SECOND DIVISION
 
 
BONIFACIO L. CAAL, SR., G.R. No. 163181
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. October 19, 2005
 
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
 
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 
 
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24496 as well as its
Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
 
The Antecedents
 
Upon complaint of Daylinda P. Caal, Bonifacio L. Caal, Sr. was charged with
Grave Oral Defamation in an indictment filed by the Chief of Police, Hinatuan,
Surigao del Sur in the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Hinatuan-
Tagbina, Surigao del Sur. The Information reads:
 
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the morning of July 25, 1996, at the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Hall, Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused with
deliberate intent of bringing one Daylinda Caal, into discredit, disrepute and
contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly
speak and utter against said Daylinda Caal the following insulting words and
expressions, to wit: AYAW MO KAHADLOK SA TESTIGOS NI DAYLINDA
KAY WALAY BANCA-AGAN, NAHADLOK KAW KANG DAYLINDA,
NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT which if
translated in English language will mean (You afraid to the witness of Daylinda
who had no how, why you afraid to Daylinda, she live from stealing, she is a long
time thieves) and other words of similar imports and as a result said defamatory
utterance and expressions caused mental anguish, serious anxiety, social
humiliation, and besmirched reputation, thereby giving rise to a moral damage in
the amount of P10,000.00.
 
CONTRARY TO LAW: under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.[3]
 
 
 
Upon his arraignment on November 20, 1997, with the assistance of Atty.
Elias C. Irizari, as counsel de parte, Bonifacio pleaded not guilty to the charge
against him.[4]The trial court thereafter set and conducted the trial of the case on the
merits.
 
To prove Bonifacios guilt, the prosecution presented two (2) witnesses,
namely, Daylinda and Emelinda A. Kimilat.
 
Emelinda declared that at around 8:30 a.m. of July 25, 1996, while she was
outside the courthouse of the 7th MCTC of Hinatuan-Tagbina, Surigao del Sur, she
saw Bonifacio and clearly overheard him say in 
Filipino: Why should you be afraid of Daylindas witnesses, they are all
nincompoops. Daylinda is a thief! She has been long eking out a living as a
thief. A number of persons outside the courthouse also heard the utterances of
Bonifacio.[5]
 
For her part, Daylinda recalled that upon hearing Bonifacios offensive
remarks, she felt utterly embarrassed and downright humiliated. She went inside
the courtroom and simply cried her heart out.[6]
 
After the prosecution had rested its case, Bonifacio, through his new
counsel, Atty. Remedios R. Alvizo, manifested that he would be filing a demurrer
to evidence within 15 days. None was, however, filed.
 
The trial court then set the reception of the evidence for the defense
on November 12, 1998. On the said date, the trial was postponed as the witness for
the defense, Carmelita Salas, was absent.[7] The trial was reset to December 4,
1998. On the latter date, Bonifacios counsel asked for a postponement and since
the fiscal was also absent, the trial was reset once more to January 29, 1999.[8]
 
At the scheduled hearing on January 29, 1999, Atty. Alvizo was again
nowhere in sight, prompting the prosecution to orally move that the case be
submitted for decision on the ground that the defense was deemed to have waived
its right to present evidence. The trial court granted the motion over Bonifacios
objection.[9] However, Bonifacio failed to file any motion for the reconsideration of
the said Order.
 
The MCTC thereafter rendered judgment on July 2, 1999, the decretal
portion of which reads:
 
IN VIEW OF THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, this court found the accused to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2)
years and four (4) months and one (1) day, and to pay moral damages in the
amount of P5,000.00, compensatory damages in the amount of P2,000.00 and to
pay the costs.
  
The accused is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of imprisonment he
having sentenced by this court in the previous case but he had filed a petition for
probation.
 
SO ORDERED.[10]
 
Bonifacio did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the decision, and
instead appealed such ruling to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On August 3,
2000, the RTCrendered judgment affirming the decision of the MCTC. The
decretal  portion reads:
 
After careful review of the record of this case, the trial court was right in
declaring accused to have waived their (sic) right to present evidence after giving
said accused several settings for the presentation of evidence. The court is
convinced that the aforesaid penalty was properly imposed especially because the
accused has been previously convicted.
 
SO ORDERED.[11]
 
The case was elevated to the CA via petition for review, and the appellate court
affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 29 of Bislig, Surigao del Sur is AFFIRMED. Costs against
accused-petitioner.
 
SO ORDERED.[12]
 

Bonifacios motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the CA.
 
The petitioner is now before this Court, alleging that he was deprived of his right
to due process, and pleads that the decision under review be vacated and the case
remanded to the MCTC for reception of his evidence.
 
The Court initially denied the petition in a Resolution[13] dated June 16, 2004, but
upon motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, the petition was reinstated
on September 27, 2004.[14]
 
The petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred in sustaining his conviction. He
insists that he was unjustly deprived of his right to adduce evidence in his behalf
due to the failings of his counsel, Atty. Alvizo, who was always absent. He argues
that at the MCTC, he was invariably present and ready to present his evidence; it
was his counsel that did him in and he should not be made to suffer for that. He
further alleges that the appellate court failed to appreciate the true facts of his case.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
The Court has laid down the criterion to determine whether an accused in a
criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law in Siquian v. People:
[15]

 
[I]f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and
proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after
inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard,
and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has
had due process of law.
 
 

In the present case, the petitioner was afforded the chance to adduce
evidence in his behalf, but due to the unjustifiable failure of his witness or/and
counsel to appear at the hearings, the trial court declared that the case was deemed
submitted for decision and considered only the evidence presented by the
prosecution. The petitioner even failed to file any motion for the reconsideration of
the said Order. The petitioners mere physical presence during the scheduled
hearings was not enough. What is equally important is his readiness to present his
evidence, lest he will be deemed to have waived his right to adduce the same.
 
 Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, he was fully accorded the
opportunity to present his evidence first, on November 12, 1998; second,
on December 4, 1998; and then on January 29, 1999. Thus, his claim that he was
denied due process is belied by the records, which granted him continuances for
the first two hearing dates due to the absence of either his 
witness and/or counsel. In all the three scheduled hearings and despite due

notice he failed to present any contrary evidence to controvert that of the

prosecution.
 
The petitioners attempt to shift the blame to his counsel is futile. The rule in
this jurisdiction is that the client is bound by the negligence or failings of his
counsel.[16] A client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case
and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had such
counsel proceeded differently.[17] If the lawyers mistake and negligence were to be
admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so
long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.[18] While this
rule admits of exceptions, the petitioners sweeping justification failed to make out
a case of excusable negligence for his counsels non-appearance at the January 29,
1999 hearing. The Court notes further that the petitioner could have dispensed with
the services of his counsel de parte and engaged the services of another or new
counsel to represent him. He did not.
 
The Court likewise rejects the petitioners contention that the respondent
failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. It is
axiomatic that in criminal cases, the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, by constitutional fiat, the burden of
proof falls on the prosecution. Thus, a finding of guilt must rest on the strength of
the prosecutions own evidence, and not on the weakness or absence of evidence for
the defense.[19]
 
Emelinda A. Kimilat, who was present during the incident, identified the
petitioner and gave a blow-by-blow account of what happened. She testified that
petitioner called Daylinda a thief before a crowd:
 
Q While you were at the outside (sic) of Hintuan Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
was there any unusual incident that happened during that time 8:30
oclock in the morning?
A There was.
 
Q Tell us what was that?
A Bonifacio Caal uttered and said, why are you afraid of the witnesses of
Daylinda Caal where in fact they are ignorant and they have no
knowledge.
 
Q Was there any utterances made by Caal aside from that?
A There was also.
 
Q What were those utterances?
A Are you afraid of Daylinda she had been living ever since of stealing, she is
really a thief.[20]
 
 
To say that Daylinda is a thief is irrefragably grave oral defamation. This
imputes to her a crime that is dishonorable or contemptuous.
 
However, the Court finds that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is
erroneous. The penalty imposed by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, for grave oral defamation is arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period which has a duration of from four
(4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
 
 In order to fix the minimum term of the penalty required by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,[21] the imposable penalty should be reduced by one
degree arresto mayor, in its medium and minimum period, which has a range of
from one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. The maximum of the
penalty imposed on the accused is to be taken from the penalty imposed by the law
taking into account the modifying circumstances attending the commission of the
offense for which the accused is convicted.
 
In this case, the petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
six (6) months and one (1) day as minimum to two (2) years and four (4) months
and one (1) day, on the trial courts premise that the petitioner had been convicted
for another crime for which he filed a petition for probation. However, we have
reviewed the records of the CA inclusive of the decision of the MCTC, and there is
no such allegation in the Information, nor is there any showing that the respondent
adduced in evidence any decision convicting the petitioner by final judgment of
any other crime, or that he filed a petition for probation therein. Thus, we find and
so hold that the petitioner should be sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of six (6)
months.
 
The award of P2,000.00 as compensatory damages should be deleted for
lack of factual basis. To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there
must be competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof.[22]
 
The Court affirms the trial courts award of moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. Article 2219(7) of the New Civil Code allows the recovery of
moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This
provision establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to
recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation.[23]
 
 It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making
it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication
subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar.[24] Indeed,
calling Daylinda a thief is defamation against her character and reputation
sufficient to cause her embarrassment and social humiliation. Daylinda testified to
the feelings of shame and humiliation she suffered as a result of the incident
complained of.[25]
 
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
24496 is AFFIRMED WITH the MODIFICATION that petitioner Bonifacio L.
Caal, Sr. is SENTENCED to a straight penalty of six (6) months of imprisonment.
He is ORDERED to pay Daylinda P. Caal P5,000.00 as moral damages. The
award of compensatory damages is DELETED.
 
Costs against the petitioner.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
 
 
 
 
 
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 
 
 

 
 
 
ATTESTATION
 
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong, with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Andres B.
Reyes, Jr., concurring, Rollo, pp. 20-31
[2]
 Rollo, p. 18.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 38.
[4]
 Id. at 5.
[5]
 Rollo, p. 39.
[6]
 Id. at 40.
[7]
 Id. at 32.
[8]
 Id. at 33.
[9]
 Rollo, pp. 35-37.
[10]
 Id. at 41-42.
[11]
 Id. at 25.
[12]
 Rollo, p. 30.
[13]
 Id. at 44.
[14]
 Id. at 54.
[15]
 G.R. No. 82197, 13 March 1989, 171 SCRA 223.
[16]
 Republic v. Arro, G.R. No. L-48241, 11 June 1987, 150 SCRA 625.
[17]
 People v. Salido, G.R. No. 116208, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 291.
[18]
 Ibid.
[19]
 People v. Batidor, G.R. No. 126027, 18 February 1999, 303 SCRA 335.
[20]
 Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[21]
 Act No. 4103, as amended.
[22]
 People v. Agudez, G.R. Nos. 138386-87, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 692.
[23]
 Occena v. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 328.
[24]
 Id. at 334.
[25]
 Q How did you feel when this accused uttered those defamatory statement against you?
A After hearing those defamatory words I went inside and cried because I was ashamed of what he uttered
against me.
 

Q The accused utter against you is (sic) when he told and stated that you are a thief, are you a thief?
A Dili, No sir, I am not a thief (Rollo, p. 22).
  
 

 
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139157. February 8, 2000]

ROGELIO PADER, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:

What is before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan [2]affirming
petitioners conviction of grave oral defamation by the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac,
Bataan.[3]
The facts may be summarized as follows:
On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was conversing
with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when petitioner
appeared at the gate and shouted putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya
mo! The latter was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a
candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.
On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac,
Bataan a complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to which petitioner
pleaded not guilty.[4]
After due trial, on October 30, 1997 the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan
rendered decision convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation.[5] The dispositive
portion reads:
Accordingly and in view of all the foregoing, the court finds accused Rogelio Pader
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation as defined and
penalized under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the extenuating
circumstances of drunkenness hereby sentences him to an imprisonment of one (1)
month and one (1) day to one (1) year imprisonment[6] and to indemnify the private
offended party in the amount of P 20,000.00 as moral damages, considering his social
standing and professional stature.
SO ORDERED.
Bagac-Morong, Bataan
 October 30, 1997.

ANTONIO C. QUINTOS

Acting Mun. Circuit Trial Judge[7]

On appeal, on March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court in toto. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
After considering the evidence adduced by the parties together with their respective
memorandum, this Court finds no reversible error [8] on the penalty imposed as well as the moral
damages awarded by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bagac-Morong, Bataan and therefore
affirms the same in toto.
xxx
SO ORDERED
Given this 4th day of March 1998 at Balanga, Bataan.
BENJAMIN T. VIANZON
Judge[9]
Elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, on May 3, 1999 the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Courts decision but with modification as to the
penalty imposed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgement appealed from is

hereby affirmed but with the modification that the accused-appellant, Rogelio
Pader is sentenced to serve a prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO A. BRAWNER

Associate Justice[10]

Hence, this petition.[11]

The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation. In
resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but
also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between
the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time.[12]
 Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the
factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The trial court, in
arriving at its decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy
Atty. Escolangos reputation since the parties were political opponents.
We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the
parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the
defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what Atty.
Escolango did when petitioners father died.[13] In which case, the oral defamation was
not of serious or insulting nature.
In Reyes vs. People,[14] we ruled that the expression putang ina mo is a common
enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slender but rather to
express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates
ones expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous
incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would
utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of
resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter.Being a candidate running for vice
mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not
uncommon.
In similar fashion, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages without proof of
suffering.[15] Accordingly, petitioner may be convicted only of slight oral defamation
defined and penalized under Article 358, Revised Penal Code, prescribing the penalty
of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY the petition. However, we set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CR No. 21710 and find petitioner Rogelio
Pader guilty only of slight oral defamation. We impose on him a fine of P200.00 and
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), It should not be denial of the petition, but a partial
grant thereof.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 21710, promulgated on May 3, 1999, Justice Romeo A. Brawner, ponente, and concurred in
[1] 

by Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.

In Crim. Case No. 6726. Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon.
[2] 

In Crim. Case No. 2339, Judge Antonio C. Quintos.

[3] 

Rollo, p. 23.
[4] 

Rollo, pp. 23-25.

[5] 
 The imposition of an indeterminate sentence where the penalty actually imposed is not more than one
[6] 

year imprisonment is wrong [See Humilde vs. Pablo, 190 Phil. 621, 623 (1981) and People vs. Arellano, 68 Phil.
678 (1939); See also R. C. Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. 1, p. 726-727].
Rollo, p. 25.
[7] 

Regrettably, Regional Trial Court Judge Vianzon failed to note the error in the imposition of an indeterminate
[8] 

penalty and the award of moral damages, not knowing any better. Both judges should take refresher lessons on the
application of the penalties and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regional Trial Court Decision, Rollo, pp. 26-28.
[9] 

[10] 
Court of Appeals Decision, Rollo, pp. 30-35.
[11] 
Filed on July 20, 1999, Rollo, pp. 8-20.
Victorio vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 645 [1989]; Larobis vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 639 [1993];
[12] 

Balite vs. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]; Padilla, Ambrosio, Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1990 edition, Vol. 4, pp.
357-358.
Municipal Trial Court Decision in Criminal Case No. 2339, Rollo, pp. 23-25; Regional Trial Court Decision in
[13] 

Criminal Case No. 6726, Rollo, pp. 26-28.

[14] 
137 Phil. 112, 120 [1969].
[15] 
Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 387 [1999]; Marquez vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 353 [1998].
  
 
 
FIRST DIVISION
 
 
NOEL VILLANUEVA,   G.R. No. 160351

Petitioner,  
 
  Present:
 
  PANGANIBAN, C.J.
- versus - Chairperson,
  YNARES-SANTIAGO,
  AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
 
CALLEJO, SR., and
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESand CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
YOLANDA CASTRO,
 
Respondents.
Promulgated:

April 10, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
 

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 

This is no ordinary word war story. Here, the Councilor and Vice-Mayor of

a town, both holders of exalted government positions, became slaves to their
human limitations and engaged in a verbal scuffle at the municipal hall as if they
were ordinary men in the streets. A moment of unguarded emotional outburst lead
to the long-drawn out twists and turns of this case, which should have been
avoided if only they have imbedded in their complex emotions, habits and
convictions that consciousness to regulate these deflecting forces and not to let
them loose, either to their own detriment or to that of the public they serve. This is
the high price they have to pay as occupants of their exalted positions.[1]
 
At bar is a petition for review assailing the decision [2] dated 28 March 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932 which affirmed with modification
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, likewise affirming with
modification the joint decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, convicting petitioner of the crime of Grave Oral
Defamation in Criminal Case No. 139-94 and Slander by Deed in Criminal Case
No.140-94. Also assailed is the resolution[3] dated 9 October 2003 of the Court of
Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
 
Petitioner Noel Villanueva was then a member of the Municipal Council
while private complainant Yolanda C. Castro was then Municipal Vice Mayor, both
of Concepcion, Tarlac. Upon complaint of private complainant, two separate
Criminal Complaints were filed on 9 October 1994 against the petitioner in the
2nd MCTC of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, to wit:
 
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 139-94

For: Grave Oral Defamation

 

On September 12, 1994 on or about 10:00 in the morning at the SB Office in the Municipal
Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, in the presence of several persons and again in the
afternoon on or about four thirty (4:30 PM) at the Old Session Hall of the Municipal
Building in my presence and in the presence of several persons, defendant NOEL L.
VILLANUEVA, in a loud voice and within hearing distance of everyone present, unlawfully,
maliciously and feloniously uttered in a serious and insulting manner at the undersigned
complainant the following words: []Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca man malinis, garapal ca[]
and Balamu mansanas cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat (You are
pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt; you
are like a red apple, but inside you are worm infested and extremely dirty), which
utterances are serious and insulting in nature, tending to cause dishonor, discredit and
contempt of undersigned complainant and causing her extreme mental anguish, wound
(sic) feelings, besmirched reputation and serious anxiety for which she is entitled to
recover moral and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the honorable
court. Contrary to law.

CRIM.CASE NO. 140-94

For: Slander by Deed

On September 12, 1994 around four thirty (4:30 P.M.) in the afternoon, more or less, at
the Municipal Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, where public authorities are engaged in
the discharge of their duties, and in the presence of several persons, the accused  Noel L.
Villanueva while in the process of hurling verbal insults at the complainant, then and
there unlawfully, feloniously and contemptuously gave the complainant what is
commonly known as dirty finger by poking his hand at complainants face with the
middle finger extended and the rest of his fingers half-closed, an act tending to cause
dishonor, discredit and contempt on the complainant and causing her mental anguish,
wounded feelings and moral suffering for which she is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages in an amount to be determined by the honorable court. Contrary to law.[4]

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on both counts and trial ensued. The
prosecution witnesses presented were the complainant and her two witnesses.
 
The MCTC restated the facts as presented by the prosecution evidence as follows:
 
On 12 September 1994, at 10:00 oclock in the morning, two utility men came to
complainants office, bringing with them the application for monetized leave
of Sangguniang Bayan member Noel Villanueva, petitioner in this case. The
application for monetized leave was not immediately attended to by
complainant as she was then busy dictating some important matters to her
secretary.[5]
 
The accused at that time was standing in front of the Vice Mayors Office and he
allegedly said: E ano kung wala sa mood, e ano kung galit sya.[6] These utterances
of accused were disregarded by complainant but accused then entered the
complainants office bringing with him his Application for Monetized Leave. The
accused addressed the complainants secretary: Malou, pag atiu ne keng mood,
papirma mu ne. The alleged request of accused to the Secretary was made in a
very sarcastic manner.[7]
 
Complainant got the monetized leave and filed it in her in and out files and
while doing this, the paper accidentally fell on the floor. When she was about to
pick it up, the accused allegedly got a yellow pad and swung it at complainants
face, but she was able to evade it. Accused then said: Ibuat daka ken, inabu daka
keng awang, e baling masukulnaku. (I will lift you from there and I will throw you
out of the window and I dont care if I will go to jail). Then the accused went out of
the office and before leaving, he pointed a dirty finger at complainant, prompting
the latter to stand and get an empty bottle of coke to shield her face. Accused
proceeded towards the office of the municipal mayor. Because accused was still
frothing invectives, complainant purportedly rolled the empty bottle of coke
towards him. The incident was witnessed by so many people numbering about 20
to 30 who were then at the municipal hall.[8]
 
Prosecution evidence further showed that accused allegedly mouthed the
following disparaging remarks, Magmalinis ka, ena ka man malinis, garapal
ka. Balamumansanas kang malutu, pero king kilub ularan ka, tiktak karinat (You
are pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are
corrupt. You are like red apple, you are worm infested inside and extremely
dirty). While this was going on, the Municipal Attorney, Atty. Pepito Torres,
intervened to pacify the accused, but he was unable to do so.[9]
 
Based on the account of the prosecution witnesses, from the municipal
session hall, the complainant was persuaded to enter the office of
the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary.Accused followed her and inside said office, the
accused again said, Ibuat daka, inabu daka keng awang, e baling masukul ku (I
will lift you from there and I will throw you out of the window and I dont care if I
will go to
jail). I Tata mu tinagal yang kapitan pero masambut ya, pero ing kaputul ku sinam
but ne man (Your father ran for barangay captain and lost but my brother won)
[10]
 and again, the accused pointed a dirty finger at complainant.[11]
 
The defense, on the other hand, presented six witnesses. From their
testimonies, the MCTC gathered that on 12 September 1994, accused requested
Flora Calayag to prepare the application for monetized leave and asked her to
have it approved by the complainant. Because the application remained unsigned
by the latter, it was Joel Cecilio who in the afternoon went to her office for the
approval of the monetized leave, but again, to no avail.[12]
 
Accused then personally carried his application to complainants office. At
that time, complainant was dictating something to the Secretary and as he was
about to give the copy to the Secretary, complainant got up and grabbed the
paper from him and placed it on the right side of her table.[13]
 
This angered the accused and he said to complainant, [i]s this the actuation
of the high government official? The complainant replied, Bolang (Insane). A
verbal squabble ensued and the complainant allegedly said, nung munta kayo
keng municipiyong ayni balamu ninu kayong hari, ala nakong depatan nung-
e gawang pera, sira nako kareng tau.(When you go to the municipal building as if
you are a king, you did nothing except to make money, the people no longer
believe in you.)[14]
 
Complainant, at that instant, hurled a bottle of coke at petitioner and hit
one of the Barangay Captains then present.[15]
 
After trial, the MCTC found petitioner guilty of Grave Oral Defamation and Serious
Slander by Deed in a joint decision dated 26 February 1998. The MCTC held that
the statements uttered by petitioner and the act of making a dirty finger
constitute an affront on complainant who, as Vice Mayor and a lady, deserves
greater respect. The MCTC posited that the defense interposed by the petitioner
that complainant brought the havoc upon herself when she refused to approve
his application for accrued leave credits monetization cannot be considered as
valid to obviate or obliterate the crime or damage done unto the
complainant. The MCTC then held:
 
With these, this Court finds overwhelming evidence against the accused and as
such this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a charged (sic) of
Grave Oral Defamation punishable under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code and Slander
by Deed punishable under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x The complainant
although she can estimate the value of the moral damages is entitled to the sum
of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees of P30,000.00 and P1,000.00 as appearance fee plus
litigation expenses.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses
or charges mentioned above, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of FOUR (4)
MONTHS and one (1) day to one (1) year in each case which the accused shall served (at
the same time), and to pay by way of moral damages the sum of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and litigation expenses and attorneys fees
of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance fee.[16]

 
Both parties appealed to the RTC of Tarlac, which affirmed petitioners conviction,
but modified the penalty and the manner of serving accuseds sentence, and with
a substantial increase in the award of damages. The fallo reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, insofar as it finds the accused guilty of grave oral defamation in Criminal Case No.
139 and slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the accused is to be sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from THREE (3) months as minimum to TWO (2) years and TWO (2) months
as maximum in each of the cases, the same to be served SUCCESSIVELY.

Likewise, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is further modified and
the accused is ordered to pay the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and
another amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, including the amount
[17]
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court with
the modification that the award of exemplary damages was deleted because
according to the Court of Appeals it was shown from the records that the
petitioner himself was a victim of complainants indiscretion for refusing, for no
reason at all, to approve petitioners application for monetization of his accrued
leave credits. The Court of Appeals disposed as follows:
 
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision is hereby affirmed with
[18]
the modification that the award of exemplary damages is hereby deleted.

 
As petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise met with failure,
petitioner, in a last stab at absolution, lodged the present petition for review on
the following arguments:
 
 I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING ON ONLY ONE (1)
ISSUE RAISED BY PETITIONER IN HIS PETITION FOR REVIEW AND IN NOT RULING
SQUARELY ON THE OTHER FIVE (5) ISSUES, THUS, DENYING PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT
TO BE HEARD AND TO DUE PROCESS.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE

ASSAILED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT AS PER
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF, IT IS CLEAR, IT BEING SUSTAINED BY
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT IT WAS THE COMPLAINANT WHO GAVE THE
PROVOCATION TO THE WHOLE INCIDENT.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION

OF THE LOWER COURTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID COURTS GAVE CREDENCE AND
WEIGHT ONLY TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, BUT FAILED TO
GIVE PROBATIVE VALUE TO AND ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
ACCUSED-PETITIONER AND THAT OF HIS WITNESSES.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE

PETITIONER ON THE GROUND THAT HIS GUILT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED HAD NOT BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[19]

 
 The issues are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
conviction of petitioner for grave oral defamation in Criminal Case No. 139-94,
and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of
petitioner for serious slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94.

 
Anent the first issue, Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
 
Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and
insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos.

Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The

term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.[20]
 

There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The

gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but
also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the
circumstances surrounding the case.[21] Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not
only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning
judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.[22]
 
 In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and position of the
offended party are also taken into account and thus, it was held that the slander
was grave, because the offended party had held previously the Office of
Congressman, Governor, and Senator and was then a candidate for Vice-
President,[23] for which no amount of sophistry would take the statement out of
the compass of grave oral defamation.[24] However, we have, likewise, ruled in the
past that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation
on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.[25]
 
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the
position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society
against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party
was a Vice-Mayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that such
scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as
found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid
justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave credits of
petitioner. In a manner of speaking, she sowed the wind that reaped the storm.
 
In the words of the Court of Appeals:
 
The already existing animosity between them does not vest in the complainant the
prerogative to deny petitioner a right to which he was legally entitled. Exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. They are designed to permit the
court to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is
required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. It cannot be
[26]
invoked as a matter of right. x x x 

The above findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial

evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court.[27]Considering this finding, the Court of Appeals not only should have struck
out the award of exemplary damages but should have modified as well the
offense committed to be of simple nature punishable by arresto mayor or a fine
not exceeding P200.00 under the above-quoted Art. 358 of the Revised Penal
Code.
 

In Pader v. People,[28] complainant was conversing with his political leaders

at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan, when petitioner appeared at the gate
and shouted putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo! The latter was
dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for
Vice Mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections of 8 May 1995. We held that the
offense committed was only slight slander. We explained why in this wise:
The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral
defamation. In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending
not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering,
however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only
slight. The trial court, in arriving at its decision, considered that the defamation
was deliberately done to destroy Atty. Escolangos reputation since the parties
were political opponents.
We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that
the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered
the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by
what Atty. Escolango did when petitioners father died. In which case, the
oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
In Reyes v. People [137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969)], we ruled that the
expression putang ina mo is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is
often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In
fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates ones expression of
profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident
involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter
words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of
resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for
vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person
are not uncommon.
In similar fashion, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages without
proof of suffering. Accordingly, petitioner may be convicted only of slight oral
 defamation defined and penalized under Article 358, Revised Penal Code,
prescribing the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
[29]
 (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Similarly, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[30] petitioner and complainant, a
Municipal Judge, were next door neighbors. Animosity grew between their two
families because of some disputes. Petitioner resented the practice of
complainant of throwing garbage and animal excrement into her premises. There
was also a boundary dispute between petitioner's mother and complainant,
which was the subject of a civil suit for "Recovery of Possession, Ownership,
Enforcement of Legal Easement and Abatement of Nuisance" filed by the mother
before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against complainant. Additionally,
petitioner's mother had previously instituted an administrative complaint against
the complainant before the Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. There
was a pent-up feeling of being aggrieved, resentment, anger, and vexation on
petitioner's part, culminating in her outburst against complainants. For having
called the complainant judge "land grabber," "shameless" and "hypocrite,"
petitioner was charged and subsequently convicted by the Court of First Instance
of three separate offenses of Grave Oral Defamation committed on 5, 6 and 8
August 1976. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdicts of
conviction. On review, however, we held that although the abusive remarks may
ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental
circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on complainant's part,
and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of unrestrained
anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for the crime of Slight Oral
Defamation. Petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 in each of the
criminal cases, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
 
Guided by the foregoing precedents, we find petitioner guilty only of slight
oral defamation because of the attendant circumstances in the case at bar.
 
Lest we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the vilification or use
of scurrilous language on the part of petitioner, but following the rule that all
possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor, it is
our considered view that the slander committed by petitioner can be
characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory
words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended
party, constitutes only a light felony.[31]
 
In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without valid
justification, but as an offshoot of a political dissension may have been vexing for
petitioner and may have been perceived by him as provocation that triggered him
to blow his top and utter those disparaging words. In hindsight, to be denied
monetization of leave credits must have stirred upon the petitioner a feeling akin
to begging for money that he was legally entitled to. This oppressive conduct on
the part of complainant must have scarred petitioners self-esteem, too, to appear
as begging for money. But again, this is not an excuse to resort to intemperate
language no matter how such embarrassment must have wreaked havoc on his
ego.
 

The next issue that faces this Court is whether or not petitioners act of
poking a dirty finger at complainant constitutes grave slander by deed.
 
Following the same principle as enunciated in our foregoing discussion of
the first issue, we find petitioner guilty only of slight slander by deed in Criminal
Case No. 140-94 inasmuch as we find complainants unjust refusal to sign
petitioners application for monetization and her act of throwing a coke bottle at
him constituted a perceived provocation that triggered the poking of finger
incident.
 
Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
 
Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to
1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not
included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt
upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
  
 
Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by performing
any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. The
elements are (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other
crime against honor, (2) that such act is performed in the presence of other
person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by
deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended
party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc.
[32]
 It is libel committed by actions rather than words. The most common examples
are slapping someone or spitting on his/her face in front of the public market, in
full view of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the
person of another.

 
In Mari v. Court of Appeals,[33] complainant and petitioner were co-
employees in the Department of Agriculture, with office at Digos, Davao del Sur,
although complainant occupied a higher position. On 6 December 1991, petitioner
borrowed from complainant the records of his 201 file. However, when he returned
the same three days later, complainant noticed that several papers were missing
which included official communications from the Civil Service Commission and
Regional Office, Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the
Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner. Upon instruction of her superior officer,
complainant sent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his 201
file was returned with missing documents. Instead of acknowledging receipt of the
memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily shouted at her:
"Putang ina, bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant and choked
her. With the intervention of the security guard, petitioner was prevailed upon to
desist from further injuring complainant. We held:
 
Prescinding from the foregoing, it would serve the ends of justice better if
the petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of imprisonment. The offense
while considered serious slander by deed was done in the heat of anger and
was in reaction to a perceived provocation. The penalty for serious slander
by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine. We opt to impose a fine.
 
 ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals and in lieu thereof renders judgment finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of serious slander by deed defined and penalized under
Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to pay a fine
of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[34](Emphasis
supplied.)
 
 
In Mari, the Court found petitioner guilty of serious slander by deed defined
and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to
pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
deed involved was the banging of a chair in front of complainant and choking her.
 
In another case, Teodoro v. Court of Appeals,[35] the incident, which gave
rise to this case, is narrated as follows:
 
Petitioner Amado B. Teodoro was vice-president and corporate secretary
of the DBT-Marbay Construction, Inc., while complainant, Carolina Tanco-
Young, was treasurer of the same corporation. Petitioner is the brother of the
president of the corporation, Donato Teodoro, while complainant is the daughter
of the chairman of the board of the corporation, Agustin Tanco. x xx
 
Records show that the incident complained of took place at the Board Room
of the D.B.T. Mar Bay Construction Incorporated in the afternoon of August 17,
1984. Present at the meeting were Agustin Tanco, Chairman of the Board; the
President, Donato Teodoro; the accused, Amado Teodoro, as Corporate Secretary;
the complainant, Carolina Tanco-Young who is the Treasurer; and one
Oscar Benares.
 
x x x x
 
It appears that there was a controversial document being insisted upon by
the accused, as secretary, to be signed by the chairman. The Board Treasurer,
Carolina Tanco-Young questioned the propriety of having the document signed as
there was, according to her, no such meeting that ever took place as to show a
supposed resolution to have been deliberated upon. A verbal exchange of words
and tirades took place between the accused Secretary and the Treasurer. One
word led to another up to the point where Carolina Tanco-Young, the treasurer,
either by implication or expressed domineering words, alluded to the accused as
a "falsifier" which blinded the accused-appellant to extreme anger and rage, thus
leading him to slap Tanco-Young the alleged name caller.[36] (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
 This Court in Teodoro held that there was grave slander by deed.
 
In another case, the acts of pushing and slapping a woman in order to
ridicule and shame her before other people constitute the felony of slander by deed
defined and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.[37]
 
In the cases as above-cited, there was no provocation on the part of the
complainants unlike the present case. Moreover, the poking of the finger in the
case at bar was, palpably, of less serious magnitude compared to the banging of
chair, the choking in Mari and the slapping of a face in Teodoro. Thus, we find that
the poking of dirty finger in the case at bar, while it smacks of slander by deed, is
of a lesser magnitude than the acts committed in the foregoing cases.
 
Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the
phrase Fuck You, which is similar to the expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in
local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,
[38]
 where the Court said that: This is a common enough expression in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and
in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from
complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant
constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the
case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to express anger
or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave
monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon
complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall
be arresto menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine
not exceeding P200.00. We opt to impose a fine following Mari.[39]
 

Yes, complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady at that, which

circumstances ordinarily demanded respect from petitioner. But, it was, likewise,
her moral obligation springing from such position to act in a manner that is worthy
of respect. In the case at bar, complainants demeanor of refusing to sign the leave
monetization of petitioner, an otherwise valid claim, because of a political discord
smacks of a conduct unbecoming of a lady and a Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover, it
appears that she had, indeed, thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which actuation
reveals that she, too, had gone down to petitioners level.
 
Holding an esteemed position is never a license to act capriciously with
impunity. The fact that there was a squabble between petitioner and complainant,
both high-ranking local public officials, that a verbal brawl ostensibly took place,
speaks very poorly of their self-control and public relations. For this, they both
deserve to be censured and directed to conduct themselves in a more composed
manner and keep their pose as befits ranking officials who officially deal with the
public.[40]
 
To be worthy of respect, one must act respectably, remembering always that
courtesy begets courtesy.
 
Anent the award of damages, the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the
award of moral damages to P100,000.00 in light of its own finding that petitioner
himself was a victim of complainants indiscretion for her refusal, for no reason at
all, to approve petitioners application for monetization of his accrued leave
credits.
 
In similar fashion, considering that petitioner and complainant belong to
warring political camps, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike
are among the hazards of the job.[41] Considering this political reality and the fact
that the Court of Appeals concluded, based on evidence on records, that
petitioner himself was a victim of complainants indiscretion, her claim for
damages and attorneys fees must, likewise, fail. Akin to the principle that he who
comes to court must have clean hands, each of the parties, in the case at bar,
must bear his own loss.

 
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
 
1) In Crim. Case No. 139-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight oral defamation only
for which we impose on him a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;
 
2) In Crim. Case No. 140-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple slander by deed for which we
impose a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;
 
 
3) The awards for moral damages and attorneys fees are DELETED.
Finally, the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it deleted the award
for exemplary damages is AFFIRMED. No costs.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
  MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

   
   
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
 

CERTIFICATION
 

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that

the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

 
 

  ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

 
[1]
 In the Matter of the Alleged Improper Conduct of Justice Badoy, Jr., 443 Phil. 296, 313 (2003).
[2]
 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Edgardo F.
Sundiam, concurring. Rollo, pp. 51-63.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 8.
[4]
 Id., p. 52.
[5]
 Id., p. 83.
[6]
 Id., p. 54.
[7]
 Id.
[8]
 Id., pp. 83-84.
[9]
 Id., p. 85.
[10]
 Id., p. 95.
[11]
 Id.
[12]
 Id.
[13]
 Id.
[14]
 Id., p. 86.
[15]
 Id.
[16]
 Id., pp. 86-87.
[17]
 Id., p. 145.
[18]
 Id., p. 77.
[19]
 Id., pp. 28-29.
[20]
 Victorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 32836-37, 31 May 1989, 173 SCRA 645, 652.
[21]
 THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book Two, Reyes, p. 956 (14 th Ed., 1998), citing People v. Jaring, C.A., 40
O.G. 3683.
[22]
 Pader v. People, 381 Phil. 932, 935-936 (2000).
[23]
 THE REVISED PENAL CODE, supra note 21, citing People v. Boiser, C.A., 53 O.G. 2202.
[24]
 Id., citing Balite v. People, 124 Phil. 868, 878 (1966).
[25]
 Id., citing People v. De Modesto, 40 O.G., Suppl. 11,128.
[26]
 Rollo, p. 63.
[27]
 Mari v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 269, 275 (2000).
[28]
 Supra note 22.
[29]
 Id., pp. 936-937.
[30]
 204 Phil. 372, 375-376 (1982).
[31]
 THE REVISED PENAL CODE, supra note 31, p. 957.
[32]
 Id., p. 959.
[33]
 Supra note 27, p. 273.
[34]
 Id., pp. 275-279.
[35]
 328 Phil. 116 (1996).
[36]
 Id., pp. 118-119.
[37]
 People v. Delfin, 112 Phil. 807, 818 (1961).
[38]
 137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969).
[39]
 Mari v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27.
[40]
 Domingo v. Quimson, supra note 1.
[41]
 Cf. Pader v. People, supra note 22.
  

FIRST DIVISION

JEROME CASTRO, G.R. No. 180832

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- v e r s u s - CORONA,

AZCUNA and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. Promulgated:

July 23, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION
 

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] emanated from the complaint for grave
oral defamation[2] filed by Albert P. Tan against petitioner Jerome Castro.
 

The facts follow.

 

On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tans

son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for violating the terms of his
disciplinary probation.[3] Upon Tans request, RIS reconsidered its decision but
imposed non-appealable conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from
participating in the graduation ceremonies.
 

Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education (Dep-Ed)

for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private Schools, Education Act of 1982
and Article 19 of the Civil Code [4] against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his
son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After
investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS code violation point system allowed the
summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in
law). The system therefore violated due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it. [5]
  

Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit

Justin Albert without any condition.[6] Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and
participate in the commencement ceremonies held on March 30, 2003.

After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent
at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that he was
contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities,
including petitioner who was the assistant headmaster.

Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told him
that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before
they hung up, petitioner told Ching:
 
Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], thats dangerous.

Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said talking to him
was dangerous.
 

Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against petitioner on August 21, 2003.
 
On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 [7] under the
following Information:
 
That on or about the 13th day of March, 2003 in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
[petitioner], with deliberate intent of bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into discredit,
dishonor, disrepute and contempt, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously speak and utter the following words to Ms. Bernice C. Ching:

OK, YOU TOO, YOU TAKE CARE AND BE CAREFUL TALKING TO [TAN],
THATS DANGEROUS.

and other words of similar import of a serious and insulting nature.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.

 

The prosecution essentially tried to establish that petitioner depicted Tan

as a dangerous person. Ching testified that petitioner warned her that talking to
Tan was dangerous. Tan, on the other hand, testified that petitioners statement
shocked him as it portrayed him as someone capable of committing undesirable
acts. He added that petitioner probably took offense because of the complaint he
filed against RIS in the Dep-Ed.
 
 For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite
the latters complaint against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted conversing
with Ching (whom he considered as a close acquaintance) on the telephone a few
days after RIS 2003 commencement exercises, petitioner asserted that he never
said or insinuated that Tan or talking to Tan was dangerous. On cross-
examination, however, he did not categorically deny the veracity of Chings
statement.
 

The MeTC found that Chings statements in her affidavit and in open court
were consistent and that she did not have any motive to fabricate a false
statement. Petitioner, on the other hand, harbored personal resentment,
aversion and ill-will against Tan since the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his
son. Thus, the MeTC was convinced that petitioner told Ching talking to Tan was
dangerous and that he uttered the statement with the intention to insult Tan and
tarnish his social and professional reputation.
 

In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the MeTC found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral defamation:[8]
 
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused, Jerome
Castro GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation,
sentencing him therefore, in accordance to Article 358(1) of the Revised Penal Code and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 1
month and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor as maximum.
 

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual findings of the
MeTC. However, in view of the animosity between the parties, it found petitioner
guilty only of slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on August 21, 2003 (or
almost five months from discovery), the RTC ruled that prescription had already
set in; it therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground. [9]
 

On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the decision of the RTC. [10] It
contended that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded
petitioners offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly misappreciated
the antecedents which provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory
statement against Tan.
 

The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
misapprehended the totality of the circumstances and found petitioner guilty only
of slight oral defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated the MeTC decision.[11]
 

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. [12] Hence, this

recourse.
  

Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in taking cognizance of the

petition for certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment (i.e., that
the RTC misappreciated the evidence presented by the parties) but failed to prove
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy
attached when the RTC acquitted him.
 

We grant the petition.

 

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
[13]
 This constitutional mandate is echoed in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
 
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or in information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.

x x x x x x x x x

 
Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2)
before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been
entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
[14]
 Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy.[15]
 

The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[16] when there was mistrial.
In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari
establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case.[17]
 

The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial
court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this
reason, void.Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
 

In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTCs finding on the nature of
petitioners statement, that is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral
defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the
RTCs erroneous evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties.
  

What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those
involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law). However, a court, in a
petition for certiorari, cannot review the public respondents evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings.[18] Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65
petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those
involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion).[19]
 

Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking
cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC.
[20]
 We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.

At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of
the Civil Code[21]:
 
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief:

x x x x x x x x x

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

 
 x x x x x x x x x

Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role

model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith.[22]
 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 29, 2007

decision and December 5, 2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 98649 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 20, 2006 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is REINSTATED. Petitioner
Jerome Castro is ACQUITTED of slight oral defamation as defined and penalized in
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
 

No pronouncement as to costs.
 

SO ORDERED.

 
RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice
 

 
  

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

 
  

CERTIFICATION
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

 
 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1]
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 358 provides:
Article 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall
be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
[3]
 Letter of RIS directress Nellie Aquino-Ong to Mr. and Mrs. Albert Tan. Rollo, p. 301. According to RIS, Justin
Albert accumulated 34 code violations including public display of affection and conduct unbecoming of a
gentleman. The maximum number of code violation was 25.
[4]
 Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
[5]
 Dep-Ed decision penned by Corazon D. Santiago, Director IV. Dated July 28, 2003. Rollo, pp. 321-331.
[6]
 Letter of Dep-Ed Director IV Corazon D. Santiago. Id., p. 141.
[7]
 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 93541.
[8]
 Decision penned by Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres. Rollo, pp. 214-221.
[9]
 Decision penned by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali of the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212. Dated
November 20, 2006. Id., pp. 438-448.
[10]
 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98649.
[11]
 Decision penned by Associate Justice Remedio A. Salazar-Fernandez and concurred by Associate Justices
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Enrico A. Lanzanas (retired) of the Seventh Division of the Court of
Appeals. Dated August 29, 2007. Rollo, pp. 56-63.
[12]
 Resolution dated December 5, 2007. Id., p. 65.
[13]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 21.
[14]
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Veridiano, 427 Phil. 795, 803 (2001).
[15]
 People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517, 554-556 (2000).
[16]
 228 Phil. 42 (1986).
[17]
 Yuchengco v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 11, 24 (2002).
[18]
 Id.
[19]
 Yuchengco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17 at 23.
[20]
 See People v. Velasco, supra note 15 at 560-561.
[21]
 This action would have been a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict, subject to Article 1146 of the Civil
Code.
[22]
 CIVIL CODE, Art. 19, supra note 4.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122274. July 31, 1996]

SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P. DICDICAN,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, HON.
AMADO B. BAJARIAS, SR., Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court, Branch 7, and VIVIAN G. GINETE, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The key issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is whether the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of a complaint
against a government official for grave oral defamation interrupts the period of
prescription of such offense.
We find this issue to be important enough to merit our attention. We thus resolved
to give due course to the petition, consider the private respondent's comment on the
petition  as the answer thereto, and decide it on the basis of the pleadings which have
[1]

sufficiently discussed the issue.

The factual and procedural antecedents are not disputed.
On 13 October 1993, private respondent Vivian G. Ginete, then officer-in-charge of
the Physical Education and School Sports (PESS) Division of the Regional Office of
Region VII in Cebu City of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
(hereinafter Ombudsman-Visayas) a complaint for grave oral defamation  allegedly[2]

committed on 23 September 1993 by petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an Education

Supervisor II of the same Regional Office.
The petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, but she failed to do so.
In his resolution of 15 March 1994,  Antonio B. Yap, Graft Investigation Officer I of
[3]

the said office, recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City for the filing of the necessary information against the petitioner.
This resolution was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas.
On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) in Cebu City an information  for grave oral defamation against the
[4]
petitioner. This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 35684-R and assigned to Branch 7
thereof.
On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to quash  the information on the
[5]

ground that the "criminal action or liability" has been extinguished. She contended that
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense of grave oral defamation
prescribes in months and that since the information was filed only on 28 March 1994, or
186 days or 6 months and 6 days after its alleged commission, the crime had then
already prescribed. In support thereof, she cited the decision in "Zalderia  vs. Reyes,
[6]

Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277," wherein this Court ruled that the
filing of an information at the fiscal's office will not stop the running of the prescriptive
period for crimes.
In her opposition,  the private respondent cited Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of
[7]

Court which provides, inter alia, that for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases and which fall within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the filing of the complaint directly with the said court
or with the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. The
filing of the complaint by the private respondent with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas was equivalent to the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's (now
prosecutor's) office under said Section 1 pursuant to its powers under Section 15(1) of
R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The private
respondent further claimed that Zaldivia is inapplicable because it involves an offense
covered by the rule on summary procedure and it explicitly stated that Section 1 of Rule
110 excludes cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Municipal Trial Court, per public respondent Judge Bajarias, denied the motion
to quash in the order of 18 July 1994.  It fully agreed with the stand of the private
[8]

respondent.
Her motion to reconsider  the above order having been denied on 29 November
[9]

1994,  the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a special civil
[10]

action for certiorari,  which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. CEB-16988. The
[11]

case was assigned to Branch 11.

In its decision of 3 July 1995,  the RTC, per public respondent Judge Isaias P.
[12]

Dicdican, affirmed the challenged orders of Judge Bajarias of 18 July 1994 and 29
November 1994. It ruled that the order denying the motion to quash is interlocutory and
that the petitioner's remedy, per Acharon vs. Purisima,  reiterated in People vs. Bans,
[13]

 was to go to trial without prejudice on her part to reiterate the special defense she had
[14]

invoked in her motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Besides, the petitioner
has not satisfactorily and convincingly shown that Judge Bajarias has acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the orders considering that the ground invoked by her
does not appear to be indubitable. And even assuming that the MTC erred in venturing
an opinion that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman is
equivalent to the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's office, such error is merely one of
judgment. For, there is no decided case on the matter, and the substantive laws have
not clearly stated as to what bodies or agencies of government should complaints or
informations be filed in order that the period of prescription of crimes or offenses should
be considered interrupted. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code simply states that the
prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the "filing of the complaint or information" and
has not specified further where such complaint or information should be filed.
Since the Regional Trial Court denied her motion to reconsider  the decision in the
[15]

order of 23 August 1995,  the petitioner filed this special civil action wherein she
[16]

reiterates the arguments she adduced before the two courts below. The private
respondent likewise did nothing more in her responsive pleading than reiterate what she
had raised before the said courts.
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Articles 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code for offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended,
for those penalized by special laws. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of grave oral defamation, which is the subject of the information in Criminal Case
No. 35684-R of the MTC of Cebu, prescribes in 6 months. Since Article 13 of the Civil
Code provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood to be of 30
days, then grave oral defamation prescribes in 180 days.  Article 91 of the Revised
[17]

Penal Code provides:

ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.

In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words were directly uttered in the
presence of the offended party on 23 September 1993. Hence, the prescriptive period
for the offense started to run on that date.
The matter of interruption of the prescriptive period due to the filing of the complaint
or information had been the subject of conflicting decisions of this Court. In People vs.
Tayco, People vs. Del Rosario,  and People vs. Coquia,  this Court held that it is the
[18] [19] [20]

filing of the complaint or information with the proper court, viz., the court having

jurisdiction over the crime, which interrupts the running of the period of prescription. On
the other hand, in the first case of People vs. Olarte,  a case for libel, this Court held
[21]

that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court even for preliminary
investigation purposes only interrupts the running of the statute of limitations.
However, the decision of 28 February 1967 of this Court in the second case
of People vs. Olarte  resolved once and for all what should be the doctrine, viz., that
[22]

the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court even for purposes of preliminary
investigation only suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Thus:
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two
lines of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace (now municipal judge) does interrupt the
course of the prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases
cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil.
588, 590. Another series of decisions declares that to produce interruption the
complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction
to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960;
People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and
Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has
arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established
by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even
if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: First, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint
is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action
on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured
party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution
is to file the requisite complaint.

And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription
"shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted," thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint
or information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the
trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is
in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may
terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused
because no prima facie case has been shown.

Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the
cases of People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia,
L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.
 Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,  this Court
[23]

not only reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by holding that the filing
of the complaint in the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation also suspends the
running of the prescriptive period. Thus:

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that . . . .

Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco held that the
complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper
court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's
Office. This is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that
the period shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of
the complaint or information terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in
the acquittal or conviction of the accused.

The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was disregarded by this Court in
the Olarte case, cited by the Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the
Olarte case, there was diversity of precedents on the issue of prescription. One view
declares that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal
judge) does interrupt the course of prescriptive term. This view is found-in
People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People v. Uba, L-
13106, October 16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other
pronouncement is that to produce interruption, the complainant or information must
have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits,
found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960;
People v. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.

The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the doctrine aforecited
by the Solicitor General. The reasons for the doctrine which We find applicable to the
case at bar read:

xxx xxx xxx

As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary

investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or
acquittal.

As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:

To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express
overruling also of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing
of a complaint or denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which
is required by law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the
period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally
initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary
investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like
municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions
of municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of First Instance x x x.

Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor
by the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it
were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks were
committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of prescription. (Italics
supplied)

This Court reiterated Francisco in its resolution of 1 October 1993 in Calderon-

Bargas vs. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. [24]

The procedural law articulating Francisco is the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule

110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Rules of Court. We quote the entire Section for a
better understanding of the last paragraph:

SEC. 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases, the institution of criminal actions shall be as follows:

(a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts,

by filing the complaint with the
appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;

(b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint or
information directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the
fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered
cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense
charged. (Italics supplied)

The rule, however, is entirely different under Act No. 3326, as amended, whose
Section 2 explicitly provides that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the
institution of judicial proceedings, i.e., the filing of the complaint or information with the
court. The said section reads:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting double jeopardy.(Italics supplied)

And so, in Zaldivia vs. Reyes,  this Court held that the proceedings referred to in
[25]

said Section 2 are "judicial proceedings," which means the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court.
Zaldivia, however, provides no safe refuge to the petitioner, and her invocation
thereof is misplaced. In the first place, it involved a violation of an ordinance, which is
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. By its express mandate, Section 1, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court does not apply to cases covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Second, since the ordinance in question partakes of a special penal statute
Act No. 3326 is then applicable; hence, it is the filing in the proper court of the complaint
or information which suspends the running of the period of prescription. In Zaldivia, this
Court categorically interpreted Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure to mean
that "the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before that," which is in consonance with
Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
What is then left to be determined is whether the filing of the private respondent's
complaint for grave oral defamation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is
equivalent to filing the complaint in the prosecutor's office such that it interrupted the
prescriptive period for grave oral defamation.
Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution provide:

SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:

1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or

omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
 Corollarily, Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, which Congress enacted pursuant to paragraph 8  of the [26]

aforementioned Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, provide as follows:

SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,

shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or
employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants
in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,

any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage from any investigatory
agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases.

SEC. 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer
or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure in office.

Needless to state, these broad constitutional and statutory provisions vest upon the
Ombudsman and his Deputies the power to initiate or conduct preliminary investigations
in criminal cases filed against public officers or employees, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. Thus, in Deloso vs. Domingo,  this Court held:
[27]

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and
duty "to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official
x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."
(Sec. 13[1]) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in
this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official x
x x and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature
of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman
may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.

It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate

any illegal act or omission of any public officer is not an exclusive authority; rather, it is a
"shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged." [28]

A public officer, as distinguished from a government "employee," is a person whose

duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of
government.  The petitioner, being an Education Supervisor II of the Regional Office of
[29]

Region VII of the DECS, is a public officer. The Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority
to conduct preliminary investigation of the private respondent's complaint against the
petitioner for grave oral defamation. Undoubtedly, the rationale of the first Olarte case,
reiterated as the controlling doctrine in the second Olarte case, which was broadened
in Francisco and reiterated in Calderon-Bargas, must apply to complaints filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman against public officers and employees for purposes of
preliminary investigation. Accordingly, the filing of the private respondent's complaint for
grave oral defamation against the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the
running of the period of prescription of the said offense. Since the complaint was filed
on 13 October 1993, or barely twenty days from the commission of the crime charged,
the filing then of the information on 28 March 1994 was very well within the six-month
prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.

[1]
 Erroneously captioned as "Reply to Petition."
[2]
 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 26. The complaint is dated 30 September 1993.
[3]
 Annex "C", Id.; Id., 30.
[4]
 Annex "D", Id.; Id., 33.
[5]
 Annex "E" of Petition: Rollo, 35.
[6]
 Should be Zaldivia.
[7]
 Annex "F" of Petition; Rollo, 38.
[8]
 Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 44.
[9]
 Annex "H", Id.; Id., 46.
[10]
 Annex "I", Id.; Id., 50.
[11]
 Annex "J", Id.; Id., 51.
[12]
 Annex "K", Id.; Id., 63.
[13]
 13 SCRA 309 [1965].
[14]
 239 SCRA 48 [1994].
[15]
 Annex "L" of Petition; Rollo, 67.
[16]
 Annex "M", Id.; Id., 74.
[17]
 See People vs. Paz del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67 [1955].
[18]
 73 Phil. 509 [1941].
[19]
 110 Phil. 476 [1960].
[20]
 8 SCRA 349 [1963].
 108 Phil. 756 [1960], citing U.S. vs. Lazada, 9 Phil. 509 [1908]; People vs. Joson, 46 Phil. 380 [1924];
[21]

People vs. Parao, 52 Phil. 712 [1929].

[22]
 19 SCRA 494, 499-501 [1967].
[23]
 122 SCRA 538 [1983].
[24]
 227 SCRA 56, 63 [1993].
[25]
 211 SCRA 277, 283-84 [1992].
[26]
 It provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law.
[27]
 191 SCRA 545, 550 [1990].
 Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, G.R. No. 98452, 26 September 1991; Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
[28]

627, 637 [1993].

[29]
 Section 2, Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292).
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132164. October 19, 2004]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. ALLYSON

BELAGAN, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his

reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before
the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose,[1] or at the time of
the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the
suit.[2] This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still change or
reform himself.
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals
Decision[3] dated January 8, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 44180, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 966213 dated September 23, 1996 and Resolution

No. 972423 dated April 11, 1997 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are
hereby set aside. The complaint against petitioner Allyson Belagan filed by
Magdalena Gapuz is hereby DISMISSED.

The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be

immediately reinstated to his position without loss of seniority, retirement, backwages
and other rights and benefits.

SO ORDERED.

The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by
Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center, and
Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with
sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and
various malfeasances.
 Magdalenas sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an
application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school.
One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school
premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to conduct the
inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his services. Sometime in June
1994, respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of the inspection,
while both were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed
his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, Sir,
is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values?
Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other people in the
area.
Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked
respondent, Sir, kumusta yung application ko? His reply was Mag-date muna tayo. She
declined, explaining that she is married. She then left and reported the matter to DECS
Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application.
However, she was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the
permit has not yet been released. Thereupon, they went to the office of the respondent.
He merely denied having a personal relationship with Magdalena.
Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his
recommendation to approve Magdalenas application for a permit to operate a pre-
school.
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain
female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS
official with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being
complained of was respondent. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities
and harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate
occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower
part of her back.
Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers
salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully
refusing to release the teachers uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity
pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the
DECS rules and regulations.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and
Ligaya. In his defense, respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment. However,
he presented evidence to disprove Ligayas imputation of dereliction of duty.
 On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision [4] finding
respondent guilty of four (4) counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed
against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of sexual advances or indignities against Magdalena.
He was ordered dismissed from the service. The dispositive portion of the Joint
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby rendered

in the two above-entitled cases, finding:

a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS Baguio City Schools
Division GUILTY of the four counts of sexual indignities or
harassments committed against the person and honor of complainant Miss Ligaya
Annawi, a Baguio City public school teacher, while in the performance of his official
duties and taking advantage of his office. He is, however, ABSOLVED of all the
other charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty.
b) Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson Belagan likewise GUILTY of
the two counts of sexual advances or indignities committed against the person
and honor of complainant Mrs. Magdalena Gapuz, a private school teacher of
Baguio City, while in the performance of his official duties and taking advantage of
his office.

Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY ORDERED

DISMISSED from the government service, with prejudice to reinstatement and all his
retirement benefits and other remunerations due him are HEREBY DECLARED
FORFEITED in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996,
promulgated Resolution No. 966213[6] affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in
the case filed by Magdalena but dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that
respondents transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. Thus:

The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was holding a
position which requires the incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral
uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan represents an institution tasked to
mold the character of children. Furthermore, one of his duties is to ensure that
teachers in his division conduct themselves properly and observe the proper
discipline. Any improper behavior on his part will seriously impair his moral
ascendancy over the teachers and students which can not be tolerated. Therefore, his
misconduct towards an applicant for a permit to operate a private pre-school
cannot be treated lightly and constitutes the offense of grave misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty of grave
misconduct and imposed the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with all the
accessory penalties. The decision of the DECS Secretary is modified accordingly.[7]

On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration,

contending that he has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years
of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the
Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, thus:
1. Criminal Case No. 43416 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (December 3, 1980)
2. Criminal Case No. 45629 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (May 13, 1982)
3. Criminal Case No. 45630 for GRAVE THREATS (May 13, 1982)
4. Criminal Case No. 45914 for GRAVE THREATS (June 24, 1982)
5. Criminal Case No. 51532 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (January 25, 1985)
6. Criminal Case No. 51533 for LIGHT THREATS (January 25, 1985)
7. Criminal Case No. 51556 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 30, 1985)
8. Criminal Case No. 51818 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
9. Criminal Case No. 51819 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
10. Criminal Case No. 51820 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (March 18, 1985)
11. Criminal Case No. 51821 for UNJUST VEXATION (March 18, 1985)
12. Criminal Case No. 62173 for UNJUST VEXATION (May 29, 1991)
13. Criminal Case No. 62172 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (May 29, 1991)
14. Criminal Case No. 62754 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)
15. Criminal Case No. 55642 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)
16. Criminal Case No. 55423 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (October 24, 1986)
17. Criminal Case No. 55846 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (November 4, 1986)
18. Criminal Case No. 55800 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 7, 1987)
19. Criminal Case No. 57312 for UNJUST VEXATION (November 29, 1987)
20. Criminal Case No. 55643 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (December 13, 1985)
21. Criminal Case No. 53404 for UNJUST VEXATION (December 13, 1985)
22. Criminal Case No. 55422 for UNJUST VEXATION (October 24, 1986) [8]
In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena were filed with the
Barangay Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio
City:
1. Ordana vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 11-19-02-A) for GRAVE THREATS, UNJUST
VEXATION, RUMOR MONGERING
2. Teresita De Los Santos vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 86-8-26-8) for GRAVE
THREATS & ORAL DEFAMATION
3. Mrs. Conchita Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 029) for ORAL DEFAMATION
and FALSE ACCUSATION
4. Mrs. Clara Baoas vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 030) for HARASSMENT and
THREATS
5. GABRIELA SILANG TANOD FORCES vs. Gapuz (Case No. 031) for HABITUAL
TROUBLE MAKER
6. Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
7. C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
8. Mrs. Liza Ancheta vs. Gapuz (September 27, 1978) for RUMOR MONGERING
9. Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
10. Mrs. Minda Valdez vs. Gapuz (November 6, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
11. WOMENS CLUB vs. GAPUZ (February 9, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
12. Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)
Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against Barangay Captain and
Police Chief
13. Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)
Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an emergency
meeting and where she shouted invectives against the residents
14. Incident of June 13, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the Barangay Sanitary Inspector
15. Incident of August 25, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the servants of Mr. De Leon
16. Incident of August 26, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz terrorized the council meeting
17. Incident of September 2, 1978
Mrs. Clara Baoas was harassed by Mrs. Gapuz
18. Incident of September 9, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz quarreled with Mrs. C. Ballesteros during the council meeting
19. Incident of September 10, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz was hurling invectives along her alley in the early morning
20. Incident of September 13, 1979
 Mrs. Gapuz tapped electric wire from Mrs. Tessie de los Santos with the
latters consent
21. Incident of September 21, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting and hurling invectives scandalously around her
residence
22. Incident of September 21, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting, complaining about alleged poisoned sardines
near the premises of her residence which killed her hen.
23. Incident of September 23, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting unpleasant words around the neighborhood. She
did not like the actuations of a bayanihan group near the waiting shed.[9]
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt
on her character, integrity, and credibility.
In its Resolution No. 972423[10] dated April 11, 1997, the CSC denied respondents
motion for reconsideration, holding that:

The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor
significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused
of having committed the offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a woman
of ill repute may become a victim of said offense.

As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to have had cases
before the regular courts for various offenses and was condemned by her community
for wrongful behavior does not discount the possibility that she was in fact telling the
truth when she cried about the lecherous advances made to her by the respondent. x x
x

Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated
earlier, it reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalenas complaint.
The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character
being questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one
whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss. In fact, her record immediately raises an
alarm in any one who may cross her path.[11] In absolving respondent from the charges,
the Appellate Court considered his unblemished service record for 37 years.
Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition raising
the following assignments of error:
I. The Supreme Court may rule on factual issues raised on appeal where the
Court of Appeals misappreciated the facts. Furthermore, where the findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, the
Supreme Court may review the record and evidence. The Court of Appeals
 erred in not giving credence to the testimony of complainant Magdalena
Gapuz despite convincing and overwhelming signs of its truthfulness.
II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it failed to give due
weight to the findings of the DECS, which conducted the administrative
investigation, specifically with respect to the credibility of the witnesses
presented.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent should be penalized
under Sec. 22 (o) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V and not Sec. 22
(e) of said rules.[12]
In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalenas derogatory record
undermines the verity of her charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in
dismissing it.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The pivotal issue before us is whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is
credible. This is a question of fact which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Courts
review.
It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported
by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court.[13] This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts. One of the
exceptions, however, is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court or a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.[14]
Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles apart in their appreciation of
Magdalenas derogatory record. While the former considered it of vital and paramount
importance in determining the truth of her charge, the latter dismissed it as of minor
significance. This contrariety propels us to the elusive area of character and reputation
evidence.
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy.[15] One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section
51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:

SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.

(a) In Criminal Cases:

xxxxxx

(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability
or improbability of the offense charged.
 It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases,
not to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence
can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondents posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under
this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the
offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits
and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.[16] Thus, on a charge of rape
- character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or
violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty.[17] In one rape case,
where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently
uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful.[18]
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer
evidence that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented are charges
for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious
mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible
under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability
of the offense charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish
is Magdalenas lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the
charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given.
It refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.[19] A witness
may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth,
[20]
 honesty[21] or integrity.[22] Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on
Evidence reads:

SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the

party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he
has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by
evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense.

Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf,
opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party
who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as
any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or
reputation.[23]
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the
character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject
of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question is Magdalenas derogatory record
sufficient to discredit her credibility?
 A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to
acts committed in the 80s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints
filed with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts
complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense
was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable
proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in
according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of
ones character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the
time in question.[24] In other words, what is to be determined is the character or
reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a
period remote from the commencement of the suit. [25] Hence, to say that
Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a
decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered
from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every
person is capable to change or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the
criminal cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of
jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or
that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in
jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.[26] This view has usually been based upon
one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge
against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent
persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may
not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.
[27]
 Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts.
Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that
would be involved, and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity
of such wrongful acts.[28] As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain
or rebut each of the charges against her listed by respondent.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the
CSC is the fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous
manner. Her testimony is replete with details, such as the number of times she and
respondent inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent
kissed her, and the matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena
would not have normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth. We
quote her testimony during the cross-examination conducted by DECS Assistant
Secretary Romeo Capinpin and Undersecretary Antonio Nachura, thus:
Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr. Belagan during the inspection on
the first floor and the second floor?
A There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we had with regard to my family,
background, how the school came about, how I started with the project. That was
all, sir.
Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words or in deeds?
A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We went up to the stairs twice,
sir.
Q Why?
A I really dont know what was the reason behind, sir. But on the second inspection, sir,
I told him that as of that time I had some transients with me. I was making use of
the premises for transients because that was summer then, sir. And I already
started paying the place so I said, Sir, I have some transients with me in the
evening and he said, You know Mrs. Gapuz, I am interested to stay in one of the
rooms as one your boarders. But I respectfully declined saying, Sir, I think
for delicadeza I cannot accept you. Not that I dont want you to be here but people
might think that I am keeping you here and that would prejudice my permit, sir.
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time that you went
up with him or the second time?
A No, sir, on the second time, sir.
Q Second time?
A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.
Q And you were going down?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the alleged
kissing?
A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.
Q Before you went down?
A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the stairs
and it has 16 steps.
Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the topmost?
A Yes sir.
Q Part of the floor of the building?
A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time?
A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about these
transients that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in one of the
rooms and then I declined and I was still showing the rooms simultaneously.
 On the last, the biggest room that I had, he said, No. Never mind, I am not
going to see that anymore. So he waited for me there and upon reaching the
place, as I was to step down on the first step going down, he placed his arm
and held me tightly and planted the kiss on my cheek, sir.
Q You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms?
A Yes, sir, as a boarder.
Q Is that room used for transients?
A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use of the time to get some
transients.
Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of the rooms?
A Yes, but I declined, sir for delicadeza.
Q At that time, there were no transients yet.
A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was there.[29]
The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter Ngabit,
DECS Assistant Division Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to
him that respondent kissed her and asked her for a date.
Q I would like to call your attention to Exhibit A which is the affidavit of Mrs. Magdalena
B. Gapuz, particularly item no. 8, and may I read for your information That the
Monday after the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office expecting to get
favorable recommendation from the DECS Regional Office for the issuance of my
permit. That I proceeded to the Superintendent and asked him, Sir, kumusta yung
application ko and he said, mag date muna tayo but I refused and explained that I
am married, after which I proceeded to the Office of Asst. Superintendent Peter
Ngabit to relate the incident and then left the Division Office. Do you remember if
Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office on the particular day?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time was that?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q Was it morning, afternoon?
A I think it was in the morning, sir.
Q Morning.
A Yes, sir.
Q Early morning?
A About noon, sir.
Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your office?
A When she came to my Office, she was relating about that and she was even insulting
me saying among others that I was a useless fixture in that Office because I
cannot do anything with the processing of her paper or application.
 Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate any
incident?
A Yes, she did sir.
Q What was that incident all about?
A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he stole a kiss
from her and that she was saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan for her
papers, she was asked for a date before the Indorsement. After that, she left.
[30]

With Magdalenas positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard the
findings of the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the
Court of Appeals outdated characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad
reputation. There are a number of cases where the triers of fact believe the testimony of
a witness of bad character[31]and refuse to believe one of good character.[32] As a matter
of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of belief,
when he testified in a straightforward and convincing manner.[33]
At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS
investigating officials who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is
telling the truth considering that they were able to hear and observe her deportment and
manner of testifying.[34]
In reversing the CSCs Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is ample
evidence to show that Magdalena had a motive in accusing respondent, i.e., to pressure
him to issue a permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent had
already issued the permit when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she had
no more reason to charge respondent administratively, except of course to vindicate her
honor.
Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave
misconduct and not merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense.
[35]
 Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official.[36] To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.[37] In grave misconduct
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. [38]Corruption
as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person
who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.[39] This is
apparently present in respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a
demand for a date, an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a
pre-school. Respondents act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal.[40]
We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made
a steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division
Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he
received numerous awards.[41]This is the first time he is being administratively charged.
He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when
Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 provides:

SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and

aggravating circumstances may be considered. x x x.

The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in Section 53, Rule IV, of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[42] which reads in part:

SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. In the

determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.

The following circumstances shall be appreciated:

xxxxxx

j. length of service

xxxxxx

l. and other analogous cases.

Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment,[43] and

respondents length of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards,
[44]
 the penalty of suspension from office without pay for one (1) year is in order.
While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees,
however, neither will we negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy
service in the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution
Nos. 966213 and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent
ALLYSON BELAGAN is SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR, with
full credit of his preventive suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
[1]
 32 C.J.S. 434, citing In re Darrow, 92 N.E. 369, 175 Ind. 44.
[2]
 81 Am Jur 897, citing Carter vs. State, 226 Ala 96, 145 So. 814; State vs. Potts, 78 Iowa 656, 43 NW
534; State vs. Crockett, 161 Wash 262, 296 P 1041.
[3]
 Rollo, pp. 42-56. Penned by former Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria and concurred in
by Justices Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (retired Justice of this Court), and Ramon A. Barcelona,
retired.
[4]
 Rollo at 52-59.
[5]
 CA Rollo at 39.
[6]
 Id. at 61-71.
[7]
 Id. at 71.
[8]
 Id. at 79-80.
[9]
 Id. at 80-81.
[10]
 Id. at 73-75.
[11]
 Rollo at 53.
[12]
 Id. at 24.
[13]
 Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Leobrera, G.R. No. 137147, January 29, 2002, 375 SCRA 81 and
cases cited therein.
[14]
 Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 520 (1998); Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 171
(1996).
[15]
 29 Am Jur 2d 363.
[16]
 Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 168, citing 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 667(5).
[17]
 Id. at 168, citing Wigmore on Evidence (Student Text), 62.
[18]
 People vs. Tempongko, Jr., G.R. No. 69668, October 2, 1986, 144 SCRA 583.
[19]
 Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 502.
[20]
 Truth means conformity to fact or reality, exact accordance with that which is, or has been or shall be.
[21]
 Honesty signifies the quality or state of being straight, forwardness of conduct, thought, speech etc.
[22]
 Integrity has been defined as moral soundness; honesty; freedom from corrupting influence or practice,
especially strictness in the fulfillment of contracts, the discharge of agencies, trusts, and the like;
uprightness, rectitude. (Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 471, citing Section
11, Rule 132, Rules of Court, as amended).
There is a distinction between evidence as to the character of a party to a litigation and evidence as to the
character of a witness; in the former case character is a fact in issue or an evidentiary fact
affecting a fact in issue, while the character of the witness is collateral matter which does not
pertain to the fact in issue but merely to the weight of the evidence of such witness. (Francisco,
Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 474, citing 70 C.J.S. 821).
[23]
 98 C.J.S. 494.
[24]
 Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 170, citing 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, 341; 22A
C.J.S., Criminal Law, 677 (2); 32 C.J.S., Evidence, 434 (b).
[25]
 81 Am Jur 2d 897, supra FN 2.
Evidence of the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity twelve years prior to the trial will be excluded
as too remote. (Hapton vs. State, 78 Tex. Crim. Rep. 639, 183 S.W. 887).
Section 41, Rule 130 reads:
SEC. 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting
facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral
character, may be given in evidence. x x x.
[26]
 81 Am Jur 2d 905, citing United States vs. Dilts, (CA7 Ill) 501 F2d 531; Stephens vs. State, 252 Ala
183, 40 So 2d 90; Woodard vs. State, (Ala App) 489 So 2d 1; State vs. Johnson, 106 Ariz 539,
479 P2d 424; Judy vs. Mcdaniel, 247 Ark 409, 445 SW2d 722.
[27]
 81 Am Jur 2d 905.
[28]
 81 Am Jur 2d, 901, citing Miller vs. Journal Co., 246 Mo 722, 152 SW 40; People vs. Brown, 72 NY
571.
[29]
 Rollo at 154-156.
[30]
 Id. at 161-162.
[31]
 98 C.J.S. 496, citing People vs. Matson, 158 P 335, 30 C.A. 288; People vs. Strope, 272 N.Y. S. 268,
151 Misc. 580.
[32]
 Id., citing State vs. Little, 94 S.E. 1, 174 N.C. 800.
[33]
 People vs. Strope, supra.
[34]
 Chase vs. Buencamino, Sr., L-20395, May 13, 1985, 136 SCRA 365.
[35]
 Section 22 (o), Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
[36]
 Maguad vs. De Guzman, A.M. No. P-94-1015, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 469.
[37]
 Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953).
[38]
 Civil Service Commission vs. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486 (1999).
[39]
 Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 345.
[40]
 Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
provides:
SEC. 22. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave,
and light, depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of said acts on the government
service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties.
(c) Grave misconduct: 1st Offense Dismissal.
[41]
 CA Rollo at 78.
[42]
 Resolution No. 99-1936. This Resolution was published in the September 11, 1999 issue of the Manila
Standard.
[43]
 Vedaa vs. Judge Valencia, 356 Phil. 317 (1998).
[44]
 Judge Agcaoili vs. Judge Ramos, 311 Phil. 238 (1995).
  
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
 
SECOND DIVISION
 
LETICIA B. AGBAYANI, G.R. No. 183623
Petitioner,  
  Present:
- versus -  
  CARPIO, J.,
  Chairperson,
  BRION,
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT PEREZ,
OF JUSTICE and LOIDA MARCELINA SERENO, and
J. GENABE, REYES, JJ.
Respondents.  
Promulgated:
 
June 25, 2012
 
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
REYES, J.:
 
On petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court is the
Decision[1] dated March 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the
petition for certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated July 3, 2008 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof in CA-G.R. SP No. 99626. Petitioner Leticia B.
Agbayani (Agbayani) assails the resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
which directed the withdrawal of her complaint for grave oral defamation filed
against respondent Loida Marcelina J. Genabe (Genabe).
 
Antecedent Facts
 
Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 275 of Las Pias City, working as Court Stenographer and Legal
Researcher II, respectively. On December 29, 2006, Agbayani filed a criminal
complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City, docketed as I.S. No. 07-0013, for allegedly uttering
against her, in the presence of their fellow court employees and while she was
going about her usual duties at work, the following statements, to wit:
 
ANG GALING MO LETY, SINABI MO NA TINAPOS MO
YUNG MARVILLA CASE, ANG GALING MO. FEELING LAWYER KA KASI,
BAKIT DI KA MAGDUTY NA LANG, STENOGRAPHER KA MAGSTENO KA
NA LANG, ANG GALING MO, FEELING LAWYER KA
TALAGA. NAGBEBENTA KA NG KASO, TIRADOR KA NG JUDGE. SIGE
HIGH BLOOD DIN KA, MAMATAY KA SANA SA HIGH BLOOD MO.[3]
 
 
In a Resolution[4] rendered on February 12, 2007, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City[5] found probable cause for the filing of the Information
for grave oral defamation against Genabe.
 
However, upon a petition for review filed by Genabe, the DOJ
Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda (Pineda) found that:
 
After careful evaluation and consideration of the evidence on record, we
find merit in the instant petition.
 
Contrary to the findings in the assailed resolution, we find that the subject
utterances of respondent constitute only slight oral defamation.
 
As alleged by the [petitioner] in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of her complaint-
affidavit, respondent uttered the remarks subject matter of the instant case in the
heat of anger. This was also the tenor of the sworn statements of the witnesses for
complainant. The Supreme Court, in the case of Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. L-56224-26, November 25, 1982, x x x held that although abusive remarks
may ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental
circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on complainants part,
and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of unrestrained
anger and obfuscation, such utterances constitute only the crime of slight oral
defamation.
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we believe that the instant case should
nonetheless be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions of Book III,
Title I, Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), of Republic Act No. 7160 (The
Local Government Code of 1991). As shown by the records, the parties herein are
residents of Las Pias City. x x x
 
The complaint-affidavit, however, failed to show that the instant case was
previously referred to the barangay for conciliation in compliance with Sections
408 and 409, paragraph (d), of the Local Government Code, which provides:
 
Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.
The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except: xxx
 
Section 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the workplace where the
contending parties are employed or xxx shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located.
 
The records of the case likewise show that the instant case is not one of
the exceptions enumerated under Section 408 of the Local Government Code.
Hence, the dismissal of the instant petition is proper.
 
It is well-noted that the Supreme Court held that where the case is covered
by P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law), the compulsory process of
arbitration required therein is a pre-condition for filing a complaint in
court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or
(b) it did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not
have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the
parties, the case should be dismissed x x x. While the foregoing doctrine is
handed down in civil cases, it is submitted that the same should apply to criminal
cases covered by, but filed without complying with, the provisions of P.D. 1508 x
x x.[6]
 
 
Thus, in a Resolution[7] dated May 17, 2007, the DOJ disposed, to wit:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the City Prosecutor of Las
Pias City is directed to move for the withdrawal of the information for grave oral
defamation filed against respondent Loida Marcelina J. Genabe, and report the
action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
  
 
SO ORDERED.[8]
 
 
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution[9] dated June 25, 2007.
 
Consequently, Agbayani filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging
that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the Resolution
dated February 12, 2007 of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City in I.S. Case No.
07-0013. She averred that the respondents petition for review filed with the DOJ
did not comply with Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70, or the 2000 National
Prosecution Service (NPS) Rules on Appeal, and maintained that her evidence
supported a finding of probable cause for grave oral defamation against respondent
Genabe.
 
On March 27, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition after finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ. Citing Punzalan v. Dela Pea,[10] the CA
stated that for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the complained act must constitute
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as it is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its
discretion; such abuse must be grave.
 
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA denied the same in
its Resolution[11] dated July 3, 2008. Hence, the instant petition.
 
 
 
Assignment of Errors
 
 Maintaining her stance, Agbayani raised the following, to wit:
 
I.       RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT DOJ DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN THE
LATTER REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE RESOLUTION OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR OF LAS PIAS CITY.
 
II.    RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
RESPONDENT DOJ'S FINDING THAT WHAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
COMMITTED WAS ONLY SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.
 
III. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
RESPONDENT DOJ'S DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.
 
IV. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 70 (2000 NPS Rule on
Appeal) ARE NOT MANDATORY.[12]
 
 
Ruling and Discussions
 
The petition is bereft of merit.
 
We shall first tackle Agbayani's arguments on the first two issues raised in
the instant petition.
 
1. Petitioner Agbayani alleged that Undersecretary Pineda unfairly heeded
only to the arguments interposed by respondent Genabe in her comment; and
the CA, in turn, took his findings and reasoning as gospel truth. Agbayanis
comment was completely disregarded and suppressed in the records of the
DOJ. Agbayani discovered this when she went to the DOJ to examine the records,
as soon as she received a copy of the DOJ Resolution of her motion for
reconsideration.
 
2. Further, petitioner Agbayani maintained that respondent Genabes Petition
for Review[13] should have been dismissed outright, since it failed to state the name
and address of the petitioner, nor did it show proof of service to her, pursuant to
Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Also, the petition was not accompanied
with the required attachments, i.e. certified copies of the complaint, affidavits of
witnesses, petitioner's reply to respondent's counter-affidavit, and documentary
evidences of petitioner. Thus, a grave irregularity was committed by the DOJ in
allowing the surreptitious insertion of these and many other documents in the
records of the case, after the petition had been filed.
 
In particular, petitioner Agbayani alleged that when the petition was filed on
March 22, 2007, only five (5) documents were attached thereto, namely: (a) the
Resolution of the City Prosecutor; (b) the respondent's Counter-affidavit; (c) Letter
of the staff dated January 2, 2005; (d) her Answer; and (e) the Information filed
against respondent Genabe with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias
City. However, at the time the Resolution of the DOJ was issued, a total of forty-
one (41) documents[14] formed part of the records of the petition. Besides,
respondent Genabe's Motion to Defer Arraignment (Document No. 40) and the
court order relative to the granting of the same (Document No. 41) were both dated
March 23, 2007, or a day after the petition was filed. Agbayani asserted that these
thirty-six (36) documents were surreptitiously and illegally attached to the records
of the case, an act constituting extrinsic fraud and grave misconduct.[15] At the very
least, the DOJ should have required respondent Genabe to formalize the insertion
of the said documents.
 
Petitioner Agbayani reiterated that her version of the incident was
corroborated by several witnesses (officemates of Agbayani and Genabe), while
that of Genabe was not.And since the crime committed by respondent Genabe
consisted of her exact utterances, the DOJ erred in downgrading the same to slight
oral defamation, completely disregarding the finding by the Investigating
Prosecutor of probable cause for the greater offense of grave oral defamation. She
denied that she gave provocation to respondent Genabe, insisting that the latter
committed the offense with malice aforethought and not in the heat of anger.
 
 We find no merit in the above arguments.
 
It is well to be reminded, first of all, that the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They
are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly
defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of
Court reflects this principle.[16]
 
Anent the charge of non-compliance with the rules on appeal, Sections 5 and
6 of the aforesaid DOJ Circular provide:
 
SECTION 5. Contents of petition. - The petition shall contain or state: (a)
the names and addresses of the parties; (b) the Investigation Slip number (I.S.
No.) and criminal case number, if any, and title of the case, including the offense
charged in the complaint; (c) the venue of the preliminary investigation; (d) the
specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (e) a clear and concise
statement of the facts, the assignment of errors, and the reasons or arguments
relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; and (f) proof of service of a copy of
the petition to the adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned.
 
The petition shall be accompanied by legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the resolution appealed from together with legible true copies of the
complaint, affidavits/sworn statements and other evidence submitted by the
parties during the preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation.
 
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution, a copy of the motion to defer proceedings filed in court must also
accompany the petition.
 
The investigating/reviewing/approving prosecutor shall not be impleaded
as party respondent in the petition. The party taking the appeal shall be referred to
in the petition as either "Complainant-Appellant" or "Respondent-Appellant."
 
SECTION 6. Effect of failure to comply with the requirements. The
failure of petitioner to comply WITH ANY of the foregoing
requirements shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
 
 
Contrary to petitioner Agbayani's claim, there was substantial compliance
with the rules. Respondent Genabe actually mentioned on page 2 of her petition for
review to the DOJ the name of the petitioner as the private complainant, as well as
indicated the latters address on the last page thereof as RTC Branch 275, Las Pias
City. The CA also noted that there was proper service of the petition as required by
the rules since the petitioner was able to file her comment thereon. A copy thereof,
attached as Annex L in the instant petition, bears a mark that the comment was
duly received by the Prosecution Staff, Docket Section of the DOJ. Moreover, a
computer verification requested by the petitioner showed that the prosecutor
assigned to the case had received a copy of the petitioners comment.[17]
 
As to the charge of extrinsic fraud, which consists of the alleged suppression
of Agbayani's Comment and the unauthorized insertion of documents in the
records of the case with the DOJ, we agree with the CA that this is a serious
charge, especially if made against the Undersecretary of Justice; and in order for it
to prosper, it must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. However,
petitioner Agbayani's only proof is her bare claim that she personally checked the
records and found that her Comment was missing and 36 new documents had been
inserted. This matter was readily brought to the attention of Undersecretary Pineda
by petitioner Agbayani in her motion for reconsideration, who however must
surely have found such contention without merit, and thus denied the motion.[18]
 
Section 5 of the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal also provides that the petition
for review must be accompanied by a legible duplicate original or certified true
copy of the resolution appealed from, together with legible true copies of the
complaint, affidavits or sworn statements and other evidence submitted by the
parties during the preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Petitioner Agbayani
does not claim that she was never furnished, during the preliminary investigation,
with copies of the alleged inserted documents, or that any of these documents were
fabricated. In fact, at least seven (7) of these documents were copies of her own
submissions to the investigating prosecutor.[19]Presumably, the DOJ required
respondent Genabe to submit additional documents produced at the preliminary
investigation, along with Document Nos. 40 and 41, for a fuller consideration of
her petition for review.
  
As for Document Nos. 40 and 41, which were dated a day after the filing of
the petition, Section 5 of the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal provides that if an
Information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of
the Motion to Defer Proceedings must also accompany the petition. Section 3 of
the above Rules states that an appeal to the DOJ must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. While it may be presumed that the motion to defer arraignment
accompanying the petition should also be filed within the appeal period,
respondent Genabe can not actually be faulted if the resolution thereof was made
after the lapse of the period to appeal.
 
In Guy vs. Asia United Bank,[20] a motion for reconsideration from the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, which was filed four (4) days beyond the
non-extendible period of ten (10) days, was allowed under Section 13 of the 2000
NPS Rules on Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the authority of the Secretary
of Justice to review and order the withdrawal of an Information in instances where
he finds the absence of a prima facie case is not time-barred, albeit subject to the
approval of the court, if its jurisdiction over the accused has meanwhile attached.
[21]
 We further explained:
 
[I]t is not prudent or even permissible for a court to compel the Secretary of
Justice or the fiscal, as the case may be, to prosecute a proceeding originally
initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by
him is insufficient for conviction. Now, then, if the Secretary of Justice possesses
sufficient latitude of discretion in his determination of what constitutes probable
cause and can legally order a reinvestigation even in those extreme instances
where an information has already been filed in court, is it not just logical and
valid to assume that he can take cognizance of and competently act on a motion
for reconsideration, belatedly filed it might have been, dealing with probable
cause? And is it not a grievous error on the part of the CA if it virtually orders the
filing of an information, as here, despite a categorical statement from the
Secretary of Justice about the lack of evidence to proceed with the prosecution of
the petitioner? The answer to both posers should be in the affirmative. As we said
in Santos v. Go:
 
 [C]ourts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public
prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may dismiss the
complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or
substance, or without any ground. Or, he may proceed with the
investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper
form. The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is
dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and,
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the
Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with
grave abuse of discretion.
 
xxx
 
[T]o strike down the April 20, 2006 DOJ Secretary's Resolution as
absolutely void and without effect whatsoever, as the assailed CA decision did,
for having been issued after the Secretary had supposedly lost jurisdiction over
the motion for reconsideration subject of the resolution may be reading into the
aforequoted provision a sense not intended. For, the irresistible thrust of the
assailed CA decision is that the DOJ Secretary is peremptorily barred from taking
a second hard look at his decision and, in appropriate cases, reverse or modify the
same unless and until a motion for reconsideration is timely interposed and
pursued. The Court cannot accord cogency to the posture assumed by the CA
under the premises which, needless to stress, would deny the DOJ the authority
to motu proprio undertake a review of his own decision with the  end in view of
protecting, in line with his oath of office, innocent persons from groundless, false
or malicious prosecution. As the Court pointed out in Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, the
Secretary of Justice would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders
or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not
convinced that the evidence warrants the filing of the action in court.[22] (Citations
omitted and underscoring supplied)
 
 
The Court further stated in Guy that when the DOJ Secretary took
cognizance of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he effectively excepted
such motion from the operation of the aforequoted Section 13 of DOJ Circular No.
70, s. 2000. This show of liberality is, to us, within the competence of the DOJ
Secretary to make. The Court is not inclined to disturb the same absent compelling
proof, that he acted out of whim and that petitioner was out to delay the
proceedings to the prejudice of respondent in filing the motion for reconsideration.
[23]

 
 The case of First Women's Credit Corporation v. Perez,[24] succinctly
summarizes the general rules relative to criminal prosecution: that criminal
prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final,
albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized; that
courts follow the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations by the DOJ, and of leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as
will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed
offender; and, that the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to a
determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
 
But while prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of probable cause, their findings are still subject to review by the
Secretary of Justice.Surely, this power of the Secretary of Justice to review
includes the discretion to accept additional evidence from the investigating
prosecutor or from herein respondent Genabe, evidence which nonetheless appears
to have already been submitted to the investigating prosecutor but inadvertently
omitted by her when she filed her petition.
 
