Analysis of The WWPA 2015

Tanzania
Analysis of the Whistleblower and Witness

Protection Act, 2015
June 2016
Centre for Law and Democracy

[email protected]
+1 902 431-3688
www.law-democracy.org
Tanzania: Analysis of the Whistleblower and Witness Protection Act, 2015
Introduction1

A free flow of information, in particular about matters of public importance, is a
foundational hallmark of a strong democracy. There are two key elements to this:
protection for the right of individuals to express their views and opinions, and
measures to ensure that individuals can access information of public importance.
Appropriate media laws and narrowly drafted rules regarding what may not be
expressed publicly are key to the first element, while the second element has driven
the recent spread of right to information (RTI) legislation globally,2 with 80 percent
of the world’s population now living in a country with an RTI law.3

While a strong RTI law is the key tool for enabling public access to information, it
will not always be enough to guarantee that important information, in particular
about wrongdoing, is made public. For the most part, RTI laws only reveal
information upon request, and in many cases wrongdoing is so deeply hidden that
ordinary citizens are not able even to make relevant requests to reveal that
information. Even where they do, secrecy is often so deeply entrenched that public
bodies refuse to disclose information that reveals wrongdoing or incompetence,
despite being legally required to do so. Moreover, most RTI laws either do not apply
to the private sector or apply only to a small proportion of private sector companies.
Repeated experience, from the Bhopal disaster4 to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,5
shows that corporate malfeasance can have catastrophic consequences, reinforcing
the need for robust oversight over their operations.

In order to fill these gaps, and to ensure that information about wrongdoing both
among officials and in the private sector is exposed, there is broad international
recognition of the need to offer formal legal protection to whistleblowers, who
release information about persons or organisations which engage in illegal,
1 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
Unported Licence. You are free to copy, distribute and display this work and to make derivative
works, provided you give credit to Centre for Law and Democracy, do not use this work for
commercial purposes and distribute any works derived from this publication under a licence
identical to this one. To view a copy of this licence, visit: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-sa/3.0/.
2 See www.RTI-Rating.org for an up-to-date list of all of the world’s national RTI laws and when they
were adopted.
3 Tanzania is not included among these countries as it still has to fulfil its promise, made at the 2013
London Summit of the Open Government Partnership, to adopt a right to information law.
4 Alan Taylor, "Bhopal: The World's Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 Years Later", The Atlantic, 2
December 2014. Available at: www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/bhopal-the-worlds-worst-

industrial-disaster-30-years-later/100864/.
5 András Tilcsik and Chris Clearfield, "Five years after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, we are closer
than ever to catastrophe", Guardian, 17 April 2015. Available at: www.theguardian.com/sustainable-

business/2015/apr/17/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-catastrophe-five-years.
The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working
internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy
-1-
irregular, dangerous, unethical or harmful practices. Whistleblowers require legal

protection against reprisals because they often work within power structures which
are responsible for the problematic behaviour. Furthermore, in many cases,
employees are subject to confidentiality rules which legally prohibit them from
releasing information, including information about wrongdoing. And cases of
serious misconduct, such as human rights violations, often engage national security,
leaving whistleblowers potentially exposed to criminal prosecution under secrecy
laws.

Whistleblower protections are ultimately grounded in the right to freedom of
expression, as spelled out in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).6 This includes a right to impart information, which applies
to both whistleblowers and other sources of information. Even more importantly, it
also includes the right to seek and receive information and it is the right of the
general public to access information of public importance that provides the
fundamental underpinning for whistleblower protection. In a similar fashion,
freedom of expression also includes well-established principles protecting the
confidentiality of sources of information.7

Whistleblower protection has been explicitly recognised and supported by leading
international bodies, including the Council of Europe and the Organization of
American States. The latter, for example, has adopted a model law on the protection
of whistleblowers8 while at least 60 States around the world have adopted some
form of whistleblower protection law.9

The problem of corruption warrants special mention in this context. 178 countries
are party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, including Tanzania,
which ratified the Convention on 25 May 2005.10 The Convention calls for protection
for whistleblowers as a key tool for combating corruption.11 Corruption is of course
a global scourge, but the need to combat it is particularly pronounced in Tanzania.
According to Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index,
6 UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976.

