellectual
nature
that
is
endowed
with
will
alone.
Further,
we
understand
that
to
be
willed
simply
for
its
own
sake
whose
nature
involves
a
repugnance
to
being
desired
for
the
sake
of
something
else.
From
this
the
result
is
that
the
sensitive
appetite,
when
desiring
something
for
its
own
sake,
that
is,
not
for
the
sake
of
something
else,
is
not
drawn
to
it
for
its
own
sake
simply
but
only
in
a
certain
respect;
for
the
sensitive
appetite
does
not
rest
in
the
object
because
of
the
object’s
perfection
(to
which
perfection
being
desired
for
the
sake
of
something
else
is
repugnant),
but
it
proceeds
from
the
imperfection
of
its
own
power,
that
the
9
object,
as
its
nature
requires,
not
be
desired
for
the
sake
of
something
else.
–
Next
is
proved
what
we
assumed
as
needing
to
be
demonstrated:
whatever
has
a
supreme
will-‐able
thing
for
will-‐able
object,
has
that
supreme
will-‐able
thing
alone
as
what
is
to
be
willed
simply
for
its
own
sake;
but
any
will
has
a
supreme
will-‐able
thing
for
will-‐able
object;
therefore
this
alone
is
to
be
willed
by
it
simply
for
its
own
sake.
Proof
of
the
major:
something
among
will-‐able
things
is
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake;
otherwise
if
each
was
to
be
willed
for
the
sake
of
another,
there
would
be
an
infinite
regress;
also
none
of
them
would
be
supreme,
because
what
is
to
be
willed
for
the
sake
of
another
is
less
to
be
willed
than
that
other
for
the
sake
of
which
it
is
to
be
willed,
from
Posterior
Analytics
1
text
3;
so
if
there
is
some
simply
supreme
thing
to
be
willed
(from
what
was
said
above),
then
that
thing
assuredly
is
to
be
willed
simply
for
its
own
sake,
speaking
as
to
the
side
of
the
objects.
–
But
that
this
is
precisely
true
of
the
supreme
desirable
thing,
namely
its
being
simply
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake,
is
proved
thus
[ib.
n.21]:
for
to
nothing
else
is
being
desired
for
something
other
repugnant,
just
as
to
nothing
else
is
the
idea
of
supreme
desirability
fitting;
yet
a
lesser
good
can
rightly
be
desired
for
a
greater
good.
A
thing,
then,
that
is
to
be
willed
precisely
for
its
own
sake
is
the
ultimate
end
for
the
intellectual
and
rational
creature,
because
any
other
thing
to
be
desired
is
desired
because
of
it.
Proof
of
the
minor:
any
will
regards
as
its
object
the
will-‐able
thing
under
the
most
common
idea,
total
being
or
something
equal
in
ambit
to
being;
as
then
all
other
goods
besides
the
first
and
supremely
desirable
good
are
the
goods
they
are
and
are
something
desirable
through
that
good,
so
most
rightly
are
they
to
be
willed
because
of
the
supremely
desirable
good;
so
in
none
of
these
other
goods
can
the
ultimate
end
of
man
be
placed,
but
precisely
in
that
which,
when
willed,
all
the
rest
are
to
be
willed.
For
to
anything
[Oxon.
ib.
n.20]
that
has
intellective
appetite
the
supremely
desirable
thing
is
to
be
desired
for
itself,
since
it
is
the
will-‐
able
object
in
anything,
and
the
same
idea
holds
about
one
and
all
the
rest.
–
Next,
although
it
is
in
the
power
of
one
who
wills
to
will
this
or
that,
yet
that
which
is
to
be
willed,
and
especially
that
which
is
supremely
to
be
willed,
is
not
in
his
power;
for
this
precedes
the
determination
of
any
will;
therefore,
whatever
the
will
is
compared
to,
there
remains
always
that
which
is
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake;
and
hence
it
is
that
it
is
to
be
willed
by
the
will
because
it
is
will-‐able
for
the
will.
–
Lastly,
for
any
will
there
is
something
that
should
be
willed,
since
any
will
can
will
something
rightly
and
will
that
which
should
be
willed,
as
its
proper
perfection,
for
itself
and
not
for
another;
for
although
any
will
is
ordered
to
the
same
ultimate
end,
yet
it
is
not
perfected,
as
by
its
proper
perfection,
by
the
fact
that
another
will
attains
the
ultimate
end;
therefore
the
supremely
desirable
thing
is
desired
by
each
will
as
that
which
it
should
will.
But
no
will
can
will
for
the
sake
of
something
else
that
which
should
be
willed
by
it
and
that
something
else
again
for
the
sake
of
something
else,
and
so
on
infinitely.
What
is
supremely
desirable
and
is
alone
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake
among
all
desirable
things,
that
very
thing
is
the
ultimate
end
of
human
life.
This
point
will
be
discoursed
of
at
length
in
what
follows.
Article
Five:
Whether
One
Man
can
have
Several
Ultimate
Ends
10
Response:
one
must
say
that
it
cannot
at
all
happen
that
the
will
of
one
man
should
be
disposed
to
diverse
things
as
to
ultimate
ends.
Declaration:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.22]
no
intellectual
nature
is
ultimately
and
completely
perfected
unless
it
possesses
what
is
supremely
desirable,
and
indeed
possesses
it
in
the
perfection
in
which
it
can
possess
it.
Intellectual
nature
(from
what
was
said
in
the
previous
article)
is
of
a
nature
to
be
ultimately
and
maximally
perfected,
and
to
be
so
by
that
alone
which
is
to
be
willed
by
it
for
its
own
sake;
therefore
it
cannot
be
ultimately
perfected
unless
it
possesses
that
object
in
the
way
the
object
can
be
possessed
by
it.
This
object
supremely
desirable,
to
be
desired
for
itself,
is
altogether
single;
for
in
it
a
stand
in
desirables
is
reached;
for
all
other
things
are
to
be
desired
for
its
sake;
so
the
end
for
any
man,
and
indeed
for
intellectual
nature
as
a
whole,
is
utterly
single.
–
Next,
when
the
supreme
desirable
thing
has
not
been
attained
as
it
can
be
attained
by
intellectual
nature,
the
desiring
power
remains
altogether
imperfect;
for
it
is
perfectible
precisely
in
that
which
is
simply
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake,
and
in
nothing
else;
therefore
nothing
else
is
its
ultimate
end;
and
even
if
the
will
were
to
will
all
the
other
things
at
the
same
time,
and
were
to
possess
them
most
fully,
they
will
not
be
ultimate
ends
for
it;
but
that
precisely
is
ultimate
end
which
is
simply
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake.
–
Third,
finally,
I
prove
the
same
thing
from
a
more
universal
middle
term:
for
in
things
having
any
appetite,
whether
animal
or
natural,
their
perfection
is
not
understood
to
be
ultimate
until
that
is
possessed
which
is
to
be
desired
for
its
own
sake
by
such
appetite.
Wherefore
a
heavy
thing
not
at
the
center
carries
with
it
some
imperfection,
and
the
sensitive
appetite
which
lacks
what
is
supremely
agreeable
to
it
is
imperfect;
therefore,
whatever
good
the
human
will
is
carried
to,
and
however
great
a
goodness
is
shown
to
it
by
the
intellect,
and
however
much
it
embrace
it
with
all
its
effort
and
has
pleasure
in
it
when
possessed,
it
will
always
be
imperfect
and
never
at
rest
unless
it
enjoy
what
is
to
be
desired
for
its
own
sake
in
the
way
agreeable
and
possible
for
it.
So
whether
the
will
establish
the
ultimate
end
for
itself
in
other
goods,
or
reason
errs
in
presenting
them
as
such
to
it,
it
will
never
be
altogether,
ultimately,
and
maximally
perfect,
in
the
way
its
nobility
demands,
unless
it
possesses
that
which
is
simply
and
precisely
to
be
desired
for
its
own
sake;
and
so
it
cannot
have
several
ultimate
ends.
To
give
a
more
exact
declaration
of
what
has
been
said,
one
must
understand
[Oxon.
ibid.]
that
there
is
in
beings
a
perfection
that
is
first
and
a
perfection
that
is
second,
or
quasi-‐second.
The
first
perfection
is
when
nothing
is
lacking
of
what
belongs
to
the
first
being
of
a
thing,
and
this
is
also
rightly
called
essential
perfection.
The
second
perfection
is
when
nothing
is
wanted
of
that
which
is
integral
to
second
being.
Of
second
perfections
some
are
intrinsic
and
do
not
combine
what
they
perfect
with
anything
that
is
extrinsically
perfective,
as
are
the
powers
of
the
soul
with
respect
to
their
first
act
and
the
other
passions
that
go
along
with
the
same
thing
as
the
essence.
But
some
second
perfections
have
regard
to
what
is
extrinsically
perfective,
even
though
they
too
themselves
are
intrinsic,
and
they
cause
perfection
by
conjoining
with
what
is
extrinsically
perfective.
Such
perfection
indeed
is
every
operation
perfective
of
its
proper
power,
and
above
all
beatitude,
which
is
the
most
perfect
of
all.
Nor
is
it
surprising
that
a
thing
is
perfected
in
what
is
extrinsic,
because
by
attaining
something
extrinsic,
and
especially
if
this
something
is
more
perfect
than
itself,
it
receives
a
further
perfection
than
it
could
11
have
in
itself
and
in
relation
to
itself.
And
for
this
reason
the
more
ignoble
things
are
perfected
in
the
more
noble
things,
not
that
these
really
pass
over
into
the
former
or
inhere
in
them
formally,
but
insofar
as
the
former
attain
them
through
their
own
operations,
such
that
they
possess
them
in
the
way
they
can
have
and
possess
them.
–
Wherefore
[ibid.
n.23]
that
whose
appetite
has
regard
to
something
more
ignoble
than
its
nature
itself
is
assuredly
not
perfected
in
what
is
extrinsic
save
in
a
certain
respect.
In
a
nobler
thing
too,
although
it
has
some
perfection
for
the
more
ignoble
thing
desiring
it,
yet
not
supreme
perfection.
But
if
some
nature
is
perfected
in
some
non-‐supreme
thing
nobler
than
itself,
there
must
be
some
nature
which
is
immediately
perfected
only
in
some
supreme
thing
perfective
extrinsically,
because
there
is
no
process
to
infinity
in
perfectibles
and
perfections;
so
at
least
the
supreme
perfectible
nature
is
not
perfected
save
in
a
supreme
thing
perfective
extrinsically.
But
the
whole
of
intellectual
nature
is
supreme
in
this
regard;
therefore
there
is
for
it
a
single,
extrinsic,
and
supreme
perfectible
thing,
which
is
also
its
single
ultimate
end.
Article
Six:
Whether
Man
desires
everything
he
Wills
for
the
sake
of
the
Ultimate
End
Response:
some
maintain
the
following
opinion
[cf.
Ia
q.60
a.2],
that
everything
a
man
desires
he
must
desire
for
the
ultimate
end;
for,
to
begin
with,
whatever
a
man
wills
he
desires
under
the
idea
of
good;
but
such
good,
if
it
is
not
desired
as
the
perfect
good,
which
is
the
ultimate
end,
must
be
desired
as
tending
to
the
perfect
good;
for
always
the
inclination
of
something
is
ordered
to
the
consummation
of
it.
–
Next,
although
one
does
not
always
think
of
the
ultimate
end
whenever
one
desires
or
does
anything,
nevertheless
the
virtue
of
the
first
intention,
which
is
in
respect
of
the
ultimate
end,
remains
in
any
appetite
for
anything,
even
if
the
ultimate
end
is
not
actually
thought
on,
just
as
there
is
no
need,
as
one
walks
along
a
road,
to
think
of
the
end
at
every
step.
By
way
of
solution
let
the
first
statement
be
as
follows:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.10
n.2]
there
is
a
double
appetite
in
the
will;
one,
namely,
is
natural,
and
the
other
is
deliberative
or
free.
Now
the
first
does
not
carry
with
it
anything
superadded
to
it
over
and
above
the
power
itself
of
the
will;
but
the
latter
states
an
elicited
act
of
it.
Clarification:
as
the
natural
appetite
of
the
intellect
is
related
to
its
act,
so
is
the
natural
appetite
of
the
will
related
to
its
own
act;
now
the
natural
appetite
of
the
intellect
is
not
an
act
elicited
by
the
intellect,
but
only
the
natural
inclination
of
it
to
its
perfection;
therefore
we
should
think
the
same
too
about
the
will.
–
Next,
[ibid.
n.3]
we
experience
no
such
act
[sc.
of
the
will]
in
us;
but
it
is
odd,
according
to
the
Philosopher
Posterior
Analytics
2
at
the
end,
for
the
most
noble
habits
to
exist
in
us
and
sometimes
to
escape
our
notice;
so
the
same
will
be
more
true,
or
at
least
as
true,
of
operations.
–
Next,
on
the
hypothesis
of
the
contrary
opinion,
opposite
acts
will
frequently
be
found
at
the
same
time
in
the
same
thing;
for
everyone
flees
death
by
natural
appetite
and
yet
can
choose
death
by
a
freely
elicited
act,
like
the
martyrs
and
other
perfect
men
who
embrace
death
without
hesitation
when
sent
by
God.
–
It
is
preferable
then
to
suppose
that
natural
appetite
is
nothing
other
than
a
certain
inclination
of
nature,
in
him
whose
nature
it
is,
to
his
proper
perfection,
and
not
to
introduce
an
elicited
act
in
the
will
anymore
than
in
a
stone.
12
Second
statement:
[Oxon.
ib.]
if
the
discussion
is
about
the
natural
appetite
of
man,
he
desires
for
the
sake
of
the
ultimate
end
whatever
it
is
he
wills;
but
as
far
as
concerns
deliberative
appetite,
he
can
will
some
things
not
for
the
ultimate
end,
both
negatively
and
oppositely.
Clarification
of
the
first
part:
for,
as
belonging
to
such
natural
appetite,
the
will
necessarily
and
perpetually
and
supremely
desires
its
own
perfection,
which
is
placed
precisely
in
the
clearly
seen
ultimate
end;
whatever
then
the
will
naturally
desires,
to
that
it
tends
so
as
to
be
maximally
perfected
as
much
as
can
be
and
as
is
possible
for
it;
so
it
desires
each
and
all
things
for
the
ultimate
end,
since
these
are
by
their
own
nature
ordered
to
it
and
from
it
get
their
desirability.
–
However
[ib.
n.4ff.]
that
the
will
by
deliberative
appetite
desires
for
the
ultimate
end
everything
it
desires
is
not
necessary
negatively,
that
is,
in
the
sense
that
it
need
not
will
it
for
the
sake
of
true
felicity.
The
proof
is
that
the
will
is
able
negatively
not
to
will
what
is
ordered
to
the
ultimate
end.
For
the
intellect
can
understand
and
think
of
anything
you
like
other
than
the
ultimate
end,
and
the
will
can
will
it
as
such;
so
in
that
case
the
will
does
not
will
it
because
of
the
ultimate
end.
–
Next,
the
intellect
can
think
of
or
know
the
idea
of
a
good,
not
as
it
is
ordered
to
the
end,
but
as
it
is
in
itself
some
good
or
other;
so
appetite
can
desire
it
under
that
same
idea
and
not
in
order
to
the
ultimate
end.
–
Someone
can
also
will
in
this
way
oppositely;
for
one
of
the
faithful,
when
apprehending
the
end,
certainly
holds
that
his
beatitude
is
located
in
God
three
and
one.
But
he
likewise
apprehends
fornication
as
incapable
of
being
ordered
to
that
end;
but
while
the
intellect
is
dictating
that
fornication
cannot
be
ordered
to
the
end,
which
is
beatitude,
nay
that
it
is
contrary
to
the
end,
the
will
chooses
fornication
by
its
own
liberty;
therefore
it
can
will
some
things
not
for
the
sake
of
the
ultimate
end,
both
oppositely
and
negatively.
Article
Seven:
Whether
there
is
One
Ultimate
End
for
all
Men
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.1
n.5]
one
must
say
that,
when
one
understands
the
question
as
about
the
true
ultimate
end
wherein
the
ultimate
completion
and
consummate
perfection
of
human
nature
is
placed,
there
is
altogether
one
ultimate
end
for
all
men;
but
several
ultimate
ends
of
the
sort
occur
to
those
who
follow
an
erring
reason;
and
the
will
can
also
set
up
several
ends
for
itself
when
it
does
not
follow
a
rightly
dictating
reason.
The
first
part
is
shown
by
what
was
said
in
articles
4
and
5
above.
And
indeed
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.n2
nn.25,
31]
all
men
are
proved
to
tend
toward
and
to
want
the
ultimate
end
from
the
fact
they
desire
their
own
happiness
and
ultimate
perfection,
which
they
certainly
know
to
be
placed
in
the
attainment
of
the
ultimate
end.
But
to
attain
these
is
not
possible
save
in
the
most
noble
extrinsic
perfective
thing,
which
is
the
ultimate
end
desirable
for
its
own
sake
and
not
orderable
to
anything
else.
There
is
therefore
one
ultimate
end
for
all
men.
–
Next,
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.2
n.1]
in
every
essential
order
there
is
only
one
first
thing;
therefore
in
the
essential
order
of
ends
too
there
is
only
one
end.
–
Again,
to
the
first
efficient
cause
there
corresponds
an
ultimate
end;
but
there
is
only
one
first
efficient
cause
and
that
under
one
idea;
therefore
there
is
only
one
end.
–
Lastly,
just
as
there
is
one
majesty
in
God,
so
there
is
also
one
goodness;
but
because
of
his
one
majesty
there
is
due
to
him
only
one
adoration,
according
to
Damascene
bk.1
ch.9,
so
much
so
that
13
it
is
not
fitting
to
adore
one
person
without
adoring
the
others,
on
account
of
their
single
and
essential
goodness,
which
is
the
ultimate
end
of
all
men
and
of
the
whole
of
intellectual
nature.
However
[Oxon
4
loc.
cit.]
when
an
erring
reason
foreshows
to
the
will
that
there
are,
before
what
is
supremely
desirable,
other
things
desirable
for
their
own
sake,
as
empires
or
pleasures
or
other
things
of
the
sort,
the
will,
acquiescing
in
these
goods
foreshown
by
erroneous
reason
and
pursuing
them
with
love,
has
ultimate
ends
other
than
the
one
that
is
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake.
And
even
if
right
reason
dictates
that
empires
and
pleasures
are
not
the
ultimate
ends,
yet
the
will,
by
its
own
liberty,
can
attribute
the
idea
of
ultimate
end
to
them
and
thus
will
them.
For,
as
it
is
in
the
will’s
power
to
will
or
not
to
will,
so
also
is
in
its
power
the
mode
of
willing
whereby
it
can
will
some
things
for
their
own
sake
which
were
simply
to
be
willed
for
the
sake
simply
of
something
else.
There
is,
however,
this
difference,
that
a
will
that
is
tending
to
the
ultimate
end,
which
is
the
true
end
and
the
end
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake,
is
simply
happy
in
the
possession
of
it.
But
when
it
happens
to
get
hold
of
ends
other
than
that
end,
it
is
only
happy
and
perfect
in
a
certain
respect.
And
indeed
if
what
it
loves
is
more
noble
in
its
nature,
then
the
will
in
possessing
it
comes
close
to
the
idea
of
happiness,
and
departs
as
much
from
the
idea
of
its
consummate
perfection
as
the
extrinsic
perfective
thing
is
less
noble.
Simply,
however,
it
cannot
have
well
being
save
in
possessing
the
supreme
and
most
noble
desirable
thing,
which
alone
is
the
ultimate
end
of
all
men.
Article
Eight:
Whether
all
Creatures
come
together
in
the
Ultimate
End
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.8
n.6,
Reportatio
4
d.49
q.7
n.7]
one
must
say
that
creatures
other
than
man
cannot
come
together
in
the
end
such
as
simply
to
rest
in
it,
although
in
a
certain
respect
those
with
sensitive
operations
can
attain
an
end
that
gives
them
rest.
Indeed
we
have
just
touched
on
the
reason
for
the
first
statement
here;
for
no
creature
is
able
to
posses
the
ultimate
end
of
man
in
the
respect
in
which
the
end
can
be
possessed
unless
that
creature
is
able
to
attain
an
immaterial
object
and
to
be
busy
about
the
supreme
good;
but
the
most
noble
creature
below
man
is
able
only
to
attain
a
material
good;
therefore
it
is
impossible
that
its
end
be
that
wherein
man
is
simply
blessed.
However
[Oxon.
ib.,
Report.
ib.]
such
a
creature
could
in
a
certain
respect
rest
in
its
own
end,
as
is
made
clear
thus:
for
every
nature
that
can
by
its
own
operation
be
immediately
joined
to
its
end,
and
can
for
that
reason
attain
what
is
its
best,
should
be
said
to
rest
in
its
end
in
the
way
possible
for
it;
but
all
natures
possessed
of
proper
operations,
and
indeed
of
immanent
ones,
as
are
those
natures
endowed
with
sensitive
powers,
can
be
joined
to
what
is
their
best;
therefore
they
can
in
this
way
be
and
be
said
to
be
blessed,
although
only
in
a
certain
respect.
–
Next,
what
is
not
joined
to
what
is
better
than
it
cannot
be
made
simply
blessed;
no
creature
inferior
to
man
is
joined
to
its
best
as
to
something
better
than
itself.
For
any
operative
power
belongs
to
an
animate
thing
as
it
is
animate;
but
material
objects,
as
the
sensitive
qualities
are
in
themselves,
are
not
more
perfect
than
an
animated
thing
insofar
as
it
is
animated;
therefore
the
powers
themselves
are
far
better
than
their
objects;
hence
too
they
are
very
far
from
the
ultimate
end
of
man.
14
From
this
it
follows
[Oxon.
ib.,
Report.
ib.]
that
creatures
which
lack
operative
powers
will
not
be
capable
of
blessedness
even
in
a
certain
respect.
For
since
they
are
destitute
of
the
operations
by
which
they
can
be
joined
to
what
is
most
fittingly
proper
to
them,
they
fall
away
from
any
idea
of
even
the
most
imperfect
blessedness,
or
of
any
complete
inherence
to
an
end
that
bestows
rest.
Of
this
sort
are
all
forms
below
the
sensitive
ones;
these
are
indeed
forms
that
make
but
not
forms
that
operate,
nor
do
they
have
any
power
for
operations
immanent
to
them.
–
And
if
an
objection
be
made
about
a
heavy
object
that
moves
itself
to
the
center
and
rests
there,
the
objection
is
nothing;
for
a
heavy
thing
is
said
by
a
metaphor
to
rest
in
the
center.
It
does
to
be
sure
have
an
action,
which
is
the
motion
of
a
heavy
thing,
but
in
no
way
does
it
dispose
of
any
operation
about
the
center
whereby
it
may
be
joined
to
the
center.
Yet,
granted
it
does
rest
in
the
center,
that
resting
will
be
nothing
other
than
the
causing
of
some
natural
‘where’
and
not
of
the
absolute
form
of
the
sort
that
blessedness
is.
Therefore
the
ultimate
end
of
man,
the
possession
of
which
is
promised
to
him
in
the
sacred
Letters,
as
I
Corinthians
13.1,
John
3,
Revelation
22,
Matthew
22,
and
frequently
elsewhere,
is
so
proper
to
him
that
it
is
simply
impossible
for
any
other
creature
more
imperfect
than
man
himself.
QUESTION
TWO:
ON
THE
THINGS
IN
WHICH
MAN’S
BLESSEDNESS
CONSISTS.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Riches
Response:
one
must
say
that
it
is
altogether
impossible
for
man
to
be
able
to
be
blessed
in
multitude
of
riches.
Declaration:
[Oxon.
3
d.30
n.5]
riches
are
counted
among
indifferent
goods,
for
a
man
can
use
them
well
or
badly.
For
one
can
expend
one’s
resources
for
the
poor
or
again
abuse
them
to
oppress
the
republic.
One
can
therefore
want
riches
for
oneself
in
an
ordered
way
either
by
despising
them
or,
if
one
is
despoiled
of
them
through
violence,
by
bearing
the
inflicted
loss
with
equanimity.
But
these
things
cannot
at
all
be
said
of
blessedness,
nor
can
they
in
any
way
agree
with
it;
for
blessedness
[Oxon.
4
d.40
q.2
n.25]
is
not
an
indifferent
good
for
man
but
is
rather
his
proper
and
ultimate
perfection,
insofar
as
he
is
by
his
own
operation
joined
to
the
most
noble
and
most
perfect
desirable
thing
without
which
his
condition
is
completely
bad,
namely
to
be
deprived
of
the
greatest
perfection
that
his
nature
by
its
natural
desire
and
most
intensely
strives
and
longs
for.
Further
[Oxon.
ib.
q.10
n.16]
he
cannot
despise
blessedness
in
an
ordered
way;
on
the
contrary,
as
he
is
drawn
to
it
by
a
correct
instinct
of
nature,
so
does
he
by
an
elicited
act
most
rightly
desire
it;
in
this
sense
Augustine
writes
On
the
Trinity
13.8,
“All
wish
to
be
blessed,
as
truth
proclaims.”
So
riches,
however
great
and
of
whatever
sort
they
are,
have
nothing
in
common
with
the
object
wherein
man’s
blessedness
is
placed.
–
Next,
the
object
in
which
human
nature
perfectly
rests
is
so
his
ultimate
end
that,
from
the
nature
of
the
thing,
all
will-‐able
things
are
for
the
sake
of
it;
but
to
it
is
repugnant
that
it
be
desired
for
the
sake
of
something
else
that
might
be
the
supremely
desirable
thing
where
a
stand
is
made.
Now
riches
[Oxon.
4
d.15
q.2
n.19,
15
3
d.34
n.15]
are
in
the
service
of
man
and
are
for
his
several
uses
in
accord
with
the
republic’s
precepts;
since
therefore
they
are
far
inferior
to
man
and
are
understood
to
have
as
much
goodness
and
utility
as
he
is
able
to
use
them
for,
wrongly
and
irrationally
is
the
idea
attributed
to
them
of
the
end
that
man
simply
desires
for
its
own
sake.
–
Lastly,
[Oxon.
4
d.15
q.2
n.19,
3
d.34
n.15]
those
things
have
a
truer
and
nearer
regard
to
man
that
he
needs
for
nourishing
the
body
and
prolonging
his
life,
as
are
food
and
other
necessary
supplies;
and
yet
no
one
would
place
the
happiness
of
man
in
the
use
of
food.
For
[Oxon.
Prol.
q.2
n.8]
this
is
the
happiness
that
Mohammed
promises
his
followers,
which
however
is
despised
and
mocked
by
Avicenna
Metaphysics
9.7
although
he
was
of
that
sect;
therefore
much
less
do
riches
and
the
other
resources
that
are
called
the
goods
of
fortune
have
regard
to
man’s
happiness
such
that
he
who
abounds
in
many
riches
should
be
happy;
nay,
since
riches
are
accompanied
by
much
solicitude
of
mind
and
are
possessed
in
greater
anxiety
through
fear
that
they
be
lost
through
some
misfortune
or
violence,
it
is
evident
that
riches
cannot
render
their
possessors
happy.
Article
Two:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Honors
Article
Three:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Fame
or
Glory
Article
Four:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Power
Article
Five:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
any
Good
of
the
Body
Response:
to
solve
these
questions
one
must
establish
what
comes
to
be
understood
by
the
name
of
blessedness.
So
the
philosophers
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.25ff.,
cf.
Augustine
City
of
God
5.13ff.],
when
making
their
discourses
about
happiness,
suppose
as
a
thing
known
that
blessedness
is
the
sufficient
good,
thereby
keeping
off
deficiency
or
need.
They
also
say
it
is
the
perfect
or
complete
good,
thereby
excluding
imperfection
or
loss;
again
that
it
is
the
ultimate
good,
removing
all
tendency
or
order
to
any
more
complete
good.
Finally
that
it
is
the
good
which,
when
attained,
is
most
fully
good
for
the
possessor.
But,
from
the
opposite
side,
we
can
conceive
complete
misery
to
be
the
need
so
fixed
by
decree
of
divine
wisdom
that
it
is
never
repaired
nor
undergoes
any
diminution;
that
also
it
is
the
lack
of
second
perfection
and
the
perpetual
exclusion
from
that
which,
if
it
were
possessed,
would
be
loved
for
its
own
sake;
and
lastly
by
this
misery
we
conceive
that
he
who
is
wretched
is
in
a
completely
evil
state.
Now
although
[Oxon.
ib.
n.22]
sufficiency,
perfection,
completeness,
and
goodness
can
belong
to
first
or
to
second
being,
nevertheless,
because
what
is
sufficient
is
sufficient
for
another,
we
presuppose
that
for
which
it
is
sufficient;
completeness
also
completes
that
which
has
already
preceded,
or
which,
without
it,
would
be
as
it
were
empty
or
not
full;
so
too
what
is
perfect
excludes
any
defect,
which
defect
is
lack
of
that
which
is
of
a
nature
to
be
present;
well-‐being
likewise
does
not
belong
to
anything
save
to
what
already
exists,
through
something
as
it
were
superadded
to
it.
Therefore
all
these
terms
rather
concern
second
than
first
perfection.
But
since
a
thing
is
not
ultimately
or
completely
perfected
save
in
16
something
extrinsically
perfective
of
it,
because
it
is
of
a
nature
to
be
thus
perfected,
hence
these
terms
do
indeed
import
second
perfection
but
only
insofar
as
they
join
the
thing
to
what
is
extrinsically
perfective.
Nor
is
it
surprising
for
something
to
be
perfected
in
what
is
extrinsic;
because
by
attaining
what
is
extrinsic,
and
especially
if
what
is
extrinsic
is
more
perfect
than
itself,
it
acquires
a
perfection
which
it
could
not
possess
in
itself
or
for
itself.
Wherefore
these
second
perfections,
insofar
as
they
join
the
more
imperfect
to
what
is
more
perfect,
are
more
desirable
than
the
first
perfections;
for
they
are
immediately
related
to
the
extrinsic
desirable
thing,
which
is
more
desired
than
is
the
proper
being
intrinsic
to
the
nature
that
desires
it;
and
this
is
especially
true
of
the
will.
For
any
other
appetite
is
carried
to
an
extrinsic
desirable
thing
because
of
the
nature
of
that
whose
appetite
it
is,
and
therefore
it
does
not
join
it
to
anything
simply
more
desirable
than
is
the
being
of
the
nature
whose
it
is.
But
the
will
loves
something
more
noble
than
itself,
and
loves
it
more
than
the
nature
to
which
the
intellective
appetite
belongs,
and
so
it
joins
it
to
something
more
desirable
both
in
itself
and
for
it
than
is
the
nature
whose
it
is.
From
the
rules
[Oxon.
ib.]
which
the
philosophers,
when
speaking
of
man’s
happiness,
suppose
as
known
by
the
natural
light
and
as
indubitable,
it
is
manifest
that
man
cannot
be
blessed
even
if
he
is
piled
high
with
all
the
honors
that
men
can
bestow
on
those
endowed
even
with
the
most
excellent
virtue,
nor
can
he
blessed
in
any
fame
or
glory,
even
the
fullest,
nor
in
the
great
power
that
follows
earthly
empires,
nor
lastly
in
any
good
of
the
body.
For
to
none
of
these,
even
when
taken
collectively,
do
the
mind’s
common
conceptions
belong
that
we
have
about
human
happiness.
For
none
of
these
excludes
the
need
of
the
soul
thirsting
to
possess
what
is
supremely
desirable.
For,
if
one
possesses
all
these
together,
one
would
still
be
very
far
from
that
perfection
which
is
of
a
nature
to
be
acquired
through
union
with
the
supremely
desirable
thing,
wherein
are
all
things
united,
such
that,
when
it
is
possessed,
all
things
are
possessed.
For
none
of
the
things
the
questions
are
about
is
the
ultimate
good
that
excludes
any
ordering
to
some
other
more
complete
good
of
the
sort
that,
by
it,
he
who
has
it
is
in
the
most
cumulatively
good
state;
indeed,
all
the
goods
of
the
body
are
ordered
to
the
soul.
The
power
given
to
princes
should
serve
the
good
of
the
subjects
and
of
the
republic;
if
kings
and
worldly
powers
establish
another
end
for
themselves,
they
are
proved
not
to
be
exercising
a
just
dominion
but
rather
are
to
be
said
to
be
running
riot
against
their
subjects
through
tyranny.
–
As
for
what
concerns
glory
or
fame,
those
should
be
judged
most
vain
who
lay
down
the
ultimate
end
for
themselves
in
this
vanity.
Each
should
judge
highly
of
good
fame
and
good
repute
among
men
with
a
view
to
the
edification
of
one’s
neighbors,
as
we
are
commanded
by
the
sacred
Letters,
Ecclesiasticus
41,
Proverbs
22,
and
elsewhere;
but
however
much
men
think
highly
of
others,
celebrate
them,
and
extol
them
with
great
praise,
this
is
not
the
ultimate
end,
in
which
alone
they
can
be
happy,
but
is
the
testimony
only
of
approved
virtue
and
excellence;
but
the
virtues
do
not
render
the
men
endowed
with
them
blessed
and
happy;
rather
the
reward
that
should
be
paid
to
them
is
happiness.
–
The
honors,
finally,
of
which
some
are
reckoned
worthy
because
of
their
virtues,
are
not
goods
proper
to
the
ones
who
are
worthy
of
them
but
are
in
the
power
of
those
who
bestow
the
honor;
therefore
blessedness
cannot
consist
in
honors,
the
blessedness,
indeed,
that
is
the
proper
and
ultimate
good
of
man.
One
must
confess
[Oxon.
3
d.34
17
n.15]
that
honors
are
to
be
counted
among
the
first
objects
of
concupiscence,
but
when
conferred
they
should
be
rejected
or
moderated
by
humility.
For
the
humble
man
considers
himself
worthy
of
little
honors,
because
he
reckons
himself
little
in
his
own
eyes.
So
far,
then,
is
human
happiness
to
be
placed
in
these
things
that
rather
there
is
need
for
a
man
endowed
with
virtues
to
use
moderately
the
honors
conferred
on
him,
with
his
virtues
as
defense,
lest,
while
he
covets
external
honors
for
the
sake
of
attaining
happiness,
he
falls
from
virtue
and
at
once
becomes
wretched.
Article
Six:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
Pleasure
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.7
n.4]
one
must
say
that
enjoyment
does
not
consist
in
pleasure,
nor
does
pleasure
enter
into
the
essence
of
enjoyment.
And
indeed,
from
the
supposition
that
pleasure
is
a
passion,
the
first
part
of
the
solution
is
evident.
For
blessedness
and
enjoyment
are
located
in
operation,
by
means
of
which
the
power
and
the
essence
it
belongs
to
are
united
to
the
extrinsic
perfective
thing.
Let
this
hypothesis,
then,
which
must
be
made
clear
more
at
large
below
in
question
31,
be
now
briefly
explained;
for
an
object
said,
according
to
its
absolute
idea,
to
be
agreeable,
when
it
is
applied
by
knowledge
to
appetite,
whether
rational
or
animal,
causes,
since
it
is
compared
to
appetite
as
active
to
passive,
pleasure
in
the
appetite,
or
it
causes
sadness
if
it
is
disagreeable.
For
although
these
passions
suppose
the
operation
of
the
will,
that
is,
the
willing
or
not
willing
because
of
which
the
object
becomes
proximately
agreeable
or
disagreeable,
yet
the
passion
follows
on
the
object
thus
willed,
or
not
willed,
as
on
its
cause,
so
that,
as
a
result,
this
passion
is
not
about
the
object
but
derived
from
the
object
to
the
appetite.
Further,
the
operations
are
required
in
the
will
first
–
as
far
as
the
will
is
distinguished
from
the
sensitive
appetite
to
which
the
object,
from
the
nature
of
the
thing,
apart
from
any
operation,
is
agreeable
or
disagreeable.
On
the
other
hand,
however,
the
objects
become
proximately
agreeable
or
disagreeable
to
the
intellective
will
by
means
of
its
operations;
from
which
it
happens
that
those
operations
proximately
dispose
the
will
to
receiving
the
passions
from
the
objects;
in
the
same
way,
then,
that
what
proximately
disposes
a
subject
so
as
to
fit
it
to
receive
the
form
is
said
to
be
in
some
manner
cause
of
the
form,
so
a
perfect
operation
is
causally
delight.
Therefore
the
will
can
be
considered
in
two
ways:
in
one
way
as
it
is
an
operative
power,
in
another
way
as
it
is
a
receptive
power.
Considered
in
the
first
way
the
will
is
perfected
simply
by
the
operation
that
joins
it
simply
to
what
is
ultimately
best;
in
which
event
blessedness
consists
essentially
in
the
operation
itself.
But
insofar
as
the
will
is
considered
as
receptive,
then
it
is
perfectible,
not
by
operation,
but
by
supernatural
passions,
because
it
is
ultimately
receptive
of
such
passions,
and
thus
is
it
by
delight
and
joy
perfected.
Now
[Oxon.
4
ib.
n.3]
as
to
delight
not
at
all
entering
into
the
essence
of
blessedness,
the
declaration
is
as
follows:
for
no
passion
is
blessedness
essentially;
delight
is
essentially
a
passion;
therefore
delight
does
not
have
regard
to
the
essence
of
blessedness.
Proof
of
the
major:
blessedness,
because
of
the
fact
it
conjoins
simply
to
what
is
best,
is
ultimate
perfection.
I
prove
this
as
follows:
because
if
anything
were
of
itself
blessedness,
it
would
most
of
all
be
the
noblest
thing;
but
the
nature
of
18
one
who
is
blest
is
something
in
itself
nobler
than
any
proper
accident;
therefore
the
nature
would
most
of
all
be
blessedness;
but
all
the
perfections
of
nature
are
accidents;
so
they
are
less
beings
than
the
nature
itself
is;
now
no
passion
conjoins
to
the
beatific
object,
but
that
is
performed
by
operations
only,
for
passion
is
derivative
from
the
object
to
the
power;
since
therefore
delight
is
a
certain
passion,
it
is
assuredly
not
something
that
has
regard
to
the
essence
of
blessedness.
–
Next,
that
which
belongs
to
the
essence
of
blessedness
should
have
regard
to
the
beatific
object
not
only
under
the
idea
of
efficient
cause
but
also
under
the
idea
of
the
object
to
which
it
conjoins
and
with
which
it
deals.
But
passion
does
not
regard
the
beatific
object
save
as
the
object
is
efficient
cause,
for
delight
arises
about
it
or
from
it
and
reaches
to
the
power,
which
is
thus
suffused
with
joy;
therefore
it
is
something
outside
the
essence
of
blessedness.
–
Lastly,
the
wayfarer
is
moved
by,
conjoined
to,
and
rests
in
the
beatific
object
through
something
of
the
same
nature
as
it
(though
in
a
very
imperfect
fashion
while
wayfarer);
so
similarly
in
the
fatherland
he
is
ultimately
and
perfectly
conjoined
to
and
rests
in
the
beatific
object
through
something
of
the
same
nature
as
it;
but
no
one
while
in
the
state
of
being
a
wayfarer
is
conjoined
to
that
object
by
a
passion,
but
rather
by
means
of
the
operation
that
is
love;
therefore
it
is
not
otherwise
in
the
fatherland.
Since
therefore
blessedness
is
what
ultimately
conjoins,
it
will
assuredly
not
be
a
passion;
but
delight
is
essentially
a
passion;
so
it
cannot
have
regard
to
the
essence
of
blessedness.
And
this
indeed
seems
to
be
the
intention
of
the
Philosopher,
Ethics
10.3,
where
his
meaning
is
that
we
would
desire
many
things
even
if
we
were
to
get
no
delight
from
them,
of
which
sort
are
knowing,
remembering,
and
the
virtues;
and
from
this
he
in
the
same
place
concludes
that
operation
is
not
for
the
sake
of
delight
but
rather
the
reverse;
for
we
do
not
work
so
that
we
may
rest,
but
rather
we
rest
so
that
we
may
work.
Article
Seven:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
some
Good
of
the
Soul
Response:
[Theoremata
18,
Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.19]
one
must
say
that
a
distinction
about
the
end
should
be
drawn.
For
one
end
of
man
is
outside
him
and
another
is
within
him,
and
the
latter
is
man’s
very
operation
or
also
its
form.
So
if
the
discussion
is
about
the
end
of
man
that
is
outside
him,
then
it
is
impossible
that
the
idea
of
this
be
placed
in
the
soul
or
in
anything
having
regard
to
the
soul.
For
the
end
is
that
supreme
thing
among
what
is
desirable
wherein,
as
in
what
is
essentially
supreme,
there
is
a
stand
in
the
order
of
desirable
things;
so
it
must
also
be
formally
infinite;
for
that
which
infinity
is
not
repugnant
to
is
not
simply
supreme
unless
it
is
formally
infinite
[cf.
q.1
aa.4-‐5].
–
The
end
is
also
and
precisely
to
be
willed
simply
for
its
own
sake
by
the
will,
since
to
nothing
else
is
being
desired
for
the
sake
of
something
else
repugnant;
for
a
lesser
good
can
rightly
be
desired
for
the
sake
of
a
greater
good.
–
Finally,
in
an
end
of
this
sort,
which
is
supremely
desirable,
intellectual
nature
is
ultimately
and
completely
perfected,
for
by
attaining
it,
even
though
it
is
something
outside
it,
it
acquires
a
perfection
beyond
what
it
is
able
to
have
in
itself
and
in
relation
to
itself.
For
the
more
ignoble
things
are,
for
this
reason,
perfected
in
the
more
noble
ones,
not
indeed
by
really
passing
over
into
them,
nor
by
having
them
formally
inherent
in
themselves,
but
by
attaining
them
through
their
own
operation;
for
they
are
not
able
to
be
united
to
them
in
any
other
way.
–
It
is
19
evident
that
all
these
things,
which
we
say
belong
to
the
end
of
man
wherein
is
placed
that
ultimate
and
complete
perfection
of
his
which
we
mean
by
the
name
of
blessedness,
are
repugnant
to
the
soul
and
to
whatever
belongs
to
it;
and
so
it
is
evident
that
neither
the
soul
nor
any
good
of
the
same
can
have
the
idea
of
man’s
blessedness.
–
However,
if
we
are
speaking
of
the
intrinsic
end,
which
is
the
operation
of
the
soul
by
whose
means
it
attains
the
extrinsic
end,
this
end
must
indeed
be
said
to
consist
in
some
good
of
the
soul;
for
operation
is
an
intrinsic
perfection
of
what
operates;
but
no
intrinsic
perfection
of
the
blessed
is
blessedness
save
insofar
as
it
immediately
conjoins
them
to
the
extrinsic
perfective
thing
by
the
fact
it
is
the
attainment
of
the
extrinsic
end.
For
neither
essence
nor
power
is
conjoined
to
that
extrinsic
perfective
thing
save
by
an
operation
that
is
an
intrinsic
perfection
of
the
blessed.
But
this
operation
does
not
rest
in
itself
or
in
relation
to
itself
but
tends
per
se
to
the
object,
even
by
immediately
excluding
every
mediate
absolute
form.
Article
Eight:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
any
Created
Good
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.1
n.3]
concerning
the
present
question
Avicenna,
Metaphysics
9.4,
seems
to
be
of
the
opinion
that
the
blessedness
of
intellectual
nature
is
placed
in
some
created
good.
For
he
wants
the
superior
intelligence
to
produce
by
its
own
act
of
understanding
an
inferior
intelligence.
And
this
produced
intellect
is
completely
perfect
when
it
attains
its
productive
principle,
according
to
proposition
15
of
Proclus,
“each
thing
is
of
a
nature
to
return
to
that
from
which
it
proceeds.”
Now
in
such
a
return
there
seems
to
be
a
complete
circle,
and
thus
perfection.
Since
therefore
the
produced
intelligence
is
perfectly
at
rest
in
the
intelligence
that
produces
it,
it
is
beatified
in
it.
–
However
this
erroneous
opinion
is
convicted
by
the
Philosopher
of
falsity.
For
a
power
is
not
at
rest
save
where
its
object
exists
most
perfectly
and
at
its
highest;
the
object
of
the
enjoying
power
is
being
in
general,
according
to
Avicenna
Metaphysics
1.5;
therefore
the
enjoying
power
is
not
at
rest
save
where
being
is
most
perfect;
but
being
is
and
can
be
nowhere
such
save
in
what
is
supremely
desirable.
–
Next,
a
power
that
is
per
se
inclined
to
many
objects
is
not
perfectly
at
rest
in
any
single
one
of
them
unless
that
one
includes
all
the
per
se
objects
to
the
extent
these
can
be
included
in
one
thing;
but
the
enjoying
power
is
inclined
to
all
being
as
to
its
per
se
objects;
therefore
it
is
not
at
rest
in
any
one
being
unless
that
one
being
include
all
beings
to
the
extent
they
can
all
be
included
in
some
one
thing;
now
they
can
only
be
most
perfectly
included
and
contained
in
one
infinite
thing;
therefore
it
is
precisely
there
that
the
enjoying
power
can
be
most
perfectly
at
rest.
–
Again,
when
an
inferior
intelligence
sees
a
superior
one,
either
it
sees
it
to
be
finite
or
sees
it
to
be
infinite,
or
certainly
it
neither
intuits
it
as
being
finite
nor
as
being
infinite.
If
it
sees
the
superior
as
endowed
with
infinity,
then
since
the
superior
is
in
fact
finite,
it
is
not
beatified
in
it,
“because
nothing
more
stupid
can
be
said
than
that
the
soul
is
blessed
in
a
false
opinion,”
according
to
Augustine
City
of
God
11.4.
But
if
it
does
not
know
whether
the
superior
is
finite
or
infinite,
then
to
be
sure
it
does
not
see
it
perfectly
and
is
not
blessed
in
such
vision.
If,
however,
it
intuits
the
superior’s
finitude,
then
it
understands
that
the
superior
can
be
exceeded
by
another
in
perfection,
and
thus
it
20
can
desire
and
love
what
thus
exceeds,
as
we
experience
in
ourselves.
Therefore
it
does
not
rest
in
the
intelligence
from
which
(as
Avicenna
falsely
imagined)
other
things
proceed.
–
Lastly,
Avicenna’s
reason
works
to
the
opposite.