3. Coming now to the DOJ's finding that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action, the CA held that the DOJ committed no grave abuse of discretion in
causing the dismissal thereof on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the Katarungang
Pambarangay conciliation procedure.
 
Undeniably, both petitioner Agbayani and respondent Genabe are residents
of Las Pias City and both work at the RTC, and the incident which is the subject
matter of the case happened in their workplace.[25] Agbayanis complaint should
have undergone the mandatory barangay conciliation for possible amicable
settlement with respondent Genabe, pursuant to Sections 408 and 409 of Republic
Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 which provide:
 
Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception thereto. The
lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes,
except: x x x
 
Sec. 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the workplace where the
contending parties are employed or x x x shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located.
 
 
Administrative Circular No. 14-93,[26] issued by the Supreme Court on July
15, 1993 states that:
 
xxx
 
I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P.D. 1508, repealed and now replaced
by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV,
R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior
recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any
government offices, except in the following disputes:
 
 
[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof;
 
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates
to the performance of his official functions;
 
[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities
and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their
difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
 
[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical
entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation
proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];
 
[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin
 each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
 
[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of
imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos
([P]5,000.00);
 
[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
 
[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice
from being committed or further continued, specifically the following:
 
[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See
Sec. 412(b)(1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law];
 
[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his
rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived of or
on acting in his behalf;
 
[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support
during the pendency of the action; and
 
[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
 
[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest
of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;
 
[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657];
 
[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee
relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as
amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over
conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain
offices of the Department of Labor and Employment];
 
[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed
directly in court [See Sanchez vs. [Judge] Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459].
 
xxx
 
 
The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for the filing of the
complaint in court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of excepted
cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did
not have a certification that no conciliation had been reached by the parties, the
case should be dismissed.[27]
 
Here, petitioner Agbayani failed to show that the instant case is not one of
the exceptions enumerated above. Neither has she shown that the oral defamation
caused on her was so grave as to merit a penalty of more than one year. Oral
defamation under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is penalized
as follows:
 
Article 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall
be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
 
 
Apparently, the DOJ found probable cause only for slight oral
defamation. As defined in Villanueva v. People,[28] oral defamation or slander is the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. It is grave slander when it
is of a serious and insulting nature.The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions
used; (2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the
special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the
heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes
only a light felony.[29]
 
We recall that in the morning of December 27, 2006 when the alleged
utterances were made, Genabe was about to punch in her time in her card when she
was informed that she had been suspended for failing to meet her deadline in a
case, and that it was Agbayani who informed the presiding judge that she had
missed her deadline when she left to attend a convention in Baguio City, leaving
Agbayani to finish the task herself. According to Undersecretary Pineda, the
confluence of these circumstances was the immediate cause of respondent
Genabe's emotional and psychological distress. We rule that his determination that
the defamation was uttered while the respondent was in extreme excitement or in a
state of passion and obfuscation, rendering her offense of lesser gravity than if it
had been made with cold and calculating deliberation, is beyond the ambit of our
review.[30] The CA concurred that the complained utterances constituted only slight
oral defamation, having been said in the heat of anger and with perceived
provocation from Agbayani. Respondent Genabe was of a highly volatile
personality prone to throw fits (sumpongs), who thus shared a hostile working
environment with her co-employees, particularly with her superiors, Agbayani and
Hon. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, the Presiding Judge of Branch 275, whom she
claimed had committed against her grievous acts that outrage moral and social
conduct. That there had been a long-standing animosity between Agbayani and
Genabe is not denied.
 
4. Lastly, petitioner Agbayani insists that the DOJ should have dismissed
respondent Genabe's petition for review outright pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of
DOJ Circular No. 70. It is true that the general rule in statutory construction is that
the words shall, must, ought, or should are words of mandatory character in
common parlance and in their in ordinary signification,[31] yet, it is also well-
recognized in law and equity as a not absolute and inflexible criterion.
[32]
 Moreover, it is well to be reminded that DOJ Circular No. 70 is a mere tool
designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice through appeals taken
with the National Prosecution Service. Thus, technical rules of procedure like those
under Sections 5 and 6 thereof should be interpreted in such a way to promote, not
frustrate, justice.
 
Besides, Sections 7 and 10 of DOJ Circular No. 70 clearly give the Secretary
of Justice, or the Undersecretary in his place, wide latitude of discretion whether or
not to dismiss a petition. Section 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70, invoked by petitioner
Agbayani, is clearly encompassed within this authority, as shown by a cursory
reading of Sections 7 and 10, to wit:
  
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. The Secretary of Justice may dismiss
the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly
intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration.
 
SECTION 12. Disposition of the appeal. The Secretary may reverse,
affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion,
dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:
 
        That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in
Section 3 hereof;
        That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided
has not been complied with;
        That there is no showing of any reversible error;
        That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except
when it suspends the proceedings based on the alleged
existence of a prejudicial question;
        That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal
was taken;
        That the offense has already prescribed; and
        That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal.
 
 
We reiterate what we have stated in Yao v. Court of Appeals[33] that:
 
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed. In other words, if
strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest
injustice, or where the merit of a party's cause is apparent and outweighs
consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements, procedural
rules should definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.[34] (Citations
omitted)
 
 
All told, we find that the CA did not commit reversible error in upholding
the Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of the DOJ as we, likewise, find the same to be
in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is
hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 27, 2008 and the
Resolution dated July 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99626
are AFFIRMED in toto.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
 
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
 
 
 
 
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
 
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296)
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Mariflor
Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 28-45.
[2]
 Id. at 46-50.
[3]
 Id. at 29-30.
[4]
 Id. at 69-71.
[5]
 Through Prosecution Attorney II Carlo DL. Monzon.
[6]
 Rollo, pp. 91-93.
[7]
 Id. at 90-93.
[8]
 Id. at 93.
[9]
 Id. at 109-110.
[10]
 478 Phil. 771 (2004).
[11]
 Supra note 2.
[12]
 Rollo, p. 13.
[13]
 Id. at 72-81.
[14]
 Id. at 97-99.
[15]
 Judge Almario v. Atty. Resus, 376 Phil. 857 (1999).
[16]
 Ginete v. CA, 357 Phil. 36, 51 (1998).
[17]
 Rollo, p. 37.
[18]
 Id.
[19]
 Doc Nos. 12, 13, 25, 27, 36, 37, 38, per petitioner Agbayanis Motion for Reconsideration from the Department of
Justice Resolution; id. at 97-99.
[20]
 G.R. No. 174874, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 703.
[21]
 Crespo v. Judge Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987).
[22]
 Supra note 20, at 712-714.
[23]
 Id. at 714.
[24]
 G.R. No. 169026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 774.
[25]
 Rollo, p. 92.
[26]
 Guidelines on the Katarungang Pambarangay Conciliation Procedure to Prevent Circumvention of the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Sections 399-442, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991].
[27]
 Morato v. Go, et al., 210 Phil. 367 (1983).
[28]
 521 Phil. 191 (2006).
[29]
 Id. at 204, citing the REVISED PENAL CODE.
[30]
 Buan vs. Matugas, G.R. No. 161179, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 263.
[31]
 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 Edition, at 238.
[32]
 Id. at 239-240.
[33]
 398 Phil. 86 (2000).
[34]
 Id. at 107-108.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EN BANC
 
 
GIORGIO RATTI, A.M. No. P-04-1844
Complainant, (formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 99-734-P)
Present:
 
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
SANTIAGO,
GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
MORALES,
LUCILA MENDOZA-DE CALLEJO, SR.,
CASTRO, Interpreter I, AZCUNA,
Municipal Trial Court, TINGA, and
Calapan City, Oriental NAZARIO, JJ.
Mindoro,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 23, 2004
x----------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
  
PER CURIAM:
 
The instant administrative case arose when Italian national Giorgio Ratti
charged Lucila Mendoza-De Castro, Interpreter I, Municipal Trial 

Court in a Sworn Letter-Complaint[1] with conduct grossly prejudicial to the best

interest of the service, conduct unbecoming a government employee, immorality
and falsification of public documents.
 
The complainant averred that when the respondent applied for a position of
court interpreter, she did not disclose the fact that she was convicted of the crime
of grave slander. She was, likewise, charged with bigamy and several other cases
which, albeit dismissed by the court, show her unfitness for government service.
 
According to the complainant, the respondent has been lawyering and
meddling with the courts business. The respondent instigated the filing of several
cases against him, and handled collection cases of certain businessmen in Calapan
City. The complainant narrated that the respondent had the habit of leaking
information pertaining to search warrants applied for by law enforcement officers
against gambling lords and drug lords, thereby causing the warrants to yield
negative results. Furthermore, according to the complainant, the respondent also
leaks decisions which are yet to be promulgated, and discloses them to the
prevailing party. The complainant requested that the respondent be formally
investigated and that, if so warranted, be meted the appropriate penalty.
 

Thereafter, the complainant enumerated the criminal and civil cases filed
against the respondent in a Sworn Supplemental Letter-Complaint[2] dated October
28, 1999.
  
The respondent denied the charges against her, claiming that she did not
falsify any document. She admitted, however, that she was convicted of simple
slander, and that such offense does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. On the
charges of immorality and bigamy, the respondent averred that until the bigamy
case was filed, she did not know that her husband was twice previously
married. She disclosed that she and her husband had been married for twenty (20)
years.
 
Anent the accusations of lawyering and meddling with cases filed in court,
the respondent maintained that she only assisted those who needed her help. She
denied instigating the filing of cases against the complainant, and asserted that the
collection cases of businessmen in Calapan were handled by practicing lawyers
who, unlike her, are trained for such jobs and have the time to work on the
cases. The respondent maintained that she never meddled in the issuances of search
warrants, and that she only learns of the courts decisions when she reads them on
the day of their promulgation.
 
Finally, the respondent averred that except for Criminal Case No. 3741,
where she was convicted of simple slander, the cases referred to by the
complainant were either dismissed or are still pending in court.
 
The case was referred to Executive Judge Manuel C. Luna, Jr., Regional
Trial Court, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, for investigation, report and
recommendation.[3]
 
After hearing the parties on their respective arguments, the Executive Judge
submitted his Report dated October 3, 2002. He opined that the respondent was a
mere victim of unfortunate circumstances, and, as such, the immorality charge
against the respondent did not merit serious consideration.[4] However, the
Executive Judge found the respondent to have deliberately concealed her
conviction for grave slander by the Municipal Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro, as well as the fact that she had several pending criminal cases in the
different courts of Oriental Mindoro in her personal data sheet on June 20, 1994
when she applied for the position of court stenographer. Thus:
 
[R]espondents assertion that she did not falsify any public document must
necessarily fail in view of the fact that the respondent while applying for the
position of Court Interpreter in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities as stated in her
Personal Data Sheet that she has not yet been convicted of any crime, when in
truth and in fact, as certified by the Clerk of Court of [the] Municipal Trial Court
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro (Exhibit A), she was found guilty of Grave
Slander by said court. Respondents defense that the offense which she was
convicted of does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, and, therefore, could be
omitted from her application form, is unavailing. A mere superficial reading of
the Personal Data Sheet (Exhibits B and B-1) would readily reveal that the said
form did not qualify the question, whether the applicant has been convicted of any
crime, i.e., whether the crime the applicant has been convicted has committed, if
there be any, involves moral turpitude or not.
 
Furthermore, respondent utterly failed to disclose that at the time she filed
her Personal Data Sheet on June 20, 1994, she had several pending criminal cases
in the different courts of Oriental Mindoro, namely:
 
(a)        Criminal Case No. 6288 for Grave Oral Defamation which
was filed against the respondent on July 30, 1981;
(b)       Criminal Case No. 6456 for Violation of Batas Pambansa
[Blg.] 22 which was filed against respondent on April 19,
1982;
(c)        Criminal Case No. 8765 for Malicious Mischief which was
filed against respondent on July 08, 1984;
(d)       Criminal Case No. 981 for Violation of Article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code which was filed against respondent on
April 7, 1983;
(e)        Criminal Case No. 982 for Grave Oral Defamation which
was filed against respondent on April 07, 1983;
(f)         Criminal Case No. 3754 for Grave Oral Defamation which
was filed against the respondent sometime in 1983.[5]
 
Moreover, the Executive Judge noted that the respondent herself admitted
that she acted as the collector of receivables of Antonio S. Catibog II and Macario
Macalalad and other well-known businessmen in Calapan City. Thus, the
Executive Judge recommended the dismissal of the respondent from the service.
 
In a Resolution dated November 25, 2002, the case was referred to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation. The OCA recommended that Executive Judge Lunas findings be
adopted accordingly, and the respondent be dismissed from the service with
prejudice to re-employment in the government service, including government-
owned and controlled corporations.[6]
 
The Courts Ruling
 
The respondent is guilty of
Gross immorality, and her claim
of good faith is not a defense
 
 
We are constrained to rule that the respondent is guilty of immoral and
disgraceful conduct.
 
It must be stressed that every employee of the judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must
exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of
her official duties but in her personal and private dealings with other people. In
order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice, court
personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency
in their professional and private conduct [7]
 
In a recent case,[8] a court stenographer was suspended for one year without
pay for living with a married man, and her claim of good faith was belied by her
own evidence, as in the case at bar. Here, while the respondent claimed that she did
not know that her husband Rogelio de Castro[9] was twice previously married when
they were wed, she admitted that she eventually found out in 1984 when a bigamy
case was filed against him. While she claimed that she was not immoral as she was
then single and never had any other affair with any other man except her husband,
she admitted that she continued to cohabit with him despite her knowledge of his
previous marriages.[10]
 
Indeed, disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense that cannot be
countenanced.[11] As we held in the recent case of Acebedo v. Arquero,[12] where the
respondent was suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay for
maintaining an illicit relationship with a married woman for eight (8) to nine (9)
months:
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
individual than in the judiciary. That is why this Court has firmly laid down the
exacting standards of morality and decency expected of those in the service of the
judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility, characterized by, among other things, propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the publics respect and confidence in the judicial
service. It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to
their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as
private individuals. There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also
judged by their private morals.[13]

 
The respondent violated the
Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials
In providing collection services
To businessmen in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro
 
 
 Anent the charge of interfering with cases pending in various courts, we
agree with the Court Administrators adoption of the Executive Judges findings, viz:
Moreover, respondents act of interfering in the cases pending in various courts in
Oriental Mindoro, in spite of her avowals to the contrary, is inimical to the
service. This too warrants severe disciplinary measures. The facts and evidence,
coupled with respondents admissions that she acted as collector of receivables of
Antonio Catibog (private complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 12105 and 12268,
entitled People vs. Jocelyn Guyutin filed before the MTCC of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro), Macario Macalalad and other well-known businessmen in Calapan
City, sufficiently establish her culpability.[14]
 
Furthermore, the respondent admitted to having acted as collector for the following
persons and was given a commission for every amount collected: Mr. and Mrs.
Antonio S. Catibog II, Henry Tan, Mrs. Josefa Cacha, Violeta Aguilon, and
Cherrie Fatalla, the complainants wife.[15] When questioned further by the
complainants counsel, the respondent hesitated and was evasive:
 
ATTY. F. S. LEGASPI: Who else, Madam witness?
 
LUCILA M. DE CASTRO: I cannot remember of (sic) anyone else.
 
ATTY. F. S. LEGASPI: But there were others; only that, you cannot remember.
 
LUCILA M. DE CASTRO: Maybe.
 
ATTY. F. S. LEGASPI: How many more?
LUCILA M. DE CASTRO: I cannot (interrupted).
 
ATTY. F. S. LEGASPI: More or less? Five (5)? Ten (10)?
 
LUCILA M. DE CASTRO: No. Not really.
 
ATTY. F. S. LEGASPI: More than five (5).
LUCILA M. DE CASTRO: Maybe more than five (5).
 
ATTY. F. S. LEGASPI: Less than ten (10)? Between five (5) and ten (10)?
 
LUCILA M. DE CASTRO: Maybe.[16]
 
 
A close perusal of the evidence submitted by the complainant shows that while the
respondent was merely acting as a collector of receivables, 
she was, in fact, acting for and in behalf of the lawyer of Antonio S. Catibog II,
who signed the demand letters[17] addressed to various debtors of the latter.
Furthermore, in one of the notes[18] addressed to the respondent, her acts were
referred to as collection services. Even the respondent herself admitted that she
acted as a collection agent or collector.[19]
 
The respondent, by her actuations, violated Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act
No. 6713,[20] which also enjoins public officials and employees to observe
professionalism in the discharge and execution of duties, to enter public service
with utmost devotion and dedication to duty, and endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.[21]
 
The respondent ought to have known that her actuations would place the
Court in a bad light. Indeed, the law does not prohibit a government employee
from augmenting his or her income. However, employees of the judiciary in
particular, bear a heavy burden of responsibility. It is well-settled that no position
demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does
the judicial office.[22] We have repeatedly emphasized that the conduct of court
personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond
reproach as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. The
Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the
part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith
of the people in the judiciary.[23]
 
Making a false statement in
A Personal Data Sheet required
Under Civil Service Rules and
Regulations for employment amounts
To dishonesty and falsification of
An official document
 
Dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses. The Court has
not hesitated to impose the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service on
employees found guilty of such offenses. In a recent case,[24] the Court held that the
use of a false certificate in order to facilitate promotion constitutes an act of
dishonesty under Civil Service Rules, and dismissed the erring employee therefor;
a clerk who was found to have falsified her daily time records was dismissed from
the service, albeit it was her first offense;[25] while a utility worker who stated in his
personal data sheet that he did not have any pending administrative/criminal case
was likewise dismissed, with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding unused leave
credits.[26]
 
In this case, the respondent admitted that she did not disclose the pending
criminal cases against her in her Personal Data Sheet dated June 20, 1994 and
opted to leave the space provided therefor blank, because if she did so, she might
not be accepted for the position.[27] She, likewise, reluctantly admitted that at that
time, she had already been convicted of grave slander or grave oral defamation in
Criminal Case No. 3741 before the Municipal Trial Court of Pinamalayan. [28] An
examination of her Personal Data Sheet, however, will disclose that the box
provided for the No answer was correspondingly checked for the question on
previous convictions, and that the answer for the next question was unreadable.[29]
 
 An employee who falsifies an official document to gain unwarranted
advantage over other more qualified applicants to the same position and secure the
sought-after promotion cannot be said to have measured up to the standards
required of a public servant.[30] When official documents are falsified, the intent to
injure a third person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein proclaimed.
[31]

 
The accomplishment of false statements in a Personal Data Sheet, being a
requirement under Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with
employment in the government, the making of untruthful statements therein is,
therefore, ultimately connected with such employment. As such, making a false
statement therein amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
[32]
 Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty
of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service. Indeed, dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.[33]
 
Thus, even if we uphold Executive Judge Lunas recommendation, as well as
that of the Court Administrators, that the charge of immorality be dismissed
because the respondent is a mere victim of unfortunate circumstances rather than a
willful violator of civil service standard, and accept the respondents claim that she
was merely making an honest living, her dismissal from the service is still
inevitable.
 
 The Court reiterates the well-settled rule that a public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees are duty-bound to serve with the 
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain
accountable to the people. Persons involved in the administration of justice ought
to live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity in the public
service. The conduct of every personnel connected with the courts should, at all
times, be circumspect to preserve the integrity and dignity of our courts of justice.
[34]

 
WHEREFORE, respondent Lucila Mendoza-De Castro, having been
found GUILTY of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
conduct unbecoming a government employee, dishonesty and falsification of a
public document, is hereby DISMISSED from the service effective immediately,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to her reemployment in any branch or instrumentality in the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
 
This decision is immediately executory.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
 Id. at 17-19.
[3]
 Id. at 69-70.
[4]
 Report, p. 3.
[5]
 Id. at 4-5.
[6]
 Memorandum Report, p. 6.
[7]
 Floria v. Sunga, 368 SCRA 551 (2001), citing Bucatcat v. Bucatcat, 323 SCRA 578 (2000).
[8]
 Amado N. Ubongen v. Virginia S. Ubongen, A.M. No. P-04-1780, February 18, 2004.
[9]
 See Exhibit E, Rollo, p. 125.
[10]
 TSN, 10 July 2002, pp. 105-113.
[11]
 Marites B. Kee vs. Juliet H. Calingin, A.M. No. P-02-1663, July 29, 2003.
[12]
 399 SCRA 10 (2003).
[13]
 Id. at 16-17.
[14]
 Memorandum Report dated February 21, 2003, p. 6.
[15]
 TSN, 10 July 2002, pp. 92-103.
[16]
 Id. at 103-104.
[17]
 Exhibits 5, 5-A, and 5-B.
[18]
 Exhibit 6.
[19]
 TSN, 10 July 2002, p. 94.
[20]
 Also known as An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, to Uphold the Time-Honored Principle of Public Office Being a Public Trust, Granting Incentives and
Rewards for Exemplary Service, Enumerating Prohibited Acts and Transactions and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof and Other Purposes, and took effect on February 20, 1989. The pertinent section reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
 
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
 
 
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions;
[21]
 Section 4.
[22]
 Re: Memo dated September 27, 1999 of Ma. Corazon M. Molo, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Court
Administrator, etc., A.M. No. SCC-00-6-P, October 16, 2003.
[23]
 Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, 386 SCRA 1 (2002).
[24]
 Judge Fe Albano Madrid v. Antonio T. Quebral, Antonio T. Quebral v. Angelina C. Rillorta and Minerva
Alvarez, A.M. Nos. P-03-1744-45, October 7, 2003.
[25]
 Marbas-Vizcarra v. Bernardo, 351 SCRA 219 (2001).
[26]
 Judge Jose S. Saez v. Carlos B. Rabina, A.M. No. P-03-1691, September 18, 2003.
[27]
 TSN, 10 July 2002, p. 76.
[28]
 Id. at 81; Exhibit A, Rollo, p. 121.
[29]
 See Exhibit BB, Rollo, p. 153. (Dorsal portion).
The pertinent questions on the Personal Data Sheet read as follows:
2. Have you ever been convicted for violating any law, decree, ordinance or regulations by any
court or tribunal?
3. Do you have any pending administrative/criminal case? If you have any, give
particulars.
[30]
 De Guzman v. Delos Santos, 394 SCRA 210 (2002).
[31]
 Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, supra, citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913 (1955).
[32]
 Ibid.
[33]
 Judge Fe Albano Madrid v. Antonio T. Quebral, Antonio T. Quebral v. Angelina C. Rillorta and Minerva
Alvarez, supra.
[34]
 De Guzman v. Gatlabayan, 352 SCRA 264 (2001).
  

THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000]

JOSEFINA M. VILLANUEVA, complainant, vs. JUDGE BENJAMIN E.

ALMAZAN, respondent. Sce-dp

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is an administrative case instituted by Josefina M. Villanueva against Judge

Benjamin E. Almazan for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion, partiality and
gross misconduct.

The verified letter-complaint  filed with the Office of the Court Administrator averred that
[1]

the acts of Judge Benjamin E. Almazan complained of were committed as follows:

On October 9, 1997, the complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Santo
Tomas, La Union, presided over by respondent Judge, two (2) Complaints for Grave
Oral Defamation against one Teresita Nabayan, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3097
and 3098, respectively.

On the same day, the respondent Judge, conducted a "preliminary examination", after
which he issued the following Order downgrading the crimes charged to simple slander,
to wit:

"The Court conducted the necessary preliminary examination to determine

the existence of probable cause by asking searching questions to the
witnesses for the prosecution. In the course of investigation, the Court is
convinced that the offense committed by the accused was just simple
slander.

In view of the findings of the Court in the two (2) entitled cases, the
accused is hereby ordered to submit her counter-affidavit including that of
her witness/es well as exhibits or evidence/s if there be any within ten (10)
days from receipt of this order. Failure on her part to comply with his
order, she is barred to present evidence during the trial of this case." Ed-psc
On the November 21, 1997, the complainant presented a Manifestation with Motion for
Reconsideration, contending that the aforesaid action of respondent judge does not
accord with the Rules of Court under which the judge has no authority to downgrade
subject accusation from grave oral defamation to simple slander. In due time, the
motion for reconsideration  was denied for failure of the private prosecutor  to get the
[2] [3]

conformity thereto of the public prosecutor.

[4]

On January 20, 1998, the day before the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial in the said
cases, complainant asked for the inhibition of Judge Benjamin E. Almazan from the said
cases on the ground that the latter used to be a law partner of the defense counsel.
Said request or motion for inhibition, which was denied, infuriated the respondent Judge
who then subjected her (Complainant) to verbal abuse. When asked why he
downgraded the charge to that of simple slander, respondent Judge explained to the
complainant that he did so "because your answers were wrong".

On January 21, 1998, accused Teresita Nabayan was arraigned in the absence of the
public prosecutor, who did not receive any calendar of cases for that day.

The same complaint sought to have Clerk of Court Violeta R. Villanueva investigated for
blatant partiality and influence peddling, alleging that the latter discussed the cases
during mahjong sessions where she entertained some litigants. Also, she (Violeta R.
Villanueva) refused to officially receive the pleading of the herein complainant so as not
to mess up the records, and was only forced to receive the same when she got a
dressing down from the lawyer of complainant.

Respondent Judge and respondent Violeta R. Villanueva submitted their Comments,

dated December 24, 1998, which the Office of the Court Administrator received on
January 18, 1999.

Explaining his aforementioned action complained of, respondent Judge contended that
he conducted a preliminary examination of the complainant and her two (2) eye
witnesses, and thereafter, arrived at the conclusion that the acts allegedly committed
were not grave oral defamation, as averred in the complaint, such that he issued his
questioned Order to the effect that the accused in subject cases should be charged with
simple slander only. Ed-p

Respondent Judge theorized that his trouble with the complainant started when he
denied her motion in subject criminal cases to amend the Complaint so as to reflect the
correct dates of commission of the crimes charged, and the complainant was incensed
by the failure of the court to grant her motion, and by the adverse effect on
complainants position of the action thus taken by respondent judge in the said cases
when she requested him to inhibit therefrom. Respondent Judge maintained that the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of complainant was proper because amendment
of the complaint could only be made with conformity of the public prosecutor who
intervened to prosecute the said cases.
Respondent Clerk of Court Violeta R. Villanueva denied the allegations of the complaint,
branding the same baseless, motivated by ill will and a mere harassment, considering
that she has no power to influence or interfere with the issuance of the orders,
decisions, or actuations of respondent judge. She brushed aside as blatant lies the
allegation that she attends mahjong sessions during office hours and entertains thereat
litigants who need her services. That she discussed cases during such sessions is a
mere speculation, since the complainant could not have gotten such information as she
spent most of her time in Manila.

As regards the accusation that she was taking sides, this respondent maintained that
the same is a fabrication by the complainant who wanted to impose her will upon the
court.

On July 27, 1999, there was received from the Court Administrator  the report finding
[5]

respondent judge administratively liable and recommending that he be fined Five

Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.

The same report recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Violeta R.
Villanueva for insufficiency of evidence.  Mis-edp
[6]

In response to the Resolution of the Court dated August 23, 1999, respondent Judge
manifested in a letter, dated September 20, 1999, that he was submitting the case on
the basis of the pleadings and records.

The principal issues for resolution here concern the propriety of the preliminary
investigation conducted by respondent judge, and the arraignment of the accused in
subject criminal cases. Corollarily, the downgrading of the said cases, and denial of
complainant's motion to inhibit respondent judge from trying the same cases are
denounced.

After a thorough examination of the report and the records on hand, the Court finds
merit in the recommendation of the Court Administrator.

The root of the controversy is the unfamiliarity of respondent judge with the rules
applicable in cases requiring preliminary investigation.

Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 1. Definition. -- reliminary investigation is an inquiry or

proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
[7]

Section 9, of the same Rules provides:

 SEC 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. -Mis-oedp

xxx.....xxx.....xxx

(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. -- If the complaint or
information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure
provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the
judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest after personally examining in writing an under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers.

Contrary to the clear mandate of the aforestated rules, the respondent Judge conducted
the preliminary investigation culminating in the lowering of the charge to simple slander.
The original charge for grave oral defamation is punishable  by arresto mayor in its
[8]

maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, while simple slander is
punishable by arresto menoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Thus, the original
charges were cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did not require a preliminary 
investigation. The proper action the respondent judge could have taken under the
premises was to dismiss the complaint if found to be without any basis for further
proceedings or if warranted, to issue a warrant of arrest for the respondent, and after
arrest, to hold him for trial. It is decisively clear that in conducting the preliminary
investigation under attack, the respondent judge exceeded his authority under the
pertinent rules.

In his Comment, respondent judge was careful to refer to his challenged action as a
preliminary examination. Be that as it may, when he concluded that the proper charge
should be simple slander, after examining the complainant and her witnesses in subject
criminal cases, respondent Judge, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation. Not
only was such preliminary investigation defective; it was a patent error because no
preliminary investigation is required for criminal cases cognizable by Municipal Trial
Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
 Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to reduce
[9]

the charge to simple slander. Ed-pm-is

Furthermore, in Bagunas vs. Fabillar,  the Court reiterated that under the new rules of
[10]

procedure, preliminary investigation has only one stage, viz.:

"(u)nder the old rules, the preliminary investigation conducted by a

municipal judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage
during which the investigating judge determines whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be
issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation
 proper where the complaint or information is read to the accused after his
arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced
against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor if he
so desires. Presidential Decree 911, upon which the present rule is based,
removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the
preliminary investigation proper. Now, the proceedings consist only of one
stage." (Underscoring supplied)

In the present cases, the respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope
of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation  but also of the procedure to follow
[11]

in conducting a preliminary investigation. Where, as in this case, the law involved is

simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all
good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. [12]

Equally erroneous was the action of respondent judge in proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases without the participation of a
government prosecutor. The Court need not belabor the point that as the officer in
charge of prosecuting criminal cases for the government, rudiments of due process
require that the public prosecutor must be afforded an opportunity to intervene in all
stages of the proceedings. Here, it cannot be denied that the public prosecutor assigned
to handle Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098 was not notified by respondent judge of
the scheduled trial of said cases. That the public prosecutor in the said criminal cases
had an arrangement with the respondent Judge as early as June 1997 - that trial of
cases requiring his appearance be transferred from the previous Tuesday schedule to
Wednesdays, did not excuse the failure of the latter to notify the former of the scheduled
trial on January 21, 1998 (a Wednesday) in subject criminal cases. Jjs-c

Concerning the refusal of respondent judge to inhibit from the cases in question, the
Court is not convinced of the need therefor. In this connection, the Court Administrator
observed that the complainant wrote respondent judge, asking him to inhibit from
subject criminal cases, but a formal motion therefor was necessary so that the alleged
grounds thereof could be ventilated properly. [13]

As a matter of fact, the request or motion for inhibition was taken up during the
scheduled arraignment of the accused on November 12, 1997, when the private
prosecutor asked the respondent Judge to inhibit himself from subject cases. Acting
thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within
five (5) days from receipt of the Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the
arraignment of the accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the required
motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance
of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. [14]

WHEREFORE, Judge Benjamin E. Almazan is hereby found GUILTY of gross

ignorance of the law and is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely. Let copy of this Decision be attached to the personal
records of respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Dated January 26, 1998. On February 9, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator received a verified complaint
containing the same allegations as that in the sworn letter-complaint.
[2]
 Order dated December 23, 1997,
[3]
 Atty. Lazaro C. Gayo.
[4]
 Efren Basconcillo.
[5]
 Alfredo L. Benipayo.

 On August 23, 1999, this Court issued a resolution which reads: Considering the memorandum of the Office of the
[6]

Court Adminsitrator on the complaint charging respondents with gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion, gross
partiality and gross misconduct relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3097-98, entitled "People vs. Teresita Nabayan," the
Court Resolved to adopt its recommendation: (a) to REDOCKET this case as an administrative matter; and (b) to
DISMISS the charges against respondent Clerk of Court for insufficiency of evidence.

The Court further resolved to require respondent Judge to MANIFEST to the Court whether he is submitting the
case on the basis of the pleadings and the records of the case, within (10) days from Notice.
[7]
 In Cojuangco vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government et al. (190 SCRA 226, 243), this Court held that
such a preliminary investigation is required for offenses cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan in accordance with section 1, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure and Section 10, P.D. No.
1386.
[8]
 The Revised Penal Code, art. 358. Slander. -- Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of s serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty
shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
[9]
 Del Rosario, Jr. vs. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645, 649.
[10]
 289 SCRA 383, 394.
[11]
 SEC. 2, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court.
[12]
 Cortes vs. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423, 458.
[13]
 Report of the Court Administrator, p. 3.
[14]
 Ibid.
  
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
THIRD DIVISION
 
MINDA VILLAMOR, G.R. No. 172110
Appellee,  
   
   
- versus -  
   
   
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  
Appellant.  
x------------------------x  
GLICERIO VIOS, JR., G.R. No. 181804
Appellee,  
  Present:
  VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
  BRION,*
  PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD, and
  SERENO,** JJ.
  Promulgated:
  August 1, 2011
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellant.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
PERALTA, J.:
 
  
These two cases were consolidated as they arose from the same factual
milieu and assail the same decision of the Court of Appeals.
 
Minda Villamor and Glicerio Vios, Jr. (petitioners), along with Nicolas
Caballero, Ricardo Tormis, and Jeffrey Cutab, were charged with frustrated murder
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, Iligan City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4-7450. The accusatory portion of the Amended
Information dated February 2, 1999 filed against them reads:
 
That on or about January 7, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, by means of treachery,
evident premeditation and inconsideration of a price or reward, armed with a
bladed weapon and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound one Jean V. Jumawan thereby
inflicting upon her the following physical injuries, to wit:
 
Multiple stab wounds, abdomen.
 
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will.[1](Underscoring in the original)
 
 
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
 
Soon after, accused Ricardo Tormis changed his previous plea to guilty, was
sentenced, and then committed to the San Ramon Penal Colony and Farm in
Zamboanga City to serve his sentence.[2] Accused Nicolas Caballero was
subsequently discharged as an accused, as he was utilized as a state witness. [3] The
case against accused Jeffrey Cutab was later dismissed after his Demurrer to
Evidence was granted by the RTC.[4]
 
The facts established by the evidence of the prosecution, as summarized by
the Solicitor General in the Peoples Brief, are as follows:
 
About 1:00 P.M. of January 7, 1999, victim Jean Jumawan, a public
school teacher, was resting inside her classroom No. 11 at Iligan City East Central
School, Tambo, Hinaplanon, Iligan City when Ricardo Tormis and Nicolas
Caballero arrived. Immediately thereafter, Caballero stepped out of the classroom
while Tormis handed Jumawan an envelope, saying that it came from Minda
Villamor and Glicerio Vios, Jr. (TSN, Aug. 18, 1999, p. 7). When Jumawan was
about to open the envelope, Tormis suddenly stabbed her successively, hitting the
different parts of her body (TSN, id., pp. 7-8). When she parried Tormis assault,
Jumawans hand likewise sustained injuries. She fell down to the floor. Tormis
continued his assault but missed because Jumawan, who was then lying on the
floor, kicked him, causing him to stagger backward. Jumawan stood up and
shouted for help while Tormis fled (TSN, id., p. 9).
Bloodied and weak, Jumawan was carried and brought to the Mindanao
Sanitarium and Hospital where Dr. Anastacio Gayao and Dr. Elfred Solis
performed surgery on her major multiple stab wounds x x x. Dr. Gayao issued her
a medical certificate (Exh. B, rollo, p. 188), x x x.
 
On February 4 to 12, 1999, because of her inability to move her wounded
right hand fingers, Jumawan likewise underwent surgery under Dr. Agustin
Morales at the Cebu Doctors Hospital, Cebu City. Dr. Morales and Dr. Manuel
Juanillo, her other attending physician, issued her a medical certificate (Exh.
C, rollo, p. 190), x x x.
 
x x x Until now, despite medical intervention, [Jumawan] cannot write with the
use of her right hand. She now uses her left hand, but still with difficulty (TSN,
Aug. 18, 1999, p. 12). She cannot anymore move easily and feels anxious that she
is no longer the same person as she used to be.
 
She was absent from her school work for about four (4) months due to her
hospital confinement and rehabilitation. Hence, she received no salary.
 
Jumawan presented numerous receipts of her medical expenses due to the
injuries she sustained (Exhs. Q to Q-14). x x x In prosecuting this case, Jumawan
hired the services of Atty. Providencio Abragan, her private prosecutor, and
agreed to pay P30,000.00 as acceptance fee and P1,000.00 as appearance fee.
 
Prior to the stabbing incident, or on October 27, 1990, when Jumawan,
Vios, and Villamor were still teaching colleagues at the Luinab Elementary
School, Iligan City, Jumawan and her mother filed an administrative complaint
against Vios before the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
(TSN, Dec. 7, 1999, p. 12).
 
xxxx
 
Likewise, prior to the stabbing incident, Jumawan filed a case for Grave
Oral Defamation against Minda Villamor who was thereafter convicted by the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Iligan City in its Decision dated April
30, 1998 in Case No. (29570-AF) I-5776. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte, Branch 5, Iligan City, in its Order dated March 3, 1999, affirmed
the lower courts decision of conviction. The case is now pending review by the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23519.
 
xxxx
 
Nicolas Caballero x x x who, upon motion by the prosecution, was
discharged [as an accused] and utilized as a state witness, affirmed his sworn
statement dated January 11, 1999 (Exhs. A & A-1, rollo, pp. 186-187).
 
According to Caballero, Vios and Minda Villamor were the ones who
planned the stabbing of Jumawan on January 7, 1999. Upon instruction by Vios
and Villamor, he looked for a killer and got Ricardo Tormis to do the job. Unlike
Caballero, Vios, Minda Villamor and Jumawan were all from Luinab, Iligan City,
while Tormis was a resident of Ladid, Digkilaan, Iligan City. He was promised
that Vios and Villamor would take care of him while the killer would be
given P10,000.00 to be shouldered equally by the two (TSN, July 26, 1999, pp.
10-11).
 
The plot was first hatched at about 7:00 P.M. of January 2, 1999 in the
house of Vios, with Caballero, Vios, Villamor and Michael Quiapo in attendance
(TSN, ibid., p. 10). On January 3, 1999, they met again at the house of Villamor,
who told Vios to make it fast because she was very angry with Jumawan
(TSN, id., p. 11). When Caballero asked her the reason of their hatred against
Jumawan, Vios replied that Jumawan implicated him in the burning of her car,
while Villamor stated that she had a case with Jumawan (TSN, id.).
 
At 5:50 P.M. of January 6, 1999, Caballero brought Tormis, who agreed to
do the job, to Vios and Villamor who instructed the former to kill Jumawan
saying, Kami nay bahala ninyo pagkahuman (TSN, id., p. 12).
 
About 12:45 P.M. of January 7, 1999, Caballero, as planned, escorted
Ricardo Tormis to the classroom of Jumawan. When inside, Caballero left Tormis
and went back to the school gate where he left the bicycle they used, and waited.
Shortly thereafter, Tormis, carrying a knife, went out of Jumawans classroom.
Caballero and Tormis boarded the bicycle and fled to Tambo, Bayug, Iligan City
(TSN, id., p. 14).
 
Both the knife used by Tormis to stab Jumawan and the bicycle used by
Caballero and Tormis were provided by Vios, x x x.
 
x x x in the late afternoon of January 7, 1999, Caballero and Tormis returned to
the house of Vios. Villamor was fetched from her house just across the street.
Vios and Villamor gave Tormis P1,000.00 and was told to come back for the
balance of P9,000.00 (TSN, id., p. 15).
 
 For his participation, Caballero was handed P400.00 and was advised to
hide somewhere because he was identified (TSN, id.). He took refuge for four (4)
days in Marawi City but, on January 11, 1999, he went back to Iligan City where
he voluntarily related the incident to the barangay captain, and then in the police
precinct, with the assistance of a counsel (Exhs. A and A1, rollo, pp. 181-187).[5]
 
 
Petitioners denied having committed the crime charged.
 
Invoking the defense of alibi, petitioner Glicerio Vios, Jr. claimed that at the
time the crime was committed, he was in his classroom conducting classes when
he noticed some pupils running, and then a co-teacher informed him that Jean
Jumawan was stabbed inside her classroom. It was only on January 11, 1999 when
he first met Nicolas Caballero during the investigation of this incident at the
prosecutors office. He did not harbor any ill-feelings towards private complainant
Jean Jumawan, since the administrative case she (and her mother) filed against him
before the DECS was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. He contradicted
himself, though, when he stated during cross-examination that there was no DECS
order dismissing the said administrative case.
 
For her part, petitioner Minda Villamor testified that she and her brother
Ernesto Lura were in Libonan, Bukidnon from January 1, 1999 until dawn of
January 4, 1999 to visit their old sick father. She thus could not have met Nicolas
Caballero, as he claimed, at petitioner Vios house in the evening of January 2,
1999 and at her house the following day where they (petitioners) supposedly
discussed with him the plan to kill Jean Jumawan. It was only during the
investigation of the stabbing incident that she first met Caballero and Ricardo
Tormis. She admitted that she and Jean Jumawan had once an altercation which led
to the filing of grave oral defamation by Jumawan and her mother against her
(Minda Villamor). She denied, however, that she was angry at the two since, she
had already forgotten about that case.
 
Finding credible and trustworthy the positive and categorical testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who have no ill motive in testifying against the petitioners,
the RTC, by Decision[6] dated July 7, 2003, convicted the latter of frustrated
murder as principals by inducement, thus:
 
 WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the Court finds both accused,
Glicerio Vios, Jr. and Minda Villamor, guilty of Frustrated Murder beyond
reasonable doubt. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of them is
hereby meted the penalty of Prision Mayor Maximum of 10 years and 1 day, as
minimum, to Reclusion Temporal Medium of 17 years and 4 months, as
maximum.
 
Further, accused Glicerio Vios, Jr. and Minda Villamor, as well as Ricardo
Tormis, are hereby ordered to pay Jean Jumawan, jointly and solidarily, the
following:
 
a) the sum of P207,279.85 as actual and compensatory damages;
b) the amount of P59,320.00 as loss of earning capacity;
c) the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages;
d) the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
e) the sum of P45,000.00 as attorneys fees.[7]
 
The petitioners seasonably filed separate Notices of Appeal.
 
The Court of Appeals (CA), Cagayan de Oro City rendered a
Decision[8] dated October 27, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27667, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
 
FOR THE REASONS STATED, We DISMISS the appeal of accused-
appellant Glicerio Vios, Jr. and AFFIRM the appealed decision with respect to the
accused-appellant Minda Villamor. The award of damages is MODIFIED and the
accused-appellants, together with the accused Ricardo Tormis, are ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the victim Jean Jumawan the following amounts:
 
1)      P207,279.85 as actual and compensatory damages;
2)      P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
3)      P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4)      P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
5)      P25,000.00 as attorneys fees.[9]
 
The appeal of Glicerio Vios, Jr. was dismissed, since his appeal brief was
filed too late without even a motion for extension of time to file the same having
been made.
 
His motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision having been denied,
[10]
 Glicerio Vios, Jr. filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 181804. Essentially, he alleged that the CA erred in dismissing his
appeal by mere technicality, and in affirming the factual findings of the trial court.
[11]

 
Minda Villamors motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was also
denied for being late. She admitted that a copy of the CA Decision was received by
her counsel, Atty. Elpidio N. Cabasan, on November 16, 2005; hence, the last
day to file her motion for reconsideration was on December 1, 2005. On
November 30, 2005, however, her new counsel, Atty. David Warren G. Lim, filed
a Motion For Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration (with Notice
of Appearance), praying for a 30-day extension of time from December 1, 2005, or
until December 31, 2005, within which to file the said motion for reconsideration
as Atty. Cabasan was suffering from prostate illness [with] diabetic complication.
[12]

It was only on December 28, 2005 that Atty. Lim filed a motion for
reconsideration[13] of the CA Decision, way beyond the reglementary period.
 
Expectedly, the CA denied both motions, holding that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed pursuant to
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208 (May 30, 1986).[14]
 
Minda Villamor then filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 172110, alleging in essence that the CA erred in affirming
the findings of the trial court, particularly on the credibility of witnesses.[15]
 
In its separate Comments, the Office of the Solicitor General prays for the
denial of both petitions for lack of merit.
The present petitions must fail.
 
It is axiomatic that the Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law,
have the force and effect of law. More importantly, rules prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with such rules is
mandatory and imperative. Only strong considerations of equity will lead us to
allow an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice.[16]
  
As regards Minda Villamors petition (G.R. No. 172110), suffice it to say
that the CA properly denied her motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed CA decision as such motion is clearly proscribed
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson. Thus, the subsequent filing of her motion
for reconsideration of the CA decision way beyond the reglementary period has
rendered the said decision final and executory.
 
With respect to the petition of Glicerio Vios, Jr. (G.R. No. 181804),
he admits that he failed to file his appellants brief within the reglementary period.
[17]
 He submits, though, that the CA erred in dismissing his appeal for such
technical deficiency.[18] He justified the late filing of his Appeal Brief in this wise:
 
x x x the reason of x x x the delayed filing of petitioners appeal brief was because
of a shooting incident that took place in the law firm of petitioners counsel
wherein one of the lawyers in the said firm was shot. For this reason, the law
office was x x x temporarily closed for fear of possible attack to the lawyers in the
said law firm. Threats were so high since then that the law office was able to
regularly function only sometime in June 2004. With such justifiable reason, a
strict application of Rule 124, Section 8 of the Rules of Court is not ideal because
it will obviously deprive therein petitioner from substantial justice.[19]
 
We are not persuaded.
 
In dismissing the appeal of Glicerio Vios, Jr., the CA noted that despite
several months had lapsed from the time the Notice to File Brief dated November
28, 2003 was sent to the appellants and their counsels, he belatedly filed his appeal
brief only on June 22, 2004 without previously filing a motion for extension of time
to file the same. In fact, as further observed by the CA, his Appeal Brief makes no
mention of any good or sufficient cause explaining the delay of its filing.[20] Thus,
the CA ruled:
 
Vios x x x filed his Brief on June 22, 2004 without filing a motion for
extension of time to file appellants brief. The OSG maintained in its second
Appellees Brief that Vios failure to file his brief within the reglementary period
warrants the dismissal of his appeal.
 
We dismiss Vios appeal for his failure to file the same within the time
allowed by the Rules of Court. Rule 124, Section 8 of the said Rules provides: x
 x x. The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu propio and
with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails
to file his brief within the time prescribed by the Rule, except where the appellant
is represented by a counsel de oficio. x x x.
 
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Section 3, Rule 124), the
appellant must file his brief within thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant
or his counsel of the notice from the clerk of court of this Court that evidence,
oral and documentary, is already attached to the record.
 
The record reveals that a Notice to File Brief dated November 28, 2003
was sent to the appellants as well as to their counsels. x x x. Vios did not file any
motion for extension of time to file brief despite the fact that several months
had lapsed from the time the notice to file brief was sent to the appellants
and their counsels. Vios appeal brief makes no mention of any good or
sufficient cause explaining the delay in its filing. The dismissal of his appeal,
therefore, is proper under the Rules, considering that the trial courts judgment of
conviction has become final as to him.[21]
 
 
The belated explanation proffered by petitioner Vios counsel to justify his
delay in filing the Appeal Brief was well rejected by the CA. Indeed, if the alleged
shooting incident at his counsels law firm was the cause of the delay, it is highly
unimaginable why such bizarre episode which supposedly prompted the temporary
closure of the law firm for fear of possible follow-up attacks to the lawyers therein
was not mentioned at all in his Appeal Brief. Strangely, such incident was totally
concealed from the CA.
 
Having failed to show compelling reason to warrant the relaxation of the
application of the Rules in his favor, Vios petition must perforce be denied.
 
The unjustified failure of both petitioners herein to observe very elementary
rules of procedure in the observance of reglementary periods undermines the
stability of the judicial process. Thus, their appeal for liberal application of the
Rules in the interest of substantial justice cannot be successfully invoked. Besides,
their petitions, as shown earlier, commonly raise factual issues relative to the trial
courts findings on the sufficiency of evidence to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt a matter beyond the province of this Court to review.
WHEREFORE, these consolidated petitions are DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
  
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
 
ATTESTATION
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
  
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 
 
 
 
 

*
 Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1056
dated July 27, 2011.
**
 Designated as an additional member, per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1]
 Records, pp. 33-34.
[2]
 Id. at 81-82.
[3]
 Id. at 84, 98, 101.
[4]
 Id. at 342-343.
[5]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 172110), pp. 96-102.
[6]
 Records, pp. 454-478.
[7]
 Id. at 478.
[8]
 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Ricardo R.
Rosario, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 246-262.
[9]
 Id. at 262.
[10]
 CA Resolution dated January 25, 2008, id. at 506-510.
[11]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 181804), p. 32.
[12]
 CA rollo, pp. 267-269.
[13]
 Id. at 279-289.
[14]
 Resolution dated March 8, 2006, id. at 390.
[15]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 172110), pp. 27-28.
[16]
 Bago v. People, G.R. No. 135638, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 404, 405-406.
[17]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 181804), p. 295.
[18]
 Id. at 295-296.
[19]
 Id. at 33-34.
[20]
 CA rollo, p. 254.
[21]
 Id. at 253-255. (Emphasis supplied.)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 158543. July 21, 2004]

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER

PUNZALAN, petitioners, vs. DENCIO DELA PEA and ROBERT
CAGARA, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is
the June 6, 2002 Decision  of the Court of Appeals and its May 23, 2003 Resolution
[1]

which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong
City. At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Pea, a house boarder of the
Platas, was in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan,
Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex Toto Ofrin, and several others
arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Pea, Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero
mo?  Dela Pea replied, Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako.  Irked by the
[2] [3]

response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth.
The group then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody
shouted, Yariin na yan!  Thereafter, Alex Toto Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab
[4]

him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him.
While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas family driver, who
was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group
chasing him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and
tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Pea. The gun accidentally went off and hit
Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran towards the
latters house and locked themselves in. The group ran after them and when they got to
the Platas house, shouted, Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin
kayo!  Dela Pea, Cagara, and Plata left the house through the back door and
[5]

proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.

As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against
Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide  and against Robert Cagara for Illegal
[6]

Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Pea filed several counter-
charges  for grave oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight
[7]

physical injuries against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by
Dela Pea against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S. No. 97-
11528); and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Pea against Alex Toto Ofrin (I.S. No.
97-11520-21).
In their counter-affidavit,  the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were
[8]

fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and
Illegal Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara,
respectively.
Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation,
docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging
that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City,
Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, Hoy
Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at
ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho.  In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the
[9]

alleged defamatory statements.

On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the
complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan,  holding that Cagara
[10]

failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a
state of distress and, hence, were not actionable.  The charge of Attempted Murder
[11]

against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor
because complainant Dela Peas claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the
defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier
against the latter. [12]

Dela Pea and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of Justice. On March
23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the
July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among
others (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be
downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against
Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the
charge of Grave Threats against Alex Toto Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City is directed to file information for three (3) counts of slight oral
defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information for two (2) counts [of] other light
threats against Alexander Toto Ofrin; information for attempted homicide against
Alexander Toto Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito
dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro
Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin
Vivar and Raymond Poliquit; information for malicious mischief and theft against Rainier
Punzalan, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander Toto Ofrin,
Herson Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino Bobby Serrano, and John
Does; and to report action taken within 10 days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. [13]
 Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-
respondents, filed separate motions for reconsideration. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary
of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the
Informations against the movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation
case should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered
without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent the
Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Pea against Rainier, the Secretary held that the
allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted
Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Pea failed to
prove that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended to kill him. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The
resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City is directed to withdraw the separate informations for slight oral defamation, other
light threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against all respondents
and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. [14]

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the
same was denied in a Resolution dated October 11, 2000. [15]

On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals praying that the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of
Slight Oral Defamation against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against
Rainier, Randall and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex Toto
Ofrin.
[16]

On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the questioned
Resolutions of public respondent dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 are set
aside insofar as it directed the withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the respondents
Alexander Toto Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito
de la Cruz, Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio,
Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua,
Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit.
The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby affirmed insofar as it
directed the withdrawal of information for two (2) counts of other light threats against
Alexander Toto Ofrin.
SO ORDERED. [17]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.  Hence, the instant petition
[18]

raising the following assignment of errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND OCTOBER 11,
2000.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT,
SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND WAS COMMITTED BY
HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES, WHICH SHOULD BE
GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE INTENT TO KILL SUCH THAT
PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE. [19]

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence
to sustain a finding of probable cause against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight
Oral Defamation and against petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted
Homicide.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the
error is in the judges findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law
and fact, appeal is the remedy. [20]

Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent
acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case;
where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps
his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his
jurisdiction.  In the case of Meat Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan,  it was held that
[21] [22]
grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power,
abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave. [23]

We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of

discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the
Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. Supervision
and control includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to
approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.
[24]

In the case of People v. Peralta,  we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute
[25]

vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,  we[26]

declared that:
A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal
information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient
evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the
prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action
where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the
averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after
investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be
prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the
discharge of this function.
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of
the functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw
the informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for
attempted homicide against the other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is
determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.
First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory
remarks were uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 6, 2002 stated the settled rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The
City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the
best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses
and determine probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made
within the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no
sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the
decision of the City Prosecutor.
As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other than
Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because
it was in the nature of a countercharge. The Department of Justice in a Resolution dated
June 18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Pea be likewise investigated for
the charge of attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred
on August 13, 1997 making him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This
resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of herein
respondent Dencio Dela Pea should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the
shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of herein petitioner Rainier Punzalan.
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of
discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent
case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona  that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
[27]

preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor

sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against
an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been
made with grave abuse. [28]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated June 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2003 denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice, directing the withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and
attempted homicide against the petitioners, is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, p. 44. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices
Roberto A. Barrios and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[2]
 Sumbong-Salaysay, Rollo, p. 202.
[3]
 Id.
[4]
 Id.
[5]
 Id., p. 203.
[6]
 Punzalan v. Plata, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1310, 18 December 2001, 372 SCRA 534, 535-536.
[7]
 Joint Resolution, Rollo, p. 99.
[8]
 Rollo, pp. 251 & 222.
[9]
 Sinumpaang Salaysay, Rollo, p. 249.
[10]
 Rollo, p. 95.
[11]
 Id., p. 99.
[12]
 Id., p. 100-101.
[13]
 Resolution, Rollo, pp. 145-146.
[14]
 Id., p. 169.
[15]
 Rollo, p. 197.
[16]
 Id., pp. 91-92.
[17]
 Id., p. 60.
[18]
 Id., p. 62.
[19]
 Id., p. 18.
[20]
 People v. Chavez, 411 Phil. 482, 491 (2001).
[21]
 Regalado, Florenz B., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 1997 Ed., p. 705.
[22]
 G.R. No. 103068, 22 June 2001, 359 SCRA 409, 421; citing Akbayan-Youth, et al. v. Comelec, G.R.
Nos. 147066 & 147179, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 318, 341.
[23]
 Benito v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134913, 19 January 2001, 349 SCRA 705, 714.
[24]
 Aurillo, Jr. v. Rabi, G.R. No.120014, 26 November 2002, 392 SCRA 595, 603.
[25]
 People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 121234, 8 August 2002, 387 SCRA 45, 64; citing Webb v. De Leon, 317
Phil. 758 (1995).
[26]
 G.R. No. 154920, 15 April 2003.
[27]
 G.R. No. 123504, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 32, 37; citing Camanag v. Guerrero, 335 Phil. 945,
969 (1997).
[28]
 Joaquin, Jr. and BJ Productions v. Drilon, et al., 361 Phil. 900, 908 (1999).
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417. May 27, 2004]

PETER BEJARASCO, JR. and ISABELITA

BEJARASCO, complainants, vs. JUDGE ALFREDO D.
BUENCONSEJO, Municipal Trial Court, Dalaguete, Cebu,
SECUNDINO PIEDAD, Clerk of Court, and LEONISA GONZALES,
Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Argao,
Cebu, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The instant administrative complaint stemmed from a Letter-Complaint dated

January 22, 2001 filed by Peter Bejarasco, Jr. and Isabelita Bejarasco charging Judge
Alfredo Buenconsejo, Clerk of Court Secundino Piedad, and Court Stenographer
Leonisa Gonzales of the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, with dereliction of
duty, ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and serious irregularity relative to Criminal
Cases Nos. R-04171 and R-4172. [1]

The complainants alleged that they were charged by a certain Dr. Edwin Fonghe
with grave threats and grave oral defamation before the Municipal Trial Court of
Dalaguete, Cebu.According to the complainants, the respondent judge inhibited himself
from the said cases on the ground of delicadeza and that Executive Judge Epifanio
Llanos of the Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, designated Judge
Palmacio Calderon of the MTC of Argao, Cebu, to hear and try the said cases.  Judge
[2]

Calderon conducted continuous and simultaneous trials, and the cases were submitted
for decision on June 29, 1999. Unfortunately, Judge Calderon died on December 31,
1999 without having rendered judgment on the said cases.
The complainants alleged that they were surprised to receive a notice from the MTC
of Argao, Cebu, that Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171 and R-4172 had been set for
promulgation on May 15, 2000 by the respondent judge, who was then designated as
presiding judge of the said court.
The complainants alleged, thus:

9. That after I (affiant husband) received the notice, I immediately proceeded to the
house of Judge Buenconsejo at Poblacion, Dalaguete, Cebu, and told him about my
late receipt of notice, but Judge Buenconsejo told me that the promulgation was reset
by the lawyer;

10. That I (affiant husband) then inquired from Judge Buenconsejo why would he
promulgate the decision he had already inhibited himself from (trying) my cases, and
why would the promulgation be only on two (2) criminal cases instead of five (5)
cases which were all submitted for decision;

11. That Judge Buenconsejo answered me (affiant husband) in the following manner:

Tikboy, miadto mi kuyog sa akong mga clerks sa ilang Judge Calderon. Wala koy
mahimo, order ni sa akong superior Judge Llanos. Huwata lang ang sunod nga notice.
which in English means: Tikboy, my clerks and I went to the house of Judge
Calderon. There is nothing I can do, this is the order of my superior Judge Llanos.
Just wait for the next notice.;

12. That on May 16, 2000, at about 10:00 A.M., I (affiant husband) went to the MTC
of Argao, Cebu, passed by the office of my PAO lawyer Atty. Quindala, and we both
went to Secundino Piedad of the MTC, and upon inquiry by Atty. Quindala, Mr.
Piedad informed us that I was convicted in the decision to be promulgated; [3]

The complainants, thereafter, received another notice of promulgation at 10:00 a.m.

of May 29, 2000. On the said date, the complainants counsel argued that the
respondent judge could not promulgate the decision since he had earlier inhibited
himself from trying the said cases, and that the judge who actually heard the case had
already died. The respondent judge, however, ignored these arguments and proceeded
with the promulgation of the Decision  dated November 19, 1999, convicting both
[4]

complainants.
Thereafter, the complainants counsel filed a motion to nullify the decision. The
respondent judge denied the motion, and ordered the arrest of the complainants. The
latters counsel filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu,
Branch 26, questioning the validity of the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171 and
R-4172 and its promulgation.
During the pendency of their petition for certiorari, the complainants requested for
an expert examination of the signatures of the late Judge Calderon in his decisions with
the PNP Crime Laboratory.  The complainants submitted a copy of Questioned
[5]

Document Report No. 098-2000  where the document examiner of the PNP Crime
[6]

Laboratory made the following findings:

FINDINGS:

Comparative examination ans (sic) analysis of the questioned signatures marked Q-1
to Q-3 inclusive and the standard signatures marked S-1 and S-14 inclusive reveal
significant differences in formation, construction and other individual handwriting
characteristics.

**** **** ****

CONCLUSION:

The questioned signatures of Judge Palmacio L. Calderon appearing in the three

copies of page 6 of the Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 4171 and 4172 all dated 19
November 1999 marked Q-1 to Q-3 inclusive are forged. [7]

On January 3, 2001, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. rendered his Resolution on

the petition for certiorari, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considering, this Court resolves to GRANT
the Petition MODIFIED as follows:

1. Issuing a preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the petitioners herein

ordering public respondent Hon. ALFREDO D. BUENCONSEJO from having the
warrant of arrest he earlier issued enforced; the said warrant of arrest is, thus, ordered
QUASHED, UNTIL and UNLESS a new decision/judgment is rendered and
promulgated;

2. Ordering the Hon. EMILIO T. REYES, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Sibonga, Cebu, to take over these cases from Hon. ALFREDO D.
BUENCONSEJO and render a decision/judgment on these cases and have the same
promulgated without further delay.

3. Ordering public respondent Hon. ALFREDO D. BUENCONSEJO to make

available and turn over the records of these cases, including the stenographic notes
duly transcribed unto the Clerk of Court of Hon. EMILIO T. REYES.

4. Ordering the Clerk of Court of this Court to return the records of these cases to the
court of origin.

IT IS SO RESOLVED. [8]

The complainants contended that the respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the
law, grave misconduct and serious irregularity, and is presumed to be the author of the
forged signature of Judge Palmacio Calderon. The favorable resolution of their petition
for certiorari in the RTC further showed the respondent judges ignorance of the law and
misconduct. They, thus, prayed that the respondent judge be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits.
 In his comment, the respondent judge denied the charges and accusations against
him. He averred, thus:

a) The Decision dated November 19, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171 and R-
4172 was personally and directly prepared and signed by the late Judge
Palmacio Calderon during his lifetime;

b) The said decision was left and deposited by Judge Calderon with his Clerk of
Court of MTC Argao, Cebu;

c) Unfortunately, however, Judge Calderon fell ill and was hospitalized for
sometime until his demise on December 31, 1999, and for which reason the
subject questioned decision was not promulgated during his lifetime;

d) When I assumed office as Acting Judge Designate of the MTC of Argao, Cebu,
the Clerk of Court informed me about the decision which was left and
entrusted to him by Judge Calderon, and consequently, I directed the Clerk of
Court to set the same for promulgation which was actually made in open court
in the presence of the complainants as the accused therein and their counsel in
the morning of May 29, 2001;

e) Under the above circumstances, I honestly believe in good faith that there was
no irregularity in the promulgation of the questioned subject decision as my
only participation on this matter was merely an exercise of a ministerial duty
to enforce the said decision which was already long rendered by the judge who
actually and completely heard the above-mentioned criminal cases on the
merits, basing my actuation on the express pertinent provision of Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states as follows:
The Judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and
the judge of the court in which it was rendered (Underlining ours);

f) At any rate, if there was ever an error on my part, it was never done with malice
in order to prejudice the substantial rights of the complainant.
[9]

The respondent alleged that he denied the complainants motion to nullify the
decision in Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171 and R-4172 as the same was not the proper
remedy available under the particular circumstances of the case, but rather an appeal,
or a motion for new trial as the case may be. Consequently, the said decision became
final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period within which the
complainants might have availed of any of the said legal remedies. Thus, according to
the respondent, he issued an order of arrest against the complainants so that they could
serve their sentence.
 The respondent also pointed out that the complainants had already filed a
complaint  before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0166,
[10]

and that such complaint was dismissed.  The respondent averred that the instant
[11]

complaint was in the nature of a harassment suit in order to exact leverage on him and
antagonize him, which has been frowned upon by the Court.
For her part, Court Stenographer Leonisa Gonzales alleged that the late Judge
Calderon directed her to submit all the transcripts of stenographic notes within a period
of fifteen days from the time the case was submitted for decision. She denied having
conversed with the parties in Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171 and R-4172. She could not,
however, attest to the correctness or erroneousness of the charges against the
respondent judge. She also averred that she did not witness the signing of the
questioned decision, whether by the late Judge Calderon or the respondent judge. [12]

Clerk of Court Secundino Piedad attested  that sometime in April 2000, he visited
[13]

the residence of the late Judge Calderon in La Paloma, Labangon, Cebu City, to verify
the serial number of a typewriter assigned to the late Judge Calderon for clearance
purposes. The wife of the late Judge Calderon, Alicia T. Calderon, thereafter, handed to
him the records of Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171 and R-4172, including a decision
thereon duly signed by the late judge. Consequently, he informed the respondent, then
acting presiding judge, about the decision and the latter set the same for
promulgation. He was then ordered to issue a subpoena to the complainants (accused
therein) for the promulgation of judgment, but for the latters failure to receive the
said subpoena on time, another was issued setting the promulgation of the said
judgment on May 29, 2000. Piedad averred he merely executed and implemented the
legal orders of the court.
Additionally, Alicia T. Calderon executed an affidavit  to attest to the fact that the
[14]

late judge indeed signed the questioned decisions.

In its Report dated February 8, 2002, the Court Administrator made the following
recommendations:

1. The present case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

2. The respondent judge be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos

(P10,000.00) to be deducted from the Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
previously set aside by the Court and to direct the Financial Management
Office, OCA, to release the balance of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and

3. The charges against Clerk of Court Secundino Piedad and Court Stenographer
Leonisa Gonzales be DISMISSED for lack of substantial evidence to hold
them administratively liable.[15]

Respondent Gonzales, thereafter, filed an Urgent Request for Clearance and

Motion to Resolve or Dismiss  the instant complaint as against her, praying that she be
[16]

cleared for retirement purposes to enable her to receive her retirement benefits. Upon
the recommendation of the Court Administrator, we granted her request and directed
the Financial Management Office to immediately release her compulsory retirement
benefits subject to the retention of the amount of P5,000 from the money value of her
terminal leave credits pending the resolution of this matter.  The case was, thereafter,
[17]

referred to Executive Judge Maximo A. Perez of the Regional Trial Court of Argao,
Cebu, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Executive Judge found that the
respondents actuation of promulgating the decision of the late Judge Calderon in
Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171 and R-4172, considering that he (the respondent) also
inhibited himself from presiding on the said cases, constitutes misconduct. It was
recommended that the respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000 and that
respondents Piedad and Gonzales be exonerated from all the charges against them for
lack of substantial evidence.
We agree that the respondent judge is administratively liable.
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines and sets
forth the requirements for a valid judgment:

SECTION 1. Judgment; definition and form. Judgment is the adjudication by the court

that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on
him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall
contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and law upon which it is based.

Thus, a judgment, to be valid, must have been personally and directly prepared by

the judge, and duly signed by him. Corollarily, a decision or resolution of the court
becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its
promulgation. Promulgation of judgment, in turn, signifies that on the date it was made,
the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it. If at the time of the
promulgation, a judge or member of a collegiate court has already vacated his office, his
vote is automatically withdrawn.  In criminal cases, promulgation of judgment is made
[18]

by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court only when the judge is
absent or outside the province or city. [19]

It is clear then, that a judge who takes over the sala of another judge who died
during office cannot validly promulgate a decision penned by the latter. In fact, decisions
promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been appointed to and qualified
in another office are null and void. To be binding, a judgment must be duly signed and
promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. In
single courts like the regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision may
no longer be promulgated after the ponente has vacated his office. [20]

The respondent judge cannot, likewise, claim that his only participation in the
promulgation of the questioned decision was merely an exercise of a ministerial duty to
enforce the said decision which was already long rendered by the judge who actually
and completely heard the above-mentioned criminal cases on the merits. It must be
stressed that the respondent judge had earlier inhibited himself from the cases in
question, and that Judge Calderon was designated to hear and try the cases in his
stead. The mere fact that the respondent judge was designated as Presiding Judge of
Branch 26 following the death of Judge Calderon does not necessarily mean that his
previous inhibition in relation to the criminal cases in question has been lifted. That
would be an absurdity, as a valid designation presupposes that the judge so designated
has not inhibited himself from the cases assigned/raffled to the said branch.[21]

We agree with the following ratiocinations of the Court Administrator:

The clause absent or outside the province or city refers only to temporary physical
absence of the judge and his inability to be represented during the promulgation. The
clause does not refer to cessation of or removal from office. In other words, the
decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his presence so long as he is
still a judge of that court. Therefore, where the judge who signed the decision was no
longer a judge of the court at the time of the promulgation because he had already
died or had retired, or had been promoted to another position, and another judge
promulgated it, the judgment is invalid. (Jimenez v. Republic, 22 SCRA 622).

Granting arguendo that the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. R-4171 and R-4172 was
indeed signed by the late Judge Calderon, respondent Judge Buenconsejo had no
authority to promulgate the decision. Judge Calderon ceased to be the judge of that
court, thus, the judgment which he signed cannot be promulgated by another judge.
Any judgment or decision is valid and binding only if both [were] penned and
promulgated by the judge during his incumbency. (People v. Garcia, 313 SCRA 279).

Considering that the full records of the case were available for perusal, another judge
could pen the decision even if he did not hear the case in its entirety. However, since
Judge Buenconsejo previously inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases, he
should have referred the matter to his Executive Judge and assigned another judge to
render judgment thereon. [22]

Indeed, it is the duty of a judge to so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  He should avoid impropriety
[23]

and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.  Having previously inhibited from the
[24]

criminal cases, the respondent should have refrained from acting thereon, to avoid
tainting the Courts good name and standing as a temple of justice.
The respondent judge cannot, likewise, rely on the dismissal of the criminal charges
filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman, as it is a settled rule that
administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may
continue despite the dismissal of the latter charges. As the disciplining arm of the
judiciary, it is the Courts duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter
in complaints against judges and to mete the necessary penalties therefor.
 In fine, the respondents actuations constitute gross misconduct and ignorance of
the law under Section 8 of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court. Considering that the
respondent judge has compulsorily retired from the service, he shall be meted a fine
of P20,000.
We, likewise, agree with Executive Judge Perez that the charges against
respondents Piedad and Gonzales should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, respondent
Judge Alfredo D. Buenconsejo is ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000). The charges against Clerk of Court Secundino Piedad and
Court Stenographer Leonisa Gonzales of the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu,
are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Financial Management Office is ORDERED to
release the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) withheld from the retirement
benefits of respondent Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), on official leave.

[1]
 Entitled People of the Philippines v. Peter Bejarasco, Jr. alias Tikboy, et al.
[2]
 Annex A, Rollo, p. 6.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 2.
[4]
 Annex B, Rollo, pp. 7-12.
[5]
 Annex G, Id. at 26.
[6]
 Annex H, Id. at 33.
[7]
 Id.
[8]
 Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[9]
 Id. at 52.
[10]
 Id. at 71-75.
[11]
 Annex A, Rollo, pp. 57-63.
[12]
 Comment, Rollo, pp. 125-128.
[13]
 Rollo, pp. 153-154.
[14]
 Id. at 133.
[15]
 Id. at 159.
[16]
 Id. at 161-163.
[17]
 Resolution dated February 26, 2003, Rollo, p. 179-180.
[18]
 Jamil v. Commission on Elections, 283 SCRA 349 (1997), citing Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 433 (1990).
[19]
 Paragraph 1, Section 6 of Rule 120.
[20]
 People v. Bellaflor, 233 SCRA 196 (1994).
[21]
 See Sevilleja v. Laggui, 362 SCRA 715 (2001).
[22]
 Rollo, p. 158.
[23]
 Canon 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[24]
 Canon 2.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-93-795. May 14, 1998]

ELMA T. FERRER, complainant, vs. JUDGE GENOVEVA C.

MARAMBA, MILAGROS SONGCUAN, Branch Clerk of
Court, JUANITA ABROGAR, Process Server, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint against Judge Genoveva C. Maramba, Branch

Clerk of Court Milagros Songcuan, and Process Server Juanita Abrogar, all of the
Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The complaint charges respondents
with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and conduct unbecoming
officers of the court.
It appears that complainant Elma T. Ferrer filed a complaint for grave oral
defamation against PO3 Domingo Eden of the PNP of Mangaldan, Pangasinan for
having allegedly uttered the following words against her in public:

Punieta ka, puta ka ya bii, maniac ka. (Bullshit, you are a prostitute, you are fund
(sic) of sexual intercourse).
[1]

The case was assigned to the court of respondent judge.

In her letter-complaint dated October 29, 1992, complainant Ferrer alleged that, on
[2] 

August 27, 1992, respondent Judge Maramba forced her to sign an affidavit of
desistance, as basis for the dismissal of the criminal complaint against PO3 Eden, and
instructed respondent Branch Clerk of Court to deduct the amount of P5,000.00, as cost
of the suit and donation to the court, from the amount to be paid by PO3 Eden to the
complainant for the settlement of the case; that on September 17, 1992, respondent
judge dragged her from the Regional Office of the Department of Agriculture to the
judges chambers in an effort to make her meet PO3 Eden and finally settle their
differences. Complainant claimed that as a result of the force used by the judge,
complainants right sleeve was torn and her gold necklace was damaged.
In another affidavit-complaint dated February 24, 1993, complainant averred that
[3] 

respondent Process Server Abrogar threatened to report her to the municipal mayor
with a view to have her dismissed from the service if she did not settle her case with
PO3 Eden. She claimed that respondent process server tried to pressure her family by
misrepresenting to them that a warrant for her arrest had been issued when in fact it
was only a subpoena that Judge Lilia Espaol had issued because of a case for slight
physical injuries filed by the respondent Branch Clerk of Court against her.
In her comment on the complaint, respondent judge denied the charges against
[4] 

her. She claimed that on August 27, 1992, complainant came to her court to file an
affidavit of desistance but as it did not have the conformity of the public prosecutor, she
advised complainant to come back on August 31, 1992 when the prosecutor was
scheduled to appear in her court; that complainant came back on August 31, 1992, and
Assistant Public Prosecutor Restituto Dumlao gave his conformity to her affidavit; and
that on the basis of the affidavit, she (respondent judge) dismissed the case for grave
oral defamation against PO3 Eden.
With respect to the incident of September 17, 1992, respondent judge alleged that
when she arrived at her office in the afternoon of that day, complainant was already
there. She, therefore, denied that she dragged the complainant from the latters office to
her sala. She admitted slapping the complainant, but she claimed she acted in self-
defense in order to prevent complainant from physically harming her and her
staff. Anent the charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
respondent judge denied having instructed respondent Branch Clerk of Court Songcuan
to deduct P5,000.00 from the amount which PO3 Eden paid to the complainant in
settlement of the criminal case. Respondent judge claimed that this administrative case
against her was filed to dissuade her from pursuing the criminal complaint for direct
assault upon a person in authority which she had filed against the complainant arising
from the same incident of September 17, 1992.
Respondent Branch Clerk of Court Songcuan filed a separate comment on the
complaint. She denied complainants allegation that upon the instruction of the
respondent judge she deducted P5,000.00 from the amount of P20,000.00 deposited
with her by PO3 Eden. She claimed that she filed charges of physical injuries against
complainant as a result of an incident on September 17, 1992, during which she was hit
by a mirror which complainant had hurled at PO3 Eden.
For her part, respondent Process Server Abrogar, in her comment dated July 9,
1992, denied complainants allegation that she invited complainant and PO3 Eden to
[5] 

discuss the settlement of the criminal case for grave oral defamation and that she
threatened to report the complainant to the municipal mayor of Mangaldan, Pangasinan
if she refused to settle the criminal case. Abrogar denied that she harassed the relatives
of the complainant and that she tried to scare them by telling them that Judge Lilia
Espaol had ordered the arrest of complainant in connection with the slight physical
injuries case filed by respondent Branch Clerk of Court Songcuan.
The Court referred the case to Judge Antonio M. Belen of Branch 38 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan for investigation, report, and recommendation. In his
report submitted on May 19, 1994, Judge Belen finds respondent judge guilty of acts
unbecoming a judge and recommends that she be fined P5,000.00 and admonished.
The Investigating Judge recommends that respondent judge, along with respondent
Branch Clerk of Court Milagros Songcuan, be exonerated of the charge of violating the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and that respondent Process Server Juanita
Abrogar be exonerated of the charge that she committed acts unbecoming an officer of
the court.
As found by Judge Belen, the facts are as follows:
On August 27, 1992, complainant presented an affidavit of desistance to the
respondent judge. However, she was told by respondent judge to come back on August
31, 1992, when the public prosecutor was scheduled to appear before her, so that the
prosecutor could give his conformity to the affidavit. The affidavit was intended for use
[6] 

as basis for the dismissal of the complaint which complainant had filed against PO3
Domingo Eden. In consideration of the dismissal of the case, PO3 Eden
paid P20,000.00 which he deposited with respondent Branch Clerk of Court Songcuan.
On August 31, 1992, complainant came back as instructed. She signed again the
affidavit of desistance in the presence of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Restituto
Dumlao, who interposed no objection to the dismissal of the
case. Accordingly, respondent judge issued an order dismissing the complaint for grave
oral defamation against PO3 Domingo Eden. [7]

On September 17, 1992, complainant confronted PO3 Eden about the rumor that
upon the advice of the respondent judge, PO3 Eden had decided not to pay her
additional money as settlement of the cases she had filed against him. Later that day,
complainant was told by respondent Abrogar that respondent judge wanted to talk to
her in the judges chambers. But complainant refused to see respondent judge
considering that she had already spoken with PO3 Eden, so the respondent judge went
to complainants office in the same building, grabbed the right sleeve of complainants
uniform, and forced the complainant to go with her to her (respondent judges)
chambers. As a result, the right sleeve of complainants uniform was torn and her gold
necklace was damaged. The spectacle drew the attention of several persons. Two (2) of
those who witnessed the incident gave their testimonies at the investigation. They were
Federico de Guzman  and Pastor Cayabyab.
[8] [9]

Apparently frustrated at the failure of the parties to settle their case, respondent

judge shouted at the complainant, PO3 Eden, and respondent Branch Clerk of Court
Songcuan: Dahil sa kaputahan ninyong tatlo, dinadamay ninyo ang opisina. (Because of
the perfidy of the three of you, you have caused embarrassment to the court.) Then, she
slapped the complainant on the left cheek and struck her right ear with a
logbook. Respondent judge ordered complainant to slap PO3 Eden and, as she refused
to do so, respondent judge threatened to undress her in the presence of the court
employees. Complainant therefore hurled a mirror at PO3 Eden but the latter was able
to avoid the flying object which instead hit respondent Branch Clerk of Court Songcuan,
 causing abrasions and contusions on her arm.
[10] [11]

Respondent judge filed a criminal complaint for direct assault upon a person in
authority against the complainant, while respondent Branch Clerk of Court Songcuan
charged her with slight physical injuries. Complainant, on the other hand, filed this
[12] 

administrative case against the respondent judge and respondent Branch Clerk of
Court.
 In December 1992, when complainant was in Quezon City, respondent Process
Server Abrogar, accompanied by two policemen, went to complainants residence in
Barangay Linoc in Binmaley, to serve a subpoena issued by Judge Lilia Espaol. The
subpoena was issued in connection with the complaint for slight physical injuries filed by
respondent Songcuan. Complainant immediately returned home to Pangasinan after
[13]

she was informed by her relatives that respondent Process Server Abrogar was
allegedly harassing them. She subsequently filed this administrative case for conduct
unbecoming an employee of the court against respondent Abrogar. [14]

Judge Belen found no basis for the allegation that respondent judge forced
complainant to sign the affidavit of desistance. In his report, Judge Belen states:
[15]

... The Court after carefully examining the evidence adduced during the hearing, finds
no substantial proof to substantiate the claims of the complainant that she was forced
to sign her affidavit of desistance that served as the basis for the dismissal of the
criminal case for Grave Oral Defamation which she filed against PO3 Domingo Eden
before the Municipal Court of Mangaldan. The Court is of the humble opinion that
Elma Ferrer being of legal age and of sufficient discretion and a highly educated
woman with two (2) degrees, one for Bachelor of Science in Agriculture (BSA) and
another for Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) cannot be so easily coerced,
intimidated and forced to do things against her will. On the contrary, she is endowed
with strong self-determination and character as shown by her temerity and courage to
fight back against a Judge and policeman (PO3 Domingo Eden).... Likewise, if the
complainant was really forced to sign the affidavit in the absence of her lawyer, why
did she receive and accept the initial payment of P15,000.00. This act of the
complainant is contrary and opposed to ordinary behavior and promotion (sic) of
human nature. Furthermore, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Restituto Dumlao,
testified in Court that he assisted the complainant when she signed her affidavit of
desistance and that nobody forced Miss Ferrer to affix her signature in the
document. With the foregoing circumstances obtaining in the case at hand, the Court
therefore concludes that the complainant was not forced, coerced and pressured by the
respondent Judge in affixing her signature in her affidavit of desistance.

However, the Investigating Judge found the charge that respondent judge had used
physical force against complainant and laid hands on her to be true. In his report, Judge
Belen states:[16]

Regarding the charge of Elma Ferrer that she was dragged from her office to the
Municipal Court by Judge Maramba which resulted in the tearing of the right sleeve
of her uniform, and the damage of her golden necklace, the Court after carefully
studying the evidence on record, finds that the accusation of the complainant is aptly
supported by substantial and convincing evidence. The pictures of Elma Ferrer and
her torn uniform (Exhibits BB and CC, and series), showing that the right sleeve of
her uniform was torn are mute but indubitable proof that the complainant was in fact
forcibly dragged by the respondent Judge to her office. The dragging likewise resulted
in the damage and in the breaking of the complainants golden necklace. (Exhibits BB-
2 and CC). The mere denial made by the respondent Judge and her witnesses of the
accusation imputed against her is not sufficient to overcome the physical and
convincing evidence presented by the complainant. It is a well established rule in this
jurisdiction, that in weighing contradictory statements and declarations, greater weight
should be accorded to the positive assertion of the complainant than the mere denials
of the defendant. It should likewise be noted that the incident in question was
promptly reported to the police of Mangaldan and recorded in the police
blotter. (Exhibit J and series)....

Anent the accusation of the complainant, that Judge Maramba slapped her on the left
face and hit her right lower ear, the Court finds sufficient and convincing evidence
that the respondent Judge committed the acts complained of. In her comment (Exhibit
EE) to the accusation imputed against her, Judge Maramba admitted having slapped
the complainant. Likewise during her testimony in Court from her very own lips
springs forth the admission that she slapped Miss Ferrer on the left face because the
latter threw a mirror at her which she was able to parry and when Miss Ferrer again
picked something from a nearby table, she slapped her on the face. The respondent
Judge tried to justify the act complained of, by claiming that she had to slap Miss
Ferrer in order to prevent her from committing further harm and injury on her. In fine,
the respondent invokes self-defense to justify her act of slapping Miss Ferrer and
relies on the finding of the Provincial Prosecutors Office which holds and finds her act
of slapping the complainant justified being an act of self-defense.

To the mind of the Court, the acts of respondent Judge in forcibly dragging Elma
Ferrer from her office to the Court which resulted in the tearing of the right sleeve of
her uniform and the damage of her golden necklace as well as the slapping of the
complainants left face, are (sic) all unwarranted and unjustified. The respondent was
not suppose to take the law in her hands as there are (sic) other persons present
notably her staff and PO3 Eden who could help her prevent the complainant from
further inflicting harm and injury on her. On the basis of the aforesaid acts imputed
against her, the respondent Judge exhibited shortness of temper and patience, which is
squarely repugnant to responsibilities, duties and restrictions imposed upon her by
reason of her office. . . . The respondent Judges acts constitutes (sic) grave misconduct
and amount to serious violation of the canons of Judicial Ethics that require that a
Judges acts while in office should be free from the appearance of impropriety and her
personal behavior while in office and also in her everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.
 With respect to the charges of corrupt acts and acts unbecoming employees of the
court filed against respondents Songcuan and Abrogar, the Investigating Judge found
no evidence to sustain the charges and accordingly, recommends that respondents
be exonerated of the charges. He states in his report:
[17]

Regarding the accusation of Elma Ferrer that respondent Clerk of Court, Milagros
Songcuan, deducted the sum of P1,000.00 as donation to the Court and P4,000.00 as
cost of suit from the amount of P20,000.00, which PO3 Domingo Eden had deposited
with the said respondent, the Court finds no substantial evidence which tends to
support the charge. The acknowledgment receipt marked Exhibit K for the
complainant which is Exhibit 12 and series for the respondents, clearly shows that
Elma Ferrer received the sum of P20,000.00 from PO3 Domingo Eden, representing
the consideration for the amicable settlement of the cases which the complainant had
filed against him. The evidence adduced by the complainant which tends to support
this accusation, is her testimony, the declaration of her witness, Federico de Guzman
and the acknowledgment receipt written on the lower portion of her Exhibit K which
has been marked Exhibit K-2 for complainant and 12-A for respondent. Based on the
testimony of the complainant, she prepared four (4) copies of Exhibit K
(Acknowledgment Receipt), however, it is quite surprising why her copy only
contained the handwriting acknowledgment receipt (Exhibit K-2) whereas the copy in
the possession of the respondent (Exhibit 13) does not contain any acknowledgment
receipt (Exhibit 12)....[I]t is therefore not hard to conclude that the complainant
manufactured Exhibit 12-A to achieve her purpose of holding the respondents
administratively liable for graft and corruption. The complainant did not even bother
to make any explanation why only her copy of Exhibit K (acknowledgment receipt)
contained the handwritten receipt (Exhibit K-2) despite the fact that both receipts
(Exhibits 12 and 13) were supposedly executed on the same date (August 27, 1992)
and same place (Mangaldan, Pangasinan).

Furthermore, it will be very unnatural for Milagros Songcuan to be making the alleged
deduction in the presence of other persons notably Federico de Guzman and Virginia
Manaois, especially so that the complainant did not freely agree to the supposed
deduction of P5,000.00. Mrs. Songcuan and Judge Maramba will not be so reckless
and imprudent to commit the acts imputed to them, in the presence of other persons
who could be presented as witnesses against them.. . .

Likewise, based on the evidence adduced during the trial and the facts obtaining in the
case, the Court finds that the accusation of the complainant that respondent, Juanita
Abrogar, threatened to report her to the Mayor of Mangaldan and be recommended for
dismissal from office, if she will not settle the cases which she filed against PO3
Domingo Eden is devoid of merit. The Court cannot conceive of any compelling
motive or reason why Mrs. Abrogar is so interested in the settlement of the cases
which were filed against PO3 Domingo Eden. She is not related to him either by
blood or affinity, nor is there any showing that she has moral or pecuniary interest in
having the cases settled. By and large, the complainant has not presented substantial
and convincing evidence to support her charge.

Likewise, the accusation of Elma Ferrer that Juanita Abrogar threatened and molested
her (complainant) relatives and friends by making it appear and known to them that
the Court process which the respondent was serving upon Miss Ferrer is a warrant of
arrest with a recommended bailbond of P50,000.00, has not been established by
substantial and sufficient evidence. SPO1 Ernesto Esquerra, a member of the PNP of
Binmaley and townmate of the complainant, declared during the hearing that
he accompanied Mrs. Juanita Abrogar and SPO3 Tomas Moulic a member of the PNP
of Mangaldan to Barangay Linoc, Binmaley because Mrs. Abrogar was going to serve
a court process on Ferrer. SPO1 Esquerra, further testified that while they were in
Barangay Linoc, Mrs. Abrogar never threatened or harassed the mother and relatives
of Miss Ferrer. Indeed, their conversations was friendly and cordial, and that Mrs.
Abrogar did not make it appear to the people of Linoc that she was serving a warrant
of arrest upon the complainant with a recommended bailbond of P50,000.00. The
court finds no improper motive on the part of SPO1 Esquerra who is the townmate of
Elma Ferrer to testify in favor of respondent Juanita Abrogar. SPO1 Esquerra came to
Court and declared in the manner he testified [that he was] impelled by the prompting
of clear conscience and of his desire to tell the truth.