7 See, for example, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression, 108th Regular Session, 19 October 2000, principle 8. Available at:
http://www.iachr.org/declaration.htm.
8 Organization of American States, Model Law to Facilitate and Encourage the Reporting of Acts of
Corruption and to Protect Whistle-blowers and Witnesses, March 2013. Available at:
www.oas.org/juridico/english/draft_model_reporting.pdf.
9 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, A/70/361, 8 September 2015, para. 27. Available at:
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/361.
10 See www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.
11 UN General Assembly Resolution 58/4, 31 October 2013, in force 14 December 2015, Articles 32-
33. Available at: treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-

14&chapter=18&lang=en.
-2-
Tanzania ranks 117th out of the 168 countries surveyed, with an overall score of just
30 percent, including a 37 percent score on controlling corruption.12

Last year, the Government of Tanzania adopted the Whistleblower and Witness
Protection Act, 2015 (the Act). This is an important positive step towards meeting
the international standards noted above, and the Act has a number of positive
features, such as extending protection across the private and public sectors and
allowing for disclosures based on a relatively broad set of grounds. At the same time,
it also has a number of shortcomings. The most serious of these is a broad and vague
set of exceptions, in the form of subject areas where disclosures are not protected,
which would very seriously undermine the Act’s ability to facilitate disclosures of
wrongdoing.

This Analysis assesses the Act in light of international standards relating to
whistleblowers. As a result of the broad recognition of the importance of
whistleblower protection, there is a strong foundation of well-established principles
for crafting an effective whistleblower protection law. Based on this assessment, the
Analysis provides a set of recommendations for possible reform and improvement
of the Act. We urge Tanzania’s government to consider these recommendations in
light of the need to ensure that the benefits of a strong whistleblower protection
framework may be fully enjoyed by Tanzanians. It is also important for the
government to undertake appropriate measures to publicise the existence of the Act
so that potential whistleblowers are aware of its existence.

1. Scope and Exceptions

Among the most important aspects of a whistleblower protection law is how it
defines whistleblowing. Section 4 of the Act allows for public interest disclosures
where a person believes that a violation of the law or a crime has been committed or
is likely to be committed, that a public institution is wasting, mismanaging or
misappropriating resources or otherwise abusing their office, or if there are threats
to the health or safety of an individual or community or the environment.

These are reasonably broad grounds for disclosure. However, there are potential
public interests which this list does not address. For example, South Africa’s
Protected Disclosures Act also provides protection for disclosures about unfair
discrimination.13 Other specific areas to cover might include a breach of human
rights or humanitarian law, a miscarriage of justice and/or concealing information
related to an investigation. In their 2015 Joint Declaration, the United Nations (UN)
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for
12 See www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table.
13 Act 26 of 2000, s. 1(i). Available at: www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-026.pdf.
-3-
Security and Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the

Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information even called for protection to be
extended generally to cover all “other threats to the overall public interest”.14

A far more serious problem in the Act is the list of exceptions to whistleblower
protection under section 6. According to section 6, disclosures of wrongdoing are
not permitted if they would be likely to cause prejudice to the “sovereignty and
integrity of the United Republic of Tanzania, the security of the State, friendly
relations with a foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to commit an offence and the
disclosure of proceedings of the Cabinet”. This list is so broad that it would very
seriously undermine the efficacy of the entire protection framework.

Many of the most important whistleblowers, such as Edward Snowden, disclosed
information about matters relating to national security. These disclosures, which
often expose grave misconduct at the highest levels, are among the most important
to facilitate. Significant disclosures of information on human rights violations might
well impact on friendly relations with foreign States, among other things because
these States might take a stand against the abuses. The LuxLeaks scandal, exposed
by whistleblower Antoine Deltour, which uncovered Luxembourg’s involvement in
international tax avoidance schemes certainly impacted the country’s friendly
relations with its European neighbours, which has suffered tax losses due to the
scheme. The exception for information that is defamatory is particularly troubling as
it effectively means that a disclosure which impugns the reputation of someone (as
virtually every exposure of wrongdoing does) will only be protected if the
whistleblower is capable of defending its veracity against a defamation charge.
Samuel Shaw, an 18th century United States naval officer who is recognised as one of
the earliest whistleblowers for reporting the torture of British prisoners of war, was
himself sued for defamation by the officer he exposed.15