For
on
his
hypothesis,
namely
that
the
second
intelligence
produces
a
third
intelligence,
the
second
certainly
does
not
produce
the
third
in
virtue
of
itself
but
rather
in
virtue
of
the
first
intelligence
on
which
it
depends;
therefore
neither
does
it
finish
the
third
by
its
own
virtue
but
by
another’s;
but
what
finishes
another
thing
in
virtue
of
some
further
end
as
the
ultimate
end
does
not
bring
that
other
thing
perfectly
to
rest;
therefore
it
is
altogether
repugnant
for
intellectual
and
rational
nature
to
be
perfectly
at
rest
in
some
created
good,
such
that
that
rest
can
be
said
to
be
its
blessedness.
One
must
say,
therefore,
[Oxon.
ib.
n.5]
that
it
is
utterly
impossible
for
man’s
blessedness
to
consist
in
any
created
good,
as
the
just
alleged
reasons
clearly
show;
and
I
explain
this
solution
further
as
follows:
just
as
one
must
assent
through
the
intellect
to
the
first
truth
because
of
that
truth
itself,
so
one
must
adhere
through
the
will
precisely
to
the
first
good
because
of
that
good
itself;
and
so
man’s
ultimate
happiness
and
blessedness
should
not
and
cannot
stand
in
any
created
good
as
in
its
object,
but
only
in
the
ultimate
end,
which
is
the
supremely
desirable
thing.
QUESTION
THREE:
WHAT
BLESSEDNESS
IS.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Blessedness
is
something
Uncreated
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.17ff.]
according
to
what
was
said
in
q.2
a.7
above,
the
extrinsic
end
of
man
is
one
thing,
the
intrinsic
end
another,
namely
his
own
operation,
by
means
of
which
the
power
and
nature
of
him
whose
operation
it
is
are
united
to
the
extrinsic
perfective
object.
If
we
speak
then
about
blessedness
as
it
is
the
beatifying
end
and
object,
it
is
evident
that
it
is
uncreated,
and
that
it
can
be
located
in
the
ultimate
end
alone
that
is
goodness
by
essence;
for
when
everything
other
than
it
is
established
in
man’s
full
possession,
the
intellective
appetite
can
still
not
be
perfectly
at
rest
while
desire
for
possessing
the
highest
good
urges
it
most
deeply
within;
but
when
that
highest
good
is
most
perfectly
and
ultimately
acquired
the
intellective
appetite
does
rest,
because
now
it
has
obtained
a
state
that
is
perfected
with
the
accumulation
of
all
goods
in
the
one
good
that
eminently
and
unitively
contains
all
other
goods
other
than
it.
But
if
the
discussion
is
about
the
blessedness
that
is
the
operation
of
the
blessed,
whereby
they
are
united
to
the
extrinsic
perfective
object,
and
that
is
formally
the
possessing
or
holding
(so
to
speak)
of
the
uncreated
good,
then
this
blessedness
is
created,
finite,
and
newly
produced
by
the
inflowing
of
perfection
to
a
finite
power,
such
as
are
the
powers
of
intellect
and
will
of
man,
which
God
makes
partaker
of
his
own
blessedness.
Article
Two:
Whether
Blessedness
is
an
Operation
21
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.27]
one
must
say
that
the
blessedness
of
man
and
of
intellectual
nature
is
the
best
and
perfect
operation,
or
at
least
that
it
consists
in
operation.
Declaration:
for
from
what
was
said
in
q.1
aa.4
&
5,
there
is
in
desirable
things
an
essential
order
such
that
a
stand
must
be
made
in
one
supreme
and
infinite
desirable
thing,
which
alone
is
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake
by
the
rational
creature;
for
all
other
things
are
ordered
to
it,
and
thus
no
nature
that
is
capable
of
it,
unless
united
to
it,
is
in
the
state
of
its
perfection
ultimately;
because
the
supreme
desirable
is
alone
to
be
willed
for
its
own
sake;
so
nature
is
not
ultimately
at
rest
in
the
possession
of
anything
other
than
it.
But
this
supreme
desirable
thing
can
be
united
in
no
other
way
to
a
nature
capable
of
beatification
than
by
that
nature’s
operation;
for
neither
essence
nor
power
is
conjoined
to
the
extrinsic
perfective
thing
save
by
means
of
an
operation,
which,
although
it
is
a
perfection
intrinsic
to
the
operator,
yet
does
not
stop
in
it
or
in
relation
to
it
but
tends
rather
by
its
natural
condition
toward
the
object,
even
when
any
intermediate
form
of
the
absolute
kind
is
removed.
This
last
point
is
added
because,
although
blessedness,
if
taken
as
the
perfection
that
is
the
idea
of
conjunction
with
the
beatific
object,
essentially
consists
in
operation,
yet
the
conjunction
itself
is
formally
the
relation
of
the
attainment
and
union
of
the
power
with
the
object
present
to
it
in
its
natural
existence;
so,
this
relation
excepted,
the
ultimate
perfection
intrinsic
to
the
blessed
and
proximate
to
the
beatific
object
is
operation.
–
Next,
[Quodlibet
q.13
n.3]
blessedness
is
essentially
the
possession
of
the
supreme
good;
for
thereby
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
is
in
a
completely
good
state.
This
possession
does
not
formally
consist
in
any
relation
although
it
necessarily
involves
relation;
therefore
it
must
be
placed
in
operation.
Proof
of
the
minor:
the
ultimate
perfection
of
a
living
substance
is
not
a
relation
merely;
operation
is
the
ultimate
perfection
of
a
living
substance
that
is
of
a
nature
to
operate,
as
is
a
living
thing’s
sensitive
or
intellective
soul;
therefore
operation
is
not
a
relation
merely.
Proof
of
the
major:
mere
relation
is
not
supremely
desired
by
the
natural
and
elective
appetite
of
a
nature
that
desires
most
perfectly;
but
the
ultimate
perfection
of
a
living
nature
is
supremely
desired
by
such
a
nature
with
natural
desire;
for
we
all
want
to
be
blessed,
whether
we
are
actually
thinking
about
blessedness
or
not;
blessedness
is
also
desired
with
the
supreme
elective
desire
of
a
well
disposed
will;
therefore
the
ultimate
perfection
of
a
living
substance
is
not
relation
merely.
–
However
the
operation
that
is
the
ultimate
perfection
of
the
operator’s
nature
has
this
relation
necessarily
annexed
to
it;
and
it
is
a
real
relation,
because
it
is
between
real
extremes;
and
a
creature
cannot
have
a
greater
unity
with
the
object
than
the
unity
of
the
relation;
but
divine
blessedness,
by
contrast,
although
it
equally
consists
in
operation,
yet
it
is
one
with
the
object,
not
however
by
relation,
not
even
a
relation
of
reason,
but
by
perfect
real
identity.
Nevertheless
the
real
relation
of
union
and
of
attainment
with
the
beatific
object,
which
relation
is
necessarily
what
is
meant
by
a
power
seeing
and
enjoying
the
deity,
does
not
import
primarily
per
se
the
ultimate
perfection
of
the
operating
power
but
only
concomitantly
and
by
connotation;
for
it
connotes
the
operation
which
is
ultimate
and
simply
perfection
and
which
is
more
outstanding
than
anything
concomitant,
although
not
by
way
of
excluding
the
relation
itself
we
are
now
talking
about.
For
if
the
beatific
object
could
stand
without
the
added
relation,
22
the
soul
would
still
remain
blessed;
but
it
would
not
be
blessed
if
the
relation
were
posited
without
the
operation.
Article
Two
Again:
Whether
Blessedness
is
an
Operation
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.3]
here
there
are
some
who
think
[Henry
of
Ghent
et
al]
that
blessedness
does
not
consist
more
principally
in
operation,
but
rather
should
be
placed
in
the
descent
of
deity
into
the
essence
of
the
soul
and
to
be
thence
derived
to
the
soul’s
powers,
in
which
powers
therefore,
when
they
attain
through
their
operations
the
beatific
object,
blessedness
exists
less
principally
and
as
it
were
secondarily.
They
make
this
point
clear
as
follows:
blessedness
more
principally
consists
in
the
object,
which
is
uncreated
blessedness;
but
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
is,
by
the
medium
of
the
will,
transformed,
and
strives
to
be
converted
into
it
by
the
force
of
love,
as
Dionysius
says
Angelic
Hierarchy
7:
“Love
is
a
power
transformative
and
convertive
of
the
lover
into
the
beloved.”
Here
Hugo
[of
St.
Victor]
says,
“he
who
loves
presses
himself
forward
so
that,
if
possible,
he
himself
should
be
him
whom
he
loves;
and
a
union
is
made
in
some
way
by
the
force
of
love,
so
that
the
lover
begins
to
be
removed
outward
and
to
leave
himself
and
begins
to
be
what
he
loves.”
But
for
the
lover
to
leave
himself
and
to
begin
to
be
what
he
loves
can
only
happen
by
circumincession,
namely
not
of
the
created
nature
descending
into
Divinity
but
the
reverse.
So
when
God
descends
into
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness,
the
nature
takes
on
divine
form,
as
iron
when
hot
glows
and
burns
like
fire
so
that
it
is
and
appears
to
be
nothing
but
fire.
–
Then
the
conclusion
is
argued
for
as
follows:
that
should
be
more
principally
made
blessed
which
is
more
principally
perfected
by
the
object
that
blessedness
essentially
is;
but
the
essence
of
the
soul
is
more
principally
perfected
by
the
perfective
object,
because
it
is
perfected
by
the
essence
of
the
Deity
descending
into
it;
therefore
the
essence
is
more
principally
beatified
than
the
power.
Blessedness
then
consists
most
of
all
in
some
first
act
that
has
regard
to
the
Deity’s
descent;
but
it
is
found
in
the
powers
by
way
of
term,
insofar
as
the
powers
reach
their
term
through
their
proper
operations,
and
so
blessedness
is
in
them
less
principally.
Again
[ibid.
n.4]
God,
who
is
blessedness
by
essence,
is
more
principally
possessed
in
the
essence
than
in
the
powers;
for
he
perfects
an
essence
in
some
way
by
his
own
essence,
namely
by
descending,
as
described
above;
but
he
perfects
the
powers
only
through
operations
that
have
their
term
in
the
divine
essence
under
the
idea
of
true
and
good;
but
he
perfects
more
principally
that
which
he
perfects
per
se
in
his
own
idea
than
that
which
he
perfects
only
by
way
of
term
under
an
attributal
idea.
–
Next,
blessedness
perfects
in
the
way
and
order
in
which
the
disposition
ordered
to
blessedness
perfects;
a
disposition
of
this
sort
is
grace;
since
therefore
grace
principally
perfects
the
essence
and
redounds
from
it
to
the
power,
blessedness
itself
also
should
more
principally
be
in
the
essence.
–
Lastly,
distributive
justice
has
regard
to
the
worth
of
the
recipient
according
to
geometrical
proportion,
namely
that
more
good
should
be
bestowed
on
the
more
worthy;
but
intellectual
nature
is
more
noble
and
more
worthy
in
fact
or
in
idea
than
its
power
is;
therefore
the
essence
itself
should
more
principally
be
perfected
by
blessedness,
while
the
powers
are
less
principally
perfected.
–
However
these
proponents
do
confess
that
the
essence
only
perceives
23
this
perfection
of
itself
through
its
powers;
for
by
the
intellect
it
knows,
while
by
the
will
it
as
it
were
tastes,
the
perfection
of
blessedness;
therefore
it
is
by
the
redounding
of
the
blessedness
of
the
essence
to
the
powers
that
the
powers
themselves
also
are
beatified.
Against
this
opinion
I
argue
first:
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.5]
God
is
not
in
himself
disposed
differently
now
than
earlier
nor
does
he
descend
into
this
soul
or
Angel
otherwise
now
than
before,
when
we
consider
his
essence
precisely
here
and
there;
for
there
is,
according
to
the
descent
of
the
divine
essence
into
the
essence
of
a
creature,
always
uniformity
while
the
essence
of
the
creature
remains;
so
if
there
is
some
newness
in
a
blessed
soul,
it
must
be
by
some
new
effect
caused
by
God
in
the
essence;
the
effect
is
said
to
be
its
blessedness
formally
or
essentially.
And
the
effect
cannot
principally
be
in
the
essence
as
the
essence
is
distinct
from
the
power,
because
then
it
would
be
first
act;
but
by
no
first
act
distinct
from
second
act
can
a
creature
immediately
attain
the
divine
essence.
–
Confirmation:
nothing
is
properly
altered
unless
something
new
formally
inheres
in
it;
the
blessed
are
disposed
differently
now
than
before
when
they
were
not
blessed;
but
the
divine
essence
is
not
the
form
of
the
blessed
by
any
descent;
therefore
something
else
must
be
present
in
them
whereby
they
are
formally
blessed.
–
Next,
[ibid.
n.6]
the
descent
is
prior
in
nature
to
any
operation,
since
it
is
[according
to
this
opinion]
in
the
presence
of
first
act;
therefore
it
can,
without
contradiction,
be
without
any
operation;
consequently
someone
not
operating
but
disposed
as
one
asleep
could
be
blessed
principally,
which
Aristotle
considers
absurd,
Metaphysics
12
text
com.51.
–
Finally,
the
creature
is
blessed,
by
some
proportion,
in
the
way
that
God
is
blessed;
but
God
is
not
blessed
precisely
by
the
fact
that
he
is
the
same
as
himself,
but
insofar
as
he
understands
and
wills
himself
as
object;
otherwise
one
could
not
infer
from
the
fact
he
is
blessed
that
he
understands;
for
if
he
had
no
power
of
intellect
he
would
still
be
the
same
as
himself,
just
as
a
stone
is
the
same
as
itself.
If
then
the
divine
blessedness
does
not
consist
completely
in
the
identity
of
what
is
capable
of
blessedness
with
the
beatific
object,
then
neither
should
the
blessedness
of
the
creature
be
placed
in
some
reality
or
within-‐ness
of
the
beatific
object
through
a
descent
into
it;
because
if
the
creature
requires
an
operation
over
and
above
identity,
much
more
is
operation
necessary
here
over
and
above
the
descent;
for
whatever
blessedness
is
posited
as
being
principally
in
a
creature,
to
which
something
more
eminent
would
correspond
in
God,
that
would
be
blessedness
principally;
but
to
the
descent,
by
which
the
soul
is
said
to
be
deified,
the
identity
of
God
far
eminently
corresponds,
and
yet
by
this
identity
God
is
not
principally
and
completively
blessed
but
rather
by
the
operations
of
intellect
and
will.
On
behalf
of
a
solution
let
the
first
statement
be
as
follows:
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.13]
on
the
hypothesis
that
the
perfection
of
essence
is
one
thing
and
the
perfection
of
power
another,
blessedness
cannot
principally
be
in
the
essence.
For
what
perfects
essence,
as
essence
is
in
some
way
distinct
from
its
powers,
can
be
nothing
save
first
act,
and
perhaps
no
habit
can
provide
it;
but
no
first
act,
or
no
act
having
regard
to
the
order
of
first
act,
is
principally
blessedness;
rather
a
contradiction
is
involved
in
blessedness
being
without
operation
and
first
act
standing
thus
without
any
second
act.
24
Second
statement:
[Oxon.
ibid.]
if
we
adhere
to
the
opinion
explained
in
Ia
q.77
a.1,
namely
that
the
powers
are
not
really
distinct
from
the
essence
of
the
soul,
blessedness
absolutely
exists
more
principally
in
the
power.
Proof:
for
the
essence
would
not
receive
blessedness
if
the
power
was,
per
possibile
or
per
impossibile,
removed;
but
the
power,
if
the
essence
were
per
possibile
or
per
impossibile
removed,
would
receive
that
perfection;
therefore,
in
the
way
in
which
principal-‐
ness
in
fact
or
in
idea
is
possible
there,
the
power
receives
more
principally,
and
consequently
blessedness
perfects
it
first;
for
blessedness
consists
in
operation,
as
was
said
in
the
preceding
article.
–
Further,
that
is
truly
and
properly
said
to
be
more
principle
with
respect
to
A
which,
when
everything
else
is
per
possibile
or
per
impossibile
removed,
is
disposed
in
the
same
way
to
A,
but,
when
it
is
removed,
nothing
else
is
disposed
in
the
same
way
to
A.
This
reasoning
is
proved
from
the
idea
of
first-‐ness;
because
that
is
first
with
respect
to
some
other
thing
which,
when
removed,
means
nothing
else
is
first
with
respect
to
that
other,
but
which,
when
something
else
is
removed,
it
would
be
disposed
to
that
other
in
the
same
way;
and
the
simply
first
is
the
simply
more
principal.
Article
Three:
Whether
Blessedness
is
an
Operation
of
the
Sensitive
Part
or
only
of
the
Intellective
Part
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.4
n.2,
q.3
n.5]
blessedness
can
be
considered
either
according
to
its
essential
idea
or
according
to
what
is
concomitantly
added
to
it.
In
the
first
sense,
no
operation
of
the
sensitive
part
enters
into
its
formal
idea.
For
only
an
immaterial
power
is
able
by
its
own
operation
to
attain
the
perfect
good
in
which
alone,
as
in
the
object,
blessedness
per
se
exists.
So
although
the
senses,
as
they
are
united
with
their
agreeable
objects,
attain
and
possess
certain
goods,
yet
those
objects
do
not
bestow
perfect
happiness
and
blessedness.
–
Next
[Oxon.
ibid.
q.8
n.6]
what
cannot
be
conjoined
to
what
is
better
than
itself
cannot
be
beatified,
nor
is
it
beatified
simply;
no
sensitive
power
is
by
its
own
operation
conjoined
to
an
object
as
to
something
better
than
itself;
therefore
blessedness
cannot
consist
in
any
operation
of
the
sensitive
part.
Proof
of
the
major:
any
operative
power
belongs
to
the
animated
thing
as
it
is
animated;
but
material
objects,
as
they
are
sensible
qualities
in
themselves,
are
not
more
perfect
than
the
animated
thing
as
it
is
animated;
therefore
the
powers
themselves
are
better
than
the
objects;
it
is
therefore
impossible
that
these
operations,
by
which
such
objects
are
attained,
can
belong
to
the
essential
idea
of
blessedness.
–
Lastly
[Oxon.
ibid.
q.2
n.24]
any
sensitive
appetite
desires
the
extrinsic
object
for
the
sake
of
the
nature
whose
appetite
it
is;
for
any
extrinsic
sensible
object
is
more
ignoble
than
the
sensitive
appetite,
and
therefore
the
sensitive
appetite
does
not
conjoin
to
anything
more
desirable
than
is
the
being
of
the
nature
whose
the
appetite
is.
But
the
will
loves
something
more
noble
than
itself,
and
more
than
the
nature
of
that
of
which
it
is
the
will;
and
so
it
conjoins
to
something
more
desirable
both
in
itself
and
for
it
than
is
the
nature
whose
it
is;
so
only
in
the
intellective
part
as
it
is
distinguished
from
the
sensitive
part
is
blessedness
to
be
placed
according
to
its
essential
idea.
However
[Oxon.
ibid.
q.12
n.8]
because
in
the
resurrection
the
body
is
united
to
the
blessed
soul,
then,
although
blessedness
properly
said,
which
consists
in
an
25
act
of
intellect
and
will,
is
repugnant
to
the
body,
yet
the
body
is,
from
its
union
with
the
soul,
capable
of
blessedness
in
a
certain
respect,
when
the
glory
of
which
it
is
capable
redounds
to
it,
as
Augustine
says
in
his
Epistle
to
Dioscorus;
thus
there
is
here
a
certain
order,
so
that
the
blessedness
of
the
soul
would
not
be
completely
perfect
unless
it
saw
its
body
united
to
it
adorned
with
glory;
not
that
the
body
is
simply
blessed,
because
such
is
what
the
person
is
who
enjoys
and
understands.
So
the
blessedness
of
the
body
consists
in
its
primary
existence,
as
it
is
perfectible
by
a
blessed
soul,
and
that
either
because
of
the
greater
perfection
of
the
soul
in
operating
or
because
of
the
greater
perfection
of
the
body
received
from
the
soul,
because
matter
is
for
the
sake
of
form
and
not
the
reverse.
Although
therefore
the
body
is
not
such
as
to
be
blessed
simply
on
account
of
the
sensitive
powers,
yet
the
redounding
of
glory
into
it
regards
the
state
of
blessedness
concomitantly,
when
the
sensitive
part
shares
in
blessedness
in
a
certain
respect,
namely
in
all
the
beatitude
that
it
is
capable
of
sharing
in.
Article
Four:
Whether,
if
Blessedness
belongs
to
the
Intellective
Part,
it
is
an
Operation
of
the
Intellect
or
of
the
Will
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.4
n.2]
there
is
here
the
following
sort
of
opinion:
blessedness
per
se
and
essentially
consists
in
an
act
of
intellect
but
in
an
act
of
will
as
in
some
extrinsic
perfection
supervening
on
vision.
Proof:
blessedness
is
either
the
external
ultimate
end
that
is
attained
by
operation,
or
it
is
the
internal
ultimate
end
which
is
only
the
operation
that
conjoins
to
the
extrinsic
end;
but
an
act
of
will
is
the
ultimate
end
in
neither
way;
therefore
blessedness
whether
in
that
way
or
this
does
not
consist
in
an
act
of
will,
as
it
is
an
act
of
will,
although
blessedness
is
in
the
will
as
object;
for
the
idea
of
good
is
the
object
of
will,
and
blessedness
as
it
is
the
ultimate
end
most
of
all
has
the
idea
of
good.
–
Proof
of
the
minor
as
to
its
first
part:
the
object
of
will
is
the
end;
therefore
all
willing
is
something
ordered
to
an
end.
–
Next,
willing
cannot
be
the
first
thing
willed,
for
it
presupposes
that
something
other
than
willing
has
first
been
willed,
because
a
reflex
act
presupposes
a
direct
act
terminating
in
something
other
than
the
act
of
the
power,
otherwise
there
would
be
an
infinite
regress;
and
the
same
must
be
said
of
acts
of
the
intellect.
–
The
second
part
of
the
minor
is
proved
thus:
[ibid.
n.3]
an
operation
per
se
conjoining
to
the
exterior
end
is
that
by
which
the
first
attainment
of
the
exterior
end
occurs;
an
act
of
will
is
not
of
such
a
sort,
for
there
is
an
act
of
will,
namely
desire,
before
the
attaining
of
the
end;
but
this
act
of
will
is
a
certain
motion
to
what
is
not
possessed,
and
another
act
of
it
is
a
certain
resting
in
the
end.
And
indeed
the
end
is
not
first
attained
by
the
first
act,
because
while
desire
of
the
end
is
in
place
what
is
desired
is
lacked.
Nor
is
the
end
attained
by
the
second
act;
the
proof
is
that
that
act
follows
attainment
of
the
end;
for
the
will
does
not
rest
in
a
different
way
in
the
thing
it
was
first
tending
toward
unless
it
is
disposed
in
another
way
to
the
thing
now
than
it
was
before,
or
conversely.
That
then
which
makes
the
will
be
thus
disposed
to
the
end
so
as
to
rest
in
it,
is
ultimate
attainment
of
the
end;
such
is
an
act
of
vision,
because
by
it
a
certain
contact
of
God
with
the
intellect
is
made,
and
it
is
through
this
contact
that
the
object
is
so
disposed
to
the
will
that
it
can
rest
in
it
in
a
way
it
could
not
before.
An
example
is
added
about
the
sensitive
appetite;
for
if
the
26
sensible
thing
is
an
extrinsic
end,
sensation
is
an
intrinsic
end,
because
by
it
the
sensible
object
is
first
possessed
in
such
a
way
that
the
sensitive
appetite
can
be
at
rest
in
it.
The
thing
is
clear
also
from
another
example;
for
if
money
is
an
extrinsic
end,
possession
of
money
is
an
intrinsic
end,
which
is
followed
by
the
resting
of
the
will
in
the
longed
for
money.
We
say
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.4]
that
blessedness
essentially
and
formally
consists
in
an
act
of
will
whereby
simply
and
solely
the
best
good
is
attained,
and
in
the
enjoyment
of
this
good
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
is
perfectly
blest.
Proof:
the
extrinsic
end
is
simply
best
and
supremely
to
be
willed;
therefore
among
the
things
that
are
related
to
this
end,
the
one
that
is
more
immediate
to
it
is
more
to
be
willed.
But
willing
is
more
immediate
to
it,
because
it
immediately
tends
to
it
as
to
the
ultimate
end,
since
the
ultimate
end
as
such
is
the
proper
object
of
willing.
Proof
of
the
major:
that
is
more
to
be
willed
by
free
will
which
is
naturally
more
to
be
desired
by
natural
appetite;
of
this
sort
is
what
is
closer
to
the
best,
for
the
best
is
most
of
all
naturally
desired.
–
Next,
the
will
can
will
its
own
act
as
the
intellect
can
understand
its
own
act;
either
then
it
wills
its
own
willing
for
the
sake
of
understanding
or
the
reverse
or
neither
for
the
sake
of
either,
and
I
am
speaking
of
ordered
willing.
Not
the
first
because
according
to
Anselm
Why
God
Man
2,
“it
would
be
a
perverse
order
to
will
to
love
so
that
you
might
understand.”
Not
the
third,
because
in
things
ordered
per
se
to
the
same
end
there
is
also
some
order
among
them
as
to
an
end
under
the
end.
Therefore
the
second
must
be
granted,
as
Anselm
elegantly
discourses.
–
Finally,
if
extrinsic
blessedness
is
simply
supremely
to
be
willed,
then
that
is
most
of
all
intrinsic
blessedness
which,
among
intrinsic
things,
is
supremely
to
be
willed;
of
this
sort
is
some
willing;
for
the
will
wants
its
own
perfection
in
the
ultimate
end
more
than
the
perfection
of
the
intellect,
and
does
so
altogether
rightly
speaking
of
free
desire,
just
as
it
naturally
desires
more
with
natural
appetite.
As
to
the
reason
on
which
the
contrary
opinion
rests,
I
reply
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.5]
by
conceding
the
first
part
of
the
minor
and
the
first
part
of
the
conclusion,
namely
that
an
act
of
will
is
not
the
altogether
ultimate
or
extrinsic
end,
just
as
neither
is
an
act
of
the
intellect;
yet
we
say
that
this
ultimate
end
comes
closer
to
an
act
of
will,
as
is
shown
by
the
reasons
introduced
above.
Nor
do
the
proofs
for
the
first
part
conclude
to
anything
more,
granted
that
they
do
conclude.
For
an
act
of
will
is
so
to
be
ordered
or
able
to
be
ordered
to
the
end
simply
that
it
is
most
immediate
above
all
other
acts
to
the
end;
an
act
of
intellect
is
not
so
able
to
be
ordered
but
only
mediately,
and
therefore
it
is
less
a
participant
in
the
idea
of
the
end.
The
second
proof
shows
that
there
is
something
first
willed
by
the
will
itself,
which
is
true,
because
it
first
wills
the
extrinsic
object;
but
that
is
not
intellection;
and
although
vision
may
be
said
to
be
first
in
order
of
generation,
this
is
not
to
the
present
purpose;
for
we
are
speaking
of
what
is
first
willed
in
the
order
of
perfection,
in
which
order
volition
is
first
willed,
both
on
the
part
of
the
first
end
moving
first
to
things
that
are
closer,
and
on
the
part
of
the
power
and
its
inclination,
which
inclination
is
carried
to
the
end
and
to
things
more
conjoint
with
the
end.
The
second
part
of
the
minor
is
to
be
denied.
[Oxon.
ibid.]
As
to
the
proof
I
concede
that
one
does
not
attain
the
end
by
an
act
of
desire,
for
desire
is
of
something
absent,
but
one
does
attain
it
by
another
act,
which
is
the
love
of
the
27
thing
when
present;
for
this
beatific
object
is
attained
first,
speaking
of
the
primacy
of
perfection,
although
there
is,
by
an
act
of
intellect,
some
sort
of
prior
attaining
of
it
in
priority
of
generation;
but
things
posterior
in
generation
are
prior
in
perfection,
from
the
Philosopher
Metaphysics
9
text
15,
and
this
is
true
in
the
case
of
a
prior
that
is
simply
more
immediate
to
the
end,
which
end
is
the
simply
perfect
ultimate.
–
As
to
the
proof
[ibid.
n.6]
of
the
proposition
about
second
act,
that
it
is
the
resting
in
the
end
and
so
is
posterior
to
the
attaining
of
the
end,
I
reply
that
resting
can
be
understood
in
one
way
as
delight
properly
speaking,
which
is
a
perfection
supervening
on
operation,
as
beauty
supervenes
on
the
body;
in
this
sense,
indeed,
delight
follows
the
attaining
of
the
end,
not
only
in
primacy
of
generation
but
also
in
primacy
of
perfection;
for
it
follows
the
act
of
loving
the
seen
end,
which
is
truly
an
elicited
act
of
the
will.
Further,
it
is
altogether
false
that
the
will
does
not
elicit
any
act
about
the
lovable
object
present
to
it
but
only
receives
delight
and
passion.
For
Augustine
says
On
the
Trinity
9
last
chapter,
that
“the
appetite
of
him
who
longs
becomes
the
love
of
him
who
enjoys.”
But
this
appetite
or
desire
is
not
passion
merely;
both
because,
Ethics
2.5,
“we
do
not
merit
by
passions,
nor
are
we
praised
or
blamed
for
them,”
although
however
it
is
clear
that
the
greatest
part
of
the
merit
and
praiseworthiness
of
wayfaring
just
men
consists
in
holy
desires;
and
also
because,
when
the
same
object
has
been
presented,
sometimes
the
will
elicits
a
more
intense
desire,
sometimes
a
less
intense
one,
for
no
other
reason
than
that
it
elicits
it
with
greater
or
lesser
effort.
If
therefore
the
will
elicits
an
act
when
desiring,
reasonably
does
it
equally
elicit
an
act
also
about
the
end
when
the
end
is
present;
for
if
it
moves
itself
to
something
not
possessed
when
it
recognizes
it,
then,
when
it
sees
the
object
present
through
its
own
act,
it
rests
in
that
present
object.
–
Therefore
[ibid.
n.7]
if
rest
is
taken
for
the
act
elicited
by
the
will
when
the
will
is
immediately
conjoined
with
the
ultimate
end,
in
the
way
ultimate
rest
is
through
this
act,
then
I
concede
that
that
rest
arises
from
a
second
act
of
the
will;
but
I
deny
that
it
follows
a
first
attaining
of
the
end;
I
mean
first
by
primacy
of
perfection,
since
rather
by
this
very
same
operation
attainment
in
the
order
of
the
primacy
of
perfection
is
possessed;
however
rest
does
follow
some
attainment,
that
is,
the
presence
of
the
enjoyable
object
itself,
which
presence
is
through
an
act
of
intellect.
However
this
act
of
intellect,
through
which
the
beatific
object
is
present
to
the
will,
is
not
the
ultimate
intrinsic
end
through
which
the
extrinsic
end
is
first
attained;
for
this
operation,
first
in
the
order
of
generation,
does
not
conjoin
immediately
with
the
extrinsic
end,
to
the
exclusion
of
all
mediation
of
another
thing
closer
to
that
end.
The
first
part
of
the
deduction
therefore
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.8]
is
not
contrary
to
any
opinion,
because
no
one
posits
that
an
act
of
created
will
is
God;
nor
is
the
second
part
about
the
first
act
of
the
will,
which
is
desire,
doubtful
to
anyone.
There
remains
then
some
force
in
the
latter,
if
some
act
of
the
will
other
than
desire
could
be
the
first
attainment
of
the
ultimate
end.
This
is
indeed
denied
by
those
who
hold
the
above
opinion;
but
their
proof
about
rest
commits
the
fallacy
of
equivocation.
For
(as
was
said)
if
rest
is
taken
for
the
delight
consequent
to
perfect
operation,
then
indeed
this
rest
is
preceded
by
perfect
attainment
of
the
end;
but
if
rest
is
taken
for
the
act
resting
in
the
end,
we
say
that
the
act
of
loving,
which
is
prior
in
nature
to
delight,
does
for
this
reason
give
perfect
rest
to
the
lover,
for
the
operative
power
is
28
not
at
rest
in
the
object
save
by
the
perfect
operation
whereby
it
is
conjoined
with
that
very
object.
And
surely,
if
the
will
is
operative
about
an
absent
object
imperfectly
known,
much
more
can
it
operate
about
an
object
present
and
perfectly
seen.
–
Wherefore
the
proposition,
‘the
first
attainment
of
the
object
precedes
rest
in
the
object’,
that
is,
the
first
perfect
attainment,
is
false
yet
having
an
appearance
of
truth
from
the
comparison
with
the
motion
whereby
a
movable
thing
attains
the
end
and
reaches
rest
in
the
end.
But
this
comparison
is
nothing
when
applied
to
operations,
because
the
same
operation
in
this
case
is
both
perfectly
attaining
and
perfectly
resting,
since
rest
consists
in
perfect
attainment
of
the
object.
And,
as
a
general
fact,
likenesses
taken
from
motions
fail
when
applied
to
operations;
for
one
must
leave
out
of
the
comparison
whatever
there
is
of
imperfection
in
the
motion,
and
the
imperfection
of
this
sort
is
motion’s
being
distinguished
from
rest;
for
in
operation
there
are
found
together
both
the
attainment
of
the
object
through
motion
as
it
were,
or
rather
by
reaching
out
to
it,
and
the
resting
in
the
object;
for
such
tending
to
the
object
is
perfect
rest
in
it.
But
there
was
the
argument
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.9]
that
the
will
can
now
be
at
rest
in
the
object
when
before
it
could
not
be;
therefore
it
is
related
differently
now
to
the
willable
object
than
it
was
before.
Response:
the
consequence
is
not
valid;
for
it
is
enough
if
some
other
power
in
the
operating
is
differently
disposed
to
the
object
than
it
was
before.
Nor
is
it
surprising
that
a
power,
which
requires
in
operating
another
operating
power,
is
not
altogether
in
proximate
potency
to
operating
unless
that
other
power
is
operating.
–
On
the
contrary,
at
least
by
that
new
thing
the
will
can
now
be
at
rest
and
could
not
be
at
rest
previously;
but
for
no
other
reason
than
that
there
is
attainment
of
the
end,
and
indeed
an
attainment
prior
to
the
resting
itself
of
the
will;
therefore
in
such
a
prior
act
there
is
attainment
of
the
end.
I
respond
from
what
has
been
said:
one
must
concede
the
inference
as
to
priority
of
generation
but
not
as
to
priority
of
perfection;
but
blessedness
is
the
first
attainment
of
the
end
by
primacy
of
perfection.
And
if
you
argue
that
attainment
of
the
end
altogether
precedes
any
resting
of
the
power,
namely
because
the
power
can
operate
now
but
could
not
before,
which
does
not
happen
without
any
change
and
this
change
is
only
toward
possession
of
the
object,
then
the
consequence
is
that
the
first
attainment
of
the
object
cannot
be
placed
in
any
operation,
not
even
of
the
intellect,
and
so
neither
can
blessedness
be
so
placed;
and
now
the
reasoning
ends
up
in
the
opinion
that
denies
blessedness
is
to
be
placed
in
operation
but
rather
in
the
descent
of
God
into
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness,
and
this
opinion
was
disproved
at
large
in
the
preceding
article.
Article
Five:
Whether
Blessedness
is
an
Operation
of
the
Speculative
or
of
the
Practical
Intellect
Response:
[Oxon.
Prol.
q.4
n.3ff,
n.6ff,
n.31ff]
according
to
what
was
said
in
Ia
q.1
a.4
about
praxis
and
practical
knowledge,
one
should
be
of
the
opinion
that
the
blessedness
of
a
created
intellect
pertains
to
the
practical
and
not
the
speculative
intellect.
Declaration:
for
an
elicited
act
of
will
is
most
truly
praxis,
even
if
no
commanded
will
accompanies
it;
but
the
extension
of
practical
knowledge
to
praxis
consists
in
its
aptitudinal
conformity
and
priority
to
praxis,
otherwise
a
carpenter
29
who
is
not
actually
operating
would
not
have
practical
knowledge;
that
knowledge
is
practical,
then,
which
is
aptitudinally
conform
to
right
volition
and
is
itself
naturally
prior;
now
the
vision
in
the
blessed’s
intellect
of
the
divine
essence
and
of
the
things
necessarily
present
therein
is
conform
by
this
reason
to
the
blessed’s
act
of
will
and
prior
to
the
same
act;
therefore
such
knowledge
or
vision
is
most
truly
practical.
Proof
of
the
minor:
the
first
subject
of
theology
is
virtually
conform
to
right
volition,
if
indeed
from
the
idea
of
this
subject
the
first
principles
of
rectitude
in
volition
are
taken;
this
subject
also
determines
a
created
intellect
to
knowledge
of
the
determinate
rectitude
of
praxis
as
to
all
theological
matters
that
are
naturally
necessary
before
any
created
will
wills;
therefore
from
the
first
subject,
which
is
equally
the
object
of
blessedness,
there
proceeds
both
conformity
and
priority
of
vision
to
volition,
and
thus
extension
to
praxis,
and
it
is
from
this
extension
that
knowledge
is
to
be
called
practical.
Confirmation:
the
first
object
of
blessedness
is
equally
the
ultimate
end,
by
which
every
intellectual
nature
is
ultimately
perfected;
but
the
principles
taken
from
the
ultimate
end
are
practical
in
a
created
intellect;
therefore
all
knowledge
and
vision
of
that
object
should
be
practical,
since
only
practical
inferences
are
contained
in
practical
principles.
So
the
vision
of
the
divine
essence
in
the
created
intellect
is
truly
practical.
Article
Six:
Whether
Blessedness
consists
in
the
Consideration
of
the
Speculative
Sciences
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.25]
either
this
discussion
is
about
blessedness
simply,
which
is
second
perfection
conjoining
immediately
to
the
most
noble
extrinsic
perfective
object,
which
object
is
also
supremely
desirable,
or
we
are
talking
about
blessedness
in
a
certain
respect,
by
which
name
we
mean
second
perfection
that
conjoins
to
an
object
less
noble
than
what
is
supremely
desirable,
or
we
are
speaking
of
the
nature
itself
that
is
perfected.
Now
if
it
chance
that
the
extrinsic
perfective
object
is
more
noble
than
the
perfectible
nature
itself,
then
such
perfection
comes
closer
to
the
idea
of
blessedness
simply,
but
things
are
otherwise
if
it
is
supposed
to
be
less
noble.
When
blessedness
is
taken
in
the
first
sense,
it
cannot
consist
in
the
consideration
of
the
speculative
sciences.
For
the
most
perfective
and
supremely
desirable
object
is
the
most
practicable
object,
that
is,
most
attainable
by
act
of
love
and
lovable
for
its
own
sake;
hence
[Oxon.
Prol.
q.4
n.3]
it
is
written:
“Love
is
the
end
of
the
law,”
and
“On
these
two
precepts
(which
are
love
of
God
and
neighbor)
hang
the
whole
law
and
the
prophets,”
Romans
13
and
Matthew
22.
For
just
as
God
made
all
things
for
his
own
sake,
so
he
most
rightly
commanded
that
that
because
of
which
all
things
were
clearly
made
be
loved
for
its
own
sake
and
most
of
all.
What
therefore
blessedness
simply
consists
in
is
outside
the
whole
genus
of
the
speculative
sciences.
–
Nor
does
it
matter
[ibid.
n.25]
that
some
speculative
sciences,
as
metaphysics,
show
that
there
exists
a
first
Principle,
and
indeed
a
supreme
good,
and
therefore
a
supreme
desirable
thing.
For
although
such
knowledge
may
be
extended
to
love,
as
showing
the
object
of
it,
yet
it
would
not
at
all
give
direction
in
act
as
act
exists
in
such
and
such
circumstances
and
insofar
as
it
is
of
this
object
in
particular;
for
this
exceeds
every
faculty
of
a
created
intellect;
and
yet
knowledge
is
30
simply
necessary
if
praxis
is
to
be
rightly
elicited,
and
if
the
first
desirable
object
is
to
be
desired
and
sought
after
as
it
should.
Since
therefore
none
of
the
speculative
sciences
is
able
to
teach
this,
it
is
evident
that
the
ultimate
perfection
of
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
cannot
consist
in
the
speculative
sciences.
–
Then,
[Metaphysics
6
q.1]
every
speculative
science
able
to
be
acquired
by
man
through
the
natural
virtue
and
light
of
the
intellect
proceeds
and
rests
on
principles
known
by
way
of
the
senses;
for
our
knowledge
arises
from
the
senses,
Posterior
Analytics
1.1.
All
speculative
knowledge,
therefore,
by
which
the
intellect
is
perfected
and
its
ignorance
warded
off,
is
virtually
contained
in
sensible
things,
and
cannot
extend
itself
beyond
those
first
objects.
[Cf.
Ia
q.1
a.7
intervening
article]
For
every
first
object
contains
the
immediate
propositions,
because
the
subject
of
these
propositions
embraces
the
predicate
and
thus
the
evidence
of
the
whole
proposition.
But
immediate
propositions
contain
the
conclusions;
therefore
the
subject
of
the
immediate
propositions
contains
all
the
truths
of
the
habit
of
the
science.
So
an
intellect
endowed
with
the
speculative
sciences
is
understood
to
have
indeed
acquired
the
perfection
that
wards
off
ignorance
of
the
things
that
are
contained
under
the
objects
of
those
sciences;
but
in
no
way
can
it
thence
be
simply
happy
and
blessed.
For
these
sorts
of
objects
of
the
sciences
are
not
simply
perfective
extrinsic
objects;
rather
they
are
absolutely
more
imperfect
than
the
most
noble
extrinsic
object
simply.
Nor
lastly
do
they
pertain
to
the
perfection
of
the
human
soul
and
of
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness,
since
they
are
essentially
and
virtually
included
in
sensible
things.
So
although
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
may
find
in
the
speculative
sciences
some
perfection
of
itself,
yet
it
cannot
be
made
simply
blessed
in
them.
Article
Seven:
Whether
Blessedness
consists
in
Knowledge
of
the
Separate
Substances,
namely
of
the
Angels
[Montefortino:
Since
we
have
dealt
at
length
with
this
present
question
in
the
last
article
of
the
preceding
question,
where
we
showed,
against
Avicenna,
that
it
cannot
be
that
an
inferior
intelligence
be
blessed
in
another
intelligence
more
perfect
than
or
superior
to
itself
but
only
in
the
first
intelligence
of
all
(even
in
the
case
of
his
false
hypothesis
that
a
second
intelligence
produces
a
third
intelligence
and
so
on),
we
judge
that
nothing
more
needs
to
be
added
here.]
Article
Eight:
Whether
Man’s
Blessedness
consists
in
the
Vision
of
the
Divine
Essence
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.3
n.3]
there
are
here
two
opinions
from
the
side
of
the
opposite;
one
indeed
says
that
blessedness
simply
should
be
posited
in
an
act
of
intellect
and
of
will
at
the
same
time;
the
other,
however,
contends
that
it
consists
in
only
one
operation,
but
what
sort
of
operation,
whether
of
intellect
or
of
will,
was
discussed
at
large
above
in
a.4.
Further,
the
reasons
on
which
the
first
opinion
rests
are,
first,
that
blessedness
should
be
placed
in
the
perfect
union
of
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
with
God;
now
this
involves
the
union
of
every
power
by
which
that
nature
is
able
to
be
united
immediately
with
the
beatific
object;
such
powers
indeed
are
intellect
and
will.
–
Next,
the
power
through
which
something
is
moved
to
its
term
is
the
same
power
as
that
through
which
it
rests
in
the
term.
Now
an
31
intellectual
nature
is
moved
to
God
through
intellect
and
will;
therefore
it
rests
in
him
through
both
powers.
–
I
add
also
a
third
reason;
for
both
intellect
and
reason
have
regard
to
the
perfection
of
an
intellectual
nature
in
first
act;
so
for
the
perfection
of
the
same
in
second
act
there
are
required
second
acts
corresponding
respectively
to
these
first
acts.
Blessedness,
therefore,
which
is
complete
perfection
of
intellectual
nature,
includes
simply
in
second
act
those
second
acts.
The
other
opinion
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.4]
is
principally
founded
on
the
fact
that,
according
to
the
Philosopher
Ethics
1,
“happiness
is
the
best
operation
according
to
the
best
virtue,
and
in
a
complete
life;”
but
it
is
impossible
for
the
same
thing
to
have
several
simply
best
operations.
For
they
cannot
be
of
the
same
species,
because
one
operation
thus
perfect
is
sufficient
for
one
thing.
Nor
can
they
be
of
a
different
species,
since
species
are
related
as
numbers,
Metaphysics
8.
So
a
repugnance
is
involved
in
several
species
being
equal.
Likewise
it
is
impossible
for
there
to
be
several
best
virtues
of
the
same
nature,
whether
virtue
is
taken
for
natural
power
(there
is
one
supreme
power
for
one
nature),
or
whether
by
the
name
of
virtue
is
understood
acquired
or
infused
virtue;
so
in
both
ways
there
is
precisely
a
single
best.
For
the
solution
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.5]
one
must
suppose
that
our
discussion
here
is
about
blessedness
insofar
as
blessedness
means
that
by
which
the
beatific
object
is
immediately
attained,
and
not
as
it
states
things
preparatory
for,
or
concomitant
with,
or
even
consequent
upon,
blessedness.
On
this
supposition,
I
say,
a
distinction
can
be
drawn
between
the
blessedness
of
intellectual
nature
and
the
blessedness
of
intellectual
power.
For
although
nature
is
not
beatified
save
through
the
power,
yet
there
is
in
nature
some
power
capable
of
blessedness,
and
the
blessedness
of
it
is
not
simply
the
blessedness
of
nature,
just
as
there
is
a
difference
between
the
natural
appetite
of
both
for
this
supreme
perfection;
because
the
nature
is
in
a
perfectly
good
state
not
for
the
reason
that
the
power
is
united
to
the
beatific
object,
but
it
is
so
in
some
other
thing
more
noble
than
it,
although
from
such
union
the
power
is
in
a
simply
good
state.
Then
[Oxon.
ibid.]
let
the
first
statement
be
as
follows:
when
blessedness
is
taken
intensively
and
for
the
ultimate
and
perfect
attainment
of
the
beatific
object,
blessedness
consists
in
a
single
operation.
Proof:
for
in
one
operation
alone
intellectual
nature
is
in
a
simply
perfectly
good
state,
so
much
so
that,
once
the
operation
is
posited,
nothing
is
lacking
to
the
nature.