The above findings of the Investigating Judge are in accordance with the
evidence. Indeed, the evidence does not show that, upon instructions of respondent
judge, the amount of P5,000.00 was deducted by Songcuan from the amount
of P20,000.00 which PO3 Eden paid to settle the criminal cases against him. For one,
the acknowledgment receipt (Exhibit K) clearly states that the complainant received the
sum of P20,000.00 from PO3 Eden. Only her testimony and the handwritten notation
(Exhibit K-2) on the said acknowledgment receipt indicate otherwise. Complainant
should not have signed the acknowledgment receipt if she received P15,000.00 only.
Moreover, the handwritten notation (Exhibit K-2) that complainant received the
amount of P15,000.00 only appears solely in the complaints copy of the
acknowledgment receipt. No similar notation appears in the copies of the
acknowledgment receipt in the possession of the respondents. The notation may have
been added by the complainant to provide a basis for holding respondents liable for
graft and corrupt practices. Indeed, the handwritten notation is self-serving. It is more
likely that complainant received P20,000.00 but complainant wanted more so she
pestered PO3 Eden for additional sum. PO3 Eden may have informed the respondent
judge about the demand of the complainant and this angered the respondent judge who
thought that she had already settled the case for grave oral defamation involving the
parties. Furthermore, as the investigating judge observed, it is unbelievable that
respondents would be so reckless to make the alleged deduction in the presence of
many witnesses.
We think, however, that respondent judge took undue interest in the settlement of
the criminal case for grave oral defamation and in so doing, severely compromised the
integrity and impartiality of her office. It may be that the initiative for the settlement of the
case came from the complainant, but once taken, it would appear that respondent judge
went out of her way to see to it that the initiative bore fruit. At one point, when efforts at
settlement were in danger of collapsing, respondent judge went to the extent of literally
dragging complainant to her chambers to make her meet PO3 Eden who was waiting
there for them. Respondent judge failed to observe prudence so necessary if judges are
to be perceived to be impartial. Indeed, as exemplars of law and justice, judges must
avoid not only impropriety but even the appearance of impropriety in all their actions. [18]

Worse, she showed a predisposition to use physical violence and intemperate

language in public which reveals a marked lack of judicial temperament and self-
restraint, traits which, besides the basic equipment of learning in the law, are
indispensable qualities of every judge.
Respondent judge claims that she acted in self-defense because complainant
allegedly threw a mirror at her which she was able to evade and was about to pick up
something else to throw at her. But slapping someone on the face is hardly a defensive
action. Had respondent judge acted in self-defense, she should have wrestled with the
complainant. For her to slap her alleged antagonist on the face suggests rather that it
was more to show contempt for the person she slapped and possibly to embarrass her
than to protect herself from any act of aggression that complainant was about to
commit.
Indeed, it was unlikely that complainant would commit aggression, surrounded as
she was by court employees. It is more likely that respondent judge acted out of
frustration at the failure of the parties to settle their case that she slapped complainant
and then struck her in the ear after scolding her, PO3 Eden and Branch Clerk of Court
Songcuan. Then in a show of petulance, she ordered complainant to hit PO3 Eden and,
as she initially refused to do so, threatened to undress her in public.
For having acted in an oppressive, improper, and violent manner, respondent judge
should be suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day in accordance with Rule XIV,
23(n) of the Civil Service Rules.
WHEREFORE, Judge Genoveva C. Maramba is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6)
months and one (1) day without pay, with WARNING that repetition of the same
misconduct will be dealt with more severely. The charges against respondents Branch
Clerk of Court Milagros Songcuan and Process Server Juanita Abrogar are hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 74.
[2] Id., pp. 1-2.
[3] Records, pp. 30-32.
[4] Rollo, pp. 51-58.
[5] Id., pp. 157-164.
[6] TSN, March 11, 1994, pp. 14-16.
[7] Rollo, pp. 52-53.
[8] TSN, February 23, 1994, pp. 12-45.
[9] TSN, March 10, 1994, pp. 3-34.
[10] TSN, March 8, 1994, pp. 47-51; TSN, March 9, 1994, pp. 14-26.
[11] TSN, March 15, 1994, pp. 15-16; Annex B, Comment of Respondent Judge; Rollo, p. 63.
[12] TSN, March 11, 1994, p. 19; Id., pp. 67 & 69-70.
[13] Rollo, pp. 434-435.
[14] Id., pp. 4-5.
[15] Id., pp. 430-432, Report of the Investigating Judge, pp. 11-13.
[16] Rollo, pp. 431-432.
[17] Id., pp. 433-435.
[18] Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct.
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131113. April 21, 1999]

DIONISIA ARTAJOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Dionisia Artajos was charged with grave slander in a complaint filed by
Nenita Uy with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The complaint
alleged -

That on December 3, 1993, in the Municipality of Vigan, province of Ilocos

Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, moved by personal resentment and ill feelings which she harbors
against the undersigned, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and publicly uttered to undersigned complainant the following slanderous and
defamatory words - sika switik, salawasaw, ma[g]nanakaw Gaga, Baboy
thereby seriously insulting, discrediting, and dishonoring complainant.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty, whereupon trial was held.
The main witness for the prosecution was complainant Nenita Uy whose testimony
is summarized in the following portion of decision of the MTC:

The witness testified that she has been a teacher of the Burgos Memorial
West since September 30, 1984. On December 3, 1993, she arrived at school
at 7:15 in the morning. She recorded in the principals office the time of her
arrival in the logbook and in her form 48. During the recitation of the Panatang
Makabayan, Miss Dionisia Artajos shouted, Oy sika Mrs. Uy, okinnam
rummuarka ta patayen ka. The accused was then standing facing west from
six to eight meters northeast of the principals office. Present were the pupils
participating in the flag ceremony. The complainant could not bear the
situation, went away then proceeded to her classroom. Still she could hear the
accused shouting. She later went out. She saw her co-teacher Mr. Faina the
officer-in-charge and Miss Henedina Alconis. They were inside the Learning
Resource Center (LRC) and so she entered the LRC asking the whereabouts
of their OIC. They went out to look for the principal. While near the door of the
Learning Resource Center the complainant saw Miss Artajos near the office of
the principal and the accused was again beckoning her hands at the
complainant uttering words because she was very angry at the time. She
uttered you come here the vulva of your mother and I will kill you, swindler,
thief, liar, you are talking with Artajos of Pagburnayan. Mrs. Nenita Uy just
remained standing and she noticed the principal with her co-teachers, Miss
Susan Alconis and Ms. Pacita Go came out from the principals office. She
saw the principal, Dr. Jovina Alibin approached her. While Ms. Pacita Go and
Miss Alconis went with Miss Artajos, Miss Artajos continued shouting. The
principal, Mr. Faina and Mrs. Henedina Alconis led the complainant away from
Miss Artajos. She was brought to a room of Mrs. Melita de Gracia. The
accused was still shouting outside the principals office. The principal advised
the complainant that she should keep calm. The principal accompanied the
complainant to her room and she continued teaching. She asked permission
from the principal that she will go to the higher authorities. She went first to
the district supervisor but upon learning that he was out of the district, the
complainant went to the division superintendent who was also out of the
province. She later went to the barangay captain. The complainant tried her
best to have a confrontation with Miss Artajos in front of the principal. The
principal refused as she thought that it might get worse if they confront each
other at that moment. Mrs. Uy went to Barangay Captain William Verzosa in
the latters house.She informed and related to the barangay captain about the
incident and the slanderous remarks made by the accused such as
salawasaw, ma[g]nanakaw, baboy. The barangay captain called for his
secretary. At about 2:00 oclock in that same day there was a confrontation
between the accused and the complainant in the principals office at the
Burgos Memorial West.Present were Dr. Jovina Alibin, barangay captain
William Verzosa, Brgy. Secretary Pinedo Rojas and barangay councilman
Desiderio Pascua. Mrs. Nenita Uy and Miss Artajos were also present. The
barangay captain told the accused about the complaint and the purpose to
settle what happened between Miss Artajos and the complainant, but Miss
Artajos answered, Isu ngamin Kapitan, thats why I told her that I will kill her
because I came to know from my co-teacher that she is looking for someone
who will kill me by means of a witchcraft. There was no settlement because
the accused got angry uttering so many bad traits of the complainant that Mrs.
Uy is a swindler, the payment of the land which was paid by Renys Dry Goods
and through the barangay captain she even said that the complainant grabbed
the grinder managed by her. That the complainant is the cause of the laziness
of their co-teacher at the Burgos Memorial West because the complainant is
not teaching but placing make up and counting her riches. On December 6,
1993, the complainant was summoned to the office of the district supervisor
where she saw Miss Artajos, the principal and the district supervisor
interviewed the complainant and the accused. The complainant did not agree
to a settlement because Miss Artajos could not accept her own
mistake. Because of the incident the personal and family life of the
complainant was affected. She was so ashamed with her friends and their
small business of grinder and a small sari-sari store was also affected.

Petitioner denied the accusation and claimed that it was complainant who, after the
flag ceremony in the morning of December 3, 1993, shouted at her Oki Artajos, uray ket
no pinnatay.According to petitioner, she was then with a group of teachers composed of
Perlita Liquete, Pacita Go, Henedina Alconis, Honorata  Anila, and Carolina
Riego. They were telling green jokes as Perlita Liquete was dancing. One of them,
Pacita Go, told her not to mind complainant. As complainant went to her room muttering
unintelligible words, petitioner went to her own room. Petitioner said that while she was
teaching in her class, she noticed that her pupils were not paying attention. She later
learned that it was because complainant was shouting Rummuar uray siasino, kayang
kaya, awan ti kabutengko. She said she became nervous and so she went to the
principals office where the principal and the guidance counselor advised her not to mind
complainant. However, complainant once again threatened to kill her. When petitioner
asked the principal to let her speak to complainant, the latter said, [Y]es, why dont you
come near me and do it now, why hire somebody to kill me, I am not afraid. As
complainant continued to shout at her, petitioner went to her room. She instructed her
pupils to write down what complainant was saying. Petitioner claimed that complainant
hated her so much that the latter filed criminal cases (for grave threats, grave slander,
two counts of falsification) and an administrative case against her.
The MTC found petitioner guilty of grave slander and sentenced her to a prison term
of one (1) year and one (1) day, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months, as
maximum, and ordered her to pay P10,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur (Branch 71) affirmed
the MTCs decision except as to the award of P10,000.00 as moral damages, there
being evidence of prior civil action to recover the same. Petitioner received a copy of the
RTCs decision on February 19, 1996.
Instead of filing a petition for review, petitioner filed a notice of appeal on March 12,
1996. Apparently realizing her error, she filed on March 20, 1996 a petition for review.
In its decision, dated February 12, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied due course to
the petition for review for having been filed late, due date being March 5, 1996 (not
March 6, 1996 as stated by the Court of Appeals); for petitioners failure to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping personally; and for lack of merit. Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
Petitioner argues that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION AND APPLYING STRINGENTLY THE TECHNICAL RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONER HAD NOT BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Court finds no reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.
First. Petitioners petition for review in the Court of Appeals was filed late and its
certification of non-forum shopping was not signed by petitioner herself as required by
Rule 122, 6 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Second. As to the merits, the Court concurs with the Court of Appeals that
petitioners guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner cites alleged contradictions between the testimony of the complainant
Nenita Uy and the other prosecution witnesses. Petitioner alleges that despite the fact
that the information charged one count of grave slander, the prosecution allegedly
presented evidence showing three incidents of the same on December 3, 1993 one at
around 7:15 when the Panatang Makabayan was being recited, another at around 8:00
to 8:15 after the flag ceremony during the first period of classes and another at around
2:00 p.m. at the principals office.
The contradictions, however, are more apparent than real. Petitioner claims that
complainants testimony that she was with her co-teacher Perlita Liquete in the morning
of December 3, 1993 was contradicted by Perlita Liquete who testified that she was only
with a certain Miss Alconis and with nobody else during the morning exercises following
the flag ceremony. What complainant said was that she was with Perlita Liquete prior to
the formation for the flag ceremony. Perlita Liquete confirmed this.
The fact that Perlita Liquete did not notice any commotion at the time of the flag
ceremony does not necessarily mean that none took place. For one, Perlita Liquete said
that, during the flag ceremony, she was unaware where petitioner was, which indicates
that she was far away from where the incident happened. In fact, what Perlita Liquete
actually contradicted was petitioners testimony because Perlita said she was not with
petitioner in the morning of December 3, 1993 nor did she dance, tell green jokes, or
hear complainant threatening petitioner.
As for the testimony of student Daisy Ayson, the same even corroborates
complainants testimony that petitioner shouted at her during the recitation of
the Panatang Makabayan while complainant was in the principals office. Daisy Ayson
said she saw complainant coming out of the said office after she heard petitioner
shouting, Oy, Mrs. Uy, vulva of your mother, come out and I will kill you, you are talking
to Artajos of Pagburnayan and swindler, liar, thief.
 Anent the testimony of the school principal, Dr. Jovina A. Alabin (also spelled Alibin
in the MTCs decision), which petitioner claims is insufficient to prove slander as Dr.
Alabin testified that she only heard petitioner saying Uy, Uy maykadtoyman (Uy, Uy, will
you come here), it must be stated that such was not the only basis for petitioners
conviction. Dr. Alabins testimony must be taken in conjunction with the testimonies of
complainant and prosecution witnesses, Alfredo Guzman, who was in the school to give
money to his children, and Daisy Ayson, which clearly show that defamatory words had
been uttered by petitioner against private respondent.
With regard to petitioners observation that the prosecution presented evidence
showing three incidents of slander (at various times on December 3, 1993) when she
was only charged with a single count of slander, as aptly observed by the Regional Trial
Court in its decision:

Assuming that what the defense is claiming is true that instead of

only one incident of slander, there were three, then the same without doubt
works in their favor. Instead of being confronted with three criminal cases,
there is only one. This alleged omission of the prosecutorial arm of the State
does not wreck havoc against the basic constitutional rights of the Accused. It
favors her because obviously instead of having three cases against her, by
virtue of said omission, she only has one.

Finally, petitioner also argues that it was wrong for the Court of Appeals to uphold
her conviction just because she did not file any case against complainant who had
allegedly threatened her. As already stated, this is but one factor which made the three
courts below decide that as between the contradictory testimonies of petitioner and that
of complainant, the latter was more worthy of credence being consistent with human
behavior and experience.
Be that as it may, the Court thinks that a modification of petitioners penalty is in
order as it appears that the Indeterminate Sentence Law was not applied in this
instance.
Under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code, grave slander is punishable by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. There being
neither a mitigating nor an aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty shall
be within the medium period thereof, which is from one (1) year and one (1) day to one
(1) year and eight (8) months. The minimum shall be within the penalty one degree
lower, i.e., arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which is from one (1)
month and one (1) day to four (4) months per Art. 61, par. 4.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
 Bellosilo, (Chairman), Puno, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

 
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
FIRST DIVISION
 
 
DANTE HERNANDEZ DATU,   G.R. No. 169718
Petitioner,  
Present:
 
 
  CORONA, C.J.,

  Chairperson,

  LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

  DEL CASTILLO,

- versus - ABAD,* and

  PEREZ, JJ.

   

   

  Promulgated:

   

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, December 13, 2010

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
 

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2005 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 26159, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of the City of Manila, Branch 38 dated August 28, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 95-
144230 that found petitioner Dante Hernandez Datu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness penalized under Section 5, Article III
of Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
 
The full text of the Information filed against petitioner reads as follows:
 
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor upon sworn complaint of Rolando Registrado, complainant herein, in
representation of his daughter, Jerica Registrado, whose statement is hereto attached as Annex A, accuses DANTE DATU
Y HERNANDEZ of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness punishable under RA 7610 otherwise known as the Special
Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed as follows:
 
That on or about February 24, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon JERICA REGISTRADO, 5 years of
[3]
age, by then and there inserting his finger in the latters genitals, against her will and consent.
 
 
 Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty; thus, trial ensued.
 
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
 
The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of February 24, 1995, at about 7:00 a.m., Jerica,
aged 5, was playing with her friends Khamil and Neeca near the house of their neighbor Boyet Rama (or Boyet) situated
at the corner of a street in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila; that suddenly, [petitioner] grabbed Jerica and inserted his middle finger
in her vagina, after which, he warned her not to tell it to anyone; that immediately, Jerica ran to her house; that while her
mother was giving Jerica a bath, she found bloodstain in her (Jerica) panty and blood in her vagina; that upon being
informed of her mothers discovery, Rolando, Jericas father, looked at her vagina and found it swollen; and that asked by
her father who did it, Jerica disclosed that it was appellant.
 
On the same date, February 24, 1995, Jerica was brought to the NBI where she was examined by Dr. Villena,
whose findings are as follows:
 
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
 
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, coaptated (sic). Fourchette, tense. Vestibular
mucosa, congested. Contusion, purplish, peri-urethral area. Hymen, thin, short, intact. Hymenal
orifice measures 0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and rugosities, cannot be reached by the
examining finger.
 
CONCLUSION:
 
Physical Virginity Preserved.
 
Professing innocence, appellant claimed that commission of the alleged sexual molestation is highly
improbable as it supposedly took place in a busy street; that the charge was concocted upon inducement of David Escalo
(or Escalo), a friend of Jericas parents, as admitted by Escalo to Zaragosa during one of their drinking sprees; and that a
case for oral defamation was filed by him against Jericas parents for their false accusation.[4]
 
 

In the end, the trial court convicted petitioner of the crime charged in a
Decision dated August 28, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610 and sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal together with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify private complainant
in the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of moral damages and to pay the costs.[5]
 
 

Taking issue with the said judgment, petitioner appealed the same to the Court of
Appeals but the appellate court merely affirmed the assailed lower court ruling in
a Decision dated March 31, 2005.
 
Undaunted, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court [6] assailing the aforesaid Court of
Appeals Decision. This Court gave due course to the petition and required both
parties to submit their respective Memoranda. However, in petitioners
Memorandum, his counsel indicated that petitioner died on August 3, 2006. [7] As
proof of petitioners death, a certified photocopy of his Death Certificate with
Registry No. 2006-859[8] was attached as Annex 1 of the said pleading.
 
In light of this supervening event which occurred while petitioners appeal of the
judgment of his conviction was pending resolution before this Court, we are
constrained by both law and jurisprudence to dismiss the present case for the
appeal has been rendered moot.
 
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code instructs us that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the offender, to wit:
 
1.      By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
 
 

In the seminal case of People v. Bayotas,[9] we formulated the following

principles which guide this Court as regards to the application of the foregoing
penal provision, to wit:
1.                  Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
 
2.                  Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
 
a)                  Law
 
b)                  Contracts
 
c)                  Quasi-contracts
 
xxxx
 
d)                 Quasi-delicts
 
3.                  Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
 
4.                  Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.[10]
 
 

It is therefore evident from the foregoing discussion that venturing into the
merits of petitioners appeal given the circumstance of his untimely demise has
become superfluous because, even assuming this Court would proceed to affirm
the lower courts judgment of conviction, such a ruling would be of no force and
effect as the resultant criminal liability is totally extinguished by his
death. Consequently, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex
delicto, is likewise extinguished by his death.Since his appeal was still pending
before this Court, there was no final judgment of conviction upon which an award
of civil indemnity could be based.
Accordingly, this Court holds that the death of petitioner extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., acts of
lasciviousness.Thus, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated March 31, 2005,
affirming petitioners conviction by the trial court, had become ineffectual. [11] As a
result thereof, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of petitioner Dante Hernandez Datu, the
Decision dated March 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26159
is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 95-144230 before the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Manila is DISMISSED.
  
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

 
  
 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice
Associate Justice
   

   
   

   

   

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 
*
 Per Special Order No. 917 dated November 24, 2010.
[1]
 Rollo, pp. 63-71; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner and
Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court), concurring.
[2]
 Id. at 58-61; penned by then Presiding Judge and now Court of Appeals Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-
Padilla.
[3]
 CA rollo, p. 5.
[4]
 Rollo, pp. 64-65.
[5]
 Id. at 60.
[6]
 Id. at 14-57.
[7]
 Id. at 162.
[8]
 Id. at 215.
[9]
 G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239.
[10]
 Id. at 255-256.
[11]
 De Guzman v. People, 459 Phil. 576, 580 (2003).
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1301. December 18, 2001]

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN AND RAINIER PUNZALAN, complainants,

vs. JUDGE RUBEN R. PLATA, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Respondent Judge Ruben Plata is a judge and a father. As a judge, he is hidebound to the
judicial canon that he should "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities."  As a father, he has a moral duty to care for and protect his family. In his effort to
[1]

defend his family at the expense of propriety, he sullied his judicial robe and must therefore pay
the price.
On February 18, 1998, Precioso R. Perlas and Ma. Teresa C. Manansala, on behalf of
complainants Rosalinda B. Punzalan and Rainier B. Punzalan, filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) a Sworn Complaint against respondent judge for grave misconduct, lack of
moral character and oppressive conduct unbecoming a judge.
The following facts gave rise to this complaint.
On August 15, 1997, an information for attempted homicide allegedly committed against
Rainier Punzalan on August 13, 1997, was filed against Michael Plata. It was filed, on complaint
of the victim, in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 66879. The accused therein, twenty-year old Michael Plata, is the son of
respondent Judge Plata. Michael Plata appealed to the Chief State Prosecutor the resolution in
I.S. No. 97-10732 upon which the information in Criminal Case No. 66879 was based. On June
18, 1998, the Chief State Prosecutor set aside the said resolution upon finding that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were conflicting, and more importantly, that Dencio
dela Pea voluntarily, spontaneously, and knowingly admitted that it was he who accidentally shot
Rainier Punzalan on August 13, 1997. The Chief State Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong to cause the withdrawal of the information for attempted homicide against Michael
Plata.  Rainier Punzalan moved for reconsideration of the Chief State Prosecutor's June 18, 1998
[2]

resolution, but this was denied by former Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas on February 8, 1999. [3]

After the information against Michael Plata was filed and while it was not yet withdrawn,
numerous cases were filed by respondent's wife Rosario, his son Michael and his driver Robert
Cagara, the Platas' house boarder Dencio dela Pea and Rolando Curampes, against herein
complainant Rosalinda, her sons Rainier and Randall, and the latter's friends who were
eyewitnesses to the shooting incident. The Platas and the Punzalans were neighbors in Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong City. Complainants allege that, by taking advantage of his legal expertise
and experience as a former prosecutor of Pasay City and of his judicial connections and
influence, respondent judge orchestrated the filing of the following groundless cases to harass
and retaliate to the Punzalans and their eyewitnesses:

1. I.S. No. 97-11487 for grave oral defamation allegedly committed on August 13,
1997, filed by Michael Plata against Rosalinda Punzalan;

2. I.S. No. 97-11528 for attempted murder allegedly committed on August 13, 1997,
filed by Dencio dela Pea against Rainier Punzalan and six eyewitnesses;

3. I.S. No. 97-11485 for slight physical injuries allegedly committed on August 30,
1997, filed by Robert Cagara against Randall Punzalan and three eyewitnesses;

4. I.S. No. 97-11786 for grave oral defamation allegedly committed on October 16,
1997, filed by Michael Plata against Rosalinda Punzalan;

5. I.S. No. 97-11522 for grave oral defamation allegedly committed on October 16,
1997, filed by Dencio dela Pea against Rosalinda Punzalan;

6. I.S. No. 97-44856 for grave oral defamation allegedly committed on October 16,
1997, filed by Robert Cagara against Rosalinda Punzalan;

7. I.S. No. 97-11764 for grave oral defamation allegedly committed on October 21,
1997, filed by Rolando Curampes and Robert Cagara against Randall Punzalan and
ten eyewitnesses;

8. I.S. No. 97-11766 for robbery allegedly committed on October 25, 1997, filed by
Judge Ruben R. Plata and Michael Plata against Randall Punzalan and eleven
eyewitnesses;

9. I.S. No. 97-11765 for malicious mischief allegedly committed on October 25, 1997,
filed by Michael Plata against Randall Punzalan and eleven eyewitnesses;

10. I.S. No. 97-11492 for grave threats allegedly committed on October 30, 1997,
filed by Michael Plata against Rosalinda Punzalan.

Other cases were filed without preliminary investigation conducted by the Mandaluyong
City prosecutors who, complainants allege, are "obviously friendly" to respondent judge, viz:

1. I.S. No. 97-11648 or Criminal Case No. 68742 for grave threats allegedly
committed on October 21, 1997, filed by Rolando Curampes and Robert Cagara
against Randall Punzalan, Rainier Punzalan, et al;
2. I.S. No. 97-11427 or Criminal Case No. 68848 for malicious mischief committed
on August 13, 1997, filed by Rosario J. Plata against Randall Punzalan, et al.;

3. I.S. No. 97-11427 or Criminal Case No. 68849 for malicious mischief committed
on August 30 and 31, 1997, filed by Rosario J. Plata against Rainier Punzalan, et al.

For maliciously causing the filing of these allegedly unfounded cases, complainants seek the
dismissal of respondent judge on the following grounds, viz:

"(a) GROSS MISCONDUCT

x x x x x x x x x

A GOOD JUDGE invites the "peaceful settlement of disputes in the community". A

BAD JUDGE on the other hand,
encourages STRIFE, DISSENSION and DISCONTENTMENT in the community.

The deliberate filing of the above false and concocted thirteen (13) countercharges in
such a flagrant and shameless manner clearly demonstrates a serious flaw in the
character of the respondent to be an exemplary and respectable Member of the
Bench.

(b) LACK OF MORAL CHARACTER

x x x x x x x x x

A person (referring to Judge Plata) who bears a perverted notion of right and
wrong is unfit and unsafe to sit in judgment of the citizens who seek his office. He
is bound to misapply the law and thereby cause the loss of confidence in the
judiciary. It would be dangerous to allow him to occupy such a position with its
powers and prerogatives.

A judge who has a predisposition to do wrong is bound to commit frequent

infractions of the law; he would set a bad example. (Legal and Judicial Ethics,
Martin)

(c) OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE

x x x x x x x x x

Had Judge Plata been an ordinary law practitioner, his desperate attempt to defend his
son by unethically resorting to the Macheviallian (sic) strategy of "OFFENSE IS THE
BEST DEFENSE" would be understandable. But being an incumbent and presiding
Judge of a Court of the Republic who among others, had sworn as follows-

'xxx; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or
give aid nor consent to the same; xxx.'

his oppressive conduct is simply UNACCEPTABLE not only to the legal profession
as a whole but more particularly to the other respectable members of the Judiciary.

Undeniably - this oath is so sacred. And it should be - specially for an individual like

respondent Judge PLATA who now sits in a responsible and respectable judicial
position in Isabela City, a major commercial city in North Luzon. He is obliged under
the CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS not only to act impartially but also to
BEHAVE with dignity and above reproach." [4]

On March 2, 1998, Precioso Perlas filed a Supplemental Administrative Complaint

informing the OCA that the daughter of respondent judge, Kathy Rose J. Plata, filed a 14th case,
Criminal Case No. MC 98-319, entitled "People v. Avelino 'Bobby' Serrano" for attempted
murder against one of complainants' eyewitnesses. Complainants allege that the case was filed
upon the instigation of respondent judge.
In his Comment dated April 3, 1998, respondent judge denied the charges against him and
narrated his version of what happened after the stabbing of complainant Rainier Punzalan, viz:

"As a father, after I learned of the foregoing incident (referring to the stabbing and the
implication of his son), I immediately discussed the matter with my son who
vehemently denied his involvement and professed to me that he merely became
involved in the incident in his efforts to pacify a group of youngsters who were
engaged in a rumble. While it is not for me to pass judgment on my son's guilt or
innocence, it is evidently my moral obligation to make arrangements for the
engagement of adequate and competent legal representation for my son to ensure that
his rights will be protected and that the truth will be determined in accordance with
due process of law. However, I have repeatedly advised my son as well (sic) my
family to abide by the final resolution of said criminal case and to be ready to face
whatever its consequences may be.

Further, in the interest of restoring peace and tranquility in the community where my
children reside, far from my station in Santiago City, Isabela, I exerted earnest efforts
to resolve any misunderstanding that may have arisen from the foregoing
incident. However, my efforts proved futile as my family even became the subject of
subsequent repeated acts of harassment and intimidation. Thus, faced with the
foregoing predicament, I also advised my family to always seek the assistance of the
authorities for their protection. I also advised my family to resort only to peaceful and
legal means to protect themselves and to seek redress for whatever grievance they
may have within the confines of our judicial processes.

As a member of the bench, I recognized the implications of the foregoing incidents to

the office that I hold. I realize the need to act with circumspection and to purposely
avoid any untoward suspicion as what the complainants now have raised. Since the
inception of the criminal indictment of my son, I have consciously distanced myself
from the mire of the ensuing proceedings relating to said criminal case. I also left all
legal matters involving my son and my family entirely in the able hands of their
lawyers. I have not participated and I never intend to take part, much more to unduly
influence or intervene, in any proceedings involving my son and my family as I have
full faith in the integrity of our criminal justice system and the men and women tasked
to dispense justice under it. All these I have done in a conscious effort to avoid any
misimpression that I am exerting undue influence over the outcome of the proceedings
involving my son and my family. Thus, it now pains me to be subjected to the unfair
and malicious allegations leveled against me by the complainants." [5]

Respondent judge denies having exerted influence over the Mandaluyong City prosecutors
who filed the set of cases without preliminary investigations as he claims that he does not even
know them. He stressed that he had no participation in the filing of all the cases cited by
complainants, except for I.S. No. 97-11766, the robbery charge filed by his son where he (Judge
Plata) had to file a Supplemental Affidavit as he was the registered owner of the vehicle subject
of the robbery.
[6]

On February 24, 1999, the Second Division of the Court resolved to refer the instant case to
Executive Judge Fe Albano Madrid, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela for
investigation, report and recommendation.  In compliance thereto, Judge Madrid submitted a
[7]

one-page report dated July 19, 1999 without making findings of fact and conclusions of law nor
making a recommendation therein, viz:

"In compliance with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court, Second
Division dated January 24, 1999 which was received on April 12, 1999, the
undersigned Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City called the parties to
appear for hearing, after receiving the records of the case on May 11, 1999.

The complainants did not appear in the scheduled hearing on June 4, 5, 25 and 26,
1999.

On June 25, 1999, the complainants filed an urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing thus the
hearing was re-scheduled on July 16, and July 17, 1999.
On July 16, 1999, the complainant together with their counsel Atty. Ma. Theresa
Manansala manifested jointly with respondent's counsel Atty. Wilfredo Ambrocio,
that the parties have settled and that they will move to dismiss the case.

Apparently the respondent offered to settle which the complainants accepted and so
they choose to have their complaint dismissed.

Respectfully submitted." [8]

The report did not include a copy of the compromise agreement between the complainants
and respondent judge.
On September 6, 1999, the OCA received a copy of an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Revive"
dated August 16, 1999 filed by the complainants before the investigating judge seeking to revive
the investigation on the respondent judge as he did not comply with his undertakings in the
compromise agreement dated July 16, 1999. The agreement stipulated that in the spirit of
neighborliness, herein complainants and respondent judge agreed to amicably settle their
differences with the respondent judge undertaking to pay the complainants P180,000.00 in four
equal monthly installments payable on July 31, 1999, August 31, 1999, September 30, 1999, and
October 31, 1999, and to withdraw or cause the withdrawal of the cases he, his wife, and his son
Michael Plata filed against the complainants, Randall Punzalan, and their eyewitnesses. For their
part, the complainants undertook to cause the withdrawal of the instant administrative case and
the attempted homicide case against Michael Plata. [9]

Respondent judge admitted that he was not able to pay the first installment on July 31, 1999,
but explained that when he entered into the compromise agreement, he thought that he could
seek financial assistance from a friend who promised to lend him money because her daughter
received inheritance; he also planned to sell or mortgage a piece of land he owned in
Muntinlupa. It turned out, however, that by the time the first installment fell due, his financial
condition could not permit him to pay the amount due the complainants. Thus, on August 4,
1999, complainants' lawyer sent him a letter demanding payment of the first installment by
August 6, 1999. The letter was sent to respondent judge's residence in Mandaluyong even though
he was then stationed in Santiago City, Isabela. While his family was trying to raise the amount
to cover the first installment, the complainants filed the "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Revive"
dated August 16, 1999. Respondent also pointed out that complainants themselves had failed to
comply with the terms of the compromise agreement as they had not caused the provisional
dismissal or withdrawal of the instant case.  Under these circumstances, respondent judge no
[10]

longer wished to abide by the compromise agreement and instead proceeded to present evidence
to exculpate himself from the administrative charges leveled against him.
The Court issued a resolution on December 15, 1999, returning the instant case to Executive
Judge Madrid for a more thorough fact-finding investigation. Judge Madrid conducted the
investigation and submitted a report dated April 6, 2000 wherein she recommended that
respondent judge be "admonished to be more upright in his dealings with others." [11]

On July 3, 2000, the Court noted the report of Judge Madrid  and referred the instant case
[12]

to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. In its Memorandum dated August 7,
2000,  the OCA adopted the findings of the investigating judge that, while the complainants in
[13]
the above-mentioned fourteen cases were family members and companions of the respondent
judge, this circumstance does not of itself render the respondent judge administratively liable for
aiding in the filing of allegedly groundless cases. There is no evidence to prove the participation
of respondent judge in the filing of these cases nor is there evidence to show that he exerted
influence over the Office of the Prosecutor in Mandaluyong to get favorable actions and
recommendations. The OCA observed that it was Atty. Rodel A. Cruz, lawyer of respondent
judge's family, who prepared and signed the pleadings and other documents relative to the said
fourteen cases. The OCA also noted that 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Susante J. Tobias'
dismissal of eleven out of the thirteen cases for lack of sufficient basis in fact and in law as stated
in her July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution  shows that respondent judge did not exert influence over
[14]

the prosecutor for her to act in his favor. On appeal to the DOJ, then Justice Secretary Artemio
Tuquero, in his March 23, 2000 resolution, modified this Joint Resolution and directed the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City to file informations for slight oral defamation, light threats,
attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft.  On motion for reconsideration, Secretary
[15]

Tuquero reversed his March 23, 2000 resolution and in his June 6, 2000 resolution, directed the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City to withdraw the above informations.  In a motion for
[16]

reconsideration dated July 3, 2000, Michael Plata sought reconsideration of the June 6, 2000
resolution with respect to the cases for grave oral defamation and theft and malicious mischief
where respondent Judge submitted a Supplemental Affidavit as registered owner of the vehicle
subject of the theft.
The OCA found nothing illegal nor improper with respondent judge's tolerance of his
family's filing of numerous criminal cases as every person, including his family members, has a
right to seek judicial recourse for his grievance. Respondent judge even admitted that he advised
his family not to take the law into their own hands and "to seek redress for whatever grievance
they may have within the confines of our judicial processes." [17]

Congruent with the finding of the the investigating judge, the OCA found that the failure of
respondent judge to comply with the July 16, 1999 compromise agreement was tainted with bad
faith. The OCA noted, viz:

"Respondent bound himself to pay the sum of P180,000.00 payable in four (4)
monthly installments in consideration for the withdrawal of the criminal case for
attempted homicide and herein administrative case but he reneged on said
promise. Adding insult to injury, respondent merely rationalized that he was
financially hard-up and claimed that herein complainant was only after monetary
compensation and not really (sic) to exact judicial relief. Respondent judge's
explanation of financial difficulties cannot be countenanced. Compromise agreement
entails reciprocal concessions, non-compliance of (sic) which raises doubt as to
respondent's sincerity and honest desire to avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced." [18]

The OCA recommended that the instant case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter
and that the respondent judge be ordered to pay Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.  On [19]

August 30, 2000, the Court resolved to docket the instant case as a regular administrative matter.
 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.04 of the Code
provide, viz:

"Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

x x x x x x x x x

Rule 2.04 - A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."

The personal behavior of the judge, not only while in the performance of his duties but also
outside the court, must be beyond reproach for he is the visible representation of the law and of
justice. Thus, the above canon enjoins judges to avoid not only impropriety, but even the
[20]

appearance of impropriety in all their conduct, whether in their public or private life.  The [21]

proscription includes a judge's meddling with judicial processes in courts other than his own and
acting in a manner that would arouse suspicion that he is meddling with such court processes.
The records show that the complainants failed to adduce evidence that respondent judge
participated in the filing of the fourteen allegedly retaliatory and harassment suits against the
complainants and their eyewitnesses, except in the case for robbery/theft filed by his son Michael
where respondent judge filed a Supplemental Affidavit as registered owner of the vehicle subject
of the case. Even assuming that contrary to his testimony, respondent judge was in fact aware
that his family and companions would file the subject fourteen cases, such awareness does not
necessarily amount to wittingly or willingly promoting or giving aid or consenting to the filing of
groundless, false or unlawful suits.
There is also a dearth of evidence with respect to complainants' allegation that respondent
judge took advantage of his legal expertise and experience as a former prosecutor and exerted
influence upon the Mandaluyong City prosecutors to secure favorable actions and
recommendations. In fact, as pointed out by the OCA, eleven of the alleged harassment suits
were dismissed by 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Susante J. Tobias in her July 28, 1998 Joint
Resolution for lack of sufficient basis in fact and in law.
[22]

We, however, find improper respondent judge's execution of the July 16, 1999 compromise
agreeement. Worthy of notice is the subject matter of the compromise agreement, which, among
others, is the dismissal of the instant administrative case in consideration of P180,000.00 and the
withdrawal of the cases filed against the complainants and their eyewitnesses. It cannot be
gainsaid that public office is a public trust and this truism is no more applicable than to the office
of a judge  for he is a visible representation of law and justice. The dignity of a public office
[23]

cannot be bought nor compromised. Thus, in Bais v. Tugaoen,  the Court frowned upon the
[24]

complainant's affidavit of desistance and in spite of it, proceeded with the complaint against the
erring judge.
Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court pertaining to the disbarment and discipline of
lawyers provides, viz:
"No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same."

In Bolivar v. Simbol,  the Court, citing In re Davies,  ruled that the discipline of lawyers
[25] [26]

cannot be cut short by a compromise or withdrawal of charges, viz:

"It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this settlement operated as an
absolution and remission of his offense. This view of the case ignores the fact that the
exercise of the power is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between
parties, but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy
practices in his profession. He had acted in clear disregard of his duty as an attorney at
the bar, and without 'good fidelity' to his client. The public had rights which Mrs.
Curtis could not thus settle or destroy. The unworthy act had been fully consummated.
xxx" [27]

Lawyers are officers of the court tasked with aiding the court in its dispensation of justice. There
are weightier reasons why investigations and complaints against judges should not be settled or
compromised for judges not only aid in the dispensation of justice but dispense justice
themselves. Respondent judge's execution of a compromise agreement to have the instant
administrative case dismissed is glaringly improper and should not be countenanced.
As though respondent judge's execution of the compromise agreement was not sufficient
impropriety to merit reproof, he even failed in bad faith to comply with his undertakings in the
agreement. He rationalized that he was not able to pay the first installment when it fell due
because his plan to secure financial assistance from a friend and to sell or mortgage his lot in
Muntinlupa did not materialize.Without these other financial resources, his salary as a judge,
according to him, was not sufficient to cover the installment amount. There is a dearth of
evidence, however, to prove his efforts to secure financial assistance from his friend and to sell
or mortgage his lot in Muntinlupa. Respondent judge also miserably failed to remedy the
situation and show good faith in trying to comply with the terms of the compromise
agreement. He could have requested from the complainants a few days extension for payment of
the first installment or he could have partially paid the first installment as his means would
permit him, but these he did not do. These omissions of respondent judge, coupled with the
absence of evidence on his efforts to raise the first installment amount, lead us to conclude that
respondent judge was even in bad faith in not complying with the provisions of the compromise
agreement.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ruben R. Plata is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1]
 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[2]
 Rollo, pp. 437-443.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 444.
[4]
 Rollo, pp. 5-6; Administrative Complaint against Honorable Ruben R. Plata, pp. 6-8.
 Rollo, pp. 73-74; Judge Plata's response dated April 3, 1998 to the letter-complaint dated February 18, 1998 of Ms.
[5]

Rosalinda B. Punzalan and Mr. Rainier B. Punzalan.

[6]
 Rollo, p. 74.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 102.
[8]
 Rollo, p. 121.
[9]
 Rollo, pp. 434-444.
 TSN, Ruben Plata, February 12, 2000, pp. 19-21; Rollo, pp. 271-273; Memorandum for Respondent, pp. 12-
[10]

13; Rollo, pp. 513-514.

[11]
 Rollo, p. 607.
[12]
 Rollo, pp. 601-607.
[13]
 Rollo, pp. 645-650.
[14]
 Rollo, pp. 419-426.
[15]
 Rollo, pp. 584-593.
[16]
 Rollo, pp. 719-723.
[17]
 Rollo, p. 73.
[18]
 Rollo, p. 649.
[19]
 Rollo, p. 650.
[20]
 Alday, et al. v. Cruz, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-725-RTJ), March 14, 2001.
[21]
 Mamba, et al. v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001.
[22]
 Rollo, pp. 419-426.
[23]
 Conde v. Superable, 29 SCRA 727 (1969).
[24]
 89 SCRA 109 (1979).
[25]
 16 SCRA 623 (1966).
[26]
 39 American Reports, 729.
[27]
 Id., p. 731.
  
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
 
THIRD DIVISION
 
 
SYLVIA SANTOS,   A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093
Complainant,   (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2312-RTJ)
     
    Present:
     
    YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -   Chairperson,
    AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
    CHICO-NAZARIO,
    NACHURA, and
    PERALTA, JJ.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-    
CHUA, Regional Trial Court,   Promulgated:
Branch 144, Makati City,    
Respondent.   February 13, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------x
 
RESOLUTION
 
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
 
Before the Court is the Complaint of Sylvia Santos (complainant) dated July 14, 2005,
against Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua (respondent), of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 144, MakatiCity for serious misconduct and dishonesty.[1]
 
Complainant, an aunt of respondent's husband, alleges: In the first week of September
2002, she asked respondent's help, who was then the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 63 of Makati City, regarding the cases[2] of complainant's
friend, Emerita Muoz, pending before the Supreme Court. Respondent, a former employee
of the Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the
Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for
the speedy resolution of said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave
respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter's chamber. When complainant
followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as
the other party was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to
return the P100,000.00; however respondent could no longer be contacted.[3]
 
In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denies the charges against her and
avers: In the months adverted to by complainant, she (respondent) was facing protests,
damaging newspaper reports and administrative cases which caused her hypertension;
thus, she could not have agreed to the supposed transaction of complainant. When she
became a judge, complainant asked a lot of favors from her, and knowing that she worked
as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a certain Mario
Tolosa of the Third Division, to whom complainant gave P50,000.00 for a favorable
resolution of Muoz's cases. Respondent declined; thereafter complainant started spreading
malicious imputations against her. On April 23, 2005, complainant begged respondent to
talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover the money she gave Tolosa. Respondent
again refused; complainant then repeatedly tried to talk to her until April 25, 2005 when
complainant threatened to file a case against respondent with the Supreme
Court. Complainant sent two demand letters addressed to respondent's court asking for the
return of the P100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which letters were read by
respondent's Clerk of Court. Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside
respondent's house, that she (respondent) was corrupt, as she asked for money in order to
settle cases in court. Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against
Honor and Unjust Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case
against her.[4]
Complainant and respondent filed several pleadings reiterating their respective claims.[5]
 
The Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred the instant case to Associate Justice
Marina L. Buzon of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.[6]
 

A preliminary conference was set for September 4, 2007.[7] On said date, complainant

manifested her desire to move for the dismissal of her complaint against respondent.[8] In a
Verified Manifestation dated September 6, 2007, complainant stated that in the latter part
of August 2007, she and respondent had a long and serious discussion about the dispute
and bad feelings between them; that after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on
complainant that her accusation against respondent was brought about by
misunderstanding, confusion and misapprehension of facts concerning the incident subject
of the present administrative case; that for the sake of unity and harmonious relations in
their family, the complainant and respondent had reconciled and restored friendly relations
with each other; and that in view of the foregoing, complainant was no longer interested in
pursuing her administrative case against respondent.[9]
 
In her Report dated October 5, 2007, Justice Buzon recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case in view of paucity of evidence upon which a conclusion could be
drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by Santos of her complaint and her failure and
refusal to prove the allegations in her complaint.[10]
 
The Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, issued its Resolution
dated December 5, 2007 dismissing the complaint against respondent for lack of
evidence. The Court in the same Resolution also ordered complainant to show cause why
she should not be held in contempt of court for filing an unfounded verified complaint
dated July 14, 2005 against respondent.[11]
 
Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6, 2008 stating that:
 
xxxx
 
2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable Court, her administrative complaint
against Judge Evelyn Argaya [sic] Chua is not unfounded;
 
 3. All the allegations therein are true and based on respondent's personal knowledge;
 
4. The main reason why respondent did not anymore pursue her complaint was because of
the pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of unity and harmony in the
family, given the fact that Judge Chua's husband is her nephew;
 
5. On several occasions in August 2007, Judge Chua, her husband and their children came to
respondent's house and pleaded for forgiveness. Later, respondent's sister, husband and
children, as well as her close friends persuaded her to forgive Judge Chua and let bygones
be bygones, for the sake of peace and unity in the family;
 
6. It is solely due to the foregoing events as well as for humane reasons that respondent gave
up her complaint against Judge Chua.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
In its Resolution dated March 3, 2008, the Court found that complainant's compliance was
not satisfactory, and that she was trifling with court processes. The Court then resolved to:
reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed
on her in the event of a repetition of the same offense; recall the Resolution of the Court
dated December 5, 2007; reopen the administrative case against respondent; direct Justice
Rebecca D. Salvador[13] to conduct an investigation and submit her report and
recommendation; and directed complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice
Salvador under pain of contempt of court.[14]
 
Justice Salvador issued an order setting the preliminary conference on April 9 and 10,
2008, and respondent filed a motion to defer the proceedings pending her motion for
reconsideration of the Court's March 3, 2008 Resolution.[15] In a Resolution dated April 10,
2008, Justice Salvador denied the motion to defer proceedings.[16] A preliminary
conference was conducted on September 3, 2008 where both parties presented their
respective exhibits; and a clarificatory hearing on September 17, 2008 attended by
complainant, her counsel and respondent.[17]
 
In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient
grounds to hold respondent liable for the offenses charged and recommended that
respondent be administratively penalized for the grave misconduct and dishonesty charged
by complainant.[18]
 
Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to present substantial evidence in
support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she asked for
and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a favorable decision on
Muoz's cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her office in
September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such meeting; that is, complainant
was there to console her for the protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims
to have incurred complainant's ire for declining complainant's request for favors in June
2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk to
Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not heard of Tolosa
before; however it was respondent's comment[19] and her husband's affidavit[20] which
stated that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on absence
without leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to
know who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to believe that respondent knew and
associated with Muoz prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua
(Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muoz was introduced to them by complainant
in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed,
however, that the topic of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a
complaint for grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June
20, 2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied,
however, that respondent at the time had already been served complainant's demand letters
dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a
lawyer, to reply to complainant's first demand letter, was unusual; considering
complainant's advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim -- that complainant's motive
for filing the administrative case was respondents refusal to give in to complainant's
request to intercede in the cases of the latters friend -- was too paltry an explanation for
complainant's willingness to expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by
the administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her; complainant's
compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why she should
not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint against respondent, stated that
the allegations in her complaint were true and based on personal knowledge, and it was
only because of respondent and their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she
gave up her complaint against respondent.
 
Justice Salvador particularly observed the demeanor of complainant at
the September 3, 2008 hearing. According to her, complainant, while weary of the
demands entailed by the administrative case, staunchly stood pat over the veracity of her
complaint and the reasons why she decided to withdraw the same; respondent also had no
reason to ask forgiveness from complainant, if indeed complainant falsely instituted the
administrative case against her.[21]
Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainant's testimony that the return of the money
by respondent, in addition to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the complaint.[22]
 
Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008 claiming that there were significant
omissions of testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) particularly on
the statementIbinalik naman ho nila ang pera; such question was also beyond the scope of
clarificatory questions that may be propounded, as nowhere in the previous testimonies of
complainant, either in the direct or the cross-examination, did she mention the return of the
money, and it was only during the clarificatory hearing that it surfaced; thus, she
(respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant. Respondent prayed
that corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant -- that the
money was returned to me and ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera -- be stricken off; and in
case the correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her manifestation that the said
testimony of complainant was given only during the clarificatory hearing and, in effect,
without an opportunity for her to cross-examine the complainant.
 
In the Court's Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court denied respondent's prayer
that the proposed corrections on the TSN be made, and that the subject testimonies of
complainant be stricken off. The Court, however, granted her prayer and noted her
manifestation that the subject testimony was given only during the clarificatory hearing and
in effect without granting her an opportunity to cross-examine complainant about the same.
 
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador.
 
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish
malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[23]
 
In this case, Justice Salvador found that substantial evidence existed to support the
allegations against respondent.
 
Try as she might to show the implausibility of complainant's claims, respondent could not
deny that she and complainant met at her office sometime in September 2002; that she and
her husband knew Muoz and associated with her on several occasions, and that it was she
(respondent), being a former employee of the Supreme Court, who stood to know who
Tolosa was.
 
But most telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondent's guilt is the unwavering
stance of complainant that respondent did solicit and receive P100,000.00 from her in
order to facilitate a favorable ruling in Muoz's cases.
 
As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly asked during the
hearing, was consistent in her testimony:
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
x x x At the start of this afternoon's proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the matters stated
in your verified complaint?
 
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?
 
MS. SANTOS:
My complaint is true. That is all true.[24]
 
xxxx
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Ano ang totoo?
  
MS. SANTOS:
Ang sabi ko sa kanya, Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng kaso
niya. Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi. Ang sabi niya, Sige Tita,
tutulungan ko.
 
Evelyn, sasabihin ko ang totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Just tell us what happened.
 
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi niya, Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa loob ng
tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo ang P50,000.00. Which is true
ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya. Dumating ang
panahon. It took already years walang nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang
ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi ko, Evelyn, kahit konti
magbigay ka sa akin para maibigay ko kay Emerita. Unang-una iyang Emerita
may utang sa akin ng P20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng
alahas. Bumili sya.
 
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to continue with
her testimony because she is already through with her direct examination.
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the record.[25]
 
Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her true reasons for
withdrawing her complaint. As borne out by the records and correctly pointed out by
Justice Salvador in her Report:
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.
 
Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September 7, 2007, and
which had been marked as Exhibits 1, 1-A, 1-B and submarkings for respondent.
You stated in the verified complaint that the accusation against respondent was
brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and
confusion. Please clarify what do you mean by the accusation against respondent
was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts
and confusion?
 
MS. SANTOS:
 Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na kami't nagkabatian. Sa
totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi nagkibuan. Ngayon, dahil nakiusap
nga po sila sa akin, kaya ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila dahil pamilya ko
ho sila, ang asawa niya. Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan, baka, ewan
ko, baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan.
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you misunderstood or
misapprehended?
 
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa pakiusap po nila na
magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho,
tama na. Iyan po ang buong katotohanan, Justice.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
 
The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are generally given
by this Court great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment
of the witnesses as they testified.[27] As Justice Salvador's observations and findings are
well supported by the records, the Court finds no reason to depart from such rule.
 
Indeed, complainant's claim that respondent returned the money to her was given during a
clarificatory hearing. And respondent's belated objections to said testimony, through a
motion submitted to the Court a month later, were accordingly noted. But respondent
could not deny that she was present during the clarificatory hearing and could have very
well objected to and refuted complainant's declaration on the matter. Respondent,
however, did not make any objection at the time, which failure is truly damaging.
 
As well explained by Justice Salvador:
 
Unrefuted by respondent, it would appear from the foregoing declarations that the return of
the money complainant claims to have given the former was, in addition to the familial
interests cited therefor, part of the reason the latter withdrew her complaint and acceded to the
amicable settlement of the case. If it is true that she received no money in consideration of the
favorable and expeditious resolution of G.R. Nos. 142676 and 146718, it necessarily and
logically follows that respondent would not have returned as in fact she would not have
anything to return said money to complainant. More so, when it is borne in mind that, as per
respondent's September 20, 2005 manifestation, the aforesaid cases had reportedly been
decided in favor of Emerita Muoz. Finding no refutation of the assertion regarding
respondent's return of the money and no reason to doubt the veracity thereof and/or the
credibility of complainant insofar as said material fact is concerned, the undersigned is
 constrained to affirm the existence of a reasonable ground to believe that the former is
responsible for the conduct complained of. If a criminal conviction for which the quantum of
proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, may be made to rest on the testimony of a single
credible witness, it stands to reason that an administrative complaint, for which only
substantial evidence is required can be sustained on the strength thereof.[28]
 
Clearly, substantial evidence exists in this case to hold respondent liable for gross
misconduct.
 
As defined, misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior; while gross, has been defined as out of all measure; beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.[29]
 
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140,[30] a judge found guilty of gross misconduct may be
punished with any of the following sanctions: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of
all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00.
 
This is respondent's first administrative offense.[31] In view of such circumstance and the
sanctions provided under Rule 140, the Court finds suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for six months to be proper in this case.[32]
 
As a final word, let it be stressed once again that the office of a judge is sacred and imbued
with public interest. The need to maintain the publics confidence in the judiciary cannot be
made to depend solely on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense,
only witnesses therein.[33] Thus, withdrawal of a complaint or desistance from a complaint
will not deprive this Court of its power under the Constitution to ferret out the truth and
discipline its members accordingly.[34]
 
 WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
144, Makati City is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without salary and other
benefits. She is WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar act in the future
shall merit a more severe penalty.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 
[1]
 Rollo, pp. 1-4.
[2]
 G.R. No. 142676 entitled Emerita Muoz v. Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. et al. and G.R. No. 146718 entitled Emerita Muoz v. Sps.
Samuel and Aida Go Chan and Bank of the Philippine Islands.
[3]
 Rollo, pp. 1-3.
[4]
 Id. at 6-15. The estafa case filed by complainant against respondent was dismissed by the City Prosecution Office and the petition
for review thereon denied by the Department of Justice, id. at 123-125, 169-177, 226-227.
[5]
 Rollo, pp. 61-62, 68-70, 75-79, 91-92, 107-109.
[6]
 Id. at 240-241, 255-256. See also id. at 228. Prior to this Resolution, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the
instant case be dismissed for being premature, without prejudice to its being refiled after the criminal complaint shall have
been resolved (id. at 160). The Court in a Resolution on July 5, 2006, resolved to hold in abeyance the proceedings of the
instant case pending the outcome of the estafa case against respondent (id. at 161-162). Complainant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and prayed that the case be referred to a Justice of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation
(id. at 165-167).
[7]
 Id. at 265.
[8]
 Id. at 268.
[9]
 Id. at 270-271.
[10]
 Id. at 303-304.
[11]
 Rollo, p. 292.
[12]
 Id. at 305.
[13]
 In lieu of Justice Buzon, who was to retire on March 18, 2008.
[14]
 Rollo, p. 308.
[15]
 Id. at 310-314.
[16]
 Id. at 339-342.
[17]
 Report dated September 23, 2008, pp. 11-12.
[18]
 Id. at 2, 31.
[19]
 Dated August 19, 2005.
[20]
 Dated August 10, 2005.
[21]
 Report, pp. 12-27.
[22]
 Report, p. 28; TSN September 17, 2008, p. 53.
[23]
 Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005, 469 SCRA 439, 458.
[24]
 TSN, September 3, 2008, pp. 53-54.
[25]
 TSN, September 3, 2008, pp. 75-77.
[26]
 TSN, September 17, 2008, pp. 51-53.
[27]
 Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, supra note 23.
[28]
 Report, pp. 28-29.
[29]
 Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, supra note 23, at 469.
[30]
 As amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC.
[31]
 Per OCA Docket Legal Office.
[32]
 See Dulay v. Lelina, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 269, 276.
[33]
 Carman v. Zerrudo, 466 Phil. 569, 580 (2004).
[34]
 Id.
  
EN BANC
 
 

TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, A.C. No. 7902

Complainant,  

   

  Present:

   

  PUNO, C.J.,

  QUISUMBING,

  YNARES-SANTIAGO,

  CARPIO,

  AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

  CORONA,*
- versus -
  CARPIO MORALES,

  AZCUNA,

  TINGA, 

  CHICO-NAZARIO,

  VELASCO, JR.,

  NACHURA,
  REYES,

  LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

  BRION, JJ.

ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ,  

Respondent. Promulgated:

   

September 30, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the

practice of law for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and 
deceitful conduct. The complainant alleges that despite receipt of legal fees in
compliance with a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of
his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainants
requests for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected
demands for return of the money paid to him.
 
On December 16, 2005, the complainant, Torben B. Overgaard, a Dutch
national, through his business partner John Bradley, entered into a Retainer
Agreement[1] with the respondent, Atty. Godwin R. Valdez. For the amount of
PhP900,000.00, the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to
represent him as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed
against him, all pending in Antipolo City; including a dismissed complaint which
was appealed before the Department of Justice. The Agreement stipulated that
fees would cover acceptance and attorneys fees, expenses of litigation, other
legal incidental expenses, and appearance fees.[2]
 
The cases filed by the complainant included a complaint for Estafa, Grave
Threats, Coercion, Unjust Vexation and Oral Defamation [3] pending before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Antipolo and a civil case for Mandamus, Injunction
with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages [4] which is on trial at
Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. On the other hand, the cases filed
against the complainant included a criminal case for Other Light Threats at Branch
2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,[5] and violation of Section 5(a) of
Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004[6] before the Family Court ofAntipolo City. A complaint for Illegal
Possession of Firearms was also filed against Torben Overgaard which was
dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Antipolo City. This was appealed to the
Department of Justice by way of Petition for Review.[7]
 
Upon the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant paid the
respondent USD16,854.00 through telegraphic bank transfer, [8] as full payment for
the services to be rendered under the Agreement. The respondent then assured
the complainant that he would take good care of the cases he was handling for
the complainant.[9]
 
On April 11, 2006, four months after the execution of the Retainer
Agreement, the complainant, through his business partner John Bradley,
demanded from the respondent a report of the action he had taken with respect
to the cases entrusted to him. However, despite his continued efforts to contact
the respondent to inquire on the status of the cases, he was unable to reach him;
his phone calls were not answered and his electronic mails were ignored. [10]
 
The complainant had no knowledge of the developments of the cases that
the respondent was handling for him. Upon his own inquiry, he was dismayed to
find out that the respondent did not file his entry of appearance in the cases for
Other Light Threats and Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Children Act.[11] The respondent also did not inform him that he was
entitled to prepare a Counter-Affidavit to answer the complaint for Other Light
Threats. The complainant had no knowledge that there had already been
arraignments for the criminal cases against him, and that there were already
warrants of arrest[12] issued for his failure to attend the arraignments. He was
constrained to engage the services of another lawyer in order to file a Motion to
Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Other Light Threats, [13] and an Omnibus
Motion to Revive the Case and Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Violation
of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act. [14]
 
The complainant alleges that the respondent did not do a single thing with
respect to the cases covered under the Retainer Agreement. Not only did the
respondent fail to enter his appearance in the criminal cases filed against the
complainant, he also neglected to file an entry of appearance in the civil case for
Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. The respondent
also did not file a Comment on the complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms
which was dismissed and under review at the Department of Justice.[15]
 
Due to the above lapses of the respondent, on November 27, 2006, the
complainant wrote the respondent and demanded the return of the documents
which were turned over to him, as well as the PhP900,000.00 that was paid in
consideration of the cases he was supposed to handle for the complainant.
[16]
 However, complainant was unable to get any word from the respondent
despite repeated and continuous efforts to get in touch with him.
 
Hence, on December 28, 2006, Torben Overgaard was constrained to file an
administrative complaint against Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, alleging that the respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct.[17] Despite the order to submit an Answer to the
complaint against him,[18] the respondent failed to comply. A Mandatory
Conference was set on September 21, 2007,[19] but the respondent failed to
attend despite being duly notified.[20] This prompted the Commission on Bar
Discipline to issue an Order declaring the respondent in default for failure to
submit an Answer and failure to attend the Mandatory Conference. [21] The
investigation proceeded ex parte.
 
The complainant submitted his position paper on October 5, 2007,[22] with a
prayer that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, and to be
ordered to return the amount of PhP900,000.00. A Clarificatory Hearing was
scheduled on December 11, 2007,[23] and again, it was only the complainant who
was in attendance; the respondent failed to attend the hearing despite notice.
The case was then submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by
the complainant and the hearings conducted.[24]
 
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Antonio
S. Tria, to whom the instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation,
report and recommendation, found the respondent guilty of violating Canon 15,
Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In his Report dated January 29, 2008, he
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-126, dated March 6, 2008, approved the recommendation of
Commissioner Tria, and further ordered the complainant to return the
PhP900,000.00 to the complainant within 60 days from receipt of the notice.
 
We agree. We find the respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have
committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 
The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, viz:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
 
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit;
(2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct;
(4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7)
willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
 
The respondent has indubitably fallen below the exacting standards
demanded of members of the bar. He did not merely neglect his clients cause, he
abandoned his client and left him without any recourse but to hire another
lawyer. He not only failed to properly handle the cases which were entrusted to
his care, he refused to do a single thing in connection with these cases. He did not
file any pleading to defend his client; he did not even enter his appearance in
these cases. Moreover, he disregarded the complainants letters and electronic
mails and rejected the complainants phone calls. All the complainant was asking
for was a report of the status of the cases but the 
respondent could not be reached no matter what the complainant did to get in
touch with him. After receipt of the full amount of fees under the Retainer
Agreement, he simply disappeared, leaving the client defenseless and plainly
prejudiced in the cases against him. Warrants of arrest were even issued against
the complainant due to the respondents gross and inexcusable negligence in
failing to ascertain the status of the case and to inform his client of the
arraignment. It was not a mere failure on the respondents part to inform the
complainant of matters concerning the cases, it was an unmistakable evasion of
duty. To hide from the complainant, avoid his calls, ignore his letters, and leave
him helpless is unforgivable; and to commit all these acts and omissions after
receiving the full amount of legal fees and after assuring the client of his
commitment and responsibility violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary
to justice, modesty or good morals.[25] It is an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or
to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
[26]
 Representing to the complainant that he would take care of the cases filed
against him,[27] assuring the complainant that his property involved in a civil case
would be safeguarded,[28] and then collecting the full amount of legal fees of
PhP900,000.00, only to desert the complainant after receipt of the fees, were
manifestly deceitful and dishonest.
 
The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when
dealing with his client. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. [29] However, instead of
devoting himself to the clients cause, the respondent avoided the complainant,
forgot about the cases he was handling for him and ostensibly abandoned him.
The client reposed his trust in his lawyer with full faith that the lawyer would not
betray him or abscond from his responsibilities. By assuring the complainant that
he would take care of the cases included in the Retainer Agreement, and even
accepting fees, the respondent defrauded the complainant when he did not do a
single thing he was expected to do.
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. [30] A lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.[31] Respondent should indeed be held liable, for
he was not just incompetent, he was practically useless; he was not just negligent,
he was indolent; and rather than being of help to the complainant, he prejudiced
the client. Respondents inaction with respect to the matters entrusted to his care
is obvious; and his failure to file an answer to the complaint for disbarment
against him and to attend the hearings in connection therewith, without any
explanation or request for resetting, despite proper notice from the IBP, is clear
evidence of negligence on his part.
 
The Code of Professional Responsibility further provides that a lawyer is
required to keep the client informed of the status of his case and to respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. [32] The respondent
did the opposite. Despite the complainants efforts to consult him and
notwithstanding numerous attempts to contact him, simply to ask for an update
of the status of the cases, the respondent was able to avoid the complainant and
never bothered to reply.
 
 After months of waiting for a reply from the respondent, and discovering
that the respondent had been remiss in his duties, the complainant demanded
the return of the documents he had turned over to the respondent. He also
demanded the return of the money he had paid for the legal services that were
not rendered and expenses of litigation which were not incurred. However, the
respondent rejected the complainants demands.
 
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides
that a lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or received for
and from the client. The complainant paid $16,854.00 to the respondent via
telegraphic bank transfer. This was considered as complete payment for the
PhP900,000.00 that was stipulated as the consideration for the legal services to
be rendered. However, since the respondent did not carry out any of the services
he was engaged to perform, nor did he appear in court or make any payment in
connection with litigation, or give any explanation as to how such a large sum of
money was spent and allocated, he must immediately return the money he
received from the client upon demand. However, he refused to return the money
he received from the complainant despite written demands, and was not even
able to give a single report regarding the status of the cases.
 
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for filing fees but not used for
failure to file the case, must immediately be returned to the client on demand. [33]
 
In Sencio v. Calvadores,[34] the respondent lawyer Sencio was engaged to
file a case, which he failed to do. His client demanded that he return the money
which was paid to him but he refused. Sencio similarly failed to answer the
complaint and disregarded the orders and notices of the IBP on many occasions.
[35]
 The respondent lawyer was ordered to return the money that he received from
the complainant with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the
promulgation of the resolution until the return of the amount.[36]
 
The practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those
of good moral character.[37] The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing.[38] Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, [39] and a violation
of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.[40]
 
The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of
responsibility to the courts and his client but also a wanton disregard for his
duties as a lawyer. It is deplorable that members of the bar, such as the
respondent, betray not only the trust of their client, but also public trust. For the
practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.
[41]
 Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and
meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice
law. We must protect the administration of justice by requiring those who
exercise this function to be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
 
In this case, we find that suspension for three years recommended by the
IBP is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of
respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference
to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the bar. We could not find
any mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. For violating
elementary principles of professional ethics and failing to observe the
fundamental duties of honesty and good faith, the respondent has proven himself
unworthy of membership in this noble profession.
 
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is
ORDERED to immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of
$16,854.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment,
with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the
date of extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu
of six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of
promulgation of this decision until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED
to immediately return all papers and documents received from the complainant.
 
 Copies of this Decision shall be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and all courts.
 
SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

 WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

   
 
   

   

   

  ANTONIO T. CARPIO

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice

Associate Justice
    

   

   

   

  (on official leave) 

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

   

   

   

   

   

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

   
 
    
 
 
 DANTE O. TINGA
  
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

   

    

   

   

   

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
   

   

   

   

RUBEN T. REYES  TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

 
  

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

* On official leave.

[1]
 Rollo, p. 3.
[2]
 Id.
[3]
 Id., p. 5.
[4]
 Id., p. 6.
[5]
 Id., p. 7.
[6]
 Id., p. 8.
[7]
 Id., p.9
[8]
 Id., pp. 4, 45.
[9]
 Id., p. 5.
[10]
 Id, p. 46.
[11]
 Id., p. 2.
[12]
 Id., p. 10 and 11.
[13]
 Id., p. 72.
[14]
 Id., p. 75.
[15]
 Id., p. 23-24.
[16]
 Id., p. 12 and 40.
[17]
 The administrative complaint was docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1894.
[18]
 Rollo, p. 13.
[19]
 Id., p. 19.
[20]
 Id.
[21]
 Id., p. 21.
[22]
 Id., p. 22.
[23]
 Id., p. 41.
[24]
 Id., p. 43.
[25]
 In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275, 276 (1920), citing Bouviers Law Dictionary.
[26]
 In re Gutierrez, AC No. L-363, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 661.
[27]
 Rollo at p. 4.
[28]
 Id., at p. 26.
[29]
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 17.
[30]
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 18.
[31]
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 18, Rule 18.03.
[32]
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 18, Rule 18.04.
[33]
 Barnachea v. Quiocho, A.C. No. 5925, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 1.
[34]
 A.C. No. 5841, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 393.
[35]
 Id.
[36]
 See also Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Atty. Michael Dioneda, A.C. No. 5162,
March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 296.
[37]
 People v. Santodides, G.R. No. 109149, December 21, 1999, 321 SCRA 310.
[38]
 Maligsa v. Cabanting, A.C. No. 4539, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 408, 413.
[39]
 Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017, September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 406.
[40]
 Ere v. Rubi, A.C. No. 5176, December 14, 1999, 320 SCRA 617.
[41]
 Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot, 74 Phil 477 (1944)
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1890. August 7, 2002]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAFAEL G.

SUNTAY, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew,

Atty. Rafael G. Suntay, alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and
confidant who was privy to all his legal, financial and political affairs from 1956 to
1964. However, since they parted ways because of politics and respondent's
overweening political ambitions in 1964, respondent had been filing complaints and
cases against complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their
attorney-client relationship existed, and otherwise harassing him at every turn.
Complainant enumerated the following cases filed by respondent to harass him: (a)
Civil Case No. 4306-M  for injunction and damages in 1975, "Carlos Panganiban v. Dr.
[1]

Federico Suntay," where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff involving
fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer; (b) Civil Case No.
4726-M,  "Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay," in 1970 where respondent appeared as
[2]

counsel for the plaintiff to determine the real contract between the parties likewise
involving the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer;
(c) Civil Case No. 112764,  "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for damages where
[3]

respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff; and, (d) I.S. No. 77-1523, "Magno
Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan involving complainant's same testimony
subject of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 112764.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case against
him for violation of PD No. 296  for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks
[4]

traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-

15674. Complainant alleged that respondent's possession and examination of the TCT
and the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for complainant
provided him with the information that there used to be two (2) creeks traversing the
fishpond, and that since respondent helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also
came to know that the two (2) creeks had disappeared.
 Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to
Specify His Charges" alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential
information or intelligence" gained by him while the attorney-client relationship existed
but which he allegedly used against complainant when the relationship
terminated. Complainant filed his Comments thereon as required in our Resolution of 26
July 1978. Thereafter this case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
for investigation, report, and recommendation in our Resolution dated 23 October 1978.
After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and
Recommendation dated 14 October 1982 enumerating the following findings against
respondent, to wit:

The evidence presented by complainant which was largely unrebutted by respondent

establish two counts of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating the
confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship and one count of engaging in unethical
conduct.

1. Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan in the

case for false testimony and grave oral defamation filed by Magno Dinglasan against
complainant before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (I.S. No. 77-1523).

The case stemmed from the testimony given by complainant on December 21, 1976,
before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. When asked
why Magno Dinglasan had testified against him in that case, complainant stated that
he once declined the demand of Magno Dinglasan, a former official of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, for P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of
complainants record in the Bureau.

On account of that testimony, Magno Dinglasan charged complainant on July 29,

1977 with the crime of false testimony and grave oral defamation (Exhibits G and G-
1). During the preliminary investigation of the case by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan, respondent acted as counsel for Magno Dinglasan. When the case
was dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and it was elevated to
the Ministry of Justice on appeal, respondent continued to be the lawyer of Magno
Dinglasan.

Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who

was then his counsel, about the demand made in 1957 or 1958 by Magno Dinglasan
for P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainants record in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Respondents advice was for complainant to disregard the
demand as it was improper. Later, when Magno Dinglasan reduced the amount
to P50,000.00, complainant again consulted respondent. Respondent likewise advised
complainant not to heed the demand (pp. 61-62, tsn, May 21, 1981).
Respondents representation of Magno Dinglasan in I.S. No. 77-1523 constitutes
malpractice (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) for respondent was previously the
lawyer of complainant and respondent was consulted by complainant regarding the
very matter which was the subject of the case. By serving as the lawyer of Magno
Dinglasan, in I.S. No. 77-1523, respondent thus represented an interest which
conflicted with the interest of his former client.

2. Respondent again committed malpractice when he served as lawyer of Magno

Dinglasan in Civil Case No. 112764 before the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Civil Case No. 112764 was an action for damages filed by Magno Dinglasan against
complainant based, among others, on the same testimony that complainant gave on
December 21, 1976 before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No.
3930-M.

For the same reasons set forth above, respondents representation of Magno Dinglasan
in Civil Case No. 112764 constitutes malpractice as thereby he represented conflicting
interests.

3. In filing a charge against complainant for alleged illegal destruction of dikes,
respondent violated the confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer
relationship.

In his capacity as lawyer of complainant from 1956 to 1964, respondent had the
following functions:

Witness

A: He was my lawyer from 1956 from the time he passed the bar up to
sometime in 1964 and my legal adviser on political matters and legal matters.

ATTY. AQUINO:

Q: As your lawyer from 1956 to 1964, will you kindly inform the Honorable
Hearing Officer what was the nature of the work of Atty. Suntay?

A: He handled my cases on the titling of our properties. He served as my legal

counsel in the Hagonoy Rural Bank of which my family is the majority
stockholders. He used to help me manage my fishpond. He is our legal
adviser on legal matters. He is our confidant. We have no secrets between
us. He has complete access in our papers (tsn, May 21, 1981)
Complainant owned several fishponds in Bulacan, among them, the fishpond covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674. This fishpond was previously traversed
by two creeks, Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang. The existence of the creeks is
shown by the certificate of title and the blue print plan of the fishpond. In the
certificate of title, the fishpond is bounded on the north and northeast by Sapang
Caluang and on the west by Sapang Malalim (please see Exhibit 6).

In a letter dated March 17, 1973, respondent reported the disappearance of the two
creeks to the authorities. The Chief State Prosecutor referred the letter to the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
required the Public Works to conduct a re-survey. (Exhibit 6).

In 1974, the Ministry of Public Works conducted a relocation survey of the

fishpond. The relocation survey disclosed that there were no more creeks traversing
the fishpond. Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang had disappeared.

Respondent was requested to file a formal complaint with supporting affidavits, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 296. Respondent did so and the complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 74-193. (Exhibit 6)

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that respondent made use of the information he
gained while he was the lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint for the
building of illegal dikes. His possession and examination of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-15674 and the blueprint plan provided him the information that there used
to be two creeks traversing the fishpond covered by the title. Since he helped in the
administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two creeks had
disappeared. Thus, he gained the data which became the basis of his complaint when
he was a lawyer and part administrator of complainant. Under the circumstances, there
is a violation of professional confidence.

4. The evidence also establishes the commission of unethical conduct by respondent

for serving as lawyer of Panganiban and Lopez x x x and for himself filing criminal
charges against complainant which were later dismissed. The cases wherein
respondent served as lawyer for the adversary of complainant or filed by respondent
himself against complainant are the following:

1. Carlos Panganiban v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4306-M, CFI, Branch VII,
Malolos, Bulacan;

2. Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4726-M, CFI, Branch II,
Malolos, Bulacan;
3. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, I.S. No. 77-1523, Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan;

4. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 112764, CFI, Branch XX,
Manila; and

5. Rafael G. Suntay and Magno Dinglasan v. Federico C. Suntay, I.S. No. 74-193,
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, for violation of P.D. 296.

While there may be validity to respondents contention that it is not improper for a
lawyer to file a case against a former client, especially when the professional
relationship had ended several years before, yet under the over-all circumstances of
the case at bar it can not be said that respondent acted ethically. Complainant was not
a mere client of respondent. He is an uncle and a political benefactor. The parties for
whom respondent filed cases against complainant were former friends or associates of
complainant whom respondent met when he was serving as the lawyer and general
adviser of complainant. The cases filed by respondent were about properties which
respondent had something to do with as counsel and administrator of complainant.

xxxx

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence

establishes commission by respondent of malpractice for violating the confidentiality
of client-lawyer relationship and engaging in unethical conduct x x x x[5]

Resolution of this case was delayed despite receipt of the foregoing Report and
Recommendation in view of the Omnibus Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the
Solicitor General; Motion to Disqualify Solicitor Rogelio Dancel to Act on this Case and
Motion to Suspend Period to File Answer dated 18 January 1983 filed by respondent
principally accusing handling Solicitor Dancel of having given unwarranted advantage
and preference to the complainant in the investigation of the case.
After several pleadings on the issue were filed by both respondent and Solicitor
Rogelio Dancel, the Court in its Resolution dated 22 August 1983 denied respondent's
motion to disqualify Solicitor Dancel and required the OSG to proceed with the
investigation of this case. However, no further proceedings were conducted by the OSG
until the records of the case together with other cases were turned over to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 19 May 1988.
After almost three (3) years from the time the records of this case were turned over
to it, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted to this Court on 11 May
2001 Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding respondent guilty as
charged. The IBP recommended that respondent Atty. Suntay be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years for immoral conduct. In so recommending the
Investigating Commissioner adopted in toto the findings of the OSG in its Report and
Recommendation dated 14 October 1982. In our Resolution of 5 September 2001 we
noted the foregoing IBP Resolution. However, in view of the penalty involved, this case
was referred to the Court En Banc for final action pursuant to our Resolution dated 18
January 2000, Sec. 2, par. (b), in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC. [6]

After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the
IBP Recommendation to be well taken. As found by both the OSG and the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay acted as counsel for
clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either been previously
consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer
as the latter's counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964. Thus in Civil Cases Nos. 4306-
M and 4726-M respondent acted as counsel for estranged business associates of
complainant, namely, Carlos Panganiban and Narciso Lopez, the subject matter of
which were the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer.
On the other hand, I.S. No. 77-1523 for false testimony and grave oral defamation
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Civil Case No. 112764 for
damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, were filed in behalf of Magno
Dinglasan, a former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) official, regarding whose alleged
demand for P150,000.00 from complainant in exchange for the destruction of the latter's
record in the BIR, respondent had previously advised complainant to disregard. Civil
Case No. 117624 and I.S. No. 77-1523 were precisely filed against complainant
because the latter had previously testified on the alleged demand made by
Dinglasan. Although respondent denied that there was ever such a demand made by
Dinglasan, the point is that his word on the matter, i.e., whether there was in fact such a
demand, would carry much weight against complainant considering that he was the
latter's counsel in 1957 or 1958 when the alleged demand was made. In addition,
respondent initiated the prosecution of complainant in I.S. No. 74-193 for violation of
P.D. No. 296  for the disappearance of the two (2) creeks, namely, Sapang Malalim and
[7]

Sapang Caluang, previously traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by

TCT No. T-15674 by using information obtained while he was in possession of the
certificate of title and the blueprint plan of the property.
As the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates
or by judicial action.
Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage
or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.

A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after
termination of the attorney-client relation.  As his defense to the charges, respondent
[8]

averred that complainant failed to specify the alleged confidential information used
against him. Such a defense is unavailing to help respondent's cause for as succinctly
explained in Hilado v. David - 
[9]

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a

complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between
an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation,
in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainants cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary
results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition
precedent, i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the
knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not
enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with
lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of
necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has received and in
what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in
consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the
proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorneys
inaccurate version of the facts that came to him x x x x

Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice x x x x It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste x x x
x [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind,
it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, IBP Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 dated 29

April 2001 is adopted and approved. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client
relationship and for unethical conduct, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon the finality
hereof.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona,
JJ., concur.

[1]
 Of the then CFI-Bulacan.
[2]
 Also of the CFI-Bulacan.
[3]
 Of the then CFI-Manila.
 Directing all Persons, Natural or Juridical, to Renounce Possession and Move Out of Portions of Rivers,
[4]

Creeks, Esteros, Drainage Channels and Other Similar Waterways Encroached Upon by Them and
Prescribing Penalty for Violation Hereof.
[5]
 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 207-214.
 Referral of Administrative Matters and Cases to the Divisions of the Court or to the Chief Justice and
[6]

Chairmen of Divisions for Appropriate Actions.

[7]
 See Note 4.
[8]
 Canon 21, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[9]
 84 Phil. 569, 578-579 (1949).
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138647. September 27, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON

BULFANGO y PEAFIEL alias JUDDIE, alias FREDDIE BULFANGO
y PEAFIEL, alias MARLON NAVARRO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Marlon Bulfango y Peafiel alias Juddie, alias Freddie Bulfango y

Peafiel, alias Marlon Navarro, together with a certain Mario Doe, was charged with
murder in an information which reads:

That on or about 6:30 oclock in the evening, more or less, of April 6, 1997, at Osmea
Street, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a bladed weapon,
which they were then conveniently provided, with treachery, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Joemari A. Bedua, hitting the
latters chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds on the latter which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death.

Contrary to and in Violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
R.A. 7659. [1]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-1240 and raffled to Branch 19 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City.
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then
ensued.
Helenia Pagapulaan testified that at 3:30 in the afternoon of April 6, 1997, the
victim, Joemari Bedua, and accused-appellant figured in a heated argument at the
bleachers of the Gold City Coliseum located along Osmea Street in Cagayan de Oro
City. Joemari was in front of Helenia while accused-appellant was closely seated at
Helenias right side.
 At around 6:30 that evening, right after leaving the Gold City Coliseum and while
waiting for a motorela along Osmea Street, Helenia saw accused-appellant throw a
stone at Joemari, who was then crossing the road. Joemari was hit at the back. Just
then, another person whom she failed to recognize threw a stone at Joemari, which hit
him at the back of his head and caused him to fall down on the pavement. Accused-
appellant then pulled a knife and stabbed Joemari once on the chest. Petrified by what
she saw, Helenia immediately fled from the crime scene.
Dr. Tammy Uy, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in
Cagayan de Oro City, certified that the cause of Joemaris death was hemorrhage,
severe, secondary to stab wound on the chest which was directed backward, upward,
slightly medially . . . piercing the pericardium and right ventricle of the heart with an
approximate depth of 9.5 cm. [2]

Accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He averred that on

April 6, 1997, he was in front of the basketball court of Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City
where he acted as banker in the cara y cruz game. His co-players were a certain
Bingbing, his compadre and a certain Edwin. He admitted using the aliases Judy,
Marlon Navarro and Sagal but denied using the alias Freddie, which is the name of his
elder brother. Roberta Bebura corroborated accused-appellants alibi.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence, convicted accused-
appellant of murder and rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this court sentencing accused to the

penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P50,000.00, to pay said heirs actual damages in the sum of P40,500.00, and moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00. He is also ordered to pay the costs of this case.

Accuseds custodian is hereby ordered to ship him as soon as possible to the proper
higher authorities.[3]

From the aforesaid decision, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal,

alleging that the trial court erred:
1. In convicting the accused based on the conflicting and incredible testimony of the
prosecution witnesses;
2. In appreciating treachery as present during the commission of the crime; and
3. In convicting the accused despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant decries the perceived extreme partiality  of the trial court as
[4]

shown by the following statement in the assailed decision, to wit:

Marlon Bulfango has been born a loser. He practically grew up as a crooked boy, and
later a crooked man, by his own testimony. After minor offenses, he now is
graduating or graduated to heinous crime. For this he must pay society. [5]
 Indeed, the trial court may have made unnecessary statements but they were,
nevertheless, not without any basis. The records show that accused-appellant himself
admitted having been thrice convicted of theft, had several pending cases ranging from
grave oral defamation to carnapping, not to mention the present murder case.
 Accused-appellants imputation of extreme partiality on the part of the trial court is
[6]

clearly unfounded. Verily, the statements were made after full-blown trial, long after the
court had reached a conclusion with regard to accused-appellants guilt. From a reading
of the records and the transcripts of stenographic notes, this Court finds no indication of
bias on the part of the trial court, and accused-appellant has failed to show any other
instance save for the above-quoted statements.
In any event, we find that the trial court was correct in disregarding accused-
appellants defense of denial and alibi. Denial is an inherently weak defense vis--vis the
positive and categorical assertion of prosecution witnesses.  Between the categorical
[7]

statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and the bare denial of
accused-appellant, on the other hand, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when the former comes
from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law. It is considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because
it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated and
concocted. [8]

Moreover, for alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear and

satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission, and not merely that he was
somewhere else.  Accused-appellant miserably failed in this regard. As correctly found
[9]

by the trial court:

Accuseds alibi is rendered the weaker because his alleged place of residence, as well
as Gold City Coliseum which is a cockpit, located at Sergio Osmea St. in Cagayan de
Oro City are only 7 kilometers from the basketball court in Cugman where accused
allegedly played cara y cruz (Id., 14). Moreover, the mentioned places are linked by
criss-crossing concrete streets which are plied by the smallest vehicle to heavy
trucks. And April 6, 1997, being a Sunday, it could be presumed that there was no
traffic jam.