Even if a whistleblower’s information is strong enough to stand up in court, the
uncertainty as to whether they will enjoy proper legal protection will substantially
chill the willingness of whistleblowers to come forward, thus eroding the main
purpose of the Act. Indeed, the whole idea behind whistleblower protection is that
all that is needed to come forward is a reasonable belief in the truth of the
14 Adopted 4 May 2015, clause 5(b). Available at: www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/JD-2015.final_.Eng_.pdf. The special international mandates on freedom

of expression have adopted a Joint Declaration every year since 1999.
15 More information about Shaw can be found in Stephen M. Kohn, “The Whistle-Blowers of 1777”
The New York Times, 12 June 2011. Available at:

www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/opinion/13kohn.html?_r=0.
-4-
allegations, rather than a fine appreciation of legal complexities. A better way to

address concerns about having very sensitive information about important public
interests being made public is through the rules on reporting, as discussed in the
following section.

Recommendations:

Ø Section 4 should be expanded to allow for disclosures regarding a breach of
human rights, a miscarriage of justice and/or concealing information related
to an investigation and unfair discrimination, and consideration should be
given to covering any threat to the public interest.
Ø Section 6, which includes a list of matters which are excluded from
whistleblower protection, should be repealed.

2. The Reporting Mechanism

Another problem with the Act is that it contains only rather vague procedures for
how information should be disclosed. According to section 4, disclosures should be
made to a “Competent Authority”, defined in the case of disclosures within the
whistleblower’s institution as a superior person of that institution who has an
authority to investigate the wrongdoing or, if the matter is beyond his powers, to
forward the same to another institution responsible for investigation. In the case of
disclosures outside of the whistleblower’s institution, the Competent Authority is a
superior person who has the authority to investigate the wrongdoing. Section 4(2)
also allows the whistleblower the alternative of disclosing the information to “a
person who has authority in a locality or a person in whom he has trust and that
person shall transmit the disclosure to a Competent Authority”.

While some flexibility in reporting mechanisms is good, in order to enable
whistleblowers to choose the avenue which works best for them, section 4 is too
unclear. In particular, it essentially requires whistleblowers to have a strong
understanding of the powers of senior figures within their organisation, so as to
disclose to the person who has the power to resolve the problem. This is
problematic since it might make it difficult for potential whistleblowers to
determine to whom, exactly, they should be disclosing information. Moreover,
smaller organisations may not have anyone who is vested with internal powers to
investigate a matter or any real external oversight body. One option would be to
require bodies to appoint or designate a recipient of whistleblowing disclosures,
which is helpful However, this would not resolve another common challenge with
making disclosures internally, namely that if the problem being disclosed is
-5-
widespread, most or all senior figures could be implicated in the wrongdoing,

meaning there will be no safe avenue for disclosure. Even where some senior
officials are not complicit, potential whistleblowers may have difficulty determining
who is or is not involved, which may mean they do not feel confident in approaching
the designated person.

While whistleblowers should be given the option of disclosing the matter to a
superior, better practice is also to designate specific options for external disclosure.
These designated officials may be judicial or administrative, but should have
sufficient powers and independence to protect the whistleblower from retribution.
The United Kingdom’s Public Interest Disclosure Act allows for disclosures to a
person’s employer, or to a list of prescribed officials, depending on the subject
matter, such as the Office of Communications (OfCom) for matters relating to
broadcasting and communication, or the Information Commissioner for matters
related to freedom of information or data protection.16 In South Korea, the Act on
the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers allows for disclosures to the Anti-
Corruption & Civil Rights Commission, which is given general authority over
whistleblowers.17 However, Korean whistleblowers are also given the option of
reporting the wrongdoing to their employer or another administrative agency or
supervisory body which holds authority in the area. South Africa’s Protected
Disclosures Act also grants whistleblowers a measure of flexibility, allowing for
protected disclosures to a legal advisor, an employer or a person authorised by
them, a member of Cabinet or the Executive Council of a province, or other
prescribed persons, including the Public Protector or the Auditor General.18