Not
as
if
it
includes
everything
pertaining
to
the
well
being
of
nature,
but
because
there
stands
in
it
precisely
the
complement
of
everything
that
exists
in
well
being;
also,
in
the
way
that
the
beatific
object
is
in
fact
and
in
idea
single,
wherein,
as
in
the
extrinsic
perfective
object,
this
nature
has
perfect
well
being
to
the
extent
that
well
being
is
immediately
attained
through
operation
by
this
nature,
so
this
sort
of
operation
too
will
be
simply
single.
The
second
statement
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.6]
is
that,
if
blessedness
is
taken
extensively
for
the
immediate
attaining
of
the
beatific
object
by
whichever
power,
then
it
must
be
placed
in
the
operation
of
both
the
intellect
and
the
will.
Indeed
nothing
else
is
proved
by
the
reasons
adduced
for
the
first
opinion.
But
for
the
evidence
of
the
matter
one
must
draw
a
distinction
about
immediacy.
For
either
immediacy
excludes
an
intermediate
of
the
same
nature,
namely
one
that
would
be
intermediate
to
it
for
an
attainment
in
the
same
order
(as
operation
is
intermediate
32
for
the
power
in
the
attaining
of
the
object);
or
it
excludes
an
intermediate
of
a
different
order,
such
that
nothing
attains
more
immediately
or
more
perfectly
than
it
does.
An
example:
a
prior
and
posterior
cause
immediately
reach
the
same
passive
object,
such
that
neither
acts
by
the
medium
of
the
other,
and
yet
the
prior
cause
more
immediately
reaches
it,
because
reaching
it
more
intimately
and
more
perfectly.
As
far
as
concerns
the
first
kind
of
immediacy
[Oxon.
ibid.],
one
must
concede
absolutely
that
both
the
intellect
and
the
will
immediately
attain
the
beatific
object;
because
neither
is
intermediate
with
respect
to
the
other,
whether
in
idea
of
object
or
in
idea
of
attaining
the
object;
rather
the
more
immediate
term
of
the
operation
of
each
power
is
the
beatific
object
itself
as
it
is
attained
by
the
operations
of
both.
And
so
the
total
extensive
beatitude
possible
in
an
intellectual
nature
consists
in
several
operations,
according
to
the
plurality
of
the
powers
that
can
all
in
their
own
way
be
beatified.
For
which
reason,
if
an
intellectual
nature
were
endowed
with
ten
powers,
each
of
which
would
by
its
own
operation
immediately
attain
the
beatific
object,
total
extensive
blessedness
would
have
to
be
placed
in
ten
operations.
–
But
when
speaking
of
the
second
immediacy
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.7],
it
is
evident
that
blessedness
is
situated
precisely
in
a
single
operation;
because
only
one
power
in
intellectual
nature
most
perfectly
attains
the
object;
so
the
blessedness
of
nature,
namely
the
blessedness
by
which
the
nature
is
in
the
simply
best
state,
at
any
rate
on
the
part
of
the
best
object
as
it
is
best,
exists
only
in
a
single
operation
of
one
more
excelling
power.
–
The
like
holds
when
speaking
of
the
blessedness
of
the
power,
as
far
as
it
includes
immediacy
said
in
both
ways.
Therefore
in
no
way
can
blessedness
be
placed
in
two
operations,
unless
one
asserts
that
a
single
operation
without
the
other
is
not
sufficient
for
beatific
operation,
which
however
is
doubtful.
QUESTION
FOUR:
ABOUT
THE
THINGS
REQUIRED
FOR
BLESSEDNESS.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Pleasure
is
required
for
Blessedness
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.7
nn.2-‐4]
one
must
say
that
pleasure
is
not
required
for
blessedness
as
something
that
regards
the
essence
of
blessedness;
yet
it
makes
for
the
extensive
integrity
of
it,
insofar
as
blessedness
is
a
state
perfected
by
the
aggregation
of
all
goods.
And
in
fact
the
first
part
of
the
solution
was
shown
above
in
q.2
a.6.
For
blessedness
is
so
far
the
greatest
perfection
of
intellectual
nature
that
it
states
the
conjoining
of
intellectual
nature
with
the
most
noble
object
extrinsic
to
it.
Now
the
passions,
of
which
sort
is
pleasure,
do
not
conjoin
with
the
extrinsic
perfective
object
but
rather
suppose
the
conjunction
and
flow
from
it.
–
Next,
passion
does
not
have
regard
to
the
beatific
object
in
its
idea
as
object,
but
in
its
idea
as
cause;
blessedness,
however,
has
regard
to
the
beatific
object
as
such,
by
which
nature
is
made
blessed
because
through
operation
it
is
conjoined
with
it.
But
[Oxon.
ibid.]
joy
and
ineffable
pleasure
are
nevertheless
included
in
very
blessedness,
to
the
extent
blessedness
is
described
by
Boethius
as
‘the
state
perfected
by
the
aggregation
of
all
goods’,
and
thus
pleasure
is
required
for
33
extensive
blessedness,
as
can
be
collected
from
the
fact
that
the
will
is
both
effective
of
its
own
operation
and
is
receptive,
not
only
of
its
own
acts,
but
also
of
spiritual
passions;
about
these
passions
Augustine
speaks
in
On
the
Morals
of
the
Church
1.15,
where
he
reduces
all
the
passions
of
the
will
to
love.
Will
therefore
is
perfected
to
the
ultimate
under
both
aspects.
For
as
it
is
active
it
is
perfected
to
the
ultimate
with
the
most
perfect
operation,
and
thereby
it
is
conjoined
with
the
most
noble
object;
but
as
it
is
receptive,
it
is
equally
perfected
to
the
ultimate
with
the
ultimate
passion,
which
is
pleasure
and
joy.
Pleasure
then
brings
will
to
ultimate
rest
as
will
is
receptive
of
passions,
just
as
will
is
perfected
with
ultimate
fruition
as
it
is
susceptive
of
operations.
–
With
respect
to
intensive
blessedness
therefore
[Oxon.
ibid.
q.3
n.5],
as
by
this
name
is
meant
that
by
which
the
object
is
immediately
attained
and
as
by
it
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
is
perfected
to
the
ultimate,
pleasure
is
not
required
for
it;
but
to
the
extent
blessedness
states
an
aggregation
of
all
goods
pertaining
to
what
is
capable
of
blessedness,
we
say
that
pleasure
and
joy
are
necessarily
required.
Otherwise,
as
was
said,
the
will,
as
receptive
of
passions,
would
neither
be
nor
be
understood
to
be
at
rest
to
the
ultimate
it
could
be
made
to
be.
Article
Two:
Whether
in
Blessedness
Vision
is
more
Principal
than
Pleasure
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
qq.4,
7]
one
must
say
that
in
blessedness
operation
is
most
predominant
as
it
is
compared
to
the
consequent
joy
or
pleasure.
This
solution
is
plain
from
what
was
said
both
in
the
preceding
article
and
in
q.3
a.4.
For
what
unites
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
to
the
extrinsic
most
noble
perfective
object
is
its
best
operation,
and
through
this
operation
the
nature
rests
to
the
ultimate
in
the
object
present
to
it,
which
unites
it
for
its
own
sake.
In
such
love
is
its
well
being
simply.
For
if
nature
tends
to
the
object
when
absent
by
act
of
desire,
then
certainly
it
should
tend
to
and
inhere
in
the
object
when
present
by
act
of
love
for
the
sake
of
the
object
of
infinite
goodness
itself,
when
this
object
is
clearly
shown
to
it
by
the
intellect;
in
that
act
of
love
then
it
rests
to
the
ultimate,
desiring
nothing
further,
having
now
attained
in
one
thing
that
most
eminently
contains
all
things
the
accumulation
of
all
desirable
goods.
In
this
fact
it
experiences
an
indescribable
pleasure,
yet
this
pleasure
supervenes
on
operation
as
beauty
supervenes
on
youth.
But,
in
addition,
pleasure
elicits
nature’s
operation
about
the
object,
and
through
this
operation
the
object
is
united
to
the
nature
in
the
most
perfect
way,
and
the
nature
is
essentially
blessed;
pleasure
therefore
is
something
less
principal
in
blessedness,
and
the
nature
does
not
through
pleasure
tend
to
God
as
to
the
object,
but
rather
pleasure
has
regard
to
the
object
as
efficient
cause
and
as
impressing
on
the
will,
as
the
will
is
receptive,
the
quality
by
which
the
will
rests
in
the
object
which
it
had
already
got
possession
of;
so
necessarily
pleasure
is
something
less
principal
in
blessedness,
and
the
will
does
not
inhere
by
love
in
the
supreme
good
because
of
pleasure,
but
rather
because
the
supreme
good
is
thus
lovable
for
its
own
sake,
although
from
it
when
thus
loved
pleasure
redounds
into
the
loving
will.
34
same
subject
as
well;
blessedness
absolutely
is
in
the
concupiscible
power;
so
holding
onto
does
not
in
any
way
pertain
to
blessedness
itself.
Article
Four:
Whether
Rectitude
of
Will
is
required
for
Blessedness
Response:
[Oxon
4
d.49
q.6,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.5]
some
people
have
here
the
following
sort
of
opinion:
rectitude
of
the
will
is
required
for
blessedness
both
antecedently
and
concomitantly.
Antecedently,
then,
because
rectitude
of
will
exists
for
the
sake
of
due
order
to
the
ultimate
end;
so
when
that
is
taken
away,
no
one
can
reach
blessedness.
Concomitantly,
however,
because
blessedness
consists
in
the
vision
of
the
divine
essence,
which
is
the
very
essence
of
goodness;
and
so
the
will
of
one
who
sees
the
essence
of
God
of
necessity
loves
whatever
it
loves
in
its
order
to
God,
just
as
the
will
of
one
who
does
not
see
the
essence
of
God
of
necessity
loves
under
the
common
idea
of
good,
which
idea
he
knows.
We
say
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.1
n.2]
that
the
first
member
must
be
conceded,
according
to
Augustine
83
Questions
q.30:
“Supreme
perversity
lies
in
enjoying
what
should
be
used.”
Therefore
true
enjoyment
cannot
anywhere
exist
unless
it
is
ordered,
namely
so
as
to
be
ordered
according
to
the
due
circumstances;
therefore
the
will
that
is
going
to
possess
blessedness
must
enjoy
that
which
is
the
highest
and
supreme
desirable
thing
and
must
use
other
things
in
order
to
it,
in
the
way
and
manner
that
has
been
declared
they
must
be
willed.
But
we
do
not
admit
the
second
member,
either
as
to
the
hypothesis
or
as
to
the
reason.
And
indeed
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.4]
we
disputed
about
it
at
large
in
q.3
a.4,
showing
that
blessedness
must
be
placed
in
an
act
of
will,
not
of
intellect,
although
the
latter
attains
the
beatific
object
first
in
order
of
generation.
But
that
the
will
is
by
that
fact
concomitantly
right,
because
it
of
necessity
wills
whatever
it
wills
in
its
order
to
God,
we
think
to
be
false.
But
this
question
must
be
explained
below
in
q.10
a.1.
For
since
it
is
the
same
power
that
busies
itself
about
the
end
and
about
things
ordered
to
the
end,
it
must
have
regard
to
both
under
the
same
idea
and
manner
of
tendency;
but
it
is
clear
that
it
tends
altogether
freely
to
that
which
is
ordered
to
the
end;
so
it
would
equally
freely
love
the
end
when
clearly
seen.
But
from
the
fact
that
the
end
is
goodness
by
essence,
and
that
the
things
ordered
to
the
end
are
not
of
such
sort,
nothing
else
can
properly
be
inferred
other
than
that
the
will
is
not
able
to
refuse
the
end
or
to
hate
it;
besides,
if
the
acts
of
the
inferior
powers
are
in
the
power
of
the
will
such
that
it
can
suspend
them
from
their
proper
acts
–
for
not
only
can
the
will
bring
about
and
command
that
the
eye
see
this
or
that
other
object
but
also
to
command
that
it
simply
not
see
–,
much
more
will
it
be
able
to
do
or
present
the
same
thing
in
its
own
acts,
by
willing
this
thing
or
its
contrary,
or
by
willing
altogether
nothing;
so
although
the
reason
proves
that
the
will
is
not
able
to
refuse
the
good
by
essence,
yet
it
does
not
show
that
the
will
is
not
able
not
to
will
it.
We
say
therefore
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.5]
that
the
reason
why
rectitude
of
will
is
required
in
blessedness
is
because
blessedness
itself
or
enjoyment
is
nothing
other
than
love
of
friendship,
but
not
love
of
concupiscence.
When
the
will,
therefore,
moves
to
act
according
to
an
affection
for
justice,
it
is
necessarily
right,
because,
just
as
it
loves
the
highest
good
for
its
own
sake,
so
it
should
love
all
other
things
in
order
to
the
highest
good.
So,
properly
speaking,
rectitude
of
will
is
not
required
in
36
blessedness,
but
rather
blessedness
is
itself
the
most
correct
will
of
those
who
intuit
God.
How
then
is
it
[Oxon.
ibid.
q.6
n.10]
that
the
blessed
are
incapable
of
sin?
For
if
they
freely
and
contingently
love
the
thing
by
essence
good
and
thereupon
the
other
things
that
are
ordered
to
it,
then
they
will
be
able
to
stop
enjoying,
or
at
any
rate
to
will
the
things
ordered
to
it
in
a
way
other
than
they
should
be
willed,
the
contrary
of
which
is
eloquently
conveyed
by
Augustine
Against
Maximinus
3.13
who
says:
“when
provision
is
given
to
any
nature
that
it
not
be
able
to
sin,
this
is
not
by
nature
proper
but
by
the
grace
of
God;”
so
the
blessed
are
incapable
of
sin
by
something
intrinsically
inherent
in
them.
–
Again,
in
Enchridion
86
or
73
Augustine
says,
“Just
as
our
soul
is
able
to
refuse
unhappiness,
so
will
it
always
be
able
to
refuse
iniquity.”
But
as
a
matter
of
fact,
it
is
able
to
refuse
unhappiness
because
it
cannot
will
it;
hence
Augustine
says
in
the
same
place,
“Not
only
do
we
not
will
to
be
miserable,
but
we
are
in
no
way
able
to
will
it.”
I
reply
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.11]
that
the
inability
of
the
blessed
to
sin
insofar
as
they
are
blessed,
that
is,
their
inability
at
the
same
time
to
be
blessed
and
to
sin,
is
certain.
But
that
by
which,
in
the
divided
sense,
the
power
to
sin
is
excluded,
can
be
understood
in
two
ways,
namely
either
through
something
intrinsic
to
the
power,
or
through
an
extrinsic
cause
removing
from
the
blessed
the
proximate
power
of
sinning.
An
example:
a
well
disposed
eye
is
endowed
with
the
power
of
seeing
any
body
whatever;
however
an
extrinsic
cause
can
bring
it
about
that
some
particular
visible
thing
is
never
seen
by
it,
since
the
cause
perpetually
acts
to
remove
the
body
endlessly
from
the
eye;
and
in
this
way,
while
the
remote
power
of
seeing
is
preserved,
the
proximate
power
of
seeing
will
always
be
impeded;
and
in
this
way
the
damned
will
be
perpetually
prevented
from
seeing
the
empyrean
heaven,
which,
if
they
were
permitted
to
come
near
to,
they
would
see
as
one
among
the
visible
things.
–
With
this
distinction
as
preface,
we
say
that
the
blessed
are
incapable
of
sin,
not
by
something
intrinsic
to
the
will,
whereby
the
power
for
sinning,
in
the
divided
sense,
is
removed;
for
there
is,
as
I
say,
no
intrinsic
cause
preventing
that
power
altogether
from
being
reduced
to
act;
but
there
is
an
extrinsic
cause
preventing
the
power
from
proceeding
to
an
act
of
sinning.
Now
this
cause
is
the
will
of
God
anticipating
the
will
of
the
blessed
so
that
their
will
always
continues
the
act
of
enjoyment,
and
thus
their
will
is
never
able
to
reduce
to
act
its
remote
power
of
sinning
or
of
not
enjoying.
For
it
cannot
happen
that,
when
a
second
cause
is
anticipated
by
a
superior
cause
that
is
acting
for
one
opposite,
the
proximate
power
should
proceed
to
the
other
opposite.
The
blessed
therefore
could,
in
the
sense
of
division,
sin
by
remote
power,
as
the
natural
and
proper
liberty
remains
in
place
that
their
will
is
possessed
of;
but
yet
this
power
will
never
be
reduced
to
act,
as
the
extrinsic
cause
determines
it
always
to
the
opposite
of
sin,
as
has
been
said.
–
And
this
is
the
point
of
the
first
authority
from
Augustine;
for
he
means
that
the
fact
of
the
blessed
not
being
able
to
sin
by
proximate
power
is
not
to
be
attributed
to
their
own
nature
but
to
the
grace
of
God
gratuitously
anticipating
and
conserving
the
wills
of
the
blessed
in
the
most
right
act,
of
which
sort
is
the
enjoyment
of
the
highest
good.
As
to
Augustine’s
other
authority
[Oxon.
ibid.],
he
does
not
say
that,
just
as
now
the
soul
has
a
necessity
of
refusing
unhappiness,
so
then
it
will
have
a
necessity
37
of
refusing
iniquity
(for
neither
is
true
when
speaking
of
refusal
as
it
is
an
elicited
act),
but
that,
just
as
now
it
has
perpetually
a
habit
of
refusing
unhappiness,
so
then
it
will
have
a
habit
of
refusing
iniquity.
–
And
when
you
argue:
it
now
has
refusal
in
a
way
that
it
is
not
able
to
have
willing
acceptance,
I
say:
for
this
reason
it
is
not
able
to
will
unhappiness,
not
because
it
necessarily
has
the
refusing
of
it,
but
because
unhappiness
cannot
be
the
object
of
an
act
of
willing.
On
the
other
side,
the
same
reason
does
not
have
the
consequence
that
there
cannot
be
a
willing
of
iniquity;
because
iniquity,
when
speaking
of
the
substrate
of
sin,
can
be
the
object
of
a
created
will.
Or
one
can
say
briefly:
in
the
way
that
a
created
will
now
never
wills
unhappiness
but
always
has
the
habit
of
refusing
it,
so
then
it
will
never
will
it,
and
so
there
is
a
likeness
in
fact
on
both
sides.
–
And
if
you
argue:
now
it
cannot
will
unhappiness,
therefore
it
will
then
not
be
able
to
will
iniquity,
the
consequence
is
null;
for
there
can
very
well
be
a
likeness
as
to
the
does
not
from
this
side
to
that,
but
not
as
to
the
is
not
able.
Article
Five:
Whether
the
Body
is
required
for
Man’s
Blessedness
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.43
q.2
n.32,
d.49
q.8
n.2]
the
discussion
is
either
about
man’s
imperfect
blessedness
or
about
his
perfect
blessedness,
which
we
learn
about
from
revelation
alone.
Further,
imperfect
blessedness
is
that
which
a
man
can
acquire
in
this
present
life,
insofar
as
even
the
philosophers,
proceeding
by
way
of
natural
knowledge,
established
that
it
was
placed
in
the
speculation
of
the
highest
causes,
as
is
plain
from
the
Philosopher
Ethics
1.17,
when
he
speaks
of
blessedness
in
general,
and
in
Ethics
10.10
when
he
speaks
of
objective
blessedness
in
particular.
But
for
attaining
this
speculation
man
needs
the
corporeal
senses;
for
we
speculate
about
whatever
is
found
in
phantasms,
on
which
man
necessarily
depends
according
to
the
condition
of
the
present
state,
which
state
is
all
that
the
Philosopher
recognized,
knowing
nothing
of
the
nobility
from
the
principle
of
established
nature.
Wherefore
man
cannot
attain
to
this
blessedness
knowable
by
natural
reason
without
the
body,
and
hence
Aristotle
writes,
Ethics
10.10,
“There
is
need
also
of
a
healthy
body
and
food
and
services;
and
yet
the
happy
man
must
not
be
thought
to
need
many
and
great
things.”
As
to
what
concerns
perfect
blessedness
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.8
nn.5-‐9],
which
consists
in
the
union
of
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
with
the
supreme
desirable
thing,
the
soul
does
not
need
the
body
in
order
to
be
fit
for
this
blessedness.
Declaration:
for
that
we
in
fact
experience
the
contrary,
the
intellect
being
unable
to
attain
anything
in
universal
form
without
imagination
busying
itself
about
a
singular
instance
of
it
–
this
does
not
come
from
the
nature
of
the
intellect
but
is
in
punishment
for
the
sin
of
the
first
man,
as
we
explained
at
length
in
Ia
q.84
a.7.
Hence
the
first
man
was,
before
he
sinned,
able
to
understand
without
turning
to
phantasms.
When
the
intellect,
then,
is
separated
from
the
body
of
which
it
is
the
form,
no
impediment
holds
it
back
from
being
borne
to
objects
proportionate
to
it.
If
therefore
the
beatific
object
is
shown
to
it,
it
will
be
able
to
see
it
and
to
inhere
to
it
as
with
present
love
for
its
own
sake;
therefore
the
soul
will
then
be
perfectly
blessed.
Add
that,
although
in
fact
the
intellect
may
be
moved
by
sensible
objects,
yet
since
it
understands
so
many
things
in
addition
which
are
not
sensible,
it
cannot
38
attain
them
through
phantasms
but
through
intelligible
species,
which
it
produces
with
incredible
speed
and
preserves
in
itself,
while
phantasms
provide
an
accompanying
path
to
them
in
the
form
of
exemplar
cause;
so
when
the
connection
with
the
body
is
broken
off,
the
intellect
can
through
its
species
have
perfect
operations
by
way
of
abstraction
and
can
also
intuit
the
objects
present
to
it.
Hence
Avicenna
says,
Naturalia
6
ch.6,
“the
separated
soul
will
see
the
truth
more
clearly
than
the
unseparated
soul
does.”
But
see
the
above
cited
Ia
q.87
a.7.
If
then
the
soul
can
be
perfectly
blessed
without
the
body,
what
benefit
will
the
soul
gain
from
the
body
being
repaired
and
being
again
united
to
it?
I
reply:
although
the
essential
blessedness
of
the
soul
consists
in
a
single
operation,
which
is
love
of
the
highest
good
seen
in
its
very
presence,
yet
its
extensive
blessedness
also
embraces
the
operation
of
the
intellect;
so
there
also
has
regard
to
this
extension
of
blessedness
that
the
soul
be
reunited
to
the
body
and
that
the
body
be
made
to
share
in
its
own
way
the
same
glory.
For
whatever
in
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
is
able
to
be
at
rest
would
be
perfectly
then
at
rest
when
the
powers
of
the
soul
reach
through
their
own
operations
the
highest
good
and
when
the
body
has
through
redounding
of
glory
been
adorned
with
its
own
dowry;
thus
therefore
the
soul
is
most
perfectly
blessed,
both
intensively
and
extensively,
because
nothing
at
all
in
such
a
nature
capable
of
rest
is
without
the
rest
that
it
is
able
to
perceive.
Just
as,
then,
many
things
come
together
for
the
first
act
of
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness,
so
there
are
proper
rests
corresponding
to
each
of
these
things
individually,
and
a
single
rest
corresponding
to
the
nature
itself,
and
to
its
whole
extensive
totality,
conflated
from
those
many
rests,
in
which
many
each
of
the
first
acts
seeks
in
its
own
way
and
order
to
be
at
rest.
Article
Six:
Whether
some
Perfection
of
Body
is
required
for
Blessedness
Response:
[Oxon.
Prol.
q.1,
4
d.49
q.8]
imperfect
blessedness,
possible
for
man
in
this
present
life,
is
one
thing;
perfect
blessedness,
which
we
expect
in
the
future
age,
is
another.
About
the
first
the
Philosopher
speaks
in
Ethics
1
in
general
and
in
Ethics
10
in
particular,
as
was
also
noted
in
the
preceding
article,
where
this
blessedness
was
located
in
the
speculation
of
the
highest
causes,
and
especially
of
the
first
cause.
But
man
cannot,
according
to
his
principles,
know
this
first
cause
save
from
a
concept
taken
from
sensible
things,
and
this
concept
indeed
cannot
be
of
the
substance
in
itself
of
the
first
cause
but
the
knowledge
of
it
is
a
sort
of
abstractive
and
obscure
one.
But
since
the
happiness
of
man
that
comes
from
such
speculation,
as
the
Philosopher
says
in
Ethics
1.8,
is
“the
best
operation
in
a
complete
life,”
assuredly
this
perfect
life
of
man,
whereby
he
is
more
apt
for
performing
this
best
operation,
requires
the
best
constitution
of
the
body
proceeding
from
a
precise
temperament;
for
it
is
clear
that
a
body
broken
by
disease
and
weakened
in
health
very
much
impedes
the
perfect
operations
of
man;
hence
the
Philosopher
writes
in
Ethics
10.10
that
“there
is
need
of
a
healthy
body.”
This
imperfect
happiness
of
man,
therefore,
of
which
the
Philosophers
spoke,
requires
perfect
health
of
body.
However,
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.12
n.8]
as
to
the
blessedness
revealed
to
us
and
promised
to
those
who
keep
the
law
of
God,
the
body
is
not
simply
necessary;
for
the
soul
separated
from
the
body
can
be
perfectly
blessed.
–
Nevertheless,
for
the
39
soul’s
resting
in
every
way
there
is
required
also
a
body
perfect
in
every
way.
Declaration:
for
the
soul
cannot
be
perfectly
blessed,
that
is,
at
rest
in
every
respect
in
which
it
can
be
at
rest,
when
joined
to
a
body
that
is
mortal
by
common
law;
thereby
it
desires
to
be
made
perfectly
blessed;
so
it
desires
to
be
united
to
an
immortal
body,
because
then
whatever
can
be
at
rest
in
it
is
most
perfectly
at
rest,
and
it
desires
nothing
further
to
be
added
to
it.
Not,
however,
that
the
body
will
be
likewise
simply
blessed,
but
rather
what
enjoys
and
understands
it
will
be,
the
way
Augustine
speaks
to
Dioscorus
about
blessedness
of
nature
and
blessedness
in
a
certain
respect,
which
latter
consists
in
act;
but
the
body,
as
it
is
distinct
from
the
soul,
has
no
second
act.
So
this
perfection
of
the
body
consists
in
its
primary
being,
as
it
is
perfectible
by
the
blessed
soul,
through
which
it
becomes
fittingly
perfectible
by
such
form,
namely
that
as
the
soul
is
immortal
and
blessed
so
also
the
body
is
immortal
and
in
its
way
blessed;
and
then
it
is
the
instrument
and
organ
of
the
soul
in
operating,
for
which
reason
it
is
endowed
with
agility,
clarity,
subtlety,
impassibility;
hence
also
Augustine
writes,
On
Genesis
12.35,
“So
since
the
soul
has
received
this
now
not
animal
but
spiritual
body,
being
made
equal
to
the
angels,
it
will
have
the
perfect
mode
of
its
nature,
obedient
and
commanding,
vivified
and
vivifying,
with
such
ineffable
facility
that
what
was
for
it
a
burden
is
now
for
it
glory.”
Article
Seven:
Whether
any
exterior
Goods
are
required
for
Blessedness
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.43
q.2,
d.49
qq.2
&
8,
Metaphysics
12
q.3
n.7]
imperfect
blessedness,
which
the
philosophers
thought
was
attainable
in
this
present
life,
requires
many
exterior
goods;
but
none
of
these
goods
is
required
for
the
blessedness
that
the
divine
Scriptures
promise
us.
And
to
be
sure
those
who
place
blessedness
in
the
speculation
of
the
first
cause
and
of
the
intelligences
clearly
suppose
that
man
needs
good
health
to
have
this
perfect
operation,
as
was
said
in
the
preceding
article;
for
if
a
less
advantageous
health
is
made
use
of,
there
will
be
distraction
from
this
perfect
operation.
–
Next,
for
the
subsistence
and
duration
of
animal
life
man
needs
many
exterior
things
in
order
to
persist
in
the
contemplative
life,
and
even
more
in
order
to
exercise
himself
in
the
active
life
and
to
be
useful
to
the
republic.
However,
the
Philosopher
did
not
in
Ethics
10
posit
that
man
was
happy
in
this
operation;
hence
after
he
says,
“there
is
need
of
a
healthy
body,
of
food,
and
of
service,”
he
adds,
“however
the
happy
man
must
not
be
supposed
to
need
many
and
great
things.”
–
But
that
perfect
blessedness
does
not
need
this
sort
of
goods,
even
after
the
body
is
again
united
to
the
blessed
soul,
is
plain
from
this,
that
we
need
those
exterior
goods
because
we
bear
a
mortal
and
animal
body;
and
a
body
subject
to
contraries
in
its
natural
constitution
would
quickly
fail
if
what
is
continually
lost
is
not
restored
through
exterior
helps,
and
so
we
have
need
of
food
to
introduce
restoration
of
strength
and
production
of
life.
But
the
body
after
the
resurrection
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.13
n.1]
will
be,
not
animal,
but
spiritual,
on
the
evidence
of
the
Apostle
I
Corinthians
15;
not
as
if
it
will
pass
over
into
spirit,
but
because
it
will
be
immortal
and
impassible,
endowed
with
ineffable
clarity,
and
most
agile,
so
much
so
that
it
will
no
longer
be
a
burden
to
the
soul
but
lead
rather
to
an
increase
of
its
glory;
the
blessed,
therefore,
will
have
no
need
of
external
goods.
40
Article
Eight:
Whether
the
Company
of
Friends
is
required
for
Blessedness
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.2
n.22]
the
company
of
friends
does
not
relate
to
the
idea
of
true
blessedness.
For
just
as
we
say,
when
we
conceive
it,
that
it
is
to
be
placed
in
the
ultimate
and
supreme
perfection
of
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness,
so
that
perfection
can
never
be
present
in
a
man
unless
he
is,
by
means
of
his
own
operations,
united
to
the
supremely
desirable
thing,
wherein
he
may
ultimately
rest
desiring
nothing
further,
having
attained
the
fullness
of
all
desires
through
clear
vision
and
enjoyment
of
the
highest
desirable
thing,
which
is
also
the
infinite
good,
embracing
unitively
and
eminently
all
goods.
Therefore
while
this
union
of
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness
with
the
supremely
perfective
object
stands,
even
with
no
supplementing
association
of
friends,
it
will
be
most
perfectly
blessed,
because
it
will
have
the
most
perfect
well
being;
so
this
company
of
friends
is
not
required
for
blessedness.
–
However,
because
the
supreme
City
abounds
most
fully
with
every
possible
happiness,
the
society
and
association
of
friends,
who
love
the
highest
good
together
and
love
each
other
mutually
with
sincere
and
perfect
charity,
does
make
for
the
accidental
joy
and
pleasure
of
the
citizens;
and
while
each
rejoices
about
his
own
glory
and
happiness,
he
is
at
same
time
made
happy
by
the
blessedness
of
others.
QUESTION
FIVE:
ABOUT
THE
ATTAINMENT
OF
BLESSEDNESS.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Man
is
able
to
Secure
Blessedness
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.8,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.7]
that
human
nature
is
capable
of
blessedness
is
a
dogma
of
the
faith,
expressed
frequently
in
Scripture
and
notably
in
I
Corinthians
13
where
the
Apostle
says,
“We
see
now
through
a
glass
darkly,
but
then
face
to
face.
Now
I
know
in
part;
but
then
I
shall
know
as
also
I
am
known.”
And
I
John
3,
“Now
we
are
the
sons
of
God,
and
it
has
not
yet
appeared
what
we
shall
be.
For
we
know
that
when
he
appears,
we
will
be
like
him,
since
we
will
see
him
as
he
is.”
Revelation
22,
“They
will
see
his
face.”
Matthew
22,
“They
will
be
like
the
Angels
of
God
in
heaven,”
and
elsewhere.
But
[Oxon.
ibid.]
whether
this
most
certain
truth
can
be
made
clear
and
proved
by
reason
through
the
natural
light
of
the
intellect
is
denied
by
Aristotle.
For
when
he
speaks
of
human
happiness,
Ethics
10.10,
he
places
it
in
speculation
of
the
first
substance,
which
speculation,
although
it
can
be
attained
by
the
human
intellect
through
the
sensible
things
presented
to
it,
yet
will
remain
always
abstract
and
obscure
and
in
no
way
clear
and
intuitive;
wherefore
he
thought
that
a
clear
vision
of
God
was
altogether
impossible
for
man.1
1
On
this
point
Montefortino
adds
[from
Oxon.
ibid.
and
n.3,
Prol.
q.1
n.11]
the
following
in
one
of
the
replies
to
objections:
“Aristotle’s
argument
is
conclusive
according
to
his
own
principles;
for
in
fact,
in
the
imperfection
of
our
present
state,
no
reason
is
to
hand
whereby
to
prove
that
we
can
attain
to
a
clear
vision
of
God,
but
we
can
know
this
only
by
revelation;
and
for
this
reason
there
was
added
in
41
To
us,
nevertheless,
it
seems
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.2]
that
a
proof
by
natural
reason
can
be
given
that
human
nature
is
capable
of
the
blessedness
promised
to
us,
provided,
however,
the
imperfection
of
the
present
state
as
to
mode
of
cognition
is
taken
away.
The
first
proof
on
the
part
of
the
object
is
as
follows:
every
power
that
has
an
adequate
first
object
has
per
se
power
for
whatever
is
contained
under
the
object;
but
the
first
object
of
the
human
intellect
is
being;
therefore
too
whatever
the
idea
of
being
is
preserved
in
is
the
per
se
object
of
it.
But
it
is
impossible
for
the
intellect
to
be
at
rest
in
anything
save
in
the
peak
of
the
whole
analogy
of
being
immediately,
such
as
sight
too
is
not
at
rest
save
in
the
most
beautiful
visible
thing.
But
this,
namely
perfect
and
ultimate
rest,
cannot
come
through
knowledge
of
the
most
perfect
being
in
general,
for
this
is
not
knowledge
of
it
as
it
is
in
itself;
therefore
it
will
be
knowledge
of
it
as
it
is
in
itself
in
particular.
And
what
sees
the
First
Being
clearly
and
distinctly
is
blessed,
insofar
as
blessedness
has
been
revealed
to
us;
therefore
the
intellect
not
subject
to
the
imperfection
of
the
present
state
is
able
to
show
b
the
natural
light
that
human
nature
is
capable
of
blessedness.
–
The
second
proof
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.5]
I
take
from
the
side
of
act;
for
what
belongs
to
perfection
simply
in
any
genus,
if
it
belongs
to
an
inferior
in
that
genus,
belongs
also
to
the
superior;
but
the
senses
are
endowed
with
intuitive
knowledge;
therefore
much
more
has
the
intellect
been
furnished
with
that
virtue,
so
that
it
can
attain
the
things
included
under
its
adequate
object
as
these
are
present
to
it
in
their
own
existence,
and
so
it
can
know
all
things
intuitively;
so
not
only
can
it
thus
know
material
quiddities
but
also
immaterial
ones,
in
the
ultimate
one
of
which
consists
its
perfection
and
blessedness.
–
Lastly,
if
we
did
not
have
intuitive
knowledge
of
something,
we
would
not
know
with
certainly
about
our
own
acts
whether
they
are
present
in
us
or
not;
but
this
is
plainly
false;
so,
for
the
reason
that
we
should
concede
that
one
thing
among
beings
can
be
intuitively
known,
we
should
for
the
same
reason
also
concede
that
any
of
them
can
be.
the
conclusion
[sc.
in
the
immediately
following
paragraph
of
the
reply]
‘provided,
however,
the
imperfection
of
the
present
state
as
to
mode
of
cognition
is
taken
away’;
for
in
the
state
of
nature
as
first
created,
and
when
the
soul
was
absolved
from
the
necessity
of
turning
itself
to
phantasms,
it
would,
by
virtue
of
assumed
middle
terms,
assent
to
the
inferred
conclusion,
and
would
see
that
there
was
no
repugnance
in
its
coming
to
a
clear
vision
and
enjoyment
of
God.
And
although
one
may
object
to
the
Philosopher
that
there
is
in
man
a
natural
desire
to
know
the
first
substance
as
it
exists
in
itself,
and
therefore
this
substance
will
at
some
time
thus
be
intuited
(otherwise
the
natural
desire
would
be
present
in
vain,
which
no
one
would
say),
yet
this
objection
is
not
conclusive;
for,
when
speaking
of
a
desire
merely
natural,
one
has
to
prove
that
such
an
appetite
exists
in
man;
but
if
by
the
term
‘natural
desire’
is
meant
an
elicited
act
of
the
will
in
accord
with
right
reason,
then
Aristotle
did
not
see
this,
nor
could
he
according
to
natural
reason
have
known
of
another
state
in
which
he
would
see
more
clearly,
nor
did
he
desire
more,
because
he
did
not
know
that
more
was
to
be
desired
in
accord
with
right
reason
than
the
condition
of
the
present
life
dictates.
Hence,
although
he
could
know
that
the
first
substance
was
capable
of
being
seen
in
itself,
he
did
not
for
that
reason
know
that
it
was
thus
visible
to
man,
or
that
man
had
a
desire
for
intuiting
it
clearly.
An
example:
man
knows
that
the
sun
is
more
visible
in
itself
than
can
be
seen
by
himself,
and
that
he
is
surpassed
in
the
vision
of
it
by
an
eagle;
yet
from
this
the
conclusion
does
not
follow
that
men
desire
to
intuit
the
sun
itself
as
far
as
it
is
visible
or
to
the
extent
an
eagle
can
see
it;
for
the
human
eye
has
no
ability
to
see
the
sun
save
insofar
as
it
does
in
fact
see
it.”
42
Intervening
Article:
Whether
Human
Nature
is
the
lowest
of
the
Natures
capable
of
Blessedness
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.8,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.7]
one
must
say,
first,
that
it
is
simply
repugnant
to
any
nature
inferior
to
human
nature
to
be
made
blessed,
as
the
reason
just
adduced
shows.2
–
Next
I
argue
also
as
follows:
what
is
not
conjoined
with
a
better
than
itself
cannot
be
made
blessed,
nor
is
it
simply
blessed;
but
no
nature
inferior
to
man
is
conjoined
with
a
best
as
something
better
than
itself;
therefore
it
is
simply
repugnant
for
it
to
be
made
blessed.
Proof
of
the
minor:
any
operative
power
belongs
to
the
animate
thing
as
it
is
animate;
but
material
objects,
as
they
are
sensible
qualities,
are
not
in
themselves
more
perfect
than
the
animate
thing
as
it
is
animate;
therefore
the
powers
are
themselves
far
better
than
their
objects.
–
One
must
say
second
that
some
nature
inferior
to
man
is
capable
of
blessedness
in
a
certain
respect.
For
every
nature
that
can,
by
its
own
operation,
be
conjoined
immediately
to
its
end
and
so
possess
its
best
object,
although
this
object
be
not
best
simply,
is
in
its
own
order
at
ultimate
rest;
but
natures
endowed
with
a
virtue
of
operating
immanently,
as
that
of
the
senses,
can
be
conjoined
with
their
best
object;
therefore
they
can
be
made
blessed,
although
not
simply
so.
From
this
the
conclusion
follows
[Oxon.
ibid.]
that
natures
destitute
of
operative
powers
can
neither
simply
nor
in
a
certain
respect
be
made
blessed;
for
they
must
hereby
lack
operations
conjoining
them
with
their
best
object;
but
blessedness
consists
in
operation;
therefore
blessedness
can
in
no
way
be
attributed
to
them.
Further,
all
things
that
only
make
and
do
not
operate,
as
are
all
forms
below
sensitive
things,
cannot
participate
in
any
blessedness;
for
they
lack
any
operation
immanent
to
them
and
conjoining
them
with
an
extrinsic
perfective
object.
–
Nor
is
what
is
commonly
said
about
heavy
objects
of
any
validity,
namely
that
a
heavy
thing
moves
itself
to
the
center
and
rests
there;
for,
to
begin
with,
this
is
said
by
way
of
metaphor;
for
while
there
is
action
in
a
heavy
thing,
which
is
the
motion
of
it,
yet
the
heavy
thing
performs
no
operation
about
the
center;
and
so
neither
does
it
conjoin
itself
to
the
center;
however,
on
the
hypothesis
that
it
did
so,
then
certainly
this
is
only
the
causing
of
some
natural
‘where’
and
not
of
any
absolute
form;
therefore
it
is
not
blessedness,
which
is
an
absolute
form.
Article
Two:
Whether
one
Man
can
be
more
Blessed
than
Another
[Montefortino
remarks
here:
Since
the
present
question
was
expounded
in
Ia
q.12
a.6
[Oxon.
4
d.50
q.5],
we
have
judged
that
the
reader
should
be
referred
to
what
was
said
there.
And
although
Cajetan
in
his
Commentary
says
that
the
vision
of
God
in
his
essence
and
the
blessedness
of
the
intellectual
creature
coincide
indeed
in
the
thing,
yet,
because
they
are
formally
distinct,
it
became
the
Angelic
Doctor
to
complete
formally
question
Ia
q.12,
nevertheless
Valentia
Ia
IIae
q.5
frankly
confesses
that
the
Saintly
2
This
reason
was
given
by
Montefortino
in
the
On
the
Contrary.
It
runs:
“Every
nature
inferior
to
man
performs
all
its
operations
through
an
organ;
therefore
it
does
not
busy
itself
about
an
immaterial
object;
but
objective
blessedness
exists
precisely
in
an
immaterial
object,
which
is
not
attained
by
operation
of
an
organ;
therefore
every
nature
inferior
to
man
is,
by
its
natural
condition,
unable
to
attain
to
blessedness.”
43
Doctor
could
have
omitted
several
articles
in
this
question.
And
Vazquez
thought
the
same
about
the
present
article,
and
refers
back
to
what
he
said
in
Ia
disput.
47.]3
Article
Three:
Whether
Anyone
can
be
Blessed
in
this
Life
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.12,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.11]
some
have
here
the
following
opinion,
that
although
a
certain
imperfect
participation
in
blessedness
can
be
had
in
this
life,
nevertheless
it
is
impossible
for
any
mortal
to
possess
perfect
blessedness;
for
this
blessedness
excludes
all
evil
and
all
misery;
but
mortal
life
is
subject
and
liable
to
miseries
in
many
ways.
–
Next,
man
naturally
desires
the
permanence
of
a
possessed
good;
but
mortal
life
is
passing,
which
however
we
desire
to
abide
perpetually,
as
we
fear
death
by
its
very
nature;
therefore
it
cannot
happen
that
blessedness
should
be
obtained
in
this
life.
–
They
also
prove
this
finally
from
the
fact
that
man
cannot
see
God
in
this
life;
therefore
neither
can
he
be
blessed;
for
blessedness
consists
in
the
vision
of
God.
We
say
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.3]
that
by
the
absolute
power
of
God
blessedness
can
be
communicated
to
a
mortal
man.
Proof:
for
an
impossibility
preventing
something
being
received
in
a
pre-‐existing
subject
arises
either
on
the
part
of
the
agent
or
on
the
part
of
the
subject,
whether
because
it
is
simply
repugnant
to
the
subject,
as
it
is
repugnant
for
a
stone
to
be
wise,
or
repugnant
in
a
certain
respect;
but
on
the
part
of
these
three
there
is
no
repugnance
in
blessedness
being
communicated
to
a
mortal
man;
therefore
this
is
simply
possible,
having
regard
to
God’s
absolute
power.
Proof
of
the
minor:
for
God
can
then
give
blessedness
to
a
man
the
way
he
bestows
it
after
death,
whether
immediately
or
by
a
mediating
light,
if
this
is
required
in
the
next
life.
There
is
no
impossibility
therefore
on
the
part
of
the
agent.
On
the
part,
however,
of
the
passive
subject
[ibid.
n.4],
it
is
evident
that
no
intrinsic
impediment
is
present,
otherwise
it
would
be
perpetually
repugnant
for
man
to
be
blessed.
Therefore
all
repugnance
must
be
expected
by
reason
of
some
passive
adjunct
with
which
blessedness
does
not
cohere;
and
if
there
is
something
such,
it
cannot
be
anything
other
than
mortality;
but
this
sort
of
repugnance
cannot
be
formal;
otherwise
blessedness
and
mortality
would
not
have
been
present
in
Christ,
which
is
erroneous
and
altogether
foreign
to
the
truth.
This
repugnance
therefore
is
only
virtual,
insofar
as
passibility,
which
follows
as
an
effect
from
a
natural
cause,
and
the
corruption
adjunct
to
mortality
are
repugnant
to
the
supreme
joy
that
follows
on
blessedness.
But
God
can,
by
his
absolute
power,
prevent
a
natural
effect
from
following
on
its
cause,
and
by
this
there
is
no
repugnance
or
impediment
left
to
stop
a
man
in
the
state
of
mortality
from
being
blessed,
with
God
conferring
the
blessedness.
For
since
it
is
incompossible
with
blessedness
that
there
be
in
the
intellective
appetite
any
wrong
motion
that
is
of
a
nature
to
conduct
itself
in
conformity
with
a
sensitive
appetite
supremely
inclined
toward
some
delightful
thing
agreeable
to
it,
so,
in
a
case
where
a
mortal
man
were
made
blessed,
these
3
The
editors
of
Montefortino
add
a
footnote:
“That
in
glory
one
person
is
more
blessed
than
another
is
a
dogma
of
the
faith
defined
at
the
Council
of
Florence
under
Eugene
IV,
according
to
John
14,
‘In
my
Father’s
house
are
many
mansions’.
The
heretic
Jovinian
held
the
opposite
opinion
according
to
the
philosophy
of
the
Stoics
about
the
parity
of
the
virtues
and
vices.
Against
this
error
Jerome
inveighed
most
strongly
in
his
second
book
against
the
said
heretic.”
44
causes
would
be
prevented
from
eventuating
in
their
effects,
effects
which
are
naturally
consequent
to
them;
therefore
blessedness
is
not
repugnant
to
mortality
save
in
that
the
effect
of
one
is
not
compatible
with
the
effect
of
the
other.
Hence
the
delight
of
blessedness
would
ward
off
all
sadness
in
the
sensitive
appetite,
not
only
what
is
opposite
but
even
what
is
contingent;
for
which
reason,
because
the
sensitive
appetite
would
be
prevented
from
delighting
itself
in
some
agreeable
sensible
object,
it
would
not
thereby
be
saddened,
nor
the
intellective
appetite
either.