Also, accused-appellant assails his conviction based on the alleged conflicting and
incredible testimony of Helenia. In particular, accused-appellant argues that despite
Helenias admission that Joemari was once her caretaker in her ricefield, she failed to
identify Joemari as the one involved in the verbal tussle inside the coliseum. However,
the Solicitor General correctly observed:

On this score, suffice it to state that it is very possible for the victim to have really
worked as one of the caretakers of Helenias ricefield, and the latter may have only
known him by face and not necessarily by his name. This happens when there are
several workers and the employers memory is not retentive enough to remember the
name of each and every employee working for him. At any rate, whether or not
Helenia knew the name of the victim prior to the incident does not alter the fact that
she did witness the incident and saw how appellant stabbed the victim to death. [10]

Accused-appellant cites another inconsistency wherein Helenia, in her direct

examination, explained that she went to the coliseum to watch the cockfight and to be
with her husband so she can buy their provisions. However, during cross-examination,
she testified that she was just accompanying her sons and that she wanted to see their
remaining cocks fight. Thus:
Q. Now, you said that your husband was a gaffer. When was that when your husband died?
A. March 7, 1998.
Q. You went to the coliseum because you were accompanying your husband who was a
gaffer?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time when the incident happened, your husband was still alive or deceased?
A. Already dead.
Q. Can you tell us what year when this incident allegedly happened?
A. April 6, 1997.
Q. And did I get you right that your husband died on March 8, 1998?
A. March 8, 1997.
Q. So, it is not 1998?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. So, since your husband died on March 8, 1997, the incident happened one month after?
A. Yes.
Q. So, one month after your husband died, you were still going to coliseum?
A. It just happened that I went to coliseum because we wanted his remaining cocks to
fight.
Q. I thought that you were just accompanying your husband because you buy your
needs?
A. Yes, because he usually stay very late in the afternoon because if there is a friend of him
who wanted to have a gaff of his fighting cock, he will do it.
Q. My question is, you only went with your husband to coliseum because you will buy your
needs for your home?
A. Yes.[11] (Italics supplied)
Apparently, when Helenia was answering the questions propounded during cross-
examination, she was referring to what she was doing at the coliseum after the death of
her husband.On the other hand, the defense counsel was trying to clarify Helenias and
her husbands usual routine in going to the cockpit, obviously when Helenias husband
was still alive. If at all, this is only a case of simple misunderstanding which bears no
significant bearing on the finding of accused-appellants guilt.
Helenias failure to comprehend defense counsels question cannot be labeled as
prevarication on her part. Far from it, Helenias answer that she was at the coliseum to
see their cocks fight was, in fact, responsive to defense counsels question of what she
was doing at the coliseum since her husband was already dead.
In any case, this apparent inconsistency is inconsequential to the trial courts finding
of Helenias credibility as it refers only to a minor and insignificant detail. Such minor
inconsistencies do not destroy credibility. On the contrary, they manifest truthfulness
and candor and erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. [12]

Accused-appellant likewise assails the prosecutions failure to present Ricky Babor

as witness considering that Ricky was Joemaris companion during that fateful night. He
contends that Ricky was a vital witness who could have really known who killed
Joemari.
The contention is without merit. The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whom to present as witnesses. The prosecution need not present each and
every witness but only as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the
other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in
nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would
not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecutions case.
[13]

Absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts
or gravely abused its discretion in consideration of the same, this Court is bound to
respect its findings and to refrain from reviewing these findings of fact. As this Court has
previously reiterated, the matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand
is best and most competently performed or carried out by a trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the accuseds behavior,
demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. Consequently, conclusions of trial courts
command great weight and respect. [14]

Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the attack was not attended by treachery
since Joemari was not taken by surprise in view of the prior heated argument between
them which should have placed Joemari on guard. We are not persuaded. The essence
of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or to escape.[15]

In the case at bar, Joemari was crossing the street when accused-appellant,
together with a cohort, commenced the attack by throwing a stone hitting the
unsuspecting Joemari at the back. Then a second stone hit Joemari at the back of his
head causing him to fall. While Joemari was struggling to move and probably dazed
from being hit at the back of his head, accused-appellant swiftly exploited Joemaris
vulnerable position and delivered the coup de grace with a well-placed thrust to the
chest aiming for the heart. As described by the trial court, it was a thrust to kill. The fact
that three (3) hours had elapsed since accused-appellant and Joemari figured in a
verbal tussle may even have relaxed Joemaris guard for he could have left the coliseum
much sooner had he feared an impending attack from accused-appellant. Plainly, the
manner by which Joemari was killed can only be described as treacherous. The attack
commenced without warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner. Joemari
was unarmed and the manner by which he was first immobilized and rendered
vulnerable by hitting him first with a stone causing him to fall was definitely meant to
remove Joemaris ability to resist or to escape.
Thus, the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, penalized under Article 248 with reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no other modifying circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed, pursuant to Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial courts award of P40,500.00 as actual damages should be reduced to
P11,000.00, this being the amount substantiated by receipts representing funeral
expenses and services.  The amount of P29,500.00 representing various expenses
[16]

was only contained in a certification by Joemaris wife, Vienna Rose Bedua. This list of
expenses cannot be considered as competent proof and cannot replace the probative
value of official receipts to justify the award of actual damages. The certification may
even be considered as self-serving, and does not meet the requirement that a party
seeking the award of actual damages must produce competent proof or the best
evidence obtainable to justify such award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or
those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake
or burial of the victim will be recognized in court.
[17]

On the other hand, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the awards of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity  for the death of Joemari and P50,000.00 as moral
[18]

damages.  Also, as held in People v. Samson  and People v. Catubig,  exemplary

[19] [20] [21]

damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is proper in view of the attendance of the

qualifying circumstance of treachery.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 97-1240, finding accused-appellant Marlon Bulfango y
Peafiel alias Juddie, alias Freddie Bulfango y Peafiel, alias Marlon Navarro, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder for the killing of Joemari A. Bedua, and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased Joemarie Bedua the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased the reduced amount of P11,000.00 as actual damages and
the additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1]
 Rollo, p. 1.
[2]
 Exhibit B-1, Records, p. 7.
[3]
 Penned by Judge Anthony E. Santos of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19.
[4]
 Rollo, p. 54.
[5]
 Decision, Records, pp. 462-463.
[6]
 Exhibit I, Records, p. 110.
[7]
 People v. Liwanag, G.R. No. 120468, August 15, 2001.
[8]
 People v. Baniega, G.R. No. 139578, February 15, 2002.
[9]
 Ibid.
[10]
 Appellees Brief, Rollo, p. 79.
[11]
 TSN, September 14, 1998, pp. 18-19.
[12]
 People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103647, July 20, 1999.
[13]
 Ibid.
[14]
 People v. Aranjuez, G.R. No. 121898, January 29, 1998.
[15]
 Ibid.
[16]
 Exhibit F, Records, p. 108.
[17]
 People v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 133799, February 5, 2002.
[18]
 People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 136736, April 11, 2002.
[19]
 People v. Boller, et al., G.R. No. 144222-24, April 3, 2002.
[20]
 G.R. No. 124666, February 15, 2002.
[21]
 G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
 
 
ERWIN TULFO, G.R. No. 161032
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA,* and
and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
 
SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, G.R. No. 161176
JOCELYN BARLIZO, and
PHILIP PICHAY,
Petitioners,
 
 
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and Promulgated:
CARLOS SO,
Respondents. September 16, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but
even as we strive to protect and respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys
must be balanced with responsibility. There is a fine line between freedom of
expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine whether or not that line
has been crossed.
 
The Facts
 
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4)
separate informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial
Court in (RTC) PasayCity. These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as
author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor,
Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo
Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in
connection with the publication of the articles in the column Direct Hit in the
issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.[1] The
four informations read as follows:
 
Criminal Case No. 99-1598
 
That on or about the 11th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
REMATE, a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent
to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS DING SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on
May 11, 1999, its daily column DIRECT HIT, quoted hereunder, to wit:
 
PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS
 
Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng Bureau of
Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na yata na government official
sa buong bansa sa pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.
 
Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas daw ito sa
Iglesia ni Kristo.
 
Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata ang
pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro nito.
 
Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing simbahan dahil sa
mga kalokohan mo.
  
Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.
 
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt
public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him
before the bar of public opinion.[2]
 
Criminal Case No. 99-1599
 
That on or about the 12  day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
th

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
REMATE, a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent
to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS DING SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on
May 12, 1999, in daily column DIRECT HIT, quoted hereunder, to wit:
 
SI ATTY. SO NG BOC
 
LINTEK din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng Bureau of
Customs Intelligence Unit sa South Harbor.
 
Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at matakaw na si
So sa mga importer na ayaw ideklara ang totoong laman ng mga
container para makaiwas sa pagbayad ng malaking customs duties
at taxes.
 
Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng mga container
na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din niya ng salapi yung ibang mga
ahensiya para pumikit na lang at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic]
bibig diyan sa mga buwayang taga BOC.
 
Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga, ninanakawan
pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.
 
Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang tumayo ng sarili
niyang robbery-hold-up gang para kumita ng mas mabilis.
 
Hoy So.. hindi bagay sa iyo ang pagiging attorney . . . Mas bagay
sa iyo ang pagiging buwayang naka korbata at
holdaper. Magnanakaw ka So!!
 
 WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt
public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him
before the bar of public opinion.[3]
 
Criminal Case No. 99-1600
That on or about 19th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
REMATE, a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent
to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS DING SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on
May 19, 1999, in daily column DIRECT HIT, quoted hereunder, to wit:
 
xxxx
 
Tulad ni Atty. Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence
Division, saksakan din ng lakas itong si Daniel Aquino ng
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Unit na nakatalaga sa SouthHarbor.
Tulad ni So, magnanakaw na tunay itong si Aquino.
 
Panghihingi ng pera sa mga brokers, ang lakad nito.
Pag hindi nagbigay ng pera ang mga brokers, maiipit ang pagre-
release ng kanilang kargamento.
 
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public
official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with
the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him before the
bar of public opinion.[4]
 
Criminal Case No. 99-1597
That on or about 25th day of June, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
REMATE, a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent
to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS DING T. SO, and with the
malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on
June 25, 1999, its daily column DIRECT HIT, quoted hereunder, to wit:
 
xxxx
  
Nagfile ng P10 M na libel suit itong si Atty. Carlos So ng
Bureau of Customs laban sa inyong lingkod at ilang opisyales ng
Remate sa Pasay City Court. Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So
dahil binanatan ko siya at inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC.
 
Hoy, So . . . dagdagan mo pa ang pagnanakaw mo dahil
hindi kita tatantanan. Buhay ka pa sinusunog na ang iyong
kaluluwa sa impyerno.
 
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt
public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already
stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him
before the bar of public opinion.[5]
 
 
On November 3, 1999, Tulfo, Salao, and Cambri were arraigned, while
Barlizo and Pichay were arraigned on December 15, 1999. They all pleaded not
guilty to the offenses charged.
 
At pre-trial, the following were admitted by petitioners: (1) that during the
four dates of the publication of the questioned articles, the complaining witness
was not assigned at South Harbor; (2) that the accused and complaining witness
did not know each other during all the time material to the four dates of
publication; (3) that Remate is a newspaper/tabloid of general circulation in the
Philippines; (4) the existence and genuineness of the Remate newspaper; (5) the
column therein and its authorship and the alleged libelous statement as well as the
editorial post containing the designated positions of the other accused; and (6) the
prosecutions qualified admission that it is the duty of media persons to expose
corruption.[6]
 
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Oscar M. Ablan, Atty.
James Fortes, Jr., Gladys Fontanilla, and complainant Atty. So. The prosecution
presented documentary evidence as well.
 
Ablan testified that he had read the four columns written by Tulfo, and that
the articles were untrue because he had known Atty. So since 1992 and had worked
with him in the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service Division of the
Bureau of Customs. He further testified that upon reading the articles written by
Tulfo, he concluded that they referred to Atty. So because the subject articles
identified Atty. Carlos as Atty. Ding So of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service Division, Bureau of Customs and there was only one Atty.
Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs.[7]
 
Fontanilla, Records Officer I of the Bureau of Customs, testified that she
issued a certification in connection with these cases upon the request of Atty. So.
[8]
 This certification stated that as per records available in her office, there was only
one employee by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So who was also known as Atty.
Ding So in the Intelligence Division of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service or in the entire Bureau of Customs.[9]
 
Atty. Fortes testified that he knew Atty. So as a fellow member of the Iglesia
Ni Kristo and as a lawyer, and that having read the articles of Tulfo, he believed
that these were untrue, as he knew Atty. Carlos Ding So.[10]
 
Atty. So testified that he was the private complainant in these consolidated
cases. He further testified that he is also known as Atty. Ding So, that he had been
connected with the Bureau of Customs since October 1981, and that he was
assigned as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service Division at the Manila International Container Port since December 27,
1999. He executed two complaint-affidavits, one dated June 4, 1999 and the other
dated July 5, 1999, for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1598 to 99-1600. Prior to this, he
also filed 14 cases of libel against Raffy Tulfo, brother of petitioner Erwin
Tulfo. He testified that petitioner Tulfos act of imputing upon him criminality,
assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him dishonor, discredit, and contempt
among his co-members in the legal profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, co-members and peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers and
employees and superior officers in the Bureau of Customs, and among ordinary
persons who had read said articles. He said it also caused him and his family
sleepless nights, mental anguish, wounded feelings, intrigues, and
embarrassment. He further testified that he included in his complaint for libel the
officers of Remate such as the publisher, managing editor, city editor, and national
editor because under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), they are
equally responsible and liable to the same extent as if they were the author of the
articles. He also testified that Ding is his nickname and that he is the only person in
the entire Bureau of Customs who goes by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So or Atty.
Carlos Ding So.[11]
 
In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject
articles with malice, that he neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the
publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of
the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by
the name of Atty. Ding So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the
practice of certain people to use other peoples names to advance their corrupt
practices. He also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored
the complainant because as per his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had
been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So
before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and
that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in
the SouthHarbor.[12]
Petitioner Salao testified that he came to know Atty. Carlos Ding So when
the latter filed a case against them. He testified that he is an employee of Carlo
Publishing House, Inc.; that he was designated as the national editor of the
newspaper Remate since December 1999; that the duties of the position are to edit,
evaluate, encode, and supervise layout of the news from the provinces; and that
Tulfo was under the supervision of Rey Briones, Vice President for Editorial and
Head of the Editorial Division. Salao further testified that he had no participation
in the subject articles of Tulfo, nor had he anything to do with the latters column.
[13]

 
 Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified that she classifies
the news articles written by the reporters, and that in the Editorial Division, the
officers are herself; Briones, her supervisor; Lydia Bueno, as news and city editor;
and Salao as national editor. She testified that petitioner Barlizo is her subordinate,
whose duties and responsibilities are the typesetting, editing, and layout of the
page assigned to her, the Metro page. She further testified that she had no
participation in the writing, editing, or publication of the column of Tulfo because
the column was not edited. She claimed that none among her co-accused from
the Remate newspaper edited the columns of Tulfo, that the publication and editing
of the subject articles were the responsibility of Tulfo, and that he was given
blanket authority to write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the page
wherein Tulfos column appeared was supervised by Bueno as news editor.[14]
 
Petitioner Pichay testified that he had been the president of Carlo Publishing
House, Inc. since December 1998. He testified that the company practice was to
have the columnists report directly to the vice-president of editorials, that the
columnists were given autonomy on their columns, and that the vice-president for
editorials is the one who would decide what articles are to be published and what
are not. He further testified that Tulfo was already a regular contributor.[15]
 
The Ruling of the RTC
 
In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the
crime of Libel. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI,
REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code, and penalized by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, or a fine ranging from P200.00 Pesos to
P6,000.00 Pesos or both, under Article 355 of the same Code.
 
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences EACH of
the accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as
 minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional,
as maximum, for EACH count with accessory penalties provided by law.
 
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn
Barlizo and Philip Pichay wrote and published the four (4) defamatory articles
with reckless disregard, being, in the mind of the Court, of whether it was false or
not, the said articles libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND (P800,000.00) PESOS,
as actual damages, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral
damages, and an additional amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00), by way of exemplary damages, all with subsidiary imprisonment,
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
 
SO ORDERED.[16]
 
 
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 
Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Tulfo assigned the following errors:
 
1.      THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED
TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT THAT HE DID NOT CRITICIZE
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WORKING AT THE NAIA. HE
CRITICIZED ANOTHER PERSON WORKING AT
THE SOUTH HARBOR. HENCE, THE ELEMENT OF IDENTITY IS
LACKING.
2.      THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE LACK OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DISCREDIT OR DISHONOR, AS DEFINED
BY JURISPRUDENCE.
3.      THERE WAS NO MALICE AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
ATTY. CARLOS DING SO.[17]
His co-accused assigned the following errors:
 
A
 
The trial court seriously erred in holding accused Susan Cambri, Rey Salao,
Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay liable for the defamations contained in the
questioned articles despite the fact that the trial court did not have any finding as
to their participation in the writing, editing and/or publication of the questioned
articles.
 
B
 
 The trial court seriously erred in concluding that libel was committed by all of the
accused on the basis of its finding that the elements of libel have been
satisfactorily established by evidence on record.
 
C
 
The trial court seriously erred in considering complainant to be the one referred to
by Erwin Tulfo in his articles in question.[18]
 
 
 
In a Decision[19] dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration
dated June 30, 2003 was filed by Tulfo, while the rest of his co-accused filed a
motion for reconsideration dated July 2, 2003. In a Resolution dated December 11,
2003, both motions were denied for lack of merit.[20]
 
 
Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
 
Tulfo brought this petition docketed as G.R. No. 161032, seeking to reverse the
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 which affirmed the decision of the
RTC.Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay brought a similar petition
docketed as G.R. No. 161176, seeking the nullification of the same CA decision.
 
In a Resolution dated March 15, 2004, the two cases were consolidated since both
cases arise from the same set of facts, involve the same parties, assail the same
decision of the CA, and seek identical reliefs.[21]
 
Assignment of Errors
 
Petitioner Tulfo submitted the following assignment of errors:
 
I
 
Assuming that the Prosecution presented credible and relevant evidence, the
Honorable CA erred in not declaring the assailed articles as privileged; the CA
 erred in concluding that malice in law exists by the courts having incorrectly
reasoned out that malice was presumed in the instant case.
 
II
 
Even assuming arguendo that the articles complained of are not privileged, the
lower court, nonetheless, committed gross error as defined by the provisions of
Section 6 of Rule 45 by its misappreciation of the evidence presented on matters
substantial and material to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.[22]
 
 
Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay submitted their own
assignment of errors, as follows:
 
 
A - The Court of Appeals Seriously Erred In Its Application of Article 360 Of
The Revised Penal Code By Holding Cambri, Salao And Barlizo Liable For The
Defamatory Articles In The May 11, 12, 19 And June 25, 1999 Issues Of Remate
Simply Because They Were Managing Editor, National Editor And City Editor
Respectively Of Remate And By Holding Pichay Also Liable For Libel Merely
Because He Was The President Of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. Without Taking
Into Account The Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had No Participation In
The Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In Question.
 
B - The Court Of Appeals Committed Grave Abuse Of Discretion In Manifestly
Disregarding The Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had No Participation In
The Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In Question.
 
C - The Court Of Appeals Seriously Misappreciated The Evidence In Holding
That The Person Referred To In The Published Articles Was Private Complainant
Atty. Carlos So.[23]
 
 
Our Ruling
The petitions must be dismissed.
 
The assignment of errors of petitioner Tulfo shall be discussed first.
 
In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not applying the ruling in Borjal v.
Court of Appeals.[24] In essence, he argues that the subject articles fall under
qualifiedly privileged communication under Borjal and that the presumption of
malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply. He argues that it is the burden of the
prosecution to prove malice in fact.
 
This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the first being
that Borjal stemmed from a civil action for damages based on libel, and was not a
criminal case.Second, the ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficient
identification of the complainant, which shall be differentiated from the present
case in discussing the second assignment of error of Tulfo. Third, the subject
in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject is a public
official. Finally, it was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were
fair commentaries on matters of public interest.[25] It shall be discussed and has yet
to be determined whether or not the articles fall under the category of fair
commentaries.
 
In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfos articles being qualifiedly
privileged communication is raised for the first time in the present petition, and
this particular issue was never brought before either the RTC or the CA. Thus,
neither the RTC nor the CA had a chance to properly consider and evaluate this
defense. Tulfo now draws parallels between his case and that of Art Borjal, and
argues that the prosecution should have proved malice in fact, and it was error on
the part of the trial and appellate courts to use the presumption of malice in law in
Art. 354 of the RPC. This lays an unusual burden on the part of the prosecution,
the RTC, and the CA to refute a defense that Tulfo had never raised before
them. Whether or not the subject articles are privileged communications must first
be established by the defense, which it failed to do at the level of the RTC and the
CA. Even so, it shall be dealt with now, considering that an appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the whole case open for review.
 
There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the
OIC of the Bureau of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) at the time of the printing of the allegedly
libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted that the goings-on at the Bureau of
Customs, a government agency, are matters of public interest. It is now a matter of
establishing whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged
communication or are defamatory and written with malice, for which he would be
liable.
 
 
 
Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press
 
The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when
it came to commentaries made on public figures and matters of public
interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was given greater weight
over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such freedom is
not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the
Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible exercise of that
right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run
roughshod over the rights of others.
 
The Journalists Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists of
the Philippines shows that the press recognizes that it has standards to follow in the
exercise of press freedom; that this freedom carries duties and responsibilities. Art.
I of said code states that journalists recognize the duty to air the other side and the
duty to correct substantive errors promptly. Art. VIII states that journalists shall
presume persons accused of crime of being innocent until proven otherwise.
 
In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalists Code of
Ethics and exercised his journalistic freedom responsibly.
 
In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs as
being involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal
gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his
religion, saying ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro nito.
[26]
 He accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt
activities.[27] And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another
article, challenging Atty. So, saying, Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil
binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs].[28]
In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So, and had
neither met nor known him prior to the publication of the subject articles. He also
admitted that he did not conduct a more in-depth research of his allegations before
he published them, and relied only on his source at the Bureau of Customs.
 
In his defense before the trial court, Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the
names of others for personal gain, and even stated that he had been the victim of
such a practice. He argued then that it may have been someone else using the name
of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South Harbor, and this person was the target
of his articles.This argument weakens his case further, for even with the
knowledge that he may be in error, even knowing of the possibility that someone
else may have used Atty. Sos name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify
the information given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person
he was accusing.
 
The trial court found Tulfos accusations against Atty. So to be false, but Tulfo
argues that the falsity of contents of articles does not affect their privileged
character. It may be that the falsity of the articles does not prove malice. Neither
did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their publications. It cannot
be said that a false article accusing a public figure would always be covered by the
mantle of qualified privileged communication. The portion of Borjal cited by Tulfo
must be scrutinized further:
 
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error,
inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or
misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and
debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be
held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in
the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well
as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they
 courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.
In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held
 
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage,
should be free to report on events and developments in which the
public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled
to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for
libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the
standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general
community.
 
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for
erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required
to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the
same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for
defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence
of proof of actual malice on the part of the person making the libelous statement.
[29]
 (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done
consistent with good faith and reasonable care. This was clearly abandoned by
Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest
mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story
and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate
margin of error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand
to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance
of their profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of responsibility.
 
Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged communication
beyond the instances given in Art. 354 of the RPC, but this expansion does not
cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of qualified privileged communications
is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
 allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from
the facts.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
The expansion speaks of fair commentaries on matters of public
interest. While Borjal places fair commentaries within the scope of qualified
privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject of the article is a public
figure or a matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the author from
liability. Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a public official to be
actionable, it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations
against Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the
information before publishing his articles.
 
Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the
Bureau of Customs and relied only on this source for his columns, but did no
further research on his story. The records of the case are bereft of any showing that
Atty. So was indeed the villain Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfos articles related no
specific details or acts committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public
official. These columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be
countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public
official. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public
officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties, or
against public officials in relation to matters of public interest involving them, such
defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally
protected speech.[31] Journalists still bear the burden of writing responsibly when
practicing their profession, even when writing about public figures or matters of
public interest.As held in In Re: Emil P. Jurado:
 
Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist who deliberately
prints lies or distorts the truth; or that a newsman may ecape liability who
publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a person or entity, but
recognizes no obligation bona fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of
such imputations and refuses to submit proof thereof when challenged to do so. It
 outrages all notions of fair play and due process, and reduces to uselessness all the
injunctions of the Journalists Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the
potential of his profession to influence popular belief and shape public opinion, to
make shameful and offensive charges destructive of personal or institutional
honor and repute, and when called upon to justify the same, cavalierly beg off by
claiming that to do so would compromise his sources and demanding acceptance
of his word for the reliability of those sources.[32]
 
 
The prosecution showed that Tulfo could present no proof of his allegations
against Atty. So, only citing his one unnamed source. It is not demanded of him
that he name his source. The confidentiality of sources and their importance to
journalists are accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are journalists
making no efforts to verify the information given by a source, and using that
unverified information to throw wild accusations and besmirch the name of
possibly an innocent person. Journalists have a responsibility to report the truth,
and in doing so must at least investigate their stories before publication, and be
able to back up their stories with proof. The rumors and gossips spread by
unnamed sources are not truth. Journalists are not storytellers or novelists who may
just spin tales out of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as reality. There must
be some foundation to their reports; these reports must be warranted by facts.
 
Jurado also established that the journalist should exercise some degree of care
even when writing about public officials. The case stated:
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual
interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the
maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the
other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two
legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who,
invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require
that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm
does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or
circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the
truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted point of balance or
adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of
both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of Ethics adopted by the
journalism profession in the Philippines.[33]
  
Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered
as qualified privileged communication under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of
the RPC which exempts from the presumption of malice a fair and true report,
made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative,
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions. This particular provision has
several elements which must be present in order for the report to be exempt from
the presumption of malice. The provision can be dissected as follows:
 
 
In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be
considered privileged, the following conditions must exist:
 
(a)                That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his
functions;
(b)               That it is made in good faith; and
(c)                That it is without any comments or remarks.[34]
The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the
provision. They provide no details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty.
So. They are plain and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one
unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even
attempt to verify his story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the
character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion and
the legal profession. As none of the elements of the second paragraph of Art. 354
of the RPC is present in Tulfos articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are
qualified privileged communications under the RPC.
 
Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms fair and true,
Tulfos articles do not meet the standard. Fair is defined as having the qualities of
impartiality and honesty.[35] True is defined as conformable to fact; correct; exact;
actual; genuine; honest.[36] Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as he did not
do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these
allegations were baseless. The articles are not fair and true reports, but merely wild
accusations.
 
Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield
of qualified privileged communication, this would still not protect Tulfo.
 
In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged
communication, Tulfo argues that the presumption of malice in law under Art. 354
of the RPC is no longer present, placing upon the prosecution the burden of
proving malice in fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there should have
been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in writing the subject
articles.
 
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
[37]
 and reiterated in Flor v. People, which should be to determine whether the
defamatory statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.[38]
 
The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject
articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not, as proven by
the prosecution. There was the finding that Tulfo failed to verify the information
on which he based his writings, and that the defense presented no evidence to show
that the accusations against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue that because he
did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there was no malice attendant in his
articles. The test laid down is the reckless disregard test, and Tulfo has failed to
meet that test.
 
The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So
can be considered as further evidence of malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo,
[39]
 wherein publication after the commencement of an action was taken as further
evidence of a malicious design to injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent nor did he
pause to consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming respondent Atty.
So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost,
and is proof of malice.
Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged communication, Tulfo also
argues that the lower court misappreciated the evidence presented as to the identity
of the complainant: that Tulfo wrote about Atty. Ding So, an official of the Bureau
of Customs who worked at the South Harbor, whereas the complainant was Atty.
Carlos So who worked at the NAIA. He claims that there has arisen a cloud of
doubt as to the identity of the real party referred to in the articles.
This argument is patently without merit.
 
The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of two other witnesses
who identified Atty. So from Tulfos articles. There is the certification that there is
only one Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. And most damning to Tulfos case is
the last column he wrote on the matter, referring to the libel suit against him by
Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. In this article, Tulfo launched further attacks
against Atty. So, stating that the libel case was due to the exposs Tulfo had written
on the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. This last
article is an admission on the part of Tulfo that Atty. So was in fact the target of his
attacks. He cannot now point to a putative Atty. Ding So at South Harbor, or
someone else using the name of Atty. So as the real subject of his attacks, when he
did not investigate the existence or non-existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor,
nor investigate the alleged corrupt acts of Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. Tulfo
cannot say that there is doubt as to the identity of the Atty. So referred to in his
articles, when all the evidence points to one Atty. So, the complainant in the
present case.
 
Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged communication and the
matter of the identity of the person referred to in the subject articles, there remains
the petition of the editors and president of Remate, the paper on which the subject
articles appeared.
 
 In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim that they
had no participation in the editing or writing of the subject articles, and are thus not
liable.
 
The argument must fail.
 
The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons responsible
for libel:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall
be responsible for the same.
 
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a
daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
 
 
The claim that they had no participation does not shield them from
liability. The provision in the RPC does not provide absence of participation as a
defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the responsibility of those
involved in publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of
whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles,
because the law simply so states that they are liable as they were the author.
 
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous
articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the
preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication
of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly
hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the
president in the publishing company.
 
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his
responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say that they are
not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and
publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and
control of its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally
liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous article.[40] On the
theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents
of the paper,[41] it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility by
abandoning the duties to employees,[42] so that it is immaterial whether or not the
editor or manager knew the contents of the publication. [43] In Fermin v. People of
the Philippines,[44] the Court held that the publisher could not escape liability by
claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of a libelous
article. The Court cited U.S. v. Ocampo, stating the rationale for holding the
persons enumerated in Art. 360 of the RPC criminally liable, and it is worth
reiterating:
 
 
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States,
the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by
reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents
thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the
publisher but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any
connection with its publication are liable as publishers.
 
xxxx
 
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St.
Rep., 629), the question of the responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a
newspaper was discussed. The court said, among other things (pp. 782, 783):
 
The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a
newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the ground that the
libelous article was published without his knowledge or consent. When a libel is
published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to
charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication.
 
The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held
prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his paper; and it should be no
defense that the publication was made without his knowledge or consent, x x x.
 
One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a
newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he selects
and controls may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and
should be held responsible therefore, whether he was individually concerned in
the publication or not, x x x. Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent or
 servant in the course of his employment necessarily implies some degree of guilt
or delinquency on the part of the publisher; x x x.
 
We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published in
the newspaper without the knowledge or consent of its proprietor or manager is
no defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor or manager.
 
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this same
question was considered and the court held that in the criminal prosecution of a
publisher of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is prima facie presumed to
have published the libel, and that the exclusion of an offer by the defendant to
prove that he never saw the libel and was not aware of its publication until it was
pointed out to him and that an apology and retraction were afterwards published
in the same paper, gave him no ground for exception. In this same case, Mr.
Justice Colt, speaking for the court, said:
 
It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be used for the
publication of improper communications, to use reasonable caution in the conduct
of his business that no libels be published. (Whartons Criminal Law, secs. 1627,
1649; 1 Bishops Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson, 64 Ill., 195;
Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)
 
The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English
courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon said that he was
clearly of the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable
criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in
the management of the paper.
 
This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr.
Justice Foster.
 
Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:
 
An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a papers, although
he did not know of its being put into the paper and stopped the sale as soon as he
discovered it.
 
In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held that
 
A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper
for publication, is liable both civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared by
the agent and all others who aid in publishing it.[45]
 
 
Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the subject articles, has
been found guilty of libel, so too must Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay.
  
Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the punishment must
still be tempered with justice. Petitioners are to be punished for libel for the first
time. They did not apply for probation to avoid service of sentence possibly in the
belief that they have not committed any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v. People,[46] the
Court, in a criminal case for libel, removed the penalty of imprisonment and
instead imposed a fine as penalty. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals,[47] the accused was
merely fined in lieu of the original penalty of imprisonment and fine. Freedom of
expression as well as freedom of the press may not be unrestrained, but neither
must it be reined in too harshly. In light of this, considering the necessity of a free
press balanced with the necessity of a responsible press, the penalty of a fine of
PhP 6,000 for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, should suffice.[48] Lastly, the responsibilities of the members of the
press notwithstanding, the difficulties and hazards they encounter in their line of
work must also be taken into consideration.
 
The award of damages by the lower court must be modified. Art. 2199 of the
Civil Code provides, Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages. There was no showing of any pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant
Atty. So. Without proof of actual loss that can be measured, the award of actual
damages cannot stand.
 
In Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, it was held, as regards actual and moral
damages:
 
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable,
must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed,
and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a
basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
 
 Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one
for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages
must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in
nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although
incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the sound
discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have
been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of
the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A causal
relation, in fine, must exist between the act or omission referred to in the Code
which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or proceeding on the one hand, and the
resulting injury, on the other hand; i.e. the first must be the proximate cause and
the latter the direct consequence thereof.[49]

 
It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for that Atty.
So deserves the award of moral damages. Justification for the award of moral
damages is found in Art. 2219(7) of the Civil Code, which states that moral
damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other form of
defamation. As the cases involved are criminal cases of libel, they fall squarely
within the ambit of Art. 2219(7).
 
Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or
compensatory damages. The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was
proven before the trial court does not adversely affect the offended partys right to
recover moral damages.[50]
 
And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be amiss to state at
this juncture that Tulfos libelous articles are abhorrent not only because of its
vilifying and demeaning effect on Atty. So himself, but also because of their
impact on members of his family, especially on the children and possibly even the
childrens children.
 
The Court can perhaps take judicial notice that the sense of kinship runs
deeply in a typical Filipino family, such that the whole family usually suffers or
rejoices at the misfortune or good fortune, as the case may be, of any of its
member. Accordingly, any attempt to dishonor or besmirch the name and
reputation of the head of the family, as here, invariably puts the other members in a
state of disrepute, distress, or anxiety. This reality adds an imperative dimension to
the award of moral damages to the defamed party.
 
The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified. Under Art.
2230 of the Civil Code, In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the
civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the offended party. No aggravating circumstances accompanied the
commission of the libelous acts; thus, no exemplary damages can be awarded.
 
Conclusion
 
The press wields enormous power. Through its widespread reach and the
information it imparts, it can mold and shape thoughts and opinions of the
people. It can turn the tide of public opinion for or against someone, it can build up
heroes or create villains.
 
It is in the interest of society to have a free press, to have liberal discussion
and dissemination of ideas, and to encourage people to engage in healthy debate. It
is through this that society can progress and develop.
 
Those who would publish under the aegis of freedom of the press must also
acknowledge the corollary duty to publish responsibly. To show that they have
exercised their freedom responsibly, they must go beyond merely relying on
unfounded rumors or shadowy anonymous sources. There must be further
investigation conducted, some shred of proof found to support allegations of
misconduct or even criminal activity. It is in fact too easy for journalists to destroy
the reputation and honor of public officials, if they are not required to make the
slightest effort to verify their accusations. Journalists are supposed to be reporters
of facts, not fiction, and must be able to back up their stories with solid
research. The power of the press and the corresponding duty to exercise that power
judiciously cannot be understated.
 
But even with the need for a free press, the necessity that it be free does not
mean that it be totally unfettered. It is still acknowledged that the freedom can be
abused, and for the abuse of the freedom, there must be a corresponding
sanction. It falls on the press to wield such enormous power responsibly. It may be
a clich that the pen is mightier than the sword, but in this particular case, the lesson
to be learned is that such a mighty weapon should not be wielded recklessly or
thoughtlessly, but always guided by conscience and careful thought.
 
A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of the most effective
checks on government power and abuses. Hence, it behooves government
functionaries to respect the value of openness and refrain from concealing from
media corruption and other anomalous practices occurring within their
backyard. On the other hand, public officials also deserve respect and protection
against false innuendoes and unfounded accusation of official wrongdoing from an
abusive press. As it were, the law and jurisprudence on libel heavily tilt in favor of
press freedom. The common but most unkind perception is that government
institutions and their officers and employees are fair game to official and personal
attacks and even ridicule. And the practice on the ground is just as disconcerting.
Reports and accusation of official misconduct often times merit front page or
primetime treatment, while defenses set up, retraction issued, or acquittal rendered
get no more, if ever, perfunctory coverage. The unfairness needs no belaboring.
The balm of clear conscience is sometimes not enough.
Perhaps lost in the traditional press freedom versus government impasse is
the fact that a maliciously false imputation of corruption and dishonesty against a
public official, as here, leaves a stigmatizing mark not only on the person but also
the office to which he belongs. In the ultimate analysis, public service also unduly
suffers.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161032
and 161176 are DISMISSED. The CA Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 25318 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be a fine of six
thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, while the award of actual damages and exemplary damages
is DELETED. The Decision dated November 17, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 112
in Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600 is modified to read as
follows:
 
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN
CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences EACH of the accused to
pay a fine of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 6,000) per count of libel with
subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.
 
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao,
Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay wrote and published the four (4) defamatory
articles with reckless disregard whether it was false or not, the said articles being
libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay complainant Atty. Carlos T.
So, jointly and severally, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (PhP 1,000,000)
as moral damages. The claim of actual and exemplary damages is denied for
lack of merit.
 
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 
 
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
 
 
ATTESTATION
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


 Additional member as per August 27, 2008 raffle.
[1]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 39.
[2]
 Id. at 38-39.
[3]
 Id. at 39-40.
 [4]
 Id. at 40-41.
[5]
 Id. at 41-42.
[6]
 Id. at 42.
[7]
 Id. at 43.
[8]
 Id. at 44.
[9]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 88.
[10]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 44.
[11]
 Id. at 45-46.
[12]
 Id. at 46-47.
[13]
 Id. at 48-49.
[14]
 Id. at 49-50.
[15]
 Id. at 50-51.
[16]
 Id. at 38-39.
[17]
 Id. at 52.
[18]
 Id. at 53.
[19]
 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and Rosemari D. Carandang.
[20]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 68.
[21]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 168.
[22]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), pp. 16-17.
[23]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 20.
[24]
 G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301 SCRA 1.
[25]
 Id. at 22.
[26]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 10.
[27]
 Id. at 11.
[28]
 Id. at 12.
[29]
 Supra note 24, at 30-31.
[30]
 Borjal, supra at 23.
[31]
 Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541, 574.
[32]
 A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 299, 332.
[33]
 Id. at 327.
[34]
 2 Reyes, Luis B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE 858 (13th ed., 1993).
[35]
 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed., 1990).
[36]
 Id. at 1508.
[37]
 376 US 254, 11 L ed. 2nd 686.
[38]
 G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 440, 456.
[39]
 29 Phil. 595 (1915).
[40]
 Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis 133, 65 NW 744; Faulkner v. Martin, 133 NJL 605, 45 A2d 596; World Pub. Co. v.
Minahan, 70 Okla 107, 173 P 815.
[41]
 Faulkner, supra.
[42]
 World Pub. Co., supra.
[43]
 Faulkner, supra; Goudy v. Dayron Newspapers, Inc., 14 Ohio App 2d 207, 43 Ohio Ops 2d 444, 237 NE2d 909.
[44]
 G.R. No. 157643, March 20, 2008.
[45]
 U.S. v. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1, 50-52 (1910).
[46]
 G.R. No. 142409, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 275.
[47]
 G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 692.
[48]
 Administrative Circular No. 08-2008. See Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008.
[49]
 G.R. No. 1045676, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.
[50]
 Patricio v. Leviste, G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 774, 781.
 FIRST DIVISION
 
 

LETICIA GONZALES,   A.C. No. 6836

Complainant,    

    Present:

     

    PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairman,

    YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus -   AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

    CALLEJO, and

    CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

     

    Promulgated:

ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA,    

Respondent.   January 23, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------x

 
RESOLUTION
 

 
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting
interests.
 
On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of
money and damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567 where she was represented by the
law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with
Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an
associate/partner; on February 26, 2001, a decision was rendered in the civil case
ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest
and P6,000.00 as attorneys fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully
implement the writ of execution issued in connection with the judgment which
prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff with this Court; in
September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales;
they harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance
regarding her complaint before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the
Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation,
simple coercion and unjust vexation; notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case
No. 1-567, where respondents law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein
respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the
said spouses; respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since
respondents acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client
relationship between complainant and respondents law firm and renders
respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) particularly
Rules 10.01,[1] 13.01,[2] 15.02,[3] 15.03,[4] 21.01[5] and 21.02.[6]

 
On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino
Cabucana, Jr. to submit his Answer to the complaint.[7]

 
In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented
complainant in Civil Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana
who appeared and represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is
representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but
claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the spouses pleaded with him as
no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in
good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave them
defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that
the cases filed against them by Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking
official who wanted to get even with them for their refusal to testify in favor of
the said official in another case. At first, respondent declined to serve as counsel
of the spouses as he too did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking official,
but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for
money or malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the
spouses free of any charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted
against respondent which shows that respondent is now the subject of a
demolition job. The civil case filed by Gonzales where respondents brother served
as counsel is different and distinct from the criminal cases filed by complainant
against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal
ethics. [8]

 
Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondents
brother is closely connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the
respondent is handling; that the claim of respondent that he is handling the cases
of the spouses pro bono is not true since he has his own agenda in offering his
services to the spouses; and that the allegation that she is filing the cases against
the spouses because she is being used by a powerful person is not true since she
filed the said cases out of her own free will.[9]

 
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of
Mandatory Conference dated March 1, 2004. [10] On the scheduled conference,
only a representative of complainant appeared.[11] Commissioner Demaree Raval
of the IBP-CBD then directed both parties to file their respective verified position
papers.[12]

 
Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added
that respondent prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco
spouses; that the high-ranking official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben
Plata and the accusations of respondent against the said judge is an attack against
a brother in the profession which is a violation of the CPR; and that respondent
continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that
said partner has already been appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City,
again in violation of the CPR.[13]

 
Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer.[14]
On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying
both parties to appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory
question regarding said case.[15] On the said date, only respondent
appeared[16] presenting a sworn affidavit executed by Gonzales withdrawing her
complaint against respondent. It reads:

 
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA

Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at

nakatira sa Barangay Dubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa
batas ay nagsasabing:
Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No. 04-1186 na may pamagat
na Leticia Gonzales versus Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. na kasalukuyang nahaharap
sa Commission on Bar Discipline ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines

 
 Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa di-pagkakaintindihan na
namamagitan sa akin at nina Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.

Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana,

Jr. sa sigalot na namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-asawang Gatcheco, gayong nalalaman
ko na si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana ay walang nalalaman sa naturang di
pagkakaintindihan.

Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kay Atty. Marcelino

C. Cabucana, Jr., nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kay Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang kinalalaman (sic) sa
di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang Gatcheco.

Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging abogado sa Civil Case No. 1-567
(MTCC Br. I Santiago City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo Mangano.

Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kayat aking iniuurong ang naturang
kasong inihain ko kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil dito ay
hindi na ako interesado pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking hinihiling sa
kinauukulan na dismisin na ang naturang kaso.
 

Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng nakasaad

dito.[17]

 
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales
to appear before him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be
subject to clarificatory questioning.[18] However, none of the parties appeared.
[19]
 On February 17, 2005, only respondent was present. Commissioner Reyes then
considered the case as submitted for resolution.[20]

 
On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and
Recommendation, portions of which are quoted hereunder:
 The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a mistake in the
acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however, the Commission
(sic) believes that there was no malice and bad faith in the said acceptance and this can
be shown by the move of the complainant to unilaterally withdraw the case which she
filed against Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. However, Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be
more careful in the acceptance of cases as conflict of interests might arise.

It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly warned
and reprimanded andadvised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases
which might result in conflict of interests. [21]

On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP,
to wit:

 
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153
CBD CASE NO. 03-1186

Leticia Gonzales vs.

Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
that respondent made (a) mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo
Gatcheco, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby WARNED and REPRIMANDED and
advised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in
conflict of interests.[22]
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of
Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses
in the administrative case filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent
himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in
the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them. [23]
 
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
 
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

 
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.[24] Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.[25] Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[26]

 
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[27]

As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba,[28]

 
 The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an
unrelated action.  It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.   It is enough that
the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients
and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [29]

 
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the
civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the
criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related,
has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though
unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites
suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow. [30]
 

Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales
in the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We
do not agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented
Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing
conflicting interests applies.
 
As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:[31]
[W]e can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who
had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any
injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the
courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest,
corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly
inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished
member, into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice. [32]
 The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest
intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the
prohibition inoperative.[33]
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no
other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that
while there may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation
they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present
client and a prospective one.[34] Granting also that there really was no other
lawyer who could handle the spouses case other than him, still he should have
observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the
prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter
would involve a conflict with another client then seek the written consent of
all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. [35] These respondent failed to
do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
 
We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not
bound by such desistance as the present case involves public interest.
[36]
 Indeed, the Courts exercise of its power to take cognizance of
administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil
remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an
attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. [37]
 

In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting
interests a penalty ranging from one to three years suspension was imposed. [38]
 
We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is
representing the Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not
respondent personally, which handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted
by complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of
complainant by stating first the name of the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA,
DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and
signature appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the
Gatcheco spouses only with his name, [39] without any mention of the law firm.
We also note the observation of the IBP Commissioner Reyes that there was
no malice and bad faith in respondents acceptance of the Gatchecos cases as
shown by the move of complainant to withdraw the case.
 
Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and taking into consideration the aforementioned mitigating
circumstances, we impose the penalty of fine of P2,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines is APPROVED with MODIFICATION that respondent Atty.
Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 

SO ORDERED.
 

 
  

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
 

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 

 
 

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 

 
  

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

[1]
 Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
[2]
 Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with judges.
[3]
 Rule 15.02 A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to him
by a prospective client.
[4]
 Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.
[5]
 Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a)       When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b)       When required by law;
c)       When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial
action.
[6]
 Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Rollo, pp. 1-3.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 10.
[8]
 Id., pp. 12-16.
[9]
 Id., pp. 19-21.
[10]
 Id., p. 29.
[11]
 Id., p. 33.
[12]
 Id., p. 53.
[13]
 Id., pp. 37-41.
[14]
 Id., pp. 46-50.
[15]
 Id., p. 54.
[16]
 Id., p. 55.
[17]
 Id., p. 56.
[18]
 Id., p. 58.
[19]
 Id., p. 60.
[20]
 Id., p. 63.
[21]
 Id., pp. 68-69.
[22]
 Id., p. 65.
[23]
 Id., pp. 46-49.
[24]
 See Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[25]
 Quiambao vs. Bamba, A.C. No. 6708 (CBD Case No. 01-874), August 25, 2005.
[26]
 Ibid.
[27]
 Santos, Sr. vs. Beltran, A.C. No. 5858, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 17, 25-26.
[28]
 A.C. No. 6708 (CBD Case No. 01-874), August 25, 2005.
[29]
 Ibid.
[30]
 Ibid.
[31]
 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
[32]
 Id., p. 579.
[33]
 Quiambao vs. Bamba, supra.
[34]
 Ibid.
[35]
 See Rules 15.01 & 15.03, CPR.
[36]
 Mercado vs. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1, 8; Rangwani vs. Dio, 443 SCRA 408, 417.
[37]
 Rangwani vs. Dio, supra.
[38]
 Quiambao vs. Bamba, Adm. Case No. 6708, August 25, 2005; Vda de Alisbo vs. Jalandoni, A.C. No. 1311, July
18, 1991, 199 SCRA 321; PNB vs. Cedo, 312 Phil. 904 (1995); Maturan vs. Gonzales, 350 Phil. 882
(1998); Northwestern University, Inc. vs. Arguillo, A.C. No. 6632, August 2, 2005.
[39]
 See rollo, pp. 1-2, 38.
 

EN BANC
 
 
ARNEL COLINARES, G.R. No. 182748
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

- versus - PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,

SERENO,

REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. Promulgated:
 

December 13, 2011

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

 
DECISION
 

ABAD, J.:
 

This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that
it takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and
c) when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the
case to the trial court.
 
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel
Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.[1]
 
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening
on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting
nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the
head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as
Jesus fled.
 
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino
lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with
something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel
had hit him.
 
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he
happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay
tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
 
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[2] showing that Rufino suffered
two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor
testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to
go home after initial treatment.
 
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed
self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met
Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he
supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him,
causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back.
Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending
himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged
towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack
and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters
house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal
Police Station.
 
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding
party on the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his
way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years,
Arnel did not qualify for probation.
 
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely
affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of
evidence to support it.[3] Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for
review.
 
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and
the Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or not,
assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its
imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he
could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
 
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to
apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes
his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants
such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the
Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused
has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
 
The Issues Presented
 
The case essentially presents three issues:
 
 1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the
head with a stone;

2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of

frustrated homicide; and

3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and
a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation
on remand of the case to the trial court.

 
The Courts Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and
that he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
 
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing
that he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The
accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing
evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused,
mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. [4]
 
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense
requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed
unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person
defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.[5]
 
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the
latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense
would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an
actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack
the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.[6]
 
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of
unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on
him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnels
testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnels only other witness, Diomedes,
merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the
middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his
point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions. [7]
 
In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that
Arnel was the aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with
inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The witnesses were
one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnels
testimony, the prosecutions version is more believable and consistent with
reality, hence deserving credence.[8]
 

Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he
be liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his
victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
 

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds

intent to take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and
convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. [9] And
the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the
offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his
victim.[10]
 
 Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so
forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the
impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his
victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
 

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not
frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we ruled that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the
wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical
assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victims
wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
 

Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent,
depth, and severity of the victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that head
injuries are always very serious,[12] he could not categorically say that Rufinos
wounds in this case were fatal. Thus:
 
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
 
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually
are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming
fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to go home at that time.
 
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the
length of the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
 
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the
label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in
that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth.[13]
 

Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no
indication that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the
pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required
suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further
testified:
 
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
 
Q: The injuries are slight?
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and
antit[e]tanus the problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.
 
xxxx
 
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
 
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would
rather go home and then come back.
 
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
 
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.[14]
 
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to
support the prosecutions claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical
intervention.Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
 
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide.
 

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC.
 
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege
granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the
probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.[15] Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he
should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
 
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not
that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has
is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term
should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for
probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
 
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from
the judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out
to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now
set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will
apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment
against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty
that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to
the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel
will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the
forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang
hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is
justice there?
  
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to
apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals[16]that the probation law requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a
huge difference between Francisco and this case.
 
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the
accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of
one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a
clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal,
seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When
the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course
let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He
certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
 
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused
must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. This requirement outlaws the element of speculation on the part of
the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus
rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction.[17]
 
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have
allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and
probation. He was not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to
apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied
him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling
in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.
  
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the
penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his
conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to
bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for
probation.
 
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the
first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right
from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed
on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one
of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. [18] As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded
as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he
comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases
that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is
a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.[19]
 
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel
to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of
conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the
probation law should be interpreted to provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a
judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
 
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of
conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated
homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect
him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not
commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2
years and 4 months.
 
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under
the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be
robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender,
defeating the very purpose of the probation law.

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he
would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty
that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by
him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he
got was not probationable.
 
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel
the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on
him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
 
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from four months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P.
Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner
applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has
been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines
Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.
 
SO ORDERED.
  
ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 
 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 

 
 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

 
 

CERTIFICATION
 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

 
 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 
[1]
 Records, p. 25.
[2]
 Id. at 2.
[3]
 Rollo, pp. 109-128. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Magdangal
M. de Leon and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring.
[4]
 People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 64, 73-74.
[5]
 Oriente v. People, G.R. No. 155094, January 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 348, 359.
[6]
 People v. Se, 469 Phil. 763, 770 (2004).
[7]
 Records, pp. 245-246 (TSN, May 5, 2004, pp. 28-29).
[8]
 People v. Enfectana, 431 Phil. 64, 76 (2002).
[9]
 People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351 (2001).
[10]
 Rivera v. People, 515 Phil. 824, 832 (2006).
[11]
 G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533, 555-556.
[12]
 Records, p. 82 (TSN, June 17, 2002, p. 6).
[13]
 Id. at 83-84 (id. at 7-8).
[14]
 Id. at 84-85 (id. at 8-9).
[15]
 Sec. 4, Presidential Decree 968 also known as the Probation Law of 1976, provides: SEC. 4. Grant of Probation.
Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal.(Emphasis supplied)
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
[16]
 313 Phil. 241, 255 (1995).
[17]
 Id.
[18]
 Yusi v. Honorable Judge Morales, 206 Phil. 734, 740 (1983).
[19]
 Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16, at 273.
 THIRD DIVISION

SALVADOR FLORDELIZ y ABENOJAR, G.R. No. 186441

 
Petitioner,
Present:
 
 
 
CORONA, J.,
 
Chairperson,
 
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
NACHURA,
 
DEL CASTILLO,* and
 
MENDOZA, JJ.
 
 
 
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
 
Respondent.
March 3, 2010
 
 

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 
 

DECISION

 
NACHURA, J.:

For review are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] and Resolution[2] dated
July 29, 2008 and February 16, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 30949. The
assailed decision affirmed the Regional Trial Courts [3] (RTCs) Joint
Judgment[4] dated March 9, 2007, convicting petitioner Salvador
Flordeliz y Abenojar of nine (9) counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness, with a modification of the award of damages, while the assailed
resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

Sometime in March 1995, ABC, the wife of petitioner and the mother of
private complainants AAA and BBB, left for Malaysia as an overseas worker. AAA
and BBB were left under the care and custody of petitioner. They resided in a
small house in Quezon Hill, Baguio City.[5]

In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who was then eleven (11)
years old, petitioner woke up AAA, touched her vagina, then played with it. AAA
cried and told petitioner that it was painful. The latter stopped, but warned AAA
not to tell anyone about it; otherwise, she would be harmed. [6] Petitioner
allegedly committed the same acts against AAA repeatedly.

Petitioner and his daughters later transferred residence and lived with the
formers siblings. Not long after, petitioner was convicted of homicide and
imprisoned in Muntinlupa City. Consequently, AAA and BBB lived with their
grandparents in La Trinidad, Benguet.[7] While petitioner was incarcerated, AAA
and BBB visited him and sent him two greeting cards containing the following
texts, among others: happy valentine; ur the best dad in the world; I love you
papa, love BBB, Love BJ; till we meet again; portrait of Jesus Christ with a heart,
this is for you dad; flordeliz, AAA P., love AAA and Iyos.[8]

In 2001, petitioner was released on parole. He would frequently fetch AAA

and BBB from their grandparents house during weekends and holidays and they
would stay with him in Gabriela Silang, Baguio City.[9]

Unsatisfied with the abuses committed against AAA, petitioner allegedly

started molesting BBB in May 2002.[10] In 2003, BBB spent New Years Day with her
father. On January 3, 2003, while they were sleeping, petitioner inserted his two
(2) fingers into BBBs vagina.[11] BBB did not attempt to stop petitioner because of
fear. Thereafter, they slept beside each other. [12] BBB suffered the same ordeal
the following night.[13]

On February 8, 2003, BBB visited petitioner. Again, petitioner held her

vagina, played with it and inserted his fingers, which caused her pain. [14]

The same incident allegedly took place on August 3, 2003.[15] On October

26, 2003, a day before AAAs birthday, while BBB was with petitioner, the latter
committed the same dastardly act. This time, it was for a longer period.[16]

During All Saints Day of 2003, BBB spent two nights with her father and,
during those nights (November 1 and 2), she experienced the same sexual abuse.
[17]
 The same thing happened on December 28, 2003.[18]
  

Notwithstanding the repeated incidents of sexual abuse committed against

her, BBB did not reveal her ordeal to anybody because of fear for her life and that
of her mother.[19]

AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal their horrifying experiences when
their mother ABC arrived for a vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what
petitioner did to her.When confronted by ABC, BBB likewise admitted the
repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC forthwith reported the incidents
to the National Bureau of Investigation.[20]

After conducting medical examinations on AAA and BBB, the attending

physician remarked that there was a disclosure of sexual abuse and she noted the
presence of hymenal notch in posterior portion of hymenal rim that may be due
to previous blunt force or penetrating trauma suggestive of abuse. [21]

With these findings, petitioner was charged with the crimes of Acts of
Lasciviousness,[22] committed against AAA, and nine (9) counts of Qualified Rape
through Sexual Assault,[23] committed against BBB, before the RTC. The crime of
acts of lasciviousness was allegedly committed as follows:
 

That sometime in the month of April 1995 up to 1996 in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design and deliberate intent to cause malice and satisfy his lascivious
desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched and play the
private part of the offended party AAA, a minor 14 years of age against her will and
consent which act debeased (sic), demeaned and degraded the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the minor as a human being.

 
 CONTRARY TO LAW.[24]

On the other hand, except for the dates of the commission of the crime, each
Information for Rape reads:

 
That on or about the 8 th day of February 2003, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force and intimidation and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over the private
offended party he being the biological father of said offended party, did then and there
remove the pants and underwear of said offended party and thereupon fondles her
private part and forcibly inserted his finger into the vagina of the offended party BBB, a
minor, 11 years of age against her will and consent, which acts constitute Rape as
defined under Republic Act 8353 and which acts demeaned, debased and degraded the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the minor as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[25]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded Not guilty to all the charges. During
trial, he interposed the defense of denial and insisted that the charges against
him were fabricated by his wife to cover up the infidelity she committed while
working abroad.[26] Petitioner also relied on the testimonies of Florabel Flordeliz,
Levy Hope Flordeliz and Roderick Flordeliz, whose testimonies consisted mainly of
the alleged infidelity of ABC; and petitioner, being a good father, was often visited
by his daughters at his residence, where the rooms they occupied were only
separated by see-through curtains.[27]

On March 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment [28] finding petitioner

guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

 
 WHEREFORE, premises all duly considered[,] the court finds that the
prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and
hereby imposes upon him the following penalties:

1. In Criminal Case No. 23145-R for Acts of Lasciviousness, the Indeterminate Penalty of

6 months of Arresto Mayor as the minimum penalty to 6 years of Prision Correccional as
the maximum penalty and to indemnify the victim AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as
moral damages and to pay the costs.

The penalty shall also carry the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Art. 43, Revised Penal Code)[.]

2. In Criminal Cases Nos. 23072-R to 23080-R, the Indeterminate Penalty of twelve (12)
years of Prision Mayor as the minimum penalty to twenty (20) years of Reclusion
Temporal as the maximum penalty for each case or nine (9) counts of sexual assault
considering the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of relationship against the accused
and to indemnify BBB the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

The penalties shall carry with them the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life
and perpetual absolute disqualification (Art. 41, Revised Penal Code).

The accused shall be credited with 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of
his sentences.

In the service of his sentences, the same shall be served successively subject to the
provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code or the Three-Fold Rule.

SO ORDERED.[29]

 
 On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction with a modification of the
amount of his civil liabilities.

Petitioner now comes before us, raising the following errors:

 
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the judgment of

conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court for the crime charged despite the fact
that the guilt of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt with
moral certainty.

RAPES THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT

1. The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the judgments of

conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 23075-R ( alleged
rape through sexual assault sometime in May, 2002) and 23078-R (alleged rape through
sexual assault on August 3, 2003) respectively, despite the complete absence of
evidence to show how the alleged incidents of rape through sexual assault were
committed by petitioner on said particular dates.

2. The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the judgments of

conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court in the other alleged counts of rape
through sexual assault despite the fact that the guilt of the petitioner has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt with moral certainty.[30]

 
Simply put, petitioner assails the factual and legal bases of his conviction,
allegedly because of lack of the essential details or circumstances of the
commission of the crimes. Petitioner, in effect, questions the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution and insists that the charges against him were
designed to conceal ABCs infidelity.

We have repeatedly held that when the offended parties are young and
immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their
version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but
also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter
about which they testified were not true.[31]

It is not uncommon in incestuous rape for the accused to claim that the
case is a mere fabrication, and that the victim was moved by familial discord and
influence, hostility, or revenge. There is nothing novel about such defense, and
this Court had the occasion to address it in the past. In People v. Ortoa,[32] we held
that:

 
Verily, no child would knowingly expose herself and the rest of her family to the
humiliation and strain that a public trial surely entails unless she is so moved by her
desire to see to it that the person who forcibly robbed her of her cherished innocence is
penalized for his dastardly act. The imputation of ill motives to the victim of an
incestuous rape [or lascivious conduct] becomes even more unconvincing as the victim
and the accused are not strangers to each other. By electing to proceed with the filing of
the complaint, the victim risks not only losing a parent, one whom, before his moral
descent, she previously adored and looked up to, but also the likelihood of losing the
affection of her relatives who may not believe her claim. Indeed, it is not uncommon for
families to be torn apart by an accusation of incestuous rape. Given the serious nature
of the crime and its adverse consequences not only to her, it is highly improbable for a
daughter to manufacture a rape charge for the sole purpose of getting even with her
father. Thus, the alleged ill motives have never swayed the Court against giving
credence to the testimonies of victims who remained firm and steadfast in their account
of how they were ravished by their sex offenders. [33]
 Neither can we sustain petitioners claim that the charges against him were
products of ABCs fabrication to cover up the infidelity she committed while
working abroad. No matter how enraged a mother may be, it would take nothing
less than psychological depravity for her to concoct a story too damaging to the
welfare and well-being of her own daughter. Courts are seldom, if at all,
convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to expose her own daughter to
physical, mental and emotional hardship concomitant to a rape prosecution.[34]

We now proceed to discuss the specific crimes with which petitioner was
charged.

Criminal Case Nos. 23072-R, 23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R, and
23080-R for Rape Through Sexual Assault
 

The RTC, affirmed by the CA, correctly convicted petitioner of Rape in Criminal
Case Nos. 23072-R, 23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R, and 23080-R.

In her direct testimony, BBB clearly narrated that, on seven (7) separate
occasions, petitioner woke her up, held her vagina, played with it, and inserted his
fingers. During trial, the prosecutor presented a small doll where BBB
demonstrated how petitioner inserted his forefinger and middle finger, making an
up and down motion between the dolls legs.[35]

 
 The insertion of petitioners fingers into the victims vagina constituted the
crime of Rape through sexual assault[36] under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, or
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which in part provides:
 
Art. 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
 
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
 
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.[37]
 

Aside from proving the fact that Rape was committed, the prosecution also
established that petitioner is the biological father of BBB and that the latter was
less than twelve (12) years old at the time of the commission of the crimes. Under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape by sexual assault, if attended
by any of the aggravating circumstances under paragraph 1 [38] of Article 266-B,
would carry the penalty of reclusion temporal, ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years.

 
 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the
RPC. Other than the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship (which are already taken into account to raise the penalty
from prision mayor to reclusion temporal),[39] no other aggravating circumstance
was alleged and proven. Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months.

On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence

should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by the Code which is prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years.

For each count of sexual assault, petitioner should be meted the

indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim of Rape through sexual assault is
entitled to recover civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 for each
count. This is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of Rape.[40] Moreover, the
award of moral damages is automatically granted without need of further proof,
it being assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral damages entitling
her to such award. She is, thus, entitled to recover moral damages of P30,000.00
for each count.[41] In addition, the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
minority and relationship entitles her to an award of exemplary damages. The
amount of P30,000.00 for each count is appropriate under the circumstances.

Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and 23078-R

 
In Criminal Case No. 23075-R, it was alleged that petitioner sexually abused BBB
on August 3, 2003. Indeed, the RTC and the CA stated in their narration of facts
that on that particular date, while BBB was visiting her father, the incident
happened. A perusal of the transcript of the prosecution witnesses testimonies,
however, reveals that no such incident took place. No details were related by BBB
herself as to the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident.

In Criminal Case No. 23078-R, it was also stated in the Information that, from May
2002 to December 2003, petitioner committed the crime of Rape through sexual
assault against BBB. The Court notes, however, that the RTC decision is silent as to
the sexual abuse allegedly committed in May 2002. The RTCs narration of facts
started only with the incident that occurred in January 2003. While the CA stated
that, in May 2002, petitioner started sexually abusing BBB, the statement was
merely a conclusion unsupported by proof of how the crime was committed.
Assuming that acts of Rape were indeed committed in 2003 (which is within the
period from May 2002 to December 2003 as stated in the Information), those
instances could very well be the same incidents covered by the other
Informations discussed earlier.

Absent specific details of how and when the sexual abuses were
committed, petitioner should be acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and
23078-R.

Criminal Case No. 23145-R for Acts of Lasciviousness

In Criminal Case No. 23145-R, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Acts
of Lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed by Article 336 of
the RPC.While we sustain petitioners conviction of acts of lasciviousness, we
modify the assailed Decision in order to give the proper designation to the crime
committed and the law violated, and eventually to impose the proper penalty.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, AAA was
eleven (11) years old.[42] This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610 or The
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the
penalty therefor in its Article III, Section 5, to wit:
 

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or

female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be

imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.[43]

Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only

with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other
sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but
also where one -- through coercion, intimidation or influence -- engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.[44]

However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be

convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.[45]

The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the
following elements:
 
(1)  That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
 
(2)  That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
 
a.  By using force or intimidation; or
b.  When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c.  When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
 
(3)  That the offended party is another person of either sex.[46]
 

In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article

III of R.A. No. 7610 must be proven:
(1)   The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2)   The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse; and
(3)   The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[47]

Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610
defines lascivious conduct as follows:
 

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,

groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.[48]

 
Based on the foregoing definition, petitioners act of touching AAAs vagina and
playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the act
was committed on a child less than twelve years old and through intimidation, it is
beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.

We are aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts
of Lasciviousness under the RPC, without stating therein that it was in relation to
R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of
the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein
clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime
is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. [49]

In the instant case, the body of the Information contains an averment of the acts
alleged to have been committed by petitioner and unmistakably describes acts
punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

It is also undisputed that petitioner is the father of AAA. The RTC did not
appreciate the alternative circumstance of relationship, because it was not
alleged in the Information.We do not agree.

The resolution[50] of the investigating prosecutor, which formed the basis of the
Information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that petitioner is the
victims biological father. There was, therefore, substantial compliance with the
mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. [51]

In crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness, relationship is considered

aggravating.[52] Considering that AAA was less than twelve (12) years old at the
time the crime was committed, petitioner should be meted the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be meted the indeterminate
penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days
of reclusion temporal as maximum.

With respect to the lascivious conduct amounting to child abuse under

Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 committed by petitioner, we impose a fine
of P15,000.00.[53]

Civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P20,000.00 shall be awarded.

[54]
 Additionally, upon a finding of guilt of the accused for acts of lasciviousness,
the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages may be awarded to the victim in the
same way that moral damages are awarded to victims of rape even without need
of proof because it is assumed that they suffered moral injury.[55] In view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount
of P15,000.00 as exemplary damages should likewise be awarded.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals July 29, 2008 Decision

and February 16, 2009 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 30949
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The Court finds petitioner Salvador
Flordeliz y Abenojar:

1. GUILTY of seven (7) counts of RAPE Through Sexual Assault in Criminal

Case Nos. 23072-R, 23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R, and 23080-R.
He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for each count. Petitioner is ordered to indemnify
BBB P30,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages, for each count;

2. GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in Criminal Case No. 23145-R. He is

sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and to indemnify AAA P20,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, and P15,000.00 as exemplary
damages;

3. NOT GUILTY in Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and 23078-R.

SO ORDERED.

 
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. MARIANO
C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
 

ATTESTATION
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 
 
 

CERTIFICATION
 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
 Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per Special Order No. 824 dated February 12,
2010.
[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 392-402.
[2]
 Id. at 412-413.
[3]
 Branch 59, Baguio City.
[4]
 Penned by Judge Iluminada P. Cabato; records (Criminal Case Nos. 23072-R), pp. 691-715.
[5]
 Rollo, p. 95.
[6]
 Records (Criminal Case No. 23072-R), p. 701.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 95.
[8]
 Id.
[9]
 Id.
[10]
 Id.
[11]
 BBB demonstrated how her father touched her vagina with her forefinger and middle finger by making a sliding
up and down motion on the area between the two legs of the doll. (Id. at 96.)
[12]
 TSN, February 7, 2005; records (Criminal Case No. 23072-R), pp. 441-445.
[13]
 TSN, June 2, 2005; id. at 452-453.
[14]
 Id. at 454-455.
[15]
 Rollo, p. 96.
[16]
 TSN, June 2, 2005; records (Criminal Case No. 23072-R), pp. 456-457.
[17]
 Id. at 458-461.
[18]
 Id. at 461-462.
[19]
 Rollo, p. 97.
[20]
 Id.
[21]
 Records (Criminal Case No. 23072-R), p. 7.
[22]
 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 23145-R.
[23]
 Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 23072-80.
[24]
 Records (Criminal Case No. 23145-R), p. 1.
[25]
 Records (Criminal Case No. 23072-R), p. 1.
[26]
 Rollo, p. 98.
[27]
 Id. at 98-99.
[28]
 Records (Criminal Case No. 23072-R), pp. 691-715.
[29]
 Id. at 714-715.
[30]
 Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[31]
 People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 280, 295-296.
[32]
 G.R. No. 176266, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 536.
[33]
 Id. at 552.
[34]
 Id. at 553.
[35]
 Records (Criminal Case No. 23072-R), p. 702.
[36]
 People v. Hermocilla, G.R. No. 175830, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 296; People v. Palma, 463 Phil. 767 (2003).
[37]
 Emphasis supplied.
[38]
 Article 266-B. Penalties. x x x.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
[39]
 See People v. Noveras, G.R. No. 171349, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 777, 794; see also People v. Tonyacao, G.R.
No. 134531-32, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 513, 534.
[40]
 People v. Bunagan, G.R. No. 177161, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 808, 814; People v. Hermocilla, supra note 36,
at 305.
[41]
 People v. Bunagan, supra, at 814; People v. Hermocilla, supra note 36, at 305.
[42]
 TSN, March 8, 2005; records (Criminal Case No. 23145-R), p. 217.
[43]
 Emphasis ours.
[44]
 Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643, 656-657.
[45]
 Navarrete v. People, G.R. No. 147913, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 509, 517; Amployo v. People, 496 Phil. 747,
755 (2005).
[46]
 Navarrete v. People, supra, at 517; Amployo v. People, supra, at 755; People v. Bon, 444 Phil. 571, 583-584
(2003).
[47]
 People of the Philippines v. Salvino Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009; People v. Montinola, G.R.
No. 178061, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 412, 431; Navarrete v. People, supra note 45, at 521; Olivarez v. Court of
Appeals,G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 465, 473; Amployo v. People, supra note 45, at 758.
[48]
 Navarrete v. People, supra note 45, at 521-522; Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 473-474; People v. Bon,
supra note 46, at 584.
[49]
 People of the Philippines v. Salvino Sumingwa, supra note 47, citing Malto v. People, supra note 44;
and Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
[50]
 Records (Criminal Case No. 23145-R), p. 3.
[51]
 Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, at 478-479.
[52]
 People of the Philippines v. Salvino Sumingwa, supra note 47; People v. Montinola, supra note 47, at 432.
[53]
 People of the Philippines v. Salvino Sumingwa, supra note 47; People v. Montinola, supra note 47; People v.
Candaza, supra note 31; Amployo v. People, supra note 45, at 762-763.
[54]
 See People v. Palma, supra note 36.
[55]
 Amployo v. People, supra note 45, at 761-762.
 THIRD DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER D. MANAOG, A.M. No. P-08-2521

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2329-P)
Complainant,
 
 
Present:
 
 

  YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
  Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
  CHICO-NAZARIO,
  NACHURA, and
  PERALTA, JJ.
   
ARNEL JOSE A. RUBIO and EDGAR C. Promulgated:
SURTIDA II, both Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Naga City,  

Respondents. February 13, 2009

   

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 
 
 RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

The instant controversy arose from a Complaint dated November 14, 2005
and docketed as OCA I.P.I No. 05-2329-P for misconduct, unethical behavior,
verbal abuse, manhandling, grave threat, grave/serious oral defamation,
harassment, abuse and usurpation of judicial power by Christopher D. Manaog
against Arnel Jose A. Rubio and Edgar C. Surtida, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court
(RTC)-Naga City.

In a Resolution[1] dated February 27, 2008, the Third Division of the Court

referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the RTC at Naga City[2] for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the case was referred to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), also for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[3]

As summarized by the Investigating Judge, the facts are as follows:

The complainant, on October 21, 2005, went to the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC), RTC, Naga City to secure information on ownership of certain parcels of
land, which had been transferred to others allegedly through fraud. He was
inquiring at the information counter in the lobby of the Hall of Justice, when
respondent Rubio approached him and said, Digdi (Its here) after the former saw
the documents he had brought with him. The complainant claims the respondent
told him that the person whose signature appeared on the said documents was
already dead, and whatever records the complainant was looking for were
already gone. A discussion followed, culminating in a verbal tussle between them.

The complainant avers that the respondent summoned the guard-on-duty at the
Hall of Justice and instructed the latter: Guard, pahaleon mo ang hayop na taong
ini (Guard, send away this beast!). The respondent proceeded to hurl invectives at
the complainant, statements like Dae ka tatao makipag-olay, hayup ka (You do
not know how to ask for a favor, you beast!). Respondent Surtida, who was
unknown to the complainant at the time, also joined the fray, telling the
complainant, Magdigdi ka ta titirahon ta kang di, puta kang hayop ka (Come here
and I will hit you, you vile beast!).

The complainant avers that on October 26, 2005, together with his brother, he
returned to the Hall of Justice to verify the identity of the other employee
(respondent Surtida) who had joined respondent Rubio in verbally abusing
him. While on their way to the office of RTC Branch 25, respondent Rubio shouted
at him and said, Hoy, hoy, ano nakua mo na ang daga mo (Hey, hey, have you
found your land?)? The complainant avers that he merely ignored the taunts from
respondent Rubio. The latter, however, refused to keep silent and, in the
presence of the court employees, told the complainant, Maski ka pa mo, raot
garo an payo mo (Whatever, you appear to be a nutcase). The complainants
brother responded, UP graduate man lang kami (We are just UP graduates),
which statement apparently drew the ire of respondent Rubio, making him retort
with the following remark: Ano man daa yang UP? Siguro raot an payo kan mga
nagkaklase dyan. Maski pa kamo magsurog na duwa, papatulan ko kamo (What
is that UP? I think the students there are also nutcases. Even if both of you would
help each other, I will fight you).
 

In his June 30, 2008 Report, Executive Judge Jaime E. Contreras, RTC, Naga City,
found respondents Sheriffs Jose Arnel Rubio and Edgar C. Surtida II liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Judge Contreras
recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) month for Sheriff Rubio and
reprimand for Sheriff Surtida, a recommendation joined by the OCA.

The Court agrees with the report of the Executive Judge and OCA.

Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden of responsibility
which court officials and employees are mandated to perform. They are
constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in
the performance of official functions must be avoided. This is so because the
image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Thus, court employees have
been requested to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in
order to preserve the judiciarys good name and standing as a true temple of
justice.[4]

This Court, speaking in Pizarro v. Villegas,[5] held that:

 
We stress that the conduct of even minor employees mirrors the image of the courts
they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the judiciarys good name and standing as
a true temple of justice x x x.

 
Respondents Rubio and Surtida failed to meet these exacting standards. They
have shown lack of decorum, propriety, and respect in their dealing with other
people. Their actuations also debased the publics regard for the very institution
they represent, thereby warranting administrative sanction. Any conduct that
would be a bane to the public trust and confidence reposed in the Judiciary
cannot be countenanced.[6]

The Investigating Judge correctly observed that the respondents failed to exercise
the necessary prudence in dealing with the complainant. A court employee, even
in the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, ought to conduct
himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and an officer of the court. Suffice it to
say, respondents did not accord the complainant the respect due
him. Respondents Rubio and Surtida could have easily avoided the heated
discussion with the complainant had they simply referred him to the OCC.

Respondents Rubio and Surtida should be held liable for conduct unbecoming
court employees. Their acts of provoking the complainant constitute behavior
wholly unexpected from those in the judicial service. They should be reminded
that government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of
dispensing justice, civility is never a sign of weakness, and courtesy is a mark of
culture and good breeding. Impatience and rudeness have no place in
government service in which personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and
civility at all times.[7]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Sheriff Jose Arnel Rubio GUILTY of simple

misconduct for which he is SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) month and
one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The Court also
finds Sheriff Edgar C. Surtida II GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a court employee
for which he is REPRIMANDED with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
  

SO ORDERED.

 
 
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
 
 

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

[1]
 Rollo, p. 33.
[2]
 Judge Jaime E. Contreras, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Naga City.
[3]
 Resolution dated August 13, 2008, rollo, p. 123.
 
[4]
 Reyes v. Vidor, A.M. No. P-02-1552, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 257, 260.
[5]
 A.M. No. P-97-1243, November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA 42.
[6]
 In Re: Complaint for Failure to Pay Just Debts against Esther T. Andres, A.M. No. 4004-40-SC, March 1, 2005,
452 SCRA 654, 664.
[7]
 Jacinto v. Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 83, 94.
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
 

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. P-94-1015. March 29, 1999]

JASMIN MAGUAD and REBECCA BRIOSO, complainants, vs. NICOLAS

DE GUZMAN and RUBY C. BARCENAS, respondents.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

This is a complaint filed by Jasmin Maguad and Rebecca Brioso against Nicolas de
Guzman, Sheriff of Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City and Ruby Barcenas,
Court Social Worker in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, for grave misconduct,
falsification and immorality.
The complaint[1] alleges that sometime in 1982, respondent Nicolas de Guzman (lawfully
married to Corazon Punzalan de Guzman), and respondent Ruby Barcenas, single, unlawfully
and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at 137 Ignacio St., Pasay City; that in October,
1983, when respondents' first illegitimate child Nathaniel Roy was born, respondents unlawfully
and maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the Birth Certificate of said child, making it
appear that respondents were lawfully married on December 8, 1982; that when respondents'
second illegitimate child Natalia, was born in 1984, respondents unlawfully and maliciously
conspired to falsify an entry in the said child's Birth Certificate, making it appear that
respondents were lawfully married on December 8, 1984 (perhaps a typographical error meant to
be December 8, 1982 as in the first Birth Certificate).
In their joint comment and/or answer,[2] the respondents admitted that respondent Nicolas de
Guzman was married to Corazon Punzalan in 1968 and has two legitimate children with her; de
Guzman explained that he and Corazon Punzalan had long been separated in fact and a
reconciliation between them for purposes of their living together again has become quite remote
as she is now living with another man by the name of Eliseo Almero; de Guzman added that he
has not been remiss in his obligations as a father to his two legitimate children, as he provided
them within his means all that they needed for their sustenance. Respondents denied the
complainants' allegation that they cohabited as husband and wife under scandalous
circumstances; they also denied that they unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify the
entries in the certificates of live birth of their two children. They claimed that the truth is that
respondent de Guzman had no knowledge, much less any participation in the entries therein
relating to their alleged marriage on December 8, 1982; that in the birth certificates of the
children, the informant appearing therein is only-respondent Barcenas. The respondents
explained that Barcenas was "constrained to supply such erroneous information as regards her
civil status solely for purposes of shielding her two children from the stigma of shame and
disgrace that they might encounter in their later years in life by reason of their illegitimacy." De
Guzman and Barcenas took exception to the claim of the complainants that they filed the present
charges as "concerned citizens." According to the respondents, "for some ulterior designs," the
complainants allow themselves to be the willing pawns of one Leoncio Cesar in the latter's
attempts to unduly harass herein respondents because respondent Barcenas was one of the
private complainants against Leoncio Cesar for Grave Oral Defamation before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 46, in Crim. Cases Nos. 93-1300 to 1303.
In a resolution[3] dated March 23, 1994, the complaint was referred to Executive Judge
Conchita Carpio Morales for investigation, report and recommendation. However, in view of the
promotion of Executive Judge Morales to the Court of Appeals, this case was referred to Acting
Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo of Branch 116, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
investigation, report and recommendation.[4]
During the hearing of the case, instead of presenting proofs in support of the accusation, the
complainants offered in evidence their joint Affidavit of Desistance,[5] dated August 12, 1994
stating, among others:
x x x x x x x x x

"3. That, assisted by our private lawyer, we recently conferred with the said two
accused about this case and we have realized: (a) that they had no malicious or
criminal intent when they made that entry and that Ruby Barcenas innocently did it in
the best interest of their said children to avoid future social stigma upon the persons of
the said children when they grow up; and (b) that Mr. De Guzman had been separated
for many years from his wife, who has likewise been living her own life with a
common-law husband in Mindoro; and that his wife and two children with her had
expressly condoned and consented to his relationship with Ms. Barcenas many years
ago;

"4. That we are no longer interested to pursue this administrative case and that
therefore, in the interest of justice, we hereby request the Supreme Court, thru the
investigating Executive Judge of Pasay City to dismiss the same."

In his Investigation Report[6] dated November 2, 1994 Acting Executive Judge Alfredo J.

Gustilo (now Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan), made the following findings which the
Court quotes with approval:

"Misconduct means intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or

standard of behavior, specially by a government official. (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary). To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a
public officer. (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456) No act of the respondents appears or
has been established which can be considered as misconduct in office. The charge of
grave misconduct against them is therefore without any basis.
"With respect to the charge of falsification, the complainants allege that the
respondents committed the offense when they made, through conspiracy, an entry in
the birth certificates of their children that they were married on December 8, 1982, or
December 8, 1984, in Davao City, when in fact they were not. Apparently, this
accusation is predicated on one of the ways of committing falsification, i.e., by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts under Article 171 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code. One essential element of this kind of falsification is that there
must be a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the fact claimed to be false. In other
words, there must be a law requiring, expressly or impliedly, the disclosure of the
truth of the fact alleged to have been falsified. No law has been shown by the
complainants making it either expressly or impliedly a duty of an informant in a
record of birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child covered by it are
married or not. Consequently, the charge of falsification against the respondents
cannot likewise prosper.

"It is alleged in the complaint that the respondents conspired with each other in
making the entry in the birth certificates of their children that they were
married. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, Revised Penal
Code). The rule is that conspiracy should be shown by strong and convincing
evidence. No evidence has been adduced in this case indicating that the respondents
agreed and decided to make the entry in the birth certificates of their children that they
were married. Even on the assumption that such entry in the birth certificates of
Nathaniel and Natalia would constitute falsification by making an untruthful statement
in a narration of fact, only respondent Barcenas, the informant who made the entry,
could be held liable therefor. Respondent De Guzman could not be made to answer
for it, since there is no proof that he conspired with his co-respondent in making such
entry.

"On the other hand, the circumstances in this case admitted by the respondents are
sufficient to sustain the charge of immorality. It is not in accordance with the norms of
morality for a man who is legally married to cohabit with another woman during the
subsistence of such marriage. In the same manner, it is against the tenets of morality
for a woman to be living together with a married man not her husband.The stigma of
immorality attaches to this kind of relationship even if the married man is separated
from his wife and the woman living with him is single. This is specially so when the
persons concerned are public officers who are supposed to maintain a high standard of
morality so as to live up to their role to be looked upon as models in society.

"However, to temper justice with mercy, these circumstances may be considered to

mitigate the liability of the respondents:
"1. They have voluntarily admitted that they are living together as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage.

"2. Respondent De Guzman and his lawful wife have been separated in fact for a long
time and his wife is already cohabiting with another man, thereby rendering
reconciliation between them improbable.

"3. Notwithstanding their separation, respondent De Guzman has continued giving

support to his children with Punzalan.

"4. The relationship between the respondents is one of the realities of life which is
difficult to prevent from happening, more so because respondent De Guzman has been
separated for a long time from his wife.

"5. Apparently, the lawful wife and legitimate children of respondent De Guzman
have tolerated the relationship between the respondents as can be implied from the
fact that none of them has filed a complaint against them.

"6. There is no indication that the relationship between the respondents has caused
prejudice to any person or has adversely affected the performance of their functions
and duties as officers of the government to the detriment of the public service.

"7. The complainants have desisted from further prosecuting their complaint and
asked for its dismissal, admitting that the filing of the present charges was an offshoot
of a civil case involving complainant Maguad and the respondents."

The investigating Judge made the following recommendation:

"1. Respondents Nicolas de Guzman and Ruby Barcenas be exonerated of the charges
of grave misconduct and falsification; and

"2. Both respondents be found guilty of the charge of immorality.

"However, because of the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, only the penalty

of suspension from office for one (1) month without pay be imposed on them.

"Additionally, the respondents should be admonished to terminate their cohabitation

or to take such proper course of action as will legitimize the relationship between
them."

The Court fully agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge that
the respondents be absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and falsification, the same
being duly supported by the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the matter.
 With regard to the third accusation, the stigma of immorality attaches to the kind of
relationship between the respondents, the same being improper, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent de Guzman was separated from his wife (who is now living with another man) and
respondent Barcenas was single. In Nalupta, Jr. vs. Tapec,[7] this Court held that illicit relations
is considered disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action pointing out that
Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission has categorized
disgraceful and immoral conduct as a grave offense for which a penalty of suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day shall be imposed for the first offense while the penalty of dismissal is
imposed for the second offense.
However, this being the first offense of the respondents and there being no allegation in the
complaint that respondent Barcenas knew that de Guzman was married even before they started
their relationship and came to know of it only when it was already too late to back out, with the
birth of their children, and taking into account the circumstances enumerated by the Investigating
Judge that may be considered to mitigate their liability, the Court, in order to temper justice with
mercy is inclined to impose a lighter penalty upon the respondents.
In a Memorandum[8] for the Chief Justice dated September 28, 1998, the Court Administrator
recommended that the respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas de Guzman and Social Worker Ruby
Barcenas be absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and falsification, but respondent de
Guzman should be suspended for two (2) months without pay for immorality and respondent
Barcenas be suspended for fifteen (15) days without pay and that both respondents be
admonished to terminate their relationship or to take the necessary steps to legitimize the same.
Parenthetically, on February 5, 1999, the respondents filed a Manifestation [9] stating among
others:
x x x x x x x x x

"5. That on May 25, 1995, respondent Nicolas de Guzman filed a

Petition for Annulment of Marriage before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite;

"6. On August 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the Honorable Judge Dolores C.
Espaol in favor of the respondent;

"7. That on November 27, 1998, Entry of Final Judgment regarding the Annulment of
Marriage was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite; and,

"8. That on October 19, 1998, the respondents had tied their marriage knot before the
Honorable Judge Leticia P. Morales of Regional Trial Court, Makati."

WHEREFORE, respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas de Guzman and Court Social Worker
Ruby Barcenas are absolved from the charge of grave misconduct and falsification, but
respondent de Guzman is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay and respondent
Barcenas for fifteen (15) days also without pay, both for immorality.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 1-7.
[2]
 Ibid., pp. 30-32.
[3]
 Ibid., p. 44.
[4]
 Ibid., p. 45.
[5]
 Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[6]
 Rollo, pp. 97-109.
[7]
 220 SCRA 505 (1993).
[8]
 Rollo, pp. 111-117.
[9]
 Rollo, pp. 118-124.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125319. July 27, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HUGA TANILON

y CARINAL, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Huga Tanilon y Carinal and Simeon Yap y Montecino were charged with the crime
of murder under an Information which reads:

"The undersigned 2nd Asst. Prov'l. Prosecutor hereby accuses HUGA

TANILON y CARINAL and SIMEON YAP y MONTECINO of the crime of
Murder, committed as follows:

"That sometime in the evening of September 25, 1994, at Matuog, Tayasan,

Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation, with treachery,
and with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating with and mutually helping
each other, with accused Huga C. Tanilon as principal by inducement, having
paid the P 1,000 reward for the killing to the other accused, Simeon M. Yap,
who, as principal by direct participation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously ATTACK, STAB, and KILL one Andrew Caldera, inflicting fatal
stab wounds on the vital parts of the latter's body, who died instantaneously
as a result thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
Andrew Caldera.

'An Act defined and penalized by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."

Both accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned and were tried. On February 28,
1996, the trial court convicted them in a Decision,  the dispositive portion of which
[1]

states:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Huga Tanilon y Carinal

and Simeon Yap y Montecino guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal and
accomplice, respectively, of Murder penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. Accordingly, accused Huga Tanilon y
Carinal is hereby sentenced to the (sic) penalty of reclusion perpetua,
together with all the accessory penalties provided by law. Accused Simeon
Yap y Montecino is hereby sentenced, after applying the indeterminate
sentence law, to suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law. Both defendants are jointly and severally ordered to pay
to the lawful heirs of the deceased victim Andrew Caldera the following:

(a) P 1,440,000.00 representing loss of income;

(b) P 50,000.00 as death indemnity; and
(c) P 30,000.00 for moral damages.

"The jailer is hereby ordered to make the proper reduction of the period during
which the said two defendants were under preventive custody by reason of
this case in accordance with law.

"SO ORDERED." [2]

Seeking a reversal of the decision, accused-appellant Huga C. Tanilon interposes

the present appeal. She assigns the following errors to the Decision of the trial court,
viz:
I

The trial court erred in giving credence to the uncorroborated and

contradictory testimony of prosecution witness Simeon Yap.
II

The trial court erred in finding the accused Tanilon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that the accused Tanilon had a grudge
against the victim, Andrew Caldera. Nancy Caldera, the wife of the victim, testified that
Tanilon and the victim were not in good terms because on June 12, 1992, the victim
called Tanilon "x x x a prostitute, a nymphomaniac, a whore and a fucker" and
threatened "x x x I will kill you; you will not reach morning alive, and if you will not come
down, I will set fire to (sic) your house. x x x I will cut your clitoris with a long
bolo."  Tanilon filed two (2) criminal cases against the victim, one for Grave Oral
[3]

Defamation  and another for Grave Threats.  Both cases were pending in the MCTC of
[4] [5]

Tayasan, Negros Oriental, at the time of the incident.