Section 5(2) allows whistleblowers to go public with any disclosure, although it is
conditional upon meeting the provisions of section 4, which appears to mean that
the information must also be provided to a Competent Authority. In many cases
open disclosure of information is in the public interest, and openness regarding
misconduct is a key facet of democratic accountability. At the same time, there will
inevitably be cases where whistleblowers bring forward information that is highly
sensitive, the public disclosure of which could harm vital public interests. The Act
seeks to balance the competing interests through its wide-ranging complete
exclusions to the system of whistleblowing in section 6, as discussed above. A far
better solution would be to impose limits on public disclosures, and then to do away
with the section 6 exclusions. For example, South Africa’s Protected Disclosures Act
16 See: Department of Business, Innovation & Skills, "Blowing the Whistle to a Prescribed Person",
February 2016. Available at:

www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/510962/BIS-16-79-
blowing-the-whistle-to-a-prescribed-person.pdf.
17 Act No. 10472 of 2011, Article 4. Available at: www.moleg.go.kr/FileDownload.mo?flSeq=39685.
18 Act 26 of 2000, ss. 6-8. Available at: www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-026.pdf.
-6-
mandates that disclosures should be made to a prescribed authority, and it allows

for public disclosures only if one of the following conditions applies:

(a) that at the time the employee who makes the disclosure has reason to believe
that he or she will be subjected to an occupational detriment if he or she makes a
disclosure to his or her employer in accordance with section 6;
(b) that, in a case where no person or body is prescribed for the purposes of section
8 in relation to the relevant impropriety , the employee making the disclosure has
reason to believe that it is likely that evidence relating to the impropriety will be
concealed or destroyed if he or she makes the disclosure to his or her employer ;
(c) that the employee making the disclosure has previously made a disclosure of
substantially the same information to-
(i) his or her employer ; or
(ii) a person or body referred to in section 8,  in respect of which no action
was taken within a reasonable period after the disclosure ; or 
(d) that the impropriety is of an exceptionally serious nature.19

In addition to limiting public disclosures to cases where using the internal systems
will pose a risk to the whistleblower or would result in the destruction of the
evidence, where the whistleblower has gone through the internal mechanisms and
found them to be ineffective, or where the disclosure relates to an imminent and
serious risk of danger to a person or the environment, section 5(2) could also limit
the scope of disclosures of sensitive information to what is necessary to expose the
wrongdoing. It could also impose a requirement that the whistleblower genuinely
believed that the disclosure was in the overall public interest.

Recommendations:

Ø The Act should be amended to grant whistleblowers the option of either
disclosing their information to a senior official in their organisation, or to a
designated oversight body or other senior public figure or body.
Ø Section 5(2) should be amended so that public disclosures are only allowed
in certain cases, as described above.
Ø Section 5(2) could also limit the scope of public disclosures to what is
necessary to expose the wrongdoing and/or impose a requirement that the
whistleblower had a genuine belief that the (public) disclosure was in the
public interest.

3. Protections

19 Act 26 of 2000, s. 9(2).
-7-
Given the broad public interest in encouraging whistleblowers to come forward, it is

imperative that a good whistleblower law should provide robust protection against
retaliation. Section 9 of the Act, which establishes the protection regime, only
applies where a whistleblower makes a disclosure in good faith. As long as a
whistleblower exposes wrongdoing, and believes that their disclosures are true,
their motivations should not be relevant. Thus, the 2015 Joint Declaration of the
special international mandates on freedom of expression extends protection to
whistleblowers “as long as at the time of the disclosure they had reasonable grounds
to believe that the information disclosed was substantially true and
exposed wrongdoing”.20

Some systems even provide monetary incentives for whistleblowers to come
forward, encouraging them to view their disclosures through the filter of personal
gains.

For example, in the United States the Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower
provision states that, where whistleblowers come forward with evidence of tax
evasion or underpayment of an amount greater than USD 2 million, the
whistleblower will receive an award of between 15-30% of the collected proceeds
(including penalties and interest).21 This highly pragmatic approach is focused on
the end result of having misconduct brought to light, with no consideration of
whether disclosures are motivated by a desire to do the right thing. It appears to be
effective. Over the course of 2013, the Internal Revenue Service paid out USD 53
million on recovered revenue of USD 367 million.22 Section 13 of the Act envisions a
process for “rewarding and compensation of whistleblowers”, hinting that there is at
least some allowance for facilitating those who wish to come forward for selfish
reasons.