Further
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.5],
repugnance
can
be
assigned
on
another
head;
for
although
the
body
is
not
capable
of
blessedness
properly,
which
is
located
in
acts
of
intellect
and
will,
yet
it
is
capable
of
blessedness
in
a
certain
respect,
to
the
extent
the
blessedness
of
the
soul
redounds
upon
it;
so
much
so
that
the
resting
of
the
soul
in
the
beatific
object
is
not
altogether
perfect
without
that
of
the
body.
Since
therefore
the
blessedness
of
the
body
cannot
stand
together
with
mortal
life,
it
is
repugnant
for
perfect
blessedness
to
be
conferred
during
mortal
life.
Only
by
the
absolute
power
of
God,
then,
and
according
to
the
order
of
another
providence
can
a
man
be
blessed
in
this
present
life.
And
not
only
would
a
man’s
being
blessed
in
this
state
have
thus
to
be
attributed
to
a
miracle,
but
also
on
the
ground
that
a
natural
cause
would
be
prevented
from
issuing
in
the
effect
naturally
consequent
to
it
even
though
no
cause
of
the
natural
order
would
be
able
to
do
the
preventing.
On
the
basis
of
these
points
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.6]
can
be
solved
and
rightly
understood
all
the
authorities
of
the
saints
who
deny
that
the
wayfarer
can
see
God
in
himself
and
become
blessed;
for
they
are
speaking
according
to
existing
providence
and
ordinary
power,
by
which
God
has
established
that
no
mortal
is
to
be
admitted
to
the
clear
vision
of
himself.
Hence
it
would,
as
was
said,
be
a
miracle
if
God
were
to
give
blessedness
to
any
mortal,
and
moreover
only
a
miracle
could
bring
it
about
that
a
cause
not
produce
its
natural
effect;
and
therefore
is
it
said
that
by
common
law
and
according
to
the
present
state
such
cannot
happen.4
Article
Four:
Whether
Blessedness
once
Had
can
be
Lost
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.6,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.5]
it
is
most
certain
that
blessedness
will
be
perpetual
and
eternal.
For
this
is
a
truth
of
faith,
expressed
in
Matthew
ch.25,
“The
just
will
go
to
eternal
life.”
And
ch.22,
“They
will
be
like
the
Angels
of
God.”
And
in
Psalm
83,
“They
will
praise
you
for
ages
of
ages.”
And
often
elsewhere.
Likewise
the
same
thing
is
borne
witness
to
by
many
sayings
of
the
Saints,
but
let
it
be
enough
to
have
adduced
Augustine
On
the
Trinity
13.8
when
he
writes,
“life
cannot
be
blessed
unless
it
is
immortal.”
He
also
proves
it
from
this,
that
if
it
can
be
lost,
then
either
the
blessed
person
loses
it
unwillingly
and
then
he
will
not
be
blessed,
since
everything
he
wants
is
not
supplied
to
him;
or
it
is
taken
from
him
willingly;
or
at
least
he
loses
it
neither
willingly
nor
unwillingly
but
is
indifferent;
and
from
the
last
two
it
follows
at
once
that
he
is
not
blessed
because
he
does
not
love
blessedness;
4
Hence
Montefortino,
in
one
of
the
responses
to
objections
he
inserts,
quotes
Scotus
to
the
effect
that
Christ’s
being
blessed
and
mortal
at
the
same
time
was
miraculous
and
a
result
of
God’s
absolute
power.
45
rather,
if
he
loses
it
willingly,
he
hates
it,
and
if
he
is
indifferent
to
either
result,
he
does
not
value
it
as
much
as
it
should
be
valued;
he
is
not
then
a
man
enjoying
blessed
life.
This
triple
distinction
of
Augustine
is
to
be
understood
not
for
the
moment
at
which
blessedness
would
be
posited
as
lost,
because
this
result,
namely
that
he
would
not
then
be
blessed,
would
not
be
logically
unacceptable,
but
is
rather
to
be
taken
for
the
first
‘then’
or
for
the
time
at
which
he
is
blessed.
The
same
point
can
be
urged
if
it
be
said
that
a
blessed
person
can
fall
from
possession
of
blessedness
by
loss
of
temporal
life.
For
either
he
loses
life
willingly
or
he
loses
it
unwillingly
or
in
neither
way.
And
it
is
not
rational
to
reply
that
he
loses
life
but
this
is
not
foreseen
or
considered
by
the
blessed
while
he
is
in
possession
of
blessed
life,
and
so
he
is
disposed
indifferently
as
far
as
his
will
is
concerned,
not
as
if
he
does
not
put
a
high
value
on
possessing
perpetually
the
good
he
has
apprehended,
but
because
he
does
not
consider
its
perpetuity.
This,
I
say,
is
irrational.
For
how
would
he
never
think
of
the
eternal
duration
of
that
life
which
he
loves
supremely
if
it
is
blessed?
But
if
he
is
posited
as
apprehending
and
believing
that
his
life
is
to
be
perpetual,
which
however
is
not
going
to
be
the
case,
then
he
is
deceived,
and
yet
nothing
more
illogical
can
be
said
than
that
someone
with
a
false
opinion
is
blessed,
according
to
Augustine
City
of
God
11.4.
For
fuller
understanding
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.3]
of
this
most
certain
truth,
one
must
consider
first
what
the
cause
is
of
the
perpetuity;
next
how
it
has
regard
to
blessedness;
and
lastly
about
the
security
of
the
blessed
and
that
they
will
never
lose
blessedness.
The
cause,
then
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.4],
of
the
perpetuity
of
blessedness
is
assigned
by
some
with
the
assertion
that
blessedness
cannot
cease
because
it
is
of
itself
formally
necessary,
although
it
is
so
from
an
extrinsic
causing
cause
as
principle.
–
But
others
say
that
a
power
is
necessarily
determined
to
grow
by
habit,
as
the
intellect
to
seeing
by
the
light
of
glory
and
the
will
to
enjoying
by
consummate
charity.
This
cause
then
they
posit
as
giving
perpetuity
to
blessedness.
We
think
that
neither
opinion
is
to
be
approved.
And
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.6]
a
point
indeed
against
the
first
is
that
created
blessedness
is
an
accident;
therefore
it
is
dependent
no
less
than
its
subject
is;
but
the
subject
depends
on
the
conservation
of
God
contingently
conserving
it,
and
consequently
it
does
not
have
necessary
existence
formally;
so
an
accident
much
more
does
not
have
it.
–
Response:
although
blessedness
absolutely
has
contingent
existence,
yet,
from
its
once
being
present
in
a
nature,
it
is
necessarily
present
in
it
while
the
nature
lasts,
and
so
it
has
necessary
existence
from
the
fact
that
it
has
been
produced
into
existence.
On
the
contrary:
God
can
conserve
an
essentially
first
thing
without
a
later
thing;
the
nature
is
essentially
prior
to
blessedness,
nay
even
prior
in
time;
therefore,
while
the
subject
remains,
blessedness
can
cease
to
be.
Confirmation:
there
is
never
greater
necessity
of
a
third
to
a
first
than
of
a
third
to
a
second;
yet
in
the
case
of
the
third
to
the
second
blessedness
is
only
contingent.
Wherefore
[Oxon.
ibid.]
we
say
that
other
than
God
nothing
has
necessary
existence
formally
but
simply
contingent
existence.
However
something
created
is
said
to
possess
incorruptible
existence
insofar
as
it
does
not
have
a
contrary,
or
because
it
cannot
be
destroyed
by
anything
created
but
can
only
be
annihilated
by
God
not
conserving
it;
and
for
this
reason
blessedness
should
be
called
46
incorruptible,
but
this
sort
of
incorruptible
is
not
of
itself
perpetual
save
by
possibility;
for
just
as
blessedness
receives
its
existence
from
God
contingently
conserving
it,
thus
too
can
it
receive
perpetuity.
A
point
against
the
second
position
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.9]
is
first
that
a
habit
is
not,
with
respect
to
operation,
a
cause
prior
to
the
power
but
always
second
to
it;
for
a
power
is
that
by
which
we
simply
have
ability;
and
hence
it
is
that
the
habit
does
not
use
the
power
but
the
power
uses
the
habit,
as
a
second
cause
and
instrument.
But
a
prior
cause
is
not
determined
to
acting,
nor
consequently
is
it
necessitated
to
act,
but
conversely.
–
Next,
the
Blessed
Virgin
as
wayfarer
was
endowed
with
charity
as
was
given
to
any
of
the
blessed
of
an
inferior
degree,
and
yet
she
was
not
compelled
to
enjoyment,
even
when
she
was
abiding
in
the
contemplation
of
God.
–
Lastly,
although
the
light
of
glory
imposes
a
necessity
on
the
intellect
of
seeing
the
object
present
to
it,
yet
if
will
is
the
cause
commanding
the
vision,
it
is
able
not
to
command;
for
it
unites
intelligence
contingently
to
the
memory
of
the
object,
whereby
it
loves
contingently.
And
further
it
appears
it
should
so
unite
it,
because
Augustine
in
On
the
Trinity
frequently
says
that
in
the
generation
of
the
perfect
Word
there
is
concurrence
of
the
will
thus
uniting
it;
but
the
vision
is
the
Word
according
to
him,
On
the
Trinity
15.
–
There
is
then
[ibid.
n.10]
a
necessity,
or
a
necessary
perpetuity,
from
habits
determining
powers
to
their
acts;
but
from
the
habit
of
glory
there
is
only
a
necessity
in
a
certain
respect,
because
a
habit
inclines
naturally;
nor
is
there
from
charity
such
a
necessity
in
the
will,
for
the
will
can
freely
use
or
not
use
charity.
So
the
eternal
happiness
of
the
blessed
is
from
the
divine
will
alone,
which,
just
as
it
perfects
intensively
a
nature
capable
of
blessedness,
so
it
conserves
the
nature
perpetually
in
this
sort
of
perfection
bestowed
by
itself.
However
[Oxon.
ibid.]
from
this
arises
a
doubt:
for
if
blessedness
does
not
of
its
nature
require
that
it
be
perpetual,
and
if
nothing
intrinsic
to
the
blessed
makes
for
the
perpetuity
of
blessedness,
then,
from
the
point
of
view
of
the
nature
of
created
will,
which
can
turn
to
good
or
bad,
the
blessed
could
sin,
which
is
unacceptable.
–
Response:
we
expounded
this
doubt
at
large
in
the
preceding
article
4.
It
was
said
there,
then,
that
the
blessed
can
sin
by
remote
power,
not
by
proximate
power,
since
God
perpetually
preserves
the
act
of
enjoyment
and
denies
any
coming
together
for
sinful
act.
But
[Oxon.
ibid.
nn.16-‐18]
as
to
how
this
perpetuity
relates
to
blessedness,
some
think
that
it
is
included
in
the
formal
idea
of
blessedness,
and
they
are
moved
by
these
reasons:
for
blessedness
is
the
end
of
all
desires;
for
once
it
is
attained
all
appetite
ceases;
therefore
it
should
so
include
all
desirable
things
that
nothing
is
left
to
desire.
But
everyone
desires
to
remain
in
the
good,
and
to
do
so
perpetually.
–
Next,
punishment
is
perpetual
in
the
damned;
therefore
the
happiness
of
the
blessed
is
also
essentially
perpetual.
We
say
first
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.19],
that
if
blessedness
is
taken
for
permanent
perfection
as
permanent,
then,
however
intense
it
is,
perpetuity
does
not
have
regard
to
its
formal
idea.
For
any
perfection
that
is
permanent,
and
any
that
is
the
same
and
equal,
can
for
an
instant,
or
for
any
brief
time,
stay
being
what
and
as
much
as
it
can
be
in
the
whole
of
time;
for
a
whiteness
of
one
day
is
as
equally
perfect
as
a
whiteness
of
one
year,
Ethics
1.6.
–
Second
we
say
that
if
blessedness
is
taken
not
only
intensively
but
also
extensively,
then
perpetuity
does
pertain
to
its
47
idea.
For,
according
to
this
understanding
of
it,
nothing
is
in
every
way
extensively
perfect
save
what
lasts
as
long
as
it
can
last;
but
blessedness
is
of
a
nature
to
abide
perpetually;
therefore
when
taken
for
supreme
perfection
intensively
and
extensively,
it
includes
perpetuity.
And
indeed
there
is
in
nature
not
only
a
desire
for
having
intense
perfection
but
also
for
thus
having
it
extensively,
just
as
desire
is
not
only
for
the
essential
good
but
also
for
its
always
existing,
to
the
extent
the
nature
is
capable
of
receiving
it;
and
many
seem
to
speak
of
blessedness
according
to
this
latter
acceptation
of
it;
although
as
thus
taken
it
is
not
something
one,
for
it
includes
both
intensive
blessedness
and
the
other
concomitants
that
have
regard
to
the
substance
of
blessedness.
Hereby
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.20]
there
is
a
response
to
the
first
point
[sc.
in
the
previous
paragraph],
that
intensive
blessedness
is
the
end
of
all
desires
as
far
as
this
holds
on
the
part
of
the
object
unitively
and
eminently
including
everything
rightly
desirable,
as
has
often
been
said
about
how
the
‘whatever
he
wants’
is
to
be
understood
in
Augustine’s
definition,
namely
that
he
possesses
everything
desirable
unitively
in
one
thing.
But
blessedness
in
the
second
way
is
not
only
the
end
of
desires
unitively,
but
also
extends
itself
to
perpetual
duration,
as
was
said.
Wherefore
the
argument
introduced,
if
we
admit
the
assumed
proposition,
is
erroneous
in
its
form;
because
the
fact
that
it
is
the
end
of
all
desires
does
not
entail
the
conclusion
that
it
includes
in
itself
everything
that
is
desired;
for
it
is
enough
that
it
either
include
or
suppose
or
even
accompany
whatever
is
necessarily
required
in
the
order
of
the
fulfilling
of
desires.
–
To
the
second
point
about
reward,
it
is
doubtful
whether
the
perpetuity
of
blessedness
falls
per
se
under
merit
or
is
only
something
annexed
to
what
does
fall
per
se
under
merit.
And
one
must
say
that
God
is
not
indebted
to
any
of
us
by
any
merits
whatever
for
rendering
us
a
perfection
so
excellent;
but
let
it
be
that
he
has
determined
of
his
own
liberality
to
confer
on
our
merits
an
act
as
perfect
as
the
reward;
however
this
is
recompense
by
supererogatory
justice,
of
the
sort
namely
that
befits
him;
but
from
this
it
does
not
follow
necessarily
that
from
such
justice
perpetual
glory
is
to
be
given
as
a
reward;
rather
the
recompense
would
be
abundant
if
the
conferred
blessedness
lasted
for
an
instant
(Oxon.
4
d.46
q.4
n.20].
If
then
perpetuity
pertains
to
reward
as
falling
under
merit,
the
correspondence
must
be
in
relation
to
justice
and
overflowing
liberality.
Nor
is
it
unacceptable
to
assert
that
God
from
supererogatory
justice
determines
to
give
a
reward,
even
as
something
perpetual,
in
return
for
merits.
–
Therefore
we
say
to
the
argument
that
the
equality
taken
from
the
punishment
of
the
damned
is
to
be
rejected,
because
although
it
becomes
divine
goodness
to
bestow
reward,
even
a
lasting
one,
in
return
for
merits
that
are
his
own
gifts,
yet
it
does
not
fit
with
his
justice
to
inflict,
from
the
law
of
revenging
demerits,
a
punishment
that
goes
beyond
the
measure
and
the
demerit
of
the
crimes.
As
to
what
concerns
the
security
of
the
blessed
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.33],
security
seems
opposed
to
fear.
But
fear
is
either
of
an
impending
evil
or
of
the
continuation
of
one
that
has
been
inflicted,
with
however
preceding
awareness
of
the
evil.
Further
this
security
is
in
the
will
as
something
opposed
to
fear,
and
it
is
preceded
by
certitude
in
the
intellect
about
a
good
being
conferred
or
about
the
duration
of
one
already
conferred.
Therefore
the
blessed
have
this
certitude,
not
because
they
see
blessedness
to
be
perpetual
in
its
idea,
as
was
said,
nor
even
because
they
draw
48
that
conclusion
through
natural
reasoning;
for
since
the
continuation
of
blessedness
depends
on
the
one
divine
will
contingently
continuing
the
blessedness,
it
cannot
be
inferred
by
natural
reason.
The
blessed
therefore
are
most
certain
about
the
eternal
duration
of
their
happiness
from
divine
revelation.
–
However
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.23]
this
security
is
not
of
the
essence
of
blessedness
as
this
is
taken
intensively;
for
security
presupposes
certitude
about
the
continuing
of
blessedness;
but
that
apprehension
follows,
in
the
order
of
nature,
the
whole
of
blessedness;
for
it
is
not
an
act
tending
to
the
beatific
object
but
is
a
reflection
on
the
act,
and
consequently
the
whole
of
blessedness
could
be
essentially
in
place
without
certitude;
therefore
also
much
more
so
without
security.
–
Next,
the
perpetuity,
about
which
the
certitude
is
and
on
which
security
follows,
is
not
of
the
essence
of
blessedness.
Yet
it
is
enclosed
within
the
idea
of
it
as
it
is
taken
intensively
and
extensively,
as
was
said
before;
and
so
the
security
expelling
all
fear
of
sometime
losing
the
happiness
they
are
possessed
of
also
equally
has
regard
to
blessedness.
And
just
as
fear
is
in
the
irascible
power,
so
also
is
the
security
opposed
to
it;
for
opposites
are
in
the
same
thing;
but
blessedness
intensively
is
in
the
concupiscible
power,
since
it
is
the
love
of
friendship.5
Article
Five:
Whether
Man
can
acquire
Blessedness
by
his
Natural
Powers
[Montefortino:
Since
this
question
was
disputed
of
in
Ia
q.12
a.4
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.11,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.10],
we
refer
the
reader
to
what
was
said
in
that
place.]
Article
Six:
Whether
Man
obtains
Blessedness
through
the
Action
of
some
Superior
Creature
Response:
[Quodlibet
q.14
n.10ff,
Oxon.
1
d.3
q.2
n.16]
one
must
say
that
through
the
action
of
no
creature,
of
whatsoever
excellence
it
be,
does
man
obtain
blessedness,
but
both
he
and
angels
receive
it
immediately
from
God
voluntarily
showing
himself
to
them
in
intuitive
knowledge,
and
equally
freely
causing
a
representation
of
himself
in
abstractive
knowledge.
Declaration:
[Oxon.
2
d.3
q.9,
cf.
Ia
q.12
a.4]
for
whether
we
speak
of
the
perfect
blessedness
that
consists
in
the
clear
vision
of
God
present
in
his
own
existence,
or
of
the
imperfect
blessedness
of
the
sort
we
think
the
angels
had
when
they
were
wayfarers
(for
on
them
was
conferred
a
representation
of
the
deity
as
it
is
such
an
essence),
both
knowledges
are
immediately
from
God;
therefore
by
the
action
of
no
creature
can
another
creature
be
made
blessed,
whether
in
the
first
way
or
in
the
second.
Proof
of
the
minor:
God
5
In
response
to
an
objection
from
Aristotle
on
happiness,
Montefortino
adds
the
following
from
Oxon.
ibid.
n.24:
“The
Philosopher
was
never
able,
by
virtue
of
the
natural
light
of
the
intellect,
to
reach
the
true
happiness
of
human
nature,
either
by
denying
it
or
affirming
it.
Not
by
denying
it
because
a
falsehood
cannot
be
demonstrated;
nor
by
affirming
it
because
sensible
things
do
not
sufficiently
lead
to
it;
hence,
being
as
it
were
in
doubt,
he
seemed
sometimes
to
think
that
a
happiness
to
which
misery
could
succeed
was
not
true
happiness,
and
sometimes
that
no
other
happiness
of
man
was
to
be
sought
for
than
that
which
was
a
matter
of
experience
(for
the
happiness
promised
to
us
was
altogether
hidden
to
him);
but
this
latter
is
not
perpetual
nor
incapable
of
being
lost;
so
one
should
not
accept
his
authority
on
this
matter,
since
it
is
clear
that
he
erred.”
49
under
the
proper
idea
of
divinity
is
not
present
to
any
created
intellect
unless
he
himself
has
wished
to
be
made
present,
as
Ambrose
writes
when
discussing
Luke,
“it
is
in
his
power
to
be
seen,
it
is
his
nature
not
to
be
seen;
if
he
wishes
he
is
seen,
if
he
does
not
wish
he
is
not
seen.”
Well
does
Ambrose
say
that
it
is
not
God’s
nature
to
be
seen,
namely
by
the
creature,
because
God’s
nature
is
not
naturally
the
active
cause
of
this
seeing.
And
neither
is
any
created
nature,
which
is
naturally
active
with
respect
to
the
created
intellect,
able
to
cause
this
intuitive
vision
of
God,
or
bring
it
about
that
such
object
be
perfectly
present
to
another;
for
a
creature
cannot
contain
that
essence
perfectly
in
itself
according
to
that
essence’s
own
being,
and
so
not
according
to
its
intelligibility
either.
–
[Quodlibet
q.14
n.24ff.]
And
the
same
reason
shows
that
nothing
created
can
be
the
cause
of
the
presence
of
the
object
in
the
intellect
even
abstractively.
For
it
cannot
cause
anything
that
would
be
a
proper
and
per
se
representation
of
divinity
under
divinity’s
own
proper
idea
of
knowability;
for
such
a
representation
cannot
be
caused
save
either
by
the
knowable
thing
itself
or
by
something
that
perfectly
contains
that
thing
under
its
idea
of
knowability.
So
although
God
can
be
distinctly
known
and
attained
by
abstractive
knowledge
through
some
representation
of
him,
yet
the
representation
cannot
be
caused
save
immediately
by
God
himself
voluntarily
causing
it.
–
And,
put
more
briefly,
this
argument
can
be
formalized
thus:
God,
as
this
essence
in
itself,
under
which
idea
he
is
the
beatific
object,
is
not
known
naturally
by
any
created
intellect,
because
as
so
knowable
he
is
a
voluntary
object
and
not,
save
only
in
respect
of
God’s
own
intellect,
a
natural
one;
nor
does
any
essence
that
is
naturally
knowable
by
us
sufficiently
reveal
this
essence
as
it
is
this;
nor
is
it
revealed
by
a
univocal
likeness,
which
univocity
is
only
according
to
general
ideas,
nor
by
an
imitative
likeness,
because
such
likeness
is
deficient
and
an
imperfect
likeness;
for
creatures
imitate
the
divine
essence
imperfectly.
Therefore
it
is
utterly
impossible
for
man
to
attain
his
blessedness,
or
a
clear
vision
of
God
intuitively
or
abstractively,
by
means
of
the
action
of
another
creature,
whatever
excellence
creatures
may
be
said
to
be
endowed
with.
Article
Seven:
Whether
any
Good
Works
are
required
for
Man
to
get
Blessedness
from
God
Response:
one
must
say
[Quodlibet
q.14
n.14]
that
good
works
are
required
for
man
to
be
made
by
God
a
sharer
in
blessedness.
Declaration:
the
beatific
object,
which
is
the
essence
of
God,
only
naturally
moves
the
divine
intellect,
and
that
object,
clearly
seen
and
thoroughly
understood,
is
necessarily
loved
by
the
will,
by
which
vision
and
love
God
is
most
fully
blessed.
God
then
possesses
blessedness
of
his
own
nature.
But
the
other
intellectual
natures
are
not
naturally
moved
by
that
object
but
only
if
it
is
freely
and
voluntarily
shown
to
them;
because,
however,
they
are
capable
of
blessedness,
as
bearing
the
image
of
him
who
is
naturally
blessed
and
so
thereby
endowed
with
liberty,
it
became
the
wisdom
and
goodness
and
justice
of
their
Creator
to
propose
blessedness
to
them
as
a
recompense
and
reward;
now
the
ordering
of
it
we
gather
from
the
Scriptures
and
the
sayings
of
the
Saints.
For
in
these
it
is
eloquently
maintained
[Oxon.
1
d.17
q.2]
that
sinners
are
unworthy
of
eternal
life,
but
the
just
worthy.
For
since
they
could
by
their
own
nature
turn
to
the
50
worse,
they
needed
to
be
ruled
by
command
and
frightened
by
destruction.
Whether
angels
or
men,
therefore
[Oxon.
2
d.9
q.2,
d.6
q.2],
precepts
were
to
be
given
to
them,
and,
if
they
obeyed,
a
reward
from
supererogatory
liberality
was
to
be
paid
them,
but
if
they
did
not,
irremediable
punishments
according
to
the
quality
of
their
crimes
were
to
await
them.
So
during
man’s
state
of
life
and
mortality
he
must
dispose
himself
through
obedience
to
the
commands
given
him
by
God,
so
that
he
may
obtain
a
reward
for
his
labors
and
a
prize
of
victory.
For
[Oxon.
4
d.2
q.1
n.3]
his
spiritual
life
is
a
sort
of
way
ordaining
that
by
living
well
in
it
he
may
pass
without
impediment
to
the
other
life,
for
which
he
is
being
prepared;
and
this
is
done
through
the
right
use
of
the
things
that
God
has
prepared
as
helps
for
men.6
Article
Eight:
Whether
every
Man
desires
Blessedness
[Montefortino:
The
matter
of
this
present
question
you
have
express
in
Ia
q.82
a.1,
so
it
should
be
brought
forward
from
there.
Cajetan
too
refers
himself
back
to
what
is
said
in
that
place.
Master
Hiquaeus
should
be
looked
at
in
his
commentary.
Scotus
is
followed
by
Valentia,
Ia
IIae
point
1
of
the
present
question,
and
by
others.]
QUESTION
SIX:
ABOUT
THE
VOLUNTARY
AND
INVOLUNTARY.
IN
EIGHT
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
the
Voluntary
is
found
in
Human
Acts
Response:
[Quodlibet
q.18,
Oxon.
2
d.32
q.4,
d.14
q.1]
one
must
say
that
the
voluntary
must
altogether
be
laid
down
in
human
acts.
And
in
fact
the
voluntary
can
be
understood
in
many
ways;
for
just
as
the
involuntary
is
that
against
which
the
will
simply
murmurs
back,
so
too
the
voluntary
is
that
against
which
it
does
not
murmur
back
but
undertakes
of
its
own
accord.
Therefore
[Oxon.
2
d.32
n.14,
Quodlibet
q.18
n.21]
the
voluntary
is
in
one
way
understood
as
that
which
is
subjectively
in
the
will.
But
because
there
can
be
found
in
the
will
something
that
is
not
accepted
by
it,
therefore
to
be
thus
in
the
will
does
not
completely
constitute
the
idea
of
the
voluntary.
Secondly,
the
voluntary
is
that
which
is
willed
by
the
will;
but
this
is
said
to
be
voluntary
by
participation,
insofar
as
the
acceptation
of
it
as
of
an
object
is
voluntary;
besides
it
should
rather
be
called
willed
than
voluntary.
So
properly
that
is
voluntary
which
is
contained
in
the
power
of
the
will
as
it
is
an
active
force.
Wherefore
not
only
an
act
immediately
elicited
by
the
will
is
first
and
per
se
voluntary,
but
also
an
exterior
act
commanded
by
it,
and
as
far
as
it
is
conjoined
with
it,
is
equally
voluntary
and
thereby
imputable
to
the
agent.
–
Again
[Oxon
1
d.1
q.5
n.4,
4
d.49
q.6,
d.43
q.4
n.2,
Quodlibet
q.16],
although
everything
free
is
voluntary,
yet
not
everything
voluntary
is
similarly
free.
For
the
blessed
6
In
a
response
to
an
objection
based
on
Romans
9,
about
what
is
of
grace
not
being
also
of
merit,
Montefortino
adds
the
following
from
Scotus
[Oxon.
4
d.2
q.1
n.11]:
“The
meaning
of
the
Apostle
is
that
grace
does
not
have
a
condign
cause
in
him
on
whom
grace
is
conferred;
it
can
however
have
a
congruous
cause
in
him
and
a
meritorious
condign
cause
that
is
extrinsic,
namely
the
merits
of
the
passion
of
Christ,
in
view
of
which
merits
God
confers
grace
on
those
who
dispose
themselves
congruously
for
it,
through
which
grace
they
thence
observe
the
divine
precepts
for
salvation.”
51
voluntarily
and
by
choice
enjoy
the
beatific
object,
but
not
freely
in
such
a
way
that
they
can
suspend
the
operation
of
inhering
in
the
supreme
good
for
its
own
sake
or
can
sin,
since
God
does
not
provide
concurring
assistance
for
every
act
that
a
created
will
of
itself
has
power
for.
Likewise
God
voluntarily
loves
his
own
goodness,
but
not
freely
to
the
extent
that
by
the
name
of
freedom
is
meant
a
power
for
acting
and
not
acting
and
insofar
as
this
power
is
accompanied
by
a
contingency
opposed
to
the
necessity
of
operating.
Therefore
God
freely
and
necessarily
loves
himself
and
produces
the
Holy
Spirit,
because
he
does
so,
not
by
way
of
nature,
but
by
a
way
proper
to
the
will.
Wherefore
the
term
‘natural’
is
not
only
opposed
to
supernatural
but
also
to
voluntary.
And
so
the
natural
is
as
it
were
what
is
of
itself
determined
to
acting,
as
a
heavy
object
to
a
place
downwards,
and
fire
to
burning;
but
the
voluntary
is
not
determined
to
act
by
something
else,
nay
it
has
a
principle
determinative
of
itself
for
acting,
however
necessarily
it
operates.
Nor
is
there
any
other
reason
for
this
than
that
it
is
the
will,
which
of
its
own
nature
determines
itself
to
operating.
Wherefore
[Oxon.
4
d.6
q.5
n.2],
since
a
human
act
is
one
that
is
by
intellect
and
will
caused
in
a
man
intending
the
end
of
the
act,
as
was
said
in
q.1
a.1,
so
by
this
necessity
is
the
voluntary
found
in
these
acts,
to
the
extent
the
will
does
flow
into
them;
but
the
will
concurs
in
such
a
way
that,
if
its
action
is
not
understood,
no
human
act
would
remain.7
Article
Two:
Whether
the
Voluntary
is
found
in
the
Brute
Animals
Response:
some
have
here
the
following
opinion:
the
voluntary
in
its
perfect
idea
belongs
only
to
the
rational
creature;
but
the
voluntary
in
imperfect
idea
can
also
be
found
in
brutes.
For
there
is
a
double
knowledge
of
the
end,
one
perfect
and
the
second
imperfect.
The
first
is
when
not
only
the
end
itself
is
known
but
the
idea
of
end
is
also
known,
together
with
its
proportion
to
what
is
ordered
to
the
end.
But
the
end
is
imperfectly
known
when
a
stand
is
made
in
the
end
itself,
and
the
idea
of
end
and
the
proportion
of
the
act
to
the
end
are
not
known.
Since
brutes
therefore
7
The
following
is
added
by
Montefortino
in
one
of
the
replies
to
objections
[from
Oxon.
2
d.25,
Quodlibet
q.16
nn.14-‐15]:
“An
external
desirable
object
concurs
with
volition
metaphorically;
hence
the
adequate
principle
of
volition
is
within
man,
which
principle,
because
it
determines
itself
to
acting,
does
therefore
freely,
spontaneously,
and
voluntarily
act.
Even
given
that
some
principle
could
concur
together
with
the
will
for
action,
as
the
object
according
to
some
or
the
intellect
according
to
others’
opinion,
and
given
that
this
co-‐cause
is
naturally
active,
yet
the
will
is
never
a
natural
active
principle;
for
to
act
naturally
and
to
act
freely
are
first
differences
of
active
principle.
So,
when
the
will
is
operating
freely
and
the
intellect
acting
naturally,
the
totality
is
said
to
be
produced
freely
and
on
purpose,
because
purpose
is
the
principal
and
immediate
principle
of
the
production.
Things
are
similar
in
the
case
of
acts
commanded
by
the
will.
For
although
the
inferior
powers
are
natural
causes
of
their
acts,
yet
because
the
whole
process
is
subject
to
the
will,
we
are
rightly
said
to
use
them
freely
and
to
act
freely
by
the
principal
agent.
–
In
confirmation
I
say
as
follows
[Oxon.
2
d.25
n.24]:
there
is
one
form
in
potency
for
contradictories
that
is
not
able
to
determine
itself
to
one
of
them,
because
it
is
diminished
and
imperfect,
as
science
is.
But
there
is
another
power
that
is
indeterminate
but
perfect,
possessing
virtue
for
determining
itself
to
the
object
presented
to
it,
and
of
this
sort
is
the
will,
which
is
able
to
determine
itself
and
the
other
powers
to
act,
once
one
of
the
previously
shown
objects
is
first
chosen
and
the
other
omitted.
This
matter
was
dealt
with
at
large
in
Ia
q.83
on
free
choice.”
52
apprehend
the
end
imperfectly,
while
the
rational
nature
does
so
perfectly,
therefore
only
in
human
acts
is
the
idea
of
the
voluntary
perfectly
found,
but
in
brutes
imperfectly.
We
say
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.5
n.2ff.]
that
the
idea
of
end
is
only
abusively
or
imperfectly
attributed
to
the
sensitive
appetite
of
brutes.
Because
unless
this
idea
is
perfect
in
its
order,
it
does
not
exist
in
any
place
where
an
intrinsic
principle
of
voluntary
acts
needs
to
be
found,
a
principle
which
is
not
determined
by
another
but
only
by
itself
(from
the
preceding
article).
This
idea
is
absent
from
the
whole
genus
of
brutes,
whose
sensitive
appetite
is
effectively
determined
by
the
external
desirable
thing
and
is
by
it
drawn
and
acted
on
in
its
acts,
such
that
it
does
not
dominate
its
acts;
on
the
contrary
[Oxon
2
d.25
n.21,
3
d.27
and
elsewhere],
if
there
is
a
sensible
object
that
is
agreeable
to
it,
at
once
the
sensitive
appetite
desires
it,
but
if
the
object
is
not
agreeable,
it
turns
from
it
and
flees
it,
as
Damascene
rightly
says,
On
the
Orthodox
Faith
2.23;
therefore
the
idea
of
the
voluntary
is
altogether
repugnant
to
sensitive
appetite
and
is
only
to
be
found
in
intellective
appetite,
which
is
not
led
but
leads
by
its
dominating
power
over
its
acts,
and
it
also
dominates
over
the
acts
of
the
inferior
powers.
–
But
the
reason
[Oxon.
4
d.43
q.2
n.12]
that
lordship
over
its
acts
is
intrinsically
repugnant
to
sensitive
appetite
is
because
any
organic
or
material
appetite
is
determined
to
a
certain
class
agreeable
to
it
of
desirable
things,
such
that
when
the
class
is
apprehended
it
cannot
not
be
agreeable,
nor
can
the
appetite
not
approve
it;
therefore
in
the
sensitive
appetite
the
indetermination
altogether
necessary
for
any
idea
of
the
voluntary
cannot
be
set
up;
rather,
there
is
as
much
repugnance
to
the
idea
of
the
voluntary,
whether
perfect
or
imperfect,
in
the
sensitive
appetite
as
there
is
of
necessity
in
that
appetite
for
its
total
determination
in
respect
of
desirable
things;
but
this
necessity
proceeds
from
the
condition
of
its
nature,
which
nature
is
organic
and
material,
as
the
soul
also
is
material
to
which
the
organic
powers
belong.
–
However
[Oxon.
2
d.42
q.4
n.19,
1
d.1
q.4
n.9]
the
sensitive
appetite
in
us,
in
respect
of
which
we
are
one
with
the
brutes,
is
free
and
rational
by
participation,
not
indeed
by
its
own
act,
but
by
the
act
of
another
power,
which
is
the
intellective
appetite
that
it
is
subject
to;
and
for
this
reason
it
can
be
turned
to
the
good
and
turned
from
the
good;
but
in
brutes
such
appetite
cannot
be
partaker
of
reason,
because
there
is
in
them
no
such
reason
as
there
is
in
us.
Article
Three:
Whether
the
Voluntary
can
exist
without
any
Act,
or
whether
there
can
be
a
Pure
Omission
Response:
one
must
say
first
[Oxon.
2
d.7
n.23,
1
d.1
q.4,
4
d.49
q.10
n.10,
Quodlibet
q.18
n.9]
that
there
is
no
repugnance,
physical
or
metaphysical,
in
something’s
being
voluntary
without
any
act
which
might
be
the
cause
of
the
free
omission
of
it,
or
the
occasion
for
it,
direct
or
indirect.
Proof:
according
to
Augustine,
Retractions
1.22,
“Nothing
is
so
in
the
power
of
the
will
as
the
will
itself,”
namely
as
to
operating,
for
its
being
does
not
fall
under
its
power;
but
the
will
is
able
to
suspend
the
inferior
powers
from
all
action;
therefore
much
more
can
it
suspend
itself
from
all
action.
And
such
suspension
or
omission
is
voluntary
for
it;
therefore
the
voluntary
is
possible
without
any
act.
Proof
of
the
assumption:
the
will
can
not
only
will
and
53
refuse
but
also
not
will
and
not
refuse;
therefore
in
the
way
it
conducts
itself
freely
when
it
exercises
acts,
so
does
it
when,
in
proportion
to
its
exercise
of
dominating
power,
it
omits
them.
–
Again,
this
dominating
power
of
the
will
has
regard
to
willing
and
refusing
such
that
it
does
not
first
require
other
acts
for
the
exercise
and
use
of
them,
otherwise,
if
it
has
regard
to
those
acts
through
the
mediation
of
others,
the
same
question
arises
about
those
mediating
acts,
and
so
on
ad
infinitum;
thus
it
has
immediate
regard
to
the
positive
extreme;
therefore
to
the
negative
extreme
as
well.
Just
as
then
for
its
willing
some
object
it
has
no
need
of
another
act,
so
also
for
its
omitting
the
same
or
another
object
it
does
not
require
any
act
that
might
be
the
cause
or
occasion
of
this
sort
of
free
omission;
and
in
this
the
free
dominion
of
the
will
over
its
acts
shines
out,
that
they
so
fall
under
its
whole
power
that
it
can
elicit
them
and
can
altogether
omit
them.
One
must
say
second
[Oxon.
2
d.25]
that
in
respect
of
the
good
as
it
is
opposed
to
virtue,
or
about
the
good
in
general,
a
pure
omission
is
scarcely
possible
in
fact.
Declaration:
for
although
it
is
a
natural
power
of
the
will,
that
about
any
object
whatever
it
can
exercise
its
dominion
of
willing
or
refusing,
or
can
suspend
itself
from
both
and
altogether
omit
those
acts,
nevertheless
in
fact,
as
conjoined
to
sensitive
appetite,
it
is
of
a
nature
to
delight
in
itself,
as
the
intellect
conjoined
to
the
senses
is
of
a
nature
to
understand
sensible
things;
therefore
in
wanting
to
withdraw
appetite
from
its
object
of
delight
by
which
it
is
drawn,
both
does
the
appetite
itself
suffer
difficulty
when
carried
off
against
natural
inclination
and
the
will
cannot
carry
this
out
without
an
effort.
But
the
will
does
not
strive
against
the
sensitive
part
erring,
or
trying
to
err,
from
what
is
right,
save
by
an
act
willing
what
is
right
and
refusing
that
after
which
the
sensitive
appetite
pants;
so,
in
this
present
state,
the
will
can
scarcely
exercise
a
pure
omission
whenever
a
good
opposed
to
virtue,
or
a
good
that
is
good
in
general,
is
presented
to
it.
Article
Four:
Whether
Violence
can
be
done
to
the
Will
Response:
one
must
say
[Oxon.
4
d.29
n.6]
that
there
is
altogether
a
contradiction
involved
in
the
will
being
compelled
to
elicit
its
acts.
Declaration:
according
to
Aristotle
Ethics
3.2,
“The
violent
is
that
whose
principle
is
external,
where
the
thing
undergoing
it
contributes
none
of
the
force,”
that
is,
contributes
none
of
the
violence
–
and
not
only
by
negation
but
also
by
contrariety,
by
its
being
against
the
inclination
of
the
passive
thing,
as
when
a
stone
is
thrown
upwards
and
other
things
of
the
sort.
And
for
this
reason
the
violent
is
wholly
from
an
extrinsic
principle,
because
the
passive
thing
is
not
inclined
to
the
form
which
is
induced
by
the
extrinsic
agent,
but
rather,
as
far
as
concerns
itself,
resists
it
because
of
a
natural
inclination
to
a
form
contrary
to
that
which
it
is
violently
receiving
from
the
agent.
But
acts
of
willing
and
refusing
cannot
thus
be
present
in
the
will,
because
then
the
will
would
be
either
willing
when
refusing
or
refusing
when
willing;
thus,
for
violence
to
be
inflicted
on
the
will
implies
a
contradiction,
because
then
it
would
act
in
a
way
opposite
to
its
own
nature,
which
is
to
act
freely.
–
And
from
this
it
is
plain
that
it
is
in
like
manner
impossible
for
the
will
to
be
compelled
with
respect
to
acts
commanded
by
itself
in
the
inferior
powers,
which
acts
are
human
acts;
because
it
would
then
in
the
same
way
be
refusing
when
willing
or
willing
when
refusing;
for
54
these
acts
are
human
to
the
extent
they
fall
under
the
command
of
the
will
intending
a
pre-‐known
end;
since
therefore
the
will
cannot
be
simply
compelled
to
elicit
its
own
acts,
although
it
could
be
annihilated,
so
equally
it
cannot
be
driven
by
violence
to
elicit
commanded
acts.
Therefore
it
is
precisely
impossible
in
fact
that,
when
anyone
has
will,
he
should
have
force
inflicted
on
him
in
respect
of
undergoing
a
passion,
as
when
one
is
unwillingly
detained
somewhere,
or
in
respect
of
order
to
some
instrumental
act,
which
however
will
not
be
his
act,
as
when
someone
strikes
a
blow
using
another’s
hand;
for
he
could
just
as
well
strike
the
blow
with
a
hand
made
of
bronze.
The
will
therefore
cannot
be
forced
into
an
action
or
operation,
which
would
be
a
truly
human
act,
elicited
or
commanded
by
itself,
save
in
a
certain
respect,
as
we
will
explain
in
a.6
below.
Article
Five:
Whether
Violence
is
cause
of
the
Involuntary
Response:
one
must
say
that
violence,
in
the
way
it
inflicts
violence
on
what
possesses
will,
causes
the
involuntary.
Wherefore
the
solution
is
plain
from
what
was
said
in
the
preceding
article.
For
although
a
contradiction
is
involved
in
the
will
suffering
violence
in
the
acts
that
are
with
deliberation
immediately
elicited
or
commanded
by
it,
yet
violence
can
be
inflicted
on
what
has
free
choice
so
that
it
is
compelled
to
suffer
many
things
unwillingly,
such
that
the
will
does
not
have
power
to
proceed
to
the
contrary
acts
that
are
of
a
nature
to
be
done
by
locomotive
power;
so
that
thing
is
involuntary
to
it
which
it
is
compelled
to
undergo
against
its
desire,
for
it
would
desire
to
use
its
locomotive
power
at
will,
and
yet
an
extrinsic
impediment
does
not
allow
it.
But
[Reportatio
4
d.43
q.4]
one
must
understand
that
the
term
natural
is
equivocal;
for
it
has
several
opposites,
which
is
a
rule
for
recognizing
what
is
multiple,
according
to
Aristotle’s
teaching
in
Topics
1.12.
So
the
natural
is
in
one
way
opposed
to
the
free,
and
these
terms
are
the
first
differences
of
active
principle,
from
Aristotle
Physics
2
text
49,
and
they
have
an
opposite
way
of
being
a
principle;
for
a
natural
active
principle
is
necessarily
determined
to
one
thing,
such
that
it
has
no
power
for
the
opposite;
but
a
free
active
principle,
even
then
when
it
is
acting,
has
power
for
the
opposite
of
what
it
is
doing.
Further,
passive
principle
does
not
fall
under
this
latter
division,
because
everything
passive,
as
such,
undergoes
naturally
and
not
freely,
and
therefore
natural
principle
embraces
also
passive
principle.
–
Next,
natural
is
opposed
to
violent,
and
active
principle
or
agent
is
not
embraced
by
this
acceptation;
for
no
agent
acts
under
violence,
since
anything
acts
according
to
its
natural
form
and
the
inclination
of
the
same
form.
But
the
violent,
as
to
what
it
is
in,
is
always
against
the
inclination
of
the
form
suffering
the
violence,
moving
it
or
impeding
it
or
even
preventing
its
natural
perfection.
So
if
violence
does
not
work
on
the
active
principle,
violence
remains
to
be
asserted
of
the
passive
principle
only.
And
the
passive
thing
is
understood
then
to
suffer
violence
when
it
is
naturally
inclined
to
the
opposite
of
what
it
is
affected
by,
just
as
it
is
naturally
suffering
through
the
opposite
when
it
is
not
naturally
thereto
inclined;
violence
then
is
not
a
condition
of
the
agent
but
of
the
passive
thing.
For
although
someone
might
seize
my
hand
and
strike
another
whom
I
do
not
want
to
hit,
yet
I
am
not
for
that
reason
said
to
be
acting
violently
but
rather
to
be
suffering
violence,
because,
55
with
respect
to
the
hitting,
I
am
no
more
acting
than
a
stone
is
[sc.
if
someone
is
hitting
another
with
a
stone].
For
the
principle
of
doing
any
action
is
intrinsic
to
the
agent,
but
in
this
case
the
principle
is
wholly
extrinsic.
Violence
therefore
is
a
condition
of
the
passive
thing,
or
of
the
passive
principle,
as
was
said.
Article
Six:
Whether
Fear
causes
the
Involuntary
simply
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.29,
Reportatio
ibid.]
some
have
the
following
opinion:
things
done
through
fear
are
mixed
of
the
voluntary
and
involuntary,
according
to
the
teaching
of
the
Philosopher
Ethics
3.1.
(Nevertheless,
when
one
considers
the
matter
rightly,
such
things
appear
rather
to
be
voluntary
than
involuntary;
for
they
are
voluntary
simply
and
involuntary
in
a
certain
respect.)8
For
each
thing
is
said
to
be
simply
to
the
extent
it
is
in
act;
but
to
the
extent
it
is
in
apprehension
only
it
is
not
simply
but
in
a
certain
respect.
