Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, February 11, 2008
Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, February 11, 2008
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126297, February 11, 2008
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD and
ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents,
G.R. No. 126467
NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children
MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR.,
EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and
RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE AGANA,
Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
JUAN FUENTES, Respondents,
G.R. No. 127590
MIGUEL AMPIL, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE
AGANA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
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On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for
damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes.
PSI, Dr. Ampil and the Aganas filed with this Court separate petitions
for review on certiorari. On January 31, 2007, the Court, through its
First Division, rendered a Decision holding that PSI is jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Ampil for the following reasons: first, there is
an employer-employee relationship between Medical City and Dr.
Ampil. The Court relied on Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[2] holding that for
the purpose of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals
and their attending and visiting physicians; second, PSI’s act of publicly
displaying in the lobby of the Medical City the names and
specializations of its accredited physicians, including Dr. Ampil,
estopped it from denying the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between them under the doctrine of ostensible agency
or agency by estoppel; and third, PSI’s failure to supervise Dr. Ampil
and its resident physicians and nurses and to take an active step in
order to remedy their negligence rendered it directly liable under the
doctrine of corporate negligence.
In its motion for reconsideration, PSI contends that the Court erred in
finding it liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, there being no
employer-employee relationship between it and its consultant, Dr.
Ampil. PSI stressed that the Court’s Decision in Ramos holding that
“an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals
and their attending and visiting physicians for the purpose of
apportioning responsibility” had been reversed in a subsequent
Resolution.[3] Further, PSI argues that the doctrine of ostensible
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xxx
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xxx
Clearly, PSI is estopped from passing the blame solely to Dr. Ampil.
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Its act of displaying his name and those of the other physicians in the
public directory at the lobby of the hospital amounts to holding out to
the public that it offers quality medical service through the listed
physicians. This justifies Atty. Agana’s belief that Dr. Ampil was a
member of the hospital’s staff. It must be stressed that under the
doctrine of apparent authority, the question in every case is
whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent
in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular
business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority
to perform the particular act in question.[6] In these cases, the
circumstances yield a positive answer to the question.
Unfortunately, PSI had been remiss in its duty. It did not conduct an
immediate investigation on the reported missing gauzes to the great
prejudice and agony of its patient. Dr. Jocson, a member of PSI’s
medical staff, who testified on whether the hospital conducted an
investigation, was evasive, thus:
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x x x x x x
Atty. Agana
Court
By that answer, would you mean to tell the Court
that you were aware if there was such a move done
by the hospital?
A I cannot answer that, your honor, because I did
not have any more follow-up of the case that
happened until now.[9]
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negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also
directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.
Moreover, there is merit in the trial court’s finding that the failure of
PSI to conduct an investigation “established PSI’s part in the dark
conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.” The
following testimony of Atty. Agana supports such findings, thus:
SO ORDERED.
[1]
The medical staff was composed of physicians, both residents and
interns, as well as nurses.
[2]
G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 584.
[3]
Promulgated on April 11, 2002.
[4]
G.R. No. 142625, December 19, 2006, 511 SCRA 204.
[5]
TSN, April 12, 1985, pp. 25-26.
[6]
Id., citing Hudson V.C., Loan Assn., Inc. v. Horowytz, 116 N.J.L. 605,
608, 186 A 437 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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[7]
The corporate negligence doctrine imposes several duties on a
hospital: (1) to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and
adequate facilities and equipment; (2) to select and retain only
competent physicians; (3) to oversee as to patient care all persons who
practice medicine within its walls; and (4) to formulate, adopt, and
enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for its
patients. These special tort duties arise from the special relationship
existing between a hospital or nursing home and its patients, which are
based on the vulnerability of the physically or mentally ill persons and
their inability to provide care for themselves. 40 A Am Jur 2d 28 citing
Funkhouser v. Wilson, 89 Wash. App. 644, 950 P 2d 501 (Div.1 1998),
review granted, 135 Wash. 2d 1001,959 P 2d 126 (1998).
[8]
Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P2d 335 (1972).
[9]
TSN, February 26, 1987, pp. 26-28.
[10]
TSN, November 22, 1985, pp. 52-53.
Batas.org
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