According to sections 10 and 11, primary responsibility for providing protection to
the whistleblower is delegated to the Competent Authority, who is directed to either
protect them or issue appropriate directions to institutions which are capable of
rendering protection. It is unclear how this might work. Even a senior employee
working for the Ministry of Education, for example, would not be able to direct the
police to institute criminal proceedings for retaliation against a whistleblower or to
effect a transfer of employment to another ministry, let alone to relocation a person
to another place of residence, as envisaged in section 12. Senior figures in the
private sector would be even less equipped to take on this role.

20 Note 14.
21 26 U.S.C.A. § 7623(b)(1).
22 "'Too little, too late': IRS pays out $53mn to whistleblowers on 2013 tax evaders", Russia Today, 6
April 2014. Available at: www.rt.com/usa/irs-whistle-blowers-pay-657/.
-8-
Instead, better practice, at least in relation to employment measures, is to make it an

offence for anyone to subject a whistleblower to retaliatory measures, and, in
relation to legal retaliation, to make it clear that such cases are not legitimate. It
would then fall to the police to investigate these offences and, in cases where there
is a risk of physical retaliation, to provide protection to whistleblowers who request
it.

The Act should also provide a broader definition of retaliation. Currently, sections
10 and 11 prohibit a whistleblower from being subjected to threats against his life
or property or the life or property of persons close to him or her, as well as against
“dismissal, suspension, harassment, discrimination or intimidation by his
employer”. This should be expanded to include protection against civil or criminal
liability, as well as a more general protection against adverse consequences. For
example, India’s Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2011, states:

The Central Government shall ensure that no person or a public servant who has
made a disclosure under this Act is victimised by initiation of any proceedings or
otherwise merely on the ground that such person or a public servant had made a
disclosure or rendered assistance in inquiry under this Act.23

It is also useful to provide a clear, albeit non-exclusive, list of some of the main types
of employment retaliation that are prohibited. South Africa’s Protected Disclosures
Act includes a fairly comprehensive list of potential reprisals, stating that a
whistleblower may not, as a result of making a protected disclosure, be subjected to
any “occupational detriment”, defined as:

(a) being subject to any disciplinary action;
(b) being dismissed, suspended, demoted, harassed, or intimidated;
(c) being transferred against his or her will;
(d) being refused transfer or promotion;
(e) being subject to a term or condition of employment or retirement which is
altered or kept altered to his or her disadvantage;
(f) being refused a reference or being provided with an adverse reference, from his
or her employer;
(g) being denied appointment to any employment, profession or office;
(h) being threatened with any of the actions referred to in paragraphs (a) to (g)
above; or
(i) being otherwise adversely affected in respect of his or her employment
profession or office, including employment opportunities and work security;24

One other important area of protection for whistleblowers is maintaining the
secrecy of their identity. Although section 16(1) makes it an offence for the
competent authority or anyone under their authority to disclose the identity of a
whistleblower, this should be extended so that it is an offence for anyone to reveal
23 No. 17 of 2014, s. 11(1). Available at: egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2014/159420.pdf.

24 Act 26 of 2000, s. 1. Available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-026.pdf.
-9-
the identity of a whistleblower. In this regard, India’s Whistleblowers Protection

Act, 2011, states:

Any person, who negligently or mala fidely reveals the identity of a complainant
shall, without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act, be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend up to three years and also to fine which
may extend up to fifty thousand rupees.25

Ideally, the authority which receives complaints should not even confirm that a
disclosure was made, unless this is necessary to resolve the wrongdoing.

Recommendations:

Ø Section 9(a), which requires that whistleblowers make their disclosures in
good faith in order to be protected, should be repealed.
Ø Sections 10, 11 and 12 should be amended so that it is a general offence to
retaliate against whistleblowers, so that it becomes the responsibility of the
police to prosecute such cases (as well as to provide physical protection to
whistleblowers where this is necessary).
Ø Sections 10 and 11 should be amended to say that whistleblowers should
suffer no adverse consequences as a result of their disclosure, which should
include protection against civil or criminal liability. They could also provide a
list of specific adverse employment consequences which were prohibited.
Ø Section 16(1), which makes it an offence to disclose the identity of a
whistleblower, should apply to everyone.