An
example:
to
someone
in
peril
on
the
sea,
throwing
the
merchandise
overboard
is
simply
involuntary;
for,
as
far
he
is
concerned,
he
does
not
in
fact
want
to
throw
it
overboard;
but
throwing
it
overboard
is
voluntary
in
a
certain
respect,
because
of
the
danger
which
is
apprehended
as
imminent.
–
On
the
contrary
[Oxon.
3
d.15
n.29],
the
will
does
not
seem
to
will
in
a
certain
respect
anything
that
it
wants
because
of
a
present
necessity,
but
rather,
if
it
wants
because
of
such
necessity,
it
wants
simply
and
absolutely,
as
the
adduced
example
shows;
for
since
he
who
is
in
danger
is
lord
of
his
acts,
as
being
one
who
has
power
to
use
his
force
for
throwing
the
merchandise
overboard,
so
he
also
has
power
not
to
use
it,
and
that
both
when
in
danger
and
when
beyond
any
danger;
therefore
he
is
willing
simply
when
he
throws
the
merchandise
away,
because
he
uses
his
motive
power
without
being
compelled
by
anyone.
For
it
is
evident
that
his
will
can
so
inordinately
love
the
merchandise
that
he
refuses
to
throw
it
overboard
even
to
avoid
the
impending
peril
of
death.
Wherefore
[ibid.
n.17,
d.26
n.20]
a
merchant
in
peril
on
the
sea
would
refuse
to
throw
the
merchandise
overboard
if
he
could
in
any
way
overcome
the
danger
of
death.
Such
refusing
then
is
conditioned,
because
as
far
as
he
is
concerned
he
would
refuse
simply;
yet
he
wants
to
lighten
the
ship
of
the
merchandise,
for
he
does
not
throw
it
overboard
by
coercion.
For
although
he
throws
it
overboard
because
of
something
he
does
not
want,
namely
the
danger
of
death,
yet
he
is
not
compelled
unwillingly
to
cast
it
away.
This
volition
would
be
stated
by
the
term
‘I
will’,
but
the
conditioned
refusal
by
the
term
‘I
would
refuse
if
I
could
do
otherwise’;
and
so
it
is
the
condition,
because
of
which
he
wills
to
throw
the
merchandise
overboard,
that
is
not
willed
simply.
One
should
not
therefore
approve
what
the
aforesaid
opinion
asserts,
namely
that
throwing
the
merchandise
overboard
is
voluntary
in
a
certain
respect
and
involuntary
simply,
but
rather
the
opposite
is
true.
Nevertheless,
replying
to
the
question
asked,
we
say
that
fear
of
an
imminent
evil
causes
the
involuntary
in
a
certain
respect,
provided
the
impending
evil
is
greater
than
the
act
which
the
coerced
will
performs.
For
although
the
will
cannot
be
compelled
to
any
elicited
or
commanded
act,
which
are
properly
human
acts,
yet
8
[Translator’s
note:
these
remarks
are
put
in
parentheses
because
they
seem
to
represent
Scotus’
opinion,
as
at
the
end
of
the
paragraph,
rather
than
the
opinion
he
wants
to
criticize.]
56
a
man
endowed
with
virtue
could
have
some
evil
put
before
his
eyes
which
he
must
certainly
undergo
unless
he
does
this
or
that
thing,
unless
he
gives
assent
or
dissent
to
the
thing
he
is
being
compelled
to
give
assent
or
dissent
to.
For
in
such
a
case,
a
prudent
man,
when
considering
that
the
evil
certainly
to
be
inflicted
on
him,
given
sufficient
certitude
in
human
acts,
is
more
disagreeable
to
him
than
to
elicit
the
displeasing
act,
performs
the
act
under
coercion
and
involuntarily;
the
act
therefore
is
involuntary
for
him,
not
simply,
but
in
a
certain
respect.
An
example:
if
death
is
presented
to
someone
unless
he
sells
a
farm,
or
if
prison
is,
or
captivity,
severe
mutilation
of
his
bodily
members,
rape,
and
such
like
evils,
he
judges
by
right
reason
rather
to
let
the
farm
go
than
to
fall
into
the
evils
certainly
threatening
him;
this
fear
therefore
is
cause
of
the
involuntary
in
a
certain
respect.
For
since
he
is
lord
of
his
will,
he
is
not
compelled
simply;
yet
he
can
will
something
which
otherwise
he
would
refuse,
and
he
can
command
an
act
which
simply
he
would
refuse,
rather
than
fall
into
imminent
evils,
and
do
so
indeed
by
right
reason.
Hence
this
fear
is
said
to
be
able
to
befall
a
man
of
constant
virtue.
However,
no
fear
can
induce
anyone
into
mortal
sin
according
to
the
judgment
of
right
reason;
for
no
greater
evil
than
mortal
sin
can
be
proposed,
because
no
punishment
is
worse
than
the
guilt
of
mortal
sin.
Article
Seven:
Whether
Concupiscence
causes
the
Involuntary
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.14
q.1
n.11]
one
must
say
that
concupiscence
does
not
cause
the
involuntary.
Declaration:
the
involuntary
simply
is
that
against
which
the
will
simply
protests;
and
so,
for
contrary
reason,
the
voluntary
can
be
understood
in
a
threefold
way:
first,
that
against
which
the
will
does
not
altogether
protest
but
patiently
endures;
and
in
this
way
the
torments
they
patiently
endured
were
voluntary
for
the
holy
martyrs.
Next
[Oxon.
2
d.37
n.7]
that
too
is
voluntary
for
the
will
which
it
accepts
of
its
own
accord
and
gladly.
Lastly,
that
is
equally
voluntary
for
it
which
it
voluntarily
causes.
But
concupiscence
is
a
certain
proneness
in
the
rational
appetite
for
desiring
pleasant
things
immoderately;
for
this
appetite
is
of
a
nature
to
delight
together
with
the
sensitive
appetite
with
which
it
is
conjoined;
concupiscence
therefore
does
not
effect
the
involuntary
but
rather
causes
the
voluntary,
as
often
as
the
will,
according
to
its
innate
proneness,
delights
together
with
the
sensitive
appetite
in
immoderate
pursuit
of
pleasant
things.
Article
Eight:
Whether
Ignorance
causes
the
Involuntary
Response:
one
must
say
that
ignorance
does
cause
the
involuntary.
But
[Oxon.
4
d.15
q.1
n.8,
d.30
q.1
n.2,
d.22
n.2]
one
needs
to
understand
that
ignorance
is
related
in
a
threefold
way
to
a
human
act;
for
either
ignorance
is
cause
of
the
act
such
that,
if
the
ignorant
person
knew,
either
he
would
not
do
the
act
or
at
least
he
would
do
the
contrary
act;
or
it
is
concomitant
to
a
human
act,
and
thus
is
someone
said
to
be
ignorant
while
sinning;
or
finally
ignorance
follows
on
sin,
as
the
punishment
for
it.
Again
ignorance
can
be
of
the
fact
itself
in
itself,
or
as
to
some
circumstances
of
it,
or
as
to
something
consequent
to
it.
57
Ignorance,
therefore,
and
especially
ignorance
of
the
condition
that
is
required
for
an
act
of
will,
does
cause
the
involuntary,
according
to
the
Philosopher,
Ethics
3.3,
and
Augustine
On
the
Trinity
8.4,
“Nothing
is
loved
or
willed
unless
it
is
known
first.”
–
However,
when
ignorance
is
voluntary
and
imputable
to
guilt,
as
when
someone
is
under
obligation
to
know
and
yet
despises
to
understand,
it
never
causes
the
involuntary,
because
the
person
is
ignorant
willingly;
nor
does
it
do
so
when
it
follows
a
wrong
act
as
the
punishment
of
it;
nor
even
when
it
is
concomitant
does
it
cause
the
involuntary,
because
concomitant
ignorance
does
not
impede
the
act
to
which
it
is
connected;
for
even
if
he
knew
what
for
the
moment
he
does
not,
the
ignorant
person
would
still
elicit
the
act.
So
ignorance
is
only
a
cause
then
of
the
involuntary
when
a
person
does
something
from
an
ignorance,
which
is
not
voluntary
to
him,
of
the
fact,
or
of
its
circumstances,
or
of
the
condition
that
is
required
for
an
act
of
will,
and
he
would
not
do
what
he
does
if
he
had
clear
knowledge
of
the
fact
in
itself
or
of
its
circumstances.
An
example:
[Oxon.
4
d.15
ibid.]
if
someone
who
has
an
abundance
of
the
goods
of
fortune
feigns
himself
a
pauper
so
as
to
get
alms
from
dispensers
of
funds,
the
other
who
bestows
alms
on
him
does
so
involuntarily,
thinking
he
is
coming
to
the
aid
of
the
needy.
Or
if
he
were
to
give
to
someone
as
being
near
in
relation
to
him
who
however
is
not
near
to
him,
he
would
give
involuntarily,
because
he
is
deceived
about
the
circumstance
on
the
basis
of
which
he
gives;
and
so
with
the
other
conditions,
as
was
said
in
the
matter
of
the
matrimonial
contract
in
the
additions
to
IIIa
q.51
a.1.
QUESTION
SEVEN:
ABOUT
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES
OF
HUMAN
ACTS.
IN
FOUR
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Circumstance
is
Accident
of
a
Human
Act
Response:
one
must
say
that
circumstance
is
an
accident
of
a
human
act.
To
see
this
one
needs
to
know
[Oxon.
2
d.7
n.11,
Quaest.
Miscell.
q.5,
Quodlibet
q.18]
that,
over
and
above
volition’s
natural
goodness,
which
belongs
to
it
insofar
as
it
is
a
positive
thing,
volition
can
have
a
triple
moral
goodness
inhering
in
it
in
a
certain
order.
The
first
is
called
goodness
in
genus.
The
second
is
virtuous
goodness,
or
goodness
from
circumstance.
Finally
the
third
is
gratuitous
goodness,
or
goodness
from
divine
acceptation.
The
first
belongs
to
volition
insofar
as
it
concerns
an
object
fitting
such
an
act
according
to
the
dictate
of
right
reason,
and
not
merely
because
it
is
naturally
agreeable
to
the
act,
as
the
sun
is
to
sight.
And
this
is
the
first
moral
goodness,
which
is
for
this
reason
called
goodness
in
genus
because
it
is
as
it
were
material
with
respect
to
ensuing
goodnesses
[sc.
as
a
genus
is
material
for
ensuing
differences].
The
second
goodness
belongs
to
volition
from
the
fact
the
volition
is
elicited
by
the
will
along
with
all
the
circumstances
dictated
by
right
reason.
The
third
goodness,
finally,
belongs
to
an
act
from
the
fact
that,
on
the
supposition
of
the
twin
goodness
just
stated,
the
volition
is
elicited
in
conformity
with
the
principle
of
merit,
which
is
grace
or
charity.
Since
therefore
the
same
act
as
substrate
to
these
goodnesses
can
have
those
degrees
of
goodness
or
can
lack
them,
as
when
it
is
elicited
against
the
58
dictate
of
right
reason,
then
circumstances
are
evidently
accidents
of
human
acts,
because
acts
can
be
elicited
according
to
them
or
contrary
to
them.
Article
Two:
Whether
Theologians
should
pay
Attention
to
the
Circumstances
of
Human
Acts
Response:
one
must
say
that
it
does
belong
to
the
theologian
to
consider
the
circumstances
of
human
acts.
For
[Oxon.
and
Quodlibet
in
previous
article]
it
belongs
to
a
theologian
to
consider
human
acts
as
they
are
imputable
to
the
will
for
praise
and
reward
or
for
blame
and
punishment;
but
acts
borrow
these
from
the
circumstances
such
that,
if
the
circumstances
are
present,
the
act
will
be
completely
morally
good
and
imputable
to
the
will
for
praise
and
reward,
and
conversely
imputable
for
punishment
if
the
circumstances
are
not
present,
or
if
the
act
is
deprived
of
agreement
to
the
rule
according
to
which
it
should
be
elicited.
The
theologian
needs
therefore
to
inquire
into
and
scrutinize
the
circumstances
by
which
acts
are
good
or
bad
and
worthy
of
reward
or
punishment,
especially
since
ignorance
of
the
circumstances
may
introduce
involuntariness,
as
we
said
above
in
q.6
a.8.
For
in
that
case
the
act
is
not
imputed
for
punishment,
provided
the
ignorance
is
not
willed.
–
Again,
human
acts
can
be
elicited
according
to
the
inclination
of
the
habit
of
charity
and
thus
be
accepted
by
God
as
worthy
of
eternal
life;
but
it
concerns
the
theologian
to
deal
with
things
that,
by
divine
law,
are
ordained
to
the
attainment
of
eternal
salvation;
the
circumstances
of
human
acts
are
therefore
to
be
considered
by
the
theologian.
Article
Three:
Whether
the
Circumstances
are
suitably
Enumerated
in
Ethics
3
Response:
the
circumstances
about
which
the
question
is
being
asked
are:
who,
by
what
means,
what,
where,
why,
how,
when.
So
[Oxon.
2
d.40
n.3ff.,
Quodlibet
q.18
n.4ff.]
one
must
say
that
when,
these
circumstances
are
present,
a
human
act
is
completely
morally
good,
and
that
therefore
the
circumstances
by
which
an
act
is
made
morally
good
are
sufficiently
enumerated.
For
the
goodness
of
a
moral
act
comes
from
the
aggregation
of
all
the
things
that
belong
to
the
act,
not
absolutely
from
the
nature
of
the
act,
but
belonging
to
it
according
to
right
reason;
so
because
right
reason
dictates
for
an
act
a
fitting
object
and
a
determinate
mode
and
other
circumstances,
one
can
immediately
conclude
which
object
is
fitting
to
such
an
act.
An
example:
right
reason
dictates
that
an
act
of
eating
should
be
exercised
on
food
restorative
of
what
has
been
lost
and
not
be
focused
on
what
is
not
of
a
nature
to
be
nourishment.
This
determination
of
the
object
is
the
first
determination
that
has
regard
to
the
genus
of
morals,
not
as
a
difference
determining
it
to
something
in
that
genus
but
as
a
potential
capable
of
being
further
morally
specified;
for
when
an
act
has
an
object
agreeing
to
the
agent
and
the
action,
it
is
then
capable
of
being
further
determined
by
ordered
circumstances;
and
hence
it
is
that
an
act
is
said
to
have
goodness
in
genus
from
its
object,
because
as
a
genus
is
potential
with
respect
to
differences,
thus
the
goodness
from
the
object
is
the
first
in
the
genus
of
morals,
presupposing
only
the
goodness
of
nature
and
being
capable
of
all
specific
goodness
in
the
genus
of
morals.
59
Further,
in
the
specific
goodness
that
is
goodness
from
circumstances,
there
is
the
following
sort
of
procession:
the
first
such
goodness
seems
to
be
the
circumstance
of
the
end;
for
from
the
nature
of
the
agent
and
action
and
object
the
conclusion
is
immediately
drawn
that
such
and
such
act
should
not
belong
to
such
and
such
agent
save
in
order
to
such
and
such
end,
and
should
be
chosen
and
desired
for
the
sake
of
such
and
such
end.
But
this
circumstance
does
not
belong
to
the
act
itself
as
it
is
precisely
done
or
not
done
in
fact,
but
rather
to
the
act
as
willed
and
related
by
the
will
to
such
and
such
end;
indeed,
a
choice
that
is
done
for
the
due
end
is
no
less
good
if
the
end
of
the
choice
is
not
attained
by
the
externally
elicited
act
than
if
it
is
attained.
–
After
the
circumstance
of
the
end
there
seems
to
follow
the
circumstance
of
the
mode
of
acting
or
of
the
form;
for
certainly
the
act
should
be
done
in
a
due
way,
as
is
proved
by
all
that
has
been
said
or
by
some
of
it.
–
Next
can
be
shown
the
circumstance
of
time,
because
such
and
such
an
act
for
such
and
such
an
end,
even
one
having
such
and
such
a
mode,
does
not
have
to
agree
with
such
and
such
an
agent
at
any
time
but
only
at
the
time
at
which
the
act
can
be
ordered
to
the
intended
end,
or
at
which
it
can
attain
the
end.
–
The
last
circumstance
of
all
seems
to
be
the
circumstance
of
place;
but
there
are
many
acts
whose
moral
goodness,
even
complete
moral
goodness,
does
not
determine
a
place.
Article
Four:
Whether
the
Principal
Circumstances
are
the
End
for
the
sake
of
which
and
those
in
which
there
is
Operation
Response:
it
was
explained
in
the
preceding
article
that
the
first
and
chief
of
all
the
circumstances
is
the
end;
next
the
one
that
provides
the
form;
and
the
rest
are
posterior
to
these.
QUESTION
EIGHT:
ABOUT
THE
THINGS
THE
WILL
IS
OF
AS
WILLED.
IN
THREE
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
the
Will
is
of
the
Good
only
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.10
n.8ff.]
one
must
say
that
for
the
will
to
desire
the
bad
as
such
involves
a
contradiction.
Declaration:
it
is
impossible
for
any
power
to
elicit
an
act
about
any
object
which
cannot
be
an
object
of
that
act.
For
the
power
of
vision
cannot
elicit
an
act
about
sound,
for
it
is
altogether
repugnant
for
sound
to
the
terminative
object
of
such
act.
For
sight
is
the
sort
of
entity
that
is
of
a
nature
to
terminate
only
at
color.
Now
evil
cannot
be
the
determinative
object
of
an
act
of
willing;
therefore
evil
cannot
be
desired
by
the
will.
Proof
of
the
minor:
the
object
of
volition
is
good
alone,
whether
real
or
apparent;
for
hereby
it
is
that
the
will
is
drawn
or
enticed
to
pursuit
of
an
object,
by
loving
it
with
the
love
either
of
friendship
or
of
concupiscence;
so
when
the
idea
of
goodness
is
taken
from
the
object
and
in
its
place
wickedness
is
substituted,
the
will
cannot
be
borne
along
to
it
by
love
but
rather
by
hatred
and
aversion.
For
[Oxon.
3
d.17]
will
is
essentially
free
appetite
along
with
reason.
Appetite
is
not
borne
along
by
desiring
and
willing
save
to
its
perfection,
or
to
the
object
from
which
it
expects
its
perfection;
no
goodness
60
can
redound
to
the
will
from
evil
insofar
as
it
is
evil;
therefore
the
intellective
will
does
not
have
regard
to
evil
save
insofar
as
it
detests,
abhors,
repels
it,
and
save
insofar
as
some
idea
of
good
is
apprehended
in
it.
Hence
the
Philosopher
writes
Ethics
1.1,
“Well
have
they
said
that
the
good
is
what
all
things
desire.”
Intervening
Article:
Whether
every
Act
of
Will
is
of
the
End
or
of
what
is
for
the
End
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.3]
one
must
admit
that
there
is
an
act
in
intellective
appetite
which
is
not
of
the
end
nor
of
what
is
for
the
end.
Declaration:
although
from
the
nature
of
the
thing
there
is
no
being
that
is
not
an
end
or
ordered
to
an
end,
nevertheless
there
can
be
shown
to
the
will
a
good
object
apprehended
absolutely
under
the
idea
neither
of
what
is
good
for
its
own
sake
nor
of
what
is
for
the
sake
of
some
other
good.
Now
about
such
a
good
thus
shown
the
will
can
have
an
act
of
willing
it
absolutely,
abstracting
from
relation
to
another
and
from
the
idea
of
what
is
good
for
itself;
but
this
act
is
neither
of
an
end,
which
is
something
to
be
loved
for
its
own
sake,
nor
of
means
to
an
end,
which
the
will
desires
for
the
sake
of
the
end;
the
act
is
therefore
neither.
For
it
lies
in
the
capability
of
a
free
power
to
act
in
this
way
and
in
that
way,
relating
it
or
not
relating
it,
and
therefore
the
will
can
tend
toward
any
willable
good
either
according
to
the
former
act
or
according
to
the
latter.
Article
Two:
Whether
the
Will
is
of
the
End
only
or
also
of
what
is
for
the
End
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.3,
Quodlibet
q.16
n.6]
one
must
say
that
it
is
the
same
power
of
willing
that
intends
the
end
and
wills
what
is
for
the
end.
Declaration:
means
or
useful
goods
are
endowed
with
their
own
and
intrinsic
goodness
in
the
genus
of
being,
independently
of
the
end
to
which
they
are
by
nature
ordered;
when
therefore
they
are
in
fact
ordered
to
the
end
and
are
desired
for
the
sake
of
it,
then
there
is
an
order
there
in
goodness
or
desirability
between
the
end
and
what
is
for
the
end,
insofar
as
what
is
for
the
end
has
a
participated
goodness
with
respect
to
the
end;
however
the
participated
goodness
is
not
a
pure,
extrinsic
denomination
received
from
the
end
and
derived
to
the
means,
but
is
a
goodness
proper
and
intrinsic
to
the
means,
and
for
the
sake
of
this
goodness
they
can
be
ordered
to
the
pursuit
of
the
end;
it
is
like
the
way
there
is
a
per
se
order
of
truth
between
principle
and
conclusions;
for
the
principle
is
true
of
itself,
namely
from
the
connection
of
the
terms
that
make
it
up;
but
the
conclusion
borrows
truth
from
the
principle;
however
it
receives
this
truth
in
such
a
way
that
the
truth
is
proper
and
intrinsic
to
it,
and
is
not
merely
an
extrinsic
denomination;
the
result
is
that
for
an
intellect
apprehending
its
terms
the
truth
is
plain
in
its
own
degree
of
evidence,
even
independently
of
the
principle,
although
when
taken
along
with
the
principle
on
which
it
depends
it
is
far
more
evident.
Likewise
means
and
useful
goods
possess,
independently
of
the
end,
their
own
proper
goodness,
by
which
they
can
be
desired
in
order
to
the
end;
but
when
they
are
thus
loved,
then
the
utility
of
them
is
clear.
Since
therefore
included
in
them
is
the
formal
idea
of
the
object
of
the
will,
it
is
evident
that
the
will
is
not
only
of
the
end
but
also
of
what
is
ordered
to
the
end.
61
Article
Three:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
to
the
End
and
to
what
is
for
the
End
by
the
same
Act
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.41,
3
d.7
q.3,
3
d.34]
an
act
of
the
will
can
be
considered
as
dealing
immediately
with
the
means
and
terminating
at
the
end,
or,
contrariwise,
as
being
elicited
for
the
sake
of
the
end
and
terminating
at
the
means.
Again
too,
the
act
can
either
be
effective
or
be
ineffective
or
conditioned.
One
should
then
say
that,
whenever
the
will
pursues
the
means
for
the
sake
of
attaining
the
end,
it
must
necessarily
be
moved
to
both
extremes
by
one
and
the
same
act.
For
the
means
are
certain
goods
useful
for
pursuing
the
end;
unless
therefore
the
act
terminates
at
the
intended
end,
the
means
to
the
end
are
not
then
being
desired,
but
are
either
not
being
desired
or
the
will
is
at
least
not
willing
and
desiring
them
as
they
are
means
but
rather
as
they
have
got
hold
of
some
other
goodness
in
the
genus
of
being.
For
by
the
very
fact
that
a
sick
man
wishes
to
make
use
of
a
medicine
suitable
for
expelling
a
disease,
thereby
is
he
willing
the
intended
state
of
health.
–
But
when
the
will
terminates
at
the
end,
it
first
wills
the
end
and
then
the
means
to
the
end,
and
not
only
first
in
nature
but
even
possibly
first
in
time.
Hence
an
invalid
who
wants
to
be
restored
to
health,
which
is
the
end,
consults
about
means
at
a
later
point
of
time
and
applies
the
means
that
are
more
suitable
for
attaining
the
loved
end.
But
this
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.10
n.2,
2
d.6
q.1]
must
be
understood
of
efficacious
volition.
For
if
the
will
wills
the
end
inefficaciously
and
conditionally,
recognizing
the
impossibility
of
it,
it
does
not
busy
itself
about
the
pursuit
of
it;
for
where
no
hope
appears
of
attaining
some
end,
either
the
end
is
not
in
any
way
desired,
or
is
so
very
slightly;
hence
Aristotle
rightly
says
that
choice
is
not
about
impossibilities;
and
it
is
in
this
way
that
the
damned
desire
blessedness
as
a
good
advantageous
for
them;
but
as
they
see
that
they
are
striving
for
what
is
impossible
they
do
not
consult
about
means
for
getting
it.
QUESTION
NINE:
ABOUT
WHAT
MOVES
THE
WILL.
IN
SIX
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
by
the
Intellect
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.25,
Reportatio
ibid.]
it
is
said
here
in
the
opinion
that,
since
the
will
is
in
potency
to
several
options,
it
needs
to
be
reduced
to
act
by
something
that
is
in
act,
and
this
is
to
move
it.
The
will
then
needs
a
mover
in
two
respects,
namely
as
to
the
exercise
or
use
of
its
act
and
as
to
the
determination
of
its
act.
The
first
indeed
is
on
the
part
of
the
subject,
sometimes
acting
and
sometimes
not
acting;
but
the
other
is
on
the
part
of
the
object,
in
accord
with
which
the
act
is
specified;
the
will
then
is
moved
by
the
intellect
proposing
an
object
for
the
specification
of
the
act;
but,
on
the
other
hand,
the
will
moves
the
intellect
and
the
rest
of
the
inferior
powers
to
the
exercise
of
their
acts.
–
In
response
to
the
question
we
say
first
that
it
cannot
be
that
volition
comes
from
the
known
object
in
the
way
that
sensation
comes
from
the
sensible
object.
Proof:
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.6]
a
natural
agent
cannot
be
a
per
se
cause
of
contraries
about
the
same
thing;
but
in
the
power
of
our
will
lies
the
having
of
an
act
of
refusal
and
of
an
act
of
willing,
which
are
contraries
about
the
62
same
object;
therefore
these
acts
cannot
proceed
from
the
object,
since
the
object
is
a
natural
agent.
Even
if,
then,
the
object
may
be
called
a
cause
of
volition,
some
other
principle
must
be
laid
down
for
refusal.
But
that
principle
other
than
the
will
can
only
be
a
bad
object;
but
the
bad,
since
it
is
something
privative,
cannot
be
the
cause
of
a
positive
act
of
the
sort
that
refusal
is;
so
refusal
must
be
effectively
from
the
will
and
not
from
the
known
object.
–
Next,
passion
is
not
in
the
power
of
the
one
undergoing
it,
especially
when
it
is
from
a
natural
agent;
but
if
volition
were
from
the
known
object
and
from
the
will,
it
would
proceed
from
a
naturally
acting
cause;
the
volition
itself,
therefore,
will
not
be
in
the
power
of
the
will,
nor
further
will
any
act
commanded
by
the
will
be
in
its
power,
and
so
it
will
neither
merit
nor
demerit
through
its
volition,
which
no
one
would
say.
–
Lastly
[ibid.
nn.7,
22]
there
are
in
reality
contingent
events,
and
I
call
a
contingent
event
an
event
that
happens
avoidably;
otherwise
if
everything
happened
with
unavoidable
necessity
there
would
be
no
need
to
deliberate
or
be
busy
about
things,
as
Aristotle
concludes
De
Interpretatione
1
final
chapter.
I
ask
therefore
whence
or
by
what
cause
that
which
contingently
happens
does
happen.
Not
from
a
determined
cause
because
at
the
moment
at
which
it
is
thus
determined
the
effect
cannot
happen
contingently;
therefore
from
a
cause
indeterminate
to
each
of
the
opposites.
Either
then
the
cause
can
determine
itself
contingently
to
one
of
them,
since
it
cannot
do
both
at
once,
as
Aristotle
says
Metaphysics
9
text
10
about
rational
power;
or
it
cannot
determine
itself
but
needs
something
else
to
determine
it
to
one
of
the
opposites.
If
it
can
determine
itself
to
one
of
them
contingently,
or
non-‐inevitably,
then
the
proposed
conclusion
is
gained.
If
it
is
determined
by
something
else
to
one
of
the
opposites,
then
either
necessarily
or
contingently.
If
necessarily
then
the
effect
happens
unavoidably.
If
the
determining
cause
determines
avoidably
to
one
result,
such
that
it
could
also
determine
to
the
other,
the
cause
effecting
this
determination
cannot
be
anything
other
than
the
will.
For
any
other
natural
active
cause
is
determined
altogether
to
one
effect,
or
at
any
rate,
if
a
natural
cause
is
said
to
be
indeterminate,
it
cannot
determine
either
itself
or
anything
else.
We
say
second
that
the
will
moves
the
intellect
to
the
exercise
of
its
acts.
Declaration:
for,
when
the
intellect
has
one
perfect
understanding,
there
can
be
in
it
in
addition
several
other
confused
and
imperfect
understandings
(unless
perhaps
the
understanding
were
to
be
so
perfect
and
actual
that
it
excluded
all
others),
in
the
way
that
the
seeing
power,
when
it
is
on
a
pyramid
and
focuses
below
the
base
on
one
point
in
the
cone
distinctly,
sees
at
the
same
time
many
points
imperfectly
and
indistinctly;
therefore
when
these
imperfect
and
confused
understandings
exist
in
the
intellect,
the
will
can,
by
its
innate
liberty,
be
pleased
with
any
one
of
them,
even
if
that
understanding
were
not
known
actually
as
the
object.
Now
when
the
will
approves
and
is
pleased
with
some
understanding,
that
understanding
itself
is
confirmed
and
intensified;
but
when,
on
the
contrary,
the
will
disapproves
or
refuses,
the
understanding
in
question
is
weakened
and
lessened;
for
if
an
agent
that
has
diverse
operations
and
actions
is
active
about
one
and
the
same
thing,
it
acts
more
strongly
and
perfectly
than
it
would
if
it
were
active
about
diverse
things
according
to
diverse
powers.
The
understanding,
therefore,
which
was
weak
and
imperfect,
becomes,
through
the
influx
of
the
will
willing
it
eagerly,
perfect
and
intense;
so
in
this
way
we
very
well
understand
that
the
will
can
command
a
63
thought
and
turn
the
intellect
toward
it.
But
when
the
will
refuses
another
understanding,
or
is
pleased
with
a
first,
this
other
is
weakened
and
ceases
to
be;
and
thus
we
perceive
the
will
turning
the
intellect
away
from
the
understanding
of
some
object.
Article
Two:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
by
the
Sensitive
Appetite
Response:
one
must
say
that
the
will
is
in
fact
moved
by
the
sensitive
appetite.
In
order
to
see
this
[Oxon.
2
d.32
n.7]
one
needs
to
know
how,
by
the
disobedience
of
the
first
man,
we
lost
original
justice.
The
intellective
appetite,
like
a
ship
with
its
rudder
lost
by
force
of
a
storm,
and
like
a
horse
with
its
reins
broken
(to
use
Anselm’s
example,
On
the
Conception
of
the
Virgin
5)
left
unbridled
to
itself,
is
by
its
very
nature
prone
to
delight
in
the
sensitive
appetite
to
which
it
is
joined,
and
all
its
effort
tends
to
what
is
agreeable
to
itself;
for
that
by
which
it
was
being
restrained,
so
as
not
to
delight
immoderately
in
the
things
that
the
sensitive
appetite
is
drawn
to,
is
no
longer
ready
to
help
it;
so
thereby
it
comes
about
that
it
is
said
to
be
moved
by
the
sensitive
appetite.
For
[ibid.
d.29
n.5],
just
as
the
intellect
joined
to
the
senses
is
of
a
nature
to
understand
sensible
things,
so
the
will
joined
to
the
sensitive
appetite
is
of
a
nature
to
delight
in
that
appetite,
so
much
so
that,
when
it
is
striving
to
hold
the
appetite
back
from
being
inordinately
drawn
to
what
it
delights
in,
it
is
acting
against
its
own
inclination;
for
therein
it
too
itself
experiences
difficulty
and
the
sensitive
appetite
is
affected
by
sadness,
since
force
is
being
applied
to
it.
Yet
not
for
this
reason
however
is
the
will
thus
moved
directly
by
the
sensitive
appetite
(because
on
the
contrary
it
compels
that
appetite
to
obey
it),
but
rather
it
is
moved
indirectly,
in
that,
when
the
things
that
the
sensitive
appetite
delights
in
and
tries
to
pursue
and
possess,
are
presented
beforehand
to
the
will,
the
will
itself
takes
delight
in
the
pursuit
of
these
objects,
and
thereby
the
whole
man
is
understood
to
be
delighted.
So,
by
reason
of
the
objects
shown
to
the
will
by
the
sensitive
appetite,
the
will
is
said
to
be
moved
by
the
appetite;
in
truth,
however,
it
is
moved
and
enticed
by
the
objects
that
are
agreeable
to
the
appetite
themselves,
and
hence
both
the
appetite
itself
and
the
will
and
finally
the
whole
man
are
delighted.
[Hence
[Oxon.
1
d.3
q.3
n.24,
in
reply
to
an
objection]
the
objects
desired
by
the
sensitive
appetite
do
not
efficaciously
influence
the
will
but
serve
the
will
as
occasions
or
conditions
for
willing
of
its
own
accord
what
will
bring
pleasure
to
the
sensitive
appetite…
Although
[Oxon.
3
d.33
n.4]
the
will
naturally
tends
to
what
pleases
it
in
the
things
that
are
agreeable
and
delightful
to
sensitive
appetite,
nevertheless,
when
it
actually
takes
pleasure
in
them,
it
suffers
no
coercion
nor
suffers
any
movement
impressed
on
it
as
it
were
by
a
material
power,
but
it
itself
is
determinative
of
itself
to
willing
so.
Wherefore,
although
the
will
commands
the
sensitive
appetite
and
although
the
sensitive
appetite
obeys
its
command,
yet
the
will
is
not
said
conversely
to
obey
the
sensitive
appetite;
for
a
free
thing
is
persuadable
by
reason
but
does
not
properly
obey
it,
nor
consequently
is
it
moved
by
reason;
and
much
less
is
it
moved
by
the
sensitive
appetite.]
Article
Three:
Whether
the
Will
moves
Itself
64
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.25,
Reportatio
ibid.,
Metaphysics
9
qq.14-‐15]
some
who
have
been
persuaded
by
arguments
to
the
negative
side
have
thought
that
the
will
does
not
move
itself
but
needs
some
other
mover,
a
subject
distinct
from
it
at
least,
by
which
it
may
be
reduced
to
an
act
of
willing
or
refusing;
and
they
said
that
the
other
mover
is
a
phantasm
illumined
by
the
light
of
the
agent
intellect,
whereby
intellection
is
immediately
caused
and
volition
too,
by
immediacy
of
cause
but
not
by
immediacy
of
effect,
because
intellection
first
proceeds
from
the
phantasm
as
thus
irradiated
by
the
light,
and
then
volition
does.
As
far
as
intellection
is
concerned,
the
question
has
been
expounded
in
Ia
q.79
a.2.
Therefore
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.7],
that
the
cause
of
volition
cannot
be
a
phantasm
irradiated
by
the
light
of
the
agent
intellect,
there
is,
besides
the
things
said
in
a.1
(which
directly
and
equally
conclude
that
a
known
object
and
a
phantasm
cannot
be
the
adequate
cause
of
volition),
the
following
argument:
the
first
action
caused
in
the
will
by
a
phantasm
is
altogether
natural;
therefore
it
is
not
in
the
power
of
the
will;
for
it
is
not
in
our
power
not
to
be
affected
by
what
we
see,
as
Augustine
says,
On
Free
Choice
3.
Since
therefore
after
such
an
act
we
are
able
to
move
the
intellect
to
consider
this
or
that,
I
ask
by
what
act
we
do
so.
Not
indeed
by
the
medium
of
the
first
act;
for
that
is
not
in
our
power;
and
again
that
act
is
not
about
considering
or
not
considering
but
is
caused
merely
naturally;
therefore
it
must
be
done
by
another
act.
I
ask
about
that
other
act
where
it
comes
from.
Either
it
will
proceed
from
the
will
determining
itself,
or
it
will
at
least
proceed
from
the
phantasm.
If
from
the
will,
the
intended
conclusion
is
attained,
for
such
volition
is
in
its
power
and
proceeds
efficaciously
from
it.
If
from
the
phantasm,
then
the
act
will
be
natural
and
consequently
not
more
in
the
will’s
power
for
commanding
the
intellect
to
consider
this
or
that
than
the
first
act
was.
–
Response
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.8]
when
the
intellect
is
considering
an
object
there
can
arise
an
impediment
to
it;
for
with
the
first
phantasm
that
moves
it
another
is
conjoined,
and
one
that
is
as
it
were
neighbor
to
the
first,
and
therefore
it
moves
the
intellect,
or
can
move
it,
more
strongly
to
the
consideration
of
itself,
and
can
consequently
incline
the
will
to
an
act
of
volition,
so
much
so
that
the
phantasm
moving
first
need
not
cause
a
volition.
For
if
I
think
of
something
delightful
that
moves
my
appetite,
there
is
no
need
that
I
be
moved
to
desire
it;
for
another
object
can
through
the
consideration
of
the
intellect
arise
that
moves
the
will
more,
so
much
so
that
the
will
ceases
from
its
first
volition.
Against
this:
even
if
it
is
true
that
an
impediment
can
arise
by
chance,
that
however
will
not
be
in
the
power
of
the
will,
nor
fall
under
its
command.
And
it
is
the
same
in
the
case
of
the
sensitive
appetite;
for
when
an
ox
sees
grass,
its
appetite
is
moved,
and
from
that
appetite
it
is
progressively
moved
to
eat
the
grass;
and
if
in
such
movement
there
occur
to
the
beast
a
more
delightful
object,
one
that
thereby
more
strongly
moves
its
appetite,
then
indeed
it
stops
from
its
first
movement
and
yet
not
freely,
because
it
is
necessarily
drawn
by
something
more
desirable
that
occurs
to
it,
although
this
something
occur
by
chance.
–
There
is
also
another
response
to
the
argument
as
follows:
when
two
delightful
things
come
together
in
a
phantasm,
it
is
in
the
power
of
the
will
to
make
the
intellect
stand
at
the
base
one,
the
other
reason
being
set
aside,
whence
it
happens
that
an
evil
choice
follows.
On
the
contrary,
are
these
two
reasons
of
equal
efficacy
as
regard
moving
the
will
or
not?
If
they
move
equally,
then
they
will
cause
a
willing
and
a
refusing
at
the
same
time
in
the
will
65
with
respect
to
the
same
object,
which
is
impossible.
If
they
move
unequally,
then
one
moves
the
will
more
efficaciously
and
necessarily,
and
consequently
that
volition
will
not
be
in
the
power
of
the
will
but
the
volition
will
also
necessarily
move
the
intellect
in
accord
with
it;
so
it
will
not
be
able
to
make
the
intellect
stand
at
consideration
of
the
other
reason.
The
second
reason
against
those
who
think
thus:
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.9]
if
the
phantasm
is
a
thoroughgoing
and
equivocal
cause
of
volition
and
intellection
by
immediacy
of
cause,
then
it
is
simply
more
perfect
than
intellection
and
volition;
then
phantasizing
is
nobler
than
the
happiness
of
the
Philosophers,
which
they
posited
as
consisting
in
intellection
and
volition.
For
the
teacher
[sc.
of
this
view]
cannot
lay
down
some
other
agent,
as
the
agent
intellect,
because
the
agent
and
patient
are
necessarily
distinct
in
subject
according
to
his
opinion.
–
Lastly,
an
angel
and
a
separated
soul
can
operate
by
willing;
but
a
phantasm
effecting
volition
cannot
be
posited
in
them;
therefore
one
will
have
to
say
that
God
immediately
caused
an
evil
willing
in
the
will
of
the
angels
who
revolted
from
him,
which
is
false.
Or
if
some
other
agent
is
posited,
as
the
heavens
or
any
other
object
whatever,
then
he
[sc.
the
above
teacher]
will
be
compelled
to
deny
his
principle,
namely
that
a
total
equivocal
cause
is
nobler
than
its
effect.
Wherefore
it
is
altogether
impossible
for
an
angel
and
a
separated
soul
to
be
in
no
way
able
to
move
themselves
but
to
stand
immovably
in
whatever
place
they
may
be
put,
just
as
if
they
were
in
a
prison.
For
this
reason
we
say
[Metaphysics
9
q.15
n.8ff.]
that
the
will
is
not
an
active
principle
determined
of
itself,
but
a
principle
with
power
determinative
of
itself
to
either
alternative;
and
so
it
moves
itself
to
operating
when
objects
occur
that
provide
it
occasion.
For
a
created
active
principle,
beyond
all
contradiction,
is
capable
of
the
perfection
which
we
attribute
to
the
will,
namely
not
to
be
determined
to
one
effect
or
act,
since
it
has
many
operations,
even
contrary
ones,
in
its
power,
nor
even
to
be
determined
to
some
one
of
those
that
it
virtually
contains;
for
it
can
hold
itself
back
from
any
operation,
even
when
any
object
you
like
occurs
to
it.
Further,
the
more
perfect
an
active
principle
is,
the
less
dependent,
determined,
and
limited
it
is
with
respect
to
act
or
effect.
Hence
is
rightly
understood
the
most
excellent
nobility
of
the
first
glorious
Principle,
causing
everything
through
infinite
independence
and
supreme
liberty,
which
perfection
(namely
being
itself),
the
Philosophers
took
away,
thinking
falsely
that
it
was
a
necessary
cause.
But
if
an
active
cause
unlimited
as
to
producing
many
effects,
though
with
a
natural
determination
to
some
one
of
them,
is
more
perfect
than
a
cause
which
is
not
thus
unlimited,
how
much
more
so
is
it
if,
along
with
this
unlimitedness
and
indetermination,
there
is
also
understood
an
indetermination
excluding
natural
determination
to
some
one
of
the
effects
to
which
its
active
power
can
extend
itself?
Such
is
the
will,
and
it
alone,
among
active
principles,
is
such,
having
a
mode
of
acting
distinct
from
the
whole
class
of
active
principles
that
are
not
the
will;
for
the
will’s
mode
of
acting
is
opposite
to
the
mode
of
all
the
principles
other
than
it.
If
then
this
perfection,
which
we
attribute
to
the
will,
is
not
repugnant
to
a
created
active
principle,
and
the
supreme
such
principle
is
the
will,
then
this
perfection
is
rationally
to
be
attributed
to
it.
–
Lastly,
if
the
intellect
through
the
same
knowledge
is
in
some
way
of
opposites,
namely
as
showing
them,
then
an
active
power
more
indeterminate
can
be
of
opposites
in
a
more
excellent
way,
66
namely
that
it
itself,
being
single,
is
able
to
determine
itself
to
either
of
the
opposites
shown;
otherwise
the
first
power
for
opposites
would
seem
to
have
been
given
in
vain,
since
without
the
second
it
would
have
power
for
neither
of
them.
[In
response
to
the
objection
that
the
same
thing
cannot
move
itself
because
then
it
would
be
active
and
passive
at
the
same
time,
Montefortino
includes,
among
other
things,
the
following
from
Oxon.
ibid.
n.12:
An
equivocal
agent
[as
the
sun
with
respect
to
causing
the
generation
of
worms
in
rotting
flesh]
is
in
act
with
respect
to
its
effect,
not
as
formally
having
the
same
act,
since
otherwise
it
would
not
be
an
equivocal
agent,
but
as
being
universally
endowed
with
the
virtue
of
attaining
the
effect,
because
it
is
formally
endowed
with
a
more
eminent
virtue.
It
is
therefore
in
potency
as
to
the
term
of
the
movement,
but
in
act
according
to
the
equivocal
active
principle
in
respect
of
the
term.
So
may
it
be
supposed
in
respect
of
the
will
and
its
moving
itself
to
this
act
rather
than
that.]
Article
Four:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
by
an
Exterior
Principle
Response:
[Quodlibet
q.21]
Some
think,
because
of
arguments
adduced
for
the
affirmative
side,
that
one
must
altogether
set
down
that
the
will
proceeds
to
its
first
act
by
the
instigation
of
some
exterior
mover,
as
Aristotle
concludes
Eudemian
Ethics
7.18.
For
the
solution
of
the
question
we
say
first
[Quodlibet
q.21
n.12,
Oxon.
2
d.42
q.4
n.5]
that
the
first
intellection
is
not
from
reason
but
in
some
way
from
chance.
Declaration:
he
who
understands
does
not
understand
by
first
understanding;
therefore
the
first
intellection
is
not
from
reason
showing
an
object
first;
therefore
it
is
in
some
way
from
chance,
according
to
Augustine
On
Free
Choice
3.15
when
he
writes,
“It
is
not
in
our
power
not
to
be
affected
by
what
we
see;”
therefore
it
is
fortuitous
and
by
chance.
However,
when
the
first
intellection
and
volition
are
in
place,
one
can
reason
about
what
is
to
be
done;
and
consequently,
although
the
first
intellection
is
thus
by
chance,
the
things
that
nevertheless
follow
deliberation
are
not
fortuitous
but
from
deliberate
reason.
–
And
it
is
significant
that
the
‘in
some
way’
is
added,
because
the
first
intellections
are
not
to
be
called
simply
fortuitous.
For
they
are
from
objects
moving
more
strongly,
according
to
phantasms
that,
when
impediments
cease,
are
impressed
more,
and
thereby
there
is
in
us
a
naturally
motive
cause
of
the
first
intellection;
but
since
it
is
not
from
deliberating
reason,
it
is
not
imputable
to
man
save
by
interpretation,
namely
insofar
as
it
was
in
man’s
power
to
make
the
object
move
more
strongly
by
considering
it
frequently,
on
account
of
which
consideration
the
phantasm
is
more
strongly
impressed
on
the
memory;
hence
the
phantasm
would
more
strongly
and
first
move,
when
impediment
ceases.
We
say
second
that
the
fact
someone
first
determines
himself
to
willing
or
to
not
willing
is
from
the
will
and
not
from
the
intellect.
For
the
will
alone
is
endowed
with
a
power
of
virtue
for
determining
itself
to
either
option
and
also
of
refraining
from
all
determination.
Declaration:
the
intellect
is
moved
naturally
by
the
object;
if
therefore
the
will
were
moved
naturally
by
the
naturally
moved
intellect,
then
it
itself
would
equally
be
moved
by
natural
necessity;
and
so
man
would
be
a
brute,
whose
appetite
is
drawn
and
led
and
does
not
lead.