 Simeon Yap, a co-accused of Tanilon, was called by the prosecution as a hostile
witness with his consent. Yap's wife is a cousin of accused Tanilon.  Yap testified that
[6]

at about 6 o' clock in the morning of September 25, 1994, at Guindahogan, Suquib,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental, accused Tanilon saw him in the house of his brother-in-law
and told him to go to her store.He arrived at the store at about 7 o' clock in the
morning. There, he was invited to drink by Dioscoro Dupio, Bonifacio Alejo and
Nordebelio Calijan. The accused Tanilon supplied them five (5) bottles of beer and four
(4) bottles of Anejo Rum 65. Thereupon, she proposed to give each one of
them P 1,000.00 to kill Caldera so she would have no more cases against him. She
then handed to each one of Dupio, Alejo and Calijan P 1,000.00 in ten (10) P 100.00
bills. When he was about to leave the store, he was called by the accused Tanilon who
handed to him P 50.00 with the instruction to use the money to drink with Caldera. He
proceeded to the town proper to look for Caldera. [7]

At the Tayasan Market, he met Romeo Villegas and had a drinking spree with him
until 11 o' clock in the morning. Afterwards, they proceeded to the store of Elvis Bahandi
where they consumed two (2) more bottles of Anejo Rum 65. He told Villegas that he
was looking for Caldera as he had instruction from accused Tanilon to kill him. When
they parted ways, he went to the house of his elder sister, Loling Villegas, in Palaslan,
Tayasan, where he took his lunch. [8]

At about 5 o' clock in afternoon of the same day, he went to Barangay Matuog,
Tayasan, which is more or less two (2) kilometers from Palaslan. He arrived in the place
at past 6 o' clock in the evening. He saw Caldera smoking alone at the store of a certain
Lodina Anjao. Caldera requested him to buy some drinks. He bought one (1) flat bottle
of Anejo Rum. After drinking one-half of its content, they left the store and walked
together on their way home. On the road, they consumed the remaining half of the
rum. They used the empty bottle as kerosene lamp, with Caldera carrying it. [9]

At about 7 o' clock in the evening and after hiking more than half of a kilometer with
Caldera walking ahead of him, Dupio, Alejo and Calijan appeared on the road. At a
distance of more or less one (1) fathom or about six (6) feet, he saw Dupio stab Caldera
with a file. Caldera was hit at the base of the right side of his neck. Alejo was the next to
stab Caldera with a stainless knife, hitting him at the left shoulder. Caldera fell to the
ground face up. Calijan then forcefully stepped on the chest of Caldera five (5) times.
Dupio threatened him with death if he would not assist in carrying the body of
Caldera. Fearing for his life, he helped the three in carrying Caldera's lifeless body to
the river located at about seventeen (17) fathoms or one hundred two (102) feet away
from the place of the incident. They dumped the body of Caldera at the river so the flood
would carry it away. They then parted ways. He went home. [10]

In the early morning of September 26, 1994, the accused Tanilon came to his house
and gave him P 1,000.00 for fetching Caldera. At about 7 o' clock in the morning of the
same day, he passed by the store of accused Tanilon where Dupio and Calijan were
drinking rum with accused Tanilon. He joined the group and took two (2) shots of rum. [11]

Yap's testimony was corroborated by Teresa Ollana, his sister, and Romeo
Villegas. Villegas testified that when he asked Yap why he was looking for Caldera, he
(Yap) told him that he was paid by accused Tanilon and made the gesture with his hand
cutting across his neck. He understood the gesture to mean that Yap would kill
Caldera. He further declared that Yap visited him on October 2, 1994, and requested
him not to tell anybody that he was hired by accused Tanilon to kill Caldera.
[12]

Ollana similarly testified that Yap went to her house on October 10, 1994, and
confided to her that he killed Caldera upon the order of accused Tanilon who paid
him P1,000.00. Yap then told her to go to Tayasan and execute an affidavit about his
revelation. He also instructed her to inform the authorities that he would be the one to
reveal the names of his companions. [13]

Dr. Rolando Herrera, Municipal Health Officer of Bindoy, Negros Oriental,

conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim. He submitted a Post-mortem
Report dated September 27, 1994 with the following findings:

"GENERAL APPEARANCE OF THE VICTIM WHEN SEEN:

- Lying position with both upper extremities flexed

- Multiple hematoma over the chest
- Left lower leg slightly flexed

"POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound at the right side of the neck, five (5) cm. wide, penetrating and
traversing the chest cavity, directed towards the left chest and causing injury
to the heart with a measurement of five (5) inches deep.

2. Stab wound at the middle third of the left shoulder, five (5) cm. wide and
two (2) inches deep, penetrating the muscle.

No other injuries seen upon further examination.

"CAUSE OF DEATH:

Cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe internal hemorrhage." [14]

He testified that stab wound number 1 was the fatal wound and the weapon used was a
sharp three-bladed instrument like a file. He likewise opined that another weapon, a
shorter one, was possibly used. He declared that the hematoma could have been
caused by the contact of the chest with any hard object except a boxing blow. [15]

Nancy Caldera, the victim's wife, testified that she pitied her husband whose death
saddened her. She asked for P 300,000.00 as compensation for her depression. She
said that her husband, who was forty (40) years old at the time of his death, had a daily
income of P 300.00 from farming and fishing. She spent P 6,000.00 for the funeral of
her husband. [16]
 Accused Tanilon did not take the witness stand. She relied mainly on her testimony
in the preliminary investigation conducted on December 20, 1994, and counter-affidavit
dated October 17, 1994 [Exhibit "11"] denying any participation in the murder of
Caldera.
As aforestated, the trial court convicted the accused Tanilon.
In this appeal, appellant Tanilon assails the credibility of Yap. Her efforts cannot
succeed.
First. As we have so frequently ruled, the trial judge who sees and hears witnesses
testify has exceptional opportunities to form a correct conclusion as to the degree of
credit which should be accorded their testimonies; and where, as in the instant case, the
judge has exercised due care and discretion in making his findings and has not
overlooked anything which would justify us in questioning the soundness of his
conclusions, this court will not disturb his findings and conclusions. [17]

Second. In affirming appellant's conviction, we note that appellant had strong

motive to have Caldera killed. They had near violent quarrels which resulted in criminal
suits. During the preliminary investigation of the case at bar, appellant herself admitted
that Caldera continued to threaten her even during the pendency of these two (2)
criminal cases she filed against him. [18]

Third. The alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of accused

Yap cannot completely erode his credibility. Appellant pounds on the following
inconsistencies: (a) Yap's testimony that he was merely one (1) fathom away from
Caldera when the latter was stabbed by Dupio and Alejo is contradicted by his
statement in the preliminary investigation that he was fifty (50) meters away; (b) Yap's
testimony to the effect that he had known appellant for four (4) years prior to the
incident contradicts his statement in the preliminary investigation that he came to know
appellant only on September 25, 1994; and (c) Yap's testimony that appellant gave his
three (3) companions P 1,000.00 each on September 25, 1994 while he was given the
same amount only on September 26, 1994 contradicts his affidavit dated November 11,
1994 stating that he and his three (3) companions were given P 1,000.00 each by
appellant on September 26, 1994. Appellant further points out that Yap's testimony was
not corroborated by Dr. Rolando Herrera. [19]

Yap sufficiently explained the discrepancy between his testimony and his statement
in the preliminary investigation regarding the distance from which he observed the killing
of the victim, viz:
"Q Mr. Yap, on page 9 of the Preliminary Investigation conducted by the MCTC of Tayasan,
Negros Oriental, which is now page 89 of the records of this case, you testified among
other things, and I quote,
'Q - What were Bonifacio Alejo and Nordevillo Calijan doing at that time?
''A - When we reached after the chapter he was immediately stabbed by Coroy and followed
up by Bonifacio hitting at the left and when Andrew Caldera fell down he was stepped on
by Nordy Calijan (sic).
"And you repeated this kind of testimony on page 12 of the preliminary
investigation which is now page 92 of the records of this case, and now
marked as Exhibit "4-K" for the prosecution and Exhibit "M-11" for the
defense, and I quote:

'Q - And you are very sure of that - that you saw Dioscoro Dupio and Bonifacio Alejo stab
Andrew Caldera?
'A - Yes.
'Q - At a distance of 50 meters?
'A - Yes, I saw.
'Q - At a distance of 50 meters, you are very sure of this?
'A - Yes.
'Q -Even if it is (sic) dark?
'A - Yes.
'Q - So that the distance of Andrew Caldera and the persons who killed Andrew Caldera like
Dioscoro Dupio and Bonifacio Alejo and Nordevillo Calijan, you were at a distance of 50
meters from them?
'A - I saw.
'Q - You are very sure of that it was 50 meters?
'A - I am sure.
'Q - And that distance is that distance from where you were setting (sic) to the goal?
'A - Yes.
"Q Mr. Yap, do you remember having testified to that effect?
"A Yes.
"Q And all these answers are true, Mr. Yap?
"A During that time, I got rattled that is why I answered that I was fifty (50) meters away."[20]
The second inconsistency, referring to whether Yap knew the appellant prior to the
incident, even if true, does not justify disbelieving Yap's entire testimony.  The rule has
[21]

always been that the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not
by its truncated portions or isolated passages.  Anent Yap's inconsistency regarding
[22]

the date of payment of the P1,000.00 price, suffice it to say that contradictions between
the contents of an affiant's affidavit and his testimony on the witness stand do not
always  militate against the witness' credibility because we have long taken judicial
notice that affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete
and inaccurate.  To be sure, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered
[23]

to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of
cross examination.  Moreover, the alleged inconsistency is insignificant. Whether Yap
[24]

and his companions received the money before or after the incident, the important
circumstance common to both the affidavit and the testimony in court is that the
appellant ordered the killing of the victim for a price.
We reject appellant's claim that Yap's testimony that two (2) weapons were used in
stabbing the victim was contradicted by Dr. Herrera who opined that only one (1)
weapon was used.A more accurate reading of Dr. Herrera's testimony will show that he
gave the opinion that it was possible that two weapons were used in slaying the victim,
viz:
"x x x
"PROSECUTOR SALMIN:
"Q I will again read the typewritten words and you indicate where is that finding in the blank
form. Again, finding No. 1 is stab wound at the right side of the neck, five (5) cm wide,
penetrating and traversing the chest cavity, directed towards the left chest and causing
injury to the heart with a measurement of nine (9) inches deep.
"x x x
"Q So because of the depth of such a wound which is nine (9) inches, would you say Doctor
that the weapon used could be measured more than nine inches?
"A It is possible and the weapon might be having (sic) a three (3) cornered weapon.
"COURT:
"Q Three (3) cornered weapon like what?
"A Like a file.
"PROSECUTOR SALMIN:
"Q When you say three (3) cornered weapon doctor, you are implying what we call in the
dialect a 'tres cantos'?
"A Possible.
"COURT:
"Q Three pointed instrument?
"A Three sided instrument.
"Q You mean three (3) sided not three (3) pointed?
"A Three (3) sided.
"x x x
"Q And the entrance of the wound is five (5) cm. Does that indicate also the width of the
weapon used?
"A Possible, sir.
"Q So, what would have been the possible weapon used in the perpetration of that kind of
wound aside from its being three (3) sided, three (3) cornered weapon.
"A Three sided weapon.
"Q It is a sharp three sided weapon, Doctor?
"A Yes.
"Q Compatible with an icepick, a file - as what you said?
"A It is a sort of an instrument like a file.
"x x x
"Q Now, in your finding No. 2, as I read, kindly indicate that also on the anatomical chart
Doctor, is (sic) a stab wound at the middle third of the left shoulder?
"x x x
"Q The same finding Doctor is to the effect that the entrance of five (5) cm wide and the
deepness is of two (2) inches penetrating the muscle. x x x
"x x x
"Q And what kind of weapon must have been used in inflicting such a wound?
"A The same weapon.
"Q The same weapon or the same type of weapon?
"A The same type of weapon.
"Q In other words, it is also a three sided or three cornered sharp and pointed instrument?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Again, compatible with a file or an icepick, Doctor?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Considering that the entrance is five (5) cm wide, could it be that the same weapon was
used in inflicting such kind of wound?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Considering that the deepness is only two (2) inches, could it also be possible that
another weapon, a shorter one, was being (sic) used?
"ATTY. ERAMES:
"We object to the question. The question asks for possibilities, Your Honor, please. Besides,
Your Honor, please, the deepness of a certain injury would depend on the pressure
applied by the assailant on the victim.
"COURT:
Read the question. (Done) Answer.
"A I cannot determine exactly whether another weapon was used.
"COURT:
You are only asked about the possibility, not exact determination.
"A It is also possible.
 "x x x" [25]

Fourth. Yap's testimony was fully corroborated by the unquestioned and

unquestionable testimony of two (2) competent witnesses, Romeo Villegas and Teresa
Ollana.  There is no reason to withhold full faith and credit to the testimony of these
[26]

prosecution witnesses especially after appellant failed to prove any improper motive on
their part for testifying against her. [27]

We conclude that the conviction of accused-appellant is fully sustained by

competent evidence on record and there can be no reasonable doubt as to her guilt.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Penned by Judge Eleuterio E. Chiu.
[2]
 Decision, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 104-105.
[3]
 TSN, Nancy Caldera, July 19, 1995, pp. 12-18; see Exhibits "J" and "K".
[4]
 Criminal Case No. 1807 (Exhibit "J").
[5]
 Criminal Case No. 1874 (Exhibit "K").
[6]
 TSN, Nancy Caldera, July 19, 1995, p. 6 and 12; TSN, Simeon Yap, August 11, 1995, p. 7.
[7]
 TSN, Simeon Yap, August 11, 1995, pp. 7-12, 14; TSN, Simeon Yap, August 18, 1995, pp. 7-13.
[8]
 TSN, Simeon Yap, August 11, 1995, pp. 14-16; TSN, Simeon Yap, August 18, 1995, pp. 14-16.
[9]
 TSN, Simeon Yap, August 11, 1995, pp. 16-21.
[10]
 TSN, Simeon Yap, August 11, 1995, pp. 21-28.
[11]
 TSN, Simeon Yap, August 11, 1995, pp. 28-29.
[12]
 TSN, Romeo Villegas, July 20, 1995, pp. 6-7, 9-10.
[13]
 TSN, Teresa Ollana, August 9, 1995, pp. 32-33.
[14]
 Exhibit "D", Folder of Exhibits, p. 13.
[15]
 TSN, Dr. Rolando Herrera, August 9, 1995, pp. 4-13.
[16]
 TSN, Nancy Caldera, July 19, 1995, pp. 10-11, 24.
[17]
 People of the Philippines v. Victoriano Pontilar, Jr., G. R. No. 104865, July 11, 1997; People of the
Philippines v. Diarangan Dansal, G. R. No. 105002, July 17, 1997.
[18]
 Resolution, p. 7; Records, p. 153.
[19]
 Rollo, pp. 84-88.
[20]
 TSN, Simeon Yap, August 30, 1995, pp. 5-6.
[21]
 People v. Pacapac, 248 SCRA 77 [1995].
[22]
 People v. Calegan, 233 SCRA 537 [1994].
[23]
 People of the Philippines v. Dione Palomar, Hermie Ceriales and Jose Ceriales, G. R. No. 108183-85,
August 21, 1997; People v. Calegan, 233 SCRA 537 [1994].
[24]
 People v. Lazaro, 249 SCRA 234 [1995].
[25]
 TSN, Dr. Rolando Herrera, August 9, 1995, pp. 7-11.
[26]
 People v. Alcantara, 254 SCRA 384 [1996].
[27]
 Id.; People of the Philippines v. Rolly Alvarado y Llaner, G. R. No. 117402, July 21, 1997; People of the
Philippines v. David Salvatierra, G. R. No. 104663, July 24, 1997.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129124. March 15, 2002]

RENATO A. TAPIADOR, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

and ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] dated January 22, 1997 of the
Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-94-0983 dismissing the petitioner from the
government service for grave misconduct and the Order[2] dated April 7, 1997 denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The incipience of the case could be traced to the complaint-affidavit [3] dated July 4, 1994
lodged with the Resident Ombudsman at the main office in Manila of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID for brevity) by Walter H. Beck, a U.S. citizen, against the petitioner,
Renato A. Tapiador, BID Special Investigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office
of the then Associate Commissioner Bayani M. Subido, Jr. The complaint alleged in substance
that petitioner Tapiador demanded and received from Walter Beck the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of registration (ACR for
brevity) which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite repeated
demands by Beck, unless the latter pay an additional amount of Seven Thousand Pesos
(P7,000.00). Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit[4] executed by a certain Purisima C.
Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment of the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by Walter Beck and his wife to the petitioner in consideration for
the issuance of the subject ACR.
The petitioner categorically denied in his counter-affidavit [5] dated July 11, 1994 that he
demanded nor received any amount of money from Walter Beck in consideration for the issuance
of the latters ACR. In addition, the petitioner alleged that Beck and his wife, Monica Beck, came
to the BID office in Manila on June 29, 1994 to follow-up his visa application. On the said
occasion, when the petitioner advised the couple to accomplish first all the requirements for a
visa application, Beck and his wife shouted invectives at him and charged the petitioner with
having demanded money from them. This incident prompted the petitioner to file a criminal
complaint for oral defamation before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila. The petitioners
allegations were corroborated by Rosanna C. Vigo, a BID employee and officemate of the
petitioner, in her affidavit dated July 15, 1994.[6]
 After investigation, BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found the petitioner
liable for violating existing civil service rules and regulations as well as penal laws and thus,
recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against the petitioner.
Upon review of the case, the criminal charge was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of
evidence;[7] however, the Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for grave misconduct in the
administrative aspect of the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the government
service.[8] His subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 7, 1997, the
petitioner filed the instant petition for review[9] which raises the following assignment of errors:
I

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN

FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT
DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
II

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN

RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION ONLY AFTER ALMOST
THREE YEARS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL.
III

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN

RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WITHOUT CONDUCTING
A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND ACTUAL HEARING IN
VIOLATION OF ITS OWN RULES, THUS CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION
OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
IV

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONTRADICTING ITS OWN FINDING RELATIVE TO THE CRIMINAL
ASPECT OF THIS CASE DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
EVIDENCE.
V

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN

IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL AGAINST
PETITIONER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS HIS FIRST OFFENSE IN
HIS THIRTY YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE.
 In the Resolution dated July 7, 1997, we required the public respondent to file his comment
to the instant petition. After several extensions of time given by this Court, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment[10] on February 20, 1998
which essentially recommended that the petitioner be exonerated from the subject administrative
charge on the ground that the assailed resolution of the Ombudsman was rendered in violation of
procedural due process and that it was not supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, we
directed the Office of the Ombudsman to file directly its own comment which it did on May 12,
1998.[11] The petitioner filed a Reply[12] thereto on August 14, 1998. Thereafter, this case was
submitted for decision after the petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the
Solicitor General had filed their respective memoranda.[13]
The Office of the Ombudsman maintains that the petitioner was accorded due process of law
inasmuch as he was duly informed and furnished a copy of the complaint against him as
evidenced by his letters dated July 22 and 26, 1996 addressed to the investigating officer
requesting for a copy of the case records to enable him to prepare for his defense. Likewise, there
was no undue delay in the conduct of the administrative proceedings since the preliminary
investigation was conducted immediately after the complaint was filed in 1994; and that after the
criminal aspect of the case was resolved, the administrative proceeding was conducted shortly
thereafter. That no preliminary conference had been conducted in the case was primarily due to
the petitioners manifestation to dispense thereof and submit the case for resolution inasmuch as
he has already filed his memorandum of evidence. Moreover, the Ombudsman opined that the
petitioner was absolved of criminal liability during the preliminary investigation of this case due
to insufficiency of evidence constituting probable cause contrary to his claim that there was
absolutely no evidence against him. However, the Ombudsman asserts that the sworn statements
of Walter Beck a and his witness, Purisima Terencio, substantially established the administrative
liability of the petitioner for grave misconduct by demanding from complainant Beck a sum of
money in exchange for the issuance of the latters ACR; and for that offense, petitioner should be
imposed the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the government service.[14]
By way of reply, the petitioner adverted to the minutes [15] of the preliminary hearing on July
18, 1998 and contended that it was the hearing officer, Atty. Vitaliano M. Mendoza, who
instructed him and his counsel to simply file a memorandum within fifteen (15) days after which
the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. The petitioner reiterated that the Office of the
Ombudsman found no evidence against him in its investigation of the criminal aspect of the case
and thus, he argued that the instant administrative charge should also have been dismissed.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint.[16] Substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[17]
In dismissing the petitioner from the government service the Office of the Ombudsman
reasoned out, as follows:

xxx [E]vidence for the complainant clearly established that respondent Tapiador
unlawfully received the amount of P10,000.00 from spouses Walter and Monica
Becker (sic), which act was personally witnessed by complainants witness, Purisima
C. Terencio, who in her affidavit dated July 01, 1994 positively identified the
respondent as the person to whom spouses Becker (sic) gave the money. In quoting,
witness Terencio states That said spouses paid the full amount of P10,000.00 on
February 23, 1992 to Mr. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of
Registration with the promise for the immediate release of the same (p. 13, Record).
To us, the said declaration of witness Terencio appears to be credible and worthy of
belief since there is no apparent reason for her to impute false statements against the
respondent. It is also significant to observe that the said declaration of Terencio was
aptly corroborated by complainant Walter Becker (sic), a foreigner, who in his desire
to stay permanently in the Philippines became a victim of such irregularity. Moreover,
there is no showing that respondent, in his capacity as Technical Assistant, is
authorized to receive payment for the processing of ACR. Worse, Mrs. Becker (sic)
also claimed that respondent demanded an additional amount of P7,000.00 from them
for the release of the ACR.[18]

Notably, the instant administrative complaint was resolved by the Ombudsman merely on
the basis of the evidence extant in the record of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983. The preliminary
conference required under Republic Act No. 6770[19] was dispensed with after the nominal
complainant, then BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma, manifested on July 29, 1996
that he was submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the documents on record [20] while
the petitioner agreed to simply file his memorandum. [21] Consequently, the only basis for the
questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the petitioner from the government service
was the unverified complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that of his alleged witness,
Purisima Terencio.
A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and
Terencio were not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation
conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. Neither did they appear
during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn statements despite prior
notice before the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the
case upon finding that the charge against the petitioner was not supported by any evidence.
[22]
 Hence, Becks affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this basis alone, the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the
administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance.
Nonetheless, a perusal of the affidavit executed by Walter Beck does not categorically state
that it was petitioner Tapiador who personally demanded from Beck the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) in consideration for the issuance of the latters ACR. On the other
hand, it appears that Walter Beck and his wife sought the assistance of Purisima Terencio
sometime in the later part of 1992 in facilitating the issuance of his ACR and in the process,
Terencio allegedly informed the couple that Beck could be granted the same and would be
allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently with the help of the petitioner and a certain Mr.
Angeles who was also with the BID, for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Hence, Beck
and his wife did not appear to have any direct or personal knowledge of the alleged demand of
the petitioner except through the information allegedly relayed to them by Terencio. Likewise,
although Beck claimed to have subsequently paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), his
affidavit is silent as to the identity of the person who actually received the said amount from him.
The pertinent portion of his affidavit reads, thus:
1. That during the months of Sept[ember] and Oct[ober] 1992 a certain Baby
(Purisima)Terencio informed us that I could be granted an ACR and will be allowed to stay
in the Philippines permanently thru Mr. Tapiador and Mr. Angeles, both from the Bureau of
Immigration, Manila and the fees was agreed at P10,000.00, official receipts inclussive (sic);
2. That after completing all the requirements and the amount of P10,000.00 was given I waited
but no ACR was given to me;
3. That sometime in February 1993 my wife went to see Mr. Tapiador and was informed that he
will hold my passport while I have my ACR, which I refused;
4. That when we tranfered (sic) our residence to Negros Occ[idental] we arranged with Mr.
Tapiador to pick up the ACR before we will leave for that place, and when my wife went
again to see Mr. Tapiador to pick up the ACR he was not in the office, and that Baby
Terencio promised to (sic) us that the ACR will be mailed to us, but it was never mailed;[23]

xxx xxx xxx

Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount directly to
the petitioner if it were indeed the latter who actually received the same, but he did not. This
significant omission in his affidavit is fatal in establishing the alleged administrative liability of
the petitioner. It also appears that Beck and the petitioner would eventually meet personally for
the first time only later, more specifically on June 23, 1994, at the office of the latter. On the said
occasion, so Becks affidavit went on to state, petitioner even informed him that his ACR had
been approved but that he still needed to submit his quarantine clearance before the same could
be issued to him. Before the said date however, it appears that Purisima Terencio had apparently
been doing most of the legwork for the Beck couple in facilitating the release of the subject
ACR. Consequently, there is logical basis to assume that it was to Terencio that the alleged
payment was made by the Beck couple.
Anent the affidavit of Purisima Terencio, the Ombudsman gave full faith and credit to her
statement that the spouses paid the full amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on February
23, 1992 to Mr. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with the promise
for the immediate release of the same[24] on the mere assumption that there is no apparent reason
for her to impute false statements against the petitioner who is employed with the government
for more than thirty (30) years.[25] On the contrary, the rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the
truth until proven otherwise[26] does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that Terencio had
the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of the Beck spouses for reneging on
her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The Ombudsman should have been more
prudent in according credence to the allegations of Terencio coming as they do from a supposed
fixer.
Besides, Purisima Terencio was adroit enough to make it appear in her affidavit that the
Beck spouses had paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) in grease money to the petitioner on
February 23, 1992 even without categorically stating that she had personal knowledge or had
actually witnessed the alleged pay off. A close scrutiny of the allegations in her affidavit show
that the alleged pay off had taken place as early as February 23, 1992. However, Beck claimed in
his own affidavit that he was informed by Terencio only between the period from September to
October 1992 that the processing of his ACR could be facilitated through the assistance of the
petitioner and a certain Mr. Angeles. This glaring inconsistency more than sufficiently
impeached Terencios credibility thereby belying the assessment of the Ombudsman in the
assailed resolution.
In view of the foregoing, it is not necessary anymore to pass upon the other grounds raised
by the petitioner in his petition. The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof
necessary to prove the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial
evidence.[27] Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service,
more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution,[28] the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public
official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the
Ombudsman dated January 22, 1997 dismissing the petitioner from the government service and
the Order dated April 7, 1997 in OMB-ADM-0-94-0983 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED immediately to his position in the government
service more particularly in the Bureau of Investigation and Deportation, Manila, without loss
nor diminution in his salaries and benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Resolution approved by the Ombudsman on March 14, 1997. Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 18-21.
[2]
 Petition, Annex B, Rollo, pp. 22-24.
[3]
 Denominated as Affidavit of Explanation. Petition, Annex C, Rollo, p. 25.
[4]
 Petition, Annex D, Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[5]
 Rollo, p.28.
[6]
 Rollo, p. 34.
[7]
 Resolution approved by the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military on January 6, 1995. Rollo, pp. 35-38.
[8]
 See Note No. 1.
[9]
 Rollo, pp. 3-16.
[10]
 Rollo, pp. 76-91.
[11]
 Rollo, pp. 102-110.
[12]
 Rollo, pp. 129-133.
 Rollo, pp. 141-154; 155-165. The memorandum filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case on
[13]

November 27, 1998 can be located at the unnumbered later portion of the rollo.
[14]
 See Note No. 11.
[15]
 Rollo, p. 124.
 Lorena v. Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632, 641 (1999); Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423, 456 (1998);
[16]

Lachica v. Flordeliza, 254 SCRA 278, 284 (1996).

 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 524, 531 (1994); Heirs of E. B. Roxas, Inc. v. Tolentino, 167 SCRA 334,
[17]

341 (1988).
[18]
 Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[19]
 Otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
[20]
 Rollo, p. 127.
[21]
 See Note No. 15.
[22]
 See Note No. 7.
[23]
 See Note No. 3.
[24]
 See Note No.4.
[25]
 Petition, Annex F, Rollo, p. 39.
[26]
 People v. Gayomma, 315 SCRA, 639, 648 (1999); People v. Suplito, 314 SCRA 493, 503 (1999).
[27]
 See Note No. 17.
[28]
 Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault and
recommend his removal xxx.
  
 
THIRD DIVISION
 
 
JEFFREY O. TORREDA, G.R. No. 165960
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
 
TOSHIBA INFORMATION
EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC., Promulgated:
and GERARDO C. CRISTOBAL,
JR.,
Respondents. February 8, 2007
 
 
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court questioning the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 76289 and the Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof. The appellate court affirmed the November 15, 2002 Resolution[3] of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC RAB IV Case No. 3-
10931-99-L (CA No. 023462-2000).

The Antecedents
 
 Jeffrey O. Torreda was employed by Toshiba Information Equipment
(Phils.), Inc. as a finance assistant [4] (on a probationary basis) on July 1, 1997. He
was mainly responsible for payroll processing and management, and for the
bookkeeping of T&P Properties, Inc.[5] Effective January 1, 1998, he was employed
on a regular basis as finance accountant[6] under the Finance and Accounting
Department headed by Kazuo Kobayashi, Vice-President, and Teresita Sepulveda,
Finance Manager.[7] He was tasked to do the following:
 
(i) processing of the payrolls of the employees of the Company, (ii)
maintenance of reports on year-to-date earnings and taxes withheld, monetary
benefits, and government contributions, (iii) preparation of vouchers related to
payroll accounts of the employees, (iv) preparation and reconciliation of payment
of taxes withheld and file tax returns, and (v) preparation of reportorial
requirements of government agencies and regulatory bodies.[8]
On May 22, 1998, Torreda and his four co-employees in the Finance and
Accounting Department reported to Senior Vice-President Hisao Tanaka that,
before and after the reorganization, Finance Manager Teresita Sepulveda had
ordered them to prepare petty cash vouchers in their names and that the sums
covered by the vouchers were received by Sepulveda for her own personal use.
[9]
 Tanaka told them that he would bring the matter to Gerardo Cristobal, Jr., the
Manager of the Human Resources Department.[10]Consequently, Sepulveda was
barred from approving petty cash vouchers with an amount beyond P1,000.00. She
was also required to make monthly reports of petty cash vouchers to the Senior
Vice-President. Thus, restrictions were imposed on Sepulvedas authority to
approve petty cash vouchers.[11]
 

On July 22, 1998, Sepulveda opened Torredas personal computer and read his
Lotus Notes mail and other personal files, specifically the report he had sent to
Tanaka about her. She reprimanded Torreda and told him that he should not send
mails to Tanaka without her approval.[12] Upset over Sepulvedas actuations,
Torreda reported the incident via electronic mail (e-mail) to Tanaka[13] on the same
day. He complained that Sepulveda had no right to open the computer because it
was his, and it contained his personal files. He told Tanaka that Sepulveda used to
open the employees computers; hence, she could no longer be trusted.[14]
 
Sepulveda filed a complaint against Torreda with the Human Resources
Department (HRD) for repeated tardiness during the period of April to July 1998.
 On August 27, 1998, Sepulveda ordered Torreda to make a summary of
payroll overpayments from October 1996 to June 1998.[15] Torreda refused and
informed Sepulveda that all countermeasures for immediate and long-term
solutions had been identified, and that what was needed was a strict
implementation of countermeasures.[16] He further questioned the propriety of his
being ordered to prepare financial summaries starting October 1996, when he was
employed only on July 1, 1997.[17]
 
From September 1 to 3, 1998, Sepulveda received complaints from separated
employees regarding full salary claims, and from incumbent employees on
maternity and other benefits. Torreda failed to process the claims before taking a
leave of absence on September 3, 1998. In order to retrieve the claimants payrolls
and Social Security Services (SSS) files, which Torreda kept in his drawer,
Sepulveda, with prior approval from Kobayashi, had the drawer forcibly opened by
Ruben delos Santos, a staff 
member of the General Administration Section. The drawer was opened in the
presence of Oscar Eusebio, Noralyn Florencio and Flor Berdin of the Finance
Department. The claims of the employees were later processed and released.[18] As
shown by official records, Torreda went to his office on September 5, 1998, a
Saturday, and stayed thereat for several hours.
 
On September 7, 1998, Sepulveda requested Torreda to submit his key for
duplication to prevent similar incidents.[19] Torreda refused. Sepulveda sent a
formal request via e-mail directing him to turn over his drawer key to the General
Administrator of the company for duplication and to explain in writing why he
refused to surrender his key.[20]Torreda replied via e-mail to Sepulveda, to wit:
 
I WILL ONLY GIVE YOU THE DUPLICATE COPY (sic) IF YOU CAN
PROVIDE ME WITH OR (SIC) AN EXPLANATION OF THE FOLLOWING:
 
1.) TIP policy on Key duplication to be submitted to your possession (sic).
 
2.) Why is is (sic) that my Php 200.00 pesos (sic) in my drawer is missing (or
STOLEN, by WHO ELSE____)?? Because you are the only one who
FORCIBLY open (sic) my drawer without my knowledge. This is a plain and
simple robbery on your part[21]
 
Torreda furnished copies of this e-mail to Cristobal, Kobayashi, Tanaka and N.
Florencio, the Senior Manager of the HRD, Manager of General Administration,
Vice-President for Finance, Senior Vice-President and Financial Analyst of the
company, respectively.
 
Torreda then accomplished the company complaint form against Sepulveda
declaring that at 8:00 a.m. on September 7, 1998, he discovered that two P100.00
bills he kept in his drawer were missing. He noted that his drawer had been
forcibly opened before by Ruben delos Santos on Sepulvedas orders.[22]
On the same day, Sepulveda sent to the HRD a complaint/request for
investigation (via e-mail) regarding Torredas accusation and his abusive and rude
behavior.[23] The complaint reads:
 
This is to formally file a complaint against one of my staff, Mr. Jeffrey
Torreda. In this statement below, he blatantly accused me of robbery for
the P200.00 missing in his drawer. This is a fabrication of a story and I felt very
much humiliated by his words.
 
Would like to request for an investigation to be conducted to clear my
name of this incident. I cannot be silent and accept this as simple error when my
name and career are at stake. This is a clear case of misrepresentation. In my
position as the Finance Manager of TIP, integrity is the most important virtue that
I have to project and protect. Mr. Torreda, thru his misrepresentation particularly
to top management, caused damage to my image.
 
I pray for justice. Lest this act of Mr. Jeffrey Torreda will happen again.[24]
 
On September 7, 1998, a conference was held in the office of Kobayashi
between Torreda, Cristobal and Sepulveda. Torreda claimed that Sepulveda never
informed him that his drawer needed to be opened. He pointed out that some
employees of the Finance and Accounting Section knew his contact
numbers. Sepulveda, for her part, claimed that she did not have the contact
numbers of Torreda, hence, was unable to contact him before his drawer was
opened. Kobayashi told Sepulveda that she should have the contact numbers of
those in the Finance and Accounting Section.
 
Maximo Dones of the General Administration Section conducted an
investigation of the complaint against Sepulveda. On September 8, 1998, he
submitted a Report where he declared that there was no factual basis for Torredas
robbery charge against Sepulveda.
 
 In a separate development, the HRD issued a written warning on September
10, 1998 to Torreda, in reference to his tardiness from April to July 1998 (the
matter Sepulveda had earlier complained of).[25]
 

 
The next day, September 11, 1998, Sepulveda and Kobayashi directed
Torreda to explain, in writing, within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him for the following violation against the company:[26]
 
Offenses against the Company: Insubordination Refusal or neglecting to obey the
order of the supervisor or superior x x x. in reference to the Sept. 10 incident.[27]
 
 
He was warned that failure to submit the Employees Written Explanation
Form within the given period would be considered as an admission of the offense.
[28]

Torreda, for his part, sent an e-mail message to Hisao Tanaka on September
11, 1998, where he complained against Sepulveda for the following
offenses/violations:
 
A.) ABUSE OF POSITION IN THE COMPANY TO GAIN PROFIT OR
ADVANTAGE FROM THE EMPLOYEE
 
UNDER HER SUPERVISION. 1st Offense DISMISSAL
 
B.) UNAUTHORIZED OPENING OF ANOTHERS LOCKER,
DRAWER OR OFFICE 1st Offense DISMISSAL
 
C.) FALSIFYING COMPANY RECORDS AND OR DOCUMENTS
1ST Offense DISMISSAL
 
D.) FALSE REPORTING 1ST Offense DISMISSAL
 
E.) OTHER CASE OF DISHONESTY AND MISREPRESENTATION
1st OFFENSE DISMISSAL
 
F.) COERCING, INTIMIDATING AND THREATENING 1st Offense
SUSPENSION
 
G.) CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENT SUBMISSION OF ANY ITEM
OF EXPENSE. 1st Offense DISMISSAL[29]
  

Meanwhile, Sepulveda approved Torredas paternity leave from September

12 to September 21, 1998.[30] Torreda received the directive of Sepulveda and
Kobayashi on September 13, 1998, but failed to submit his written explanation on
the charges against him.
Torreda then applied for leave for the period beginning September 22,
1998 up to October 2, 1998, but Sepulveda disapproved the same.[31]
 
On October 2, 1998, the General Administration (GA) Department
recommended that Torreda be dismissed conformably with its findings that he
committed grave slander under the companys Employee Handbook.
 
Torreda submitted his written explanation[32] to Sepulvedas complaint for
grave slander only on October 6, 1998. He alleged that he had the right to accuse
Sepulveda of stealing because she was the one who ordered his drawer forcibly
opened. His charge of robbery against her was the normal reaction of one who
finds out that something he owns is missing due to an unlawful act. He pointed out
that he had been a victim of Sepulvedas unauthorized acts on prior occasions. She
repeatedly opened his computer and his drawer on September 10 and 11, 1998
while he was on leave. Had Sepulveda acted rightly, he (Torreda) would not have
committed grave slander against her.[33] He also pointed out that since his contact
numbers were known to his officemates, Sepulveda should have called him up
before ordering the opening of his drawer on September 3, 1998.[34]
In a letter[35] addressed to Hisao Tanaka dated October 7, 1998, Torreda,
Finance Supervisor Visitacion Agustin, and Finance Assistant Rowena Alinas
demanded that appropriate action be taken against Sepulveda for various offenses
or violations. They alleged that Sepulveda had degraded and humiliated them
(specifically Torreda); that she looked into their personal computer files without
authority; that she mishandled and appropriated for herself the companys petty
cash; that she forcibly opened the drawer of Torreda resulting in the loss of
documents and money; that there were cases of negligent payment of SSS
contribution and under-declaration of withholding tax due to Sepulvedas fault; that
Torreda was warned for tardiness without due process; that Sepulveda unjustifiably
disapproved Torredas leave application; that Torreda was stripped of his duties and
responsibilities and given new ones alien to him; that she intimidated Torreda by
ordering the removal of his Lotus Notes Software from his computer without any
explanation; that she deliberately caused the payments of allowances to employees
who were not entitled thereto and the deduction of performance bonuses from
employees so entitled; and that overpayments of salaries to several employees
occurred due to Sepulvedas negligence in checking the payroll.
 
On October 14, 1998, Torreda received a letter[36] from Gerardo Cristobal, Jr.
informing him that his employment had been terminated effective at the end of
official working hours on that day, for grave slander, which under the Employee
Handbook is punishable by dismissal.[37] The letter of termination reads:
 
After a thorough review and evaluation of the Grave Slander charge by your
superior and your reply/explanation, the following points become relevant; (sic)
 
1. While we have a policy prohibiting unauthorized opening of Employee
lockers/drawers, your superior, Ms. Teresita Sepulveda sought the approval of
your Department Head/Vice President. This approval made the action of opening
your drawer authorized and official.
2. Your Department Head/Vice President authorized the opening of your drawer
to locate and retrieve vital documents needed last September which was (sic)
under your custody.
3. Several employees witnessed the opening and the retrieval of the said vital
documents from your drawer by your superior and testified they did not see any
money inside the drawer nor any taken by your superior.
4. Your claim that there was (sic) Pesos 200 in your drawer is not substantiated.
5. You reported the alleged loss to GA on Monday, September 7, 1998 yet you
spent several hours at the office the previous Saturday, September 5, 1998 per our
official records. Mr. Maximino Dones of General Affairs did not receive any
report of loss then. It would seem natural for an Employee to report immediately
the loss of his money upon discovering that his drawer was opened.
6. Prudence and common sense dictate that personal properties including money
should not be left behind (sic) in drawers and lockers which are Company
properties.
 
Based on the Investigation Report submitted by Mr. Maximino Dones
on September 8, 1998 of General Affairs on your alleged theft complaint and the
above considerations, we find your complaint against Ms. Sepulveda without
basis and merit. Consequently, there is basis in the charge of Grave Slander
against you by Ms. T. Sepulveda when you called her a robber in your e-mail
dated September 7, 1998 addressed to her.
 
Your false accusation has caused her undue embarrassment and has cast aspersion
on her character as Manager of TIP. This is strengthened by the fact that you
furnished a copy of the said e-mail to other parties, e.g., K. Kobayashi, R. Suarez,
N. Florencio and H. Tanaka.
 
 As a subordinate, you (sic) action shows an utter disrespect and disregard to her
as a person of authority and the Company considers this a grave and serious
violation of our existing policies on Offenses Related to Conduct and Behavior.
And as stated in our Employee Handbook, the penalty for Grave Slander is
Dismissal for the first offense.
 
In view hereof, you are hereby formally informed that your employment with
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), is terminated effective at the end of
official working hours today October 14, 1998.
 
Please comply with the relevant post-employment requirement of the Company
by surrendering your accountabilities to HRA through Ms. Candice Cipriano to
enable us to process your last salary.
 
(Sgd.) GERARDO C. CRISTOBAL, JR.
Senior Manager, HRA[38]
 
 
On March 23, 1999, Torreda filed a complaint[39] for illegal dismissal against
Cristobal and Toshiba. The case was docketed as NLRC RAB IV Case No. 3-
10931-99-L.
 
On February 15, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,[40] declaring
that Torredas dismissal from employment was unjustified. The series of events
indicated that Torreda was harassed by Sepulveda because of his expos of
irregularities she had committed. The opening of his drawer formed part of her
harassment tactics.[41] Thus, Torreda had all the right to demand an explanation for
the forcible opening of his computer files and drawer which resulted in the loss of
some amount of money.[42]
 
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that respondent Toshiba did not observe the
rudiments of due process in terminating Torredas employment. The result of the
investigation on the charges against him came out on October 2, 1998, or four days
before Torreda submitted his written explanation to the charges.[43] The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondent company is found
guilty of illegal dismissal and is hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant to
his former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay him backwages in
the amount of P238,745.00 [(P14,692.00 x 15 months = P220,380.00) + (13th
month pay P220,380.00/12 = P18,365.00)] computed from the time of dismissal
up to the date of this decision. In the event that reinstatement is no longer
possible, respondent company is hereby ordered to pay complainant separation
pay in the amount of P44,076.00 (P14,692.00 x 3 years) plus backwages.
  
SO ORDERED.[44]
 
 
Aggrieved by the decision, respondents appealed the case to the NLRC.[45] They
maintained that the sending of an e-mail message containing insulting and
offensive words, and false and malicious statements against his immediate superior
(Sepulveda), clearly intended to cause dishonor, is not only destructive of the
morale of his co-employees and violative of company rules and regulations; it also
constitutes serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from employment.
[46]
 The requirement of due process was further met, since the termination of the
complainant was made on October 14, 1998, or eight (8) days after the company
received his explanation to the charges against him.[47]
 
On November 15, 2002, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
[48]
 The NLRC ratiocinated that the complainant committed the infraction of
accusing his immediate superior of stealing P200.00 and calling her a robber
(through an e-mail message), without any evidence at all, and forwarding copies to
the other officers of the company. The NLRC declared that this infraction
constitutes serious misconduct, a just cause for dismissal under Article 282(a) of
the Labor Code, as amended.
 
The NLRC declared that considering the urgency of the situation, it was
necessary to open the drawer of Torreda: there had been numerous follow-ups
from separated employees regarding their pending final salary payments, and from
incumbent employees claiming maternity and sickness benefits under the SSS, and
processing these applications was part of complainants responsibilities. Moreover,
the opening of the drawer was conducted in the presence of Oscar Eusebio,
Noralyn Florencio and Flor Berdin, who were employees of the Finance Section,
with prior notice to Kobayashi, Vice-President for Finance.[49]
 
The NLRC further held that disrespect to company officials and staff
members constitutes serious misconduct which means a transgression of some
established rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction. Consequently, pursuant to
Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the complainant is
not entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and privileges, or to payment of any separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, or
payment of any backwages and other benefits.[50] The NLRC cited the ruling of this
Court in Gutierrez v. Baron.[51] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is VACATED and a new one
ENTERED dismissing the instant case for lack of merit.
 
SO ORDERED.[52]
 
When his motion for reconsideration[53] was denied by the NLRC in its January 27,
2003 Resolution,[54] Torreda filed a petition for certiorari[55] before the CA on April
1, 2003. He alleged that the NLRC committed grave and patent abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the Labor Arbiters
decision and in finding that his dismissal was justified.[56]
Unpersuaded, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition on February
27, 2004.[57] It affirmed the NLRC ruling dismissing petitioners complaint.
However, the appellate court found that petitioner committed grave slander when
he concocted the charge of theft against Sepulveda, the penalty for which, under
the Employees Handbook, is dismissal.[58]
 
Petitioner timely filed his motion for reconsideration[59] which the appellate court
denied in its May 13, 2004 resolution.[60]
 
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition insisting that the Court of Appeals
seriously erred in holding that the dismissal of the petitioner was legal.[61]
 
Petitioner contends that the ground for his termination does not fall among the just
causes stated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.[62] The alleged grave
slander was in response to Sepulvedas September 7, 1998 e-mail requesting him to
submit the key of his drawer for duplication. [63] He reacted in that manner because
Sepulveda had previously harassed him.[64] In fact, he wrote Tanaka, on September
11, 1998, requesting for assistance on the offenses committed by his direct
superior. Instead of penalizing Sepulveda, however, respondent Toshiba dismissed
him from the service for alleged grave slander.[65]
 
In their Comment,[66] respondents Toshiba and HR Manager Cristobal assert that
the issues raised by petitioner involve questions of fact and not of law, which are
improper in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.[67] The factual findings and
conclusion of the NLRC, which were affirmed by the CA, should be accorded with
respect and finality.[68]
 
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
 
  
It bears stressing that what petitioner filed before the CA was one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, he was burdened to prove
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it dismissed his petition. The Court has invariably defined grave
abuse of discretion, thus:
 
x x x By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown
that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie,
there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very
antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law
and common law traditions.[69]
 
 
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.[70] The only question involved is
jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the
issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[71] An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
which error is reversible only by an appeal.[72] In Cosep v. NLRC,[73] this Court held
that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final by law are not
exempt from judicial review for want of substantial basis in fact and in law.
 
A careful review of the decisions of the NLRC and the CA reveal that they
differ on their bases for the dismissal of petitioners complaint. The NLRC declared
that the charge of robbery which was fabricated by petitioner against his immediate
superior, Sepulveda, constitutes serious misconduct punishable by dismissal under
Article 282(a) of the Labor Code; in contrast, the CA ruled that petitioner
committed grave slander - an act punishable by dismissal under the Employees
Handbook.
 
We hold that the CA correctly affirmed the NLRC Resolution ordering the
Labor Arbiter to dismiss petitioners complaint. However, the appellate court erred
in ruling that petitioner committed grave slander against Sepulveda and in applying
the Employees Handbook as basis for his dismissal.
 
 The rule in labor cases is that the burden is on the employer to prove that the
dismissal of an employee is for a just or valid cause. Evidence must be clear,
convincing and free from any inference that the prerogative to dismiss an
employee was abused and unjustly used by the employer to further any vindictive
end.[74] In this case, respondent Toshiba adequately proved that petitioner was
dismissed for just cause.
 
The NLRC did not err much less commit grave abuse of its discretion when
it based its ruling on Article 282(a) of the Labor Code on its finding that petitioner
committed serious misconduct for falsely accusing his immediate superior of
robbery. As the Court held in Villanueva v. People:[75]
 
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.
 
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The
gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but
also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3)
the circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending
not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.[76]
 
 
 
The false attribution by the petitioner of robbery (theft) against Sepulveda
was made in writing; patently then, petitioner committed libel, not grave slander
against Sepulveda. The malicious and public imputation in writing by one of a
crime on another is libel under Article 353, in relation to Article 355, of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:
 
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
 
xxx
  
Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed
by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means,
shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or
a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.
 
 
Indeed, an employee may be dismissed from employment for acts
punishable by dismissal under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code, which reads:
 
Article 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
 
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; x x x
 
 
In Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
[77]
 the Court explained the nature of serious misconduct as a ground for dismissal
from employment:
 
Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere
error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such misconduct,
however, serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the employees work to
constitute just cause for his separation. Thus, for misconduct or improper
behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate to
the performance of the employees duties; and (c) must show that the employee
has become unfit to continue working for the employer.Indeed, an employer may
not be compelled to continue to employ such person whose continuance in the
service would be patently inimical to his employers interest.[78]
 
There is abundant evidence on record showing that petitioner committed libel
against his immediate superior, Sepulveda, an act constituting serious misconduct
which warrants the dismissal from employment.
 
Petitioner maliciously and publicly imputed on Sepulveda the crime of robbery
of P200.00. As gleaned from his Complaint dated September 7, 1999 which he
filed with the General Administration, he knew that it was Delos Santos who
opened his drawer and not Sepulveda. Thus, by his own admission, petitioner was
well aware that the robbery charge against Sepulveda was a concoction, a mere
fabrication with the sole purpose of retaliating against Sepulvedas previous acts.
 
The records show that Sepulveda was impelled to forcibly open petitioners drawer.
She needed to retrieve the benefits applications of retirees and incumbent
employees of respondent-corporation, which petitioner had failed to process for
payment before his leave. The claimants sought to have their claims approved and
released with dispatch. Before opening petitioners drawer, Sepulveda saw to it that
she had Kobayashis approval. Delos Santos opened the drawer of petitioner in the
presence of his co-employees in the Financial Section. Thereafter, the claims were
processed and payments were effected. Thus, Sepulveda acted in good faith.[79]
 
Petitioner admitted that his charge of robbery/theft against Sepulveda was baseless,
but claimed that he fabricated the charge because of his exasperation and anger at
Sepulvedas repeated acts of opening his drawer without prior permission while he
was on leave, not only on September 7, 1998 but also on September 10 and 11,
1998; he also pointed out that Sepulveda looked into his personal files in his
computer. In fine, by falsely ascribing a crime to Sepulveda, petitioner was merely
retaliating against perceived misdeeds she had committed against him. However,
the manner resorted to by petitioner of redressing the wrong committed by
Sepulveda is a criminal act. As the adage goes, the end cannot justify the means
used by petitioner.
 
In St. Michaels Institute v. Santos,[80] this Court held that the employers right to
conduct the affairs of his business, according to its own discretion and judgment, is
well-recognized. An employer has a free reign and enjoys wide latitude of
discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill
discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon
erring employees. This is a management prerogative, where the free will of
management to conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose takes form.[81] The
law, in protecting the rights of workers, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer.[82]
 
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 76289 is AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
ATTESTATION
 
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Aurora
Santiago-Lagman, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-46.
[2]
 Rollo, p. 47.
[3]
 Id. at 137-153.
[4]
 Records, p. 76.
[5]
 Id. at 78.
[6]
 Id.
[7]
 Id. at 78.
[8]
 Id. at 67.
[9]
 Id. at 4-5.
[10]
 Id. at 5.
[11]
 Id.
[12]
 Id.
[13]
 Id. at 16.
[14]
 Id.
[15]
 Id. at 80 and 82.
[16]
 Id. at 81.
[17]
 Id.
[18]
 Id. at 92.
[19]
 Id. at 93.
[20]
 Id. at 83.
[21]
 Id.
[22]
 Id. at 53.
[23]
 Id. at 84.
[24]
 Id. at 86.
[25]
 Id. at 20.
[26]
 Id. at 21.
[27]
 Id.
[28]
 Id. at 22.
[29]
 Id. at 17.
[30]
 Id. at 57.
[31]
 Id.
[32]
 Id. at 26.
[33]
 Id.
[34]
 In full, Torredas letter-explanation reads:
6 October 1998
Mr. Gerardo Cristobal, Jr.
HRA Senior Manager
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc.
Laguna Technopark, Bian, Laguna
 
Sir,
 
This is my explanation in response to the violation of Grave Slander, filed against me by Ms. Teresita
Sepulveda (sic) as follows; (sic)
 
(A) Attached please find (sic) the Complaint Affidavit filed to G.A. Section c/o Mr. Max Dones-
Supervisor, last September 07, 1998 (a week after), in relation to the forcible opening of my drawer by Ms.
Sepulveda and allowing it to be open for more than 29 hours resulting to the loss/missing (sic) of my Php 200.00.
Ms. Sepulveda did not bother to inform me of such act, and during the meeting between Mr. Kobayashi, me, (sic)
you and Ms. Sepulveda, she reason (sic) out that she has (sic) no copy of my contact numbers, even Mr. K.
Kobayashi, agreed that she should have the list of contact numbers of her staff. Some of the Finance and Acctg. staff
knows (sic) my contact numbers and yet she doesnt know my number. This complain (sic) that I have filed to (sic)
HRA has no concrete result up to now.
 
(B) Attached please find (sic) the lotus notes sent to Ms. Sepulveda last Sept. 07, 1998, in connection to
(sic) the violations filed against me, please notice the following; (sic)
 
1.) That my memorandum was only a response to the intimidating and threatening notes
sent to me by Ms. Sepulveda in retaliation to the complaint I have verbally announce (sic) to her
during our one-on-one meeting on (sic) the morning of September 07, 1998 and for the written
complaint I have filed against her to (sic) G.A. Section.
2.) That my memorandum was a demand for an explanation for the unlawful act
committed by Ms. Sepulveda against me, as stated on (sic) the heading and no. 2 of the
memorandum.
 
(C) Attached please find also, the lotus notes I have sent to you, that Im requesting for an investigation for
the incident and for the appropriate actions to be taken. As a proof that Im requesting only for a relief of the
complaint I have filed.
 
(D) I believed (sic) that I have the right to accuse her of stealing because my money was lost and she was
the one who ordered the forcible opening of my drawer. Whatever meaning the last sentence of no. 2 of
memorandum signifies, I know that this is the common or normal reaction of a person, if he will find out that there
was a (sic) missing belongings due to unlawful act. Furthermore, this is not only the first time that Ms. Sepulveda
has done his bad acts. The first time was when she opened my PC without my knowledge, she waited for me to get-
up from my chair, and then immediately performed such act. The opening of my drawer was constantly repeated by
Ms. Sepulveda on Sept. 10, 11, 1998 and during my leave days, and again without informing me of the said act.
Without the unlawful act performed by Ms. Sepulveda there would have been any violations of Grave Slander?
 
Done in Toshiba Information (Phils.), Laguna Technopark, Bian, Laguna on October 06, 1998
 
(Sgd.) Jeffrey O. Torreda
Finance Analyst
[35]
 Records, pp. 27-30.
[36]
 Id. at 63-64.
[37]
 Id. at 91.
[38]
 Id. at 63-64.
[39]
 Id. at 1.
[40]
 Id. at 124-132. (Penned by Labor Arbiter Nieves De Castro)
[41]
 Id. at 130.
[42]
 Id. at 131.
[43]
 Id.
[44]
 Id. at 132.
[45]
 Id. at 138.
[46]
 Id. at 148.
[47]
 Id. at 150.
[48]
 Rollo, pp. 137-153.
[49]
 Id. at 145.
[50]
 Id. at 150-152.
[51]
 105 Phil. 9. (1957)
[52]
 Rollo, p. 152.
[53]
 Id. at 154-156.
[54]
 Id. at 157-158.
[55]
 Id. at 159-175.
[56]
 Id. at 172.
[57]
 Id. at 40-46.
[58]
 Id. at 45-46.
[59]
 Id. at 176-178.
[60]
 Id. at 47.
[61]
 Id. at 21.
[62]
 Id. at 17-39.
[63]
 Id. at 32.
[64]
 Id. at 33.
[65]
 Id. at 35.
[66]
 Id. at 191-210.
[67]
 Id. at 200.
[68]
 Id. at 201 and 204.
[69]
 Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480.
[70]
 People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 617.
[71]
 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Construction Co., G.R. No. L-35630, November 25,
1982, 118 SCRA 664, 667.
[72]
 People v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 617.
[73]
 G.R. No. 124966, June 16, 1998, 290 SCRA 704.
[74]
 St. Michaels Institute v. Santos, 422 Phil. 723, 734 (2001).
[75]
 G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 42.
[76]
 Id. at 53-54.
[77]
 G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737.
[78]
 Id. at 767-768.
[79]
 De Guzman v. People, G.R. No. 19075, March 23, 1968, 18 SCRA 706.
[80]
 Supra note 71.
[81]
 Id. at 732-733.
[82]
 Lopez v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 167385, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 596, 602.
 EN BANC
 

CRISTETA D. ORFILA, A. M. No. P-06-2110

Complainant, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 02-1377-P)

Present:

- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

PUNO,

QUISUMBING,

ESTIFANA S. ARELLANO, YNARES-SANTIAGO,

H.R.M.O. II, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

Respondent. CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO-MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.

x----------------------------------------x

SPS. ROMULO and ESTIFANA A.M. NO. P-03-1692

ARELLANO, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 02-1424-P)

Complainants,

-         versus -

Clerk of Court JESUS P, MANINGAS, Promulgated:

Assistant Clerk of Court JENNIFER C.

BUENDIA and Process Server CRISTETA

D. ORFILA, Regional Trial Court, February 13, 2006

Office of the Clerk of Court, Manila,

Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 
 

DECISION
 
TINGA, J.:
 

Jesus drove away the moneylenders from the temple for good reason.
 

These consolidated administrative matters involve employees of the Office

of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. The first,
docketed as OCA IPI No. 02-1377-P was filed on 20 April 2002 by Cristeta D.
Orfila (Orfila), a Process Server, charging Estifana S. Arellano (Arellano), a
Human Rights Resource Management Officer II, with conduct unbecoming of
a court employee. The second, docketed as Administrative Matter No. P-03-
1692,[1] concerns a countercharge filed on 26 June 2002 by Arellano and her
husband, retired Judge Romulo Arellano,[2] charging in turn Atty. Jesusa P.
Maningas[3] and Atty. JenniferC. Buendia, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk
of Court, respectively,

 
of the RTC Manila with graft and corrupt practices, etc., [4] as well as Orfila for
falsification of public document, etc.[5]
 
The cases were filed separately. On 2 April 2003, the Second Division of the
Court resolved to consolidate both cases and referred them to Justice
Narciso T. Atienza[6] for investigation.[7]
 

 
  
Since the parties have conflicting versions, the facts for each case as
culled from the records, shall be presented and discussed separately.
 
Cristeta D. Orfila v. Estifana S. Arellano
A.M. No. P-06-2110
 

According to Orfila, at about 8:15 in the morning of 16 April 2002, she went
to the office of Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas, who was then Clerk of Court of RTC
Manila, to give the latter suman for breakfast. While they were conversing,
Arellano barged in and said, Magbayad ka ng iyong utang.[8] She had
previously borrowed P10,000.00 from Arellano and the latter was
demanding payment for the unpaid interest due thereon in the amount
of P2,000.00. A heated argument ensued between them. Atty. Maningas
advised the two women to settle the matter outside her office and urged
them to respect her position. Then Orfila asked
Arellano, Bakit namanPanyeng ganyan ka binabastos mo ako, wag kang
bastos. Pormalin mo ako Panyeng. Meron naman akong table sa kabila,
doon mo ako puntahan at singilin. Huwag kung saan-saan pati doon sa table
ni Boy, to which Arellano retorted, Sinungaling ka talaga, Tita, hindi yan
totoo, sinungaling ka.[9]
 

 
 
At this point, Arellano suddenly slapped Orfila on her left cheek
prompting Atty. Maningas to call for the help of the other employees who
were seated by their table right outside the door of her office. There were
only two other employees present, Glenda Homeres and Ernesto
Lacaba. They later testified that they had heard the altercation, and through
the glass panels of Atty. Maningass cubicle, witnessed the slapping
incident. Homeres helped Orfila to sit down as she seemed about to fall
while Lacaba tried to pacify Arellano who then had taken off one of her
shoes and was attempting to hit Orfila with it.
 

Thereafter, Orfila had herself examined in the Ospital ng Maynila and

was attended to by Dr. Jose Pingol. Dr. Pingol issued to her a medical
certificate[10]diagnosing her with swelling of the left and right cheeks that
could have been caused by slapping.
 

Atty. Buendia, the Assistant Clerk of Court, was not present when the
incident took place but learned of the same through a text message she
received while she was on her way to the office. [11] When she arrived, Atty.
Maningas relayed to her what she had witnessed and instructed her
verbally, and through a subsequent memorandum, [12] to conduct an
investigation on the matter. Atty. Maningas inhibited herself therefrom as
Arellano was her kumadre, she being a principal sponsor in the wedding of
one of the latters children. She also feared being accused of bias should she
find for Orfila because the latter gave her suman.[13]
 

On the same day of the incident, Atty. Buendia called a meeting of all
section chiefs and officers as well as Arellano, wherein they were reminded
to be vigilant in preventing a repetition of the same untoward incident in the
office. After the meeting, Atty. Buendia spoke to her about the shameful
incident. Arellano just replied, Agi, nabigla ako. Buligi na la ako.[14]
 
Later that afternoon, Judge Arellano came to their office. He told both Atty.
Maningas and Atty. Buendia that he gave his wife money out of his
retirement pay para may mapaglibangan and that refusal to pay a debt was
actionable under the Civil Service Law.[15] Atty. Buendia expressed her hopes
that the matter between Orfila and his wife will be settled, to which he
replied, Ah oo, pepersonalin ko ito.[16] Orfila then arrived and Judge Arellano
apologized to her. He asked that she forgive his wife and not to push
through with filing a complaint but Orfila refused.
 

 
The Investigating Committee headed by Atty. Buendia interviewed Orfila,
Arellano, Homeres, Lacaba and Atty. Maningas. They also tried to reconcile
Orfila and Arellano several times but to no avail. According to Atty. Buendia,
the parties were not represented by counsel nor were stenographic notes
taken during the investigation since it was only an inter-office matter that
they hoped would be settled between the parties.
 

On 29 April 2002, the Investigating Committee rendered a report [17] to

Atty. Maningas that documented the slapping incident but stopped short of
making any recommendation. Atty. Maningas endorsed the same for
administrative action to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) through
the Hon. Enrico A. Lanzanas, Acting Executive Judge of RTC Manila. [18] At the
same time, Orfila filed the instant administrative complaint as well as a
criminal complaint against Arellano for slight physical injuries, slander by
deed and oral defamation with the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor.
 

Defending herself, Arellano decried complainants version of the facts as

fabricated, trumped-up, malicious and intentionally filed by Orfila out of
vindictiveness and for the purpose of harassment. [19] She claimed that the
complainant obtained a P10,000.00 loan from her at 10% interest every
month to be paid in three (3) months.When complainant defaulted, she
tried to collect from her every pay day. It took Orfila years to pay a part of
the principal amount and would burst into anger every time she was
reminded of the unpaid balance of her loan. Arellano testified that she did
not file any formal complaint against Orfila regarding her debt but only
asked her husband to send her a demand letter.[20]
 

At 8:00 oclock in the morning of 16 April 2002, per Arellanos testimony,
Orfila came to her office in the RTC Library, informing her that Atty.
Maningas has the money for the balance of Orfilas loan. She was glad
because at long last Orfila was going to pay her so she went to see Atty.
Maningas. But as soon as she entered the said office, Orfila began
lambasting her saying, Bastos ka, ayaw kong magbayad sa iyo, kung
magbabayad ako dito rin kay Atty. Maningas ibibigay ko. Ayaw kong
magbigay sa iyo, bastos ka.[21] She did not say a word but just crossed her
arms. Atty. Maningas said, Magpasensyahan na kayo.[22] Orfila stood up and
pointed her finger near Arellanos face and said, Ikaw bastos ka hindi ako
magbabayad sa iyo.[23] Arellano pushed her and parried Orfilas fingers with
her hand. She denies slapping her, claiming that Orfila could have been hit
by her own hand when she pushed it towards her. [24] Arellano also tried to
remove one of her shoes for self-defense, or to scare Orfila because the
latter was charging towards her.
 

Arellano further claimed that the instant case was filed by Orfila in
connivance with Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia. Atty. Maningas is also
indebted to her in the total amount of P15,000.00 at 10% monthly interest
which she refused to pay. Atty. Maningas allegedly tried to convince her
several times to condone her loan obligations as well as that of Orfila in
exchange for Orfilas desistance from filing a complaint against her but she
flatly refused. They then conspired with Atty. Buendia to silence her by
carefully planning a set-up wherein she was called to Atty. Maningass office
under the pretext that Orfila would settle her indebtedness through
her. They then made it appear that she had provoked the incident and Atty.
Maningas could be the sole witness while Atty. Buendia would conduct the
investigation. Arellano charged that Glenda Homeres and Ernesto Lacaba
were only instructed by Atty. Maningas to testify in favor of Orfila.
 

Arellano testified that she did not file any complaint against Orfila,
Maningas and Buendia nor report the matter to her superior or with the
Executive Judge of RTC Manila. Nobody prevented her from doing so but she
simply did not want to have any enemies for she was then retiring soon.
[25]
 Arellano further testified that she was interviewed by the Investigating
Committee regarding the incident
but she was not allowed to submit a written explanation. Thereafter, Atty.
Maningas and Atty. Buendia suggested that she settle the case amicably
with Orfila by giving the latter P30,000.00, which amount was later reduced
to P20,000.00. However, she did not assert that she was the aggrieved party
because she wanted the case to be settled before she retired.
 

Arellano further averred that after the slapping incident, Atty.

Maningas, Atty. Buendia and Orfila started harassing her by threatening to
block her retirement benefits if she did not give in to their
demands. However, she filed an administrative complaint against them only
after she received a copy of Orfilas complaint.[26]

 
Arellanos husband also testified in his wifes behalf, essentially corroborating
her tale. According to him, after his wife called him in the afternoon of 16
April 2002, he went to see Atty. Maningas to verify the facts. Atty. Maningas
allegedly told him that no one saw Arellano slap Orfilas face. Orfila even
apologized to him, assuring him that it was just a simple misunderstanding
between her and his wife. [27]
 
 

Sps. Romulo and Estifana Arellano v. Jesusa P. Maningas, Jennifer C.

Buendia and Cristeta D. Orfila

A.M. No. P-03-1692

 
The spouses Arellano, this time as complainants, filed a joint complaint-
affidavit[28] against Orfila, Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia.
 
Charges Against Cristeta D. Orfila
 

The Arellanos accused Orfila of falsification of public documents by

making it appear in her Service Record[29] and in her Personal Data Sheet,
[30]
 which she personally accomplished when she was appointed janitor in
the Court of First Instance of Manila on 1 November 1982, that she was born
on 8 October 1942 in Carigara, Leyte when in fact she was not.
 

Her marriage contract[31] showed that when she was married on 29

November 1956, she was already 22 years old. Thus, she must have been
born in 1934 and should have compulsorily retired in 1999 at the age of
65. Similarly, the birth certificate[32] of her son William indicated that she
was married on 29 November 1956and she was 21 years old at the time of 
Williams birth in 1957.
 

The Arellanos further charged Orfila with the nonpayment of her loan and of
conniving with Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia in harassing Arellano in
order to evade payment of her obligation. She allegedly acted as a willing
tool considering that she was extraordinarily close to them and that she
owed Atty. Maningas favors, among which was the employment of her three
children in RTC Manila.
 

Orfila denied the charges, insisting that she was born on 8 October
1942. Said date was what her parents had inculcated in her mind as her
birthdate which she had been using in good faith ever since she can
remember. She cannot produce her birth certificate because records of birth
from 1942 to 1944 in Carigara, Leyte were destroyed during the Japanese
occupation. She submitted her Certificate of Live Birth [33] which was issued
only on 29 July 2002 after she applied for late registration of her birth in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Carigara, Leyte. The information appearing
therein were all furnished by respondent herself and her daughter, Maria
Teresa Castel. It indicated 1942 as the year of her birth.
 
Orfila further claimed that her marriage with her husband was arranged by
her parents. When she signed the marriage contract, she did not know that
her age as stated therein was 22 years old. She was only asked by her father
to sign the document and she did not know what she was signing
then. Neither could she remember how old she was because she was still
very young then. She had just enrolled in Grade II and she cannot read but
can only write her name.
 

According to Orfila, she has nothing but a simple superior-subordinate

relationship with Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia. She denied that they
framed up Arellano.She filed a case against Arellano of her own volition
because the latter had slapped her.
 

Charges Against Atty. (now Judge) Jesusa P. Maningas

 

Meanwhile, complainants-spouses charged Atty. Maningas with graft and

corrupt practices, illegal and immoral abuse of official position, gross
misconduct, immoral solicitation and nonpayment of loans, betrayal of
public trust, illegal solicitation of money, oppression, coercion, maliciously
and deliberately trying to delay, block or otherwise deprive Mrs. Arellano of
her retirement benefits by filing midnight and trumped-up charges against
her, in connivance with Atty. Buendia and Orfila, and dishonesty. [34]
 
 Arellano admitted that after her husband got his retirement gratuity,
she extended loans to people in the office who requested for one. Atty.
Maningas allegedly pleaded with Arellano to allow her a loan
of P30,000.00. Arellano was then a subordinate employee of Atty. Maningas
in the OCC. At first, Arellano refused but after consulting her husband,
Arellano agreed to lend her P10,000.00. Atty. Maningas accepted the same
for which she signed a receipt dated January 21, 1999.[35] To avoid further
disturbance, Arellano lent Atty. Maningas another P5,000.00 in February
1999.[36] They agreed that the loans were payable in three (3) months.
 

Yet despite several demands by Arellano, Atty. Maningas never paid

the loans. Instead, the latter tried to sweet talk her that she would
recommend her for promotion if she would condone her loans. When
Arellano was eventually promoted as Human Resource Management Officer
II, Atty. Maningas claimed that she facilitated her promotion by following it
up personally and even treating the members of the Selection and
Promotion Board of the Supreme Court to snacks.
 

Arellano testified that she did not file any action against Atty. Maningas out
of respect and she just hoped that she would be paid. Neither did she send
her any demand letter. It was only when she was about to retire in May
2002 that she informed her husband of Atty. Maningass refusal to pay.
 
 
 
 
The Arellanos further alleged that it was usap-usapan in the RTC Manila that
Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia were involved in the anomalous re-raffle
of certain criminal cases. They also allegedly created their own screening
committee for accepting employment in the OCC.
 

Rebutting these charges, Atty. Maningas claimed that in January 1999, she

learned from a fellow employee that Arellano was granting loans at a very
low interest rate. She approached Arellano who offered her a loan. Atty.
Maningas admitted procuring two (2) loans totaling P15,000.00 at P500.00
monthly interest per P10,000.00 increment of the principal amount, payable
in six (6) installments. The installments, interest and period covered were
stated in Arellanos notebook which Atty. Maningas signs every time she
pays. At the beginning, she kept a list [37] of her own but she discontinued the
same because she trusted Arellano. No oral or written demand was ever
made to her by Arellano. On the day of the slapping incident, she even
reminded Judge Arellano of the fact that she had paid her debt and the
latter did not correct her.[38]
Atty. Maningas further testified that in 2002 she requested for a moratorium
from paying the loan which Arellano granted. Upon approval of her SCSLA
loan in February 2002,[39] she paid Arellano the balance of her loan which
was more or less P4,000.00 in the presence of some female employees in
the library, namely: Editha Gochingco and Lenida Cario. [40] After Arellano
received the same, she said, Naku matutuwa si Judge nito, to which Atty.
Maningas replied, Wala ba akong diploma comadre?[41] But Mrs. Arellano
answered, Wala na maam, ok na ito. She no longer insisted on getting a
receipt because it would be a sign of mistrust.Furthermore, Arellano had the
habit of not issuing any receipt upon full payment of loans by
borrowers. She admitted lending money to Laniel Jornada, a co-employee,
and not issuing a receipt when he paid her. She simply recorded his
payments in her notebook.
 

Atty. Maningas also denied having any knowledge of Orfilas age. According

to her, there were more than 100 personnel in their office and they cannot
be expected to go over each of their biodata. Neither did she have anything
to do with Orfilas employment with the RTC Manila nor with her
childrens. Orfila was recommended by then Executive Judge Salvador and
her children were recommended by their respective judges. Atty. Maningas
likewise denied having a hand in Arellanos promotion.Arellano was
promoted in 2001 to the position of Human Resource Management Officer II
because she was the lone applicant and she was recommended by then
Executive Judge Guarina.
 

As regards the alleged anomaly in the re-raffle of cases, Atty. Maningas

explained that the case of People v. Jose Sy y Ang, on which the disturbing
rumors had centered, was added to the cases calendared for raffle on 28
February 2000. She had no participation in the preparation of the
calendar. She tendered her resignation from the raffle committee out
of delicadeza.[42] Her resignation was not accepted.
 
 
 
 

Charges Against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia

 

Complainants-spouses hurled similar charges of conspiracy, corruption and

abuse of position against Atty. Buendia. In addition, Atty. Buendia is
popularly known to have the habit of throwing sumptuous birthday parties
in the Office of the Clerk of Court. During her birthday party on 12 April
2002, an abundant supply of food was on the table. One of the
several litsons had a tag on which was written, To Atty. Buendia, happy
birthday from a certain bonding company.[43]
 

Atty. Buendia denied framing up Arellano as earlier mentioned. She did not

even know that Atty. Maningas borrowed money from Arellano. She found
out about it only when Atty. Maningas excused herself one day and
informed her that she was going to the library to pay Arellano the balance of
her loan. When she came back, she happily announced, Graduate na ako, la
na ako utang kay Estifania.[44] Atty. Maningas had bought fried chicken for
their lunch that day because she was finally able to encash her loan check
from the SCSLA.
 

Atty. Buendia denied harassing or threatening Mrs. Arellano into paying

Mrs. Orfila P30,000.00. She admitted exerting efforts to reconcile the two
but Orfilas children objected to their mother acceding to any
settlement. According to them, the only acceptable settlement was for their
mother to also slap Mrs. Arellano.
 

Atty. Buendia also denied throwing a birthday bash on 12 April 2002,
claiming that the lunch in question was a potluck organized by the April
birthday celebrants in the OCC, herself included. Atty. Buendia likewise
disavowed having knowledge of Orfilas age and the circumstances of her
employment as well as that of her children. She opined that she has no
power to appoint people to government position. She also denied blocking
Arellanos retirement benefits and argued that she and Atty. Maningas would
gain nothing by doing so.
 
As regards the alleged rigging of the raffle of the Ang Sy case, Atty. Buendia
claimed that she was not forced to resign from the raffle committee. She
tendered her resignation out of delicadeza and no charges were filed against
her regarding the same.[45]
Judge Arellano also testified to support his wifes charges. He asserted
that he did not apologize to Orfila. He also testified that he did not respond
when Atty. Maningas told him that she had already paid her debt because
he felt amused by her remark knowing that she had not yet settled her loan
obligations with his wife. He did not take any legal action to demand
payment from Atty. Maningas because he did not want his wife to
encounter any problem when she retires. He likewise stated that he and his
wife talked to Gochingco in the RTC library sometime in September
2002. She allegedly told them that she was pressured by Atty. Maningas to
execute a joint-affidavit with Cario and that she promised them a promotion
if they would testify in favor of Atty. Maningas. But he no longer confronted
her on the matter when she testified at the hearing because it was enough
that it was put on record that Atty. Maningas went to her and requested
that she execute a joint affidavit with Cario in her favor. He also submitted a
photocopy of a letter addressed to Hon. Presbitero J. Velasco, Court
Administrator, purportedly written by Atty. Rolando Alejandro Q. Agustin of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas charging Atty. Buendia, et. al. with alleged
gross violation of laws and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
government.[46]
 

During the course of the investigation, Mrs. Orfila passed away. In a

letter dated 09 January 2004, Mrs. Orfilas daughter, Mrs. Winefreda O. Paas
informed the OCA of her mothers death on 12 December 2003, together
with corroborating documents.
 After the investigation, Justice Atienza submitted his consolidated
report[47] to the OCA on 7 June 2004. Said report was noted by this Court
on 9 August 2004.[48]
 

The OCA through Justice Atienza made the following

recommendations:
 
 
IPI No. 1377-P [A.M. No. P-06-2110]

Respondent Estifana S. Arellano be penalized to:

(a)         pay a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 for misconduct for having

slapped Cristeta D. Orfila in the Office of the Clerk of Court and in her
presence; and

(b)        pay a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 for engaging in the business

of lending money in the Office of the Clerk of Court at usurious rates
of interest.

 
Administrative Matter No. 03-1692
 
(1)        In view of the death of Cristeta D. Orfila during the pendency of the
investigation as shown in the Death Certificate submitted by Ms.
Winefreda O. Paas was marked as Annex 1, the penalty of suspension
or dismissal from the service is no longer possible, the penalty of
 forfeiture of retirement benefits, except the accrued leaves, be
imposed for falsification of public documents.

(2)        Then Clerk of Court, (now) Judge Jesusa P. Maningas be penalized to

pay a fine of P20,000.00 for borrowing money from a subordinate
employee. The other charges be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

(3)        The charges against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia be dismissed for

insufficiency of evidence.[49]

Both administrative matters are now before us to consider Justice

Atienzas findings and recommendations.
 

The issue in these twin administrative matters is whether or not the

respective conduct of the parties warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction. We agree with the findings of Justice Atienza and
adopt the penalties he recommended except with respect to Arellano.
 
Charges against Estifana S. Arellano
 
Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee
 

Employees in the government service are bound by the rules of proper

and ethical behavior and are expected to act with self-restraint and civility at
all times, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. [50] Arellano
utterly failed in this regard.
 
 The records reveal that Arellano indeed slapped Orfila in the presence
of Atty. Maningas after starting a heated argument regarding an unpaid
loan. Orfila categorically and unwaiveringly testified that Arellano slapped
her in the presence of Atty. Maningas. The medical certificate issued to her
by Dr. Pingol confirms that she sustained injury as a result thereof. Her
testimony was further corroborated by three eyewitnesses to whom
Arellano failed to impute evil motive. In the absence of evil motive, their
testimonies should be given full weight and credence. [51] In People
v. Villagracia,[52] this Court held:
 

 
 

On the other hand, accused-appellants were unable to prove any

ulterior motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely
implicate them for the crime. In the absence of ill-will, it is hardly credible
that these witnesses would prevaricate and cause damnation to the one
who brought them no harm or injury.

Meanwhile, Arellano interposed the defenses of denial and frame-

up. Justice Atienza reported that it is physically impossible for Orfila to have
sustained injury on her left cheek if her right hand, which she was allegedly
thrusting at Arellanos face was merely pushed by the latter considering the
fact that they were facing each other when the incident occurred.
 
 As to the defense of frame-up, the same is farfetched and
flimsy. Aside from her own self-serving testimony and that of her husband,
she failed to present a scintilla of evidence that the slapping incident was a
mere fabrication. Neither could have Atty. Buendia rendered a distorted
report on the investigation as there were two other employees designated
as members of the Investigating Committee who participated actively during
the entire investigation. Arellano did not take legal action against either of
them. To say that the investigation was staged would be stretching it too far.
 

The testimony of her husband, Judge Arellano, is bereft of

evidentiary value being mere hearsay. [53] His knowledge of the incident
came from his alleged conversations with Atty. Maningas, Orfila and his
wife. At best, his testimony may be admitted only as proof that there was
such a conversation but without reference to the truth or falsity of the
words uttered.
 

If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, denial is self-

serving and cannot overturn positive eyewitness accounts. [54] Meanwhile,
the tenability of the defense of frame-up depends largely on the courts
assessment of the credibility of the testimonial evidence of the offender.
[55]
 Arellano failed to substantiate her allegations. Justice Atienza reported
that when Arellano testified in both cases, she was restless and did not even
look directly at Atty. Maningas,[56] while Orfila and her witnesses did not
waiver in their testimony.
 
It is highly probable that Arellano, after consultation with her
husband, panicked for fear of losing her retirement benefits because of her
own mischief.Believing that offense is the best defense, they turned the
tables on the complainant and even implicated her superiors. [57] If there was
anyone who manufactured a tall tale, it was she. Arellano then filed an
administrative case against the three with her husband, a retired RTC judge,
as co-complainant in order to lend credence to her story.
 
Arellano lays emphasis on her clean record and long faithful service in
the judiciary. However, her act of slapping Orfila without proof of sufficient
provocation and in the presence of her superior in the latters office during
working hours falls short of the standard of conduct required of court
employees. We ruled in Baloloy v. Flores,[58] to wit:
 
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the office
charged with the administration of justice must at all times be
characterized by propriety and decorum.The court will not tolerate
misconduct committed by court personnel, particularly during office hours
within the premises of the court. Such misconduct shows lack of respect
for the court, and erodes the good image of the judiciary in the eyes of the
public.

 
Although the slapping may not be work-related, the brazenness of her
act is totally unacceptable and should not be countenanced. As enunciated
by this Court in Zenaida C. Gutierrez, et. al. v. Rodolfo Quitalig,[59] to wit:
 
Employees of the judiciaryshould be living examples of uprightness
not only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal
and private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all times the
good name and standing of the courts in the community. The image of a
court, as being a true temple of justice, is aptly mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat,
 from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel. (Emphasis
supplied.)

 
Lending Money at Usurious Rates of Interest
and Lending Money to Superior Officer
 

 
Moreover, Arellanos behavior in the office can be characterized as
anything but exemplary. Arellano admitted that she lent money to her
officemates including Atty. Maningas, who was her direct superior, at a
monthly interest rate of 10%. It was because of the unpaid interest on
Orfilas loan that Arellano had an altercation with Orfila that resulted to the
slapping incident. Under the Civil Service Law, lending money at usurious
rates of interest is prohibited.[60] So is the lending of money by subordinates
to superior officers.[61] The same is punishable as a light offense under
Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service
Law, as amended, and for which Arellano must likewise be penalized.
 

However, Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil

Service Law states that if the respondent is found guilty of two or more
charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be that corresponding to the
most serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered aggravating
circumstances.
 

For slapping Orfila and worse, in the presence of her superior, Arellano
is guilty of misconduct which is punishable by suspension for one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense.[62] Such penalty should be imposed in its maximum
considering that Arellano is also guilty of lending money at usurious rates of
interest and of lending money to a superior officer. Since she has already
retired, she should be held liable to pay a fine equivalent to six (6) months
salary at the time she committed the offense in 2002.
 
 

Charges against Cristeta D. Orfila

 
Falsification of Official Documents
 
Justice Atienza found substantial evidence to show that Orfila falsified her
Service Record and Personal Data Sheet indicating thereon a false
birthdate. She stated therein that she was born on 08 October 1942. Orfila
claims to have believed in good faith that she was indeed born on that date
as she had learned it from her parents.As evidence of her birthdate, Orfila
presented her birth certificate that was issued only in 2002 after she applied
for late registration of her birth. This indicates that she was 59 years old at
the time this case was filed in June 2002.
 

However, her marriage contract readily reveals that she was 22 years
old at the time she was married in 1956. The birth certificate of her son,
William, where she was the informant, shows that she was married on 29
November 1956 and was 21 years old when William was born in
1957. Evidently, Orfila must have been born between 1934 and 1936 but not
in 1942.
 

All three (3) documents mentioned above, namely Orfilas birth certificate,
her marriage contract, and William Orfilas birth certificate, are official
records that are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[63] While it
has been held that a birth certificate is the best evidence of a persons date
of birth and that late registration by the mother of her childs birth does not
affect its evidentiary value,[64] we cannot say the same for Orfilas birth
certificate in the face of contradictory evidence.
 

There is no record of Orfilas birth on 8 October 1942 in the Office of

the Municipal Registrar of Carigara, Leyte[65] nor in the National Statistics
Office[66] so that she applied for late registration of her birth in
2002. However, Orfilas birth certificate is merely equivalent to a bare
declaration on her part as to her age because it

 
 
was she who furnished the data contained therein. [67] Furthermore,
the timing in which the late registration of the said birth certificate
was effected, which was on 29 July 2002 when Orfila was already accused of
falsification, casts doubt on the veracity of the fact it purports to prove.
 

Moreover, Orfila did not tell the truth when she testified that she had
just enrolled in Grade II at the time she was married in 1956. Her Personal
Data Sheet that she personally accomplished and submitted to the Supreme
Court on 6 June 1983 shows that she studied at
the Holy Cross Academy High School from 1954 to 1958.Her signature in the
marriage contract was legible and neatly written, a sign that she did not
have difficulty writing then as she alleged, and that she very well knew what
she signed. Her marriage contract is a public document that needs no
authentication.[68] As such, it cannot be overcome by the testimony of one of
the contracting parties.
 

The same is true for Williams birth certificate. In addition, Orfila

herself was the informant therein and she is estopped from
denying that she was 21 years old when she gave birth to William.

 
Whether Orfila was 22 years old at the time she got married or 21 years old
when William was born, she must have falsified her Personal Data Sheet and
Service Record in the judiciary in either case.
 

Under the Civil Service Law, falsification of official document is a grave

offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. [69] Since the penalty of
dismissal is no longer feasible in view of Orfilas death, the penalty of
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leaves, should be imposed
on her.
 

Charges against Atty. (now Judge) Jesusa P. Maningas

 
Illegal Solicitation and Nonpayment of Loans
 

Atty. Maningass version that she was offered a loan by Arellano and
that she had already paid the same should be given more credence than
that of the Arellanoss. It was impossible that Atty. Maningas pestered
Arellano into lending her money considering that Arellano admitted to being
a moneylender in the OCC. It is likewise impossible that Atty. Maningas had
not paid Arellano at all considering that both loans were secured in 1999
and both were payable in three (3) months but not a single demand letter

 
 
was sent to Atty. Maningas even after Arellano retired from service on 29
May 2002. Neither did Arellano file an administrative complaint against her
before the slapping incident. Her husband, being a retired Judge, could have
advised her on the legal implications of Atty. Maningass acts but he
remained silent.
 

As opposed to the Arellanoss self-serving and uncorroborated

testimonies, there is ample evidence on record to show that Atty. Maningas
had paid her loan.However, borrowing money from a subordinate is
punishable as a light offense under Civil Service Law. [70] Being the Clerk of
Court of the RTC Manila, she was expected to know the Civil Service Law by
heart as she had the duty to implement the same among her
subordinates. For failing to measure up to the exacting standards of conduct
required of her, she must be correspondingly penalized.
 

Graft and Corrupt Practices, Oppression,

Abuse of Office, etc.

 
 As to the other charges against Atty. Maningas, the Arellanos
failed to substantiate their accusations. They presented mere

 
hearsay evidence as well as their self-serving testimonies totally devoid of
factual basis. It is the complainants duty to prove what they allege. Hence,
Atty. Maningas is hereby exonerated from the said charges.
 

Charges against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia

 

The Arellanos likewise failed to present substantial evidence to prove their

charges against Atty. Buendia. There is also nothing wrong with celebrating
ones birthday in the office especially if it has been a tradition
therein. Furthermore, the anonymous complaint addressed to Executive
Judge Salvador against Atty. Buendia regarding the anomalous re-raffle of
the Ang Sy case deserves scant consideration considering that they were
handwritten and were not even endorsed by Judge Salvador to the OCC for
proper disposition. This kind of letter can easily be manufactured and does
not inspire belief.
 

Common Charges against Cristeta D. Orfila, Atty. (now Judge) Jesusa P.

Maningas and Atty. Jennifer Dela Cruz-Buendia

 
As earlier discussed, the Arellanos have not shown any positive and
convincing evidence of conspiracy among Orfila, Atty. Maningas and Atty.
Buendia to frame her up and to delay and/or
deprive her of her retirement benefits. They failed to prove that

 
 
Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia performed overt acts in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. Again, we believe that such accusations were concocted
by complainants as a desperate but futile attempt to shield Arellano from
the consequences of her misconduct. This Court shall not be an instrument
to the furtherance of such duplicity.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
 

1. Estifana S. Arellano is found GUILTY of misconduct, lending money at

usurious interest rates and lending money to a superior, and meted a
FINE in the amount equivalent to six (6) months salary deducted from
whatever leave and retirement benefits/privileges she may be entitled to;
 

2. Cristeta D. Orfila is found GUILTY of falsification of official documents and

meted the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leaves. The other charges against her are DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence;
 
3. Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas is found GUILTY of borrowing money from a
subordinate and meted a FINE of P20,000.00. The other charges against her
are DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence;
 

 
4. As to Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia, all charges against her are
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
 

SO ORDERED.

 
 
 
 
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
 

 
 REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAG0 ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES

 Associate Justice

  Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   
 

 
[1]
Formerly OCA IPI No. 02-1424-P before consolidation
 
[2]
Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 5.
[3]
Now Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch. 24.
 
 [4]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 12; The letter-complaint filed by complainant-spouses Arellano charges
Attys. Jesus P. Maningas and Jennifer C. Buendia as follows:
 
1. Against Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas for Graft and Corrupt Practices, Illegal and Immoral Abuse of
Official Position, Gross Misconduct, Immoral Solicitation and Non-payment of Loans with Abuse
of Official Position and Influence, Betrayal of Public Trust, Illegal Solicitation of money
amounting to Attempted Extortion, Oppression, Coercion, Maliciously and deliberately trying to
delay, block or otherwise deprive my wife, Estifana S. Arellano, of her retirement benefits by
filing midnight and trumped-up charges against her, in connivance with Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia
and Cristeta D. Orfila, and Dishonesty.
 