4. Other Sanctions

A whistleblower protection law requires teeth to be effective. These are contained in
sections 16 and 17 of the Act. Section 16(2) makes it an offence if the Competent
Authority fails to take action as a result of a whistleblower complaint if that failure
leads to a loss to a public institution. This is not an ideal formulation since it neglects
several potential categories of harm, such as environmental damage or private
sector embezzlement. Rather than linking criminal sanctions to specific types of
consequences, the Act should require whomever receives a complaint to follow up.
If they fail to do so, there is always the potential that the whistleblower will go
public with the information, which should serve as enough of an incentive to take
cases seriously.

25 No. 17 of 2014, s. 16. Available at: egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2014/159420.pdf.
- 10 -
Section 17(1) of the Act also makes it an offence for persons who knowingly disclose
information relating to a wrongdoing which is false. This provision is problematical,
even though it is limited to knowingly false disclosures. The mere presence of
potential criminal liability for people who come forward could serve to chill their
willingness to become whistleblowers. It is important to bear in mind that, even
with strong protections in place, the decision to expose misconduct can be intensely
nerve-wracking. Whistleblowers are often betraying friends and colleagues, and
making powerful enemies in the process. In other words, the disincentives against
coming forward are already more than strong enough. In addition, any
whistleblower who comes forward with demonstrably false information will already
face potential employment contract measures, and other legal sanctions, including
potentially for the violation of secrecy laws, defamation laws, and so on. Additional
criminal penalties are unnecessary and counterproductive through their potential to
create an additional chilling effect on legitimate acts of whistleblowing.

Section 17(2), which makes it illegal for a whistleblower to provide information
regarding their disclosure to those to whom it relates should also be deleted. Often,
whistleblowers will not understand the full extent of the misconduct they are
reporting, and this prohibition thus places then in a difficult position. Furthermore,
it would, indirectly or through the back door, effectively rule out any public
disclosures (since these would automatically be at least potentially available to the
target of the information). Finally, the point raised in the previous paragraph about
avoiding any potential chilling effect on whistleblowers is also relevant here.

Recommendations:

Ø Section 16(2), which creates a criminal offence for any Competent Authority
who fails to take an action on wrongdoing reported by a whistleblower,
should be amended so that instead the Act places a legal obligation on any
recipient of a disclosure to follow up on it.
Ø Section 17(1), which criminalises false disclosures, should be repealed.
Ø Section 17(2), which makes it illegal for a whistleblower to provide
information regarding their disclosure to those to whom it relates, should be
repealed.

- 11 -

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Tanzania

Analysis of the Whistleblower and Witness

Centre for Law and Democracy

1 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0

December 2014. Available at: www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/bhopal-the-worlds-worst-

than ever to catastrophe", Guardian, 17 April 2015. Available at: www.theguardian.com/sustainable-

irregular, dangerous, unethical or harmful practices. Whistleblowers require legal

6 UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976.

33. Available at: treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-

1. Scope and Exceptions

Security and Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the

14 Adopted 4 May 2015, clause 5(b). Available at: www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-

content/uploads/2015/05/JD-2015.final_.Eng_.pdf. The special international mandates on freedom

The New York Times, 12 June 2011. Available at:

allegations, rather than a fine appreciation of legal complexities. A better way to

2. The Reporting Mechanism

widespread, most or all senior figures could be implicated in the wrongdoing,

February 2016. Available at:

mandates that disclosures should be made to a prescribed authority, and it allows

19 Act 26 of 2000, s. 9(2).

Given the broad public interest in encouraging whistleblowers to come forward, it is

April 2014. Available at: www.rt.com/usa/irs-whistle-blowers-pay-657/.

Instead, better practice, at least in relation to employment measures, is to make it an

23 No. 17 of 2014, s. 11(1). Available at: egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2014/159420.pdf.

the identity of a whistleblower. In this regard, India’s Whistleblowers Protection

25 No. 17 of 2014, s. 16. Available at: egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2014/159420.pdf.

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