The
will
therefore
does
not
67
move
by
natural
necessity
as
regards
any
of
its
acts,
but
once
the
first
intellection
is
had,
it
is
in
the
power
of
the
will
to
move
the
intellect
to
consider
this
or
that,
and
in
its
power
to
will
or
refuse
this
or
that;
and
thus
the
first
volition
is
altogether
from
us,
and
is
not
by
chance
in
the
way
the
first
intellection
is.
[From
response
to
objections:
It
was
expounded
in
a.1
how
the
will
is
moved
by
the
object.
For,
to
begin
with,
it
is
impossible
for
it
to
be
moved
by
any
object
as
by
a
total
effective
cause
of
volition;
and
although
it
is
not
improbable
that
it
is
moved
by
a
partial
less
principal
cause,
we
however
think
that
understood
objects,
at
least
of
the
natural
order,
provide
only
the
occasion
for
the
will
to
pursue
these
objects
with
love
or
to
flee
them
through
refusal…
We
concede
that
the
will
becomes
willing
from
not
willing
by
occasion
taken
from
an
object
first
presented
to
it
by
the
intellect…
For
there
is
required
for
an
act
of
will
only
the
will
and
the
intellect
showing
an
object…
An
angel,
while
having
an
intellect
showing
it
an
object
and
a
will
prior
in
nature
to
volition,
yet
had
willing
at
the
same
time,
not
through
some
other
volition,
but
by
a
first
act
containing,
by
way
of
power,
that
operation
in
its
own
active
virtue.]
Article
Five:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
by
Celestial
Body
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.14
q.3
n.4,
Reportatio
ibid.
n.5,
Quodlibet
q.21
n.14,
De
Anima
q.11]
since
the
present
question
was
extensively
expounded
in
Ia
q.115
a.4,
we
will
now
explain
it
briefly
by
saying
that
the
celestial
bodies
are
not
at
all
able
directly
to
move
the
will
or
the
intellect,
but
only
indirectly
and
on
occasion
of
directly
acting
on
the
sensitive
appetite.
The
reason
is
that
what
is
purely
bodily
cannot
directly
act
on
the
spiritual,
for
an
agent
is
a
more
noble
thing
than
the
patient;
now
the
will
and
the
intellect
are
powers
altogether
spiritual;
so
the
extremes
here
are
wholly
out
of
proportion
for
the
latter
to
receive
the
influence
of
the
former
or
to
be
moved
on
the
action
of
them.
Because,
however,
the
celestial
bodies
are
able
to
act
directly
on
the
sense
organs,
which
are
mixed
bodies,
these
latter
can
thence
be
altered
and
changed
to
some
state
that
agrees
or
disagrees
with
them
insofar
as
they
are
sense
organs,
and
consequently
they
can
in
some
way
have
some
activity
as
regard
an
act
of
the
intellect
and
of
the
will;
for
if
the
senses
are
disordered
in
their
own
act,
the
intellect
too
will
err
in
following
that
act,
as
is
plain
in
the
mad
and
lunatic
whose
imagination
is
confused,
and
that
this
indisposition
of
theirs
is
directly
influenced
by
the
stars
cannot
be
doubted.
But
when
there
is
disorder
in
the
intellect,
disorder
in
the
will
also
follows.
–
Further,
the
higher
bodies
can,
when
directly
influencing
the
sensitive
appetite,
introduce
that
change
in
the
will,
so
that
it
inclines
more
to
these
objects
than
to
those,
because
in
truth
the
rational
will
of
the
wayfarer
is
inclined
to
pursue
what
is
efficaciously
desired
by
the
sensitive
appetite;
and
hence
it
is
that
the
stars
are
said
to
incline
the
will
as
well,
not
because
they
have
a
direct
influence
on
it,
but
for
the
reason
just
stated.
However
in
nothing
is
the
will
absolutely
necessitated;
rather
it
can,
of
its
own
freedom,
stand
in
the
way
of
any
inclination
of
the
sensitive
appetite.
Nevertheless,
because
of
this
proneness
of
the
will
to
follow
the
sensitive
appetite
in
its
inclinations
against
the
right
dictates
of
reason,
astrologers
do
make
true
conjectures
about
men’s
morals,
although
absolutely
68
things
could
happen
otherwise
if
men
were
to
be
persuaded
they
should
follow
the
dictate
of
reason
rather
than
the
proneness
of
the
sensitive
appetite.
Simply
then
and
absolutely
there
is
in
man
something
to
which
no
influence
whatever
of
the
celestial
bodies
can
extend
itself
(and
the
will
is
of
this
sort),
save
on
occasion
by,
as
was
said,
moving
the
sensitive
appetite,
toward
whose
inclination
the
will
is
apt
to
be
inclined.
But
still
these
influences
of
the
stars
are
not
able
either
to
reach
the
will
or
even
to
join
together
the
causes
necessary
for
its
activity.
But
the
afore
cited
Ia
q.115
should
be
looked
at.
Article
Six:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
only
by
God
as
by
an
Exterior
Principle
Response:
[Quodlibet
q.16
n.15]
Here
there
is
an
opinion
that
says
the
motion
of
the
will
is
from
what
is
intrinsic,
just
as
is
also
natural
motion.
Now
although
a
natural
thing
can
be
moved
by
something
that
is
not
the
cause
of
the
nature
of
the
moved
thing,
yet
that
something
cannot
cause
a
natural
motion
unless
it
is
in
some
way
cause
of
the
nature.
For
a
stone
is
moved
upwards
by
a
man,
who
does
not
cause
the
nature
of
the
stone;
but
this
motion
is
not
natural
to
the
stone,
but
its
natural
motion
is
only
caused
by
what
causes
its
nature.
In
the
first
way,
then,
a
man
possessed
of
will
can
be
moved
by
someone
who
is
not
his
cause;
but
that
his
voluntary
motion
should
be
from
some
extrinsic
principle
which
is
not
the
cause
of
the
will
is
impossible;
but
the
cause
of
the
will
can
be
nothing
other
than
God.
We
say
that
we
have
declared
in
a.4
above
how
the
will
determines
itself
to
willing
and
not
willing;
but
how
a
created
will
is
moved
by
God
we
explained
in
Ia
q.105
a.4.
For
the
present,
however,
it
seems
one
should
not
approve
the
statement
above
that,
just
as
natural
motion
is
caused
by
that
which
is
cause
of
the
nature,
so
voluntary
motion
is
by
that
from
whose
active
virtue
the
will
proceeds.
For
although
a
heavy
object
is
determined
to
a
place
downwards,
nevertheless
its
going
downwards
is
not
from
what
causes
its
heaviness
but
is
from
the
intrinsic
heaviness
itself,
and
no
second
extrinsic
cause
is
here
to
be
mixed
in
with
it,
over
and
above
a
general
influence.
A
natural
principle
is
therefore
supremely
determined
because
it
directly
excludes
an
indetermination
to
either
side,
and
indeed
what
causes
such
a
principle
gives
the
thus
determined
form,
as
that
fire
is
hot
or
the
heaven
round,
because
the
cause
that
gives
being
to
fire
and
being
to
the
heaven
gives
heat
and
roundness
at
the
same
time.
Nevertheless
fire
and
the
heaven
do
not
necessarily
receive
their
second
acts
from
the
maker
of
their
natures,
but
they
receive
only
principles
naturally
determined
to
heating
and
to
spherical
motion.
Now
even
if
the
will,
which
receives
being
through
creation,
be
said
necessarily
to
will
something,
yet
it
is
not
by
its
cause
as
determined
to
that
willing
as
a
heavy
thing
is
to
going
downwards
and
as
fire
is
to
burning,
but
it
has
received
precisely
from
its
cause
a
principle
determinative
of
itself
to
this
willing.
–
The
reason
for
all
these
things
is
that,
although
some
principle
can
concur
with
the
will,
namely
the
object,
according
to
some,
or
the
intellect,
in
the
opinion
of
others,
and
although
the
concurring
principle
is
of
itself
naturally
active,
yet
the
will
per
se
speaking
never
is
or
can
be
a
natural
active
principle;
for
being
naturally
active
and
being
freely
active
are
first
differences
of
active
principle,
and
the
will
as
such
is
a
freely
active
principle.
So
the
will
can
no
more
be
naturally
active
than
can
nature,
as
it
is
a
principle
distinct
from
69
will,
be
freely
active.
–
Nor
should
anyone
be
moved
by
the
fact
that
the
first
movement
of
the
will
seems
to
be
necessary
and
must
therefore
be
thought
to
be
natural.
For
every
natural
agent
is
either
altogether
first
or,
if
it
is
posterior,
it
will
be
naturally
determined
to
act
by
something
prior.
Now
the
created
will
must
in
no
way
be
said
to
be
an
agent
altogether
first.
But
neither
can
it
be
naturally
determined
by
any
superior
agent;
for
it
is
itself
an
active
principle
of
such
a
sort
that
it
determines
itself
in
acting.
On
the
hypothesis
therefore
that
the
will
necessarily
wills
something,
nevertheless
the
willing
is
not
at
all
caused
naturally
by
what
causes
the
will,
even
if
this
cause
gave
the
will
being
naturally;
but
once
the
first
act
is
in
place
whereby
the
will
is
will,
then,
if
it
is
left
to
itself
and
if
it
can
contingently
have
or
not
have
this
willing,
it
would
still
determine
itself
to
this
willing.
QUESTION
TEN:
ABOUT
HOW
THE
WILL
MOVES.
IN
FOUR
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
naturally
to
Anything
Response:
[Quodlibet
q.16
n.13ff.]
‘nature’
can
be
take
extensively
and
properly.
In
the
first
way
it
embraces
every
being;
hence
we
do
not
hesitate
to
declare
this
or
that
to
be
the
‘nature’
of
negation,
of
second
intentions,
and
of
other
things
of
the
sort.
Thus
too,
speaking
extensively,
necessity
in
any
being
can
be
called
‘natural
necessity’;
from
this
fact,
since
at
least
the
divine
will
of
its
own
liberty
has
necessarily
some
willing,
this
necessity
of
perfect
liberty
can
be
called
natural
necessity.
However,
when
we
thus
extend
this
locution
we
are
speaking
improperly.
The
proper
acceptation
of
nature,
then,
is
that
which
the
Philosopher
gives
in
Physics
2
text.49,
when
he
divides
active
principle
into
nature
and
purpose,
as
into
two
differences
dividing
a
common
genus
or
quasi
genus.
“Of
those
among
them,”
he
says,
“that
happen
for
the
sake
of
something,”
that
is,
for
the
sake
of
an
end,
of
which
sort
are
all
things
that
come
to
be
from
a
per
se
cause,
“some
are
according
to
purpose
but
others
are
not
according
to
purpose.”
And
a
little
later,
“Things
for
the
sake
of
something
are
those
that
are
done
by
intellect
and
those
that
are
done
by
nature,”
and
to
these
two
per
se
causes
he
thereafter
reduces
per
accidens
causes,
which
are
chance
and
fortune.
He
gives
the
same
division
of
active
principle
in
Metaphysics
9
text.10
when
he
assigns
the
way
in
which
rational
and
irrational
active
powers
proceed
in
diverse
ways
to
their
acts.
Augustine
speaks
about
this
same
distinction
in
City
of
God
5.9.
“There
is,”
he
says,
“fortuitous
cause,
natural
cause,
and
voluntary
cause,”
and
he
makes
clear
what
each
of
them
is.
Having
noted
these
points
by
way
of
preface,
we
say
[Quodlibet
ibid.]
that
the
will
does
not
will
anything
at
all
naturally,
taking
‘nature’
in
its
proper
signification.
For
each
of
the
active
principles,
namely
the
natural
and
the
free,
has,
taken
per
se,
its
own
proper
mode
of
being
principle;
the
intellect,
indeed,
does
so
by
way
of
nature,
and
hence,
when
compared
to
its
proper
act,
it
is
a
nature.
However
the
will
has
a
proper
mode
of
causing
freely
on
account
of
the
power
of
virtue
it
has
for
determining
itself;
and
for
this
reason,
when
it
concurs
with
the
intellect,
as
in
the
production
of
artificial
objects,
the
whole
result
is
said
to
be
produced
freely
and
on
70
purpose,
because
purpose
is
the
principal
and
immediate
principle
of
its
production.
And
even
when
an
immediate
principle
concurs
by
way
of
nature,
as
when
we
use
the
lower
powers
for
our
act,
then,
since
what
is
done
is
subject
to
the
will
freely
using
such
instruments,
the
action
is
free
and
we
are
said
truly,
from
the
principal
agent,
to
have
acted
freely.
However
much
it
may
be,
then,
that
the
intellect
understands
naturally,
this
in
fact
being
required
by
the
mode
peculiar
to
it,
yet
the
will
does
not
will
naturally,
although
it
conform
itself
to
the
intellect
in
the
thing
willed;
rather,
to
will
naturally
is
intrinsically
repugnant
to
it,
just
as
is
incompatible
with
it
the
other
of
the
two
differences,
the
one
that
contracts
active
principle
to
intellect,
and
conversely.
The
will
then
can
no
more
be
active
naturally
than
nature
(as
nature
is
a
principle
distinct
from
will)
can
be
active
freely.
[From
replies
to
objections:
we
say
[Quodlibet
q.21
n.14]
that
the
will
does
indeed
follow
the
act
of
the
intellect,
insofar
as
through
the
intellect
are
presented
to
it
the
objects
that
it
would
otherwise
not
be
able
to
pursue
or
to
hate…
But
whatever
be
the
objects
presented
to
the
will,
the
will
is
able,
by
its
innate
power
of
virtue,
to
love
or
hate
them
or
indeed
not
to
have
any
act
about
them…
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.10,
Quodlibet
q.17]
From
the
fact
that
the
intellect
necessarily
and
naturally
knows
the
connection
of
the
terms
of
a
first
principle
and
assents
to
it
without
delay,
it
does
not
thereby
follow
that
the
will
is
carried
by
the
same
necessity
to
the
ultimate
end,
when
speaking
of
the
will
of
the
wayfarer;
rather,
the
will
is
able
to
withhold
itself
from
any
act
at
all
about
the
ultimate
end;
otherwise
it
would,
by
its
dominating
power,
always
keep
the
intellect
detained
in
considering
that
end
and
would
not
allow
it
to
focus
on
understanding
other
objects.
Given,
however,
that
the
will
is
necessarily
carried
to
some
object
first
presented
to
it,
nevertheless
this
act
should
not
at
all
be
called
a
natural
one.
There
is
indeed
in
the
will
a
natural
appetite
for
good,
and
especially
for
the
highest
good;
but
since
this
appetite
is
not
an
elicited
act
in
it
but
is
only
the
propensity
of
nature
to
its
perfection,
it
does
not
belong
to
the
concern
of
the
present
question.
An
elicited
act
of
the
will
conform
to
this
appetite,
however,
can
for
this
reason
be
indeed
called
natural,
but
the
denomination
will
be
merely
extrinsic;
for
essentially
the
act
is
freely
and
not
naturally
elicited.]
Article
Two:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
of
Necessity
by
its
Object
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.4,
4
d.49
q.10,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.2,
Quodlibet
q.16
a.1,
Collationes
14,
16-‐17]
[Oxon.
1
ibid.
n.2,
4
ibid.
n.5]
for
the
solution
let
the
first
statement
be:
the
will
in
respect
of
the
exercise
of
its
acts
is
not
necessitated
by
its
object,
which
is
the
good,
whether
the
good
is
understood
as
such
and
in
general
or
in
particular,
wherein
is
placed
the
ultimate
happiness
of
an
intellectual
and
rational
nature.
The
proof,
also
concluded
elsewhere,
is
that
any
unimpeded
agent,
provided
it
be
posited
as
necessitated
to
act,
removes
of
necessity,
if
it
can,
everything
impeding
its
act;
therefore
if
the
unimpeded
will
is
compelled
of
its
nature
to
will
the
ultimate
end,
apprehended
in
general
or
in
particular,
it
necessarily
removes
everything
prohibiting
that
volition,
if
it
can
remove
it.
But
the
non-‐consideration
of
the
object
prohibits
this
volition;
therefore
the
will,
by
willing
this
object,
will
necessarily
make
the
intellect
stay
put
in
the
consideration
of
it.
The
major
is
plain,
because
what
is
of
itself
necessitated
to
act
is
never
prohibited
save
by
something
71
repugnant
that
overcomes
its
active
power;
but
we
experience
the
opposite;
therefore
the
will
undergoes
no
necessity
from
its
object
however
presented
to
it
by
the
intellect.
–
Next,
necessity
in
a
higher
cause
cannot
come
from
the
necessity
of
a
lower
cause;
for
an
inferior
cause
cannot
determine
the
mode
of
acting
of
a
superior
cause,
because
it
cannot
determine
the
superior
cause
to
act;
therefore
the
superior
cause,
if
it
acts
necessarily,
has
that
necessity
through
something
intrinsic
to
its
own
form,
or
from
its
own
nature;
if
therefore
the
will
has
a
necessity
to
will
something,
such
necessity
will
be
in
it
from
its
own
nature
and
not
from
an
inferior
cause.
–
Then
I
argue
further
as
before:
a
superior
cause,
if
it
acts
necessarily,
moves
inferior
causes
with
the
same
necessity
to
the
doing
of
the
actions
that
are
necessary
for
its
own
action;
since
therefore
the
apprehension
of
the
intellect
is
required
for
the
act
of
the
will,
then,
from
the
hypothesis
that
the
will
is
compelled
by
its
object
to
pursue
the
object,
it
follows
that
the
will
necessarily
determines
the
intellect
to
the
perpetual
consideration
of
the
object,
which
is
false.
Therefore
[Oxon.
4
ibid.
n.6]
the
will
contingently
wills
the
end,
both
in
general
and
in
particular,
although
for
the
most
part
it
wills
them
both,
provided
the
intellect
is
not
in
doubt
as
to
what
its
happiness
in
particular
is
located
in
–
as
with
the
faithful
believing
that
their
ultimate
happiness
reposes
in
the
enjoyment
of
the
Trinity,
although
for
the
most
part
they
neglect
the
necessary
means
for
attaining
that
end,
and
so
they
think
little
of
living
virtuously
because
they
do
not
efficaciously
will
the
ultimate
end.
The
second
statement
[Oxon.
4
ibid.
n.9]
is
that
the
will
as
to
the
specification
of
its
act
is
necessitated
by
its
object,
so
much
so
that
it
cannot
hate
the
good
or
pursue
and
love
the
bad
as
such,
or
misery.
For
although
the
will,
by
its
dominating
power,
is
able
not
to
pursue
its
object
pre-‐shown
to
it
by
the
intellect,
and
thereby
to
withhold
itself
from
any
act
and
thus
be
immune
from
any
necessity
in
exercising
its
act,
yet,
on
the
supposition
that
it
does
determine
itself
to
issue
in
acts,
it
necessarily
turns
away
from
misery
and
on
the
contrary
wills
and
loves
the
good
or
blessedness
in
whatever
way
this
is
pre-‐shown
to
it.
For
neither
can
blessedness
be
an
object
of
refusal
nor
is
misery
suited
for
terminating
volition.
Just
as
an
act
of
seeing
is
by
diffusion
excluded
from
vision
in
respect
of
black,
because
black
is
not
suited
to
be
the
object
of
such
a
diffused
act,
so
in
this
case
the
will
is
not
capable
of
such
an
act
in
order
to
such
an
object.
In
this
way,
then,
the
will
is
determined
to
willing
blessedness
and
fleeing
misery,
namely
that
if
it
must
issue
in
some
act
about
those
objects,
it
necessarily
and
determinately
elicits
an
act
of
willing
blessedness
and
of
refusing
misery.
[From
reply
to
objections
[Oxon.
4
ibid.
n.8]:
from
the
fact
that
someone
does
not
wish
blessedness
the
conclusion
cannot
rightly
be
inferred
that
he
refuses
such
an
object,
because
‘to
refuse’
is
a
positive
act
of
the
refuser,
as
is
also
‘to
will’,
and
so
the
one
act
is
free
just
as
is
also
the
other;
for
we
elicit
neither
of
them
necessarily
about
any
object
whatever,
and
so
we
are
able
not
to
elicit
refusal
about
the
bad,
as
also
to
abstain
from
volition
about
the
good.
Yet
just
as
we
cannot
have
about
some
evil
shown
to
us
an
act
of
will
save
that
of
refusing
it
as
such,
so
about
some
good
offered
to
us
we
cannot
elicit
an
act
of
will
save
that
of
willing
it;
and
so
one
should
argue:
we
cannot
will
to
be
miserable;
therefore
I
am
not
able
to
hate
blessedness;
but
from
this
does
not
follow:
therefore
I
necessarily
will
blessedness,
because
no
‘to
will’
is
necessarily
elicited
from
the
will.]
72
Article
Three:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
of
Necessity
by
the
Lower
Appetite
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.42,
3
d.15
n.18]
the
appetite,
being
subjected
to
passions
of
the
irascible
and
concupiscible
part,
to
pain
and
delight,
in
surpassing
degree,
either
so
moves
the
superior
powers
of
the
soul
that
man
falls
from
the
use
of
reason,
or,
while
the
inferior
appetite
is
liable
to
such
passions,
man
is
in
command
of
himself
and
is
not
deprived
of
the
use
of
reason.
If,
because
of
the
vehement
action
of
the
sensitive
appetite,
the
use
of
reason
is
impeded,
as
in
the
case
of
the
greatest
torments
and
of
great
delight,
according
to
Augustine
City
of
God
14.16,
then
it
is
evident
that
thereby
the
will
is
necessarily
dragged
off
by
the
inferior
appetite;
[Oxon.
2
d.25]
not
because
the
root
of
the
will’s
freedom
is
the
use
and
indifference
of
reason,
but
because,
since
the
will
cannot
will
anything
save
what
is
first
shown
it
by
the
intellect,
then,
once
the
intellect
is
not
abiding
in
its
right
use,
the
result
is
that
the
will
too
issues
wrongly
in
its
acts,
namely
in
the
way
the
objects
are
pre-‐
shown
it
by
an
erring
intellect.
But
if,
while
the
passions
in
surpassing
degree
are
present
in
the
inferior
appetite,
reason
is
not
absorbed
in
them,
as
in
the
case
of
the
holy
martyrs
despite
their
being
afflicted
by
atrocious
torments,
then
the
will
is
not
at
all
moved
necessarily
by
the
inferior
appetite;
rather
it
is
in
the
will’s
power
to
suffer
and
be
sad
along
with
the
inferior
appetite
suffering
such
things
or,
if
the
inferior
appetite
is
amid
pleasures,
to
find
pleasure
along
with
it
in
such
object,
or
to
oppose
it.
And
[Oxon.
3
ibid.
n.14]
although
some
surreptitious
delight,
or
some
sadness
with
respect
to
sad
objects,
might
be
posited
as
preceding
in
the
will
every
free
act
of
it
(for
[Oxon.
2
d.42.
q.1
n.1]
“it
is
not
in
our
power
not
to
be
affected
by
what
we
see”),
however
not
for
that
reason
[ibid.
q.4
n.15]
must
the
will
be
said
to
cooperate
with
the
inferior
appetite
so
necessarily
that
it
is
led
by
it
in
such
way
that
to
contradict,
to
oppose,
and
to
issue
in
the
opposite
act
is
not
in
its
power.
The
intellect
does
indeed
cooperate
with
strongly
moved
senses
unless
it
is
distracted
about
other
objects;
and
so
too
the
will
commonly
suffers
along
with
a
suffering
sensitive
appetite,
and
delights
with
it
in
joy
about
the
same
object,
provided
it
is
not
impeded
by
the
non-‐consideration
of
the
intellect
or
by
some
other
overpowering
impediment.
But
yet,
if
reason
remains
in
charge
of
itself,
the
will
is
not
in
this
way
carried
off
necessarily
by
a
change
in
the
appetite
such
that
the
delight
and
sadness
following
elicited
acts
of
will
are
not
in
the
will’s
dominating
power.
And
for
this
reason
it
would
be
said
that
a
woman
being
violently
raped
does
not
sin.
For
although
the
delight
of
the
sensitive
appetite
might
reach
to
her
will,
yet
because
she
does
not
will
the
delight
or
the
delightful
thing,
her
delight
is
surreptitious
and
the
pleasure
is
not
consequent
to
a
free
act
of
the
will.
It
could
also
be
said
that,
in
the
case
of
a
woman
suffering
rape,
she
has
delight
in
her
sense
of
touch
but
not
in
her
will,
unless
the
object
be
freely
willed.
Article
Four:
Whether
the
Will
is
moved
of
Necessity
by
the
Extrinsic
Mover,
which
is
God
73
Response:
[Quodlibet
q.21,
Oxon.
2
d.37
q.2
n.15]
since
in
the
whole
of
Ia
q.85
we
explained
in
many
ways
that
man,
even
after
sin,
is
possessed
of
free
liberty
of
choice,
so
much
so
that
he
is
very
truly
left
in
the
hands
of
his
own
counsel,
able
to
turn
himself
in
any
direction,
as
is
written
in
Ecclesiastes
15,
we
now
briefly
say
that
he
is
not
moved
of
necessity
by
the
extrinsic
mover,
which
is
God.
For
the
Creator
himself
of
all
things
“so
administers
the
things
he
has
made
that
he
allows
them
to
perform
their
own
motions,”
as
Augustine
says
City
of
God
7.30.
In
the
way
then
that
he
so
moves
a
nature
determined
to
one
thing
that
it
issues
in
its
proper
effects
and
is
truly
the
natural
and
determined
cause
of
them,
in
this
way
too
he
so
moves
a
free
principle
that
it
can
freely
and
contingently
operate;
otherwise,
if
he
were
to
turn
it
of
necessity
to
one
side,
it
would
no
longer
act
according
to
the
proper
nature
of
that
principle
but
rather
against
the
energy
of
its
power,
and
it
would
not
be
allowed
to
have
the
operations
proper
to
its
created
essence.
See
Ia
q.19
a.8.
QUESTION
ELEVEN:
ABOUT
ENJOYMENT,
WHICH
IS
AN
ACT
OF
WILL.
IN
FOUR
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Enjoyment
is
an
Act
of
the
Appetitive
Power
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.3
n.2]
one
must
say
that
enjoyment
is
an
act
of
the
appetitive
power.
To
make
this
clear
one
needs
to
know
that,
just
as
there
are
in
the
intellect
two
acts
of
assenting
to
propositional
truths,
one
by
which
we
assent
to
a
true
proposition
because
of
itself,
the
way
we
assent
to
a
principle,
and
one
by
which
we
assent
to
a
proposition
because
of
something
else,
the
way
we
assent
to
a
conclusion
because
of
a
principle,
so
there
are
found
in
the
will
two
acts
of
pursuing
or
of
adhering
to
a
good,
one
of
doing
so
to
a
good
because
of
itself,
and
one
of
doing
so
to
a
good
because
of
some
other
good,
to
which
good
the
first
is
referred
and
by
which
it
is
the
sort
of
good
it
is.
However
there
is
to
begin
with
this
difference,
that
the
assents
of
the
intellect
are
distinguished
by
the
nature
of
the
propositions,
some
of
which
get
their
evidence
from
the
nature
of
the
terms
and
not
as
borrowed
from
elsewhere,
while
other
propositions
are
evident
and
assented
to
by
the
intellect
because
of
the
principles
from
which
they
are
shown
to
have
been
deduced.
But
the
will,
pursuing
and
adhering
in
a
different
way
to
the
goodnesses
in
things,
does
not
come
to
the
distinction
between
its
acts
from
the
nature
of
the
objects,
but
this
arises
precisely
from
a
distinct
act
of
a
free
power
that
takes
its
object
in
this
way
or
in
that.
For
to
act
thus
or
thus,
referring
or
not
referring
one
good
to
another,
is
in
the
power
of
the
will
itself.
And
for
this
reason
there
are
no
distinct
proper
objects
corresponding
to
the
will’s
acts;
rather
any
will-‐able
object
whatever
can
be
had
by
the
will
either
in
this
act
or
in
that.
Next,
there
is
this
other
difference,
that
the
two
assents
of
the
intellect
give
a
sufficient
division
of
intellectual
assent
in
general,
such
that
they
exclude
any
assent
in
between,
for
no
evidence
on
the
part
of
the
object
can
be
found
in
between
that
could
be
the
source
for
a
truth
other
than
the
truth
of
principles
or
of
inferences
from
principles.
On
the
other
hand,
however,
since
there
can
be
shown
to
the
will
some
object
that
is
good
absolutely,
not
under
the
idea
of
a
good
to
be
pursued
for
its
own
sake
nor
a
good
ordered
to
another
good,
and
since
74
the
will
can
have
about
such
an
object
an
act
that
need
not
be
disordered,
hence
the
will
can
issue
in
an
act
about
that
object
absolutely,
no
account
being
taken
of
whether
it
is
to
be
loved
for
its
own
sake
or
for
the
sake
of
something
else
(although
the
will
can
thence
apply
the
intellect
to
inquiry
about
how
the
object
should
to
be
willed).
–
From
all
this
four
things
manifestly
emerge,
which
are:
an
imperfect
act
of
willing
a
good
for
the
sake
of
something
else,
which
is
called
use;
a
perfect
act
of
willing
a
good
for
its
own
sake,
which
is
rightly
called
enjoyment;
a
third
act
which
is
neutral
between
these;
and
finally
delight
which
is
consequent
to
an
act.
By
the
name
then
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.3]
of
enjoyment,
which
of
these
four
is
properly
being
referred
to?
The
response,
it
is
evident,
is
that
the
name
cannot
be
attributed
to
a
neutral
act,
nor
again
to
an
imperfect
act,
which
is
use
or
the
pursuit
of
one
thing
in
order
to
another.
The
controversy
then
reduces
to
whether
by
the
term
is
expressed
a
perfect
act,
or
the
delight
consequent
to
a
perfect
act,
or
both.
Above
in
q.2
a.4
we
made
clear
that
pleasure
or
delight,
since
it
is
a
passion,
does
not
have
regard
to
the
idea
of
blessedness;
but
that
enjoyment
imports
both
act
and
delight
seems
to
be
signified
by
Augustine
On
the
Trinity
10.10
when
he
says,
“For
we
enjoy
things
known,
wherein,
being
delighted
for
their
own
sake,
the
will
rests.”
For
when
he
says,
“we
enjoy
things
known,”
this
pertains
to
the
act,
because
presupposed
to
the
act
of
the
will
is
an
act
of
the
intellect
toward
the
thing
known;
but
when
he
adds,
“wherein…the
will…,”
he
insinuates
that
to
the
essence
of
enjoyment
delight
too
equally
belongs.
Similarly
in
83
Questions
q.30
he
says,
“We
are
said
to
enjoy
the
thing
from
which
we
take
pleasure.”
So
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.5]
what
really
is
the
proper
signification
of
this
term
is
not
easy
to
see;
nevertheless
it
can
be
conjectured
from
the
use
of
the
term;
for
the
verb
‘to
enjoy,
to
take
joy
in’
is
constructed
with
a
transitive
object,
and
this
sort
of
construction
belongs
to
words
that
signify
an
act
that
passes
over
into
the
object;
the
verb
is
not
constructed
with
an
instrumental
object
of
cause,
which
sort
of
construction
is
due
to
undergoings
signified
by
purely
passive
verbs
(as
in
‘to
be
hit
by’).
For
to
say
‘I
am
joyed
by
God’
is
an
error,
just
as
‘I
am
delighted
by
God’
or
‘God
delights
me’
is
correct;
rather
I
am
said
‘to
enjoy
God,
to
take
joy
in
God’
transitively,
the
way
I
am
said
‘to
love
God,
to
have
love
for
God’;
so
this
is
what
seems
to
be
the
more
proper
signification
of
the
term.9
However
[Oxon.
ibid.],
one
should
not
contend
overmuch
about
the
signification
of
terms
when
it
is
clear
what
the
thing
signified
is,
as
Augustine
advises
On
the
Trinity
5.7
when
he
says,
“Wherefore
one
should
not
consider
in
things
how
the
usage
of
our
speech
allows
or
does
not
allow
them
to
be
said,
but
what
is
the
understanding
of
things
themselves
that
shines
forth.”
But
it
shines
forth
that
the
will
has
power
for
a
perfect
act,
which
is
enjoyment,
for
an
imperfect
act,
which
is
called
use,
and
also
for
another
act,
which
is
not
the
former
or
the
latter;
9
[Tr.
Thus
‘to
enjoy’,
as
a
transitive
verb
focused
on
the
object
of
the
act
and
not
as
a
passive
verb
focused
on
the
subject
of
the
act,
must
signify
a
perfect
act
rather
than
the
subjective
delight
following
that
act.
The
issue
of
grammar
Scotus
raises
here
relates
to
peculiarities
of
Latin,
not
English,
because
the
Latin
for
‘to
enjoy’
is
‘fruor’,
and
‘fruor’
is
an
active
verb
in
grammatically
passive
form
which
takes
a
direct
object
in
grammatically
indirect
or
instrumental
form.
Hence
the
need
to
explain
that
one
should
not
let
one’s
understanding
of
the
word’s
meaning
be
confused
by
the
surface
grammar.]
75
and
also
that
the
will
is
the
subject
of
the
delight
that
follows
an
act.
It
is
also
clear
that
the
signification
of
the
term
enjoyment
does
not
in
any
way
fit
a
neutral
act
or
an
imperfect
act;
but
some
seem
to
use
the
term
for
either
of
the
other
two,
or
for
both
together.
From
this
it
follows
that
‘to
enjoy’
has
to
be
an
equivocal
term;
or
if
it
is
univocal,
then
the
authorities
brought
in
from
Augustine
signifying
that
‘to
enjoy’
imports
act
and
delight
are
in
need
of
explanation,
and
one
must
say
that
the
authorities
are
true
to
the
extent
that
the
object
of
enjoyment
is
the
cause
of
delight,
or
at
least
that
delight
accompanies
enjoyment,
but
not
that
delight
is
included
in
the
formal
idea
of
enjoyment.
Article
Two:
Whether
Enjoyment
befits
only
the
Rational
Creature
or
also
Brute
Animals
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.5
n.3,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.4]
one
must
say
that
enjoyment
belongs
to
no
creature
inferior
to
man.
Declaration:
for
by
the
name
of
enjoyment
we
mean
to
express
the
act
of
inhering
in
an
object
for
that
object’s
sake,
and
this
act
has
the
resting
of
delight
as
concomitant,
or
it
is
the
resting
itself,
that
is,
the
act
which
is
the
ultimate
term
of
the
power,
insofar
as
the
power
has
its
term
and
its
rest
in
its
own
act;
so
much
so
that
it
does
not
seem
to
be
of
the
idea
of
enjoyment
that
it
must
give
rest
to
the
power
on
the
part
of
the
object,
but
rather
on
the
part
of
the
power
inhering
in
the
object
for
the
object’s
own
sake.
–
From
this
it
follows
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.3ff.]
that,
over
and
above
the
divine
will,
which
simply
and
necessarily
and
per
se
enjoys
first
the
infinite
good,
there
is
also
the
will
of
blessed
minds
enjoying
the
Deity
simply
and
perpetually
and
per
se,
but
not
first;
additionally
the
will
of
the
just
wayfarer
enjoys
the
Deity
simply
and
per
se
but
not
immovably
nor
first;
the
will
of
the
one
mortally
sinning
enjoys
simply,
as
far
as
concerns
the
part
of
the
will
giving
itself
rest,
for
the
will
rests
in
the
object
which
it
per
se
loves,
but
the
will
does
not
simply
rest
as
far
as
concerns
the
part
of
the
object;
nor
does
enjoyment
require
this,
but
because
the
object
does
not
give
rest
of
itself,
so
that
the
power
may
in
its
act
be
at
rest
in
it,
for
that
reason
such
enjoyment
is
disordered.
Nevertheless
the
one
gravely
sinning
does
commonly
take
joy
in
himself.
For
he
pursues
the
object
of
his
act
with
the
love
of
concupiscence;
so
he
must
love
something
else
with
the
love
of
friendship;
for
a
love
of
friendship
precedes
any
love
of
concupiscence.
That
something
else,
then,
is
himself,
for
whose
sake,
as
for
the
thing
loved
with
love
of
friendship,
he
has
concupiscent
desire
of
the
object
that
he
inheres
in
with
his
act.
He
does
not,
then,
enjoy
the
object
of
his
act,
nor
consequently
does
he
enjoy
the
act,
which
should
not
be
the
first
thing
he
is
turned
back
to;
rather
he
enjoys
himself,
as
was
said.
However
[Oxon.
ibid.
5]
none
of
this
can
in
any
way
fit
the
sensitive
appetite.
For
although
the
sensitive
appetite
inheres
in
some
way
in
agreeable
things
for
their
own
sake,
that
is,
negatively
not
for
the
sake
of
another
(because
it
does
not
have
the
wherewithal
to
refer
them
to
something
else),
yet
not
contrarily
so,
because
it
does
not
value
the
object
as
not
referable
to
something
else;
therefore
it
is
said
improperly
and
abusively
to
enjoy,
because
what
it
adheres
to
it
does
not
refer
to
something
else;
but,
as
we
said,
it
does
not
have
the
wherewithal
to
refer
or
not
to
refer
one
thing
to
another.
–
Next,
neither
does
it
inhere
with
love,
because
‘to
love’
76
does
not
properly
belong
to
it.
–
Lastly,
neither
does
it
properly
inhere,
because
it
does
not
apply
itself
to
the
object,
but
is
as
it
were
fixed
by
the
force
of
the
object
that
it
is
led
by
and
drawn.
–
Wherefore
much
less
should
all
the
other
beings,
which
are
destitute
of
sensitive
appetite
and
of
the
knowledge
necessary
for
desiring,
be
said,
because
of
their
natural
appetite,
to
enjoy
anything,
even
abusively.
For
if,
in
the
act
of
enjoying,
a
proper
cognitive
power,
which
agrees
more
with
the
will,
where
enjoyment
is
proper,
and
which
corresponds
to
it,
the
way
the
intellect
pre-‐
shows
to
the
will
any
object
whatever
–
if
this
cognitive
power
does
not
fit
the
sensitive
appetite,
then
in
no
way
can
the
idea
of
enjoyment
be
attributed
to
natural
appetite,
even
in
the
improper
sense
in
which
it
does
fit
the
sensitive
appetite.
[From
reply
to
objections
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.7]:
although
natural
appetite
inheres
in
something
for
that
thing’s
sake
negatively,
yet,
for
the
most
part,
not
contrarily;
and
if
sometimes
it
does
inhere
contrarily,
it
does
not
inhere
with
love;
however
it
does
not
even
properly
inhere,
but
is
fixed
as
it
were
on
the
object
by
what
gives
it
its
nature,
and
not
by
an
elicited
act
that
is
other
than
the
nature
(such
as
happens
even
in
the
case
of
sensitive
appetite),
but
only
by
the
habitual
inclination
of
nature.
Hence,
as
was
said
before,
enjoyment
belongs
less
to
natural
appetite
than
to
sensitive
appetite,
which
does
by
an
elicited
act
inhere
as
it
were
in
an
already
known
object,
although
it
does
not
do
so
freely.
But
natural
appetite
has
its
perpetual
inclination
without
any
knowledge.]
Article
Three:
Whether
Enjoyment
is
only
of
the
Ultimate
End.
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.5
n.2,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.4]
let
the
first
statement
for
the
solution
be:
the
blessedness
of
intellectual
nature
consists
simply
in
that
act
alone
which
is
enjoyment.
Declaration:
there
is
a
double
act
in
kind
of
the
will,
namely
willing
and
refusing.
The
act
of
willing
is
also
itself
double
in
kind,
either
for
the
sake
of
the
thing
(or
the
good
of
the
thing)
willed,
or
for
the
sake
of
the
one
(or
the
good
of
the
one)
who
wills.
The
first
willing
is
said
to
be
the
love
of
friendship;
the
second
the
love
of
concupiscence;
and
only
the
first
willing
is
enjoyment,
which
is
‘to
inhere
with
love
in
another
thing
for
the
sake
of
that
other
thing
itself’.
–
With
this
distinction
as
premise,
I
prove
the
conclusion:
for
blessedness
cannot
be
placed
in
any
refusing,
both
because
the
object
of
refusing
is
the
bad,
which
cannot
be
the
beatific
object,
and
because
the
beatific
act
is
first
and
immediate
with
respect
to
the
ultimate
end,
and
so
is
not
had
by
virtue
of
any
prior
act
of
will;
but
refusing
is
not
first
with
respect
to
the
ultimate
end;
rather
it
is
not
even
simply
first
among
acts
of
the
will,
for
the
will
does
not
commonly
issue
in
the
refusal
of
anything
save
because
it
first
wants
something
else,
according
to
Anselm
On
the
Fall
of
the
Devil
3,
where
he
writes:
“No
one
deserts
justice
save
by
wanting
something
that
does
not
stand
along
with
justice,”
and
he
gives
an
example
about
a
miser,
money,
and
bread.
The
second
statement
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.3]
is
that
blessedness
does
not
consist
in
an
act
of
love
of
concupiscence.
Proof:
for
even
though
that
act
could
be
good,
if
it
has
the
right
circumstances,
yet
it
is
not
good
by
reason
of
itself
or
its
object,
even
when
not
excluding
the
supreme
good.
For
it
can
be
immoderate,
as
appears
from
Augustine
83
Questions
q.30,
“Perversity,”
he
says,
“is
in
using
what
should
be
enjoyed.”
Likewise
in
Ia
q.63
a.3
it
was
made
clear
that
the
angel
first
sinned
by
77
immoderately
coveting
for
itself
the
beatific
object,
as
Anselm
maintains
On
the
Fall
of
the
Devil
6,
when
he
says
that
some
of
the
angels
had
appetite
for
what
they
would
have
obtained
if
they
had
stood.
But
these
angels
desired
nothing
first
or
more
than
blessedness;
for
the
affection
for
advantage
is
inclined
to
that
first
and
supremely.
On
the
other
hand,
however,
the
act
of
friendship
in
respect
of
God
is
good
by
reason
of
itself
and
its
object;
at
least
it
cannot
be
immoderate
by
excess,
though
perhaps
it
can
by
deficiency.
–
Next,
an
act
of
concupiscence
neither
is
nor
can
be
the
first
act
of
the
will
with
respect
to
the
end;
for
every
act
of
concupiscence
is
in
virtue
of
some
act
of
friendship;
because
it
is
for
this
reason
that
I
covet
a
good
for
this
man,
because
I
love
this
man
for
whom
I
covet
and
wish
well
being.
–
Again,
an
act
of
love
of
friendship
is
in
the
will
according
to
the
will’s
having
been
endowed
with
the
affection
of
justice;
for
if
it
had
only
affection
for
advantage,
plainly
it
would
only
be
able
to
will
supreme
advantage
for
itself,
according
to
Anselm
On
the
Fall
of
the
Devil
14.
But
an
act
of
concupiscence
is
in
the
will
insofar
as
it
has
affection
for
advantage,
because
concupiscence
according
to
this
affection
is
necessarily
present
in
the
will,
even
if
it
were
alone
there.
But
nobler
in
the
reason
is
the
affection
of
justice
than
the
affection
of
advantage,
because
it
is
ruler
and
moderator
of
the
latter,
according
to
Anselm,
and
is
proper
to
the
will
insofar
as
the
will
is
free,
since
the
affection
of
advantage
would
be
present
in
the
will
even
if
the
will
were
not
free.
An
act
then
elicited
according
to
the
affection
of
justice
is
more
excellent
than
an
act
from
the
will
according
to
the
affection
of
advantage.
–
Lastly,
an
act
of
friendship
tends
to
the
object
as
the
object
is
good
in
itself;
but
an
act
of
concupiscence
tends
to
it
as
it
is
good
for
me.
But
the
object
is
nobler
in
itself
than
as
it
is
possessed
by
someone;
at
any
rate
the
having
or
possessing
of
the
object
in
relation
to
the
possessor,
which
is
the
formal
idea
in
the
object
as
thus
compared,
takes
away
from
the
objective
perfection
that
the
good
has
as
it
is
in
itself;
so
blessedness
cannot
consist
in
an
act
of
love
of
concupiscence;
and
this
is
what
was
to
be
shown.
Article
Four:
Whether
Enjoyment
is
only
of
the
End
Possessed.
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.5
n.4]
one
must
say
that
enjoyment
is
not
only
in
respect
of
the
end
had
or
possessed,
but
also
in
order
to
it
when
it
is
not
there
in
its
presence.
For
from
what
was
said
in
aa.1-‐2,
provided
the
will
inheres
with
love
in
something
for
its
own
sake,
it
is
truly
said
to
enjoy
that
thing.
Hence
too
those
who
mortally
sin
are
said
to
enjoy
on
the
part
of
their
depraved
will
which
rests
itself
in
the
object
that
it
loves
for
the
sake
of
itself.
Since
therefore
the
wayfarer,
not
possessing
the
ultimate
end,
is
able
to
inhere
in
it
with
love
for
its
own
sake,
and
to
love
with
the
love
of
friendship
what
he
has
present
only
in
his
thought,
truly
he
enjoys
it;
for
this
alone
is
required
by
enjoyment;
and
if
this
act
tends
to
the
object
as
shown
to
him
with
intuitive
vision
by
the
intellect,
he
will
be
perfectly
blessed;
but
he
is
not
such
in
respect
of
an
end
that
is
not
there
in
that
real
presence
of
it
by
which
it
is
intuitively
seen
by
the
blessed.
Intervening
Article:
Whether
the
Enjoyment
of
the
Way
and
of
the
Fatherland
differ
in
Species
78
Response:
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.5
n.5,
Reportatio
ibid.
q.4]
it
seems
more
probable
that
these
two
enjoyments
differ
in
species,
formally
indeed
in
themselves
but
effectively
from
their
causes
or
the
disposition
of
their
causes.
For
if
intellection
is
posited
as
a
partial
cause
of
volition,
then,
since
the
wayfarer’s
intellection
and
the
beatific
vision
differ
in
species,
the
effects
too
that
necessarily
pre-‐require
those
specifically
diverse
causes
equally
differ
in
species.
For
an
individual
of
the
same
species
never
necessarily
requires
a
cause
of
a
different
species
from
that
which
another
individual
of
the
same
species
requires.
But
if
intellection
is
called
a
sine
qua
non
cause,
it
is
at
least
in
its
essence
required.
And
then
as
before:
diverse
individuals
of
the
same
species
do
not
necessarily
require
among
their
causes
any
cause
of
a
different
species;
according
to
this
opinion,
then,
the
enjoyable
object
is
a
sine
qua
non
cause.