2. Against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia for Graft and Corrupt Practices, Illegal and Immoral
Solicitation of money amounting to extortion, Grave Misconduct highly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, Oppression, Abuse of Official Position and Influence, Maliciously and
deliberately trying to delay, block or otherwise deprive my wife, Estifana S. Arellano, of her
retirement gratuity and other benefits by filing or causing to be filed against her, midnight,
fabricated and trumped-up charges, in collusion with Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas and Cristeta D.
Orfila, Betrayal of Public Trust, and Dishonesty.
 
[5]
Ibid. The letter-complaint filed by complainant-spouses Arellano charges Process Server Cristeta D.
Orfila as follows:
 
3. Against Cristeta D. Orfila for Falsification of Official or Public Document, Threats,
Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Illegally remaining in the service of the judiciary and unlawfully
and fraudulently drawing her salary and other benefits after she reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 on October 8, 1999 in connivance with and protection of Atty. Maningas and Atty.
Buendia, and Maliciously and deliberately trying to deprive my wife, Estifana S. Arrellano, of her
retirement gratuity and other benefits by filing against her midnight, false and trumped-up charges
in conspiracy with Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas and Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia.
 
[6]
Consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator.
[7]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 106.
 
 
[8]
Id. at 128.
 
[9]
A.M. No. P-06-2110, p. 87.
 
 
[10]
Exhibit B; id. at 5.
 
[11]
As stated in the Rebuttal Affidavit of Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia marked as Exhibit F, A.M. No. P-06-
2110, rollo, p. 83.
 
[12]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 83.
 
[13]
TSN, 18 June 2003, p. 36.
 
[14]
When translated to English means, Alas, I was carried away! Just help me. A.M. No. P-06-2110, rollo, p.
83.
 
[15]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, pp. 141-142.
 
[16]
Ibid.
 
  
[17]
Exhibit H; A.M. No. P-06-2110, rollo, pp. 11-12.
 
[18]
Id. at 14.
 
[19]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 187.
 

 
[20]
TSN, 28 April 2003, pp. 11-13.
[21]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 135.
 
[22]
Ibid.
 
[23]
Ibid.
 
[24]
TSN, 28 April 2003, pp. 15-17.
 
[25]
Id. at 25-27.
 
[26]
Id. at 39.
 
[27]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, pp. 137-138.
 
[28]
Exhibit A, A-2; id. at 1-20.
 
[29]
Exhibit C; id. at 25.
 
[30]
Exhibit D; id.
 
[31]
Exhibit B; A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 26.
 

[32]
Exhibit F; id.

 
[33]
Exhibit 3, A.M. No. P-03-1692.
 
[34]
Supra note 4.
 
[35]
Exhibit H; id. at 22.
 
[36]
Exhibit H-1; id. at 23.
 
[37]
Exhibit 1-a; id. at 77.
 
[38]
Id. at 163-164. Atty. Maningas and Judge Arellano admitted having the following conversation on 16
April 2002:

Judge Arellano: Oh, Atty. Buendia, Ive heard that you had a bonga birthday party.
  

Atty. Buendia: Wala po yon judge. Sila lang dito ang nagkasundo mag-birthday party. Pot luck
lang po.

Judge Arellano (to Atty. Maningas): I came here because my wife

told me about the incident this morning.

Atty. Maningas: Oo nga judge, magbabayad na sana si Aling Tita, nauwi pa sa sampalan. Sayang.

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Arellano: Hindi ba alam ni Mrs. Orfila na sa Civil Service Law bawal mangutang na ayaw
magbayad.

Atty. Maningas: Eh ako nga po judge, meron din akong utang sa inyo. Buti na lang tapos na akong
magbayad, diba?

Judge Arellano: (He did not say anything at all, he just smiled.)

 
[39]
At the hearing, Atty. Maningas presented a certification from the SCSLA that she was indeed granted a
salary loan of P101,000.00 on 14 February 2002 and had an outstanding balance of P87,333.00 as of 12 August
2002; Exhibit 1-c; id. at 79.

 
[40]
Respondent also presented the joint affidavit and testimonies of Editha Gochingco and Lenida Cario who
were in the library when Atty. Maningas allegedly paid Arellano. They both testified that they saw Atty. Maningas
and Arellano talking in the library on 14 February 2002. They did not actually hear what they were talking about but
when Atty. Maningas left the library, Arellano approached them and said, Nagbayad si Atty. Maningas, so they
kidded her, Magblow out ka naman diyan Ate Fanny, to which Arellano replied, Principal lang ang binayad hindi
ko na pinainteresan.
 
[41]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 63.
 
 
[42]
Id. at 82.
 
[43]
TSN, 12 September 2003, pp. 22-24.
 
[44]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 71.
  
[45]
Id. at 82.
 
 
[46]
Exhibits L to L-12, A.M. No. P-03-1692.
 
[47]
Id. at 125-217.
 
[48]
Per Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated 09 August 2004; id. at 124.
 
[49]
Id. at 217.
 
[50]
Rona Quiroz v. Cristeta Orfila, 338 Phil. 51 (1997).
 
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, citing People v. Nicholas, 370
[51]

SCRA 473 (2001).

[52]
G.R. No. 94471, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 212, 217.
 
[53]
People v. Vda. De Ramos, 451 Phil. 215 (2003).
 
 

[54]
People v. Santiago Padao y Elcamel, 334 Phil. 726 (1997).
[55]
Ibid.
 
[56]
A.M. No. P-03-1692, rollo, p. 206.
 
[57]
Id. at 192.
 
[58]
416 Phil. 703 (2001).
 
[59]
448 Phil. 469 (2003).

 
[60]
Pres. Dec. No. 807, Art. XI, Sec. 36(b) (21). See also Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, Rule IV, Sec. 52(c) (9).
 
[61]
Pres. Dec. No. 807, Art. XI, Sec. 36(b) (20).
 
[62]
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Civil Service Laws, Rule
XIV, Sec. 22. See also Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Sec. 52.
 
 
[63]
Section 44 of Rule 130 states:
 
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
ejoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
 
[64]
People v. Apostol, 378 Phil. 61 (1999).
 
[65]
Exhibit C, A.M. No. P-06-2110.
 
[66]
Exhibit D, id.
  
[67]
People v. Romeo Geron, 435 Phil. 276 (2002).
 
[68]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 22.
 
[69]
People v. Apostol, supra note 64.
 
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Civil Service Laws, Article
[70]

XIV, Sec. 22.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 
 
FIRST DIVISION
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,   G.R. No. 188130
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
  Present:
   
  CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
  LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
  DEL CASTILLO, and
 
MARY LOU OMICTIN y PEREZ, JJ.
SINGCO, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant. July 26, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 
The Case
 
This is an appeal from the November 25, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02793, entitled People of the Philippines v. Mary
Lou Omictin y Singco. The CA Decision affirmed the Decision[2] dated May 3,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104 in Quezon City, finding
accused-appellant Mary Lou Omictin guilty of violating Section 6, in relation to
Sec. 7(b), of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995. Specifically, accused-appellant was charged with and
adjudged guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3) counts of Estafa.
The Facts
 
Primo Arvin Guevarra, one of the private complainants, arrived home
sometime in September 2003 after his employment contract in Libya expired. In
January 2004, he contacted a college classmate, Rebecca Joy Roque, who
previously informed him that she knew of a recruiter for overseas
employment. Roque thus set up a meeting between him and the recruiter, who
turned out to be accused-appellant Omictin.[3]
 
Omictin met Guevarra along with Anthony Ambrosio and Elisa Dotimas.
[4]
 In that meeting, the three agreed to pay Omictin PhP 40,000 each for their
deployment in London as caregivers. All three each gave Omictin, there and then,
PhP 10,000 as initial payment. Omictin assured them that they would leave
for London within 60 to 90 days.[5]
 
For such deployment, Guevarra had a medical examination, during which
occasion he paid Omictin an additional PhP 10,000. Later, Guevarra completed his
placement payment by giving Omictin the balance of PhP 20,000. Upon said
payment, Omictin informed Guevarra that she would schedule an orientation and
contract signing at a later date. However, the promised orientation and contract
signing never took place. Sometime in February 2004, Guevarra was able to meet
with Omictin, who promised to return his money during the first week of
March. Like the earlier promises, the promise to reimburse remained unfulfilled.[6]
 
Another private complainant, Veronica Caponpon, was assured of
employment in New Zealand as an apple picker, for which she was required by
Omictin to pay PhP 20,000 as placement fee for the deployment. Caponpon
initially paid Omictin PhP 10,000 and was then promised by the latter that she
would leave for New Zealand within two months provided that she complies with
all the requirements for deployment.[7] On April 22, 2003, Caponpon submitted her
resum to Omictin and paid the amount of PhP 8,000. The remaining PhP 2,000 was
paid on April 27, 2003. For all her efforts and the repeated promises of Omictin,
Caponpon still was not able to leave for New Zealand.[8]
 
Roy Fernandez Mago, another private complainant, was promised
employment abroad as a caregiver within three months from payment of a
placement fee of PhP 40,000 and submission of the required documents. Mago
paid the total placement fee and submitted the required documents. However, the
promised overseas employment remained unfulfilled.[9]
 
For PhP 40,000, Omictin undertook to send private complainant Anthony
Ambrosio overseas for employment within three to four months. Ambrosio was
only able to pay the amount of PhP 16,000. The promised employment never
materialized.[10]
 
On March 8, 2004, all four private complainants filed complaints against Omictin
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa. Before Joffrey Dela Merced, the Supervising Agent of the Bureaus
Counter-Intelligence Division, Mago related that, the previous day, he was able to
contact Omictin, who required him to pay an additional PhP 60,000 for his
deployment abroad. The designated place for the payment was McDonalds
Restaurant at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue. Thus, the NBI prepared an
entrapment operation to arrest Omictin and provided Mago with PhP 60,000
marked money.[11]
 
On March 9, 2004, the entrapment operation was set in motion. After receiving the
marked money, Omictin was arrested by the accompanying NBI agents.[12]
 
As a result, separate informations were filed before the Quezon City RTC charging
Omictin with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa, docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. Q-04-125442 to 45. The informations read:
 
Crim. Case No. Q-04-125442
 
That on or about the 9th day of March 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously for a fee, enlist, recruit, and promise overseas employment to the
following persons, to wit: PRIMO ARVIN S. GUEVARRA, ANTHONY P.
AMBROSIO, ROY FERNANDEZ MAGNO and VERONICA G. CAPONPON,
without first securing the required license from the Department of Labor and
Employment, in violation of said law.
 
That the above-described crime is committed in large scale, as the same was
perpetrated against four (4) persons individually or as a group as penalized under
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995.
 
Crim. Case Nos. Q-04-125443-45
 
That on or about the period comprised from January to March 2004, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously defraud [Roy Fernandez Magno, Anthony P. Ambrosio, Primo Arvin
S. Guevarra, respectively] in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which she made to
said complainant[s] to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ the said complainant[s] in U.K. London as caregiver[s] and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to
meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said [complainants] to give and deliver, as in fact, gave and
delivered to said accused the amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP 40,000,
respectively] x x x, on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made to
solely [obtain], as in fact she did obtain the amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP
16,000, PhP 40,000, respectively], which amount[s] once in possession, with
intent to defraud [said complainants] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit,
to the damage and prejudice of said [complainants] in the aforesaid amount[s] of
[PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP 40,000, respectively] x x x.[13]
During trial, Omictin gave the following version of the facts: She claimed
that she was merely asked by the private complainants to help them in the
processing of their visas for the United Kingdom and other papers for possible
employment in London. They agreed in their preliminary meeting to pay her PhP
40,000 each for the processing fees. A week after, she averred that Dotimas issued
a check for PhP 106,000 as the initial payment for the processing fees of all four
private complainants. Then, on January 31, 2004, Mago and Guevarra paid her
their respective balances for the processing fees, but both later backed out from the
placement agreement. She thus promised Mago and Guevarra that they would be
reimbursed. On March 9, 2004, she met with Mago at McDonalds Restaurant at the
corner of EDSA and Quezon Ave. to discuss the possibility of changing his United
Kingdom visa application to a United States visa application. For such purpose,
she asked from Mago the amount of PhP 60,000. After Mago paid her the money,
she was arrested by the NBI agents.[14]
 
On May 3, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Omictin guilty as charged,
the dispositive portion reading:
 
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
 
(1) In Criminal Case No. 04-125442, the Court finds accused MARY
LOU OMICTIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE defined and penalized in Section 6 in
relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, and sentences her to life
imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos.
 
(2) In Criminal Case No. 04-125443, the Court finds accused MARY
LOU OMICTIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to
seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Roy
Fernandez Mago in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.
 
(3) In Criminal Case No. 04-125444, the Court finds accused MARY
LOU OMICTIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
estafa defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify
complainant Anthony Ambrosio in the amount of Sixteen Thousand (P16,000.00)
Pesos.
 
 (4) In Criminal Case No. 04-125445, the Court finds accused MARY
LOU OMICTIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to
seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify complainant
Arvin Guevarra in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.
 
SO ORDERED.[15]
 
 
 
Aggrieved, Omictin appealed[16] to the CA, raising in her Brief for the Accused-
Appellant,[17] the following issues:
 
(1) Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but Elisa
Dotenes,[18] who issued a check in favor of accused-appellant in behalf of
Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not
presented by the prosecution, Guevarras testimony is unsubstantiated and hearsay;
[19]
 and
 
(2) As to private complainant Ambrosio, there was no receipt presented to
show payment to accused-appellant, rendering his testimony uncorroborated and
self-serving.[20]
 
Eventually, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
 
 
WHEREFORE, in light of the [foregoing] disquisitions, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-
125442, Q-04-125443, Q-04-125444, and Q-04-125445, finding appellant Mary
Lou Omictin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
 
SO ORDERED.[21]
 
 
Hence, we have this appeal.
 
Through a Manifestation (In lieu of Supplemental Brief)[22] dated October
12, 2009, Omictin repleads and adopts all the defenses and arguments raised in her
Brief for the Accused-Appellant[23] dated January 22, 2008.
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
The appeal is without merit.
 
An examination of the issues raised by Omictin in her Brief would readily
reveal that the same are all factual issues. Subject to well-defined exceptions, the
Court, not being a trier of facts, will not delve once more into the factual findings
of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The Court, in Dueas v. Guce-
Africa,[24] has articulated the rule as follows:
 
We will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals especially where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the
trial court, since we are not a trier of facts. The established rule is that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the RTC are
conclusive and binding on us. We are not wont to review them, save under
exceptional circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (8) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in the instant case. We thus perceive
no reason to disturb the findings of fact and conclusions of law arrived at by the
courts a quo.
 
 Omictin, however, maintains that the trial and appellate courts overlooked
certain facts, which, if considered, would lead to her acquittal. Omictin asserts in
her brief the following:
 
The testimony of Primo Guevarra undoubtedly shows that he was not the one who
paid the accused-appellant. His testimony, to the effect that the check, issued by a
certain Elisa Dotenes, was paid by the bank, clearly falls within the rules
proscribing the admission of hearsay evidence. It bears stressing that the failure of
the prosecution to present Elisa Dotenes renders the testimony of witness
Guevarra as unsubstantiated and hearsay.
 
Another prosecution witness, Mr. Anthony Ambrosio, testified that he gave the
accused-appellant the amount of sixteen thousand (16,000.00) pesos, representing
initial payment in consideration of the work abroad. It is borne on record
however, that Anthonys testimony was unsubstantiated by any proof that he made
such payment, i.e., receipts.
 
A perusal of the records will show that Anthonys testimony that he was divested
of said amount, through the misrepresentation of the accused-appellant, amounts
to nothing but a mere uncorroborated and self-serving allegation.
 
Surely, mere allegation, without proof, is not enough to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
 
It is submitted that the trial court should have first considered these
testimonies before rendering a judgment of conviction.[25]
 
 
These contentions are erroneous.
 
First, the testimony of Ambrosio cannot be considered as self-serving
evidence. The phrase self-serving evidence is a concept which has a well-defined
judicial meaning.Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[26] clarified what self-serving
evidence is and what it is not, thus:
 
The common objection known as self-serving is not correct because
almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is hearsay
(Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).
 
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving
statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made
 by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a partys
testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
 
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not
given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would
encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a partys testimony in
court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for
cross-examination.
 
 
This principle was reiterated in the more recent People v. Villarama,
[27]
 where the Court ruled, x x x [A] self-serving declaration is one that is made by a
party, out of court and in his favor. It does not include the testimony he gives as a
witness in court. Assayed against the foregoing standards, Ambrosios testimony is
not self-serving and is admissible in evidence.
 
We can hypothetically assume, as a second consideration, that the testimonies of
Guevarra and Ambrosio are unsubstantiated and self-serving. Still, the
unsubstantiated and self-serving nature of said testimonies would not carry the day
for Omictin, since she admitted, during trial, the substance of their
testimonies. Omictin testified thus before the RTC:
 
Q So how much did each of the four complainants paid (sic) you for the
processing of their visa?
A Arvin [Guevarra] and Roy [Mago], P40,000.00 each.
 
Q How about this Anthony Ambrosio?
A P16,000.00[28]
 
 
Through her testimony, Omictin admitted and established the fact that she
was paid by Guevarra the amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP
16,000.
 
In all, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings and core disposition of
the CA, confirmatory of that of the trial court.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the November 25, 2009 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02793 is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
 
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 
 
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
 Chief Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
 Rollo pp. 2-32. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
[2]
 CA rollo, pp. 14-18.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 7.
[4]
 Also referred to by accused-appellant Omictin as Dotenes in her pleadings.
[5]
 Rollo, p. 8.
[6]
 Id. at 8-9.
[7]
 Id. at 9.
[8]
 Id. at 9-10.
[9]
 Id. at 10.
[10]
 Id. at 12.
[11]
 Id. at 11.
[12]
 Id. at 11-12.
[13]
 Id. at 4-7.
[14]
 Id. at 13-14.
[15]
 CA rollo, pp. 60-61.
[16]
 Id. at 64.
[17]
 Id. at 80-94.
[18]
 Referred to as Dotimas by the courts a quo.
[19]
 CA rollo, pp. 90-91.
[20]
 Id. at 91.
[21]
 Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[22]
 Id. at 46-48.
[23]
 Id. at 46-47.
[24]
 G.R. No. 165679, October 5, 2009, 603 SCRA 11, 20-21.
[25]
 CA rollo, pp. 91-92.
[26]
 G.R. No. 104874, December 14, 1993, 228 SCRA 429, 436.
[27]
 G.R. No. 139211, February 12, 2003, 397 SCRA 306, 319.
[28]
 CA rollo, p. 116.
  
 
 
THIRD DIVISION
 
 
THE SANGGUNIANG   G.R. No. 170626
BARANGAY OF BARANGAY  
DON MARIANO MARCOS,  
MUNICIPALITY OF Present:
BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF  
NUEVA VISCAYA represented by  
BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
CENEN SANTOS, MARIO Chairperson,
BACUD, WALTER FRANCISCO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROSITA SEBASTIAN, CHICO-NAZARIO,
LAURETA CABAUATAN, NACHURA, and
CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY REYES, JJ.
SIMANGAN,  
Petitioners,  
  Promulgated:
- versus -  
   
PUNONG BARANGAY  
SEVERINO MARTINEZ,  
Respondent. March 3, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Orders dated 20 October 2005[1] and 30 November 2005[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 27, of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in
Special Civil Action No. 6727. In its assailed Orders, the trial court ruled that
the Sangguniang Bayan of Bayombong, Neuva Vizcaya (Sangguniang Bayan),
exceeded its jurisdiction when it imposed upon respondent Severino Martinez the
administrative penalty of removal from office.
 
Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don
Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created,
organized and existing as such under pertinent laws of the Republic of
the Philippines. Respondent Martinez is the incumbent Punong Barangay of the
said local government unit.[3]
 
On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with
Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified
complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over
elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 61[4] of Rep. Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Petitioner filed with
the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint
against Martinez on 6 December 2004 for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[5] Petitioner alleged
that Martinez committed the following acts:
 
1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income
of their solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of
fertilizer derived from composting.
 
2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable
materials taken from garbage collection.
 
3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel
for private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income
from this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected
x x x.
 
4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels
and other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of
said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste
Management Project. x x x.
 
5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003
because although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said
 purpose, he, however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he
was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. x x x.
 
6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all
in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn
the session.x x x.[6]
 
 
Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative
Complaint dated 6 December 2004, Martinez was declared by
the Sangguniang Bayan as in default.Pending the administrative
proceedings, Martinez was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days or
until 8 August 2005.[7]
 
On 28 July 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which
imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office.[8]
 
The Decision dated 28 July 2005 was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor
of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Severino Bagasao, for its implementation. On 3
August 2005, Municial Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated
that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to order Martinezs removal from
service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed
by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite suspension of Martinez since
the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.[9] The dispositive portion of the said
Memorandum states that:[10]
 
The FOREGOING considered come AUGUST 8, 2005, respondent
SEVERINO D. MARTINEZ is hereby directed NOT to ASSUME and
DISCHARGE the functions of the Office of
the Punong Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano
Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and for complainant JOSE CENEN
SANTOS to CONTINUE assuming and discharging the functions of the said
office in ACTING CAPACITY pursuant to the provisions of Sections 67 and 68
of Republic Act No. 7160.
 
 
On 26 August 2005, Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial
court against petitioner, the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Bagasao questioning
the validity of the Decision dated 28 July 2005 of the Sangguniang Bayan. This
case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 6727, which was initially heard by
Branch 28, but later raffled to Branch 27 of the trial court.[11]
 
On 20 October 2005, the trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision
of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It
maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove
an elective local official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. Thus, the Order of
the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. As a
consequence, Mayor Bagasao cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on
the basis of a void order. The trial court further ruled that Martinez properly
availed himself of the remedy of Special Civil Action, where the order assailed
was a patent nullity.[12]
 
On 10 November 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13] of
the trial courts Order dated 10 October 2005. The trial court denied the said motion
in another Order dated 30 November 2005.[14]
 
Hence, the present petition was filed.
Although Martinezs term as Punong Baranggay expired upon the holding of the 29
October 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and,
thus, rendering this petition moot and academic, the Court will nevertheless settle a
legal question that is capable of repetition yet evading review.[15]
 
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may
remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office. The pertinent legal
provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish that
the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do so.
 
 Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the
power to remove elective local officials from office:
 
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.An elective local official
may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
grounds:
 
x x x x.
 
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis provided.)
 
 
During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,[16] the
legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts,
the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the
removal of elective local officials was evident:
 
Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the
issue of whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President
can suspend or remove an elective official.
 
Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition,
may I just add the following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying
only the proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we
know that in the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be
appealed or may be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later
on, I would like to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase PROPER
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN simply by
COURTS. Kasi po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court
o ang Sandiganbayan.
 
Senator Pimentel. OR THE PROPER COURT.
 
Senator Saguisag. OR THE PROPER COURT.
 
Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr.
President.
 
Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that we will
craft to capture the other ideas that have been elevated. (Emphasis provided.)
 
 
 In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[17] the Court en banc categorically ruled that
the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since
the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the
last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. It further invalidated
Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provided that:
 
Article 125. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. x x x.
 
x x x x.
 
(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the
disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
other.
 
 
The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that
prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its
authority when it granted to the disciplining authority the power to remove elective
officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is
clear that under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to
remove Martinez.
 
Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving
elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard and decided by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or SangguniangBayan concerned, which can,
thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from office. It further claims that the courts
are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of
removal is warranted.[18]
 
The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run
counter to the rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive
judicial prerogative.In Pablico v. Villapando,[19] the court declared that:
  
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local
officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124
(sic 125)[20] (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to
remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to
the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law
on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed
and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is
vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an
ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their
constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the
caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining
authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it
should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local
official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan
activity by the disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the
power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from
office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the
decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or
partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the petitioners interpretation would
defeat the clear intent of the law.
 
Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an
implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This
would be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus
placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local
governments. The courts would be stripped of their power of review, and their
discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be
exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office
of the local elective official concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to
avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
 
Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only
after a trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and
evidence can ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political
maneuverings. Elevating the removal of an elective local official from office from
an administrative case to a court case may be justified by the fact that such removal
not only punishes the official concerned but also, in effect, deprives the electorate
of the services of the official for whom they voted.
 
As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the
procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring
elective barangay official before
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of
an erring elective barangayofficial from office, as the courts are exclusively vested
with this power under Section  60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts
allegedly committed by the barangayofficial are of a grave nature and, if found
guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed
with  the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial
that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the
most extreme penalty that
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring
elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official
from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in
court.
 
Petitioner alleged that an interpretation which gives the judiciary the power
to remove local elective officials violates the doctrine of separation of powers. This
allegation runs contrary to the 1987 Constitution itself, as well as jurisprudence.
 
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It
establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in
terms of duty.[21] Paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides that:
 
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis provided.)
 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather,
it should be applied in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The
removal from office of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics
and used to defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest
that power in a more impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local
government units are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials;
rather, they are prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.
 
Petitioner questions the Decision dated 20 October 2005 of the trial court for
allowing the petition filed before it as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. If, indeed, the Sangguniang Bayan had no power to
remove Martinez from office, then Martinez should have sought recourse from
the SangguniangPanlalawigan. This Court upholds the ruling of the trial court.
 
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to
the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for
review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which
is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the
complaint.[22]
 
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on
sound public policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are
instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly
resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3)
where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where
judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong
public interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranto proceedings.[23]
 
As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative
remedies have been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction
and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial.
 
In this case, it is apparent that the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated 28 July
2005 removing Martinez from office.Such act was patently illegal and,
therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative
appeal in order to annul the said Order of the SangguniangBayan.[24] Thus, his
direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified.
 
In addition, this Court in Castro v. Gloria[25] declared that where the case
involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative
remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. The reason behind providing an
exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that issues of law
cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the
administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. A legal question is
properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative
body.[26]
 
In the present case, Martinez raised before the trial court the sole issue of
whether the Sangguniang Bayan has jurisdiction over a case involving the removal
of a local elective official from office.[27] In Martinezs petition before the trial
court, only a legal question was raised, one that will ultimately be resolved by the
courts. Hence, appeal to the administrative officer concerned would only be
circuitous and, therefore, should no longer be required before judicial relief can be
sought.
 
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Bayombong RTC in Special Civil Action No. 6727
is AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
  MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
 
ATTESTATION
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 
 
 

[1]
 Penned by Judge Jose B. Rosales. Rollo, pp. 32-39.
[2]
 Id. at 40-42.
[3]
 Id. at 5-6.
[4]
 Section 61 of the Local Government Code states that:
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local
elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent
component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President;
 (b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before
the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before
the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final
and executory.
[5]
 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[6]
 Id. at 72.
[7]
 Id. at 33.
[8]
 Id. at 71-77.
[9]
 Id. at 78-79.
[10]
 Id. at 80.
[11]
 Id. at 7-8.
[12]
 Id. at 34-38.
[13]
 Id at 48-63.
[14]
 Id. at 40-42.
[15]
 Albana v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, 23 July 2004, 435 SCRA 98, 105; Brillantes, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163193, 15 June 2004, 432 SCRA 269, 286; and Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 505-506 (2004).
[16]
 1 August 1990, pp. 39-40, also cited in Pablico v. Villapando, 434 Phil. 853, 859-860 (2002).
[17]
 326 Phil. 847, 904-905 (1996).
[18]
 Rollo, p. 133.
[19]
 Supra note 16 at 860, citing Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., supra note 17.
[20]
 Petitioner alleged that Article 124, and not Article 125, of the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code was annulled by the Court in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Pablico v. Villapando. This hardly merits
this Courts attention.In Salalima, it was categorically stated that the power granted to the disciplining
authority in Article 125 was clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that drafted it. Citing
Article 124, instead of Article 125, in Villapando, was clearly a clerical error committed wherein no
mention was made of the subject matter of Article 124 and particular portions of Article 125 were quoted
therein.
[21]
 Disomangcop v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 149848, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 203, 219.
[22]
 Castro v. Gloria, G.R. No.132174, 20 August 2001, 363 SCRA 417, 422.
[23]
 Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA 255, 265-266.
[24]
 Section 67 of the Local Government Code states that:
Section 67. Administrative Appeals. Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof, be appealed to the following:
(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and
the sangguniang bayan; x x x.
[25]
 Supra note 22.
[26]
 Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet v. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, 208 Phil. 78, 83 (1983).
[27]
 Rollo, p. 67.
 
JUDGE RIZALINA T. CAPCO- A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124
UMALI, [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No.
RTC, Br.212, Mandaluyong City, 07-2631-RTJ]
Complainant,  
  Present:
   
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
  CARPIO MORALES,
  BRION,
JUDGE PAULITA B. DEL CASTILLO, and
ACOSTA-VILLARANTE, ABAD, JJ.
RTC, Br. 211, Mandaluyong  
City,  
Respondent.  
   
x---------------------x  
   
  A.M. No. RTJ-08-2125
JUDGE PAULITA B. ACOSTA- [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No.
VILLARANTE, 07-2632-RTJ]
RTC, Br. 211, MandaluyongCity,  
Complainant,  
   
-versus-  
   
JUDGE RIZALINA T. CAPCO-  
UMALI, Promulgated:
RTC, Br.212, Mandaluyong City, August 27, 2009
Respondent.  
 
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
DECISION
 
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Complaint-Affidavit of April 25, 2007[1] filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (Judge Capco-Umali) charged
Judge Paulita Acosta-Villarante[2] (Judge Acosta-Villarante) with violation of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[3] (New Code of
Judicial Conduct), Canon 2, Section 2[4] and Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2.[5]
The facts which spawned the filing of Judge Capco-Umalis complaint are not
disputed.
 
Judge Acosta-Villarante wrote a Memorandum of March 27, 2007[6] addressed to
Executive Judge Maria Cancino-Erum of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of MandaluyongCity. The Memorandum, copies of which were furnished the
Offices of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the
Judicial and Bar Council, Representative Benhur Abalos, Mayor Neptali Gonzales
II, the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, the Clerk of Court of Mandaluyong RTCs,
and the other judges of MandaluyongCity, reads:
 
This refers to that unfortunate incident which occurred during the first meeting
of RTC Judges ever [sic] held on March 23, 2007 (Friday) under your executive
judgeship where the newly appointed vice executive Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali
marred the event by conduct very unbecoming of a judge by uttering unsavory
remarks and epithets or words of the same import designed to humiliate the
undersigned in the presence of fellow judges and assistant clerk of court  Atty.
Leynard Dumlao, coupled with her attempt to inflict physical harm to the
undersigned which you, as the newly appointed executive Judge, miserably failed
to control and dominate and opted to take a passive stance.
 
The conduct of the newly appointed vice executive judge does not speak well of
her being a judge who is expected to conduct herself in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.
 
 While the meeting of the judges is an ideal forum for the exchange of ideals and
information, and to promote camaraderie among judges in the interest of public
service, there is no assurance that the uncalled for incident on March 23, 2007
will not be repeated.
 
It is therefore moved that the holding of monthly meeting of judges be
suspended. (Underscoring supplied)
 
On account of the underlined statements of Judge Acosta-Villarante in her above-
quoted Memorandum, Judge Capco-Umali filed a complaint for libel docketed as
I.S. No. 07-7732-D,[7] before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City.
 
Judge Acosta-Villarante countered by also filing an Administrative
Complaint of April 26, 2007 charging Judge Capco-Umali with violation of Canon
4, Sections 1 and 2[8] of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and a complaint for
Grave Oral Defamation and Grave Threats, docketed as I.S. No. 07-71846-E,
[9]
 before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City.
 
By 1st Indorsement of August 1, 2007,[10] the administrative complaints were
referred to the OCA.
 
The details of Judge Capco-Umalis complaint are contained in her Complaint-
Affidavit for Libel as follows:
 
After having been designated by the Supreme Court a[s] the new Executive Judge
and Vice-Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Judge Maria
A. Cancino-Erum and the Vice Executive Judge (complainant) together with
Executive Judge Ofelia Colo of the Metropolitant [sic] Trial Court Br. 59 agreed
to pay a courtesy call/visit to May[o]r Neptali Boyet Gonzales II, City Mayor of
Mandaluyong City. The visit took place at noontime of March 15,
2007 (Thursday). After briefing the Mayor [about] the purpose of our visit, he
warmly and graciously entertained us. Until the conversation was shifted to the
topic of local allowance. Such being the topic, Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum
showed to the Mayor the payroll for the month of April 2007 for early approval
considering that most judges would take their vacation. Perusing intently the
payroll Mayor Gonzales noticed the disparity in figures (amount) as to the
allowance received by each Judges. He noticed that respondent Villarante was
receiving additional three thousand pesos (P3,000) on top of her regular
allowance as Executive Judge; and additional five thousand pesos (Php5,000) on
top of her allowance as Acting Judge of Br. 209. He also noticed that I [Judge
Capco-Umali] and Executive Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum received additional
two thousand pesos (P2,000) each on top of our regular allowances. Asking us as
to why and as to where those additional allowances come from, complainant told
the mayor that TERRE, the one preparing the payroll told us (I and Executive
Judge Erum)[ about the P2,000 allowance.]
 
xxxx
 
Executive Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum for her part informed the
Mayor, thus: Sabi po ni Judge Villarante nirequest daw niya po
iyon sa inyo approved nyo, at pinirmahan niya ang payroll.
Tinanggap naman po naming [sic] nitong February.
 
But as regards the additional P3,000 (as Executive Judge) and P5,000 (as Acting
Judge) of Judge Villarante, we told the Mayor that we have no knowledge as to
how they come about
 
Wala akong alam na request, wala akong inaprove, at lalong wala
akong pangdagdag. Walang pondo. Iyon ngang mga tao ko, hindi
ko maincreasan. E, kayo mga judges kayo, syempre pirma na lang
ako pag prisinta sa akin an[g] payroll.
 
The Mayor summoned LOIDA, her staff and directed the latter to
retrieve the previous payrolls including the 2006 payrolls. He also
said that ang laki naman ng increase ng Executive Judge, lalo na
ang sa Acting, hindi naman ganyan yan ah. Pero in case na
naaprove ko yan, ibibigay na natin yan sa bagong Executive Judge
at iyong dating Executive Judge, balik sa dati niyang tinatanggap. 

xxxx
 
Come, March 23, 2007 (Friday) Monthly Judges Meeting hosted by the newly
designated Executive Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum. The meeting was going
smoothly until the topic of local allowance had been touched. Reporting to the
body what transpired during the courtesy call at the Mayors Office on March 15,
2007, when the matter of giving to the new executive judge the increased
allowances of Executive Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante and that the latter
would revert back [sic] to the authorized amount for Executive Judges was
discussed, respondent Villarante was angered and blurted out addressing the new
Executive Judge, thus:
 
Kayo, simula ng maupo sa pwesto, wala ng ginawa kundi kutkutin
at maghanap ng evidencia para ako masira, nagsusumbong,
 nagmamanman. Wala naman pakialaman sa allowance kanya
kanya yan dapat.[]
 
Having personal knowledge of the conversation that transpired at the Mayors
Office on March 15, 2007, and much aware that respondents accusations were
baseless, complainant felt obliged to come to the rescue of the embattled Judge
Maria A. Cancino-Erum and to refute respondents misplaced tirade by stating
matter of fact the truth and what I saw and heard.
 
For his part, Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela who admitted his presence during the
courtesy call confirmed the truthfulness of complainants report and also
confirmed the transfer of Executive Judges allowance to the new Executive Judge
thus: Totoo ang sinabi ni Judge Umali nandoon ako, ililipat nga allowance sa
bagong Executive Judge at ang dating Executive Judge will receive former
amount.
 
While complainant is still enlightening her fellow Judges of the real facts that
transpired at the Mayors Office, the respondent kept talking too and even shouting
at the top [of] her voice towards complainant visibly irked by complainants
revelation on the matter. Respondent even called complainant a
liar (sinungaling) repeatedly[;] when complainant demanded from respondent her
basis for saying that complainant is a liar, respondent was not able to answer it but
continued calling her sinungaling. Even telling her to stop talking because her
(complainant) voice is so sharp to her ear (nakakahiwa boses mo). Respondent
continued verbally attacking complainant with words connoting malicious
imputations of being an incorrigible liar and of being in cahoots with Judge Maria
A. Cancino-Erum in peddling lies [that] the complainant got upset by the verbal
aggression made by Judge Villarante that she told the latter, thus: Matanda ka
na, halos malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan,
madadamay pa kami. Judge Villarante fought back: Bog, sana mangyari sa iyo,
bog!.
 
Complainant welcomed the challenge, thus: handa akong mamatay kahit anong
oras dahil wala akong ginagawang masama.
 
At said instance complainant once more prompted Judge Villarante as to her
authority or basis in the increase in the payroll, and Judge Villarante answered:
May nag-oofer nga!.
 
More heated exchanges ensued because Judge Villarante kept o[n]
saying sinungaling to the complainant.
 
Thereafter, cooler heads intervened. Judge Edwin Sorongon brought respondent
out of the room while Atty. Leynard Dumlao [was] pacifying the complainant.
[11]
 (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied; underscoring supplied;
italics in the original)
  
By Comment of May 28, 2007,[12] Judge Acosta-Villarante denied that she wrote
the Memorandum to maliciously impute a crime, vice or defect on Judge Capco-
Umali as she merely requested for the suspension of the holding of the monthly
meeting of judges to avoid a repetition of the incident and to afford the parties an
opportunity to cool off.
 
In causing the circulation of the Memorandum, Judge Acosta-Villarante explained
that she had an obligation to bring to the attention of concerned officials the
personal demeanor of another member that would put the Judiciary in constant
public scrutiny and disrespect. Her version of the incident goes:
 
After taking up the first agenda of the meeting x x x, the agenda on allowances of
Judges was called to be taken up.
 
Whereupon, Complainant requested to take the floor and manifested as follows:
 
Judge P.A. Villarante:
 
mga kapwa kong Hukom, bago natin talakayin ang agenda ng
allowances, maari bang ipaabot ko sa kaalaman ng lahat na may
tumawag ng aking kaalaman at pansin na mayroon di-umanong
Hukom ng RTC na nagpahiwatig sa Tanggapan ng City Mayor na
di-umano hindi ko hini-hearing o dinidinig ang mga asunto
ng RTC, Br. 209, na sakup ng aking designasyon bilang Acting
Presiding Judge, na may kaugnayan sa ating pag-uusapan na
allowances. Pinatunayan ko na hindi tutoo at pawang
kasinungalingan ang bintang sa pamamagitan ng Minutes of Court
Hearings at Certification ng Branch Clerk of Court
ng RTC, Br. 209. Mga kasama sa Judiciary, nakikiusap ako na
iwasan natin ang nakakasirang bagay na hindi totoo x x x[.]
 
x x x Ugnay sa representation sa pagtaas ng allowance ng Judges
sa local Government ay napagbigyan naman. Pakiusap ko, huwag
naman siraan ang kapwa x x x, at iba pa.
 
On the matter, a Judge in the group made a comment to wit:
 
x x x upang maiwasan ang hindi pagkakaunawaan ng isat isa sa
atin, hinihiling ko sa bawat isa sa atin na kung ano ang
tinatanggap ng sino man sa atin, huwag ng questionin x x x at iba
pa.
  
at that juncture Judge Capco-Umali stood up and in a mode of anger pointing a
finger against herein Complainant, she repeatedly said in a loud voice:
 
Matanda ka na! Mamamatay ka na!... at iba pa na may
kahalintulad.
 
On the impropriety of the unruly and disrespect behavior and conduct of Judge
Capco-Umali in the presence of fellow-judges and others, a Judge tried to say
something in an effort to appease her unruliness, but she kept on unkindly
berating herein Complainant who was then speechless out of her shock on her
unexpected behavior.
 
Regaining a bit of composure and wit, Complainant appealed to the respondent in
this manner:
 
x x x Judge Umali magpakatao at makinig ka naman para
makapagunawaan tayo, nakakahiya na ito x x x
 
to which she became more angry and shouted
 
x x x Judge ako! Judge ako x x x!.
 
as she was pounding her breast continuously with her fist; because of the shock
and fright generated by the unruly behavior of respondent, complainant did not
clearly comprehend the rest of her berating statements made against her in the
process.
 
When respondent Judge Umali already appeared to be more uncontrollable in her
decorum, complainant then in fear took steps to get out of the place with Judge
Sorongon then tending her on her shoulder assisted her in haste towards the exit
door; and when about to step out of the exit door, complainant turning her face on
the then commotion at her back she saw Respondent Judge Umali still berating
her and in the act of catching her at the back but on the then timely intervention of
Atty. Leynard Dumlao who then was close at complainants back, prevented
respondent to reach her who then hastily moved to the safety of her courtroom
still with the assistance of Judge Sorongon, thus complainant got out of the wrath
of respondent Judge Umali.[13] (Italics and underscoring in the original)
 
 
In her May 22, 2007 Comment,[14] Judge Capco-Umali, admitting having uttered
the remarks matanda ka na, halos malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng
ganyan, madadamay pa kami to Judge Acosta-Villarante, explained that it was due
to exasperation as Judge Acosta-Villarante called her an incorrigible liar
or sinungaling. Alsoadmitting having uttered Judge ako! Judge ako!, she
explained that it was to remind Judge Acosta-Villarante that she deserved respect
and courtesy, for while she was speaking on the topic of allowances, Judge Acosta-
Villarante kept interrupting her by making interjections and unnecessary
comments.
 
In her June 8, 2007 Reply,[15] Judge Acosta- Villarante, admitting calling Judge
Capco-Umali sinungaling, explained that she was only constrained by the
situation, adding that Judge Capco-Umali is a pathological liar.
In its March 5, 2008 Report and Recommendation,[16] the OCA made the following
evaluation:
 
xxxx
 
The admissions made by the concerned Judges anent the allegations they hurled
against each other provide for the strongest evidence to  establish their individual
liability.
 
Time and again, the Court has constantly reminded Judges that as magistrates of
the law, they must comport themselves at all times in such a manner that their
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public
that looks up to them as epitome of integrity and justice. They must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. They must
studiously avoid even the slightest infraction of the law (Alumbres vs. Caoibes,
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1431, January 23, 2002). The actions of the respondent Judges
fell short of this exacting ethical standard demanded from the members of the
Judiciary.
 
Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary (A.M. [No.] 03-05-01-SC, [effective] 01 June 2004) enunciates the rule
that [J]udges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
 
Judge Capco-Umali failed to live up to the standard of propriety entrenched in
the aforequoted code of conduct. While, she might have been provoked by Judge
Acosta-Villarantes referral to her as a liar, she should have maintained her
composure instead of shouting back at a fellow judge. She should have
exercised self-restraint instead of reacting in such a very inappropriate manner
considering that she is in the presence of fellow Judges and other employees
of RTC, Mandaluyong City. She should have put more consideration and effort on
preserving the solemnity of the said meeting, and on giving those who are present
the courtesy and respect they deserved. It was held in Quiroz vs. Orfila (272
SCRA 324 [1997]) that [f]ighting between court employees during office hours is
disgraceful behavior reflecting adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It
displays a cavalier attitude towards the seriousness and dignity with which court
business should be treated. Shouting at one another in the workplace and during
office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not only towards co-workers, but
to the court as well. The behavior of the parties was totally unbecoming members
of the judicial service.
 
Judge Capco-Umali, however, does not bear this responsibility alone. Judge
Acosta-Villarante should also be required to answer for her failure to observe the
basic norm of propriety demanded from a judge in relation with the
aforementioned 23 March 2007 incident. At the outset, it was Judge Acosta-
Villarantes unseemly behavior, calling Judge Capco-Umali sinungalingin front of
their fellow Judges that initiated  the altercation between the two Judges. Judge
Acosta-Villarante should have been more cautious in choosing the words to
address the already volatile situation with Judge Capco-Umali.
 
Judge Acosta-Villarante also repeated the uncalled for conduct when she wrote
the memorandum dated 27 March 2007 and caused its circulation. If indeed the
memorandum was produced strictly to allow the parties to cool off and avoid a
repetition of the incident, on this ground alone, there was no need to mention the
alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali during the meeting. The
memorandum was thus written as a medium for retaliation against Judge
Capco-Umali.
 
Judge Acosta-Villarante cannot also use as justification in writing and circulating
of the memorandum the claim that she has an obligation to bring to the attention
of concerned officials the personal demeanor of another member that would put
the Judiciary in constant public scrutiny and disrespect pursuant to her oath of
office. As a Judge, respondent Acosta-Villarante is aware that there are proper
avenues for ventilation of grievance against anyone in government service.
Moreover, the termination of the conflict between her and Judge Capco-Umali
(through the suggestion of giving the parties opportunity for cooling off) is clearly
not what she is up to for what she did only worsened the situation (with the filing
of several complaints and counter-complaints).
 
An act complained of anchored on a violation of Code of Judicial Conduct, may
only constitute a serious charge under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
if the same amounts to gross misconduct. The respective acts for which the herein
respondents have been charged do not amount to gross misconduct. Thus, the
charges against them cannot be considered serious. Nevertheless, respondents
should be held administratively liable for violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Under Section
11(B) in relation to Section 9 (A) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less serious charge.
Respondents, therefore, may be sanctioned with: [1] suspension from office
 without salary and other benefits for not less than (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or [2] a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
 
In the case of Judge Capco-Umali, however, the imposable penalty should
be tempered because it is clear from the record that she was dragged into the tiff
by an act of provocation.[17] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
 
 
 
Thus, for violating Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
is a less serious charge under Section 11(B) in relation to Section 9 (A) of Rule
140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, the OCA recommended that Judges
Capco-Umali and Acosta-Villarante be fined in the amount of P11,000
and P16,000, respectively.
 
The Court finds the evaluation of the complaints by the OCA well-taken.
 
Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by
judges and employees necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or
misunderstanding is a disgraceful occurrence reflecting adversely on the good
image of the Judiciary.[18] By fighting within the court premises, respondent judges
failed to observe the proper decorum expected of members of the Judiciary. More
detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mere allowance coming from
the local government.
 
Under Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC[19] (September 11, 2001), a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is classified as a serious charge only if it
amounts to gross misconduct. Since, as correctly found by the OCA, the same does
not constitute gross misconduct, it should be considered only as a violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, which is classified as a less serious
charge, in which case, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: (1)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor
more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
 
The Court finds, however, that Judges Capco-Umali and Acosta-Villarante should
each be fined P11,000.
 
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judges Rizalina T. Capco-Umali and Paulita B.
Acosta-Villarante GUILTY of violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which they are each FINED in
the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000) Pesos.
 
In view of the retirement of Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante, the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office, Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to
DEDUCT the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000) from her retirement
benefits.
 
 
 
 
Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, who is still in the service, is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The
same stern warning applies to retired Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante in her
capacity as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
 
 
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
  
 
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

[1]
 Rollo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124, pp. 1-5.
[2]
 Compulsorily retired from the service on October 2, 2007.
[3]
 A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC (April 27, 2004) which took effect on June 1, 2004.
[4]
 SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
[5]
 SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2 As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
[6]
 Rollo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124, p. 6.
[7]
 Id. at 9-26.
[8]
 Supra note 5.
[9]
 Rollo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124, pp. 170-174.
[10]
 Id. at 200.
[11]
 Id. at 17-20.
[12]
 Id. at 28-34.
 
[13]
 Rollo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2125, pp. 6-9.
[14]
 Id. at 24-38.
[15]
 Id. at 57-67.
[16]
 Rollo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124, pp. 384-393.
[17]
 Id. at 390-393.
[18]
 Re: Fighting Incident Between Two (2) SC Drivers, Namely, Messrs. Edilberto L. Idulsa and Ross C. Romero,
A.M No. 2008-24-SC, July 14, 2009; Nacionales v. Madlangbayan, A.M. No. P-06-2171, June 15, 2006,
490 SCRA 538, 545.
[19]
 Took effect on October 1, 2001.
  
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

 
EN BANC
 
FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO, A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ

Complainant,  

   

- versus -  

   

JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA,  

Regional Trial Court, Branch
 
144, Makati City,
 
Respondent.
 
x-----------------------------------------x
 
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049

Complainant,  

   

- versus -  

   

JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA,

Regional Trial Court, Branch  
144, Makati City,
 
Respondent.
 
x-----------------------------------------x
 
OFFICE OF THE COURT
 
ADMINISTRATOR,
 
Complainant,
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
 
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263- RTC/
 
Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit
- versus - Conducted at the Regional Trial Court,

  Branch 144, Makati City)

   
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA,  
Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,
Makati City, and COURT  
STENOGRAPHER VICTORIA C.  
JAMORA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 144, Makati City,  

Respondents.  

x-----------------------------------------x  

SYLVIA SANTOS,  

Complainant,  

   

   
 -versus- A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093

   

  PUNO, C.J.,

JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, CARPIO,

Regional Trial Court, Branch
CORONA,
144, Makati City,
CARPIO MORALES,
Respondent.
VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 23, 2010

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 DECISION
 
 
PER CURIAM:
 
 
These consolidated cases[1] stemmed from the administrative complaints filed
against respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua. A decision has been rendered in
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, entitled Sylvia Santos v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua,
from which the respondent sought reconsideration. The immediately preceding
case was consolidated with the subsequent administrative complaints filed against
respondent Judge in a Resolution dated April 14, 2009 of the Court en banc.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ

 
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), Francisco P.
Ocampo charged respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with harassment, grave abuse of
authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In his letter-complaint dated April 24, 2007 to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Francisco Ocampo stated that he was the respondent in
Special Proceedings (SP) No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco
P. Ocampo, which was pending before the sala of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
 
On November 27, 2006, Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo,
filed a petition claiming the sole custody of their minor daughters, namely, Ma.
Francesca P. Ocampo (Francesca), born on June 1, 1994, and Ma. Fatima Patricia
A. Ocampo (Fatima), born on October 13, 1995. Summons was served upon
Francisco Ocampo on December 12, 2006 and the case was set for hearing the
following day, December 13, 2006.
 
During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge issued
an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the
country without the court's permission and directing him to allow his wife, Milan,
visitation rights over their minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Since then, Milan exercised visitation rights over the minors and
communicated with them through their cellular phones. Francisco Ocampo filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that he
and Milan were residents and registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He then
served written interrogatories to his wife, and presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to prove that his wife was not really a resident
of Makati City.
 
In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to
dismiss. Francisco Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his motion
since Milan never presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which he
submitted in support of his motion to dismiss.
 
Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
likewise denied by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3,
2007. On even date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO), requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor
daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala
Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts
that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the
health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide
monthly support of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of
expenses for medication and education.
 
Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing
the TPO as the period to file his answer had not yet expired when respondent
Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support
of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is
not the father of the said minors and in the absence of any factual finding as to the
resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. In directing the payment
of support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances
relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the legal
separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment.
Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the
implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her branch
sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to
implement the Order. Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a Maundy Thursday, the
sheriff dispatched by respondent Judge barged into the home of Francisco
Ocampos parents in Baguio City and woke up all the occupants therein. At that
time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters and family were having their Holy
Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and opened the rooms against the
will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned
that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused
from their sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his
minor daughters to his wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay
the support of P50,000.00 right there and then, although he was told by Francisco
that he did not have such amount of money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go
with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told them to go
with him.
 
Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgent ex
parte motion to recall or rectify the Order dated April 3, 2007, but both motions
were denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated April 13, 2007.
The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as
follows: (1) she denied the motion to dismiss filed by Francisco Ocampo,
respondent therein, despite overwhelming evidence submitted that therein
petitioner was not a resident of Makati City; (2) she scheduled the hearing of the
case immediately a day after the summons was served on therein respondent; (3)
she issued a TPO despite the fact that therein respondent's period to file an Answer
had not yet lapsed; (4) she ordered the payment of support without sufficient basis;
and (5) she caused the implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even
designating a special sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday.
These, coupled with complainant Ocampo's account that respondent Judge
demanded money from his wife, constitute the first set of charges filed against her.
 
In her Comment,[2] respondent Judge explained that the order setting SP No.
M-6375 for hearing on the petitioner's application for a TPO and Hold Departure
Order was issued on December 8, 2006, a Friday, and was received for service by
the Process Server on the same day. Based on the officer's return, the Order was
attempted to be served twice by the Process Server on December 11, 2006, a
Monday, at complainant Francisco Ocampo's house, but nobody was there.
On December 12, 2006, substituted service was resorted to by the Process Server.
 
Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have been set earlier
since the court calendar was full, nor later, because December 13, 2006 was the
last hearing date, before the court went on Christmas recess, for cases requiring the
presence of the public prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt
harassed by the suddenness of the court hearing, respondent Judge professed that
she did not have such intention. The nature of therein petitioner's prayers required
immediate action by the court and the December 8, 2006 Order could have been
served on him on December 11, 2006, but, as previously mentioned, was
unsuccessful.
 
Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant Ocampo really felt
harassed by the suddenness of the hearing, he could have complained during the
hearing of December 13, 2006. Nonetheless, he never brought such issue to the
attention of the court, until the filing of the administrative complaint, or four (4)
months after the fact. At any rate, the scheduled hearing on December 13, 2006 did
not push through because Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the same
day. Francisco Ocampo himself set the hearing of his motion for reconsideration of
the Order dated March 22, 2007 Order (which denied the Motion to Dismiss)
on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday. For utter lack of merit, reconsideration was
denied and the TPO was issued on the same day.
 
 Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was anchored on the
provision of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. The Court also took into
account the provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which deal
with the right of the mother to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children
and her right to keep them in her company. Moreover, Francisco Ocampos
contention in his Answer that he was not contesting his wifes claim that the subject
minors were not his children bolstered the propriety of the award of custody over
the subject minors to his wife, Milan.
 
Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous in causing the
implementation of the TPO, as the law itself mandates that the court order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent. The Order that directed
the implementation of the TPO was dated April 4, 2007, and it was received
by Milan's counsel on the same day. Sheriff Manuel Q. Tangangco was deputized
to serve it since the Branch Sheriff was not available. Milan Ocampo herself and
her counsel coordinated with the sheriff regarding its service, also on the same day.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua explained that had she opted to defer action on
Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO as well as its implementation, it would
have been Milan who would have charged her administratively, considering that
the Petition was filed as early as November 23, 2006, but the proceedings on the
merits were delayed due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of a Motion to
Dismiss. In fact, therein petitioner, Milan Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007
an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Petitioner's Application for a Permanent
Protection Order, etc.), claiming that Francisco Ocampo's motion to dismiss was
purely dilatory.
As regards the date, time and manner the TPO was served by the sheriff,
respondent Judge maintained that she was not privy to it, since the said TPO would
have been served on April 4, 2007, pursuant to the Order bearing the same date.
The sheriff's arrogance, if any, was his personal accountability.
 
Respondent Judge noted that the Sheriffs Report and handwritten notation
on the lower portion of the Order dated April 3, 2007, which was also signed by
Kagawad Artemio S. Zaparita of Baguio City and SP04 Arthur A. Curno of the
Baguio City Police, stated that respondent Francisco Ocampo voluntarily turned
over the custody of subject minors to the petitioner. During the hearing on May 10,
2007, the subject minors themselves belied the claims of Francisco Ocampo
regarding the alleged arbitrary manner the TPO was served by the
sheriff. Respondent Judge also pointed out that the court did not receive any
complaint from Francisco Ocampo or anyone concerned about the manner the TPO
was served. It was only in the present administrative complaint that the same was
raised, leading to the inference that Francisco Ocampos claims were concocted.
 
Respondent Judge maintained that it was irrelevant that the subject minors
may not have been in danger, but were safe in the custody of complainant
Francisco Ocampo. The court arrived at a preliminary determination that Milan,
being the biological mother and the subject minors being her illegitimate children,
was entitled to custody over them. Moreover, Milan may have been granted and
was exercising visitation rights over subject minors, yet the duration thereof, as
stated in the Order dated December 13, 2006, was only until the court resolved
complainant Ocampo's Motion to Dismiss, which was resolved with finality
on April 3, 2007. Further, there is a whale of a difference between exercise of
visitation rights and custody. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, subject minors,
who were over seven years old, declared that they preferred to stay with their
mother, Milan Ocampo, and likewise confirmed the physical violence committed
by complainant Francisco Ocampo against Milan Ocampo.
According to respondent Judge, Milan Ocampos prayer for the issuance of a
TPO and a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) was anchored mainly on R.A. No.
9262. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9262 is explicit that the TPO should be issued by the
court on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that
such order should be issued. Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO,
based on R.A. No. 9262, was incorporated in the Petition that was filed as early
as November 23, 2006. Thus, it was not necessary for the court to await the filing
of complainant Ocampo's Answer or the expiry of the period within which to file it
before issuing the TPO.
  
Respondent Judge explained that the award of support was in favor
of Milan alone as the legal wife of complainant Ocampo. This was clarified in an
Order dated April 16, 2007. Among Milan's prayers in her Petition was for an
award of monthly support of not less than P150,000.00, but the court awarded
only P50,000.00, as that was the amount found reasonable by it. At any rate, the
support granted by the court was only temporary. Likewise, although complainant
Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the directive to give support as
alleged by Milan, the court did not impose a sanction against him precisely
because the court was then completing the hearing for the issuance of a
TPO. Moreover, Francisco Ocampo had really no reason to complain about the
award of support, because the directive to provide monthly support was already
held in abeyance in the Order dated May 2, 2007.
 
Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's allegations
regarding Milan's adulterous relationships and the legal separation case do not
have any bearing on SP No. M-6375.
 
She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the records, the courses of
action taken by the counsel of complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to
normal rules of procedure. One, on April 10, 2007, he filed a Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition, but two days later, or on April 12, 2007, he still filed an Urgent Ex
Parte Motion to Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007. Two, on April 24,
2007, he filed the instant administrative complaint, but two days later, or on April
26, 2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion dated April 23, 2007
with Ex Parte Motion for Examination of the Minors, and a day later, on April 24,
2007, filed a Second Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
asseverated that from all appearances, the administrative complaint was filed for
the sole objective of compelling her to inhibit herself from handling SP No. M-
6375. Three, on May 11, 2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which
was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not really have any genuine
administrative cause of action against her. As things turned out, all that
complainant Ocampo wanted to hear from the subject minors was their declaration
that they preferred to stay with their mother.

 
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049
 
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the OCA, through
then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the Chief
Justice in a Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports about the rampant
selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
 
The said reports were thereafter confirmed by Judges Winlove M. Dumayas,
Marissa Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-
Delorino, particularly with respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S.
Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child custody case.
 
In a Resolution[3] dated June 5, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the
Memorandum of Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock as a complaint for
gross ignorance and gross misconduct against Judge Arcaya-Chua, directed
respondent Judge to file a Comment on the complaint within 10 days from receipt
of notice, and suspended respondent Judge pending resolution of the administrative
case.
 
It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a TPO in the said
case, granting, among others, the custody of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to
therein petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent, Stephanie
Pulliam, to stay away from the home and office of Chang Tan as well as from the
school of the subject minor. Per the sheriff's return dated May 8, 2007, the Order
was not fully implemented insofar as the custody of the subject minor was directed
to be turned over to Chang Tan. This development irked Chang Tan, resulting in a
heated argument between Chang Tan and the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Branch
144. Chang Tan insisted that a break open order be issued or that the sheriff be
permitted to enter the premises of Pulliam's house to search for the child and then
bring her to court. On the same day, May 8, 2007, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
issued an order authorizing the
sheriff to enter the open premises where subject minor may be found for the
purpose of turning over custody to petitioner, but is admonished to maintain peace
and order in the conduct thereof.
According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua
received money from Chang Tan in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts
clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing the TPO. Her speedy issuance of the
Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest
in the case, but it also appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted
to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in the latter's heated argument with
the OIC of Branch 144.
 
OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge
displayed unusual interest. On April 17, 2007, Judge Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles
of RTC, Branch 143, Makati City issued an order in Civil Case No. 07-352,
entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v. Moreno, setting the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment for hearing on May 9, 2007. In
view of the leave of absence of Judge Galapate-Laguilles, respondent Judge was
later designated as the pairing judge. On April 20, 2007, respondent, as pairing
judge, cancelled the previously scheduled May 9, 2007 hearing and re-scheduled
the hearing to April 23, 2007, where she ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment in favor of RCBC. According to OCA, what was highly
suspicious in respondents actuation was that there was really no urgency in the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
 
In her Comment[4] dated June 9, 2007, respondent Judge explained that SP
No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, was
originally raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 60 under Judge Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge Macaraig-Guillen recused from the case, it was re-
raffled to her branch on April 30, 2007, and the records of the case were
transmitted to her on the same day.
 
Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under
Sections 8 and 15 of R.A. No. 9262, as well as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC,
which specifically applies to a petition for custody of minors. Contrary to OCAs
finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan in SP No. M-6373 did
not contain the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein respondent
Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of the Application was
explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie Pulliam, based
on, among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she enumerated the
many abuses that her mother had committed upon her. The complaint for child
abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as well as to the Petition. Other
annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in detail the acts of violence
committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements
of yaya Josie Leynes and Rafi herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report
of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez.
 
 
Respondent Judge stated that although Article 176 of the Family
Code provides that an illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the
mother, an exception is when the court orders otherwise. The mother may be
divested of her parental authority over her illegitimate child when the court finds
compelling reasons to do so. In all cases involving a child, his best interest is of
paramount consideration. The court awarded provisional custody over the subject
minor and a TPO in favor of therein petitioner Chang Tan, but effective for a
period of 30 days only, after a careful consideration of the allegations in the
pleadings and the supporting documentary evidence. Rafi was already more than
seven years old at the time the Order dated May 7, 2007 was issued, as evidenced
by her Certificate of Live Birth.
  
Respondent Judge countered that the Order dated May 7, 2007 was not
speedily issued. As was her standard operating procedure with respect to newly
raffled and re-raffled cases, she immediately studied the records of SP No. M-
6373. Even before Chang Tan's Application was filed on May 4, 2007, she had
already arrived at a preliminary determination that the issuance of a Provisional
Order and a TPO was warranted. She also studied Chang Tan's Application on the
same day it was filed, a Friday. Her study thereof continued the following day, a
Saturday, also in her office. She was then planning to avail of her forfeitable leave
of absence of 30 days in June 2007, inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the
previous year. To expedite the resolution of motions and preparation of decisions,
and to avoid being saddled with much work on her return from her leave, she had
been reporting to her office on alternate Saturdays beginning April 2007. SP No.
M-6373 was not the only case that she studied on that Saturday, but other cases as
well. Her study of SP No. M-6373 resumed on Monday, May 7, 2007, which
culminated in the issuance of an Order at almost lunchtime of the same day.
Granting that the one week period in which she issued the May 7, 2007 Order may
be considered speedy, such circumstance should not be taken against her as she
was really a fast worker. She was accustomed to speedy preparation of orders and
decisions as a result of her training in the Supreme Court as a Court Attorney for
13 years.
Respondent Judge maintained that it was necessary to
implement the Order dated May 7, 2007 at once, because the courts are so
mandated to cause the immediate implementation of the TPO under Section 15,
R.A. No. 9262.
 
As regards the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of
Branch 144, respondent Judge surmised that the same could be merely concocted,
as it was neither reported to her nor brought to her attention. Moreover, the doors
of her chambers were always wide open and she could have clearly heard it if it
really transpired.
 
 Respondent Judge averred that during the hearing dated May 11, 2007,
she gave a directive holding in abeyance further implementation of the May 7,
2007 Order. Thus, she asserted that if she really received money or anything from
Chang Tan or from anybody in his behalf, she would have ensured complete
implementation of the Order dated May 7, 2007, instead of holding it in abeyance.
Moreover, she should have declared Pulliam and her counsel guilty of the indirect
contempt charge against them if it were really true that she received money from
Chang Tan.
 
Respondent Judge stated that if it were true that she had been engaged in
rampant selling of TPO/PPO or any order in her branch, she and her family would
not have found themselves in such state of financial drain after she had been
preventively suspended.
 
As regards her participation in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v. Moreno, respondent Judge narrated that
an Ex Parte Motion for Immediate Resolution of Prayer for the Issuance of Writs
of Preliminary Attachment was forwarded to her sala being the Pairing Judge of
Branch 143. Immediately after reading the motion, she inquired from the Clerk of
Court of Branch 143 about the alleged leave of absence of therein Presiding Judge
Zenaida Galapate Laguilles. She learned that Judge Galapate-Laguilles indeed left
for the United States on April 19, 2007 to attend a convention on Intellectual
Property and would be back on May 7, 2007. She likewise gathered information
from the same Branch Clerk of Court that Judge Galapate-Laguilles's trip abroad
was the reason behind the Application's setting on May 9, 2007, not because the
Presiding Judge did not see any urgency in the Application. The Presiding Judge
also lacked ample time to act thereon since she had a previously scheduled leave of
absence. Thus, she determined from the allegations in the ex parte Motion and the
Complaint the urgency to act on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. She also took into account the following: (1) the circumstance of
prolonged absence of the Presiding Judge of Branch 143; (2) the reason for the
setting on May 9, 2007; and (3) the mandatory wordings of Supreme Court
Circular No. 19-98, i.e., the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all
cases thereat as acting judge therein.
 
Respondent Judge explained that she granted the Application because the
allegations in the complaint were adequately supported by documentary and
testimonial evidence. She received the records of the RCBC Case on April 20,
2007, a Friday, and as was her standard practice, immediately studied them. She
continued her study of the records, and the records of other cases, on April 21,
2007, a Saturday, and on April 23, 2007, a Monday, which culminated in the
preparation of the Order on the same day.
In her Supplemental Comment[5] dated June 22, 2007, respondent
Judge added that the manner by which the incidents in the Chang Tan and RCBC
cases were resolved must not be taken in isolation, but in relation to the manner all
incidents were resolved and all decisions and orders were rendered in her sala,
such that she resolved all incidents and rendered all her rulings immediately.
 
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
 
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the Judicial Audit Case), a judicial audit was
conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, which
was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports of
alleged irregularities committed by respondent.
In a Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 by the OCA to Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock submitted for the
Courts consideration the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing the
Court of an incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in Branch 144 of the RTC
of Makati City.
 
The initial audit report stated that as early as May 12, 2007, a Saturday, the
Court ordered the padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned guards thereat on a 24-
hour basis. Before the audit team began its audit on May 15, 2007, the members
made it clear to OIC Victoria C. Jamora and the court personnel present that
actions on the records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and that no
records should be brought outside the court until after the audit.
 
At 8:05 a.m. of May 17, 2007, the guards on duty, Joel Gregorio and
Alexander Dayap, noticed Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144,
disposing a plastic bag. The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag
from a trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic bag was surrendered to
the audit team and was found to contain copies of marriage certificates of
marriages solemnized by Judge Chua numbering to hundreds. When confronted,
Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents upon respondent Judge's
instruction made several days ago. He could not offer any explanation why he
chose to dispose of the documents that morning despite the ongoing audit. He,
nonetheless, disclosed that there were other bags for disposal still kept inside the
room where the stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora, held office.
The bags, when retrieved, turned out to contain more copies of marriage
certificates. Jamora explained to the audit team that she was aware of the copies of
marriage certificates being kept inside their room. However, she alleged that she
had no control over them, because matters pertaining to solemnization of marriages
were personally handled by Judge Arcaya-Chua.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in
connection with the 1,975 copies of marriage certificates for marriages she
solemnized for the period covering January 2004 to April 2007 for the following
acts: (1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of
the said copies of marriage certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization
fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809) marriages as verified from the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati
City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the Court of the said fees
in the total amount of Five Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos
(P542,700.00) at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) per marriage; and (3)
for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases.[6]
In a Resolution[7] dated September 16, 2008, the Court resolved to consider
the Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 of the OCA as a formal complaint against
respondent Judge; require respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora to
comment on the Memorandum within 10 days from notice thereof; and refer A.M.
OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 to Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On February 10, 2009, respondent Judge filed her Affidavit, [8] in lieu of
Comment, on the OCA Memorandum dated August 10, 2007.
 
Re: Ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr. to dispose of the copies of
marriage certificates
 
 
In regard to the disposal of the marriage certificates, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua recounted that in the second week of April 2007, she, with the help
of Noel Umipig (a City Hall employee detailed to her sala), started to pack her
personal belongings in anticipation of the impending transfer of her sala from
the Gusali ng Katarungan to the Makati City Hall. She asked Umipig to discard
her piles of yellowish scratch papers. Umipig put her scratch papers inside big
plastic bags and then tied the bags. They also emptied the steel cabinet in her
chambers which contained, among other things, the files of marriage certificates,
as well as official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees. She previously
bundled the said marriage certificates according to month and year of
solemnization of the weddings, improvising paper bundles for the purpose. Umipig
then put all the marriage certificates inside four, more or less, big plastic bags and
placed them in the small room that was between her chambers and
the stenographers' room. They were kept untied so that it would be easy to add or
get a file. Immediately thereafter, Umipig asked permission to go home as he was
then getting allergic reactions due to the dust, then took with him the bags of
scratch papers out of her chambers to be thrown away. The following morning, she
noticed that there were red patches on the face and arms of Umipig so she did not
ask him anymore for help. She removed the official receipts of the marriage
solemnization fees from the worn-out boxes, wrapped them with approximately
six paper bundles then placed them inside the plastic bags containing the marriage
certificates.
 
In the first week of May 2007, she was told by the City Hall Engineer that
the transfer to the Makati City Hall would not push through yet because the
furnitures were not complete and portions of the holding room were still being
painted. She was told to just standby and to wait for an update about the schedule
of transfer. With that advice, she did not find it necessary to return the files of
marriage certificates and official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees inside
the steel cabinet.
About the second week of May 2007, upon learning that the bags of
garbage had accumulated, she reminded Salvador Indicio, Jr. to throw them away.
On May 15, 2007, she was placed under preventive suspension. On May 18, 2007,
Indicio told her, through telephone, that he was caught the previous day throwing
marriage certificates that were placed in plastic bags. He explained that he thought
those bags contained the garbage that she asked him to throw away the previous
week. She was then outraged by the news and scolded Indicio, telling him that
under the law, it is her duty to maintain copies of marriage certificates being the
solemnizing officer. In fact, Indicio stated in his affidavit that her specific
instruction was "to dispose all the garbage which were stocked" in her sala and "it
just turned out that what the plastic bag contained were copies of marriage
contracts." Thus, Indicio simply mistook the plastic bags containing the marriage
certificates and official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees to be the
garbage that she instructed him the previous week to throw away.
 
Respondent Judge stressed that she did not and would not have ordered
Indicio to dispose of the copies of the marriage certificates, citing the haphazard
manner in which Indicio disposed of the same, and the fact that she had nothing
to hide and that she would gain nothing by the disposal thereof.

Re: Unpaid marriage solemnization fees

  

Respondent Judge averred that the best proofs of payment of the marriage
solemnization fees were the official receipts. She categorically stated that all the
official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees were inside the plastic bags,
together with the marriage certificates.

She stressed that she could not have allowed non-payment of the marriage
solemnization fees, because it is of public knowledge that she had been
solemnizing a big number of weddings per day, aside from the fact that she had
solemnized weddings of several celebrities, which also included celebrities as
sponsors; thus, attracting the attention of many court employees. She was also
aware of the consequences of solemnizing a marriage without the solemnization
fee so she was very meticulous when it came to checking, among other things,
whether there was an official receipt evidencing payment of said fee. She also
knew that the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City would not allow the
registration of a marriage certificate if there was no accompanying official receipt
of payment of the marriage solemnization fee. Moreover, considering the
pervading financial crisis everywhere, any person would not part with his money
without demanding an official receipt. No couple or nobody had ever complained
about the absence of the official receipt of the marriage solemnization fee. Further,
the Audit Team found from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City that all
the marriage certificates of the weddings that she solemnized were duly registered
therein.
Respondent Judge also pointed out that the respective Clerks of Court of the
OCC of the MeTC and RTC adopted a wrong and unreliable procedure in
verifying from their records whether there was payment of the marriage
solemnization fees, simply because most of the dates of the wedding indicated in
the marriage certificates were not the same as the dates indicated in the official
receipts. She explained that a couple would often pay the solemnization fee at a
certain date, but the solemnization of the wedding would take place on another
date for one reason or another. Thus, when the Clerks of Court of the Office of the
Clerk of Court checked the dates from the copies of their official receipts on file,
the dates did not reflect payment of the fees, because payments were made on
dates different from the wedding dates.
 
Re: Failure to reflect the marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases
 
Respondent Judge related that the Monthly Reports of cases were typed by
her staff, namely: Civil-in-Charge Celedonio Hornachos and Criminal-in-Charge
Mary Jane Rafael. As regards the number of marriages solemnized, they would
inquire from her and she would then give them the figure as stated in her own
logbook. When the Reports were turned over to her for signature, she would first
verify the entries from her own
logbook before affixing her signature. Thus, she was shocked when she learned
that the Courts copy of the Reports contained incorrect figures and was different
from that which she signed.
 
She asserted that she could not have failed to reflect the correct number of
marriages in the Monthly Reports, because apart from the fact that she was very
meticulous in the accuracy of the entries, she had nothing to gain by not reflecting
the correct figures of solemnized marriages.
 
She believed that the blank and incorrect figures appearing in the number of
marriages solemnized in the Monthly Reports from January 2004 to March 2007
were the handiwork of Umipig, who most probably tampered the same, because of
a serious grudge against her. She added that it was also Umipig who transferred the
plastic bags of marriage certificates and official receipts from the small room to the
stenographer's room in an attempt to expose the big number of weddings that she
had solemnized, which, through his machinations, were not reflected in the
Monthly Reports.
 

Re: Compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code, and violation of

Circular No. 9-98[9]
 Respondent Judge claimed that she solemnized the marriages inside her
chambers or courtroom, and as proof thereof, she pointed to the entry in the
marriage certificates reflecting the place of solemnization. On few occasions, she
had also solemnized weddings in a house or place designated by both contracting
parties, but not without the required affidavit of request. She explained that she
was able to solemnize many weddings per day, because the rites took only about
10 minutes and involved a maximum of eight couples per batch.
 
She stressed that neither did she demand nor receive money for
solemnization of marriages, and only the official receipts of the solemnization fees
were given to her.
 
In regard to Victoria Jamora, she explained in her Amended Comment
dated October 2, 2008 that she failed to reflect in the Monthly Report of Cases the
correct number of marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua for the following
reasons:

1.     She was not instructed by Judge Arcaya-Chua to be present during

the marriage ceremony;

2.     She had no personal knowledge of the actual number of marriages

solemnized by respondent Judge;

3.     She merely relied on the entries in the Monthly Report as to the

number of marriages solemnized. The Monthly Report was
prepared by Jane Rafael, who was in charge of criminal
cases. When she asked Rafael why there were only such number
of marriages solemnized from June 2005 to April 2007, Rafael
replied thatwas the advice of respondent Judge. Besides, Judge
Arcaya-Chua signed the reports. As a subordinate designated
by respondent Judge as OIC, she was not in a position to question
her superior, Judge Arcaya-Chua, and signed in good faith the
Monthly Reports in question.
  
 
The administrative case was again referred to Associate Justice Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
 
The Investigation of the Administrative Complaints
 
On October 9, 2008, Investigator Justice Salazar-Fernando scheduled the
consolidated cases for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on October 23, 2008.
 

During the hearing on October 23, 2008 of A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ
(the Ocampo Case), complainant Francisco Ocampo appeared with his counsel,
Atty. Jose Aliling IV, while Atty. James Navarrete and Atty. Fe C. Aguila
appeared for OCA. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua appeared in her own behalf.
During the said hearing, complainant Ocampo submitted a Supplemental Affidavit
and additional documentary evidence.[10] Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also
furnished complainant Ocampo's counsel with a copy of her Affidavit, which
incorporated her Comments in the two cases, the Supplemental Comment, the
Motion to Recall Preventive Suspension and the Motion to Resolve. Complainant
Ocampo testified on direct examination, affirming the truth of the contents of his
Complaint and the authenticity of the annexes attached thereto. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua cross-examined him, but reserved further cross-examination as to the
Supplemental Affidavit. Hearing resumed the following day, October 24, 2008,
and respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-examined complainant Ocampo
specifically on his Supplemental Affidavit. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked
complainant Ocampo questions.
 
During the hearing on October 29, 2008, complainant Ocampo submitted his
Offer of Documentary Evidence. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua testified on
direct examination, whereby she affirmed the statements in her Affidavit and
Supplemental Affidavit, and identified her exhibits, after which, she was cross-
examined by complainant Ocampo's counsel. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua rested her case and formally offered her documentary evidence, insofar as
OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ was concerned. For the guidance and information of
Justice Salazar-Fernando, the entire original records of SP No. M-6375,
entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, was ordered brought to her
office.
On November 3, 2008, OCA started presenting evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-
07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case). Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles
testified and submitted her Affidavit, and was cross-examined, and was asked
questions on redirect-examination. The scheduled hearing for November 4, 2008
was cancelled due to the unavailability of two (2) witnesses, namely, Judges
Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino.
Hearing on the case resumed on November 10, 2008. OCA presented
Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, who both
submitted their Affidavits, which were considered as their testimony on direct.
They were questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando and cross-examined by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. Court records pertaining to SP No. M-6373,
entitled Albert K.S. Chang Tan v. Stephanie N. Estrella Pulliam, were likewise
directed to be brought to the office of Justice Salazar-Fernando for reference and
information.
 

During the hearing on November 11, 2008, the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Makati City, Judge Winlove Dumayas, appeared, and questions were
propounded to him by Justice Salazar-Fernando, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
and Atty. James Navarrete from OCA.
 
In order to expedite the proceedings, respondent Judge was allowed to
present her defense, and marked in evidence several documents,[11] which formed
part of her direct testimony. Since the documents submitted by respondent Judge
were voluminous, Atty. Navarrete was given until November 20, 2008 to conduct
his cross-examination.
 
On November 25, 2008, Atty. James Navarrete continued with the marking
of additional documents and submitted in evidence his exhibits.[12] Respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua was cross-examined by Atty. Navarrete. Respondent Judge
was also allowed to ask Atty. Navarrete some questions. Thereafter, respondent
Judge submitted her Formal Offer of Evidence. Atty. Navarrete was given until
November 27, 2008 to file his Opposition, while respondent Judge was given five
days to file her Counter-Manifestation.
 
On November 26, 2008, Atty. Navarrete filed his Comment, interposing no
objection to respondent's Formal Offer of Exhibits.
 
On December 2, 2008, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed a Counter-
Manifestation and Motion to Correct Transcript of Stenographic Notes.
 
On January 16, 2009, Justice Salazar-Fernando received the rollo of A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2141 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-
Chua and Court Stenographer Victoria Jamora, formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263-
RTC, Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City), which he noted to have been
consolidated with A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua) per Resolution of the Court en banc dated January
15, 2008.
Since A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was not included in the earlier investigation,
Justice Salazar-Fernando set A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 for hearing on February 8,
2009.
 
Hearing on A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 started on February 10, 2009, during
which the counsels for OCA and respondent stenographer Victoria Jamora
appeared. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also attended the hearing.
  
OCA proposed several stipulations for admission to respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua. She admitted that she solemnized marriages while she was the Judge
of the MeTC, Branch 63, Makati City and RTC, Branch 144, Makati City. After
going over the certificates of marriage from January 2004 to August 2004, she
admitted that she solemnized those marriages. She also admitted that she
solemnized marriages in her chambers or inside her courtroom, except for two
other marriages that she could not remember, but proper documents were presented
to her. She further admitted that payments of solemnizing fees must be paid before
conducting or solemnizing the marriage, and as part of her regular duties, she
signed the Monthly Reports.
 
Hearing resumed on February 18, 2009. OCA presented Atty. Fe Corcelles-
Aguila, who testified on the incident that occurred on May 17, 2007, which led to
the inventory of the certificates of marriage, and the audit conducted on May 15-
17, 2007. Atty. Corcelles-Aguila's affidavit[13] formed part of the records of the
case.
 
In the hearing of March 3, 2009, OCA presented Salvador Indicio, Jr., Arnel
Magsombol, Lucia Ticman and Joel Gregorio as its witnesses. The witnesses were
questioned by OCA, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Justice Salazar-Fernando.
Per request of OCA, notice of hearing was sent to German Averia, for him to
appear on the next scheduled hearing as the last witness of OCA.
 
In the hearing of March 23, 2009, German Averia testified in his capacity as
Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Statistical Records Division, Court Management
Office (CMO) of the Supreme Court. He confirmed having issued certifications
and inventory on the monthly report of cases submitted by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua to the CMO in compliance with Administrative Circular No. 4-2004.
In the same hearing, the counsel for OCA categorically stated that their evidence in
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was limited only to the alleged irregularities in the
solemnization of marriage as well as the falsification of the monthly reports.[14]
  
With the continuance of the investigation on April 8, 2009, OCA presented
in evidence the originals of the monthly reports, and the certified true copies of the
monthly reports, whose originals were unavailable. OCA, thereafter, rested its
case. In the same hearing, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua started presenting her
exhibits.[15] She manifested that her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit would
serve as her testimony on direct examination.
On April 21, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented additional
exhibits.[16] Her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, as well as the Affidavit of
her son, Robert Maurice Chua, formed part of their direct testimonies. Respondent
Judge was, thereafter, cross-examined by OCA.
 
During the hearing on May 5, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua offered
in evidence her Second Supplemental Affidavit. She also presented additional
exhibits.[17]Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's daughter, Beau Mairi Chua testified,
with her Affidavit constituting her direct testimony. No cross-examination was
conducted on her by the opposing counsel. Respondent Jamora also testified as
witness for respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
 
At the resumption of the hearing on May 18, 2009, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua recalled respondent Jamora to the stand and propounded additional
questions. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case after respondent
Jamora's testimony. Respondent Jamora, thereafter, testified in her own behalf,
with her Amended Comment constituting her direct testimony. No cross-
examination was conducted on her by OCA. Respondent Jamora, thereafter, rested
her case.
 
With the conformity of the parties, Justice Salazar-Fernando directed them
to file their respective memorandum. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed her
memorandum on July 21, 2009, while respondent Jamora filed her memorandum
on August 3, 2009. OCA did not file a memorandum; hence, Justice Salazar-
Fernando deemed that it waived the filing of its memorandum. Per this Court's
Resolution dated August 24, 2009, the case was submitted for report and
recommendation to the Supreme Court.
 
Findings of the Investigating Justice
 
Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case)
 
In regard to the denial of the Motion to Dismiss in the Ocampo
Case, without necessarily ruling on the correctness of respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chuas Order, Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge's
disposition thereof fell within the ambit of discretion vested upon her as a judge.
Not giving credence to the evidence presented by the movants with respect to the
residence of Milan Ocampo was well within her judicial discretion. Assuming the
same was erroneous, no administrative liability attached thereon in the absence of
sufficient evidence that she ruled in such manner, because of a corrupt or dishonest
motive, bad faith, fraud or malice. The evidence presented by complainant
Ocampo as to Milan's residence might constitute proof of her "domicile," but such
evidence was not necessarily irreconcilable with the fact that Milan might be
maintaining residence elsewhere other than Meycauayan, Bulacan, considering her
estranged relationship with complainant Ocampo.
 
As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's explanation acceptable.
The order setting the case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was issued
on December 8, 2006. Thus, there was an interim of at least five days from the
issuance of the order and the date of the scheduled hearing. It did not appear that
respondent Judge had any hand in the belated service of the notice to the
complainant. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that respondent Judge cannot be
faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing, because a prayer for TPO
requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that respect, no wrong-doing, fraud,
bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness can be attributed to respondent Judge.
 
 According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of
the TPO had no leg to stand on. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated
that the issuance of the TPO can be made upon the filing of the application
after ex parte determination by the judge that the same be issued. This is in
accordance with Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus:

 
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders
(TPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the
application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A
court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and
shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the
issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court
shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by
the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents
for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO.[18]
 
Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even before
complainant Ocampo could file his answer was neither irregular nor improper.
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent
Judge issued the TPO. A preliminary determination of the facts of the case justified
the issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the subject minors therein were the
illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo, having been conceived
through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or
ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent
provision of the Family Code states:
 
 
ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate.
 
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with
the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate
children of the husband and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or
ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them
before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
  
Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of complainant Ocampo's
alleged perversity and violent behavior. A sworn affidavit[19] of Emelita S.
Valentino, narrating alleged perverse behavior of complainant Ocampo, as well
as the certification[20] from the Philippine National Police of Meycauayan,
stating acts of violence committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were
appended to the Petition. The totality of the evidence thus presented, while not
exactly conclusive, justified a prima facie determination of the necessity of a
TPO.
 
While Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's
objections to the matter of support apt and plausible, the same could be merely
considered as an error of judgment or an abuse of discretion, but respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua cannot be held administratively liable thereon. Considering
that the matter of support therein was merely provisional, respondent Judge
could not be faulted for readily granting the prayer for support without further
evaluating evidence with respect thereto. Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in that respect was not gross, the same
having been brought about by an innocuous reliance on the Rule on Provisional
Orders, A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC. Under the said rule, provisional orders for
protection and support may be issued without hearing. However, the said rule
specifically applies to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
annulment of marriage or legal separation. In this case, the matter of support
was among the principal reliefs sought for in the petition for custody.
 
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando found that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's
alleged over-zealousness in causing the immediate implementation of the TPO
was without solid basis. A TPO, much like a TRO in civil cases, is required to be
served immediately, precisely to serve its purpose as a protective relief.
Respondent Judge issued the TPO on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday, right after
the hearing on complainant Ocampo's motion for reconsideration of the denial of
 his motion to dismiss. She clarified that the date of the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration on April 3, 2007 was set by complainant Ocampo's counsel
himself. The following day, April 4, 2007, a Holy Wednesday, she directed the
implementation of the TPO. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing
improper or wayward in the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the
case. There was no evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the issuance
of the TPO during the Holy Week, as it was complainant Ocampo's counsel
himself who, wittingly or unwittingly, chose the hearing date. Considering the
urgency and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper or illegal that respondent
Judge caused its immediate implementation.
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge could not have
been privy to the brazen manner in which the TPO was served by the designated
sheriff. In the first place, it was only the designated sheriff, Sheriff Tangangco,
who was administratively charged by complainant Ocampo for the allegedly
offensive manner the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent Judge,
such was the personal accountability of Sheriff Tangangco.
 
Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's allegation
of bribery against respondent Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted
by Justice Salazar-Fernando on October 24, 2007, complainant Ocampo
confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua.
 

Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ

(the Ocampo Case) should be dismissed. She stated that as a matter of policy, in
the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous.[21] She cited Espaol v. Mupas,[22] which held thus:
 
x x x While the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith
 in the judiciary, nonetheless, we have repeatedly stated that the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his or her official duties.
In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the
complainant relies mainly on secondhand information to prove the charges
against the respondent, the complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or
mere speculation. The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere
credence or speculation. As we held in a recent case:
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always
be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are
by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to
face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial
misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will
never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct,
the evidence against him should be competent.[23]

Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 ( the Chang Tan/RCBC Case)

 
Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that in the Chang Tan Case, the OCA
primarily asserted that the TPO issued by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua could not
be legally justified under R.A. No. 9262, because the said law applies only if the
applicant for TPO is a woman.
The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on that score. R.A.
No. 9262 is known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004. It isspecifically applicable to "women and their children," not to men. Thus,
while the TPO may be justified with respect to the protection accorded the minor,
the same is not legally tenable with respect to the petitioner, Albert Chang Tan.
Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his
wife. Certainly, such a TPO would be absurd. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando
found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in this regard to be gross ignorance of
the law. She cited the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
in Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Baguio-Benguet
Chapter v. Pamintuan,[24] which stated, thus:
 
 When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elementary a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is
too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority (De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-
1629, March 26, 2001). When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November
6, 2000).
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando averred that as a family court judge, respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua should be the last person to err in the application of R.A. No.
9262, and, in this case, issue a TPO applied for a man, purportedly to protect the
latter against his wife. Such is unthinkable under R.A. No. 9262. A careful
evaluation of the records in the Chang Tan Case showed that there was not even
any allegation of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against her husband,
Chang Tan. Thus, Justice Salazar-Fernando found that the TPO against Stephanie,
insofar as it directed the latter to stay away from the home and office of petitioner,
to cease and desist from harassing, intimidating or threatening petitioner and to
refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the
health, safety or welfare of petitioner, was anomalous.
 
Be that as it may, with respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-
Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's reasons for granting custody
over subject minor to Albert Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly
conclusive, the evidence relied upon by respondent Judge in granting custody in
favor of Chang Tan was substantial enough to warrant a prima facie determination
that a TPO in favor of the minor was necessary and would serve her paramount
interest. Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper in respondent Judge's
reliance on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez and the
statements of yaya Josie Leynes and the subject minor herself, Rafi Pulliam, which
all confirmed that Stephanie has not been a good influence to her daughter,
Rafi. As far as the latter's paramount interest was concerned, Stephanie was not the
ideal person to whom custody should be awarded. On this premise, respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua's award of temporary custody to the father could be justified.
However, Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that she does not necessarily affirm the
correctness of the custody award to the father, Chang Tan, since respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's Order dated May 7, 2007 was annulled and set aside by the Twelfth
Division of the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated October 31, 2007.[25]
 
In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua allegedly displayed in the said case, Justice Salazar-Fernando
found no substantial evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's
Memorandum itself admitted that there was no proof that respondent
Judge received money from Chang Tan.
 
Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed having personally
witnessed the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, except for their secondhand accounts that
they heard that such incident actually transpired. Justice Salazar-Fernando found
it speculative to attribute the commission of bribery or wrongdoing to respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua solely on such account. The Investigating Justice stated that
respondent Judge appeared to have no personal or actual participation in that
incident, because the "heated argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan and the
OIC, Victoria Jamora.
 
As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment in the RCBC Case, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no
evidence against respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the
case. Respondent convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding her
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, particularly the manner in which
she studied and evaluated the application for the writ. Justice Salazar-Fernando
was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed speedily
issued the ex parte hearing on the application having been held on a Friday,
followed immediately by the issuance of the writ on the succeeding business day, a
Monday there was really nothing impossible or irregular in such feat. Per
respondents account, she had been unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays
during that time and she did not have to evaluate the totality of the evidence for the
purpose of ruling on the propriety of issuing the writ. Further, considering
respondent's habit of immediately disposing pending motions before her court,
Justice Salazar-Fernando found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister significance
to the speedy issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The Investigating
Justice also found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of preliminary
attachment to be apt.
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that in the absence of evidence that she was
motivated by any dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua is entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed her
duties. She cited, thus:
In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of
establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint. Notatu
dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge's functions,
hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be presumed, specially
weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to administer
justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.
In a long line of cases decided by this Court, it was held that bare allegations of
bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome
the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte, it
was further held, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There
should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and
partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise
doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself
would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge.[26]
 
 
 
Findings in the Judicial Audit Case (Re: Marriage Certificates and Monthly
Reports)
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando found that there is substantial evidence of an
anomaly in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's solemnization of marriages in her
court and failure to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly
Reports.
 

The Investigating Justice stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of
the marriage certificates, which were said to have been contained in four (4)
plastic bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the time the judicial
audit was being conducted. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted the fact that
she ordered Salvador Indicio, Jr., her utility worker, to dispose of some garbage
contained in blue plastic bags. However, as regards the timing of disposal, she
explained that she ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage on the second week
of May, days before the judicial audit. [27] Such fact was confirmed by Indicio in his
testimony.[28] He testified that he was ordered by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
to dispose of the garbage on May 9, 2007. Indicio stated that the garbage was due
for disposal on May 14, 2007, but since it was election day, the disposal of the
garbage was postponed until May 17, 2007, at which time, the disposal of the
plastic bags caught the attention of the security detail of the Supreme Court.

The Investigating Justice stated that based on the foregoing account, if the

order to dispose of the garbage was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing
why such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of barely four plastic bags,
which would take only a couple of minutes to accomplish, could tarry for several
days. Why no attempt to dispose of the supposed garbage was made on May 9,
10, and 11 (May 12 & 13 were Saturday and Sunday, respectively, while May 14
was Election Day, and May 15 to 17 was the period of judicial audit) was not
sufficiently explained. The logical implication is that the order to dispose could not
have been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely later when the judicial audit was
already being conducted. Such conclusion jibes with the account of Atty. Fe
Corcelles-Aguila, one of the members of the judicial audit team, that upon being
immediately confronted why he chose that particular day to dispose of the
supposed garbage despite the ongoing audit, Indicio "could not offer any
explanation."[29]Indicio could not remember the exact date when the order to
dispose of the garbage was made by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. He testified,
thus:
 
CROSS-EXAMINATION

JUDGE CHUA:

You mentioned in your Affidavit and in your testimony this morning that you
executed an Affidavit on May 17 and the throwing away of the garbage was also
done at 8:00 oclock in the morning of May 17 upon my instruction. When did I give
my instruction to you to throw away the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:

You told me before the audit to throw all your trash.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Did you know when that particular day was?

MR. INDICIO:

That was election day, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Election day of May, 2007?

  

MR. INDICIO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Was that the exact date when Judge Chua told you to throw the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE CHUA:

May I draw your attention to paragraph 2 of your Affidavit. This was subscribed to

on May 17. So the last week that you mentioned here was a week before May
17. You mentioned here that last week, I was instructed by the Presiding Judge to
dispose of the garbage which were stocked in her branch. Do you confirm the
statement in paragraph 2 of your Affidavit?

MR. INDICIO:

Judge Chua told me to throw the garbage because it was election day.

JUDGE CHUA:

 
 I am sorry, Your Honor, but I do not get the fact straight.

May I draw your attention now to paragraph 5 of your Affidavit. You said here that
the said garbage was scheduled to be disposed last May 14, 2007. However, since it
was election day, same was not collected.

MR. INDICIO:

Yes, maam, it was scheduled on May 14, but the janitor was busy so it was only on
May 17 that he had an opportunity to throw it.

JUDGE CHUA:

To clarify the matter, Mr. Indicio, when did I give the instruction to you to throw
away the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:

I was told before the audit.

JUDGE CHUA:

The audit was conducted on May 15 up to May 17. Based on paragraph 2 of your

Affidavit, I gave the instruction to you a week before May 17, so I gave the
instruction to you probably on May 10, is that what you are saying?

MR. INDICIO:

I do not remember the exact date but I was instructed by Judge Chua.

 
 xxxx

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

When you told us that before the audit was conducted, Judge Chua already
instructed you to throw those garbage bags placed inside the stenographers room,
how many days after that instruction was given to you did you comply with her
instruction?

MR. INDICIO:

Eight (8) days, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So if you instructed Beldad to throw those garbage bags on May 17 minus 8 that
would be May 9, is that correct?

MR. INDICIO:

Yes, your Honor.[30]

 
According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, apart from the timing of the
disposal, the manner of disposing the plastic bags of marriage certificates was also
open to suspicion. Although there were four plastic bags ready for disposal, which
according to Indicio himself were really not too heavy,[31] only one was taken out
by the janitor to be disposed, leaving three other plastic bags inside the courtroom.
Taking out the plastic bags one by one could have been purposely sought to
surreptitiously remove the said bags from the courtroom, and avoid detection by
the security personnel detailed by the judicial audit team.
  
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando noted that despite repeated references to the
supposed garbage, which were allegedly contained in similar plastic bags
containing the marriage certificates, the whereabouts of the said plastic bags of
garbage were never accounted for. If what were mistakenly attempted to be
disposed of by Indicio were the plastic bags containing the marriage
certificates, the plastic bags containing the garbage could have been found
elsewhere in the courtroom. However, as things turned out, there were really no
plastic bags of garbage, but only more plastic bags of marriage certificates.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's account of the plastic bags of garbage was
unsubstantiated.
 
The Investigating Justice did not give credence to respondent Judges theory
as to why the plastic bags of marriage certificates were found in
the stenographer's room, causing Indicio to mistake it for the garbage which she
supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua theorized
that a certain Noel Umipig, a casual employee in her staff, who harbored a deep-
seated grudge against her for not being able to borrow money from her, could
have been responsible in transferring the plastic bags of marriage certificates from
the small room in her chambers to the stenographer's room before her courtroom
was padlocked. According to her, Umipig could have heard of the impending
administrative investigation on her. Hence, to expose the big number of weddings
she had been solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig' s machinations
had not been reflected in her monthly reports, Umipig could have taken out
the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers and
transferred them to the stenographer's room, so that once the plastic bags were
taken out to the garbage can along the corridor, the documents would be
discovered by the audit team.
 
 
 Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judges theory difficult to
swallow. According to her, it was fantastic that respondent Judge attached too
much cunning to Umipig for the latter to have deviously perpetrated all the acts
being attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose the big number of
weddings, it is hard to understand why Umipig would have to go the difficult way
of trespassing on her chambers when all he would have to do was spread rumors
about the weddings, as he had been wont to do, per respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua's own account.
 
In regard to the non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, the
certifications[32] issued by the Clerks of Court of the MeTC and RTC of Makati
City attest to the fact that out of the 1,975 marriages solemnized by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 166 marriages were paid the corresponding
solemnization fees. Justice Salazar-Fernando found no reason to doubt the
reliability or integrity of the said certifications, the contents of which were
confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila Ticman, the same persons who
personally verified from their records whether or not the solemnization fees of the
marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were paid.
 
Respondent Judge assailed the reliability of the procedure undertaken by
Magsombol and Ticman in verifying the payment of solemnization fees, positing
that they could have merely relied on the dates of the wedding as stated in the
marriage certificates, which were often not the same dates stated in the receipts.
She contended that most parties paid their solemnization fee on a date different
from their wedding; hence, the dates of the receipts would not be the same date as
that of the wedding. Thus, respondent Judgepostulated that when Magsombol and
Ticman verified payment of the solemnization fees based on the dates of the
wedding as stated in the marriage certificates, they would find no receipt to show
payment of the solemnization fees, because payment was made on some other
date.
 
 Justice Salazar-Fernando did not believe the foregoing postulation of
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in the light of the categorical declarations of
Magsombol and Ticman that they did not merely based their verification on the
dates of the wedding, but, specifically, they verified the payment of solemnization
fees based on the names of the contracting parties to the wedding. Pertinent
portions of the testimonies of Magsombol and Ticman state as follows:
 
DIRECT EXAMINATION
 
xxxx
 

ATTY. BUGTAS:
So how did you verify these marriages solemnized by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua?
 
MR. MAGSOMBOL;
I checked the names that were handed to me one by one.
 
ATTY. BUGTAS:
Did you check all the records?
 
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I based on the daily cash collection records beginning the first day of
January 2004 up to the last day of office of December 2005.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Are your daily cash collection records complete from January 2004 to
December 2005?
 
 
 
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
How about the other basis which you said, receipts?
 
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
In our daily collection report, we indicate the OR number.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you also check those OR numbers and the receipts?
 
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I matched the daily collection to the receipts which I brought with me,
Your Honor.
 
xxxx
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So in the years 2004 and 2005, marriages solemnized by the MeTC Judge
were supposed to be recorded in your daily cash collection book?
 
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor, the ones that are being paid.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So if they are not paid, they do not appear in your book?
 
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, we dont know if the marriage happened or not.
 
xxxx
 
(Direct Examination of Lucila D. Ticman)
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you verify from your records if the solemnization fees of the marriages
that were listed in the document were paid?
 
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What was the result of your verification?
 
MS. TICMAN:
Only 20 parties paid the solemnization fees.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Only 20? Twenty out of?
ATTY. BUGTAS:
More than a thousand, Your Honor. 1,300 plus.
 
xxxx
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What was the basis of your findings?
 
MS. TICMAN:
My basis Your Honor is the one coming from the Supreme Court, and the
names supplied us by the Supreme Court were verified by us if they were paid
or not.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What documents did you check to determine whether the fees were paid or
not?
 
MS. TICMAN:
The Certificates of Marriage.
 
xxxx
 
ATTY. BUGTAS:
What documents or records did you examine in order to determine the
marriages that paid the corresponding fees?
 
MS. TICMAN:
The logbook of the Accounting Section and official receipts.
 
xxxx
 
ATTY. BUGTAS:
Based on your records or receipt that you have, you can inform the inquiring
party whether that person or party paid the corresponding fees or not?
 
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.
 
ATTY. BUGTAS:
In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, based on your records, you enumerated
just 20 marriages as appearing to have paid the corresponding fees.
 
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.
 
ATTY. BUGTAS:
But based on the records available, the Supreme Court furnished you with a
list numbering around 1,344 names of parties for verification but you came
out with an Affidavit enumerating only those parties that paid the
 corresponding fees. Is there a possibility that the contracting parties paid the
fees, but your records would not reflect their names?
 
MS. TICMAN:
No, sir.
 
ATTY. BUGTAS:
So only those that paid will appear in your records.
 
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.
 
ATTY. BUGTAS:
If a party did not pay, his or her name will not appear in your records?
 
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
 
ATTY. BUGTAS:
In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, you stated that after a thorough
examination of the records of this office (referring to your office) has been
ascertained that only 20 marriages have been paid in the OCC RTC Makati
city, and you enumerated the 20 marriages that paid the corresponding fees
based on your records.
 
When you say you thoroughly examined, can you tell us whether the
examination was thorough enough so that your Affidavit is accurate as to its
contents?
 
MS. TICMAN:
We examined our logbook one by one, the names of the parties given by the
Supreme Court.[33]
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando was fully convinced by the findings of Magsombol
and Ticman that the solemnization fees of a substantial number of marriages
solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were unpaid.
 
As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's failure to reflect the marriages
in her monthly reports, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judges defense
of forgery, nay tampering, to be unsubstantiated. She carefully perused respondent
Judges signatures in the monthly reports and compared the same to her signatures
in the pleadings, which she submitted during the investigation, as well as in the
orders and decisions contained in the records, and found no substantial
discrepancies therein or any indication that the same had been forged. According
to Justice Salazar-Fernando, while all her signatures did not exactly appear to be
100 percent similar, there was no reason to suppose that her signatures in the
monthly reports and other signatures extant in the records were not signed by one
and the same person. Moreover, Justice Salazar-Fernando failed to see any tell-tale
signs of tampering, and this could be the reason why respondent Judge herself
withdrew such defense.
Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua that the anomaly attributed to her was the work of Umipig. The
Investigating Justicefound it incredible that since January 2004 up to April 2007 or
for a period of more than three years, Umipig had been silently working on his
sinister scheme, patiently and clandestinely forging respondent Judge's signatures
in her monthly reports as vengeance for not lending him money. Justice Salazar-
Fernando found it difficult to imagine how Umipig could have harbored such a
deep-seated grudge against respondent Judge just because the latter refused to loan
him money for his enrolment in law school, which purportedly was the reason why
Umipig failed to become a lawyer.
 
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented text messages allegedly coming
from Umipig to show the latter's extreme hatred of her. The Investigating Justice
stated that apart from the fact that it could not be established that it was indeed
Umipig who sent the text messages, the tenor of the text messages did not show
that Umipig was the author of all the anomalies relating to the marriage certificates
and monthly reports. Respondent Judge quoted Umipig saying, "Hindi bale, may
ebidensya naman ako laban sa inyo," which, according to her, could only betray
the fact that Umipig had indeed been up to something. According to Justice
Salazar-Fernando, Umipigs statement could only confirm the existence of the
anomalies in respondent Judges court, rather than attribute authorship to Umipig
for the anomalies pertaining to the marriage certificates and monthly reports.
 
Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chuas procedure of signing the monthly reports ahead of her OIC to be irregular,
since it is contrary to prevailing procedure and protocol. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua admitted that she signed the monthly reports first before her OIC,
Ms. Mabalot, during her stint in the MeTC, or Ms. Jamora, in the RTC.
Respondent Judge testified, thus:
 
xxxx
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Could you repeat the statement?
 
JUDGE CHUA:
I signed the monthly reports at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Your Honor, and
then the following morning at around 8:00 o clock, I would see the reports on top
of the table of Ornachos or Rafael still unsigned by Mabalot or Jamora. My focus
was on the typewritten name of Mabalot or Jamora without their signatures.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
And you expect the reports to be signed on the same afternoon when you
signed?
 
JUDGE CHUA:
Not necessarily, Your Honor, but my point is I showed to Ornachos or Rafael
that I have signed the monthly reports.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Do you have to sign first before the clerk of court?
 
 
 
JUDGE CHUA:
With due respect to Mrs. Jamora, Your Honor, because the branch clerk of
court of MeTC Branch 63 was not a lawyer because she was assigned on detail to
the OCC a few months ago and Mrs. Jamora, likewise, is not a lawyer so I would
rather do the checking myself, sign and then require them to affix their signatures.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Contrary to the usual procedure that the Judge would sign last?
  
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
In your case, you sign first before the OIC?
 
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.[34]
 
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved respondent Judges justification for
signing first before her OIC, reasoning that it does not take a lawyer to know what
to indicate in the monthly reports, let alone the mechanical task of indicating how
many cases were disposed or how many marriages were solemnized in a month.
 
As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's compliance with Article 8 of
the Family Code concerning the place of solemnization of the marriage,
the Investigating Justice found no evidence that would show that she disregarded
the strictures of the said provision. There is also no concrete evidence showing that
respondent Judge demanded and/or received money from the contracting parties
for solemnizing the marriage. However, it can be inferred that respondent Judge
financially benefited from solemnizing the numerous marriages by the fact that
these were not correctly reflected in the monthly reports and insufficient
solemnizing fees were paid to the court.
 
Anent respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas liability in this case, Justice Salazar-
Fernando stated:
 
x x x [T]aken as a whole, the undersigned Investigator respectfully submits that
there is convincing and substantial evidence to support a finding that anomalies
were committed in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court with respect to the
solemnization of marriages. The circumstances magnificently fit together: plastic
bags containing about 1,975 marriage certificates were surreptitiously being
spirited out of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court during the occasion of the
judicial audit; when confronted, the person seen disposing the plastic bags stated
that he was acting upon the order of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua; when
verified, the solemnization fees of the marriages covered by the said marriage
certificates were found to have not been paid; despite openly admitting having
 solemnized all the weddings covered by the said marriage certificates, the
monthly reports of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua reflected only a very minimal
number of weddings solemnized. Taken together, the circumstances lead to no
other conclusion that irregularities were obviously perpetrated by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua in solemnizing marriages in her court.
 

In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, Justice

Salazar-Fernando found sufficient reasons to hold her accountable for her
signatures in the monthly reports. She cannot feign ignorance as to the correct
number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge. Jamoras justification that
she could not have questioned respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even if there were
erroneous entries in the monthly reports is in itself pregnant with admission that
something anomalous could have indeed been taking place. She testified, thus:
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So you affixed your signature without knowing whether the report is accurate
or not?
 
MS. JAMORA:
Your Honor, to answer honestly, I was not in the position to question my
superior Judge Chua.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So, by force of circumstances, you just affixed your signature without any
question asked, whether they are correct, inaccurate, incomplete, you just
affixed your signature. Is that your job as OIC?
 
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
Your Honor, I think she stated her position already in her Comment.
 
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
That is why I am asking her for confirmation.
 
MS. JAMORA:
Yes, Your Honor.
 
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
More or less, that is the substance of her Comment, Your Honor.
  
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So without knowing anything about the figures, you just affixed your
signature because you saw already the signature of Rafael and the signature of
Judge Chua?
 
MS. JAMORA:
Yes, Your Honor.[35]
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando found unacceptable respondent Jamora's pretended
ignorance of the incorrectness of the monthly reports she had been signing, let
alone the figures relating to the number of marriages solemnized by respondent
Judge. He stressed that it does not take a lawyer to count or at least approximate
the number of weddings that respondent Judge had been solemnizing in her court,
considering the unusually big number of weddings she had solemnized. Knowing
the figures stated in the monthly reports to be incorrect, Jamora condoned the
wrongdoing, if she was actually not a willing participant, by affixing her signatures
therein.
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that the reprehensible act or omission of
respondent Jamora constitutes dishonesty amounting to grave misconduct.
Moreover, she stated that during the investigation, it was revealed that although
Jamora was an OIC Clerk of Court, she had no knowledge of her duties and
responsibilities, and had neither control over the employees under her nor did what
was expected of her.
 
Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Jamora's plea for
compassion and understanding, citing the fact that she was not a lawyer and that
the position of OIC Clerk of Court was merely thrust upon her by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua, which she reluctantly accepted, was hollow, because her
transgression did not have any connection with her status as a non-lawyer or being
a reluctant OIC. Her insistence upon her ignorance or lack of knowledge of the
 incorrectness of the figures stated in the monthly reports, specifically on the
number of marriages solemnized, aggravates her offense as it makes a mockery of
her oath.
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Justice Salazar-
Fernando.
 
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required
to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[36]
 
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, there is substantial evidence that respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report in her Monthly Reports[37] the actual number of
marriages she solemnized during her stint in the MeTC, Makati City, Branch 63
and in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization fees that were
paid did not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by her.
 
The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge Arcaya-
Chua reported zero or a lesser number of marriages solemnized by her compared
with the marriage certificates that were seized from her office. Just to mention a
portion of the evidence submitted against her: In April 2004, she reported[38] that
she did not solemnized any marriage, but there were 29 marriage certificates issued
on the said month contained in the plastic bags that were taken from her office.
[39]
 In May 2004, she reported[40] that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 36
marriage certificates issued on the said month were found in the same plastic bags.
[41]
 In June 2004, she likewise reported[42] that she did not solemnize any marriage,
but 45 marriage certificates issued on the said month were contained in the plastic
bags.[43] From November 2005 to March 2007, her Monthly
Reports[44] indicated that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 1,068 marriage
certificates issued by her during the said period are in the custody of the Court.[45]
 
Atty. Neptali D. Abasta, Clerk of Court V, OCC, MeTC, Makati City, in his
Certification[46] dated June 8, 2007, stated that only 146 of the marriages
solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua from January 2004 to June 13, 2005 paid the
corresponding marriage fee. Moreover, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., Clerk of
Court VII, OCC, RTC, Makati City, declared in his Certification[47] dated June 8,
2007 that from the list furnished by this Court of marriages solemnized by Judge
Arcaya-Chua, only 20 marriages were paid to the said office per RTC official
receipts covering the period from June 14, 2005 to April 2007. Hence, out of the
1,975 marriage certificates discovered in Branch 144, only a total of 166 marriages
were paid.
 
In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame
to Noel Umipig absent any proof of weight that he forged her signature in the
Monthly Reports.
 
In regard to respondent Victoria Jamora, her signature on the Monthly
Reports represented that she attested to the correctness thereof; hence, it is
presumed that she verified or should have verified the facts stated therein. The
Monthly Reports specifically state that the signatories thereto, including Victoria
Jamora, declare under oath that the information in this Monthly Report is true and
correct to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to the provisions of existing
rules/administrative circulars.
 
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch 144
from July 2005 to April 2007.[48] It is incredible that Victoria Jamora, as OIC, was
unaware ofthe big number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge from
November 5 to March 2007, which totaled 1,068 marriages per the confiscated
marriage certificates, but she attested in the Monthly Reports for the said period
that no marriage was ever solemnized. Thus, the Investigating Justice correctly
stated that she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect,
but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein, if she was not
actually a willing participant.
 
The Court sustains the findings of Justice Salvador-Fernando in A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2141 that respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty
of gross misconduct.
 
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court upholds
the finding of Justice Salvador-Fernando that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner Albert
Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a
man against his wife underR.A. No. 9292, known as the AntiViolence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge
Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292.
 
 In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court sustains
the recommendation of Justice Salvador-Fernando that the case be dismissed in the
absence of substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the
charge of harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross
misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
 
We now resolve the motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
 
 
 
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093
 

In A.M. RTJ-07-2093, Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005

against Judge Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and dishonesty.
 

Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judges husband, alleged that in the first

week of September 2002, she asked respondents help regarding the cases of
her friend, Emerita Muoz, pending before the Supreme Court. At that time,
respondent was the Presiding Judge of the MeTC of Makati City, Branch
63. Respondent, a former employee of the Supreme Court, said that she could
help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court; she just
needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for the
speedy resolution of the said cases. In the first week of October 2002,
complainant gave respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latters chamber.
When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her
that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the
Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00; however,
respondent could no longer be contacted.[49]
 

In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denied the charges

against her and averred that in the months adverted to by complainant, she
(respondent) was facing protests, damaging newspaper reports and administrative
cases which caused her hypertension; thus, she could not have agreed to the
supposed transaction of complainant. When she became a judge, complainant
asked a lot of favors from her, and knowing that she worked as a Court Attorney
of the Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a certain Mario Tolosa of
the Third Division, to whom complainant gave P50,000.00 for a favorable
resolution of Muoz cases. Respondent declined. Thereafter, complainant started
spreading malicious imputations against her. On April 23, 2005, complainant
begged respondent to talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover the money
she gave Tolosa. Respondent again refused. Complainant then repeatedly tried to
talk to her until April 25, 2005 when complainant threatened to file a case against
respondent with the Supreme Court. Complainant sent two demand letters
addressed to respondent's court asking for the return of the P100,000.00
complainant allegedly gave her, which letters were read by respondent's Clerk of
Court. Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside respondent's house,
that she (respondent) was corrupt, as she asked for money in order to settle cases
in court. Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against
Honor and Unjust Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa
case against her.[50]
 
The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred this case to
Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation.
 
During the preliminary conference held on September 4, 2007, complainant
manifested her desire to move for the dismissal of her complaint against
respondent.[51] In a Verified Manifestation[52] dated September 6, 2007,
complainant stated that in the latter part of August 2007, she and respondent had a
long and serious discussion about the dispute and bad feelings between them; that
 after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on complainant that her accusation
against respondent was brought about by misunderstanding, confusion and
misapprehension of facts concerning the incident subject of the present
administrative case; that for the sake of unity and harmonious relations in their
family, the complainant and respondent had reconciled and restored friendly
relations with each other; and that in view of the foregoing, complainant was no
longer interested in pursuing her administrative case against respondent.
 
In her Report dated October 5, 2007, Justice Buzon recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case in view of paucity of evidence upon which a
conclusion could be drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by Santos of her
complaint and her failure and refusal to prove the allegations in her Complaint.
 
In a Resolution[53] dated December 5, 2007, the Court, adopting the
recommendation of Justice Buzon, dismissed the complaint against respondent for
lack of evidence. The Court, in the same Resolution, also ordered complainant to
show cause why she should not be held in contempt of Court for filing an
unfounded verified Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against respondent.
 
Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6, 2008 stating that:
xxxx
 
2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable Court, her administrative
complaint against Judge Evelyn Ar[c]aya-Chua is not unfounded;
 
3. All the allegations therein are true and based on respondents personal
knowledge;
 
4.      The main reason why respondent did not anymore pursue her complaint was
because of the pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of
unity and harmony in the family, given the fact that Judge Chuas husband
is her nephew;
 
5.      On several occasions in August 2007, Judge Chua, her husband and their
children came to respondents house and pleaded for forgiveness. Later,
respondents sister, husband and children, as well as her close friends
persuaded her to forgive Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones, for the sake
of peace and unity in the family;
  
6.      It is solely due to the foregoing events as well as for humane reasons that
respondent gave up her complaint against Judge Chua.[54]
 
 

In its Resolution[55] dated March 3, 2008, the Court found that complainant's

compliance was not satisfactory, and that she was trifling with court processes. The
Court then resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more
severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event of a repetition of the
same offense; recall theResolution of the Court dated December 5, 2007; reopen
the administrative case against respondent; direct Justice Rebecca D. Salvador[56] to
conduct an investigation and submit her report and recommendation; and directed
complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice Salvador under pain of
contempt of court.
 
In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador
found sufficient grounds to hold respondent liable for the offenses charged
and recommended that respondent be administratively penalized for grave
misconduct and dishonesty.
 
Justice Salvadors findings, as stated in the Resolution dated February 13,
2009, are as follows:
 
Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to present substantial
evidence in support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied
that she asked for and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation
of a favorable decision on Muoz' cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting
complainant in her office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason for
such meeting; that is, complainant was there to console her for the protests against
respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred complainant's ire for
declining complainants request for favors in June 2004; however, it was
respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of
the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not heard of Tolosa before;
however, it was respondent's comment and her husband's affidavit which stated
that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on
 absence without leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme
Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to
believe that respondent knew and associated with Muoz prior to the parties'
falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband,
stated that Muoz was introduced to them by complainant in September 2003, and
that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the
topic of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for
grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20,
2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be
denied, however, that respondent at the time had already been served
complainant's demand letters dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005;
respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a lawyer, to reply to complainants first
demand letter, was unusual; considering complainants advanced age and illnesses,
respondent's claim--that complainant's motive for filing the administrative case
was respondent's refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in the
cases of the latter's friend--was too paltry an explanation for complainant's
willingness to expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the
administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her;
complainants compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show
cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint
against respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint were true and
based on personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and their
family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her complaint
against respondent.[57]
 

During the hearing conducted on September 3, 2008, Investigating Justice

Salvador observed that although complainant appeared weary of the demands
entailed by the administrative case, she staunchly stood pat over the veracity of
her complaint and the reasons why she decided to withdraw the same. According
to Justice Salvador, respondent had no reason to ask forgiveness from
complainant, if indeed complainant falsely instituted the administrative case
against her.
 
Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainants testimony that the return
of the money by respondent, in addition to familial interests, induced her to
withdraw the complaint.
 The Court sustained the findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador,
and rendered decision against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 144, Makati City is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without salary and other
benefits. She is WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar act in the
future shall merit a more severe penalty.[58]
 
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that:
 
(1)      The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate the failure of Sylvia
Santos to present Emerita Muoz, from whom Santos procured
the P100,000.00, in the proceedings before Justice Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador;

(2)      The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate that one of the bases for
the dismissal of the present case of 5 December 2007 was the Affidavit of
Retraction filed by Muoz on 12 January 2006;

(3)      The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the finding of Justice

Salvador that [respondent] did not refute Santos declaration during the
clarificatory hearing that [respondent] returned the money to her;

(4)      The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the other findings of

Justice Salvador; and

(5)      The Honorable Supreme Court erred in not considering [respondents]

testimonial and documentary evidence.[59]

Respondent prayed that Stenographer Diana Tenerife be directed to submit

to this Court the fully transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings held on
September 17, 2008 and to submit her tape of the proceedings on the said date, and
that her motion for reconsideration be granted and that the instant case be
dismissed.
 Respondents prayer for submission to this Court of the fully transcribed
stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008 is an attempt to
clarify alleged inaccuracies in the said transcript of stenographic notes. The Court
notes that respondent Judge had earlier filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008 on
this matter, which was already resolved in the Resolution of the Court promulgated
on February 13, 2009, thus:
 
Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008, claiming that there
were significant omissions of testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN) particularly in the statement Ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera; and that
such question was also beyond the scope of clarificatory questions that may be
propounded, as nowhere in the previous testimonies of complainant, either in the
direct or the cross-examination, did she mention the return of the money, and it
was only during the clarifiactory hearing that it surfaces; thus, she (respondent)
was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant. Respondent prayed that
corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant that the
money was returned to me and ibinalik naman ho nila and pera be stricken off;
and in case the correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her manifestation that
the said testimony of complainant was given only during the clarificatory hearing
and, in effect, without an opportunity for her to cross-examine the complainant.
 
In the Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court denied
respondents prayer that the corrections on the TSN be made, and that the
subject testimonies of complainant be stricken off. The Court, however,
granted her prayer and noted her Manifestation that the subject testimony
was given only during the clarificatory hearing and in effect without granting
her an opportunity to cross-examine complainant about the same.[60]

Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present Emerita Muoz,

from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, during the proceedings before
Justice Salvador was fatal to Santos claims against her, and, on that basis alone,
provided a reason to dismiss the present case.
The Court is not persuaded.
 
Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and her
testimony alone, found credible in this case, is sufficient to prove the
administrative liability of respondent.
 
 Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the
findings of Investigating Justice Salvador, took into consideration the testimonial
and documentary evidence presented by her.
 
The Court reiterates its statement in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009,
thus:
x x x [M]ost telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondents guilt is the
unwavering stance of complainant that respondent did solicit and
receive P100,000.00 from her in order to facilitate a favorable ruling in Muoz
cases.
 
As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly
asked during the hearing, was consistent in her testimony:
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
At the start of this afternoons proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the
matters stated in your verified complaint?
 
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?
 
MS. SANTOS:
My complaint is true. That is all true.
 
xxxx
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Ano ba ang totoo?
 
MS. SANTOS:
Ang sabi ko sa kanya, Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi
napakatagal na ng kaso niya. Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o
hindi. Ang sabi niya, Sige, Tita, tutulungan ko.
 
Evelyn, sasabihin ko and totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
 Just tell us what happened.
 
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi niya, "Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00 at tutulungan ko.
Pagka sa loob ng tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo
ang P50,000.00." Which is true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi ng pabor
sa akin. Okay siya. Dumating ang panahon. It took already years walang
nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap
ko siya. Sabi ko, "Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa akin para maibigay
ko kay Emelita." Unang-una iyang Emelita may utang sa akin
ng P20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas. Bumili
sya.
 
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to
continue with her testimony because she is already through with her direct
examination.
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the record.
 
 
Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her
true reasons for withdrawing her complaint. As borne out by the records and
correctly pointed out by Justice Salvador in her Report:
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.
 
Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September
7, 2007, and which had been marked as Exhibits "1," "1-A," "l-B" and
submarkings for respondent. You stated in the verified complaint that the
accusation against respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding,
misapprehension of facts and confusion. Please clarify what do you mean
by "the accusation against respondent was brought about due to
misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and confusion"?

MS. SANTOS:
Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na
kamit nagkabatian. Sa totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi
nagkibuan. Ngayon, dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa akin, kaya ako naman
ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila dahil pamilya ko ho sila, ang asawa niya.
 Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan, baka ewan ko, baka hindi ko
tuluyan iyan.
 
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you
misunderstood or misapprehended?
 
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa
pakiusap po nila na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang
pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po ang buong katotohanan,
Justice.[61]
 
 
These testimonies on record are evidence against respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua. The Investigating Justice observed the demeanor of complainant and found
her a credible witness. It is settled rule that the findings of investigating
magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their
unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.
[62]
 The Court found no reason to depart from such rule since Justice Salvadors
observations and findings are supported by the records.
 
The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-08-
2141 is violative of the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:
 
Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial
office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
 
Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
 
Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
 
Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
 
  

Administrative Sanctions
 
Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be based
on the provisions of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
[63]
 while disciplinary action against respondent Victoria Jamora will be based on
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include
gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross
ignorance of the law or procedure.
 
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the respondent
Judge is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
 
1.      Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
 
 
 
2.      Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3.      A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
 
Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct
is classified as a grave offense and punished with dismissal for the first offense.
 
The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent
Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141.
 
 The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent
Judges motion for reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
 
The Court has held:
 
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the
exhortation that the administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest
to the highest levels, are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon
lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the
ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression.
 
Those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and
integrity have no place in the judiciary. xxx This Court will not withhold penalty
when called for to uphold the peoples faith in the judiciary.[64]
 
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that:
 
1.     in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges against Judge Evelyn S.
Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144
is DISMISSED.
 
2.     in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law and punished with SUSPENSION from office
for six (6) months without salary and other benefits.
 
3.     in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge
Arcaya-Chua is DENIED for lack of merit. The penalty
of SUSPENSION from office for a period of six (6) months without
salary and other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED.
 
4.     in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with
 forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice
to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality.
 
5.     in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is found GUILTY of
grave misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality.
 
Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Victoria C.
Jamora of this decision, they are deemed to have vacated their respective office,
and their authority to act as Judge and Court Stenographer, respectively, are
considered automatically terminated.
 
These consolidated administrative cases are referred to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation regarding the possible
disbarment of Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua from the practice of the legal
profession.
 
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
 

On official leave

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

[1]
 Resolution dated January 15, 2008 and Resolution dated April 14, 2009.
[2]
 Rollo (OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ), p. 253.
[3]
 Rollo (RTJ-07-2049), p. 17.
[4]
 Rollo (OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ), p. 84.
[5]
 Rollo (RTJ-07-2049), p. 24.
[6]
 Other charges contained in the Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 of the Court Administrator to the Chief
Justice, such as the alleged irregularities in People v. Hiro Nakagawa (Crim. Case Nos. 06-148 to 154) and Paul
Melvin Robles v. Ida Perez Villanueva (Sp. Proc. M-6370), as well as respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas questionable
recommendation of one of her staff, Maritess Dorado, were not part of the Investigation per manifestation of the
OCA that their evidence was limited to the confiscated marriage certificates and Judge Arcaya-Chuas failure to
reflect the marriages she solemnized in her monthly reports.
[7]
 Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049), p. 119.
[8]
 Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), p. 319.
[9]
 Subject: Observance of the Statutory Requirements for Marriages and the Prescribed Amounts of Fees for the
Solemnization of Marriages.
[10]
 Annexes L to P.
[11]
 Exhibits 1 to 39.
[12]
 Exhibit A to BB.
[13]
 Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), p. 465.
[14]
 TSN, March 23, 2009, pp. 10-17, 60.
[15]
 Exhibits 1 to 23.
[16]
 Exhibits 24 to 28.
[17]
 Exhibits "31" to "85."
[18]
 Emphasis supplied.
[19]
 Records of SP No. M-6375, pp. 70-72.
[20]
 Id. at 38.
[21]
 Daracan v. Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447, September 27, 2000, 341 SCRA 161, 175.
[22]
 A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, November, 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 13, 37-38. (Emphasis supplied.)
[23]
 Emphasis supplied.
[24]
 A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 87.
[25]
 Records (SP No. M-6372), Vol. IV, pp. 1447-1468.
[26]
 Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. v. Pizarro, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 140, 155-
156. (Emphasis supplied.)
[27]
 Supplemental Affidavit dated April 14, 2009; rollo (RTJ-08-2141), p. 497.
[28]
 TSN, March 3, 2009, pp. 13, 27-30,47.
[29]
 Affidavit dated February 16, 2009, rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), p. 465.
[30]
 TSN, March 3, 2009, pp. 27-30, 45.
[31]
 Id. at 47.
[32]
 Exhibits H and I; rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), pp. 216-219.
[33]
 TSN, March 3, 2009, pp. 103-104, 106-107, 137-138, 141-146.
[34]
 TSN, April 21, 2009, pp. 73-74.
[35]
 TSN, February 18, 2009, pp. 32-33.
[36]
 Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005, 469 SCRA 439.
[37]
 Exhibits BB, CC-1 to CC-5, DD to NN, XX to ZZ, AAA to GGG, X to Z, folder of exhibits.
[38]
 Exhibit XX, folder of exhibits.
[39]
 TSN, April 8, 2009, p. 19.
[40]
 Exhibit YY, folder of exhibits.
[41]
 TSN, April 8, 2009, p. 20.
[42]
 Exhibit ZZ, folder of exhibits.
[43]
 TSN, April 8, 2009, p. 20.
[44]
 Exhibits CC-4 to CC-5, DD to JJ, JJ-1 to JJ-5, KK to MM, folder of exhibits.
[45]
 TSN, April 8, 2009, p. 39.
[46]
 Exhibit H, folder of exhibits.
[47]
 Exhibit I-1, folder of exhibits.
[48]
 TSN, February 18, 2009, p. 24.
[49]
 Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093) , pp. 1-3.
[50]
 Id. at 6-15. (The estafa case filed by complainant against respondent was dismissed by the City Prosecution
Office and the petition for review thereon denied by the Department of Justice.)
[51]
 Id. at 61-62.
[52]
 Id. at 270-271.
[53]
 Id. at. 292.
[54]
 Id. at 305. (Emphasis supplied.)
[55]
 Id. at 307.
[56]
 In lieu of Justice Buzon, who was to retire on March 18, 2008.
[57]
 Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093), pp. 400-401.
[58]
 Id. at 407.
[59]
 Id. at 422.
[60]
 Id. at 402. (Emphasis supplied.)
[61]
 Id. at 403-405.
[62]
 Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, supra note 36.
[63]
 Rule 140 is entitled Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan.
[64]
 Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA
36, 62-63.
 SEPARATE OPINION, CONCURRING

BELLOSILLO, J.:

If we make a mistake, we can only pray that their

ghosts will not haunt us for the rest of our days . . .
Amen! I say to the clear and concise ponencia of our colleague, Mr. Justice Romeo
J. Callejo Sr., who touched the issues head on and resolved them with the calm
deliberation of a dedicated jurist. Let me just add a few more thoughts in the effort to
reveal and rectify the hazards and uncertainties ordinarily concealed by the glib use of
formal illogic.
This case springs from the brutal slaughter of suspected members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang on 18 May 1995. Eleven (11) restless souls - who perished in a shroud
of mystery - remain shackled for more than half a decade by the bondage of popular
apathy and neglect, and condemned to an ignominious fall by their infamy. Stigmatized
and denounced, their demise must have been hailed by many as the triumph of
retributive justice

x x x x Gifted with the liberty they know not how to use; with a power and energy they
know not how to apply; with a life whose purpose and
aim they comprehend not; they drag through their useless and convulsed
existence. Byron destroys them one after the other, as if he were the executioner of a
sentence decreed in heaven. They fall unwept, like a withered leaf into the stream of
time x x x x They die, as they have lived, alone; and a popular malediction hovers
round their solitary tombs. [1]

The dictates of prudence however would counsel us at this time to reserve

judgment on their sins and transgressions. The overriding consideration is the need to
unveil the truth, for truth alone is the veritable touchstone of justice. The rights of the
eleven (11) victims, as much as those of the respondent and his co-accused, deserve
full recognition and protection. Only then can we say that we are truly civilized - a breed
apart from savages.
But the manner by which the carnage of 18 May 1995 was carried out sparked a
public indignation that prompted the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights,
Crimes and National Defense and Security to conduct a joint investigation on possible
human rights violations involving police officers. The inquiry focused on the issue of
whether the death of the eleven (11) victims was the result of a rub-out or summary
killing, or a shoot-out or with exchange of gunfire, between the victims and the police
considering that the principal antagonists were policemen and civilians. On 21 June
1995 the aforesaid Senate Committees, in Joint Committee Report No. 1021, found
thus -

There is no clarity as to whether the bodies were handcuffed or hogtied with ropes
when they were killed. The evidence, however, establishes that those who died were
defenseless and that except for Soronda, none of them fired a gun. The forensic report
and testimonies of De los Santos and De la Cruz show that eleven (11) persons were
killed in coldblood while in the custody of the law enforcers in the early morning of
May 18 in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City (underscoring supplied),

concluded that the killings were done in cold blood and recommended the filing of the
appropriate charges against the police officers.
[2]

Thereafter multiple murder charges were filed by the Ombudsman before

the Sandiganbayan against respondent and twenty-five (25) other police officers,
docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 23047-23057. On motion of the accused,
the Ombudsman conducted a reinvestigation of the cases resulting in the filing
of Amended Informations, this time charging respondent, among other officers, as a
mere accessory after-the-fact. Arraignment followed and respondent entered a plea of
not guilty.
Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan contending in the
main that the highest ranking principal accused under the Amended Informations held
the position of Chief Inspector with a salary below that for Grade 27, for which reason,
jurisdiction properly belonged to the Regional Trial Court and not
the Sandiganbayan. The issue of jurisdiction eventually reached the Supreme Court,
which ordered the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City not
because the highest ranking principal accused was receiving a salary below Grade 27
but because the Amended Informations did not show that the offenses charged were
committed in relation to, or in the discharge of, official functions of the accused.
The criminal cases were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
and raffled to RTC-Br. 81 then presided over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr.
Respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical motions praying for a
judicial determination of probable cause, to hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants
of arrest in the meantime, and to dismiss the cases should the court find no probable
cause.
During the hearing on the motions, the seven (7) or eight (8) victims next of kin
executed affidavits of desistance while others recanted their affidavit-complaints. With
this development, the trial court in its Resolution of 29 March 1999 dismissed the cases
for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial, holding that there is no more
evidence to show that the crime(s) have been committed and that the accused are
probably guilty thereof.
[3]

Two (2) years later, or on 29 March 2001, Secretary Hernando B. Perez of the
Department of Justice received a letter from PNP Director General Leandro R. Mendoza
indorsing for preliminary investigation the sworn affidavits of two (2) new witnesses
relative to the Kuratong Baleleng incident. Secretary Perez constituted a panel of State
Prosecutors to investigate the matter. The panel issued several subpoenas to all the
accused in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, including respondent Lacson,
requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and to appear at the preliminary
conference.
Consequently, on 28 May 2001, respondent and several of his co-accused filed a
petition for prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction with the RTC-Manila, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Justice
and the State Prosecutors from further conducting a preliminary investigation. The
prohibition case was raffled to RTC-Br. 40, Manila, presided over by Judge Herminia V.
Pasamba. The filing of this petition notwithstanding, the Panel of State Prosecutors
proceeded to issue a Resolution finding probable cause to hold respondent and his co-
accused for trial, for eleven (11) counts of murder. Accordingly, Informations were filed
before the RTC, Quezon City, and docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112.
Deviating from the normal procedure, the Executive Judge, Vice-Executive Judges
and Presiding Judges of Quezon City dispensed with the customary raffle; instead,
assigned the cases to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao of RTC-Br. 81, Quezon City,
presumably as the successor of Judge Agnir in the same branch.
Meanwhile, in the prohibition case before RTC-Br. 40, Manila, Judge Pasamba
denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order thus-

After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment
and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct
consequence of the finding of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court that no probable
cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioner herein and to hold
them for trial. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a
different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any
jurisdiction to try the cases.
[4]

Dissatisfied, respondent elevated the case on a petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals which thereafter rendered the assailed Decision of 24 August 2001 granting the
petition, declaring null and void all the proceedings conducted by the State Prosecutors,
and ordering all the criminal Informations dismissed -

The present controversy, being one involving provisional dismissal and revival of
criminal cases, falls within the purview of the prescriptive period provided under
Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second
paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical words. It
mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, as
the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2)
years after the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. It should be
noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases x x x was commenced only on
April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999,
of RTC-Quezon Citys Resolution x x x x [5]

Hence, the present recourse. The bone of contention, which crystallizes all the
arguments of the parties into a single point of inquiry, bears upon the nature and effects
of a provisional dismissal which has become permanent after the lapse of the periods
provided in Sec. 8, Rule 117, 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. For facility of
reference, the controversial provision of Sec. 8 quoted hereunder -

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. - A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except

with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment x x x of more than

six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived (italics supplied).

Assuming that Sec. 8, Rule 117, is available to respondent although it is my position

that it is not, the question that should be asked is: Does the provisional dismissal of a
criminal case which has become permanent under Sec. 8 effectively foreclose the right
of the State to prosecute an accused? I have taken great pains analyzing the position of
respondent; regretfully, I am unable to agree for my conscience shivers at its
debilitating, crippling if not crushing, impact upon our criminal justice system.
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Arts. 90 and 91
of The Revised Penal Code, which are quoted hereunder -

Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. - Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or

reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other
afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the
exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses shall prescribe in two months

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made
the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third
paragraphs of this article.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.

Evidently, respondents concept of a provisional dismissal that has become

permanent under Sec. 8, Rule 117, emasculates and renders illusory its very purpose. It
effectively obliterates the different prescriptive periods under Art. 90, which are fixed on
the basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribed for the offense, and supplants it with a
uniform period of one (1) year or two (2) years, as the case may be. It likewise
substantially modifies the manner of computing the period of prescription in Art. 91
since the reckoning of the one (1) or two (2)-year prescriptive period under Sec. 8 is
constant and invariable, and without regard to the number of interruptions. Regardless
of the number of times the case against an accused is provisionally dismissed, the
prosecution would always have a full grace period of two (2) years within which to revive
the case; much unlike Art. 91 wherein the period consumed prior to the filing of the
complaint or information is tacked to the period consumed after the dismissal of the
case for purposes of determining whether the crime has prescribed.
Interestingly, a dividing line is drawn in the application of Arts. 90 and 91 of The
Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, obviously in an attempt to lend a delusive semblance of plausibility to its
construction of Sec. 8. It is posited that Art. 91 and Sec. 8 operate on different planes,
so to speak, the vital distinction being that Sec. 8, Rule 117, contemplates a situation
where a case had already been filed and was provisionally dismissed.
I do not agree. Article 91 of The Revised Penal Code distinctly speaks
of prescription x x x shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
him. It can readily be seen therefore that the concept of a provisional dismissal is
subsumed in Art. 91 since in a provisional dismissal, proceedings necessarily terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted. Thus, to construe and apply Sec. 8 in
the manner suggested above would undeniably result in a direct and irreconcilable
conflict with Art. 91.
 In a provisional dismissal, the prosecution, the defense and the offended party, in
effect, enter into a tacit agreement for a temporary cessation of hostilities, i.e., to
momentarily hold in abeyance the prosecution of the accused. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8
prescribes the requirements thereto: (a) consent of the accused, and (b) notice to the
offended party. It must be remembered however that permanent dismissal of a case is
but an offshoot of its previous provisional dismissal and the subsequent failure to revive
within the time frames set forth in Sec. 8. But does the permanent dismissal of the case
arising from a provisional dismissal affect the right of the State to prosecute within the
periods provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code? Certainly not, for the
prescriptive periods prescribed by law cannot be affected directly or indirectly by any
agreement or consent of the parties, much less be held hostage to anyprocedural
limitations. Verily, in matters of public crimes which have a direct bearing on public
interest, no agreements or personal arrangements should be brought to bear upon the
penal action.
Courts cannot - by an act of judicial legislation - abridge, amend, alter, or nullify
statutes. We do not sit as councils of revision, empowered to judicially reform or fashion
legislation in accordance with our own notions of prudent public policy. Certainly, lest
we are prepared to ride roughshod over this prerogative of Congress, we cannot
interfere with the power of the legislature to surrender, as an act of grace, the right of
the State to prosecute and to declare the offense no longer subject to prosecution after
certain periods of time as expressed in the statute.
Furthermore, the right of the State to prosecute criminals is a substantive, nay,
inherent right. To unduly limit the exercise of such right for a short period of one (1) or
two (2) years through the expedient of a procedural rule is unconstitutional, considering
the limitation in our fundamental law on the rule-making power of this Court, that is, its
rules must not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[6]

Another decisive factor which militates heavily against the foregoing thesis that Art.
91 and Sec. 8 operate on different planes, is the fact that the phrase amounts to an
acquittal, which appeared in the original draft of what is now Sec. 8, Rule 117, was
judiciously rejected by the Supreme Court when it approved the final draft of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure -

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You know that prior to the wordings at present of Sec. 8,
Rule 117, there was a final committee draft that said and I quote: the corresponding
order shall state that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent and amount to
an acquittal one year after the issuance without the case having been revived. What I
am trying to point out is that, as originally worded, Section 8 expressly stated that the
dismissal would amount to an acquittal. But the final wording eliminated the words
amount to an acquittal, isnt it?

ATTY. FORTUN: I would not know that, Your Honor. I have not seen that revised
(interrupted) x x x x
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Well, that is true that those words were eliminated
precisely because we wanted to avoid making invocation of that rule equivalent to an
acquittal. All right, (interrupted) x x x x
[7]

Had the intention been to confer on Sec. 8 the effect of acquittal, the Court should
have retained the express provision to that effect in the final draft. Obviously, the
conspicuous absence therein of the phrase amounts to an acquittal, or its equivalent,
forecloses a speculative approach to the meaning of Sec. 8. Virtually crossed out, such
clause cannot now be incised from the original draft and grafted into the approved draft
of the revised rules, without doing violence to its intent.
It must be stressed that Sec. 8 is nothing more than a rule of procedure. As part of
the adjective law, it is only a means to an end - an aid to substantive law - and should
accordingly be interpreted and applied in that concept. It was never meant to modify the
settled provisions of law on the matter of prescription of offenses; or to unduly curtail the
right of the State to bring offenders before the bar of justice. These matters are best left
to the wisdom and sound judgment of the legislature.
Section 8 is very limited in scope and application. Justice Oscar M. Herrera,
Consultant, Committee on Revision of the Rules, in his Treatise on Historical
Development and Highlights of Amendments of Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rationale
of Amendments of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure), made the following
commentaries on the import of the provision -

There had been so many instances where the National Bureau of Investigation or other
police agencies have refused to issue clearances for purposes of employment or travel
abroad, to persons who have pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of their
cases by the court was merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that such
provisional dismissals, more often than not, had been done five or ten years ago. This
causes prejudice to the persons concerned. Accordingly, a rule was provided that the
provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. [8]

Clearly, the feverishly contested provision is purely administrative or regulatory in

character. The policy embodied therein is simply to grant the accused momentary relief
from administrative restrictions occasioned by the filing of a criminal case against
him. He is freed in the meantime of the dire consequences of his having been charged
with a crime, and temporarily restored to his immunities as a citizen, solely for purposes
of government clearances. Section 8 imports no intricate nor ornate legal signification
that we need not discern from it a meaning that too far deviates from what it actually
purports to convey.
 Indeed, were we to adhere to the thesis equating permanent dismissal with finality
and acquittal, we would be ascribing meaning to the provision which is not only at war
with the demands of reason but also contrary to the clear intention of the rule. The
disastrous effect of respondents interpretation of Sec. 8 upon our criminal justice
system is not difficult to imagine.So construed, it would afford an accused, endowed
with a fertile imagination and creativeness, a plethora of opportunities to rig his
prosecution by silencing witnesses and suppressing evidence then letting the case
hibernate for a much shorter period of one (1) or two (2) years. To be sure, our
procedural laws could not have intended to sanction such a result. A system of
procedure, intoned Justice Cardozo, is perverted from its proper function when it
multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of a clear necessity.[9]

Respondent conjures up the ingenious hypothesis that although Sec. 8 of Rule 117
and the double jeopardy principle have different requisites, they are nonetheless
cognate rules since Sec. 8 of Rule 117 affords the accused benefits analogous to that
bestowed under the "double jeopardy" principle.  Implacable and unyielding is he in the
[10]

position that a provisional dismissal that attains the character of permanency produces
the effect of a sui generis acquittal. In this respect, according to him, Sec. 8 of Rule 117
is not in that Sec. 17 (Discharge of Accused to be State Witness) unique and Sec. 18
unique and Sec. 18 (Discharge of Accused Operates as Acquittal) of Rule 119 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is also invested with the benefits of double
jeopardy when it grants the accused state witness a discharge tantamount to an
acquittal. In both instances, the absence of any or all of the essential requisites of
double jeopardy does not preclude the discharge of the accused state witness or one
whose case has attained permanent dismissal.
It bears recalling that since Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence on double jeopardy was
swept into the shores of Philippine constitutional and statutory history, our concept of
double jeopardy has faithfully adhered to the pronouncements first made by Kepner v.
United States  that x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy
[11]

includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment
be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection
is not x x x against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the
second offense. The fundamental philosophy that underlies the finality of an acquittal is
the recognition of the fact that the state with its infinite resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual and expose him to a
state of perpetual anxiety and embarrassment as well as enhancing the possibility that
although innocent, he may be found guilty.
Presently, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit in its
prescription of the requisites for the invocation of double jeopardy and the resultant
effect thereon on acquittals. Section 7, Rule 117, states -

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Ensconced in the foregoing procedural tenet are the imperatives for invoking double
jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
In contrast, provisional dismissal under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 requires only the twin
requirements of consent of the accused and notice to the offended party. When a
criminal case is provisionally dismissed upon the express application of the defendant,
the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his
action in having the case dismissed is a waiver of his constitutional prerogative of
double jeopardy as he, in a manner of speaking, throws a monkey wrench to the judicial
process and prevents the court from rendering a judgment of conviction against
him. Jurisprudence has emphatically enunciated that double jeopardy cannot be
properly invoked where the case was dismissed with the express conformity of the
accused. This much is given as one of the requisites of double jeopardy, i.e., where the
accused is acquitted or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. This assent by the accused to the dismissal is
the operative act that precludes the effects of double jeopardy from setting in, so that
despite the permanency of the dismissal due to the lapse of the periods set forth in Sec.
8 of Rule 117, the refiling of a case under a new information does not trample upon this
venerable doctrine.
The permanence of the dismissal should not be understood as the harbinger of final
and absolute liberation of the accused from future prosecution. It merely augurs the
demise of the unrevived cases but it does not prevent the state from exercising the right
to re-prosecute the accused within the prescriptive period provided in Art. 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. With more weighty reason can we not accommodate respondent
in his plea to avail of the graces afforded by the doctrine since the records would show
that he has yet to enter his plea to the charges or that the trial on the merits has as yet
to commence.
Respondent also fires a shot in the dark when he suggests that there exists no
marked difference between revival and refiling of a criminal case as in fact, according to
him, the two (2) concepts are synonymous and interchangeable. A survey of
jurisprudential antecedents reveal the distinction between the revival and refiling of a
new information. The authorities are unanimous in their recognition of the fact that a
provisionally dismissed case can be revived as it does not call for the operation of the
rule on double jeopardy and that cases can also be refiled under a new complaint or
information for the same offense. [12]
 While I agree however that the filing of Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102 - 01-101112 is
NOT a revival of the earlier dismissed cases, I wish to emphasize, lest I be
misconstrued, that the New Informations in the subsequently refiled cases are new not
because the respondent is charged thereunder as a co-principal, instead of as a mere
accessory, or that the number of the accused has been increased from 26 to 34; rather,
the new Informations which are the bases for the prosecution of the respondent again
under the same offense, are new for the singular reason that they are separate and
distinct from those in the previously dismissed cases. Simply stated, it is not of
consequence whether the allegations in the two (2) sets of Informationsare
quintessentially identical or different in form and substance insofar as concerns the right
of the state to prosecute the respondent anew after the provisional  dismissal became
permanent.
A question may be asked: Suppose that the new information is a verbatim
reproduction of the information in the permanently dismissed case, can we not now say
that the newly filed case is a mere revival of the case previously dismissed? After all,
stripped of semantic finery, their being identical would lead to the impression, although
erroneous, that one is but a revival of the other. On the surface one may see no
apparent difference between the two (2) sets of Informations, but a subtle yet significant
functional distinction in fact exists. Once a case is permanently dismissed after the
lapse of the prescriptive periods set forth in Sec. 8, the case is dead and, for all intents
and purposes, beyond resuscitation. All the on-going proceedings and those still to be
had, e.g., preliminary investigation, arraignment, trial, etc., shall cease and be
terminated. In the event however that the accused is prosecuted anew with the same
offense, albeit under an identical information, the previously terminated proceedings will
not be reactivated, the previous case having been set at rest; instead, new proceedings
will be conducted as if the accused has been charged afresh. To my mind, the foregoing
interpretation of Sec. 8, Rule 117 has in its favor the soundest policy considerations
based no less on the fundamental objectives of procedural rules.
Incidentally, I find it particularly disturbing that the Informations in Crim. Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were dismissed by the trial judge without complying with
one of the requirements of the first paragraph of Sec. 8, i.e., the dismissal must be with
notice to the offended party. There is nothing in the records which would show that all
the offended parties were ever notified that the cases against respondent and his co-
accused would be dismissed. Even if we proceed on the assumption that the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the offended parties may be considered a substantial
equivalent of notice, still the dismissal appears to be procedurally infirm since only
seven (7) of the offended parties representing eight (8) of the eleven (11) victims,
executed affidavits of desistance.  No similar affidavits were submitted for the three (3)
[13]

remaining victims.  Cannot the next of kin of these three (3) remaining victims, who
[14]

were not even notified of the provisional dismissal of the cases, prosecute those
responsible for killing them within the prescriptive period provided in Art. 90 of The
Revised Penal Code? Are they now without any remedy in law if witnesses belatedly
surface, they who cowered in fear at the time because of the positions of power held by
those perceived to be responsible therefor?
 Significantly also, I am at a loss as to why the Court of Appeals reckoned the two
(2)-year period from 29 March 1999 as the date of issuance of the resolution of
dismissal. When Sec. 8 speaks of issuance it should be construed not with reference to
the date as appearing in the resolution of dismissal but on the date it was actually
delivered to the proper person and received by him. Otherwise, how would the offended
parties know that such resolution was issued as to reckon with the two (2)-year period
after which the provisional dismissal would be considered permanent?
In the instant case, the records do not clearly identify who the offended parties are,
or whether they were all notified of Judge Agnir's order of dismissal dated 29 March
1999 as they do not even appear to have been properly named. In the absence of such
evidence, the reckoning point for computing the two (2)-year period under Sec. 8
becomes indeterminable. Assuming that Sec. 8 is available to respondent, to which we
do not even agree, still respondent has failed to discharge his burden of proving that the
two (2)-year period has indeed elapsed to make the provisional dismissal permanent.
These circumstances cast a heavy pall of doubt on whether the dismissal of the
eleven (11) Informations has indeed attained the status of permanence as to prevent
the prosecution from refiling them. The notice requirement in the first paragraph of Sec.
8 as well as the notice of the order of dismissal are by no means trivial formalities; they
are meaningful and significant. The offended parties, seeking justice and vindication for
the wrong done, would naturally be keenly interested in the progress and outcome of
the criminal prosecution. Hence, it is but proper that all of them be notified of the
termination of the cases and given an equal opportunity to object to the dismissal.
A view has been expressed that respondents rights to speedy trial and to speedy
disposition of his cases were violated; this despite the fact that the right was not invoked
by respondent before us. Accordingly, the twenty-six (26) month delay in the refiling of
cases relative to the Kuratong Baleleng killings is claimed to be vexatious, capricious
and oppressive, and hence sufficient to activate the protection of the Bill of Rights,
specifically, on the rights to speedy trial and to speedy disposition of his cases. Sections
14 (2) and 16, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution respectively provides -

Sec. 14. x x x x (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused x x x shall enjoy the right
x x x to have a speedy, impartial and public trial x x x x

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

These provisions uphold the time-honored tradition of speedy justice for, as stated
in the oft-repeated dictum, justice delayed is justice denied. Their express inclusion in
the present Constitution was in response to the common charge against perennial
delays in the administration of justice which have plagued our judicial system. [15]

The right to speedy trial under Sec. 14 and the right to speedy disposition of cases
in Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, are kindred constitutional norms
similar in nature and legal effects, sharing common operational principles, and subject
to the same test for purposes of determining violations thereof. Thus, the cornerstone of
both rights is to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring tribunals to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial and disposition of cases.
Speedy disposition of cases, like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, is
necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of
a particular case.  Verily, these rights are more indistinct concepts than other
[16]

constitutional rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when the
rights have been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system
where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, these rights
cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months. There is no fixed point
in the proceeding when a party may exercise or be deemed to have waived these
rights. Finally, the amorphous quality of the rights sometimes lead to the drastic remedy
of dismissal of a case when the rights have been infringed. This is indeed a serious
consequence because it means that an accused who may be guilty of a grave offense
will go scot-free without being tried and held responsible therefor. Such a remedy is
more radical than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial.
At any rate, the framers of the Constitution recognized the right to speedy
disposition of cases distinctly from the right to speedy trial in criminal cases. It should be
noted that Sec. 16 covers all phases before, during and after trial, and extends
protection to all parties in all types of cases: civil, criminal and administrative. In this
respect, it affords a broader protection than Sec. 14 (2) which guarantees merely the
right to a speedy trial in criminal cases.
[17]

Against this backdrop, I turn to inquire into the parameters of the right to speedy
disposition of cases. Just how broad is its mantle of protection as applied in criminal
cases? When does the right attach during the criminal process, and when may it be
properly asserted by a party? A criminal prosecution has many stages, and delay may
occur during or between any of them.As applied in the instant case, it appears that the
speedy disposition guarantee of the Bill of Rights is asserted to include the period of
delay from the provisional dismissal of the case to its revival or refiling since respondent
is as much entitled to a speedy reinvestigation and refiling of the provisionally dismissed
cases against him. [18]

Such interpretation, however, does not seem to be in consonance with the

unmistakable language, nor by the obvious intent, of Sec. 16. The provision speaks of
speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. It
clearly and logically contemplates a situation wherein there exists an outstanding case,
proceeding or some incident upon which the assertion of the right may be
predicated. Evidently, it would be idle, not to say anomalous, to speak of speedy
disposition of cases in the absence of anything to dispose of in the first place.
A review of pertinent jurisprudence attests abundantly to the indispensable
requirement of a pending case, proceeding or some incident, as sine qua non before
the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked. Thus, in Tatad
v. Sandiganbayan  we held that the long delay of three (3) years in the termination of
[19]

the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan was violative of the Constitutional right
of speedy disposition of cases because political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Similarly in Duterte
v. Sandiganbayan  involving an inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary
[20]

investigation, we ruled that such unjustified delay infringes upon the right to speedy
disposition of cases.
In Binay v. Sandiganbayan  we ruled out any violation of petitioners right to speedy
[21]

disposition of cases despite a six-year delay from the filing of the charges in the Office
of the Ombudsman to the time the Informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan. Then
in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.  we rejected the allegation of inordinate delay
[22]

in terminating the preliminary investigation. Finally, in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan  we

[23]

held that the inordinate delay of six (6) years by the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the
Tanodbayan) in the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an
Information for the offense with the Sandiganbayan violated petitioners constitutional
guaranty to speedy disposition of the case.
Invariably, the foregoing cases demonstrate that the broad protective cloak of the
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases becomes available only in instances
where preliminary proceedings have been initiated, or a case has already been filed or
any other incident pertaining thereto already had. As we succinctly stated in Binay
v. Sandiganbayan  -
[24]

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried (italics supplied).

It goes without saying therefore that the right to speedy disposition of cases is
unavailing in the absence of any proceedings conducted before, during, or after,
trial. Significantly, there is no precedent, for indeed there is none, to support the
novel conclusion that even after the dismissal of the cases, an accused may still
invoke the constitutional guarantee.
In the case before us, nothing was left to be done after the issuance of the 29
March 1999 Order of Judge Agnir dismissing all criminal charges against respondent
relative to the Kuratong Baleleng incident. During the hiatus following the dismissal of
the criminal charges, no formal proceeding remained outstanding. Not even court
processes were issued to restrain respondents liberty or subject him to any form of
public accusation; he was free to go about his affairs, to practice his profession, and to
continue on with his life. Respondent was legally and constitutionally in the same
posture as though no charges had been made. Hence, it was only at the time when he
was subjected to another pre-indictment investigation and accused anew that
respondent may invoke his right to speedy disposition of his cases. The delay after the
charges against him were dismissed, like any delay before those charges were filed,
should not be included in reckoning the time and determining whether he was denied
his right to a speedy disposition of his cases.
 The provisional nature of the dismissal of the original criminal cases is quite
immaterial. The fact that the cases were dismissed conditionally or without prejudice to
the subsequent filing of new cases, does not make the order of dismissal any less a
disposition of the cases. Although provisional, it nonetheless terminated all proceedings
against respondent such that there remained in the meantime no pending case which
the court could act upon and resolve, and which could be made the basis for the
application of the right to speedy disposition of respondent's cases.[25]

Clearly, we would be reinventing the wheel, so to speak, if we are to include within

the protective shield of the right to speedy disposition of cases the reinvestigation
and refiling of the provisionally dismissed cases. The matter
of reinvestigation and refiling of cases at some future time are not by themselves
pending incidents related to the dismissed cases; they are mere possibilities or
expectancies. The State has no definite decision yet on whether to really commence a
reinvestigation and refiling of the cases, and only indicates, at the most, a probable
action at some future time. Until such time that the State decided to exercise these
rights, they cannot ripen into a pending case, proceeding or incident for purposes of the
speedy disposition safeguard.
Certainly, the constitutional pledge mandates merely the swift resolution or
termination of a pending case or proceeding, and not the initiation or institution of a new
case or proceeding.It has no application to inexistent proceedings but only to those
currently being undertaken. Were we to hold otherwise, we would in effect be granting
to every accused an unbridled license to impose his will upon the State and demand
that he be immediately reinvestigated and a case filed against him. The determination of
whether to file or when to file a case lies within the sole discretion of the prosecution
depending upon the availability of his evidence and provided that it is filed within the
prescriptive period. As American Jurisprudence would hold -

It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from

fundamental conceptions of justice when they defer seeking indictments until they
have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional
conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause. It
should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as
probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the
suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To impose such a duty would have a
deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to
protect itself. From the perspective of potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to
commence when probable cause is established is undesirable because it would
increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed, and would add to the time
during which defendants stand accused but untried x x x x From the perspective of
law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable
cause is equally unacceptable because it could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources of information to
evaporate before they are fully exploited. And from the standpoint of the courts, such
a requirement is unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be consumed on
cases that prove to be insubstantial, or that involve only some of the responsible
parties or some of the criminal acts.[26]

To reiterate, respondents right to speedy disposition of his criminal cases attached

only at that precise moment the Department of Justice constituted a panel of
prosecutors and conducted a new preliminary investigation. Even then, the conduct of
the prosecutors cannot be assailed as violative of the speedy disposition guarantee. As
shown by the records, the government can hardly be accused of foot-dragging for, in
fact, they lost no time in commencing the new preliminary investigation and thereafter
filing the corresponding Informations in court upon the appearance of new witnesses
against respondent and his co-accused. The expeditious action of the government in
the instant case certainly cannot be viewed with suspicion.
In fairness to petitioners, they cannot be faulted in demonstrating alacrity in
performing their mandate, nor can they be castigated for the so-called unusual haste in
reopening the cases against respondent. No impure motive should be imputed to them
other than the fact that they regularly performed their duty in their apparent desire to
unravel the Kuratong Baleleng mystery.
For the petitioners, this is a classic case of damn-if-you-do-and-damn-if-you-dont
situation. Petitioners are being put to task for their alleged negligence and delay in
reviving the cases, but then again, they are also being pilloried for persecuting the
respondent because of the supposed unusual haste and uncharacteristic vigor in
pursuing the criminal cases against him and his co-accused.
For the reasons stated, I decline to extend to respondent the protection guaranteed
by Sec. 16. Plain common sense dictates that the provision cannot be applied to
situations not contemplated by it. Verily, we cannot expand the letter and spirit of the
provision and read into it a meaning that is not there.
This does not, of course, mean that respondent is utterly unprotected in this
regard. On the contrary, there are other constitutional and statutory mechanisms to
guard against possible and actual prejudice to the accused, resulting from the passage
of time. Primarily, the statute of limitations under Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code is
the principal safeguard against prosecuting overly stale criminal charges. The statute
represents legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in
administering and receiving justice; it protects not only the accused from prejudice to his
defense, but also balances his interest in repose against society's interest in the
apprehension and punishment of criminals.  This statute provides predictability by
[27]

specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrefutable presumption that the rights of an
accused to a fair trial would be prejudiced.[28]

The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to

a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has
decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect
individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may
have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official
punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the
salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate
suspected criminal activity.[29]

Moreover, the sweeping command of the Due Process Clause always protects

defendants against fundamentally unfair treatment by the government in criminal
proceedings.Procedural fairness required by due process decrees the dismissal of an
indictment if it be shown that delay caused substantial prejudice to the rights of an
accused to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical
advantage over the accused.
But even if we proceed on the assumption that respondent may rightfully invoke the
speedy disposition clause for the respondent, still I find that the circumstances of this
case fail to measure up to the criteria set forth under the Balancing Test.
In Caballero v. Alfonso  we adopted a four-factor Balancing Test to determine
[30]

whether an accused has been denied the constitutional right to speedy disposition of his
case, i.e., (a) length of the delay, (b) reason for the delay, (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it, and, (d) prejudice caused by the delay.
With these relevant factors, the otherwise abstract concept of speedy disposition of
cases is provided with at least a modicum of structure. The Balancing Test, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are considered, prescribes flexible
standards based on practical considerations. It necessarily compels courts to approach
speedy disposition cases on an ad hoc basis. No single factor in the Balancing Test is
definitive because all four (4) must be weighed against the others in determining
whether a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases occurred. In other words,
these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of
the accused, this process must be carried out in full recognition of the accuseds interest
in the speedy disposition of his case as specifically affirmed in the Constitution.
[31]

I proceed to consider the four (4) factors in the Balancing Test in seriatim. The
length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until it is shown that the delay
has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary delay from presumptively prejudicial delay,
there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.
 Considering the serious nature of the charges against respondent, and more
[32]

importantly, the criminal cases sought to be filed being deeply impressed with public
interest, involving as they do high ranking police officers, I am of the view that the
claimed two (2) years and three (3) months lag between the provisional dismissal of the
first criminal cases on 29 March 1999 and the filing of new Informations on 6 June 2001
sketches below the bare minimum needed to provoke such an inquiry. At any rate, I will
assume, without conceding, that it is sufficiently long for purposes of triggering a full
analysis under the three (3) remaining factors.
The banner the litigants seek to capture is the second factor - the reason the
government assigns to justify the delay. Here too, different weights should be assigned
to different reasons.For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily.
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate
delay.[33]

I find it hard to accept that in the criminal cases against respondent the government
is on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for
delaying the prosecution of respondent. It simplistically and unrealistically assumes that
the availability of witnesses Yu and Enad prior to 2001 renders the seeming lethargy of
the government unjustifiable. It completely disregards other considerations affecting the
decision of the government to stay its entire prosecutorial machinery.
The government may delay for a variety of reasons such as to gain time in which to
strengthen and document its case. The government may also delay, not with the view of
ensuring conviction of the accused, but because the government lacks sufficient
resources to move quickly. The species of governmental delay that are anathema to the
right to speedy disposition of cases are those which are purposely or negligently
employed to harm or gain impermissible advantage over the accused at the trial. The
reason is that, in such circumstance, the fair administration of justice is imperiled.
In the present recourse, there is nothing to demonstrate that the delay in reviving
the cases against respondent was deliberately availed of for an impermissible
purpose. It was not explained what improper tactical advantage was gained or sought
by the government; nor can I discern any such advantage from the records. To be sure,
if as claimed by respondent this whole mess is nothing more than a pure and simple
political vendetta, carried out by a poss bent on lynching him politically and personally -
which I am not inclined to acknowledge at this stage - the government could have
moved against respondent with deliberate haste, for delay is not exactly to its best
interest.
Neither can we safely conclude that the public prosecutors are guilty of negligent
omission. Insufficiency of evidence is a legitimate reason for delay. The government is
naturally not expected to go forward with the trial and incur costs unless it is convinced
it has an iron-clad case to make a worthwhile indictment. Verily, it needs time to gather
evidence, track down and collect witnesses, as well as document its case. As to how
much time it needs depends on such other factors as the availability of witnesses and
resources to enable it to move quickly. In U.S. v. Lovasco  it was held -
[34]

x x x x investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay under taken by the

Government solely to gain tactical advantage over the accused, precisely because
investigative delay is not so one-sided. Rather than deviating from elementary
standards of fair play and decency, a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek
indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able
to promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who
defer action for these reasons would subordinate the goal of orderly expedition to that
of mere speed.
 In no mean measure, the many constitutional and procedural safeguards provided
an accused can also present obstacles. It is doubly difficult in this particular case
considering the recantation and disappearance of all available vital witnesses for the
prosecution.
If we were to turn the tables against the respondent, we say that the unavailability of
the witnesses for the prosecution may be attributed to the conventional tendency of our
people never to antagonize the powerful and the influential. We are not insinuating that
respondent had a hand in the recantation or desistance of the complainants, or the non-
appearance or the shortage of witnesses for the prosecution; what we are simply saying
is that accusing an individual of respondent's stature naturally engenders fear of
physical harm, real or imagined, and can intimidate even the most stout-hearted and
temerarious individuals. This circumstance should have been given weight in resolving
the present controversy.
The third factor - the extent to which respondent has asserted his right to speedy
disposition of his case - further weakens his position. When and how a defendant
asserts his right should be given strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the
accused is being deprived of the right. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely
an accused is to complain. But the failure to invoke the right will make it difficult for an
accused to prove that he was denied thereof. [35]

I do not think that the vigor with which respondent defended himself in the original
cases against him, and the vigilance with which he assailed the filing of
the new Informations now subject of the instant petition, is the equivalent to an assertion
of his right to speedy disposition. The trouble with this observation is that every accused
in a criminal case has the intense desire to seek acquittal, or at least to see the swift
end of the accusation against him. To this end, it is natural for him to exert every effort
within his capacity to resist prosecution. But is it correct to assume that, in every
instance, the accused in resisting his criminal prosecution is also asserting his right to
speedy disposition?
Respondents reliance on Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which some have said is based on the constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases, cannot be equated with a positive assertion of the right to speedy
disposition. A perusal of the records would reveal that the issue of applicability of Sec.
8, Rule 117, was raised by respondent for the first time before the Court of Appeals, in
his Second Amended Petition - undoubtedly a mere afterthought. It was not his original
position before the trial court, which centered on the lack of valid complaints to justify a
preliminary investigation of cases which had long been dismissed. It was not even his
initial position in the early stages of the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Within
the context of the Balancing Test, respondents tardy, inexplicit and vague invocation of
this right makes it seriously difficult for him to prove the denial thereof.
Finally, the fourth factor is prejudice to the accused. Prejudice, of course, should be
assessed in the light of the interests of accused which the speedy disposition right as
well as the speedy trial right are designed to protect. There are three (3) of such
interests: (a) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (b) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and, (c) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
  Of the three (3), the most significant is the last because the inability of the defendant
[36]

to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. [37]

Needless to say, respondent was never arrested or taken into custody, or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in any manner. These render the first criterion inapplicable. Thus,
the only conceivable harm to respondent from the lapse of time may arise from anxiety
and the potential prejudice to his ability to defend his case. Even then, the harm
suffered by respondent occasioned by the filing of the criminal cases against him is too
minimal and insubstantial to tip the scales in his favor.
Concededly, anxiety typically accompanies a criminal charge. But not every claim of
anxiety affords the accused a ground to decry a violation of the rights to speedy
disposition of cases and to speedy trial. The anxiety must be of such nature and degree
that it becomes oppressive, unnecessary and notoriously disproportionate to the nature
of the criminal charge. To illustrate, a prosecution for the serious crime of multiple
murder naturally generates greater degree of anxiety, than an indictment for, say,
simple estafa. The anxiety and the tarnished reputation and image of respondent who
is, after all, presently and newly elected member of the Senate, does not amount to that
degree that would justify a nullification of the the appropriate and regular steps that
must be taken to assure that while the innocent should go unpunished, those guilty
must expiate for their offense. Verily, they pale in importance to the gravity of the
charges and the paramount considerations of seeking justice for the victims as well as
redeeming the sullied integrity and reputation of the Philippine National Police for their
alleged involvement in the perpetration of the ghastly crimes.
We cannot therefore hold, on the facts before us, that the delay in the
reinvestigation and refiling of the criminal cases weighed sufficiently in support of the
view that respondents right to speedy disposition of his cases has been violated. The
delay simply does not justify the severe remedy of dismissing the indictments.
Consistent with the views expressed above, I hold that no constitutional, statutory
and procedural impediments exist against the subsequent re-indictment of
respondent. Although we are dealing here with alleged members of the
notorious Kuratong Baleleng Gang, against whom society must be protected, we must
bear in mind that they too were human beings with human rights. Indeed, life is so
precious that its loss cannot simply be consigned to oblivion in so short a time. Withal,
the seriousness of the accusations against respondent and other high-ranking officers
of the PNP goes into the very foundation of our law enforcement institutions. We must
ferret out the truth: Is the Philippine National Police so contaminated to the core with
corrupt and murderous police officers, worse than the criminal elements they are trained
to exterminate? Let us give the courts a chance to find out - and more importantly - to
absolve respondent and erase any taint in his name, if innocent. Injustice anywhere is a
threat to justice everywhere.
I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration.
[1]
 Giuseppe Mazzini, Byron and Goethe.
[2]
 P/C Supts. Jewel F. Canson, herein respondent Panfilo Lacson, and Romeo Acop, P/Sr. Supt.
Francisco Subia, Romulo Sales, Supts. Almario Hilario, Luizo Ticman, Zozorabel Laureles, P/C
Insps. Michael Ray Aquino, Gil Meneses, Cesar Mancao, Jose Erwin Villacorte, P/Sr. Insps.
Rolando Anduyan, Glenn Dumlao, Sotero Ramos, P/Insp. Ricardo Dandan, SPO4 Vicente
Arnado, SPO1 Wilfredo Cuantero and SPO1 Wilfredo Angeles.
[3]
 See Annex A of the Petition.
[4]
 Order dated 5 June 2001.
[5]
 Decision penned by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., concurred in by Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., Hilarion L. Aquino, and Josefina Guevara-Salonga. Associate Justice
Buenaventura J. Guerrero, dissenting.
[6]
 Art. VIII, 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights x x x x
[7]
 TSN, 19 February 2002, pp. 292-293; see also, Minutes of the Revision Committee Meetings, 11
October 1999, 2:30 pm; id., 8 November 1999, 2:00 pm.
[8]
 See also Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV, 2001 Ed., at 660.
[9]
 Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 209 (1932).
[10]
 See Respondents Memorandum, at pp. 49-53.
[11]
 195 US 100.
[12]
 One of the earliest declarations by this Court on the matter is enshrined in Republic v. Agoncillo (L-
27257, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 579.) where Chief Justice Fernando, then an Associate Justice
of the Court, articulated the doctrine that the institution of a case after having been dismissed
without prejudice cannot be the basis of the claim of twice being put in jeopardy. Citing the case
of Jaca v. Blanco (86 Phil. 452 [1950]) Agoncillo unequivocally pointed out that "x x x (I)n the
absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, we find no reason why the court may not, in
the interest of justice, dismiss a case provisionally, i.e., without prejudice to reinstating it before
the order becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the same
offense." Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco (G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994,
234 SCRA 455) made the clarification that a dismissal of a case, even if made without prejudice,
and the lapse of the reglementary period within which to set aside the dismissal operates to
remove the case from the Court's docket; in which event, the case can no longer be reinstated by
mere motion in the original docket action, but only by the filing of a new complaint. This ruling was
reiterated in Banares II v. Balising (G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA 36) which
declared that since a final order of dismissal is beyond the power of the court to modify or alter, a
party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other option but to file a new complaint.
[13]
 The following executed affidavits of desistance: Myrna Abalora, mother of victims Sherwin Abalora and
Rey Abalora; Rufino Siplon, father of victim Rolando Siplon; Carmelita Elcamel, wife of victim
Wilbur Elcamel; Leonora Soronda Amora, mother of victim Joel Soronda Amora; Nenita Alap-ap,
wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap; Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero; and Margarita
Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas
[14]
 Namely, Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri.
[15]
 De Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, 1999 Ed., at p. 877.
[16]
 Caballero v. Alfonso, G.R. No. L-45647, 21 August 1987, 153 SCRA 153.
[17]
 See Abadia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105597, 23 September 1994, 236 SCRA 676.
[18]
 Decision, at p. 14
[19]
 G.R. Nos. 72335-39, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 70.
[20]
 G.R. No. 130191, 27 April 1998, 289 SCRA 725.
[21]
 G.R. Nos. 120681-83, 1 October 1999, 316 SCRA 65.
[22]
 G.R. No. 126814, 2 March 2000, 327 SCRA 145.
[23]
 G.R. No. 108595, 18 May 1999, 302 SCRA 149.
[24]
 Supra.
[25]
 See also Baares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA 36, citing Olympia
International v. Court of Appeals, No. L-43236, 20 December 1989, 180 SCRA 353, 361, wherein
we held "that dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that the
dismissal order was any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though
without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory
order but a final disposition of the complaint." And in Ortigas & Company, Ltd. v. Velasco, G.R.
No. 109645, 25 July 1995, 234 SCRA 455, 486, "the dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the
reglementary period to reconsider and set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the
case from the Court's docket." These doctrinal principles may be applied to provisional dismissals
in criminal cases.
[26]
 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 (1977).
[27]
 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
[28]
 Ibid.
[29]
 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970).
[30]
 Supra. See also Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, 1 October 1999; Dansal v. Fernandez,
G.R. No. 126814, 2 March 2000, 327 SCRA 145; and, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
116259-60, 253 SCRA 773. In all these cases, the Court applied the four factors in the Balancing
Test for purposes of determining whether the accused was deprived of his right to speedy
disposition of cases.
[31]
 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
[32]
 Ibid.
[33]
 Ibid.
[34]
 See Note 28.
[35]
 Ibid.
[36]
 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
[37]
 Barker v. Wingo, supra.
  
 
THIRD DIVISION
 
 
LADISLAO SALMA and MARILOU   G.R. No. 168362
SALMA,
 
Petitioners,  
  Present:
- versus -  
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
  Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
THE HON. PRIMO C. MIRO,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN CALLEJO, SR., and
(VISAYAS), BRGY. CAPT.
ROLANDO MARTINEZ, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
BARANGAY TANODS NAMELY;
CRISENTE ZERNA, BALTAZAR  
CUMCOM, MONTAO TORRES,
ELDIN MIRAFLOR, NOEL  
TORRES, FRANCISCO CASTRO,
BENITO BAROT, RAFAEL  
RODRIGUEZ, KASAMA
 
BUENAVENTURA, WILLIAM
DAYAO, RICO PIERO,  
JOSEPHINE CORNELIO and
GINA SALMA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
 

January 25, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 

DECISION
 

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking

to reverse and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion,
the Review on Joint Resolution[1] dated 15 October 2004 and the Order[2] dated 29
March 2005, issued by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Allan
Francisco S. Garciano, and approved by Deputy Ombudsman Primo C. Miro,
dismissing the cases against Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez (Martinez), et al.
 
The factual and procedural antecedents of this instant petition are as
follows:
 

On 15 July 2003, Gina Salma (Gina) went to the residence of Martinez to report

the harassment committed by her brother-in-
law Ladislao Salma (Ladislao). Ladislao, the brother of Ginas late husband, was
claiming an exclusive right over a property located
at Brgy. 3, Tanjay, Negros Occidental, wherein the house and the hollow blocks
making business of Gina were situated.[3]
 
 The aforesaid property was commonly owned by the Salmas although in the
possession of Gina and her late husband. After her husbands demise, Ladislao was
very adamant in regaining the possession of the entire property insisting that Gina
had no more right to remain therein.
 
At the time Gina brought to the attention of Martinez the alleged
harassment, Ladislao was fencing the perimeter of the subject property thereby
blocking access to the river, which was indispensable in hollow blocks making,
thereby causing tremendous loss to Ginas business. Aside from physically blocking
the vital thoroughfare, Ladislao, in one instance, allegedly threatened the laborers
and prevented them from entering the premises to perform their duties, thus,
completely paralyzing Ginas business.
 
Upon hearing the complaint, Martinez advised Gina to go home and wait for
the summons for he intended to call Ladislao to a conference in order to settle the
brewing dispute amicably, if possible.[4]
 
In the early morning of the following day, Martinez was awakened by Ginas report
that she was once again harassed by Ladislao that same morning by shouting at the
gate of her house and demanding her to vacate the disputed property.
 
Gina related that at around 6 a.m. of that day, Ladislao went back in the same
violent mood and in fierce and aggressive manner demanded her to leave her
house. At that moment, Ladislao, who was in the fit of anger, was determined to
use any means possible just to drive Gina off from the disputed property. At the
outset, Ladislao allegedly used verbal threats against Gina by yelling and
intimidating her to leave. Not contented, Ladislao even employed effective
material control over the subject property by tying with a wire the gate adjoining
the fence he himself built a few days ago around the lot, forcing Gina to take
another route just to get out from the premises.
 