And
then
on
the
part
of
the
object
there
can
be
preserved
a
distinction
of
enjoyments
arising
from
a
distinction
of
unions,
just
as
from
the
diverse
proximity
of
the
agent
to
the
passive
thing
there
is
a
variation
of
effects;
for
an
agent
that
is
opposite
to
and
approaches
the
passive
thing
along
a
straight
line
acts
differently
from
one
that
does
so
along
a
reflex
or
broken
line;
but
knowledge
here
is
as
it
were
the
proximity
of
the
object
to
the
will;
for
the
wayfarer,
certainly,
the
object
approaches
the
will
through
knowledge
darkly,
but
in
the
fatherland
it
is
seen
face
to
face
and
in
its
real
presence.
–
By
holding
this
second
way
[sc.
intellection
as
a
sine
qua
non
cause],
there
is
no
need
to
concede
that,
by
the
absolute
power
of
God,
there
can
be
caused
in
the
soul
of
a
wayfarer,
who
does
not
see
God
nakedly,
any
enjoyment
equal
to
the
lowest
enjoyment
possible
to
any
of
the
blessed.
Because
the
supreme
of
the
lowest
species
cannot
equal
the
lowest
of
a
higher
species,
for
the
whole
of
the
former
is
below
the
whole
of
the
latter.
But,
according
to
the
first
way
[sc.
intellection
as
a
partial
cause],
it
is
difficult
to
prevent
the
possibility
of
there
being
in
the
soul
of
the
wayfarer,
while
he
knows
darkly,
as
much
or
as
intense
an
enjoyment
as
is
equal
to
some
given
beatific
enjoyment.
QUESTION
TWELVE:
ABOUT
INTENTION.
IN
FIVE
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Intention
is
an
Act
of
the
Intellect
or
the
Will
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.38
n.2,
Reportatio
ibid.
n.2]
one
needs
first
to
look
at
the
signification
of
this
term
‘to
intend’,
and
then
to
respond
to
the
question
asked.
‘To
intend’
then
(according
to
the
etymology
of
the
word)
is
the
same
as
‘to
tend
to
another’.
But
this
can
be
taken
first
in
a
certain
general
signification,
namely
either
to
have
from
something
else
that
one
tends
to
another,
or
to
be
moved
to
it
by
oneself.
Also
it
is
possible
to
tend
to
something
as
a
present
object
or
to
a
term
distant
or
absent.
In
this
acceptation
it
is
clear
that
‘to
tend
to
another’
belongs
to
any
power
in
respect
of
its
object.
But
more
properly
‘to
tend’
is
taken
for
that
which
so
tends
to
another
that
it
is
not
led
or
drawn
to
it
but
rather
moves
and
leads
itself
to
it;
and
this
signification
excludes
all
natural
powers,
for
it
belongs
only
to
a
free
power
to
tend
in
this
way
to
another.
For
the
sensitive
appetite
is
led
and
drawn
by
objects
agreeable
to
it,
and
much
more
so
are
all
the
natural
powers.
79
One
must
therefore
say
[Oxon.
ibid.,
Reportatio
ibid.]
that
intention
belongs
formally
and
principally
to
the
will
alone,
although
it
pre-‐requires
an
act
of
the
intellect.
And
indeed
when
one
derives
‘intention’
from
‘to
intend’,
not
as
taken
in
its
general
and
extended
sense,
but
as
it
is
taken
properly,
intention
cannot
be
an
act
of
a
power
other
than
the
will.
But
because
freely
willing
belongs
to
the
whole
of
free
decision,
including
intellect
and
will,
intention
will
belong
to
this
whole
power,
and
to
another
power
not
in
respect
of
its
object
but
in
respect
of
its
end.
For
since,
according
to
Anselm,
there
is
in
every
volition
a
‘what’
and
a
‘why’,
intending
does
not
have
regard
to
the
‘what’
but
to
the
‘why’,
namely
insofar
as
it
tends
to
something
as
a
distant
thing
to
be
attained
through
some
intermediary;
intention
therefore
will
be
an
act
of
free
decision
by
reason
of
will.
For
someone
who
wants
medicine
for
the
sake
of
health
is
not
said
to
intend
the
medicine,
even
if
this
object
is
freely
willed;
rather
he
in
fact
intends
the
absent
health
but
as
to
be
acquired
through
the
medicine.
The
act
that
has
regard
to
the
end
is
intention;
but
the
act
with
respect
to
the
means
is
not
called
intention
but
choice
or
use.
And
if
the
act
of
willing
is
the
same,
the
use
or
choice
of
means
and
the
intention
will
be
the
same;
but
if
it
is
different,
intention
formally
imports
the
act
by
which
the
will
tends
to
the
end,
and
materially
it
imports
that
the
act
whereby
means
are
referred
to
that
end
is
intended.
Article
Two:
Whether
Intention
is
of
the
Ultimate
End
only
Response:
[Reportatio
2
d.38
n.2]
one
must
say
that
intention
can
deal
even
with
a
non-‐ultimate
end.
Indeed
‘ultimate’
can
be
taken
in
two
ways;
for
either
it
is
the
ultimate
simply,
to
which
is
altogether
repugnant
that
it
be
ordered
and
referred
to
something
else;
or
it
is
the
ultimate
negatively
and
for
the
present
moment,
namely
insofar
as
it
is
not
actually
ordered
to
anything
else
although
it
could
in
fact
be
so
ordered.
As
to
ultimate
understood
in
the
first
way,
there
is
no
need
that
every
intention
deal
with
such
an
ultimate
immediately.
But,
as
regard
the
second
meaning,
one
should
say
that
intention
in
this
sense
is
precisely
in
respect
of
the
ultimate
end
then
actually
being
thought
about.
An
example:
bestowing
alms
on
a
pauper
so
that
he
may
eat;
this
end,
which
the
giver
of
alms
intends,
is
not
an
ultimate
end
which
cannot
be
referred
to
another
end;
but
if
in
addition
he
intends
God,
who
prescribes
that
one
aid
the
poor
with
alms,
then
his
intention
is
about
the
ultimate
end,
which
intention
can
never
be
the
choice
or
use
of
means
to
the
end.
Article
Three:
Whether
Anyone
can
intend
two
things
Simultaneously
Response:
since
in
Ia
q.85
a.4
it
was
shown
in
many
ways
that
we
can
at
the
same
time
understand
several
things,
however
disparate
these
are
and
however
much
they
exclude
unity
with
respect
to
the
apprehending
intellect
(even
though
the
more
that
several
things
are
understood
at
the
same
time,
the
less
perfection
and
intensity
the
acts
have
that
reach
the
individual
items),
we
say
accordingly
as
a
result,
in
response
to
the
question
asked,
that
the
will
can
equally
intend
several
things
at
once;
for
it
is
clear
that
several,
even
disparate
ends
can
occur
to
the
mind
at
the
same
time,
and
that
the
will
can
intend
them
and
be
moved
to
the
pursuit
of
them,
at
80
least
to
the
extent
opportunity
permits.
Because
these
two
points
therefore
are
connected
with
each
other,
and
because
the
question
as
to
the
intellect
has
been
expounded
at
large,
we
have
thought
that
nothing
further
should
be
added
here.
But
see
the
cited
article.
Article
Four:
Whether
Will
of
the
End
is
the
same
act
as
Will
of
what
is
for
the
End
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.38,
Reportatio
ibid.]
consequent
to
what
was
said
above
in
q.8
a.3,
this
act
can
be
single
and
also
double,
one
terminating
at
the
end
and
the
other
having
regard
to
what
is
for
the
end.
For
the
unifying
act
is
one
and
yet
it
has
two
objects
or
terms,
otherwise
a
conclusion
true
because
of
the
principles
could
not
by
any
act
be
understood,
nor
could
what
is
for
the
end
be
intended
because
of
the
end.
Intention
therefore
can
be
one
act
unifying
two;
it
can
also
equally
be
a
twofold
distinct
act
intending,
with
a
different
intensity
in
each
case,
that
in
itself
which
is
for
the
end
in
itself.
And
perhaps,
when
it
is
a
unifying
act,
the
two
other
acts
are
distinct
in
themselves;
because
unless,
when
it
is
a
unifying
act,
it
is
at
the
same
time
of
this
act
in
itself
and
of
that
act
in
itself,
no
judgment
would
rightly
be
passed
on
the
agreement
or
difference
of
these
acts
in
themselves.
Nor
do
I
see
how
these
acts,
distinct
in
themselves,
may
be
destroyed
when
the
unifying
act
supervenes.
For
just
as
sight
has
a
distinct
act
in
itself
of
whiteness
and
another
distinct
in
itself
of
blackness
when
it
is
actually
judging
their
diversity,
so
the
intellect
that
has
an
act
unifying
two
acts
attains
each
of
these
extremes
in
itself
in
distinct
acts,
and
the
will
too
when
comparing
and
tending
to
the
end
by
means
of
what
is
for
the
end.
Article
Five:
Whether
Intention
belongs
to
Brute
Animals
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.38,
1
d.1
q.5,
Reportatio
ibid.]
the
solution
of
the
present
question
you
have
expressly
in
a.1
above.
For
there
it
was
said
that
‘to
intend’
in
its
proper
signification
pertains
precisely
to
a
free
power,
and
that
it
belongs
properly
to
free
decision
to
intend
an
end
by
reason
of
the
will.
So
although,
to
the
extent
that
‘intend’,
according
to
the
comparison
of
the
word,
means
‘to
tend
to
another’,
in
which
acceptation
it
belongs
to
any
power
altogether
to
intend,
and
thus
‘intention’
in
this
derivation
exists
also
in
brute
animals,
nevertheless,
in
the
proper
signification
of
the
term,
‘intention’
cannot
belong
to
them,
since
a
free
power
is
thoroughly
repugnant
to
them.
Hence
in
q.11
a.2
above
it
was
said
that
brutes
cannot
be
said
to
enjoy
agreeable
objects,
because
they
do
not
love
them
with
the
love
of
friendship
but
for
the
sake
of
their
own
advantage,
driven
by
a
natural
instinct,
by
which
instinct
they
are
drawn
and
led
by
the
objects
in
which
they
sense
their
well
being.
Hence,
in
the
way
they
are
only
abusively
said
to
enjoy,
so
in
the
same
way
and
mode
does
intending
an
end
belong
to
them.
QUESTION
THIRTEEN:
ABOUT
CHOICE,
WHICH
IS
AN
ACT
OF
WILL
IN
RESPECT
OF
THINGS
FOR
THE
END.
IN
SIX
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Choice
is
an
Act
of
the
Will
or
of
Reason
81
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.38,
Reportatio
ibid.]
one
must
say
that
choice
is
an
act
of
free
decision
by
reason
of
the
will,
as
was
said
in
q.12
a.1
above
about
intention
in
its
proper
signification.
For
to
the
same
appetitive
power
belongs
willing,
or
intending,
the
end
and
picking
out
by
deliberation
and
discussion
of
means
those
of
them
that
reason
dictates
are
more
efficacious
and
suitable
for
attaining
the
end
(cf.
Ia
q.83
intervening
a.3,
Oxon.
Prol.
q.4
n.20];
although
sometimes
in
the
efficacious
intention
itself
of
the
end
the
means
too
are
willed,
when
there
is
no
need
for
deliberation
and
debate
as
to
the
choice
of
them.
For
then
at
once
“choice
is
the
principle
of
the
act”
(as
the
Philosopher
says
Ethics
6.2),
not
the
principle
‘for
the
sake
of
which’
but
that
which
is
‘origin
of
motion’,
that
is,
not
the
final
cause,
but
the
effecting
cause
of
the
things
the
will
chooses
so
as
to
possess
the
willed
end.
But
this
[Oxon.
2
d.6
q.1
n.4]
happens
whenever
in
the
efficacious
volition
of
the
end
the
means
too
that
are
necessary
for
attaining
it
have
been
searched
out.
For
the
most
part,
however,
choice
is
an
act
of
will
consequent
to
a
conclusion
of
the
practical
syllogism;
and
this
choice
proceeds
from
an
efficacious
volition
of
the
object,
which
volition,
as
long
as
it
is
in
place,
happens
thereon
to
command
the
investigation
of
means
by
which,
as
deduced
through
the
practical
syllogism,
the
will
choses
those
that
right
reason
concludes
are
more
opportune
for
attaining
the
end;
choice
then
is
this
result
of
a
conclusion
of
the
practical
syllogism.
But
whether
[Collationes
3]
the
dictate
of
the
intellect
is
in
every
way
an
active
principle,
or
is
so
at
least
on
the
part
of
the
choice
that
follows
it,
or
whether
it
is
an
occasion
and
a
sine
qua
non
cause
is
doubtful.
Above
q.9
a.1
we
showed
that
the
known
object
cannot
be
in
every
way
the
cause
of
volition;
but
although
the
same
evidence
does
not
make
it
as
equally
clear
that
partial
causality
is
repugnant
to
the
object,
yet
no
necessity
for
constructing
a
partial
causality
of
it
appears,
since
the
will
itself
can
be
the
adequate
cause
of
its
acts,
once
a
displaying
of
the
object
has
preceded;
for
this
agrees
more
with
the
will’s
dominating
power
and
befits
its
independent
excellence.
Such
a
thing
we
cannot
affirm
of
the
intellect,
since
the
act
of
understanding
is
a
formal
likeness
of
the
object.
On
the
hypothesis,
however,
that
the
dictate
of
the
intellect
is
posited
as
having
an
active
influence
on
choice
as
a
partial
cause
of
it,
this
hypothesis
would
not
be
excluded
by
the
objection
that
the
causality
and
influx
of
the
intellect
on
an
act
of
will
is
natural.
For
whenever
two
causes
come
per
se
together
for
acting,
if
the
principal
cause
is
free,
however
less
principal
the
necessary
one
may
be,
the
action
proceeds
therefrom
freely.
An
example:
in
an
act
of
seeing
there
come
together
both
the
power
of
seeing,
which
is
a
natural
cause,
and
the
will
applying
the
eye
to
seeing
this
or
that
object;
but
because
the
latter
is
the
more
principal
cause,
we
are
said
to
look
about
freely,
since
it
is
in
the
power
of
the
will
to
turn
sight
away
from
or
toward
these
or
those
objects.
And
in
this
way,
since
the
dictate
of
the
intellect
is
not
the
principal
cause
of
choice,
but
rather
the
will
freely
and
willingly
chooses
these
means
setting
aside
other
ones
shown
it
by
the
intellect,
choice
is
said
to
be
free,
even
though
the
dictate
of
reason
is
said
to
concur
in
part
along
with
it.
[From
reply
to
objections:
right
choice
does
indeed
require
a
right
dictate
of
the
intellect
first,
although
the
will
is
able
without
any
effort
to
try
for
things
against
right
reason,
and
to
will
what
reason
declares
is
not
to
be
willed,
and
conversely;
82
hence,
when
the
will
chooses
means
according
to
right
reason,
the
consequence
is
not
that
the
dictate
of
the
intellect
has
an
active
influence
on
such
a
choice,
since
on
the
contrary
the
will
can
issue
in
an
act
against
or
at
a
tangent
to
the
dictate,
or
even
refrain
from
any
act.
So
the
specification
of
acts
that
comes
from
the
dictates
of
the
intellect
does
not
seem
to
be
present
in
the
acts
because
of
the
active
influx
on
volition
or
choice
of
the
dictating
intellect;
otherwise,
when
the
intellect
gives
a
dictate
about
means
that
are
uniquely
necessary
for
attaining
the
end,
but
the
will
by
its
innate
liberty
opposes
the
dictate
and
chooses
the
contrary
part,
whence
comes
the
specification
of
the
act?
For
evil
or
perversity,
since
it
is
something
privative,
cannot
be
the
cause
of
a
positive
act;
therefore
[Oxon.
2
d.25]
when
an
act
is
right
as
far
as
right
reason
shows,
then
this
act,
which
brings
rectitude
down
with
it
because
of
its
conformity
to
the
right
rule
of
reason,
is
wholly
from
the
will.
It
seems
then
that
the
dictate
of
the
intellect
is
a
sort
of
occasion
or
sine
qua
non
cause
of
choice.]
Article
Two:
Whether
Choice
belongs
to
Brute
Animals
Response:
one
must
say
[Metaphysics
1
q.3
n.2]
that
it
does
not
belong
to
brute
animals
to
act
from
choice
of
means
to
an
end.
For
since
brute
animals
are
set
in
motion
by
natural
instinct
conferred
on
them
by
the
Author
of
nature,
what
they
do
necessarily
follows
the
whole
species,
such
that
they
cannot
act
both
thus
and
otherwise.
In
this
way
a
lamb
follows
its
mother
and
flees
a
wolf,
ants
gather
seeds,
on
which
they
feed
in
winter,
swallows
build
nests,
in
which
they
hatch
their
young;
but
these
and
the
like
things
are
not
done
by
them
from
some
memory
of
the
past,
because
ants
and
birds
and
other
brutes
just
born
are
led
as
equally
to
do
the
like
things
as
are
those
that
have
lived
for
several
years;
so
there
is
no
deliberation
in
brutes,
or
prudence,
which
is
a
deliberative
habit
about
what
is
for
the
end
and
concerns,
not
necessary
things,
but
contingent
ones,
which
can
only
happen
and
be
done
otherwise
by
those
who
operate
from
deliberation
and
the
discussion
of
means,
choosing
these
ones
and
not
those;
so
it
is
manifest
that
brutes
do
not
act
from
choice,
because
they
are
led
necessarily
by
natural
instinct,
and
to
embrace
this
means
or
that
is
not
in
their
power
but
they
follow
only
the
things
that
have
been
most
wisely
ordained
for
them
by
divine
Wisdom;
for
[Metaphysics
12
q.4,
Oxon.
1
d.3
q.5]
nature
is
a
sort
of
divine
art,
enfolding
in
itself
the
measures
of
all
things,
their
number
and
weight,
which
are
seen
unfolded
in
nature;
“for
measure”
(says
Augustine
On
Genesis
4.5)
“fixes
for
all
things
their
manner;
number
provides
them
with
their
species;
and
weight
draws
them
to
rest
and
stability.”
Therefore
it
is
impossible
for
anything
that
is
moved
and
drawn
by
natural
instinct
to
act
differently
from
what
has
been
by
divine
art
prescribed
to
it;
and
for
this
reason
only
metaphorically
are
there
in
brutes
prudence
and
foresight
and
choice,
which
properly
can
have
place
in
free
causes.
Article
Three:
Whether
Choice
is
only
of
what
is
for
the
End
or
also
sometimes
of
the
End
itself
83
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.38
n.2,
4
d.49
q.10
n.7,
3
d.18
n.11,
3
d.36
n.15]
one
must
say
that
choice
is
only
of
what
is
for
the
end;
however
the
end
does
sometimes
fall
under
choice,
when
it
is
ordered
to
a
further
end.
For
the
will’s
job
is
to
intend
the
end,
not
to
choose
it,
and
when
the
end
is
efficaciously
willed,
the
will
commands
the
intellect
to
inquire
and
deliberate
about
the
means
that
lead
to
its
acquisition;
and
after
the
means
are
shown
to
the
will,
the
will
thereon
chooses
these
ones
among
them
and
leaves
the
rest.
Choice
is
therefore
of
what
is
for
the
end
and
is
properly
an
act
of
will
following
a
conclusion
that
is
deduced
by
deliberation
from
a
practical
syllogism.
But
[Oxon.
3
d.32
n.5,
d36
n.18]
although
the
will
intends
the
end
and
chooses
means
in
order
to
obtain
it,
yet
the
end
which
it
intends
is
not
always
the
ultimate
end,
but
an
end
that,
from
the
nature
of
the
thing,
is
ordered
to
another
end;
and
for
this
reason
the
will
can
use
this
end,
because
it
was
in
an
inferior
order,
as
a
means
to
another
and
further
end.
An
example:
man
is
himself
the
end
of
the
sensible
world,
but
he
is
of
his
nature
ordered
to
the
ultimate
end
for
the
sake
of
which
he
was
made.
The
virtues
too
are
the
ends
of
particulars
and
of
the
choices
corresponding
to
them,
but
yet
the
virtues
are
themselves
means
for
the
attaining
of
blessedness,
which
is
not
ordered
to
another
end.
Article
Four:
Whether
Choice
is
only
of
Things
that
are
Done
by
Us
Response:
there
is
here
this
opinion:
just
as
intention
is
of
the
end,
so
choice
is
of
what
is
for
the
end;
now
the
end
is
either
an
action
or
a
thing;
and
when
the
end
is
a
thing,
some
human
action
must
intervene
whereby
a
man
may
make
the
thing
which
is
the
end,
as
the
doctor
makes
health
which
he
intends
as
end,
or
at
least
whereby
a
man
may
possess
or
use
the
thing
which
is
the
end,
just
as
for
a
miser
the
end
is
money
or
the
possession
of
it;
and
similarly
as
to
what
is
for
the
end;
for
what
is
for
the
end
is
either
a
human
action
or
a
thing
that
is
to
be
possessed
or
used
in
some
human
action;
it
is
evident,
therefore,
that
choice
is
always
of
things
that
are
done
by
us.
This
opinion
is
not
to
be
rejected
[Oxon.
Prol.
q.4
n.21,
3
d.15
n.17],
unless
perhaps
its
understanding
is
that
choice
must
always
flow
out
into
commanded
acts
that
are
to
be
performed
by
the
exterior
powers,
or
is
that
what
one
has
been
pleased
to
choose
must
be
entrusted
to
execution.
For
if
there
is
a
choice
on
its
own,
without
order
to
a
commanded
act,
namely
because
of
a
lack
of
matter
for
the
exterior
act,
there
is
a
true
choice
of
things
that
are
for
the
end,
and
yet
we
cannot
bring
it
about
that
these
things
for
the
end
are
ordered,
that
is,
placed
in
existence.
The
assumption
is
made
plain
thus:
for
someone
who
lacks
money
but
who
has
money
placed
in
front
of
his
intellect,
if,
before
his
choice
is
the
effective
principle
of
any
act
or
is
ordered
to
the
commanding
of
something,
so
that
it
may
be
entrusted
to
execution
–
if
this
someone
chooses
to
distribute
money
generously,
should
he
possess
any,
no
further
pursuit
is
required
as
far
as
the
act
and
habit
of
virtue
is
concerned;
because
once
an
object
about
which
there
can
be
an
act
of
liberality
has
been
presented,
there
is
complete
possession
of
the
choice
from
which
the
virtue
of
generosity
is
generated
or
which
is
elicited
by
generosity,
and
no
exterior
pursuit
or
order
to
exterior
acts
is
any
further
required,
given
the
hypothesis
that
money
for
84
generous
bestowal
is
not
to
hand.
–
Next,
this
order
of
choice
to
a
commanded
act
can
only
be
the
order
of
a
cause
with
respect
to
producing
the
effect.
But
that
the
cause
should
in
itself,
as
it
precedes
the
effect,
not
be
of
this
sort
but
should
have
it
as
something
received
from
the
effect
insofar
as
it
is
ordered
to
the
production
of
that
effect,
seems
unacceptable,
since
the
cause
gets
nothing
from
the
effect
nor
from
its
order
to
it.
So
when
all
ordering
of
choice
to
commanded
acts
to
be
performed
by
us
is
removed,
the
choice
still
stands
complete.
–
Therefore
one
should
admit
the
affirmative
side,
namely
that
choice
is
of
things
that
are
done
by
us,
yet
it
is
not
precisely
there
that
choice
is
found,
since
right
choice
stands
in
place
without
such
order
to
external
acts,
as
has
been
explained.
Article
Five:
Whether
Choice
is
only
of
Possibles
Response:
there
are
some
who
think
that
nothing
at
all
falls
under
choice
that
is
impossible
for
the
chooser
or
is
thought
to
be
so.
–
We,
who
think
the
opposite
of
this
is
truer,
say
that
even
impossibles
can
happen
to
fall
under
choice.
For
evidence
of
this
[Oxon.
2
d.6
q.1
n.3,
4
d.49
q.10
n.13],
one
needs
to
know
that
the
will
has
power
for
two
acts;
by
one
of
these
acts
the
will
absolutely
and
simply
wills
or
the
reverse;
but
by
the
other
it
is
borne
to
this
or
that
thing
only
under
a
condition.
Or
in
other
words:
one
is
efficacious
volition,
the
other
is
volition
of
complacency.
An
example:
someone
sick
who
hopes
that
health
will
be
restored
to
him
wills
the
desired
end
with
efficacious
and
absolute
volition;
so
much
so
that
he
chooses
and
embraces
means
suitable
for
recovering
health.
But
an
invalid
who
despairs
of
gaining
health
does
indeed
want
health,
but
with
a
will
inefficacious,
conditioned,
and
complacent;
because
health
does
in
truth
please
him,
but
since
he
thinks
it
impossible,
he
tends
to
it
with
inefficacious
effort
and
neglects
all
consultation
with
doctors,
nor
does
he
choose
anything
since
he
thinks
everything
is
uselessly
applied
for
attaining
the
end.
This
ineffective
will,
therefore,
which
we
also
rightly
call
conditioned
and
complacent,
can
exist
with
respect
to
impossibles;
for
the
will
can
be
complacent
with
respect
to
impossibles
and
can
tend
to
them
with
inefficacious
effort,
and
for
that
reason
it
does
not
issue
in
choice
nor
does
it
command
the
investigation
of
means,
since
it
thinks
all
are
thoroughly
useless
for
attaining
the
end.
–
Now
volition
of
this
sort,
although
ineffective
and
conditioned,
is
enough
for
merit
and
demerit.
For
a
will
that
follows
the
full
apprehension
of
an
intellect
not
subject
to
passions
disrupting
reason,
and
that
adheres
to
the
object
presented
to
it
with
firm
consent,
can,
even
if
the
effect
is
impossible
for
it,
merit
or
demerit.
An
example:
[Oxon.
Prol.
q.4
n.20]
if
a
pauper,
for
whom
the
getting
of
treasure
is
impossible,
chooses,
when
thinking
of
riches,
to
distribute
them
liberally
whenever
they
might
be
present,
then
he
is
matter
for
merit,
and
he
would
likewise
demerit
if
he
wanted
to
use
the
riches
to
avenge
injuries;
for
although
treasure
is
ex
hypothesi
impossible
for
the
pauper,
and
so,
because
of
the
impossibility
of
the
end,
he
does
not
seek
means
useful
for
attaining
it,
yet,
because
he
adheres
to
the
riches
with
full
consent
and
is
pleased
in
them,
he
is
deliberate
in
his
willing
in
such
a
way
that
he
can
merit
or
demerit.
[From
reply
to
objection:
[Oxon.
2
ibid.
n.4]
choice
is
equivocal:
in
one
way
it
is
taken
for
an
act
of
will
consequent
to
a
full
apprehension
of
the
intellect,
and
in
85
this
way
is
someone
rightly
said
to
sin
from
choice,
for
there
is
no
passion
disturbing
the
intellect
and
no
ignorance
either.
In
another
way
it
is
taken
for
an
act
of
will
consequent
to
the
conclusion
of
a
practical
syllogism;
choice
in
this
sense
indeed
is
nothing
other
than
an
efficacious
volition
of
the
object,
which
volition
thereon
commands
investigation
into
the
means
by
which
the
object
efficaciously
willed
may
be
attained.
–
In
the
first
sense
choice
is
of
impossible
things,
as
the
Philosopher
says
Ethics
3.2
when
he
writes
that
will
is
of
impossible
things,
and
not
only
an
erring
will,
but
also
a
will
that
follows
the
full
apprehension
in
judging
of
an
intellect
that
is
not
erring.
But
in
the
second
sense
choice
cannot
be
of
impossible
things,
for
no
one
puts
practical
syllogisms
together
about
impossibles;
because
a
practical
syllogism
concludes
from
the
end
to
what
is
for
the
end
as
far
as
through
what
is
for
the
end
possession
of
the
end
may
be
reached.
But
this
discursive
reasoning
and
syllogizing
do
not
rightly
deduce
when
the
end,
either
in
itself
or
as
compared
to
the
act
in
which
there
is
will
of
the
end,
is
impossible.]
Article
Six:
Whether
Man
chooses
of
Necessity
or
Freely
Response:
[Metaphysics
9
q.15
n.8ff.]
one
must
say
that
the
will
does
altogether
freely,
and
without
any
necessity
compelling
it,
choose
these
or
those
means
from
the
several
offered
to
it,
and
despise
the
one
or
the
other;
again,
neither
when
only
one
means
arises
for
the
attainment
of
an
end
does
it
necessarily
embrace
that
means,
save
perhaps
by
conditioned
necessity,
namely
on
the
hypothesis
of
free
volition
of
the
end.
For
the
will
itself,
especially
in
the
wayfarer,
is
not
moved
or
drawn
necessarily
by
the
goodness
of
any
object,
but
rather,
when
the
goodness
of
an
object
is
first
shown
it,
the
will
freely
determines
itself
to
pursuing
it
in
such
a
way
that
it
can
determine
itself
to
the
opposite
or
even
suspend
itself
from
any
act
at
all;
therefore,
when
it
intends
the
end
efficaciously,
and
thereon
intends
it
through
a
deliberation
about
the
means
after
several
occur
to
it,
it
is
able
to
despise
means
more
useful
and
choose
means
less
suitable
for
being
led
to
obtain
the
end;
therefore
all
choice
is
by
free
will.
For
if
any
necessity
were
to
appear,
to
which
the
will
was
subject
in
choosing,
then
it
would
most
of
all
appear
when
the
goodness
of
the
more
excelling
and
more
useful
means
is
set
in
contrast
with
respect
to
a
less
suitable
and
less
efficacious
one.
However,
in
this
is
the
will
most
of
all
distinguished
from
the
sensitive
appetite,
that
the
latter
is
so
affected
by
advantageous
and
agreeable
objects
that
it
is
not
able
not
to
follow
them
and
embrace
them
wholly,
while
the
former,
by
its
innate
nobility
and
dominating
power,
is
determinative
of
itself,
and
is
able
to
pursue
the
things
that
agree
with
it
or
not
pursue
them
if
it
prefer;
therefore
it
is
not
more
affected
or
drawn
by
the
more
excellent
means
than
by
the
less
useful
and
less
good
one.
–
But
when
there
is
a
single
means
sufficient
for
a
will
efficaciously
intending
the
end,
not
even
here
does
there
occur
any
necessity
whereby
the
will
may
deservedly
be
said
to
have
embraced
that
means
necessarily.
For
[Quodlibet
q.16
n.8]
just
as
the
will
is
altogether
freely
borne
to
the
end,
so
is
it
also
to
what
is
for
the
end.
But
if,
when
pursuing
a
single
means,
it
cannot
be
said
to
have
chosen
this
means
in
preference
to
others,
that
is
an
accidental
consequence
of
the
condition
of
the
end.
Nor
is
there
any
necessity
involved
save
what
is
consequent
to
the
will’s
liberty,
namely
that
it
has
itself
brought
the
necessity
on
86
itself,
and
it
could
have
been
altogether
immune
from
that
necessity
if
it
had
preferred
another
end
in
place
of
the
one
it
did
intend.
QUESTION
FOURTEEN:
ABOUT
DELIBERATION,
WHICH
PRECEDES
CHOICE.
IN
SIX
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Deliberation
is
Inquiry
Article
Two:
Whether
Deliberation
is
of
the
End
or
only
of
what
is
for
the
End
Article
three:
Whether
Deliberation
is
only
of
Things
done
by
us
Article
Four:
Whether
Deliberation
is
about
all
Things
done
by
us
Article
Five:
Whether
Deliberation
proceeds
by
Resolving
to
Principles
Article
Six:
Whether
Deliberation
goes
on
to
Infinity
[Montefortino
writes:
the
present
question
has,
according
to
the
accustomed
method,
no
source
in
Master
Scotus
for
its
treatment
and
exposition,
save
that
[Oxon.
2
d.25
n.22]
he
teaches
that
deliberation
is
to
be
altogether
admitted
in
human
affairs,
since
our
acts,
and
what
follows
from
them,
happen
contingently
such
that
they
cannot
happen
or
be
done
otherwise,
since
if
they
could,
he
says,
there
would
be
no
need
to
deliberate
or
busy
oneself
about
them,
as
Aristotle
reports
De
Interpretatione
1
last
chapter.
The
same
point
is
contained
in
Oxon.
1
d.39
q.5
n.11
and
more
expressively
in
Oxon.
3
d.18,
where
it
is
said
that
in
us
indeed
choice
supposes
discursive
thinking
and
inquiry
about
means
until
the
final
decision
is
reached,
which
decision
is
a
conclusion
deduced
through
practical
reason;
in
Christ
however,
because
all
things
were
clear
to
him
from
the
beginning,
there
was
no
need
for
this
sort
of
discursive
act
and
inquiry.
Wherefore
deliberation
must
suppose
inquiry
into
things
on
and
about
which
one
must
reflect,
which
was
the
first
question
[article
1].
But
as
to
whether
deliberation
must
be
taken
about
the
end
or
about
what
is
for
the
end,
which
was
the
question
asked
in
second
place
[article
2]
–
because
the
will
or
intention
deals
with
the
end,
as
the
Doctor
says
[Oxon.
2
d.38],
while
choice
is
about
things
ordered
to
the
end,
it
is
evident
that
the
end
does
not
fall
under
deliberation,
but
that
only
what
is
ordered
for
the
end
does;
and
he
discourses
of
this
at
large
in
Oxon.
3
d.36
n.15.
About
the
third
and
fourth
questions
[articles
3
and
4],
one
must
say,
from
Oxon.
2
d.25
and
38,
that
deliberation
deals
first
with
things
that
are
to
be
done
by
us,
that
is,
things
that,
after
consultation
and
investigation
and
mature
conferring,
are
to
be
chosen
as
more
opportune
for
attaining
the
end,
and
second
that
deliberation
can
also
have
an
influence
on
things
that
are
to
be
done
in
similar
way
by
others.
Now
as
to
whether
deliberation
proceeds
by
resolution
to
principles,
which
is
the
fifth
question
[article
5],
one
must
say,
from
Oxon.
2
d.28,
that
it
does
do
so,
for
choice
presupposes
and
follows
deliberation;
now
choice
embraces
the
means
about
which
reflection
for
the
sake
of
the
end
was
made
and
to
which
end
the
reflection
is
resolved;
therefore
deliberation
is
so
resolved
as
well.
To
the
final
question
[article
6]
one
must,
from
the
Doctor
Oxon.
2
d.3
q.7
n.10,
reply
in
the
negative.
For
no
one
intends
infinity
per
se,
which
is
most
of
all
true
in
the
case
where
reflection
is
made
about
what
can
conduce
to
the
attainment
of
the
end.
It
would
assuredly
be
stupid
to
deliberate
about
things
that
proceed
to
infinity,
because
such
deliberation
would
never
come
to
an
end,
nor
could
any
efficacious
choice
of
means
follow
upon
it.]
QUESTION
FIFTEEN:
ABOUT
CONSENT,
WHICH
IS
AN
ACT
OF
THE
WILL
IN
RELATION
TO
WHAT
IS
FOR
THE
END.
IN
FOUR
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Consent
is
an
Act
of
Appetitive
or
of
Apprehending
Virtue
87
Response:
here
there
is
an
opinion
as
follows:
to
consent
indicates
the
application
of
the
sense
to
something.
Now
it
is
proper
to
sense
to
be
cognitive
of
things
present;
for
the
imaginative
power
apprehends
corporeal
likenesses
even
in
the
absence
of
the
things,
and
the
intellect
apprehends
universal
ideas,
which
it
can
apprehend
indifferently
[sc.
indifferently
to
the
presence
or
absence
of
the
things].
And
because
an
act
of
the
appetitive
power
is
a
certain
inclination
to
the
thing
itself
according
to
some
likeness,
hence
it
is
that
the
application
of
the
appetitive
power
to
the
thing,
according
to
which
application
it
inheres
in
it,
receives
the
name
of
sense,
as
if
it
took
a
certain
experiential
knowledge
from
the
thing
it
inheres
in,
to
the
extent
it
is
pleased
to
inhere
in
it.
–
Those
who
say
this
seem
to
distinguish
between
choice
and
consent,
so
that
the
latter
is
a
certain
complacency
in
the
means
which
the
final
judgment,
following
disquisition,
dictates
should
be
preferred
to
others;
but
the
former
is
an
efficacious
affection
for
the
same
means.
We
say
that
these
acts
are
being
multiplied
without
any
necessity.
For
consent,
use,
and
dissent
belong
only
to
the
appetitive
power;
for
it
concerns
only
the
will
to
give
assent
to
or
to
resist
what
is
shown
to
it
by
the
intellect.
For
[Oxon.
2
d.6
q.2
n.3,
4
d.4
q.4
n.2,
d.27
q.2
n.2,
d.29]
there
is
in
general
a
double
act
of
the
will:
namely
to
will
and
to
refuse.
And
refusal
is
indeed
a
positive
act
of
the
will,
whereby
the
will
flees
what
is
disagreeable
or
recoils
from
a
disagreeable
object;
but
willing
is
an
act
whereby
the
will
holds
the
object
as
something
it
accepts
or
as
agreeable
to
him
whose
appetite
the
will
is;
with
this
act
as
intermediary,
the
appetitive
power
applies
itself
to
what
is
shown
it
by
the
intellect,
whether
this
has
been
proposed
to
it
through
deliberation
and
practical
disquisition,
or
has
been
shown
to
it
by
an
intellect
not
liable
to
disturbances
of
passion
and
to
ignorance;
as
when
right
reason
dictates
that
the
ultimate
end
is
to
be
loved,
that
health
of
the
body
is
to
be
willed.
Now
once
it
has
followed
this
application,
the
appetitive
power
gets
a
certain,
as
it
were,
experiential
knowledge
from
that
in
which
by
willing
it
inheres.
So
over
and
above
this
volition
of
what
has
been
obtained,
in
vain
is
any
other
act
laid
down
through
which
the
will
might
be
said
to
consent.
–
Again
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.10
nn.12-‐
13]
the
act
of
volition
is
double:
one
is
efficacious
willing,
and
this
is
in
respect
of
obtaining
an
end
through
means
ordered
to
that
end;
the
other
is
conditional,
respecting
the
end
indeed
but
not
the
obtaining
of
it
through
means;
the
end
is
however
desired,
for
the
sake
of
which
desire
it
would
tend
to
the
getting
of
the
end
if
it
could
and
if
the
object
were
contained
and
fell
under
the
power
of
its
activity.
In
accord
with
each
volition
the
will
must
be
said
to
consent
and
give
consent,
in
the
aforesaid
way,
to
what
it
pursues
with
efficacious
or
inefficacious
volition.
Indeed,
as
often
as
it
is
efficaciously
carried
to
the
end,
to
that
extent
it
assents
to
the
embracing
of
the
means,
that
is,
it
wants
the
means
as
far
as
it
has
previously
given
assent
to
the
end,
and
it
descends,
by
virtue
of
that
consent,
to
choosing
the
means
and,
after
discussion
of
them,
it
puts
these
or
those
ends
before
others.
Similarly,
when
it
wills
something
under
a
condition,
it
does
simply
will
it,
as
an
invalid,
who
knows
it
is
impossible
he
will
be
restored
to
health,
does
simply
desire
health,
and
he
would
embrace
the
means
of
recovering
it
too
if
he
apprehended
it
as
possible.
This
conditioned
will
is
indeed
such
that
it
is
enough
for
merit
and
demerit,
as
when
someone
wishes
to
fornicate
although
it
is
impossible
for
him
to
get
an
opportunity
for
fornicating;
so
assent
is
simply
present
in
volition
88
of
such
an
end;
and
thus
too
a
merchant
in
danger
on
the
sea
wants
simply
to
throw
the
merchandise
overboard,
lest
he
suffer
shipwreck,
just
as
he
does
in
fact
plunge
them
into
the
sea;
but
in
a
certain
respect
he
does
not
want
this,
because
he
unwillingly
deprives
himself
of
riches;
the
damned
too
simply
will
blessedness,
and
perhaps
more
intensely
than
we
wayfarers
do,
although
since
they
apprehend
it
as
impossible
for
them
they
despise
all
the
means.
So
just
as
there
is
in
an
absolute
and
efficacious
volition
consent
simply
to
that
which
the
will
wills,
so
too
in
the
volition
which
we
call
inefficacious
and
conditioned
there
is
consent,
that
is,
a
consent
whereby
someone
consents
and
inheres
in
the
object
which
he
simply
wills,
although
no
choice
of
means
then
follows
nor
any
deliberation
about
them.
For
the
will,
then,
to
consent
is
nothing
other
than
that
it
wants
whatever
it
simply
wants,
and
so
it
does
not
will
with
one
act
and
give
with
another
act
consent
to
what
it
wills;
otherwise,
without
such
an
act
of
consent,
there
would
be
no
merit
or
demerit,
but
these
circumstances
do
absolutely
follow
acts
of
willing
and
refusing.
For
[Oxon.
4
d.6
q.1]
whenever
someone
simply
wills
something,
but
not
in
the
way
it
should
be
willed,
he
sins;
and
so
the
bad
angels
sinned
by
desiring
blessedness
in
a
disordered
way;
for
in
that
act
of
theirs
of
this
sort
there
was,
when
it
was
first
elicited,
no
disturbing
passion
in
them
or
ignorance;
so
in
their
case
willing
and
assenting
or
consenting
to
the
affection
of
advantage
were
the
same
thing,
and
in
accordance
therewith
they
were
inclined
to
wanting
blessedness
at
once
and
not
according
to
the
rules
previously
laid
down
by
the
wisdom
of
God.
Now
it
can
happen
[Oxon.
I
d.1
q.3
n.2]
that
some
good
object
is
shown
to
the
will
absolutely,
namely
when
apprehended
neither
under
the
idea
of
the
good
for
its
own
sake
nor
as
a
good
for
the
sake
of
something
else.
But
the
will
can
elicit
about
an
object
thus
shown
some
act
of
willing
it
absolutely,
not
referring
it
to
anything
else
nor
inhering
in
it
with
love
for
its
own
sake,
and
thence
the
will
can
give
command
to
the
intellect
to
inquire
of
what
sort
the
good
is
and
how
it
is
to
be
willed;
once
this
point
has
been
established,
the
will
pursues
it
as
the
ultimate
judgment
of
reason
dictates
it
should
do
so.
In
such
a
case
indeed
we
do
not
deny
that
the
will
does
not
give
consent
to
an
object
presented
absolutely
to
it
by
the
intellect
(but
its
consent
first
requires
the
ultimate
judgment
of
the
intellect);
however,
it
does
not
then
merit
or
demerit,
because
neither
does
it
will
the
object
in
the
way
the
object
should
be
pursued
nor
does
it
do
the
opposite.
Whenever,
then,
the
will’s
operation
is
worthy
of
reward
or
punishment,
or
of
praise
or
blame,
the
willing
and
the
consenting
come
together
in
one
and
the
same
act.
Article
Two:
Whether
Consent
belongs
to
Brute
Animals
Response:
one
must
say
that
it
is
not
a
feature
of
beasts
to
give
assent
or
to
dissent.
For
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.5
n.5]
these
acts
belong
to
a
will
freely
assenting
or
dissenting,
or
even
suspending
both
acts.
When
therefore
this
power
assents,
it
is
carried
to
the
object
by
its
own
freedom,
by
willing
or
loving
it.
But
the
brutes
[Oxon.
2
d.25
n.8]
do
not
properly
love,
nor
do
they
have
love
for
the
things
that
agree
with
them,
but
rather
they
are
drawn
by
them
such
that
they
cannot
prevent
themselves,
unless
perhaps
an
object
moving
them
more
strongly
intervenes
and
thence
more
efficaciously
draws
them
and
turns
them
away
from
something
else
that
is
leading
89
them
less
efficaciously.
They
do
not
therefore
assent
to
what
they
see
nor
do
they
properly
give
consent
to
them,
but
are
carried
to
possession
of
what
agrees
with
them
and
flee
from
what
harms
them,
their
natural
instinct
thus
dictating
according
to
the
rules
previously
laid
down
by
the
workman,
the
divine
wisdom.
Article
Three:
Whether
Consent
is
about
the
End
or
what
is
for
the
End
Response:
[from
the
same
sources
as
article
one]
here
there
is
an
opinion
that
consent
deals
only
with
what
is
for
the
end.
For
according
to
Damascene
2.22,
consent
or
judgment
is
when
a
man
disposes
and
loves
what
has
been
judged
by
deliberation.
But
deliberation
is
only
about
what
is
for
the
end,
and
so
consent
is
not
about
the
end
but
rather
regards
and
attains
what
is
for
the
end.
We
adhere
to
what
was
said
in
article
one
and
do
not
see
any
necessity
to
multiply
and
invent
other
acts
of
the
will
besides
willing
and
refusing,
and
thus
we
judge
that
consent
and
dissent
must
be
placed
there,
since
these
are
sufficient
for
merit
and
demerit,
nor
can
any
reward
or
punishment
be
without
consent
and
dissent
paid
to
human
operations,
and
since
everything
that
is
said
about
consent
may
be
very
well
understood
through
willing
itself.
So
we
say
that
consent
can
work
and
deal
both
with
the
end
and
with
what
is
for
the
end.
It
is
indeed
true
[Oxon.
3
d.18
n.11]
that
sometimes,
when
the
will
is
about
to
issue
in
an
act
of
choosing
means
for
obtaining
the
end,
it
commands
the
intellect
to
engage
in
practical
syllogizing,
and
to
set
up
disquisition
about
the
means,
until
a
judgment
and
ultimate
decision
about
what
to
choose
is
reached,
and
then
finally
it
consents
to
the
choice
of
those
means
that
were
by
the
judgment
of
reason
preferred
to
others.
But
yet
it
consents
for
this
reason
to
means
for
the
end,
that
it
has
first
given
assent
to
the
end
itself,
willing
it
efficaciously,
from
which
consent
and
efficacious
volition
it
happens
to
consent
to
the
means,
embracing
them,
so
that
through
them
the
loved
end
may
be
possessed.
For
if
it
had
not
given
assent
to
the
end,
it
would
not
try
to
investigate
the
means
for
arriving
at
the
possession
of
it,
nor
would
it
choose
them;
so
it
consents
to
the
means
because
it
has
given
assent
to
the
end
itself,
and
indeed
with
an
efficacious
effort
of
the
sort
it
does
not
exercise
when
it
neglects
the
means,
either
because
they
are
not
to
hand
or
because
it
is
distracted
to
willing
other
things,
and
it
prefers
to
devote
itself
to
possessing
these
other
things
even
if
it
could
with
equal
facility
reach
the
former
ones.