While Ladislao was absorbed by his temper at the front of her house, Gina lost no
time in reporting to Martinez what was happening. Accompanied by her sister,
Josephine Cornelio, Gina went back to the Martinezs residence and narrated to him
the entire incident.[5]
Sensing the urgency of the situation, Martinez agreed to go with Gina to her
house, and so he convened his Barangay Tanods,
namely: Crisente Zerna, Baltazar Concom, Montao Torres, Eldin Miraflor, Noel
Torres, Francisco Castro, Benito Barot, and Rafael Rodgriguez, then proceeded to
the location where the alleged harassment took place to verify the report and
mediate between the disputing parties.[6]
 
Upon their arrival at the vicinity, the gate adjoining the fence surrounding
the entire lot was already tied with a wire but Ladislao was nowhere to be
found. Wanting to promptly settle the matter, Martinez requested Alejandro Salma,
another brother of Ladislao, who was then present, to summon and
inform Ladislao of their presence in the area.Shortly, Ladislao, who was still in an
infuriated mood, appeared.
 
To ease the growing tension, Martinez politely
greeted Ladislao, mayong buntag Lad (good morning Lad), and in a diplomatic
manner asked, di-a
mi arong pag klaroaning report sa imong bayaw nga si Gina nga imo kunong gi-
alaran ang alagi-an nila ug sa iyang mga kustomer diin naapektuhan iyang negosy
o, ug imo pa kuno gihulga angiyang trabahante, ug unya imo gyud syang gisulong 
karon lang, unsa man ni katinu-od? (we are here to verify the truth on Ginas
complaint that you allegedly fenced her house which blocked her and her
customers passage and, on one instance, mauled her laborer which affected her
business, and then again harassed her at her residence this morning).Instead of
justifying his actions, Ladislao explicitly admitted the allegations and even
retorted, ngano man diay sulongon nako si Gina? Wala moy labot kay walay maka
bo-ot saakong gustong buhaton! Wala moy labot Noy, kay ako ning property,
(What if I will harass Gina? What if I will fence my property? This is mine and I
will certainly do whatever pleases me and its none of your business
anymore). These arrogant utterances were allegedly made by Ladislao while
pointing his finger at the the Barangay Captain and pushing him away.[7]
 
The contemptuous behavior displayed by Ladislao prompted Martinez to arrest
him for direct assault committed against his authority as a Barangay Captain who
was on the occasion of performing his official duties. He then
requested Ladislao to go with them at the police station but the latter swiftly
moved to elude arrest and quickly ran away from Martinez and
the tanods. Overpowered by the strength and number of the tanods, Ladislao was
finally cornered, after which, he was handcuffed and brought to the police station
to answer the charges against him.[8]
In the process of effecting his arrest, Ladislao and his wife Marilou Salma, who
tried to help him evade the barangay authorities, suffered slight physical injuries
as evidenced by medical reports.[9] Spouses Ladislao and Marilou Salma later cried
they were victims of manhandling and police brutality alleging that the force
employed by Martinez and the Barangay Tanods was considerably excessive and
uncalled for by the circumstances.[10]
 
Consequently, Ladislao was charged with the crimes of Direct Assault, Resistance
to a Person in Authority or his Agents, and Coercion docketed as I.S. No. 03-152
entitled, Chief of Police v. Ladislao Salma.[11]
  
On the other hand, spouses Ladislao and Marilou Salma filed six counter
charges against Martinez and
the Barangay Tanods namely Crisente Zerna, Baltazar Concom, Montao Torres, El
din Miraflor, Noel Torres, Francisco Castro, Benito Barot, and Rafael Rodriguez,
before the City Prosecution Office of Tanjay City and docketed as follows: I.S. No.
03-156, For: Slight Physical Injuries, Marilou Salma v. Crisente Zerna, I.S. No. 03-
157, For: Grave
Threats, Ladislao Salma v. Crisente Zerna and Baltazar Concom, I.S. No. 03-158,
For: Slander by Deed, Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente
Zerna et al., I.S. No. 03-159, For: Grave Coercion, Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt.
Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna et al., I.S. No. 03-160, For: Arbitrary
Detention, Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna et
al., and I.S. No. 03-161, For: Unlawful Arrest, Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt.
Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna, et al.[12]
 
On 12 July 2004, the City Prosecutor of Tanjay City issued a Joint
Resolution[13] dismissing the charges filed by the spouses Salma against
the barangay officials, for want of sufficient evidence to establish a probable
cause that the offenses charged were indeed committed. The dispositive portion
of the Resolution reads:
 
ACCORDINGLY, and for reasons already cited, I.S. Nos. 03-156, 03-157, 03-158,
03-159, 03-160, 03-161 and 03-162 are hereby ordered dismiss (sic). [14]

However, the criminal complaint against Ladislao was ordered filed,

it having been established that respondent Ladislao committed the acts as
charged and is probably guilty thereof.[15] The dispositive portion of the Joint
Resolution reads:
 
 ACCORDINGLY, let two separate informations for the offense defined in
Article 148 and Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code
against Ladislao Maglucot Salma be filed before the proper court.[16]
 

Aggrieved, the spouses Salma elevated the matter to the Office of the Regional

State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, through an Appeal and/or Petition
for Review[17]they filed on 5 August 2004, seeking the reversal of the Resolution
dated 12 July 2004 issued by the City Prosecutor on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
 

Since the respondents in the criminal complaints instituted by the

spouses Salma are public officials, who allegedly committed the offenses charged
while in performance of their official duties, the Regional State Prosecutor
indorsed the resolution of I.S. Case Nos. 03-156, 03-157, 03-158, 03-159, 03-160,
and 03-161 for the proper cognizance by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
 
On the other hand, since Ladislao was a private individual, the jurisdiction for the
review of the Resolution approving the filing of Criminal Informations against him
for the crimes of Direct Assault, Resistance to a Person in Authority or his Agents
and Coercion was retained by the Regional State Prosecutor.
 
In a Resolution[18] dated 28 September 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor
ordered the City Prosecutor of Tanjay to move for the withdrawal of the
Criminal Informations filed against Ladislao on the ground that there is no
probable cause to believe that respondent committed or is guilty of the offenses
charged. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
 
Wherefore, the City Prosecutor of Tanjay is directed to move for the withdrawal
of the informations filed in court and to inform this Office of the action taken hereon
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. [19]
  

For its part, the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) resolved the appeal brought
before its jurisdiction by approving the dismissal of the complaints filed by the
spouses Salma against respondent barangay officials.[20] The decretal portion of
the Resolution reads:
 
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Joint Resolution dated July 12,
2004 issued by the City Prosecutor Elson P. Bustamante of the Tanjay City Prosecution
Office, ordering the dismissal of criminal cases filed against herein respondents
docketed as I.S. Case Nos. 03-156, 03-157, 03-158, 03-159, 03-160, and 03-161,
respectively, is hereby APPROVED.[21]

Similarly ill-fated was the spouses Salmas Motion for Reconsideration of the

foregoing resolution which was denied by the Ombudsman in an Order dated 29
March 2005 for lack of merit.[22]
 
Unyielding, the spouses Salma filed this instant Petition for Certiorari[23] advancing
the argument that Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Primo C. Miro, committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving the dismissal of cases filed against respondent barangay officials.
 
For our resolution then is the following issue:
 
WHETHER OR NOT DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, PRIMO C. MIRO COMMITTED A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
APPROVING THE DISMISSAL OF CASES FILED AGAINST MARTINEZ AND THE
BRGY. TANODS.

 
 

We rule in the negative.

 
In the eight-paged Petition[24] filed by petitioner spouses, which was
reproduced in toto in their Memorandum,[25] they generally averred that grave
abuse of discretion attended the approval of the dismissal of their complaints
against the barangay officials, but miserably failed to substantiate the
allegation. Petitioner spouses availed themselves of an extraordinary remedy
allowed under the Rules by filing this Special Civil Action for Certiorari, under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court but the allegations advanced by the petitioner
spouses were empty of any material argument to prove their recantation that the
Deputy Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion.
 
Even if the instant petition is essentially bare in substance, this Court will
nonetheless comb the records and address the issue scantily laid by the
spouses Salma and apply the pertinent legal and jurisprudential principles to
resolve this case.
 
In order to avail of the Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, petitioner in such cases must clearly show that public
respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction.[26]
 
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[27]
 
In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricous,
arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.
 
Applying the above-laid parameters in the case at bar, we must look into the
Resolution dated 15 October 2004 and the Order dated 29 March 2005 issued by
the Ombudsman and determine whether there is a substantial evidence to
support its conclusions in order to take it out from the ambit of grave abuse of
discretion as defined above.
 
In the disputed Resolution, the Ombudsman found that there is no
probable cause to engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged against
the barangay officials were indeed committed and that they were probably guilty
thereof.
 
It particularly cited that the acts of Ladislao in pointing his finger
at Martinez and pushing him away, thus, causing him to step backwards, could be
taken as an assault against a person in authority. Accordingly, the arrest without
warrant of Ladislao by the barangay officials was proper.
 
Significantly, the rule on presumption of regularity in the performance of official
function aptly applies in this case. Under the Rules of Evidence, it is presumed
that official duty has been regularly performed, unless contradicted.
[28]
 Consequently, if in the act of effecting lawful arrest upon Ladislao, the latter
was ridiculed or even injured, the same was not intentional but merely an
incidental consequence considering that he offered initial resistance against the
arresting barangay compelling the latter to use reasonable force. The same is true
with the other acts committed by the barangay officials by reason or on the
occasion of effecting the lawful arrest. The said acts were but the necessary and
incidental repercussions of the performance of the official duties by the
respondents.
Finally, in the exercise of its discretion, the Ombudsman affirmed the findings of
the Graft and Investigation Officer that, as correctly ruled by the City Prosecutor,
there is no probable cause in filing the criminal charges against
the barangay officials, and made a pronouncement that, while probable cause
need not be an actual certainty, it is regretted that, based on reasonable belief,
the same does not exist in the present cases.
 
Upon close scrunity of the foregoing Resolution, we find nothing whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious in the above findings. The determination of the Deputy
Ombudsman of the non-existence of a reasonable ground to believe that the
crime has been committed, is supported by substantial evidence and therefore it
cannot be gainsaid that the same is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
 
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists a reasonable
ground to believe that the crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and thereafter file the corresponding informations before
the appropriate courts.[29] The authority granted to government prosecutors, like
the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman in the instant case, to file criminal
charges does not preclude them from refusing to file the information when they
believe that there is no prima facie evidence to do so.
 
In Salvador v. Desierto,[30] we ruled:
 
On the issue of whether respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the complaint against respondents, let it be stressed that the
Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and
circumstances should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint
forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form [and] substance or he may proceed
with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and
substance.

 
Thus, saved on well-recognized exceptions,[31] this Court has almost adopted quite
aptly, a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsmans
constitutionally mandated powers.[32]
 
In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,[33] we held:
 
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the
Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judiciary
intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its
powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who,
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the
integrity of public service.

The non-interference rule that we rigorously observed is based, not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution
to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts will be extremely swamped if they were compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals and prosecuting attorneys, each time
they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.[34]
 
We have carefully examined the records, and we find no compelling reason to
deviate from the time-honored policy of non-interference. The Resolution of the
Ombudsman was supported by substantial evidence giving us no cogent reason to
depart from his findings. As significantly observed by the Ombudsman:
 
 The acts of complainant Ladislao Salma in laying a hand on the
respondent Barangay Captain could be taken as an assault against a person in
authority. The apprehension of complainant Ladislao Salma was but the natural reaction
of the respondent Barangay Tanods who personally witnessed the pushing incident,
especially that the complainant fled when asked to go with them to the Tanjay Police
Station for proper booking and disposition.[35]

On the other hand, the spouses Salma utterly failed to single out a particular act
indicating abuse of discretion other than the fleeting allegation that respondent
Ombudsman has committed such.
 
In sum, this Court has maintained a stature of non-interference from the
discretion of the Ombudsman provided there is no grave abuse of
discretion. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion as in the case at
bar, we are constrained to uphold the findings of the Ombudsman.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. Costs
against the petitioners.
 
SO ORDERED.

 
 

  MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

 
 

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
  

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1]
 Issued by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Allan Francisco S. Garciano, with the recommending
approval of the Director of the Evaluation and Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) Edgardo G. Canton and the approval of Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Primo
C. Miro. Rollo, pp. 10-22.
[2]
 Id. at 27-32.
[3]
 Records, pp. 22-23.
[4]
 Id.
[5]
 Id.
[6]
 Id. at 20-21.
[7]
 Id.
[8]
 Id.
[9]
 Id. at 30-31.
[10]
 Id. at 24-25.
[11]
 Id.
[12]
 Id. at 13-19.
[13]
 Id. at 8-12.
[14]
 Id.
[15]
 Id.
[16]
 Id.
[17]
 Id. at 2-7.
[18]
 Id. at 68-70.
[19]
 Id.; The records do not indicate the action taken by the City Prosecutor of Tanjay after the Resolution dated 24
September 2004 was issued.
[20]
 Rollo, pp. 10-22.
[21]
 Id.
[22]
 Id. at 29-34.
[23]
 Id. at 4-9.
[24]
 Id.
[25]
 Id. at 128-134.
[26]
 People v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 169, 180 (1999).
[27]
 Id.
[28]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3. Disputable Presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed.
[29]
 Esquivel v. Ombudsman, 437 Phil. 702, 711 (2002).
[30]
 Salvador v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135249, 16 January 2004, 420 SCRA 76, 82.
[31]
 (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice; (c) When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (d) When the acts of
the officer is without or in excess of authority; (e) When the prosecution is under an invalid law; (f) When
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it
is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated
by the lust for vengeance; (j) Where there is no prima facie case against the accused and the motion to
quash on that ground has been denied; and (k) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme
Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners, Brocka v. Enrile, G.R. Nos. 69863-65, 10
December 1990, 192 SCRA 183, 188-189.
[32]
 Nava v. Commission on Audit, 419 Phil. 544, 553 (2001).
[33]
 397 Phil. 829, 831(2000).
[34]
 Supra note 32 at 271.
[35]
 Rollo, p. 19.

 
 
 
 THIRD DIVISION
 
 
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO,   G.R. No. 184315

Petitioner,  
 
  Present:
- versus -
  CORONA, J.,
 
Chairperson,
THE MANILA CHRONICLE
CHICO-NAZARIO,
PUBLISHING CORPORATION,
ROBERTO COYIUTO, JR., NOEL VELASCO, JR.,
CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, NACHURA, and
DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. PERALTA, JJ.
DIOLA, RAUL VALINO and THELMA
SAN JUAN,  

Respondents.  

Promulgated:

November 25, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
 

 
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous

articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being
qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice
from attaching in a defamatory imputation.
 
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Amended
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 dated 28 August
2008. The Amended Decision reversed on Motion for Reconsideration the 18
March 2008 Decision[2] of the same court, which in turn affirmed in toto the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case No. 94-1114
dated 8 November 2002 finding herein respondents liable for damages.
 
The facts of the case, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
 
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of
1994, Chronicle Publishing Corporation (Chronicle Publishing for brevity) published in
the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject
articles (November 10 and 12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a Marcos crony or a
Marcos-Romualdez crony, which term according to him is commonly used and
understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who was a recipient of special
and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-
in-law Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either
or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable
business activities.

The plaintiff claims that the said articles further branded him as a mere front or
dummy for the Marcos and Romualdez clans in Benguet Corporation, which company
sought to take-over the management of Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation
(Oriental for brevity). He contends that such an imputation is untrue since his holdings
in Benguet Corporation were legally acquired by him.

Also, he was likewise accused of unsound and immoral business practices by

insinuating that he wanted to take control of Oriental in order to divert its resources to
rescue the debt-ridden Benguet Corporation. He claims that the accusation is untrue
since he was merely interested in being represented in the board thereof so as to
protect his and his companies interest therein as shareholders.

The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the
failure of Benguet Corporation and that if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it
would suffer the same fate as the former. According to him, at the time he assumed
chairmanship of Benguet Corporation, it was already experiencing financial downturns
caused by plummeting world prices of gold and unprofitable investments it ventured
into.

Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as being an unfair and uncaring
employer when the employees of Grepalife Corporation, of which he is the Chairman,
staged a strike, when the truth being that he had nothing to do with it. And that if his
group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor problems as in Grepalife.

Furthermore, the subject articles accused him of inducing Rizal Commercial

Banking Corporation (RCBC for brevity) to violate the provisions of the General Banking
Act on DOSRI loans. He denies the imputations believing that there is nothing irregular
in the RCBC-Piedras transaction for the acquisition of shares of Oriental.

Also, the plaintiff claims that the subject articles insinuated that he induced
others to disobey lawful orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC for
brevity) when the truth is that the officials of RCBC and Alcorn never defied any SEC
order, and that if ever they did, he never induced them to do so.

Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the subject articles imputed to him the
derogatory tag of corporate raider, implying that he was seeking to profit for something
he did not work for. He denies the imputation since he acquired his stake in Oriental for
adequate and valuable consideration at the time when no one was willing to bailout the
government from its difficult and losing position thereto.

In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject articles
were not defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only
after having ascertained their contents. In any event, they claim that these articles are
privileged and/or constitute reasonable and balance[d] comments on matters of
legitimate public interest which cannot serve as basis for the finding of libel against
them. They likewise alleged that they were acting within the bounds of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.

Furthermore, they contend that since plaintiff is a public figure, and assuming
that the articles were indeed defamatory, they cannot be held liable for damages since
they were not impelled by actual malice in the composition thereof. They did not
compose and/or publish said articles with the knowledge that they contained
falsehoods, or with reckless disregard on whether or not they contained falsehood.

As to defendant Coyiuto, he claims that he had no participation in the

publication of the subject articles nor consented or approved their publication.

PLAINTIFFS EVIDENCE

During the trial, the plaintiff himself, ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, testified that
prior to his appointment as Ambassador to Japan, he was the chairman of various
business organizations notably: Benguet Corporation (Benguet), Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), Bank of
America Savings Bank, House of Investments, Inc., Dole Philippines and Philippine Fuji
Xerox Corporation. He was also the President of the Philippine Ambassadors; chairman
or vice president of Bantayog ng Bayan; and chairman of AY Foundation, Inc. He was
appointed Philippine Ambassador to Peoples Republic of China after the EDSA
Revolution.

As regards the article referring to the November 10, 1993 issue of the Manila

Chronicle (Exh. A), he stated that he had never been a Marcos crony nor had been a
business partner of the Romualdezes or had personal dealings with them; that during
the shareholders meeting, the two (2) sons of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez were elected
as directors of Benguet Corporation pursuant to a Court order; that he had no personal
dealings with them; that he had no intention of taking over Oriental and that Benguet
Corporation did not lose the amount as stated in the article; that Benguet Corporation
experienced liquidity problems, and that before he joined the corporation, it had
already diversified into many other financial ventures; that he denied having any
business partnership with the Romualdezes at that time.

Regarding the November 12, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. B), he

denied having any partnership with the Marcos family; that he denied responsibility for
the losses incurred by Benguet Corporation, as the losses were due to the drop of the
commodity market, and for having diversified into other non-profitable ventures; that
he had no intention whatsoever of taking over Oriental; that although the Yuchengco
family owns a substantial block of shares of RCBC, Sanwa Bank actually owns twenty-five
percent (25%) thereof; that RCBC did not finance his fund but it extended a loan to
Piedras Petroleum, a subsidiary of the Presidential Commission of Good Government
(PCGG for brevity); admitted that Traders Royal Bank also granted a loan to PCGG but
such was an independent transaction of RCBC.

About the November 15, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. C), he denied
any knowledge of what transpired at the Trust Department of RCBC because as
Chairman he was not involved in many of the banks transactions.

Referring to November 16, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. D), he

considered the attacks against him to be malicious considering that he does not see any
connection between the labor strike at Grepalife with the case of Alcorn and RCBC; that
the article would like to show that he was the reason for the huge losses incurred by
Benguet Corporation.

As regards the November 22, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. E), he

denied giving any interest free loan, the fact that they gave a loan to PCGG does not
mean that they gave a loan to Benedicto since the latter had already turned over the
shares of Piedras to PCGG at that time.

 
 Regarding the November 23, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. F), he
denied extending an interest free loan considering that he is not the only owner of
RCBC; that these series of attacks against him and RCBC were intended to cause a bank
run; that the article imputes that he was responsible for giving an interest free loan.

About the December 5, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. G), he said the
article was intended to humiliate and embarrass him since he really had no intention of
taking over Oriental; that the reason for the attack against his person was because he
and defendant Coyiuto, Jr. were both rivals in the insurance business and that the latter
has always been envious of his position for having owned Malayan Insurance Company.

On cross-examination, plaintiff Yuchengco testified that he does not consider

himself a public figure; and that he felt maligned by the references to him as a Marcos
crony. [TSN, 07 February 1997; 10 February 1997; 12 February 1997]

ROSAURO ZARAGOZA testified that he is the Executive Vice-President of RCBC;

that the statement in Exhibits D, E and F with regard to the interest free loan allegedly
granted to Piedras Petroleum Company, Inc. (Piedras) are false because the Piedras deal
was a trust transaction which involved an advance in exchange for shares of stock; that
plaintiff Yuchengco did not have a personal interest in the Piedras deal; that Piedras or
Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation (Oriental Petroleum) shares were not
transferred to plaintiff Yuchengcos name by virtue of the transaction; and that the
defendants did not approach him or RCBC to check the veracity of the subject
articles. The affidavit of Mr. Zaragoza (Exhibit H) was adopted as part of his testimony.

On cross-examination, Mr. Zaragoza testified that he volunteered to testify in

the instant case because he was the most knowledgeable about the Piedras deal; that
plaintiff Yuchengco was aggrieved upon reading the subject articles; that under the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between RCBC and Piedras, should the latter fail to
comply with its obligations under the MOA, it will pay interest at the prevailing market
interest rate from the date of advance until full payment; and that there was a
complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas against RCBC by Mr. Felipe Remollo
questioning the Piedras deal. [TSN 28 February 1997; 26 June 1997; 27 June 1997; 04
July 1997]

 
 JOSE REVILLA testified that he and Amb. Yuchengco were long time friends,
where he (Revilla) worked for him (Yuchengco) for thirty-two (32) years in his
(Yuchengco) credit card company Industrial Finance Corporation Credit Cards; that
knowing Amb. Yuchengco for a considerable period of time, he does not believe the
truth of the contents of the subject articles; that plaintiff Yuchengco appeared
distressed when he joked about the subject articles; that other people approached him
to ask whether the subject articles are true [TSN 25 August 1997].

xxxx

DEFENDANTS EVIDENCE

On the other hand, defendants Zaragoza, Gatdula, Cabrera and Valino

substantially testified on the following matters:

GERRY ZARAGOZA testified that he was the Managing Editor of Manila Chronicle
in charge of the national and political news; that defendant San Juan was the other
Managing Editor in charge of the lifestyle section; that a story conference is conducted
everyday where the articles, including the pages where they will appear, are discussed;
that the editor-in-chief (defendant Cruz), executive editor (defendant Tolentino) and
deputy editor (defendant Cabrera) were the ones responsible for the decisions of the
story conference relative to the printing of the newspaper; that he was not involved in
the writing and editing of the subject articles; that Exhibits A to D are classified as
business news; that columns, specifically Exhibits E and F are not discussed during story
conferences; and that Exhibit G, which appeared in the Money Section did not pass thru
him.

On cross-examination, defendant Zaragoza testified that except for the columns,

Exhibits A to D and Exhibit G are considered hard news; that he handled the hard news,
while defendant San Juan handled the soft news; and that defendant Valino was the
business editor in charge of the business section (TSN 22 July 1998; 23 September 1998]
  

DONNABELLE GATDULA claimed that she was a correspondent for Manila

Chronicle assigned to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) beat; that she had
no participation in the writing or publication of Exhibits A to C and G to E; that she
attended the hearing conducted by the SEC and interviewed the two lawyers of RCBC
and SEC Chairman Rosario Lopez regarding the Oriental Petroleum case; that her name
appears as a tag line in Exhibit D, because she only wrote part of the story; and that she
did not write the entire article (Exhibit D) as some of the statements therein were added
by the editor/s; and that she did not discuss Exhibit D with any of the editors.

On cross-examination, defendant Gatdula testified that she does not have a

copy of the original article which she wrote; that she read Exhibit D after it was
published; that she did not compare her original story with Exhibit D nor question the
authority of the editor to edit her story; and that she agreed to put her name on Exhibit
D. (TSN 23 September 1998; 05 October 1998).

NOEL CABRERA contended that after having gone through the subject articles,
he believes that the news stories and commentaries were fair and that those who wrote
the same followed the proper standards; that as regard the contents of Exhibits E and F,
the opinion of Mr. Raul Valino, as written in the said articles, were valid and based on
documentary facts; as to Exhibit D, pertaining to the article of Ms. Donnabelle Gatdula,
she based her article on documents pertaining to the Oriental transaction, other
documents, as well as interviews; that at the time the subject articles were written,
Amb. Yuchengco was a public figure, being a very prominent businessman with vast
interest in banks and other businesses; that during the year 1993, the word crony was
more or less accepted to mean as a big businessman or close associate of the late
President Marcos, and its use in the column was meant only to supply the perspective as
to the figure or subject involved in the news story, and there is thus no malice or
derogatory intent when the same was used.

On cross-examination, defendant Cabrera testified that defendant Coyiuto is

one of the owners of Manila Chronicle; and that he only saw the records of Exhibits 8 to
10 and 16 to 20 after the publication of Exhibits A to G (TSN 21 April 1999; 28 April 1999
05 May 1999; 10 May 1999).

 
 RAUL VALINO stated that he was the Acting Business Manager and later
Managing Editor and Business Editor-in-Chief of Manila Chronicle; that after having
consulted several dictionaries as to the meaning of the word crony, he did not come
across a definition describing the word to mean someone who is a recipient of any
undeserving or special favor from anyone, that it merely refers to someone who is a
friend or a special friend; there was no mention whatsoever in the subject article that
Amb. Yuchengco was being accused of fronting for the late President Marcos (referring
to par. 2.3.2 of the complaint); that nowhere in the said paragraph was Amb. Yuchengco
accused of having acted as a front to facilitate the acquisition of a prohibited interest in
a private corporation by a public official while occupying a public office; that nowhere in
the article was Amb. Yuchengco accused of being directly or indirectly involved in
unsound business practices (referring to par. 2.4 of the complaint); that whatever
imputation of ill-will in par. 2.4.1 of the complaint was only in plaintiffs mind; and as
regards par. 2.6 of the complaint, that he was merely reporting on what transpired at
the picket line and what the striking employees answered to him; and that he did not
state in his columns (Exhibits E and F) that plaintiff Yuchengco violated banking laws.
[TSN 23 February 2000][3]

On 8 November 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of herein
petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco, disposing of the case as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H.

Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna
Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a.       the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as moral

damages; and

b.      the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary

damages;
  

2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. and
Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a.       the amount of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) as moral

damages; and

b.      the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) as

exemplary damages;

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff

Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
attorneys fee and legal costs.[4]

The respondents, namely the Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, Neal

H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza,
Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, and Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 and was
raffled to the Fifth Division.
 
On 18 March 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming
the RTC Decision:
 
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the appeals of defendants-appellants and AFFIRMING the
decision dated November 8, 2002 of the trial court IN TOTO.[5]

 
 Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 28 August 2008, the
Court of Appeals reversed itself in an Amended Decision:
 
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated March
18, 2008 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the court a
quo dated November 8, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Complaint for
Damages against the defendants-appellants is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where petitioner puts forth
the following Assignments of Error:
 
A.                THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RULING THAT THE CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL. CITED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WARRANTED THE REVERSAL OF THE CA DECISION DATED MARCH 18, 2008.

B.                 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE
CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

C.                 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE. [6]

Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
 
Art. 353. Definition of Libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
 circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Based on this definition, this Court has held that four elements constitute
the crime of libel, namely (a) defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor,
discredit or contempt; (b) malice, either in law or in fact; (c) publication; and (d)
identifiability of the person defamed.[7]
 
Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be
instituted, like in the case at bar, as a purely civil action, the cause of action for
which is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:
 
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party.Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The above elements of libel were adopted as well in a purely civil action for
damages. As held by this Court in GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos[8]:
 
An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act
amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel
is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person. Liability for libel attaches present the following elements: (a) an allegation or
imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

 
 Of these four elements, the most apparent in the case at bar would be the
publication of the alleged imputation. Libel is published not only when it is widely
circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice
of another person other than its author and the offended party. [9] The circulation
of an allegedly libelous matter in a newspaper is certainly sufficient
publication. We are thus left with the determination of the existence of the three
remaining elements of libel, namely: (1) the defamatory imputation; (2) the
identity of the person defamed; and (3) the existence of malice.
 
 
Defamatory Imputation
 
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring
a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious
statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish esteem,
respect, goodwill or confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or
opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything that is injurious to the
good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. [10] In
determining whether certain utterances are defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning,
as they would naturally be understood by persons hearing (or reading, as in libel)
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. [11]
 
In order to fully appreciate whether the subject articles are, in fact,
defamatory, an analysis thereof is in order. The following are what have been
referred to as the subject articles:
 

 
 
Manila Chronicle Issue Title Exhibit
Date (Author)

10 November 1993 Yuchengko joins forces with A, A-1 to A-5

Kokoy
(no by-line)

12 November 1993 RCBC probed for violating CB B, B-1 to B-2

rules
(no by-line)

15 November 1993 RCBC called to SEC; subtitled C, C-1 to C-3

Yuchengco Bank defies
(no by-line) government order

16 November 1993 Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt D, D-1 to D-4

(Donna Gatdula)

22 November 1993 Bank runs and RCBC free loans E, E-1 to E-2

(Raul Valino)

23 November 1993 RCBC case bugs Bangko F, F-1 to F-3

Sentral
(Raul Valino)

5 December 1993 The Battle for Oriental G, G-1 to G-4

(Rodney P. Diola)

In two of the subject articles, respondents allegedly accused and labeled

Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the
former President to gain unwarranted benefits:
 
Yuchengco joins forces with Kokoy[12]

 
 

Alfonso Yuchengco, a Marcos crony who wants to takeover the ownership and
management of the highly profitable Oriental Petroleum Minerals Corp. (OMPC), has
tied up with Marcos brother-in-law Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez through two of his sons,
records at the securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) showed yesterday.

Kokoys two sons, Benjamin Philip Gomez Romualdez, 32, and Ferdinand Martin
G. Romualdez, 29, are now members of the board of the debt-ridden and heavily losing
Benguet Corp., a company taken over by Marcos during his dictatorship, but which was
sequestered at the start of President Aquinos term.

xxxx

Observers said they believed the elections of the Romualdez sons officially
confirmed suspicions that the Marcos and Romualdez clans really owned Benguet.

Benguets former president, Jaime Ongpin, employed by the company for 10

years before he was named finance secretary by then President Aquino, committed
suicide after being accused of being a Marcos-Romualdez crony.

Yuchengco Bank under CB probe[13]

xxxx

The official said the case was recently brought to Bangko Sentrals attention by
an RCBC creditor who felt he was being cheated by the bank through interest-free loans
granted to related interests.

 
 Under the interest-free loan scheme, Yuchengco was able to own OMPC shares
of Piedras since they were the same shares RCBC financed and which were turned over
to the bank as payment for the loan.

The Central Bank official said that Bangko Sentral is now determining whether
RCBC violated the rule on loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests
(DOSRI).

Yuchengco is both a director (chairman) officer, stockholder, and a related

interest of RCBC.

xxxx

Violating the DOSRI rule is a criminal offense. The Bangko Sentral official

stressed. I believe that that is tantamount, not only to cheating the depositor, but also
robbing the bank of its clients money.

If Bangko Sentral does not act decisively on this matter, the official asked what
will prevent the other banks from resorting to this kind of transactions to enrich their
owners and enable them to acquire shares of stock from other companies?

The interest-free loan controversy also involves Traders Royal Bank (TRB), a
sequestered bank, owned by Roberto Benedicto, a Marcos crony.

xxxx

The deal could be from one crony to another since Yuchengco is very much
associated with the Marcoses and the Romualdezes, a source opined.

 
 Yuchengco owns Benguet Corp., which is heavily losing since he joined the
Company as Chairman in 1989.

xxxx

Since Benguet is encountering all kinds of financial problems, losses and

overdue debts, observers say they fear that Oriental may also suffer the same fate when
and should Yuchengco and his partners assume management of OMPC.

Already, it was noted the Oriental shares sold on the stock market are
weakening, and stock observers say this could be attributed to the planned entry into
the company of Yuchengco, Leonardo Siguion-Reyna and their minority partners.

In another of the subject articles, respondents allegedly insinuated that

Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful orders of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC):
 
Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt[14]

Two officials of Alcorn Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (AMPC) and Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) admitted before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) yesterday that they ignored the SEC order commanding them to
process all Alcorn shares in the name of R. Coyiuto Securities Inc. and its investor clients
such as Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (OMPC).

xxxx

RCBC is owned by Alfonso Yuchengco, chairman of the debt-ridden and heavily-

losing Benguet Corp. He also owns Great Pacific Life Insurance Co., whose employees
 are on strike because of the companys refusal to grant them better salaries and
benefits.

xxxx

SEC insiders said that while Monreal and Ricalde should be punished for
disobeying a lawful order from the SEC, people who masterminded the APMC order
should also be penalized once proven guilty.

xxxx

Some observers said the APMC order to RCBC could be a ploy to prevent Robert
Coyiuto, Jr., chairman and president of OPMC, from retaining his majority control of
Oriental, and a scheme to put on the board members of the Yuchengco company.

In fact, when Yuchengco created his own OPMC board of directors, he

appointed Ricalde as corporate secretary, OPMC officials pointed out.

In our opinion, observers following the OPMC developments stated, this is a

clear and simple case of criminal conspiracy whose perpetrators must be meted the
harshest punishment to prevent corporate thieves from making a mockery of the law
and from illegally taking over corporations which they do not own in the first place.

Yuchengco further presented the following articles which allegedly accused

him of inducing Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) to violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act on Directors, Officers, stockholders, and
Related Interest (DOSRI) loans:
 
Bank runs and RCBC free loans[15]
  

The Bank runs that devastated the economy in the recent past were, first and
foremost, instigated by rumors that bank owners were, themselves, using the publics
money to promote their own businesses and interests in violation of Central Bank rules
and regulations.

xxxx

Now here comes Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) being charged
with engaging in unsound banking by lending an interest-free loan of P101 million to
one company, Piedras Petroleum Corporation, which Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto
had surrendered to the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).

xxxx

What would happen if all the other banks resort to this kind of lending activity,
giving away loans without interest? The entire banking system would certainly be
compromised.

The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not be too liberal with their depositors
money. They should also consider what fatal effects such a practice could inflict on the
very system where RCBC operates. The country, at this time, cannot afford another
series of bank runs, nor a run at RCBC.

RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral[16]

xxxx

 
 The P101 million interest-free loan to Piedras is of national interest for not just
one reason alone.

First, the money involved came from the depositors, and not from the pockets
of Yuchengco.

Second, banking rules dictate that a bank must be prudent in lending out its
clients money, so that its financial viability must never be put in question.

Third, the money lent to a borrower must never end up in the pocket of the
owner of the bank.

Fourth, such a practice could lead to a bank run, which the economy cannot
afford at this time, even if the run is confined to just one bank.

 
Yuchengco further claims that the following article, in labeling him as a
corporate raider, implies that he is seeking to profit from something he did not
work for:
 
The Battle for Oriental[17]

Ledesma says Coyiuto will not wilt from Yuchengcos fabled financial
power. Robert has a lot of friends that will help him fend off a raider like Yuchengco,
says Ledesma.

xxxx

 
 Ledesma of OPMC says that even if Coyiuto loses in the bid, hell still remain a
very significant player in OPMC given his substantial personal holdings and proxies in the
company.Coyiutos investment in OPMC is now valued at more than a billion pesos
compared to the Yuchengco block which, the Coyiuto group points out, has only minimal
investments.

Thats our moral ascendancy over their group. Coyiuto virtually made Oriental
what it is today unlike Yuchengco who is just getting into the act now because Oriental
has become an attractive cash cow says Ledesma.

War of Families

The fight for control of Oriental Petroleum gains particular poignancy given the
long history of feuding between the families of Yuchengco and Coyiuto. Their families
were bitter rivals in the insurance business way back in the seventies. The Yuchengcos
own the Malayan Group of Insurance Companies while the Coyiutos used to control
Pioneer Insurance. That rivalry seems to have come full circle with their battle in
Oriental Petroleum.

Pomento says the best arrangement would have been a modus vivendi between
the two groups to stop their quarrel and work instead for the interest of the
company. But given the bad blood that exists between the two families, that might be a
difficult proposition, he says.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that the above
articles contain defamatory imputations. Even the Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals, wherein the appellate court reversed itself and held that respondents
were not liable for damages, did not modify its earlier ruling affirming the
defamatory character of the imputations in the above articles. The Court of
Appeals merely reversed itself on account of the allegedly privileged nature of the
articles, which goes into the element of malice.Malice, as an element of libel, and
the defenses affecting the existence of the same shall be discussed later.
  
In arguing that the subject articles are not really derogatory, respondent
Cabrera explains that the word crony was more or less accepted to describe a big
businessman or close associate of the late President Marcos, and its use in the
column was meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure or subject
involved in the news story. Respondent Valino further claimed that after
consulting several dictionaries as to the meaning of the word crony, he did not
come across a definition describing the word to mean someone who is a recipient
of any undeserving or special favor from anyone.
 
We are not swayed by the explanations of respondents Cabrera and
Valino. In determining the defamatory character of words used, the explanation
of the respondent should not prevail over what the utterances (or writing) convey
to an ordinary listener (or reader). [18] Furthermore, as held by this Court in United
States v. Sotto[19]:
 
[F]or the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous
that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is
natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally
understand what was uttered. The published matter alleged to be libelous must be
construed as a whole. In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the
court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on
being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon
the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered
explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the
sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication. (Emphasis supplied.)

In finding that the phrase Marcos crony is derogatory, the trial court took
judicial notice of the fact that the said phrase, as understood in Philippine
context, refers to an individual who was the recipient of special and/or
undeserved favors from the late President Marcos due to a special closeness to
the latter. This finding, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals in its original
Decision and was not tackled in the Amended Decision, is even supported by one
of the subject articles. In particular, the 10 November 1993article marked as
Exhibit A mentioned that Benguets former president, Jaime Ongpin, committed 
suicide after being accused of being a Marcos-Romualdez crony. [20] This statement
highlights the disgrace respondents wanted to associate with the term crony,
which was used to describe Yuchengco in the very same article.
 
Even a cursory reading of the subject articles would show the intention of
the writers to injure the reputation, credit and virtue of Yuchengco and expose
him to public hatred, discredit, contempt and ridicule. The indirect manner in
which the articles attributed the insults to Yuchengco (e.g., the money involved
came from depositors, and not from Yuchengco) does not lessen the culpability of
the writers and publishers thereof, but instead makes the defamatory
imputations even more effective. Words calculated to induce suspicion are
sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made.
Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. [21]
 
In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the
following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took
advantage of his relationship with the former President to gain unwarranted
benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful
orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer
due to the strike staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he
induced RCBC to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI
loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a corporate raider seeking to profit
from something he did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt
and ridicule, for they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable.
 
Identification
 
Defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person,
and that person must be the plaintiff. Statements are not libelous unless they
refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person. [22] However, the obnoxious
writing need not mention the libeled party by name. It is sufficient if it is shown
that the offended party is the person meant or alluded to.[23]
 
In the case at bar, all but one of the subject articles explicitly mention the
name of petitioner Yuchengco. The lone article, which does not mention
Yuchengco at all, Bank runs & RCBC free loans, [24] nevertheless chided the owners
of RCBC:
 

The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not be too liberal with their depositors
money. They should also consider what fatal effects such a practice could inflict on the
very system where RCBC operates. The country, at this time, cannot afford another
series of bank runs, nor a run at RCBC. [25]

Identifying Yuchengco in said article by name was, however, not necessary,

since the other subject articles, published a few days before and after this one,
had already referred to Yuchengco as the owner of RCBC, sometimes explicitly
(Benguet started to bleed in 1989, the year Yuchengco, who owns Rizal
Commercial Banking Corp. [RCBC], took over as chairman of the company [26]), and
sometimes implicitly (the money involved came from depositors, and not from
Yuchengco). While the defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause
of action on the part of an individual, this is subject to exception when it can be
shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter. [27] This Court therefore finds
that Yuchengco was clearly identified as the libeled party in the subject
defamatory imputations.
 
 
 
Malice
 
 Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention
to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[28] It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. [29]
 
Malice, however, does not necessarily have to be proven. There are two
types of malice malice in law and malice in fact.[30] Malice in law is a presumption
of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise the
presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive
malice, legal malice, or implied malice.[31] On the other hand, malice in fact is a
positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the
defendant was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express
malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or particular malice.[32]
 
In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code, which also enumerates exceptions thereto:
 
Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making
it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance

of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

 
 There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory
imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive
for making such imputation.
 
The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly
privileged communications. The enumeration under said article is, however, not
an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries
on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.[33] They are known as
qualifiedly privileged communications, since they are merely exceptions to the
general rule requiring proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory
imputation may be held actionable. In other words, defamatory imputations
written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged
communications enumerated above (1) a private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; (2) a fair
and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions; and
(3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest may still be considered
actionable if actual malice is proven. This is in contrast with absolutely privileged
communications, wherein the imputations are not actionable, even if attended by
actual malice:
 
A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its
author has acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of
Congress in the discharge of their functions as such, official communications made by
public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made by
the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial
proceedings, as well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions
propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or
statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to
the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or
qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing defamatory
[34]
imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith .

 
  

In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
the publication of the subject articles was attended by actual malice:
 
In the instant case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there
exists malice in fact in the writing and publication of the subject libelous articles.

As correctly found by the trial court, [petitioner] was able to show that

[respondents] were animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation
as shown by the timing and frequency of the publication of the defamatory
articles. Further, as previously stated, [respondents] failed to show that they had any
good intention and justifiable motive for composing and publishing the vicious and
malicious accusations against [petitioner].

Moreover, [respondents] published or caused the publication of the subject

defamatory articles with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. As
previously stated, there is no proof that the contents of the subject articles are true or
that the respondents exercised a reasonable degree of care before publishing the
same. [Respondents] failed to present evidence showing that they verified the truth of
any of the subject articles, especially in light of the categorical denial by [petitioner] of
the accusations made against him.

[Respondents] did not exercise reasonable degree of care or good faith efforts
to arrive at the truth before publishing the subject defamatory articles. [Respondents]
did not present any competent evidence to establish the truth of their allegations
against [petitioner]. There was no showing that [respondents] made any attempt to
talk to [petitioner] to verify the statements contained in the defamatory articles,
especially considering the gravity of the accusations made against [petitioner]. At the
very least, [respondents] should have exercised efforts to talk to [petitioner] to clarify
the issues and get his side. [Respondents] failure to verify the truth of the information
from [petitioner] himself is in itself an evidence of their lack of bona fide efforts to verify
the accuracy of her information.

 
 The incessant publication of the defamatory articles attacking the honor and
reputation of [petitioner] is also proof of [respondents] malicious scheme to malign and
defame the name, honor and reputation of [petitioner]. As earlier pointed out, in a span
of one (1) month, [respondents] wrote and published and/or caused the publication of
seven (7) libelous articles against [petitioner] attacking his honor and reputation as a
distinguished businessman, philanthropist, his political inclination, and as an employer
in his insurance company. In fact, the presence of malice is made more evident by
[respondents] baseless and uncalled for attack on the person of [petitioner] as an
employer. As aptly noted by the trial court in the assailed Decision:

Also in one of the articles, herein plaintiff was portrayed as an

unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike staged by the employees
of Grepalife suggesting that it was the [petitioner] who was the cause,
and of insinuating that if [petitioners] group takes over control of
Oriental, it would experience the same labor problem as in
Grepalife. The Court finds that [respondents] failed to render an
unbiased and fair report as to the real cause of the strike except to lay
the blame to [petitioner], without stating, much less describing, his
participation thereon, knowing fully well that Grepalife is an entity
distinct from the plaintiff. In other words, the labor policies
implemented by Grepalife as regards its employees are obviously not
that of Yuchengco.

Such baseless and malicious accusation of [respondents] on [petitioner] only

proves the intention of the [respondents] in publishing the defamatory articles was
not to present an unbiased report on current issues but to launch a personal attack on
the very person of [petitioner].

As earlier explained, as correctly found by the trial court, even the timing of the
publication of these subject articles is highly suspicious inasmuch as the subject
libelous articles came out in the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper owned and under the
control of [respondent] Coyiuto, around November to December of 1993, a couple of
months prior to the January stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation. From this,
it is logical to conclude that the publication of the subject defamatory articles defaming
the good name and reputation of [petitioner] is but a part of [a] grand scheme to create
a negative image of [petitioner] so as to negatively affect [petitioners] credibility to the
public, more particularly, to the then stockholders of Oriental Corporation. Worth
noting also is the fact that the subject articles did not only portray [petitioner] in a bad
 light. Curiously, in these articles, [respondent] Coyiuto, a known rival of [petitioner],
was portrayed as the underdog, the David and [petitioner] as the Goliath in their
battle for control over Oriental Corporation.  This does not escape the Courts
attention.

These circumstances clearly indicate the presence of actual malice on the part
of [respondents] in the publication of the subject libelous articles. [35] (Emphases
supplied.)

When the Court of Appeals granted the Motion for Reconsideration, it did
not touch upon its earlier finding of actual malice on the part of respondents in
publishing the subject articles. Instead, the Court of Appeals merely held that the
subject articles were fair commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell
within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged communications.
 
This was a glaring error on the part of the Court of Appeals. As discussed
above, whereas there is an absolute bar to an action in the case of absolutely
privileged communication, the same is not true with respect to qualifiedly
privileged communication, wherein the law merely raises a prima
facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the former, the freedom from
liability is absolute, regardless of the existence of actual malice, as contrasted
with the freedom in the latter, where it is conditioned on the want or absence of
actual malice. Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are
actionable when made with actual malice.[36]
 
When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous
articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being
qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice
from attaching to a defamatory imputation.
 
Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the
respondents. As held by the courts a quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the
attendant circumstances that respondents were animated by a desire to inflict
unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and frequency of the
publication of the defamatory articles. The portrayal of then Chronicle Publishing
Chairman Coyiuto as an underdog and his rival Yuchengco as the greedy Goliath in
their battle for control over Oriental Corporation, taken with the timing of the
publication of these subject articles a couple of months prior to the January
stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation, clearly indicate that the articles
constituted an orchestrated attack to undermine the reputation of
Yuchengco.Furthermore, respondents were shown to have acted with reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity of the articles they published, when they were
unable to rebut the categorical denial by Yuchengco of the accusations made
against him, and his allegation that he was not approached by respondents for his
side of the stories before the publication thereof.Respondents failure to present
evidence showing that they verified the truth of any of the subject articles is fatal
to their cause. In In re: Emil P. Jurado,[37] this Court ruled that categorical denials
of the truth of allegations in a publication place the burden upon the party
publishing it, either of proving the truth of the imputations or of showing that
the same was an honest mistake or error committed despite good efforts to
arrive at the truth. There is actual malice when there is either (1) knowledge of
the publications falsity; or (2) reckless disregard of whether the contents of the
publication were false or not.[38] Failure to even get the side of Yuchengco in the
published articles clearly constituted reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of
said articles.
 
Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that actual malice was
not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the
Court of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair
commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the
third type of qualifiedly privileged communications.
 
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (Peoples Journal) v. Theonen,[39] this Court
adopted the pronouncement in the United States Decision in Gertz v. Robert
Welsch, Inc.[40]that, in order to be considered as fair commentaries on matters of
public interest, the individual to whom the defamatory articles were imputed
should either be a public officer or a public figure:
 
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that the enumeration under Art. 354 is
not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are likewise privileged.  We stated that the doctrine of fair
commentaries means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made
is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable.  In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition.

Again, this argument is unavailing to the petitioners.  As we said, the respondent

is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure.  We are persuaded by the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., [418 U. S.
323 (1974)] that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about
an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a
constitutional privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose
in a discussion of public interest.(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in trying to prove that the subject articles delved on matters

concerning public interest, the Court of Appeals insisted that Yuchengco was a
public official or public figure, who must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts.[41] The Court of Appeals then noted that
Yuchengco was, at the time of the Amended Decision, appointed as a Presidential
Adviser on Foreign Affairs with Cabinet rank, and proceeded to enumerate [42] the
public positions held by Yuchengco through the years.
 
However, an examination of the subject articles reveals that the allegations
therein pertain to Yuchengcos private business endeavors and do not refer to his
duties, functions and responsibilities as a Philippine Ambassador
to China and Japan, or to any of the other public positions he occupied. A topic or
story should not be considered a matter of public interest by the mere fact that
the person involved is a public officer, unless the said topic or story relates to his
functions as such. Assuming a public office is not tantamount to completely
abdicating ones right to privacy. Therefore, for the purpose of determining
whether or not a topic is a matter of public interest, Yuchengco cannot be
considered a public officer.
 
Neither is Yuchengco a public figure. The above case Philippine
Journalists continues to cite the US case Gertz in describing who is a public figure:
 
More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.   Third, this would
impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which publications address
issues of general interest and which do not.  Even if the foregoing generalities do not
obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the
assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves
to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such
assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public
office or assumed an influential role in ordering society. (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S., at 164)  He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own
good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of
injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more
vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving
of recovery.[43] (Emphasis supplied.)

The records in the case at bar do not disclose any instance wherein
Yuchengco had voluntarily thrust himself to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. He
cannot, therefore, be considered a public figure. Since Yuchengco, the person
defamed in the subject articles, is neither as public officer nor a public figure, said
articles cannot be considered as qualifiedly privileged communications even if
they deal with matters of public concern.
  
In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant
Petition and reinstate the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its original Decision. This Court, however, finds the award of
damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million Pesos by the trial court to
be rather excessive given the circumstances. This Court, thus, further resolves to
reduce the award of damages, as follows:
 

1. The damages for which Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto

Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Valino and Rodney Diola shall be jointly and severally liable under the first cause
of action shall be reduced as follows:
 
a.     The amount of moral damages shall be reduced from Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00); and
 
b.     The amount of exemplary damages shall be reduced from Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00);
 
2. The damages for which Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing
shall be jointly and severally liable under the second cause of action shall be
reduced as follows:
 
a.     The amount of moral damages shall be reduced from Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00) to Twenty-Five Million Pesos
(P25,000,000.00); and
 
 b.     The amount of exemplary damages shall be reduced from Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00).
 

 
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Amended Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 dated 28 August 2008, which
reversed on Motion for Reconsideration the 18 March 2008 Decision of the same
Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court ofMakati City in Civil Case No. 94-1114 dated 8 November
2002 finding herein respondents liable for damages, is hereby REINSTATED, but
shall be MODIFIED to read as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H.

Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna
Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as moral damages;

and

b. the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as

exemplary damages;

2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and
Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of Twenty-Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00) as moral

damages; and
  

b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary

damages;

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff

Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
attorneys fee and legal costs.

 
Costs against respondents.
 

SO ORDERED.
 

 
 

  MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Chairperson
  

 
 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

   
   
 
   
 
   
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Japar B.
Dimaampao, concurring; rollo, pp. 53-62.
[2]
 Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Lucenito N.
Tagle, concurring; rollo, pp. 195-248.
[3]
 Rollo, pp. 114-121.
[4]
 Id. at 160.
[5]
 Id. at 247.
[6]
 Id. at 348-349.
[7]
 People v. Monton, 116 Phil. 1116, 1120-1121 (1962).
[8]
 G.R. No. 146848, 17 October 2006, 504 SCRA 638, 650-651.
[9]
 United States v. Ubiana, 1 Phil. 471, 473 (1902).
[10]
 MVRS Publications, Inc., v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., 444 Phil. 230, 241 (2004).
[11]
 Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74907, 23 May 1988, 161 SCRA 427, 432.
[12]
 Manila Chronicle, 10 November 1993, Exhibit A; rollo, p. 63.
[13]
 Manila Chronicle, 12 November 1993, Exhibit B; rollo, p. 64.
[14]
 Manila Chronicle, 12 November 1993, Exhibit D; rollo, p. 66.
[15]
 Manila Chronicle, 22 November 1993, Exhibit E; rollo, p. 67.
[16]
 Manila Chronicle, 23 November 1993, Exhibit F; rollo, p. 68.
[17]
 Manila Chronicle, 23 November 1993, Exhibit G, rollo, p. 69.
[18]
 Madrona, Sr. v. Rosal, G.R. No. 39120, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 1, 8.
[19]
 38 Phil. 666, 672-673 (1918).
[20]
 Rollo, p. 63.
[21]
 United States v. O'Connell, 37 Phil. 767, 773 (1918).
[22]
 Corpus v. Cuaderno, Sr., G.R. No. L-16969, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 807, 816.
[23]
 Quisumbing v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510, 513 (1955).
[24]
 Exhibit D; rollo, p. 67.
[25]
 Id.
[26]
 Exhibit A; rollo, p. 63.
[27]
 MVRS Publications, Inc., v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., supra note 10.
[28]
 United States v. Caete, 38 Phil. 253, 264 (1918).
[29]
 Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238, 254 (1999).
[30]
 Lawson v. Hicks, 38, Ala. 279.
[31]
 Leonardo P. Reyes, FUNDAMENTALS OF LIBEL LAW, p. 15 (2007), citing William v. Hicks Printing Co.,
150 N.W. 183, 159 Wis. 90, Ajouelo v. Auto-Soler Co., 6 S.E.2d 415, 61 Ga App. 216, Astruc v. Star Co.,
C.C.N.Y. 182 F. 705.
[32]
 Id., citing Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751; Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App.2d 161,
217 P.2d 687; Scott-Burr Stores Corporation v. Edgar, 177 So. 766, 18 Miss. 486; Davis v. Hearst, 116 P.
530, 160 Cal. 143; Id.; Swain v. Oakey, 129 S.E. 151, 190 N.C. 133.

 
[33]
 Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1, 19 (1999).
[34]
 Orfanel v. People, 141 Phil. 519, 523-524 (1969).
[35]
 Rollo, pp. 234-236.
[36]
 Orfanel v. People, supra note 34.
[37]
 313 Phil. 119, 169 (1995).
[38]
 Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, G.R. No. 164437, 15 May 2009.
[39]
 G.R. No. 143372, 13 December 2005, 477 SCRA 482.
[40]
 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
[41]
 Rollo, p. 55.
[42]
 1. Presidential Adviser on Foreign Affairs with Cabinet Rank (January 30, 2004-present)

2. Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador (November 2001-
December 2002);

3. Presidential Special Envoy to China, Japan and Korea (2001);

4. Presidential Assistant on APEC Matters with Cabinet Rank (1998-2000);

5. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of the Philippines to the Peoples Republic
of China (PROC) (1986-1988); and

6. Chairman, Council of Private Sector Advisors to the Philippine Government on the Spratlys Issue (Marine and
Archipelagic Development Policy Group (1995-1998). (Rollo, p. 56.)
[43]
 Philippine Journalists, Inc. (Peoples Journal) v. Theonen, supra note 38 at 497.

EN BANC
 [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530. March 14, 2001]

DR. EDGARDO ALDAY, MERCEDES FAVIS, MARNA VILLAFUERTE,

and CHRISTOPHER GARCIA, complainants, vs. JUDGE
ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR., Branch 58, Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Complainants seek the dismissal of respondent judge allegedly for threatening them with a
gun during a traffic incident.
In their verified complaint,[1] complainants alleged that on May 6, 1999, the van they were
riding was about to exit the Cityland Condominium at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City. When
they reached the entrance/exit ramp, respondent arrived in his car and blocked the ramp. As a
result, neither vehicle could move. Respondent alighted from his car and went over to the van.
He shouted Putang ina ninyo, anong gusto ninyo mangyari?, while brandishing a gun and
pointing it at the occupants of the van.
On June 14, 1999, the OCA required respondent to comment.[2] Respondent admitted that
there was a traffic altercation. However, he claimed that it was complainants van which blocked
the ramp. He said that he merely alighted from his car to vent his ire at the inept security guard
who did not even help them untangle the traffic snarl. He categorically denied any gun-poking
incident.
The complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to Office of
the Court Administrator Consultant, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, for investigation, report and
recommendation.[3]
During the hearing, the parties presented conflicting versions of the incident. These are
succinctly summarized by the OCA Consultant, and we present both sides for better appreciation
of the facts.
On one hand, complainants testified as follows:

1. Dr. Edgardo S. Alday, 67 years old, a physician by profession, identified and

affirmed the truth of the sworn statement (Exhibit A, Rollo, pp. 5-6) he executed at
the Eastern Police District Headquarters on May 7, 1999. Said statement was
submitted as part of his direct testimony. In said statement, Dr. Alday declared that on
May 6, 1999, and he and several companions were aboard his Mercedes Benz van. As
they were leaving the parking area of the Cityland Condominium (Cityland for
brevity) at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, shortly after noon, a car with Plate No. 16
NCR 58 met them blocking their way out.At this juncture, the security guard
motioned to them to back up so that the incoming vehicle could enter. While the van
was slowly backing up, the respondent who was driving his car was going forward
almost pushing the van and at the same time pointing a gun at them through the cars
windshield. Upon respondents car coming alongside and parallel to the van,
respondent stopped his car, alighted and with his gun pointed at the occupants of the
van, shouted three times saying Putang ina ninyo, anong gusto ninyo
mangyari. Examined further by his counsel, Dr. Alday declared that prior to the
incident, he did not know the respondent not having ever met him.

On cross-examination by respondents counsel, Dr. Alday insisted that what he related

in his statement was what actually happened. He gave a more detailed description of
the happening. Asked to specify the firearm respondent allegedly used to point at
them, Dr. Alday insisted that it was black automatic pistol not a chrome-plated
revolver which the cross-examiner suggested.

2. Ms. Marna Villafuerte-Judan, 32 years old, businesswoman, was the second

complainant to testify. She identified and affirmed Exhibit B (Rollo, pp. 9-10) as the
sworn statement she gave at the Eastern Police Headquarters on May 7, 1999. The
same was offered as her direct testimony. She declared that shortly after noon on May
6, 1999, she was in a Mercedes Benz van with Dr. Edgardo Alday and his wife, Dr.
Mercedes Favis. The said van was being operated by Dr. Aldays driver. As the vehicle
was about to leave the parking area of Cityland on Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, a
red car driven by a man in a business suit who they later found out was respondent
Judge Escolastico Cruz, blocked their way. The security guard on duty motioned Dr.
Aldays driver to back up. As they were backing up, the respondent was advancing and
almost pushing the van. She saw Dr. Alday, who was seated in front next to the driver,
open his window and inform the respondent, who was inside his car, that we were just
going out but the respondent berated (nagmura) Dr. Alday saying that he did not care
but he was coming in. When respondents car came alongside their van, she saw the
respondent point his firearm at them. After that the respondent went his way. She saw
that respondents car had Plate No. 16 NCR. Asked additional questions by their
counsel, Ms. Judan declared that she had not met respondent before the incident
which occurred on May 6, 1999. She only found out his identity at the police station
when she learned that Plate No. 16 is issued only to judges.

Answering the undersigned, Ms. Judan stated that she was a resident at Cityland. She
admitted that although she is not related to either Dr. Alday or his wife, she is close to
them and she addresses them tito and tita.

Cross examined by respondents counsel, complainant Judan admitted that after she
boarded the van next to Dr. Favis, she was engrossed in conversation with her that she
did not notice the arrival of respondents car near the tali, which she described as the
rope slung across the driveway. She first noticed the respondent after he had already
crossed the tali. She said she did not notice respondent alight from his car as she only
became aware of the incident when the red car was already in front of her. She stated
further that there was an exchange of words between Dr. Alday and respondent and
that immediately after they left the area, they had proceeded directly to the
police. Although there was a police station nearer Cityland than the one to which they
had repaired, it was a spot choice they made at that moment to go to the Eastern
Police District Headquarters on Meralco Avenue.

3. The third and last complainant to testify was Dr. Mercedes A. Favis, 66 years old,
also a physician. She identified and affirmed the truth of the sworn statement (Exhibit
C, Rollo, pp. 7-8) she executed on May 7, 1999, at the Eastern Police District
Headquarters. Answering additional questions posed by their counsel, she stated that
she did not know nor had she ever encountered the respondent before May 6, 1999. In
Exhibit C which was submitted as her direct testimony, Dr. Favis declared that they
had gone to the police headquarters to file a complaint against Judge Escolastico Cruz
who was identified to them by the security guard. In the same statement she declared
that on May 6, 1999, between 12:10 and 12:15 in the afternoon, she, together with her
husband, a guest and their driver were engressing from the parking area of the
Cityland, at Pioneer St., Pasig City, aboard their Mercedes Benz van when they were
suddenly confronted by a red automobile driven by a man dressed in a dark business
suit. The driver of this automobile was repeatedly shouting curses saying Putang ina
ninyong lahat, ano ba ang gusto ninyong mangyari, at the same time pointing a
firearm towards the passengers of the van. The driver of the red car alighted and
confronted her husband and their driver with a gun which he pointed at them. After
the driver of the red car had finished bad mouthing them, he drove away. They, in
turn, left and immediately went to a police station to make a report. Their guest was
able to get the plate number of the red car which was 16 NCR 58 which she knew was
issued to a judge.

On cross examination, Dr. Favis admitted that Exhibit C was made the day after the
incident because after they went to report to the police on the day of the incident, the
latter accompanied them to the Cityland Condominium and later they had gone to the
IBP and it was already late in the afternoon when they returned to the police
station. The investigators suggested that they return the next day to have their
statements taken. She further testified that while they were backing up, the red car
driven by the respondent was jerkily pushing them. She described how respondent
was pointing the gun at them in a swaying motion and that the weapon being
brandished by the respondent was not a revolver.[4]

On the other hand, respondent did not testify but presented his witnesses who testified as
follows:
1. Atty. Alex Tan identified and affirmed the truth of the statement he executed
before Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rizalina T. Capco-Umali of Rizal (Exhibit 1,
Rollo, pp. 58-59). The same was submitted by respondent as an annex to his comment
in this administrative matter. This sworn statement was submitted as his direct
testimony. In said statement, Atty. Tan relates that on May 6, 1999, he had invited
respondent (his classmate at San Beda College) and his wife to lunch at the Kamayan
Restaurant at EDSA. He had gone to respondents office at Makati City at half past
11:00 oclock. They proceeded to Cityland in Mandaluyong City with Judge Cruz
driving his Honda Civic while he followed aboard his white Corolla. When
respondent judge turned right towards the parking lot, he had to stop because his way
was blocked by a Mercedes Benz van which was parked in the middle of the
driveway. Respondent sounded his horn but the vans driver instead moved forward
until the van was only a meter away from the hood of respondents car. An old man
seating beside the driver of the van signaled to respondent to move back but
respondent responded that he could not because Atty. Tans car was right behind his
and following Atty. Tans car was a taxicab. He saw Judge Cruz alight from his car
and immediately go to the security guard on duty berating the latter saying, Ano ba
ang ginagawa mo dito, bakit hindi ka mag traffic? Ano ka dito, dekorasyon? Kung
hindi mo kayang mag traffic, mag resign ka na.

Atty. Tan continued saying that he saw the security guard approach the driver of the
Mercedes Benz van and signaled the latter to move back so respondent was able to
proceed to the parking area. He further testified that he never saw Judge Cruz point a
gun to anyone that noon of May 6, 1999, much less alight from his car carrying any
handgun. He finally stated that had he seen the respondent point a gun at anyone, he
would have been the first to prevent and/or stop him.

During his testimony, Atty. Tan identified another sworn statement (Exhibit 1-C)
where he described what happened in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, at the Hall of
Justice in Mandaluyong City where he was accosted, threatened and cursed by three
people, namely: complainant Dr. Edgardo Alday, a certain Bong Villafuerte and their
driver, Christopher Garcia. He speculated that he was mistaken by these three people
for the respondent Judge Cruz.

On cross examination, Atty. Tan admitted that he was a classmate of the respondent in
the San Beda College of Liberal Arts; that he had known the respondent since 1968;
that he was a name partner in the law firm of A. Tan, Zoleta and Associates; that his
firm was counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 98-3064 entitled SAAG
Philippines, Inc. versus Hexagon Realty Corp., et al which was pending before Branch
58 of the Makati Regional Trial Court presided by the present respondent; that exhibit
D is a copy of the complaint in said case; that on December 24, 1998, the respondent
issued a temporary restraining order (Exhibit E) in the said case as prayed for by
them; and that the case was terminated in January 1999.

2. Respondents second witness was Aida F. Alba, of age, married and a resident of

Cupang, Muntinglupa. She identified and affirmed the truth of the statement (Exhibit
2, Rollo, pp. 64-65) which she jointly executed with Jose Ignacio before Rizalina T.
Capco-Umali, Rizal Asst Provincial Prosecutor. The same statement was among those
annexed to respondents comment in this administrative matter. The same statement
was offered as the direct testimony of this witness.

In Exhibit 2, Ms. Alba declared that on May 6, 1999, she had arranged a tripping with
Anna B. Dianito to see certain units of the Cityland located on Pioneer St.,
Mandaluyong City. She, together with Jose Ignacio, Anna Dianito and one Jackielyn
Sawit, arrived at the said place at past 11:00 oclock. After making a tour of the
condominium, she had seen a man dressed in a coat and tie alight from the red Honda,
walk to the security guard and berate him. The guard then approached the Mercedes
van and directed its driver to move the van back. After the latter had done so, the
Honda was able to continue on its way towards the parking lot. She further stated that
during the standstill of the cars, she saw no person holding a gun or pointing the same
at anyone. She and her companions were right on the landing pad and had a clear and
unobstructed view of the scene.

On cross-examination, she admitted that respondent Judge Cruz contacted Anna

Dianito and the latter called her to inform her that she was needed to make an affidavit
regarding the incident. She had gone to the office of a lawyer whose name she could
not remember where she was interviewed. The lawyer then prepared the statement
which she and Jose Ignacio jointly swore to before the investigating prosecutor.

3. Respondents third witness was Annaliza L. Dianito, a thirty-year old real estate

broker. She identified and affirmed the truth of the statement (Exhibit 4, Rollo, pp. 62-
63) which she executed before the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor investigating the
complaint of Dr. Alday.

In the said statement, the witness declared that she is a real estate broker and that she
had arranged a tripping with some of her clients on May 6, 1999; that she had met
with them at the Goldilocks Bake Shop on Shaw Blvd. and they arrived at Cityland on
Pioneer Street at 11:10 oclock in the morning; that she had shown her clients four
units in the building and as it was almost noon, she showed them the several eateries
and convenience stores among which was Unit UG 16 which is located nearest the
stairway leading either to the driveway or the exit towards Pioneer Street; that as they
approached the landing pad leading to the stairs, their attention was called by the
honking of horns from vehicles; that she saw a red Honda Civic, a white Toyota
Corolla and a taxicab in that order; that their way was blocked by a parked Mercedes
van; that they saw a man in coat and tie who turned out be respondent Judge Cruz,
alight and approach the security guard on duty and directed the latter to ease out the
traffic snarl; that the security guard approached the Mercedes van and motioned to its
driver to move back; that the red Honda Civic of the judge was finally able to proceed
to its parking area; that during all the few minutes of traffic along the driveway, she
never saw Judge Cruz or any person for that matter, point a gun at anyone; that it was
just an ordinary day-to-day scene along the driveway of the condominium; that at
about 12:30 oclock, she parted ways with Ms. Cawit, Ms. Alba and Mr. Ignacio.

On cross examination, the witness admitted that when she and her companions arrived
at the stair landing the four vehicles a red Honda Civic, a white Toyota Corolla, a
taxicab and the Mercedes Benz van were already on the driveway. She further
admitted that she did not leave her name or address with anybody after the incident
and that she had been interviewed by Atty. Cabangon at an office on Panay Avenue in
Quezon City. She had been brought to Atty. Cabangons office by Atty. Tan. She
declared that she had been acquainted with Judge Cruz since 1998 when the latter
wanted to buy a 3 bedroom unit; that after the incident of May 6, 1999, Judge Cruz
had called her and asked her to go to his place at Cityland; that she had gone to him
and found Atty. Tan with him; that because he had seen her at the landing pad on May
6, 1999, Judge Cruz mentioned to her that he remembered having seen her with some
companions; that she took it upon herself to notify her three companions Jose Ignacio,
Aida Alba and Jacklyn Cawit and bring them to the Judge; that after being
interviewed by the Judge, Atty. Tan brought the four of them to Atty. Cabangon upon
the request of Judge Cruz and that they were interviewed and their affidavits were
made.

4. Respondents fourth and last witness in chief was Segundino Ellazo, the security
guard on duty at the Cityland on May 6, 1999. He identified his sworn statement
(Exhibit 5 and also marked Exhibit G for complainants, Rollo, pp. 33-34), as well as
his signature (Exhibit 5-A). In said statement, Ellazo stated that he was, on May 6,
1999, a member of the Airborne Security Service, Inc. and was on duty at the Cityland
from 8:00 oclock in the morning until evening; that at about 12:10 oclock in the
afternoon of May 6, 1999, he saw Judge Cruz, owner of a unit in the Cityland, arrive
aboard his car with Plate No. 16 NCR 58; that respondent judge was unable to
immediately proceed to his parking slot because a Mercedes Benz van was blocking
the driveway; that the van backed up slowly because there were cars parked on the
side; that respondent was forcing his way as the van was backing up; that suddenly he
saw respondent judge pull out a gun and point the same through his windshield at the
van; that when the vehicles were already parallel to each other, respondent Judge Cruz
alighted from his car and told Ellazo to assist in untangling the traffic snarl and
respondent immediately boarded his car and proceeded to his parking slot and the van
went out. He concluded his statement saying that he was not threatened by Judge Cruz
nor did he have any grudge against him.

Mr. Ellazo also identified a second statement dated July 31, 1999 (Exhibit 6) as well
as his signature (Exhibit 6-A) thereon. (The statement appears to have been
subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public on July 31, 1999 and resubscribed
before the Assistant City Prosecutor on August 2, 1999). Ellazo declared that he had
to correct what he had stated in his statement before the police. In Exhibit 6, the
witness stated that on May 6, 1999, at about 4:18 oclock in the afternoon, he had gone
to the Eastern Police District Headquarters at Meralco Ave., Pasig City where he
executed Exhibit 5 (also marked Exhibit G); that when Judge Cruz alighted from his
car, he was not carrying any firearm and that he did not see him point the gun at
anyone because if he did, it is not possible he could not have seen it; that immediately
after Judge Cruz approached the witness and told him to arrange the traffic, he
forthwith boarded his car and proceeded to his parking slot; that at no time did Judge
Cruz approach the van when it was in front of his car.

Ellazo executed a third statement (Exhibit 7) which he signed (Exhibit 7-A) and swore
to before a Notary Public on September 9, 1999. In the latter statement he declared
that on May 6, 1999, he was forced to go to the Eastern Police District at Meralco
Ave., Pasig City in order to give a statement which was against his will only because
he was threatened by Col. Antonio B. Aguilar, Jr., through the Cityland Administrator
that he would be charged with obstruction of justice if he did not testify for Dr.
Edgardo S. Alday and he was given only up to 4:00 P.M. that day to comply; that
because of his fear, as he was informed that the Pasig police were looking for him, he
gave a statement which was involuntary because it was made under the fear that he
might be arrested, charged and confined; that so everyone may know and for the sake
of the truth, he declared that it was not true that Judge Cruz had drawn a gun as he did
not have a gun on that day; that his description of the gun being small and black was
based only on what Dr. Alday had said; that as a matter of fact, Dr. Alday kept calling
and calling the office where he was working in order to convince him to testify
against Judge Cruz; that he had sought advice from his family and his relatives and he
was advised to come out and tell the truth so that his conscience would not bother
him; that because of the pressure of the office where he was working, he had to look
for another job and to transfer his residence. Ellazo further declared that on May 6,
1999, at about 12:10 oclock P.M., when Judge Cruz entered the driveway of the
Cityland he was followed by the white car of Atty. Alex Tan; that he did note in his
blotter this fact because after Judge Cruz proceeded to the parking area, he did not
allow Atty. Tan to follow because the area was already full; that during that time there
were many persons present among whom were real estate broker Anna Liza Dianito
who was in company with some prospective buyers/tenants; that as a matter of fact, he
was embarrassed when he was berated by Judge Cruz in the presence of Atty. Tan and
Ms. Dianito.

Continuing his direct testimony, Ellazo was asked to explain the discrepancy between
his first statement (Exhibit 5) and his second and third statements (Exhibits 6 and
7). He declared that on May 6, 1999, he had just relieved the other security guard who
had gone to eat when Judge Cruz entered driving his red car and found his way was
blocked by a Mercedes Benz van; that Ellazo had signaled the driver of the van to
move back but said driver was hardheaded and did not immediately comply; that
Judge Cruz and Dr. Alday, the passenger of the van exchanged shouts; that Judge
Cruz alighted, approached and berated him (Ellazo); that since he was outside his
guard house at the time, he approached the van and assisted its driver to move back so
that Judge Cruz was able to proceed to his parking slot; that there were many people
at the top of the stairs one of them was Anna Dianito and companions whose names
he did not know.

On cross examination Ellazo was confronted with his answers to questions

propounded by the police investigator contained in his statement marked Exhibit 5
(also marked Exhibit G). His attention was called to Question No. 5 (Exhibit G-2) in
Exhibit 5 where he was asked to describe what had happened and his answer was that
he had seen Judge Cruz pointing his gun at the Mercedes Benz van with Plate No.
WBF 991. Ellazo stated that he did not give that answer but the same was only put
there (gawa gawa lang) by the police.

Ellazo was also asked about the answer he gave to Question No. 15 (Exhibit G-3) in
Exhibit 5 where he stated that when Judge Cruz arrived in his car with Plate No. 16
NCR 58 he could not immediately proceed to his parking slot because his way was
blocked by a van with Plate No. WBF 991 so that he (Ellazo) signalled the driver of
the van to back up; that Judge Cruz immediately followed the van as the latter was
backing up and at that moment he saw Judge Cruz pull out a gun which he pointed
through his windshield at the van; that when the two vehicles were side by side, Judge
Cruz alighted from his vehicle and told him to assist in arranging the flow of the
traffic and after that Judge Cruz proceeded to his parking slot. Ellazo explained that
part of what was supposed to be his answer was actually his but the rest was just told
to him by the police.

Asked by the undersigned to indicate what part of Exhibit 5-B was his and what was
not, Ellazo stated that he never said that Judge Cruz pulled out a gun and pointed it at
the Mercedes van (Exhibit 5-B-1) although the rest of the answer was his.
On further cross examination, Ellazo admitted that he had Exhibit 6 made by neighbor
who was a lawyer, a certain Atty. Mabuti. The same affidavit was submitted at the
preliminary investigation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong at the
instance of Atty. Alex Tan and Judge Cruz. He stated that a few weeks after the
happening, he had gone to Judge Cruz to apologize for what he had said in his first
statement which was taken by the police. He also told Judge Cruz that he was willing
to execute another affidavit in his favor. After that he had voluntarily gone to Atty.
Mabuti to have his second affidavit (Exhibit 6) made and after this was made, he was
accompanied by Atty. Alex Tan to the prosecutors office in Mandaluyong to submit
Exhibit 6.

The witness further admitted that besides his going to the residence of Judge Cruz to
see him, he had seen respondent several times while he was on duty at Cityland; that it
was Atty. Tan who picked him up at his house and brought him to Mandaluyong City
to submit the second affidavit (Exhibit 6) to the prosecutor handling the preliminary
investigation.

Anent his third affidavit (Exhibit 7), Ellazo admitted that he was told by Atty. Tan to
go to the office of Atty. Gayos to make the third affidavit in order to clarify certain
matters contained in Exhibit 6. He insisted that the respondent had no gun on that
date.

Answering questions of the undersigned, Ellazo insisted that Question No. 5 (Exhibit
G-2) as well as Question No. 6 (Exhibits 5-B-2 & G-3) were never asked of him and
neither did he give the answers found in said exhibits.[5]

On June 19, 2000, respondent formally offered his evidence[6] and rested his case. Thereafter,
complainants formally offered their evidence.[7]
However, considering the apparent turnaround of Security Guard Segundino Ellazo, Justice
Quimbo allowed complainants to present rebuttal evidence. On June 19, 2000, complainants
presented Police Superintendent Antonio V. Aguilar, Jr. and SPO1 Joseph Amuyo, whose
testimonies are as follows:

Police Superintendent Antonio V. Aguilar, Jr. declared that on May 6, 1999, he

was already the Chief of the District Criminal Investigation Group, Eastern Police
District, National Capital Region. He identified the statement (Exhibit 5) which
Segundino Ellazo made at the Eastern Police District Headquarters on May 6,
1999. He further said that he had asked Ellazo whether he had executed it voluntarily
and of his own free will and whether he swore to its truth. It was only after Ellazo had
answered affirmatively to his questions that he administered his oath. He admitted that
he had no personal knowledge of the answers given by Ellazo to the investigator, but
he insists that he would not have allowed any one of his investigators to manufacture
testimony.

SPO1 Joseph Amuyo, after taking oath, declared that on May 6, 1999, he was a
police investigator at the Eastern Police District. He was the one who took the sworn
statement of Segundino Ellazo on that date. He further declared that the statement
given to him at the investigation room of the Eastern Police District was free and
voluntary; that he was asking the questions and Ellazo was supplying the answers
which he typewrote; that all the answers written on Exhibit 5 were of Ellazo; that as a
matter of fact, Ellazo corrected the Plate No. of the van as found in Questions No. 5
and 6; that the answer to Question No. 15 is also Ellazos.

Cross examined by respondents counsel, Amuyo declared that Dr. Alday had reported
an alleged grave threats against him; that in company with Dr. Alday, SPO2 Emerito
Escobido, PO1 Joseph Engero and PO1 Efren Tejada, he had proceeded to the place
where the alleged threats were made; that upon reaching Cityland, they had
encountered OIC Dominador Novencio; that he had told Novencio to request Ellazo to
report to their office for questioning; that he did not make any threats against Ellazo
nor did any member of the PNP; that when Ellazo reported to them, he had taken his
statement; that he took the statements of the complainants the next day; that Ellazo
gave his statement voluntarily and that it is not true that Ellazo was at first reluctant to
testify for as a matter of fact, he had gone to the headquarters with Dr. Alday.[8]

On June 26, 1999, respondent offered the same Security Guard Segundino Ellazo as sur-
rebuttal witness, who merely repeated his testimony in chief. After the sur-rebuttal evidence had
been submitted, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
On July 19, 2000, Justice Quimbo rendered his report. He found the version of complainants
more credible, considering that they had no possible motive to make a false accusation against
respondent. He gave credence to the positive testimonies of complainants over the negative
testimonies of respondents witnesses, particularly on whether respondent judge brandished a gun
pointed at complainants. Justice Quimbo explained that -

True they (Annaliza Dianito and Aida Alba) may not have seen respondents actual
pointing of his gun at the complainants but it is certainly possible that when their
attention was called to the incident, it was too late for them to catch the gun poking
episode as described by the complainants. Or perhaps they were not at such a vantage
point as to be able to see the entire happening. The fact, however, that the three
witnesses (Alex Tan, Annaliza Dianito and Aida Alba) did not see the gun toting
incident, is not conclusive proof that it did not actually occur.[9]

Justice Quimbo further found Atty. Alex Tan a biased witness, being respondents classmate
at San Beda College, and having represented plaintiffs in a civil case before respondents sala
wherein Tan managed to obtain a TRO on their behalf. He also found the testimony of Security
Guard Ellazo unreliable because he recanted his original statement that he saw respondent poke a
gun at complainants.Hence, citing cases of gun-poking incidents,[10] Judge Quimbo recommended
the dismissal of respondent judge with forfeiture of all benefits due him and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or in any government-owned or controlled
corporation.
The crucial issue herein pertains to the assessment of credibility of witnesses. What exactly
transpired on May 6, 1999, at the Cityland Condominium, Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City?
Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. This is
particularly true where complainants have no ill-motive in testifying against respondent.
[11]
 Complainants had never met respondent prior to the incident. They had no pending cases
before him. Yet they pursued this case with tenacity. They strongly believed they had been
unjustly wronged and sought redress therefor.
Brandishing a firearm in public imperils the lives of people. The fact that this was done by a
judge outside the courtroom and during a traffic altercation does not justify respondents gross
misconduct.Judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge. It imposes a number of
restrictions thereon. It is but a small sacrifice to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted
position in the administration of justice.[12] Irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge, needless
to say, erodes public confidence in the judiciary.[13]
In Marcelino v. Singson,[14] respondent judge was similarly involved in a traffic accident with
the complainant, a fish vendor. While complainant was slowly backing his passenger jeepney,
respondents car suddenly crossed his path, resulting in a minor impact. Respondent alighted from
the car, approached complainant and boxed him twice on the face. Respondent returned to his
car, got a gun, poked it at the face of complainant, and shouted Hayop Ka!. Respondent then
tucked the gun on his waist and delivered another blow on complainants face. He thereupon left
the premises, taking with him complainants license. Complainant filed criminal cases for Grave
Oral Defamation and Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence against respondent. He
also filed an administrative case against respondent. The criminal cases were dismissed when
complainant desisted, having apparently patched up things with respondent. Complainant
likewise desisted in the administrative case, but the Court nevertheless admonished respondent
and ordered him to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Based on the facts of the present case, we find respondents acts of confronting complainants
and threatening them with a gun during a traffic altercation constitutive of conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service is a grave offense under Section 46, No. 27, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I of Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), Section 23 (t), Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, and Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-89, as
incorporated in the Personnel Manual of the Supreme Court. The penalty for conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service is suspension for six (6) months, one (1) day to one
(1) year, for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense. This being
respondents first offense for which we find him liable, we deem it proper to impose upon him the
penalty of suspension for one (1) year without pay, and a fine of P50,000.00.
 The Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that [t]he assumption of office of judges casts upon
the incumbent duties in respect to his personal conduct which concerns his relations to the State
and its inhabitants, the litigants before him, the principles of law, the practitioners of law in his
court, and the witnesses and attendants who aid him in the administration of its functions. A
judges personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the
court, must be beyond reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible
personification of law and of justice.[15]
Finally, it is not amiss to remind members of the judiciary that the Constitution exhorts that
public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[16]
WHEREFORE, we hereby find respondent judge GUILTY of conduct grossly prejudicial
to the service, and impose upon him the penalty of SUSPENSION without pay for one (1) year
and to pay a fine of P50,000.00, to take effect immediately, with a warning that a commission of
a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Rollo, pp. 1-4. Other complaints pending against herein respondent are A.M. No. RTJ-96-1352 (mauling); and
[1] 

OCA IPI No. 99-830-RTJ (gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust judgment and gross negligence). Three
previous complaints against him were dismissed.
Id. at 14.
[2] 

Resolution dated January 31, 2000, Rollo, p. 86.

[3] 

Report, pp. 2-5.

[4] 

Id. at 5-14.
[5] 

Exhibits 1 (affidavit of Atty. Alex Tan); 1-A (his signature on the same); 1-B (signature of the investigating
[6] 

prosecutor); 1-C (another statement executed by Atty. Alex Tan); 1-D (his signature); 2 (joint sworn statement of
Jose O. Ignacio and Aida F. Alba); 2-A (signature of Alba); 3 (sketch drawn by Aida Alba in the course of her
testimony); 4 (affidavit of Annaliza B. Dianito), 4-A (her signature); 5 (Salaysay of Segundino Ellazo dated May 6,
1999); 5-A (his signature); 5-B (bracketed portion on page 1); 6 (Sinumpaang Salaysay of Segundino Ellazo dated
July 31, 1999 and sworn to before the investigating prosecutor on August 2, 1999); 6-A (his signature); 7 (a third
statement of Segundino Ellazo sworn to before Notary Public Socrates Verayo on September 9, 1999) and 7-A (his
signature).
Exhibits D (complaint in Civil Case No. 96-3064) entitled SAAG vs. Hexagon pending before respondents court)
[7] 

and E (order of respondent in said case dated December 24, 1998) which were offered to prove the bias of Atty.
Alex Tan.Offered likewise was Exhibit F (the sketch drawn by Aida Alba); G H and I (the three affidavits of
Segundino Ellazo).
Report, pp. 15-16.
[8] 

Id. at 19.
[9] 
 De la Paz v. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540, 549 (1975); Romero v. Valle, 147 SCRA 197, 203 (1987);
[10] 

Saburnido v. Madrono, 209 SCRA 755, 762 (1992). See also Arban v. Borja, 143 SCRA 634, 642 (1986).
De la Paz v. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540, 545 (1975).
[11] 

Galang v. Santos, 307 SCRA 582, 589-590 (1999).

[12] 

Id. at 590.
[13] 

243 SCRA 685 (1995).

[14] 

Marcelino v. Singson, 243 SCRA 685, 688-689 (1995).

[15] 

Sec. 1, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution.

[16] 
What are the Defenses Against Defamation?
 
Defamation is the act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement
(written or oral) to another person. As with every charge, there are defenses that can be
made to counter the charge. Defamation works on the premise that a person's good name
has value and if that good name is destroyed, the person who destroys it should be made to
pay.
The burden of proof in a defamation claim, in most cases, is on the plaintiff.
 
Answer:
 
 
Truth of the statement
If the statement is true, there is no defamation. If someone is a convicted rapist, you can't
defame that person by telling people that fact.
 
 
There Must be Harm
The plaintiff must prove that his or her good name has been harmed, in order for a charge
of defamation to stand up. If you say someone is a "deadbeat" and no one believes it, there
is no harm. On the other hand, if you say someone is a deadbeat, and a bank declines to
give that person a loan, he or she has a case against you for defamation.
 
 
There Must be Communication
It must be proved that the statement was communicated. If you wrote something about
someone and you did not send it to anyone or publish it, there is no defamation.
Communication requires a receiver of the message as well as a sender.
 
 
Consent
If you can prove that the plaintiff consented to the statement, in an interview, for example, or
in a written statement of consent, there is no defamation.
 
 
Privilege
A common defense against defamation is privilege, or immunity. There are many types of
privilege, but the most common are absolute privilege and qualified privilege. Absolute
privilege is immunity from charge of defamation, even if the statement is malicious. Absolute
privilege is most often claimed by legislators. The other common privilege is qualified
privilege, which protects the press from defamation charges for written or spoken
statements, unless they can be proved to be malicious.
 
 
Opinion
If it can be shown that a statement was opinion, rather than a pronouncement of a fact, the
statement may not be determined to be defamatory. Opinion as a defense depends on the
context, including the stature and presumed knowledge of the person making the statement
Is utterance of “putang ina” a slight or serious
oral defamation?
Posted on January 2, 2012by Erineus
The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation.  In
resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon
their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging
them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.[12]
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory.  Considering, however,
the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight.  The trial
court, in arriving at its decision, considered that the defamation was
deliberately done to destroy Atty. Escolango’s reputation since the parties
were political opponents.

We do not agree.  Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that
the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he
uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioner’s anger was
instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioner’s father died.[13] In
which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
In Reyes vs. People,[14] we ruled that the expression “putang ina mo” is a
common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slender but rather to express anger or displeasure.  In fact, more often, it is
just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity.  We do not find
it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a
drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing
anger.  Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and
not necessarily to insult the latter.  Being a candidate running for vice mayor,
occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not
uncommon.