Article
Four:
Whether
Consent
to
an
Act
belongs
only
to
the
Superior
Part
of
the
Soul
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.24
n.3,
d.42
q.4
n.13,
4
d.48
q.1
n.7]
according
to
Augustine,
On
the
Trinity
12.4,
7,
the
superior
part
of
the
soul
intends
the
contemplation
of
eternal
and
superior
rules,
while
the
inferior
part
intends
the
doing
of
temporal
things
according
to
eternal
rules.
Wherefore
the
superior
part
intends
the
first
end,
from
which
it
receives
the
rules
for
doing
things.
On
the
supposition
of
this
most
true
teaching,
then,
one
must
say
that
consent
to
an
act
belongs
to
the
superior
part
of
the
soul
alone.
Indeed,
from
what
was
said
in
article
3
above,
for
the
soul
to
consent
to
an
act
is
for
it
to
follow
the
ultimate
judgment
of
reason,
which
has
been
commanded
to
determine
about
the
means
for
obtaining
the
end.
But
the
will
cannot
90
follow
the
dictate
of
reason
without
looking
to
the
eternal
rules;
for
thence
it
knows
and
has
learnt
whether
the
act
is
right
or
wrong;
so
only
to
the
superior
part
of
the
soul
does
it
belong
to
consent
to
or
dissent
from
an
act,
since
the
soul
knows
that
so
it
most
do
from
the
eternal
rules
and
from
the
end,
whence
the
canons
of
what
is
to
be
done
proceed.
–
Next,
to
entrust
the
ultimate
judgment
to
execution
belongs
principally
to
the
agent
and
to
what
has
efficacious
willing
with
respect
to
what
is
to
be
done;
but
nothing
that,
in
acting,
is
a
cause
subordinate
to
some
other
cause
more
principal
than
it,
is
said
to
will
something
principally;
since
therefore
the
inferior
part
of
the
soul
is
subordinate
to
the
superior
part,
because
it
receives
from
it
the
rules
for
doing
things,
it
will
not
be
its
job
to
affect
the
act
through
consent
but
rather
the
superior
part’s
job,
which
commands
the
act
to
be
entrusted
or
not
to
execution.
But
the
superior
part
performs
the
command
by
its
efficacious
willing;
for
this
is
what
it
is
for
it
to
consent
to
an
act,
as
far
as
the
superior
mover
commands
the
inferior
powers
to
issue
respectively
in
their
acts.
QUESTION
SIXTEEN:
ABOUT
USE,
WHICH
IS
(ALSO)
AN
ACT
OF
THE
WILL
IN
RELATION
TO
WHAT
IS
FOR
THE
END.
IN
FOUR
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
Use
is
an
Act
of
the
Will
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
qq.3,
5]
the
Master
[of
the
Sentences,
Peter
Lombard]
in
1
d.1
refers
to
Augustine,
On
Christian
Doctrine
1.3,
“To
enjoy
is
to
inhere
with
love
in
something
for
its
own
sake.
But
to
use
is
for
that
which
has
come
into
use
to
be
referred
to
the
getting
of
what
one
should
enjoy,
otherwise
it
is
to
abuse
or
not
to
use,
for
illicit
use
should
be
called
abuse
or
abusing.”
Just
as
then
there
are
in
the
intellect
two
acts
of
assenting
to
some
true
proposition,
one
by
which
assent
is
given
to
a
true
proposition
for
its
own
sake,
as
to
a
principle,
and
the
other
by
which
assent
is
given
to
a
proposition
because
of
the
principle
itself,
from
which
it
receives
the
evidence
that
extracts
the
assent
of
the
intellect,
so
in
the
will
there
is
one
act
of
loving
the
good
for
its
own
sake
and
another
of
loving
the
good
because
of
some
other
good.
So
just
as
the
act
in
which
the
intellect
gives
assent
to
a
conclusion
is
more
imperfect
in
respect
of
an
act
by
which
it
assents
to
a
principle
for
the
principle’s
sake,
so
the
act
of
the
will
by
which
it
loves
the
good
for
the
sake
of
another
good
has
to
be
more
imperfect
than
the
act
by
which
it
inheres
in
some
thing
for
that
thing’s
sake.
Now
the
former
is
properly
use,
according
to
Augustine’s
teaching.
So
to
use
is
an
act
of
will
that
supposes
an
act
of
reason
first
showing
it
that
these
things
are
to
be
willed
and
loved
for
the
sake
of
another
good,
which
is
to
be
loved
for
its
own
sake.
–
For
the
will
itself,
just
like
the
intellect,
is
a
reflexive
power,
because
of
its
immateriality,
and
so
it
collates
one
with
another.
So,
as
referring
things
by
way
of
judgment
belongs
to
the
intellect
alone,
so
it
pertains
to
the
will
to
refer
one
lovable
thing
to
another,
and
thus
to
order
and
to
use
one
good
for
the
obtaining
of
another,
and
consequently
right
and
wrong
use
of
things
is
to
be
attributed
to
the
will
alone.
In
this
sense
Augustine
writes,
83
Questions
q.30,
“Therefore
all
human
perversion,
which
is
also
called
vice,
is
to
will
to
use
what
should
be
enjoyed,
and
to
enjoy
what
should
be
used.”
91
Article
Two:
Whether
Use
belongs
to
Brute
Animals
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.38,
3
d.33
n.9]
one
must
say
that
use
is
not
to
be
attributed
to
brutes,
just
as
neither
does
enjoyment
belong
to
them,
save
abusively.
For
according
to
Augustine
On
the
Trinity
10.11,
to
use
“is
to
take
up
something
into
the
faculty
of
the
will.”
Now
although
brutes
do
happen
to
use
what
they
have
been
provided
with
by
nature,
as
a
lion
its
claws
and
its
mouth,
birds
their
wings
for
flying,
and
other
things
of
the
sort,
yet
it
is
plain
that
these
are
not
taken
up
by
them
into
the
faculty
of
the
will,
but
brutes
are
led
to
apply
them
by
an
altogether
natural
instinct;
they
are
not
then
said
to
use,
just
as
neither
to
enjoy
when
they
adhere
to
agreeable
objects;
for
they
are
not
carried
along
by
love
but
rather
are
fixed
on
the
objects,
not
for
the
objects’
sake,
but
for
the
sake
of
their
own
advantage.
–
Next,
use
or
the
taking
up
of
one
thing
in
order
to
another
comes
from
the
intention
of
the
end;
sometimes
use
coincides
with
the
intention
itself,
although
more
frequently
the
intention
is
one
thing,
the
use
another.
However,
from
what
was
said
above
in
q.13
a.2,
it
does
not
belong
to
brutes
to
act
from
choice,
that
is,
to
select,
by
intuition
of
the
end
which
is
desired,
these
and
those
things
for
obtaining
the
same
end;
therefore
neither
can
use
belong
to
brute
animals.
Article
Three:
Whether
Use
can
also
be
of
the
Ultimate
End
Response:
[Quodlibet
q.17
n.3,
Oxon.
1.d.1
qq.1,
5]
since,
from
the
opinion
of
Augustine,
On
Christian
Doctrine
1.3,
to
use
“is
for
that
which
has
come
into
use
to
be
referred
to
the
getting
of
what
one
should
enjoy,”
it
is
manifest
that
use
is
of
things
ordered
to
the
end,
for
the
attaining
of
which
end
useful
and
opportune
means
are
approved
of.
But
we
can
understand
and
speak
of
the
ultimate
end
in
two
ways:
for
either
the
ultimate
end
is
simply
such,
that
is,
what
gives
ultimate
rest
to
the
created
will
and
can,
by
its
own
nature,
not
be
referred
to
another
good,
because
it
is
the
supreme
good
to
which
all
others
are
ordered;
or
it
is
the
ultimate
end
in
a
certain
respect,
that
is,
not
ultimate
of
itself
but
nevertheless
reckoned
to
be
so
by
a
will
that
rests
itself
in
it
exactly
as
if
it
were,
from
the
nature
of
the
thing,
going
to
be
the
ultimate
end;
in
the
same
way
the
will
of
someone
mortally
sinning
enjoys
an
end
which
he
prefixes
for
himself
in
such
act
and
rests
himself
in
it
as
far
as
concerns
the
part
of
the
act,
although
he
does
not
rest
on
the
part
of
the
object.
Because
therefore
someone
mortally
sinning
loves
the
object
of
his
act
with
the
love
of
concupiscence,
he
has
to
be
loving
something
else
with
the
love
of
friendship.
But
that
something
else
is
himself,
for
whom,
as
loved
with
the
love
of
friendship,
he
desires
the
object
in
which
he
inheres
by
his
sinning;
this
end,
therefore,
the
one
sinning
uses
for
the
sake
of
what
which
he
loves
with
the
love
of
friendship.
And
this
is
what
Augustine
says,
City
of
God
14.28,
“Two
loves
have
made
two
cities;
the
love
of
oneself
up
to
contempt
of
God
has
made
the
city
of
the
devil;
the
love
of
God
up
to
contempt
of
oneself
has
made
the
city
of
God.”
As
therefore
someone
sinning
enjoys
himself,
so
he
uses
the
end
set
before
him.
On
this
matter
more
was
said
above
q.11
a.2.
Article
Four:
Whether
Use
precedes
Choice
92
Response:
[Oxon.
Prol.
q.4
n.21ff.,
2
d.38]
according
to
what
was
said
in
q.13
a.4,
the
complete
and
absolute
idea
of
choice
can
subsist
without
a
direct
order
to
commanded
acts,
which
acts
indeed
are
by
use
performed
through
the
executive
power
in
the
faculty
of
the
will,
once
the
powers
have
been
taken
up
by
it
whence
the
acts
in
accord
with
choice
are
to
issue.
For
indeed
if
a
pauper,
when
money
is
set
before
him,
chooses
to
distribute
it
should
it
come
under
his
power,
then,
as
far
as
the
act
and
habit
of
virtue
is
concerned,
no
further
prosecution
of
the
act
is
required;
therefore,
before
any
use
and
order
to
it,
this
choice
stands,
and
indeed
is
right,
as
it
would
be
wrong
if
he
were,
though
not
having
the
opportunity,
to
choose
to
fornicate.
So
this
sort
of
choice
altogether
precedes
use,
the
way
it
must
also
precede
when
someone,
from
intention
of
the
end,
descends
to
investigating
opportune
means
for
obtaining
it.
For
before
a
sick
man
applies
himself
to
means
useful
for
recovering
health,
the
choice
of
those
means
precedes
in
him
the
use
of
the
same.
–
But
[Oxon.
3
d.18
n.11]
when
an
ultimate
judgment
can
be
had
without
preceding
discussion,
as
in
him
who,
in
a
single
instant
and
view,
knows
the
end
and
what
is
ordered
to
the
end,
choice
and
use
are
not
two
things,
but
rather
the
use
coincides
with
the
choice;
for
at
once
it
happens
by
the
choice
that
whatever
was
first
chosen
is
entrusted
to
execution.
–
But
because
“the
will
is
an
instrument
that
moves
itself”,
from
the
witness
of
Anselm
On
the
Conception
of
the
Virgin
4
and
On
Original
Sin
4,
when
he
introduces
the
powers
subject
to
the
will
speaking
to
God
in
this
fashion:
“You
have
given
us
a
lord
whom
we
cannot
obey;”
therefore
reason
is
being
used
when
someone
who
is
intending
the
end
commands
the
intellect
to
investigate
the
means
by
which
he
may
reach
the
attainment
of
it.
In
this
way
of
considering
things,
use
altogether
precedes
choice;
for
the
choice
is
following
the
deliberation
and
discussion
of
the
means.
QUESTION
SEVENTEEN:
ABOUT
THE
ACTS
COMMANDED
BY
THE
WILL.
IN
NINE
ARTICLES
Article
One:
Whether
Command
is
an
Act
of
the
Will
or
of
the
Reason.
Response:
[Oxon.
3
d.36;
4
d.14
q.2,
d.49
q.4]
I
answer
that,
some
suppose
that
to
command
does
in
fact
belong
essentially
to
reason,
on
the
presupposition,
however,
of
an
act
of
will.
Nevertheless,
for
the
greater
evidence
of
the
thing,
they
think
it
needs
to
be
added
that
reason’s
intimating
and
pronouncing
that
something
is
to
be
done
can
happen
in
two
ways:
in
one
way
absolutely,
when
the
intimation
is
expressed
by
a
verb
in
the
indicative
mood,
as
if
someone
were
to
say
to
another
‘you
ought
to
do
this’.
But
sometimes
reason
intimates
something
to
someone
by
admonishing
him
to
do
it,
and
such
intimation
is
expressed
by
a
verb
in
the
imperative
mood,
as
when
it
is
said
to
someone
‘do
this’.
But
the
first
mover
to
the
exercise
of
an
act
in
the
powers
of
the
soul
is
the
will;
since
therefore
the
second
mover
does
not
move
except
by
virtue
of
the
first
mover,
it
follows
that
reason’s
moving
by
commanding
is
present
in
it
by
virtue
of
the
will.
To
command
is
therefore
an
act
of
reason,
indeed,
but
presupposing
an
act
of
will,
in
virtue
of
which
93
reason
moves,
through
commanding,
to
the
exercise
of
an
act.
But
we
do
not
approve
of
this
opinion;
for
those
who
think
that
it
belongs
essentially
to
the
will
to
command
(the
presentation
of
the
object
being
presupposed),
seem,
as
in
all
other
cases,
to
hold
the
more
probable
opinion.
For
the
will
commands
the
intellect;
therefore
to
it,
and
not
to
the
reason,
is
commanding
essentially
to
be
attributed.
The
assumption
is
clear
from
Anselm
(On
the
Conception
of
the
Virgin
4),
where
he
teaches
that
the
will
moves
itself
against
the
judgment
of
the
other
powers,
which
submit
even
unwillingly
to
its
command;
therefore,
when
the
intellect
intimates
anything
and
presents
it
to
the
will,
whatever
the
verb
be
by
which
the
intimation
is
made
or
the
insinuation
expressed,
it
must
obey
as
the
will
prescribes
–
not
as
the
powers
of
the
soul
that
are
deprived
of
effective
dominance
think
or
dictate
is
to
be
done,
but
as
it
seems
to
the
will
and
as
the
will
prefers
to
choose,
even
against
the
inclination
and
express
judgment
of
reason.
If
therefore
the
will
uses
the
other
powers
of
the
soul
as
it
pleases,
commanding
certainly
belongs
essentially
to
the
will.
–
Next,
when
the
will
intends
and
effectually
wills
the
end,
it
orders
the
intellect
to
seek
out
and
find
means
of
getting
to
the
attainment
of
that
end,
and
it
keeps
the
intellect
employed
in
investigating
these
means
until,
by
a
practical
syllogism,
the
deduction
is
reached
that
these
are
to
be
chosen
and
those
passed
over,
as
Augustine
says
(On
the
Trinity
3,
“The
will
unites
the
parent
to
the
offspring”);
moreover,
the
will
gives
commands
to
itself.
For
neither
is
it
the
case
that
any
sensitive
power
can
command
the
intellect
and
the
will
and
combine
those
powers
in
its
acts,
nor
is
it
the
case
that
the
intellect
can
command
itself
and
the
will,
since,
no
matter
what
dictate
of
reason
is
in
place,
the
will
freely
chooses.
Therefore
the
will
alone
commands
itself
and
the
intellect;
so
it
belongs
to
the
will
alone
to
command
the
intellect
and
not
the
reverse,
since,
even
when
the
ultimate
sentence
of
practical
deduction
is
in
place,
the
will
is
able,
by
its
dominating
power
over
itself,
to
ignore
that
dictate
and
embrace
worse
counsels,
or
at
least
to
suspend
itself
and
refrain
from
any
action.
–
Lastly,
the
intellect
or
intellectual
virtue
says
that
a
thing
is
true
or
not
true,
whether
in
matters
to
be
thought
or
in
matters
to
be
done:
but
the
commanding
will,
or
the
will
to
command,
says
that
the
act
which
has
been
commanded
as
needing
to
be
immediately
done
is
to
be
carried
into
execution;
therefore
the
act
of
commanding
does
not
belong
to
reason
dictating
that
this
ought
to
be
done,
but
to
the
appetitive
power
ordering
that
what
was
intended
be
done.
[From
reply
to
objections:
[Oxon.
3
d.33
n.4]
when
the
Philosopher
says
that
appetite
obeys
reason,
he
must
be
understood
about
the
sensitive
appetite;
but
in
the
sensitive
part
of
man
there
does
not
belong
to
him
qua
man
any
operation
whereby
he
commands
himself,
and
others
subject
to
him,
and
excels
the
other
animals.
That
then
in
man
which
excels
the
whole
sensitive
part
is
divided
by
the
Philosopher,
Ethics
1.9,
into
what
understands
and
what
is
well
persuadable
by
reason;
and
by
‘persuadable
by
reason’
he
understands
the
will.
And
for
this
reason
he
calls
obedient
to
reason
sometimes
the
sensitive
appetite
and
sometimes
the
will,
as
at
the
end
of
Ethics
1.
And
just
as
‘obedient
to
reason’
is
taken
in
two
ways,
so
also
is
‘rational’;
in
one
way
‘rational’
is
taken
strictly
and
primarily,
and
thus
it
belongs
to
the
intellect
alone;
in
another
way
not
strictly
nor
primarily,
but
simply,
and
in
this
way
the
will
itself
too
is
rational.
But
in
a
third
way,
namely
as
to
the
sensitive
appetite,
it
does
not
belong
save
by
transference.
Therefore
the
one
in
the
middle,
94
the
will,
is
sometimes
called
rational
from
one
extreme,
and
sometimes
obedient
to
reason
from
the
other
extreme.
However,
when
taking
‘reason’
strictly,
the
will
is
indeed
persuadable
by
reason
but
in
no
way
obedient
to
reason;
while
the
sensitive
appetite
is
not
persuadable
by
reason
but
obedient
to
reason;
for
a
free
thing
can
indeed
by
persuaded
by
reason
but
not
be
compelled
to
obey.
Wherefore
one
does
not
get
from
this
authority
of
Aristotle
that
command
belongs
to
reason…
Some
conclude
that
command
is
not
an
act
of
reason
absolutely
but
along
with
a
certain
motion
of
the
will.
But,
to
the
contrary,
if
on
an
act
of
reason
intimating
and
announcing
that
this
or
that
is
to
be
done
the
doing
of
the
act,
unless
the
will
moves,
does
not
follow,
then
command
is
to
be
attributed
to
the
will
and
not
to
the
reason,
save
as
to
a
condition,
which
condition,
however,
does
not
flow
formally
into
the
act
of
commanding.]
Article
Two:
Whether
Command
belongs
to
Brute
Animals
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.5,
2
d.15,
Metaphysics
12
q.4
n.6]
command
is
not
a
feature
of
brute
animals.
For
if
the
brutes
were
to
command
themselves
or
others,
this
would
certainly
be
in
them
from
sensitive
appetite,
the
way
it
belongs
to
intellectual
nature
to
command
through
the
intellective
appetite.
But
the
sensitive
appetite
is
not
endowed
with
any
dominating
power
by
which
it
could
exercise
command
over
others;
for
it
does
not
move
itself
but
is
moved
by
the
objects
to
the
pursuit
of
them
or
flight
from
them,
as
they
are
agreeable
or
disagreeable;
for
it
is
impelled
by
natural
instinct,
so
that
brutes
are
not
able
to
do
otherwise
nor
to
resist
the
impulse
of
nature.
Command,
then,
or
acting
by
command
is
very
far
from
sensitive
appetite,
since
this
must
altogether
obey
as
being
led
and
drawn
according
to
what
the
nature
of
this
or
that
brute
has,
by
divine
wisdom,
been
commanded
to
perform
or
carry
out.
Hence
nature
itself
is
a
sort
of
divine
art
in
which
there
shines
forth
and
is
unfolded
what
has
been
established
by
the
artificer
wisdom.
Article
Three:
Whether
Use
precedes
Command
Response:
there
is
here
the
following
sort
of
opinion:
use
of
what
is
for
the
end,
according
as
the
use
is
in
reason
referring
it
to
the
end,
precedes
choice;
hence
much
more
does
it
precede
command;
but
use
of
what
is
for
the
end,
according
as
the
use
is
put
under
the
executive
power,
follows
command,
by
the
fact
that
the
use
of
the
user
is
conjoined
with
the
act
of
what
he
is
using.
But
command
is
not
together
with
the
act
of
him
who
is
commanded,
but
command
is
prior
in
nature
to
the
command’s
being
obeyed,
and
is
sometimes
prior
in
time.
Hence
it
is
manifest
that
it
is
prior
to
use.
–
Those
who
hold
this
view
also
add
that
not
every
act
of
the
will
precedes
the
act
of
reason
that
is
command,
but
some
act
precedes,
namely
choice,
and
some
follows,
namely
use,
because
after
the
determination
of
deliberation,
which
is
a
judgment
of
reason,
the
will
chooses,
and
after
the
choice
reason
commands
the
will
what
the
thing
chosen
is
to
be
done
through,
and
then
finally
someone’s
will
begins
an
act
of
use
by
carrying
out
the
command
of
reason;
sometimes
indeed
this
will
is
95
the
will
of
another,
when
someone
is
commanding
another,
and
sometimes
it
is
the
will
of
the
commander
himself,
when
he
is
commanding
himself.
But
it
seems
to
us
[Oxon.
4
d.14
q.2,
2
d.38]
that
these
acts
are
being
multiplied
without
necessity.
And
just
as
we
said
above,
q.15
a.1,
that
consent
does
not
differ
from
efficacious
intention
of
the
end,
nor
from
choice
of
means
for
the
end,
from
q.15
a.4,
and
just
as
we
said,
q.16
a.4,
that
it
can
happen
that
use
coincides
with
choice,
so
we
now
say
that
command
is
not
an
act
diverse
from
choice.
For
when
the
will
chooses
means
for
reaching
an
end
efficaciously
intended,
at
once
the
powers
subject
to
it
give
themselves
to
the
execution
and
embrace
the
means
that
have
been
preferred
to
others,
without
the
concurrence
of
any
other
imperative
willing
from
above;
therefore
it
is
the
same
thing
for
the
will
to
choose
the
means
and
for
it
to
command
the
subject
powers
to
execute
what
has
been
chosen.
Hence
a
sinner
intending
efficaciously
to
be
converted
to
the
heart
and
recover
the
grace
of
God
from
which
he
fell
by
guilt,
there
and
then
detests
the
sin
as
the
means
necessary
for
satisfying
divine
displeasure;
the
imperative
willing
in
him,
therefore,
was
what
the
choice
was,
the
choice
of
means
for
reaching
the
end
intended,
not
intended
in
any
way
but
with
efficacious
volition.
So,
just
as
no
other
act,
besides
simply
willing
and
refusing,
needs
to
be
laid
down
by
which
the
will
may
be
said
to
consent
or
dissent,
because
by
willing
it
consents
and
by
refusing
it
completely
resists
the
things
it
is
said
to
dissent
from,
so
by
commanding
it
chooses
and
by
choosing
it
commands
whatever
it
sees
there
is
in
fact
need
of.
Therefore
we
think
that
the
acts
of
the
powers
of
the
soul
must
be
arranged
in
the
following
order:
first,
there
is
apprehension
of
the
end;
from
this
there
is
intention
of
it
as
end,
which
intention
we
rightly
also
call
consent;
for
by
this
act
of
willing
the
will
applies
itself
to
the
object
and
receives
from
it
a
certain
experience
as
it
were.
Third,
there
is
the
showing
of
means
ordered
to
the
end;
and
this
showing
is
followed
by
choice,
and
with
this
choice,
as
was
said
above
q.15
aa.1
and
3,
consent
too
coincides.
But
this,
to
be
sure,
must
be
understood
as
a
general
rule.
For
it
can
happen
that
in
the
very
intention
itself
the
end
and
the
means
ordered
to
the
end
are
fully
seen,
and
then
the
same
act
of
the
appetitive
power
will
be
intention
and
use,
or
volition
of
what
is
desired
in
its
order
to
some
other
willed
thing.
Lastly,
there
is
the
execution
of
the
acts
to
be
performed
by
powers
other
than
the
will,
by
mediation
of
the
locomotive
power.
Over
and
above
these
acts
no
others
seem
to
us
in
need
of
being
thought
up.
But
as
to
whether
use
precedes
command,
or
the
reverse,
the
opinion
cited
above
clarifies
the
present
question
with
two
statements:
the
first
is
that
if
the
discussion
is
about
the
use
by
which
the
will
applies
the
intellect
to
consulting
about
the
means,
this
use
is
prior
to
command.
For
this
use
precedes
choice;
but
choice
precedes
command
in
their
opinion;
therefore
the
use
too
is
prior
to
command.
The
second
statement
is
that
the
use
by
which
the
will
applies
the
other
powers
to
the
execution
of
the
means,
that
to
this
use
command
is
prior.
We
say
[Oxon.
2
d.42
q.4]
that
imperative
willing
necessarily
precedes
every
use
of
the
powers
of
the
soul,
and
much
more
the
execution
to
be
performed
by
the
inferior
powers.
The
will
indeed
is
an
instrument
moving
itself;
for
it
commands
itself
and
also
moves
the
other
powers
of
the
soul,
such
that
they
cannot
not
obey
it,
as
Anselm
says
On
Original
Sin
4.
Since
therefore
the
will
uses
the
intellect
to
consider
this
or
that,
turning
it
away
from
the
consideration
of
one
object
and
96
turning
it
toward
another,
it
does
this
by
means
of
its
imperative
willing;
so
this
use
proceeds
from
command
as
from
its
proper
cause.
And
although
such
use
is
prior
to
choice,
which
choice
follows
deliberation
and
discussion
of
means,
it
is
yet
posterior
to
command,
because
it
is
the
effect
of
command.
Neither,
again,
is
this
choice
of
means
to
be
distinguished
from
command,
as
has
been
noted,
because,
when
the
will
efficaciously
chooses
means,
it
at
once
orders
and
commands
the
inferior
powers
to
embrace
the
means
that
have
been
preferred
to
others.
But
if
some
execution
over
and
above
command
seems
needed,
that
is
only
because
either
the
choice
was
inefficacious
or
extrinsic
impediments
fell
in
the
way.
About
the
second
part
of
the
solution
there
will
be
discussion
in
what
follows.
Article
Four:
Whether
Command
and
Commanded
Act
are
One
Act
or
Diverse
Acts
Response:
[Quodlibet
q.18]
some
think
that
command
and
the
commanded
act
carry
with
them
one
and
the
same
morality,
even
though
the
acts
are
entitatively
diverse,
just
as
a
single
man
is
composed
of
rational
soul
and
body,
which
parts,
however,
are
several
and
diverse
in
substantial
entity.
–
We
do
not
approve
of
this
opinion
(as
will
appear
at
large
in
q.20
below).
For
[Quodlibet
ibid.
n.12]
Augustine
in
On
the
Trinity
13.5
eloquently
teaches
the
opposite
when
he
says,
“Willing
what
is
not
decent
is
itself
a
most
wretched
thing.
Nor
is
it
as
wretched
not
to
get
what
you
want
as
to
want
to
get
what
you
ought
not.”
And
a
little
later,
“Who
would
call
a
man
blessed
because
he
is
living
as
he
wants,
when
really
he
is,
even
in
being
such,
as
wretched
as
you
please
but
would
be
less
so
if
he
had
been
able
to
get
none
of
the
things
that
he
wrongly
wanted?
For
everyone
is
made
wretched
by
an
evil
will
all
by
itself,
but
is
made
more
wretched
by
the
power
whereby
he
fulfills
the
desire
of
his
evil
will.”
Now
it
is
evident
that
these
remarks
cannot
be
understood
of
the
wretchedness
of
loss,
because
he
who
desires
and
cannot
get
what
he
wants
is
affected
with
a
greater
loss
than
he
whose
desires
are
fulfilled.
Augustine
therefore
is
speaking
of
the
wretchedness
of
guilt
present
in
the
interior
act,
and
he
says
that
this
guilt
is
further
extended
and
increased
if
to
the
interior
act
is
added
an
exterior
act
elicited
by
command.
The
exterior
commanded
act,
therefore,
is
other
than
the
commanding
act
as
regard
both
imputations,
whether
of
guilt
or
of
merit.
–
Next,
moral
goodness
(on
which
see
the
next
question,
q.18)
is
the
completeness
of
those
things
that,
according
to
the
right
reason
of
the
operator,
are
said
should
belong
to
the
act
itself;
but
there
is
one
completeness
of
what,
according
to
the
dictate
of
right
reason,
should
belong
to
the
interior
act,
and
another
of
what
should
belong
to
the
exterior
act;
therefore
the
moral
goodness
or
badness
of
each
act
is
different.
The
minor
is
plain:
for
right
reason
dictates
that
what
belongs
to
the
exterior
act
cannot
fit
the
interior
one,
and
conversely,
as
we
will
make
more
fully
plain
below
in
q.20.
[From
reply
to
objections:
[Oxon.
2
d.42
q.4
n.1,
cf.
q.20
a.3
below]
command
and
commanded
act
are
a
single
thing
by
unity
of
order,
insofar
as
the
commanded
act
is
of
a
nature
to
have,
by
means
of
the
act
of
commanding,
conformity
with
right
dictate;
nevertheless,
the
conformity
of
the
act
of
commanding
to
the
same
dictate
is
one
thing,
and
the
conformity
to
it
of
the
commanded
act
is
another;
there
are
therefore
two
conformities
and
two
human
acts,
having
a
different
morality,
even
though
they
are
ordered
to
each
other
and
are
one
by
reason
of
that
order.
97
Wherefore,
although
this
morality
and
imputability
for
reward
or
punishment
are
found
first
and
principally
in
the
act
of
the
will
commanding,
yet
they
exist
secondarily
in
the
commanded
acts
as
well.
For
just
as
the
will
has
to
have
rectitude
in
its
own
act,
so
it
has
to
have
it
in
the
exterior
acts
with
which
it
cooperates
as
mover;
for
precepts
have
been
given
not
only
about
interior
acts
but
also
about
exterior
ones
[as
in
the
commandments,
“thou
shalt
not
covet
thy
neighbor’s
wife,”
and,
“thou
shalt
not
commit
adultery”].
But
if,
because
of
this
subordination
of
the
exterior
act
to
command,
the
exterior
act
is
said
to
be
related
to
command
as
matter
to
form,
one
should
not
care
much
about
the
words
here
since
the
thing
is
nevertheless
clear
as
to
the
fact,
with
respect
to
which
everyone
rightly
admits
that
commanded
acts
and
external
operations
are
formally
sins
whenever
they
are
performed
against
the
dictates
of
law
natural
or
positive.]
Article
Five:
Whether
an
Act
of
Will
may
be
Commanded
Response:
[Oxon.
1
d.1
q.4,
2
d.42
q.4
n.1,
Quodlibet
q.16
n.3,
q.18
n.9]
one
must
say
that
an
act
of
will
is
commanded,
that
is,
elicited
by
the
will
willing
or
refusing
by
its
dominating
power,
whereby
and
because
of
which
it
commands
itself
and
the
other
powers
so
that
in
the
kingdom
of
the
soul
it
may
be
truly
queen,
whose
commands
cannot
be
resisted,
as
Anselm
says
On
the
Conception
of
the
Virgin
4.
This
was
the
express
opinion
of
Augustine
Retractions
1.9,
22,
“Nothing
is
so
in
the
power
of
the
will
as
the
will
itself.”
And
since
this
remark
cannot
be
understood
of
the
being
of
the
will
itself,
he
is
surely
speaking
of
its
act.
Also
in
the
power
of
the
will
is
that
at
its
command
another
power
should
issue
in
act,
as
the
eye
to
seeing,
the
feet
to
walking,
the
intellect
to
considering,
or
at
any
rate
that
they
should
do
nothing;
therefore
this
act
falls
much
more
under
its
power,
the
act
by
which
it
commands
and
orders
the
other
powers
to
act
or
not
to
act,
or
even
to
cease
from
any
act.
So,
on
the
command
of
the
will,
the
will
issues
in
an
act
of
willing
or
refusing
the
intellect’s
thinking
about
such
object;
therefore
the
acts
of
the
will
proceed
from
its
own
command,
and
the
nature
of
this
command
is
possessed
completely
even
if
the
commanded
acts
do
not
follow
on
it.
–
Next
[Oxon.
4
d.14
q.2],
the
will
can,
according
to
its
diverse
habits,
use
itself
circularly,
as
it
were,
in
this
way:
from
the
love
of
God
in
himself,
which
is
an
act
of
charity,
it
can
command
an
act
of
vindication
against
sin;
and
conversely,
from
an
act
commanding
vindication
against
sin,
it
can
command
an
act
of
loving
God
in
himself,
on
which
follows
a
refusing
or
displeasure
in
a
committed
sin.
The
will
therefore
can
use
the
act
of
penance
and
also
the
act
of
any
virtue
existing
in
the
will
or
the
intellect.
Article
Six:
Whether
an
Act
of
Reason
may
be
Commanded
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.42
q.4
n.5,
4
d.49
q.4,
Prol.
q.4
a.1,
Reportatio
ibid.]
one
must
say
that
the
act
of
the
intellect
does
altogether
fall
under
the
command
and
power
of
the
will,
whereby
the
will
is
able
to
turn
the
intellect
away
from
one
intelligible
thing
and
turn
it
toward
another.
Declaration:
if
matters
are
not
said
to
be
thus
disposed,
then
the
intellect
would
remain
standing
perpetually
in
consideration
of
the
most
perfect
object
habitually
known
to
it.
For
a
more
perfect
agent
acts
more
strongly
on
98
the
same
passive
thing
and
prevents
it
from
doing
something
less
perfect,
as
is
plain
of
fire
overcoming
water
in
its
operation
on
the
same
passive
object.
But
intelligible
objects
are,
in
respect
of
intellection,
natural
active
causes,
and
the
intellect
is
likewise;
therefore,
when
a
more
perfect
intelligible
thing
is
present
and
is
moving
the
intellect,
a
less
perfect
intelligible
would
never
move
the
intellect
to
consider
it,
nor
would
the
intellect
be
turned
away
from
the
more
perfect
and
most
efficacious
intelligible;
so
it
is
altogether
necessary
that
intellection
be
thus
contained
under
the
power
of
the
will,
so
that
consideration
can
be
turned
away
from
one
intelligible
and
be
turned
toward
another
intelligible.
–
But
because
the
first
thought
of
the
intellect
precedes
every
act
of
the
will,
as
Augustine
says,
On
Free
Choice
3.15,
“It
is
not
in
our
power
not
to
be
affected
by
what
we
see,”
it
is
manifest
that
this
first
thought
does
not
fall
under
the
command
of
the
will.
The
following
thoughts,
then,
are
in
our
power,
insofar
as,
when
the
intellect
remains
standing
in
the
consideration
of
one
intelligible
and
meanwhile
objects
other
than
it
are
appearing
to
it
imperfectly,
the
will
is
able
to
turn
the
intellect
from
the
object
perfectly
known
to
it
and
to
turn
it
to
those
that
are
not
as
clearly
seen
by
it,
and
command
that,
by
considering
them
more
attentively,
it
pursue
a
perfect
knowledge
of
them.
[From
reply
to
objections:
[Oxon.
ibid.
n.12]
the
will
first
requires
a
knowledge
that
is
prior
in
nature;
but
in
order
for
it
to
turn
the
intellect
to
some
object,
it
is
enough
that
this
object
be
in
some
way,
however
imperfect,
presented
to
the
will;
for
therefrom
the
will
can
take
pleasure
in
it
and
prescribe
to
the
intellect
that
it
attend
more
exactly
to
the
consideration
of
it.]
Article
Seven:
Whether
an
Act
of
the
Sensitive
Appetite
may
be
Commanded
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.29,
d.6
q.2,
d.42
q.4
n.18]
one
must
say
that
acts
of
the
sensitive
appetite
do
fall
under
the
command
of
the
will,
which
dominates
them
politically,
but
not
despotically
the
way
it
commands
the
locomotive
power.
Declaration:
the
will
when
conjoined
with
the
sensitive
appetite
is
of
a
nature
to
delight
itself
in
it,
the
way
the
intellect
when
united
to
the
senses
is
of
a
nature
to
understand
sensible
things.
So
when
the
will
itself
does
not
follow
the
rule
of
right
reason
but
rather
the
inclination
of
the
sensitive
appetite,
it
desires
and
delights
in
objects
agreeable
to
the
sensitive
appetite;
from
this
it
comes
about
that
among
men
the
dominance
of
their
sensitive
appetites
accords
with
the
diversity
of
their
bodily
compositions,
and
the
will
is
especially
inclined
through
this
dominance
to
the
act
of
it;
and
for
this
reason
some
people,
when
they
follow
their
first
inclination
without
the
rule
of
justice,
incline
first
to
luxury,
others
incline
first
to
pride,
and
so
on
with
the
rest.
The
sensitive
appetite,
therefore,
is
not
subject
to
the
command
and
power
of
a
will
giving
commands
despotically;
for
the
nature
of
the
sensitive
appetite
always
abides,
tending
to
what
is
agreeable
and
delightful
to
it
however
much
the
will
strives
to
the
contrary.
And
if
the
will
happens
to
conquer
the
natural
inclination,
it
will
not
be
without
difficulty,
nor
without
sadness
in
the
inferior
power
when
it
is,
as
by
force,
taken
from
its
proper
delight
and
from
what
agrees
with
the
constitution
of
its
composition.
However,
the
acts
of
the
sensitive
appetite
are
subject
to
the
command
of
the
will
politically;
for
as
a
prince
rules
the
subjects
whom
he
is
justly
lord
of,
so
the
will
99
in
the
kingdom
of
the
soul
bears
rule,
like
a
queen,
over
the
acts
of
the
sensitive
appetite,
moderating
them
and
directing
them
to
the
due
end.
And
indeed,
that
the
rational
appetite
moderates
the
passions
can
be
understood
in
two
ways;
for
it
gives
attention
to
the
moderation
of
passions
either
that
now
are
or
that
will
be.
The
first
can
also
happen
in
two
ways:
in
one
way
by
lessening
the
passion
that
is
of
a
nature
to
be
generated
from
the
object
in
itself,
so
that
this
passion
is
not
immoderate
in
the
way
the
object
would
be
of
a
nature
to
delight
the
sensitive
power
left
to
itself;
or
in
another
way
by
referring
the
delight
to
an
end
agreeable
to
right
reason,
to
which
end
it
is
not
referred
by
the
absolute
idea
of
the
object
of
the
sensitive
appetite.
A
future
passion
can
also
be
moderated
in
two
ways,
either
by
shunning
of
the
object
that
introduces
the
passion,
or
by
the
intending
only
of
those
objects
that
are
of
a
nature
to
give
delight
moderately;
in
which
case
the
future
passion
is
not
lessened
in
itself
but
precaution
is
taken
to
prevent
it
being
immoderate
when
present.
From
this
is
clearly
apparent
that
the
sensitive
appetite
is
subject
to
the
power
of
the
will,
not
in
a
despotic
manner
such
that
it
cannot
resist,
but
insofar
as
the
will’s
act
is
able
to
reduce
it
to
a
just
measure,
or
even
to
bring
it
about
that
the
passions
are
not
present
in
it;
and
this
is
to
exercise
political
command
over
it.
And
such
is
what
the
Philosopher
means,
Ethics
1.13,
when
he
says
that
the
sensitive
appetite
is
not
persuadable
by
reason
but
can
be
obedient
to
reason.
For
something
free
is
very
well
persuadable,
but
is
not
properly
obedient;
the
sensitive
appetite,
however,
because
it
is
not
free,
is
not
persuadable
but
can
be
obedient
to
the
will’s
command.
Further,
there
is
also
despotic
domination
by
the
will’s
command
over
the
acts
of
the
sensitive
powers,
not
to
be
sure
immediately
and
directly,
but
insofar
as
they
depend
on
the
locomotive
power,
which
power
is
directly
subject
to
the
will’s
command
such
that
it
cannot
not
obey.
Wherefore
the
will
can
command
the
eye
to
see
some
object
or
to
withhold
itself
from
such
sight;
for
that
depends
on
the
motion
of
the
eyelids;
and
therefore
by
means
of
that
motion
vision
falls
under
the
command
of
the
will.
Lastly
in
another
way
too
can
these
powers
be
understood
to
be
subject
to
the
command
of
the
will,
to
the
extent
namely
that
they
have
more
perfect
power
over
their
acts
by
the
fact
the
will
tends
by
an
act
of
pursuit
to
the
same
object;
for
then
the
operation
is
done
more
intensely
and
perfectly.
The
thing
is
plain
in
the
case
of
sight,
for
when
the
disposition
of
the
object
and
the
eye
stay
the
same,
sight
can
be
commanded
by
the
will
to
look
at
some
point
in
the
same
pyramid
and
below
the
same
base
more
perfectly
than
before
because
of
the
joining
in
of
the
will.
Article
Eight:
Whether
an
Act
of
the
Vegetable
Soul
may
be
Commanded
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.42
q.4]
there
is
here
an
opinion
that
says
acts
of
the
vegetable
soul
are
not
commanded.
The
opinion
is
made
clear
in
the
following
way:
some
acts
proceed
from
natural
appetite,
some
from
animal
or
intellectual
appetite;
for
every
agent
in
some
way
desires
the
end;
but
the
natural
appetite
is
not
consequent
to
any
apprehension
such
as
animal
and
intellectual
appetite
follow.
Now
reason
commands
by
way
of
the
apprehensive
power,
and
therefore
the
acts
that
proceed
100
from
intellective
or
animal
appetite
can
be
commanded
by
the
will,
but
not
those
that
proceed
from
natural
appetite,
of
which
sort
are
acts
of
the
vegetable
soul.
We
say
[Oxon.
4
d.49
q.10
n.2ff.,
3
d.27
a.3,
4
d.14
q.2]
that
this
explanation
rests
on
rather
dubious
principles.
For
in
the
first
place
we
think
it
false
that
any
acts
at
all
proceed
from
natural
appetite;
on
the
contrary
it
has
been
expounded
elsewhere
that
this
appetite
can
be
the
principle
of
no
acts
at
all.
For
this
appetite
is
nothing
other
than
the
natural
inclination
of
any
nature
to
its
perfection.
And
such
an
appetite
does
indeed
follow
no
intrinsic
apprehension,
but
is
led
by
the
Intelligence
that
directs
to
their
proper
ends
causes
that
have
no
knowledge
of
ends.
Now
that
reason
itself
commands
by
way
of
the
apprehensive
power
we
think
is
not
to
be
admitted,
according
to
what
was
said
in
article
one:
reason
does
indeed
show
what
is
to
be
done
and
does
direct
in
the
work,
but
that
it
commands
it
to
be
done
cannot
be
its
concern.
Wherefore
none
of
the
acts
that
proceed
from
the
intellective
or
animal
appetite
are
subject
to
the
command
of
reason
but
fall
under
the
power
of
the
will.
Lastly,
if
the
reason
for
the
solution
were
to
stand,
it
would
only
prove
that
acts
of
the
vegetable
soul
are
not
commanded
in
the
case
of
things
that
are
destitute
of
animal
and
intellective
appetite,
but
not
when
these
acts
proceed
from
a
vegetative
soul
that
is
not
present
formally
but
rather
is
enfolded
within
the
intellective
soul,
as
a
tetragon
is
in
a
pentagon.
For
then
they
proceed
from
and
follow
apprehension
just
as
do
the
animal
and
intellective
appetite.
Wherefore
we
say
that
acts
of
the
vegetable
soul
fall
under
the
command
of
the
will
indirectly,
insofar
as
these
acts
depend
on
the
motive
power.
In
man
to
be
sure
this
power
is
in
a
state
of
servile
obedience
with
respect
to
the
will,
and
the
command
corresponding
to
this
power
is
called
despotic
by
Aristotle,
Politics
1.3.
And
in
this
way
the
motive
power
obeys
the
will
such
that
it
cannot
resist;
for
there
is
no
bodily
member
suitable
for
motion,
unless
it
is
shriveled
up,
which
does
not
immediately
obey
the
will
commanding
it
to
move
to
this
or
that
position.
So
since
acts
of
the
vegetable
soul
depend
on
the
motive
power
(for
the
powers
of
nutrition
and
growth
need
the
setting
by
of
food
and
provisions,
and
in
general
the
coming
together
of
active
to
passive,
as
in
the
act
of
generation),
thus
these
acts
are
contained
under
a
man’s
power,
and
they
are
imputable
to
him
for
praise
or
blame,
according
to
the
way
he
prefers
to
conduct
himself
with
respect
to
them.
However
[Oxon.
3
d.16
q.2
n.9],
because
the
subjection
of
these
acts
to
the
will
is
only
by
means
of
the
motive
power,
as
has
been
said,
they
are
not
directly
subject
to
the
will’s
command
but
only
indirectly.
For
the
vegetative
powers
are
wholly
without
reason,
not
obedient
to
the
soul
in
their
acts;
for
although
it
is
in
a
man’s
power
to
provide
them
with
the
matter
on
which
they
act,
yet,
once
the
matter
has
been
provided,
they
are
not
subject
to
the
lordship
of
the
soul
in
their
acts;
for
whatever
the
will
may
command,
they
go
on
acting
on
the
matter
set
by
them.
Article
Nine:
Whether
the
Acts
of
the
Exterior
Members
are
Commanded
Response:
[Oxon.
2
d.42
q.4
n.16ff.,
3
d.16
q.2
n.9ff.]
from
what
was
said
in
the
preceding
article,
it
is
evident
that
the
soul
dominates
the
body,
because
the
body
is
subject
to
the
soul
with
servile
subjection
as
far
as
the
locomotive
power
is
101
concerned.
Hence
all
the
bodily
members,
unless
they
are
shriveled
up,
move
at
the
soul’s
command
and
obey
without
delay.
Hence
nothing
further
needs
to
be
added.
QUESTION
EIGHTEEN:
ON
THE
GOODNESS
AND
BADNESS
OF
HUMAN
ACTS
IN
GENERAL.
IN
ELEVEN
ARTICLES.
Article
One:
Whether
every
Human
Act
is
Good
or
Some
are
Bad
Response: