G.R. No.

212674

FIRST DIVISION

March 25, 2019

G.R. No. 212674

CENTRAL VISAYAS FINANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
SPOUSES ELIEZER** S. ADLAWAN and LEILA ADLAWAN, AND
SPOUSES ELIEZER** ADLAWAN, SR. and ELENA ADLAWAN,
Respondents

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the February 15, 2013
Decision2 and April 24, 2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which denied the appeal in CA-G.R. CEB-C.V. No. 02899 and
affirmed the July 31, 2008 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 8 (RTC), in Civil Case No. CEB-24841.
:
 Factual Antecedents

In 1996, respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan obtained a

Php3,669,685.00 loan from petitioner Central Visayas Finance
Corporation covered by a Promissory Note,5 Chattel Mortgage6
over a Komatsu Highway Dump Truck, and a Continuing Guaranty7
executed by respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan.

Eliezer and Leila Adlawan failed to pay the loan, prompting petitioner
to file an action against respondents for replevin before Branch 58
of the Cebu Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
22294.

In a June 22, 1999 decision, the trial court ruled in petitioner's favor,
and respondents were ordered to deliver possession of the dump
truck to petitioner. Petitioner then foreclosed on the chattel
mortgage and caused the sale at public auction of the dump truck,
which was then sold to it as the highest bidder for Php500,000.00.8

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In 2000, petitioner commenced a second case before the RTC -

Civil Case No. CEB-24841 - this time for collection of sum of money
and/or deficiency judgment relative to respondents' supposed
unpaid balance on their loan, which petitioner claimed to be at
Php2,104,604.97 - less the value of dump truck - with damages.
This time, petitioner in its Amended Complaint9 sought to hold
respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan liable on their continuing
guaranty.

On July 31, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, decreeing as follows:

:
 This resolves the affirmative defenses of (a) res judicata; (b)
violation of the rule against forum shopping; and (c) estoppel,
pleaded by the defendants in their answer10 and for which they
were preliminarily heard as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

xxxx

Contending that defendants Eliezer and Leila still have a balance

of ₱2,104,604.97 as of July 12, 1999, exclusive of interest,
penalty, attorney's fees, cost of the suit and collection expenses,
it filed the instant case, to which the defendants pleaded the
subject affirmative defenses.

The Court agrees with the defendants that the instant complaint
is barred by res judicata under Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.

The judgment of the 58th Branch of this Court in Civil Case No.
CEB-22294, which involves, as in this case, the same parties,
subject matter and cause of action, i.e., non-payment of the loan,
secured by a mortgage over the above vehicle, obtained by
defendants Eliezer and Leila from the plaintiff, was one on the
merits, rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof and the parties therein, and had become final.

The plaintiffs remedy should have been to appeal from the above
judgment for its alleged failure to consider defendants Eliezer
and Leila's whole obligation. If, for the sake of argument, the
amount of said defendants' whole obligation to the plaintiff was
not actually raised in said case, hence, the failure of the 58th
Branch of this Court to consider it, it is still covered and barred
:
 by res judicata under the above-cited Rule because it is one that
could have been raised therein.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs complaint having been barred by res

judicata, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner moved to reconsider, but was rebuffed.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner appealed the above Order of the trial court before the CA,
claiming that the trial court erred in ruling that res judicata applied,
in that there is no identity of cause of action between Civil Case No.
CEB-22294 and Civil Case No. CEB-24841, as the first was one for
the recovery of personal property used as collateral in the loan,
while the latter case was one for deficiency judgment and based on
the continuing guaranty executed by Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan.

On February 15, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision, which

contains the following pronouncement:

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a complaint may be dismissed

when, upon the comparison of the two actions, there is (1) an
identity between the parties or at least such as representing the
same interest in both actions; (2) a similarity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for (that is, the relief is founded on the same
facts); and (3) identity in the two actions is such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, fully adjudicate or settle
the issues raised in the action under consideration.
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 xxxx

A reading of the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 22294 would
show that the principal relief was for the recovery of the
possession of the dump truck, which was used as a collateral in
the mortgage contract between the parties. In the event that
delivery thereof cannot be effected, plaintiff stated an alternative
prayer, that is, for the defendants to pay the amount of
Php2,604,604.97 which represented the outstanding obligation
of the defendants. Since the first relief was granted by the trial
court, which is the delivery of the dump truck, was it necessary
for the trial court to pronounce the full monetary liability of the
defendants in the said action? Moreover, may the plaintiff still
recover the deficiency of the monetary obligation incurred by the
defendants?

The issue presented in this case is not novel. The instant case
has similar facts and circumstances with that of the case of PCI
Leasing v. Dai.12 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that an
action for replevin, which is both an action in personam and in
rem, bars the deficiency suit because the deficiency could well
be raised in the replevin case. x x x

xxxx

Plaintiff also asserts that there is no identity of parties because

Elena Adlawan was not sued in the first case. It is based on the
Continuing [Guaranty] executed by Elena Adlawan for which she
was sued. Hence, it is plaintiffs postulate that had the proceeds
of the first action been sufficient, there would have been no need
to file the second case against Elena Adlawan to enforce her
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 guaranty.

However, it should be stressed that only substantial identity is

necessary to warrant the application of res judicata and the
addition or elimination of some parties would not even alter the
situation. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a
community of interest between the party in the first case and a
party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in
the first case. In this case, there is no question that Elena
Adlawan, acting as a guarantor, has the same interest and
defenses as that of the principal debtors Spouses Eliezar and
Leilani Adlawan. Her exclusion in the first case is therefore of no
moment, res judicata still applies.

As to the damages and other fees being claimed by the

defendants, We are inclined to deny it. It is the plaintiff-
appellant's belief that it has a right to institute a deficiency
judgment against the defendants and there should be no
premium on its right to litigate however erroneous such
presumption can be. Moreover, bad faith was not raised as an
issue and none is evident in this case.

There being no reversible error committed by the trial court, We

find no cogent reason to reverse its findings, thus, warranting the
dismissal of this appeal.

WHEREFORE, this appeal is DENIED. The Order dated July 31,

2008 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City
dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-24841 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the plaintiff-appellant.
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 SO ORDERED.13

Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in its April 24, 2014 Resolution,

the CA stood its ground. Thus, the instant Petition.

Issues

In an August 24, 2015 Resolution,14 this Court resolved to give due

course to the Petition, which contains the following assignment of
errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE

DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
OF PETITIONER FOR DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT UNDER CIVIL
CASE NO. 24841 CONSIDERING THE ABSENCE OF IDENTITY OF
PARTIES AND SIMILARITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION IN THE
EARLIER COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN IN CIVIL CASE NO. 22294.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE

DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN PCI LEASING VS.
DAI, G.R. NO. 148980, SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 TO THE CASE OF
HEREIN PETITIONER.15

Petitioner's Arguments

In praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that,

instead, respondents be adjudged solidarity liable for its monetary
claims in Civil Case No. CEB-24841, petitioner pleads in its Petition
and Reply16 that the CA erred in ruling that res judicata applies to
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 the subsequent case for collection of deficiency against Eliezer, Sr.
and Elena Adlawan as guarantors in the loan agreement between
petitioner and respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan; that the
causes of action, parties, and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No.
CEB-22294 - the case for replevin - are not identical or similar to
the causes of action, parties, and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No.
CEB-24841 - which is a collection case founded on the liability on
the continuing guaranty executed by respondents Eliezer, Sr. and
Elena Adlawan; that the cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-24841
arose only after the foreclosure sale of the dump truck recovered in
the replevin case, when it became apparent that the proceeds from
the auction sale were not enough to satisfy the outstanding
obligation on the loan; and that the cited case of PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc. v. Dai does not apply to the instant case because there
is no identity of causes of action and parties in the two cases - Civil
Case No. CEB-22294 and Civil Case No. CEB-24841 - since
petitioner in the latter case was seeking to hold respondents liable
on the continuing guaranty executed by Eliezer, Sr. and Elena
Adlawan, who were not parties to the replevin case.

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, counter in their Comment17 that

the Petition is a mere rehash of the arguments presented in the trial
and appellate courts; that the CA is correct in finding that res
judicata applies in the subsequent case - Civil Case No. CEB-24841
- filed by petitioner; that the pronouncement in the PCI Leasing case
applies, in that an action for replevin - which is both an action in
personam and in rem - bars a deficiency suit because the deficiency
could have been raised in the replevin case; and that it was
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 erroneous for petitioner to have filed a collection/deficiency case, as
it should have appealed the trial court's decision instead.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

For reference and emphasis, we reproduce petitioner's prayer in

Civil Case No. CEB-22294, or the case for replevin which is the first
action filed by petitioner, viz.;

a. to forthwith issue a writ of replevin ordering the seizure of the

motor vehicle, with all its accessories and equipment, together
with the registration certificate thereof, and direct the delivery
thereof to plaintiff in accordance with law, and after due hearing,
declare that plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the motor
vehicle and confirm its seizure and delivery to plaintiff;

b. or, in the event that manual delivery of the motor vehicle

cannot be effected, to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants ordering them to pay to plaintiff, the
sum of Php2,604,604.97 plus interest and penalty thereon from
June 3, 1998 until fully paid as provided in the promissory note;

c. In either case, to order defendant to pay jointly and severally:

1. The sum of Php651,151.24 as attorney's fees and liquidated

damages, plus bonding fees and other expenses incurred in the
seizure of the said motor vehicle; and

2. costs of suit.18

Clearly, petitioner's prayer for relief in its complaint in Civil Case No.
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 CEB-22294 was in the alternative, and not cumulative or
successive, to wit: recover possession of the dump truck, or, if
recovery is no longer feasible, a money judgment for the
outstanding loan amount. Petitioner did not pray for both reliefs
cumulatively or successively. "The rule is that a party is entitled only
to such relief consistent with and limited to that sought by the
pleadings or incidental thereto. A trial court would be acting beyond
its jurisdiction if it grants relief to a party beyond the scope of the
pleadings."19

By praying for recovery of possession with a money judgment as a

mere alternative relief in Civil Case No. CEB-22294, and when it did
not pursue a claim for deficiency at any time during the
proceedings in said case, including appeal, petitioner led the
courts to believe that it was not interested in suing for a deficiency
so long as it recovered possession of the dump truck; after all, the
basis of its alternative relief for collection of the outstanding loan is
the same as that of its prayer for replevin - the respondents' unpaid
obligation in the amount of Php2,604,604.97, plus interest and
penalty. Its actions were thus consistent with and limited to the
allegations and relief sought in its pleadings. This consistency in
action carried on until the dump truck was foreclosed and sold at
auction.

In case of a loan secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single

cause of action against the debtor - the recovery of the credit with
execution upon the security. The creditor cannot split his single
cause of action by filing a complaint on the loan, and thereafter
another separate complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. This is
the ruling in the case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal,20
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 where the Court held:

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor

has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause
of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of
the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make
two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his
mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the
non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a
single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage
constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the
former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single
breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules
above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a
complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the
filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By
allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints
simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be
authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at
so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and
oppression to the debtor.

In PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Dai21 cited by respondents, the

specific issue of whether a judgment in a replevin case would bar a
subsequent action for deficiency judgment was raised. The Court
resolved the question in the affirmative, thus:

For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the
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 former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment
or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.

Petitioner denies the existence of identity of causes of action

between the replevin case and the case for deficiency judgment
or collection of sum of money. x x x

xxxx

Petitioner's position fails.

Petitioner ignores the fact that it prayed in the replevin case that
in the event manual delivery of the vessel could not be effected,
the court render judgment in its favor by ordering [herein
respondents] to pay ... the sum of P3,502,095.00 plus interest
and penalty thereon from October 12, 1994 until fully paid as
provided in the Promissory Note.

Since petitioner had extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel

mortgage over the vessel even before the pre-trial of the
case, it should have therein raised as issue during the pre-
trial the award of a deficiency judgment. After all, the basis
of its above-stated alternative prayer was the same as that
of its prayer for replevin - the default of respondents in the
payment of the monthly installments of their loan. But it did
not.

Section 49 of Rule 39 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which

governed petitioner's complaint for replevin filed on October 27,
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 1994, and which Section is reproduced as Section 47 of the
present Rules, reads:

SEC. 49. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a

judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or

in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the
estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the
probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with

respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their

successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
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 thereto.

Paragraph (a) is the rule on res judicata in judgments in rem.

Paragraph (b) is the rule on res judicata in judgments in
personam. Paragraph (c) is the rule on collusiveness of
judgment.

Petitioner contends that Section 9 of Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules

of Court which reads:

Sec. 9. Judgment. - After trial of the issues, the court shall

determine who has the right of possession to and the value of
the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the
delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value
in case delivery cannot be made, and also for such damages as
either party may prove, with costs,

does not authorize the court to render judgment on the

deficiency after foreclosure, citing BA Finance Corp. v. CA.

But replevin is, as the above-cited BA Finance Corp. case

holds, usually described as a mixed action.1âшphi1

Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal

remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the
action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal
chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by
another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the
plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action
and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory
in nature and generally determines nothing more than the
right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a
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 mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam —
in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is
concerned, and in personam as regards to damages
involved. As an action in rem, the gist of the replevin action
is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific
personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his
having a special interest therein.

Petitioner's complaint for replevin was doubtless a mixed

action - in rem with respect to its prayer for the recovery of
the vessel, and in personam with respect to its claim for
damages. And it was, with respect to its alternative prayer,
clearly one in personam.

Following paragraph (b) of Section 49, Rule 39 of the 1964

Rules of Court, now [Section] 47 of Rule 39 of the present
Rules, petitioner's second complaint is unquestionably
barred by res judicata.22 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

The Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal and PCI Leasing &
Finance, Inc. v. Dai rulings were reiterated in Allandale Sportsline
Inc. v. The Good Development Corporation,23 where this Court
ruled that -

By causing the auction sale of the mortgaged properties,

respondent effectively adopted and pursued the remedy of
extra-judicial foreclosure, using the writ of replevin as a tool to
get hold of the mortgaged properties. As emphasized in
Bachrach, one effect of respondent's election of the remedy
of extra-judicial foreclosure is its waiver of the remedy of
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 collection of the unpaid loan.

xxxx

However, another effect of its election of the remedy of

extra-judicial foreclosure is that whatever deficiency
remains after applying the proceeds of the auction sale to
the total loan obligation may still be recovered by
respondent.

But to recover any deficiency after foreclosure, the rule is

that a mortgage creditor must institute an independent civil
action.1âшphi1 However, in PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. v.
Dai[,] the Court held that the claim should at least be
included in the pre-trial brief. In said case, the mortgage-
creditor had foreclosed on the mortgaged properties and
sold the same at public auction during the trial on the action
for damages with replevin. After judgment on the replevin
case was rendered, the mortgage-creditor filed another
case, this time for the deficiency amount. The Court
dismissed the second case on the ground of res judicata,
noting that:

Petitioner ignores the fact that it prayed in the replevin case

that in the event manual delivery of the vessel could not be
effected, the court render judgment in its favor by ordering
[herein respondents] to pay x x x the sum of ₱3,502,095.00
plus interest and penalty thereon from October 12, 1994
until fully paid as provided in the Promissory Note.

Since petitioner had extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel

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 mortgage over the vessel even before the pre-trial of the
case, it should have therein raised as issue during the pre-
trial the award of a deficiency judgment. After all, the basis
of its above-stated alternative prayer was the same as that
of its prayer for replevin - the default of respondents in the
payment of the monthly installments of their loan. But it did
not. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Finally, in Marilag v. Martinez,24 the Bachrach ruling was once more

referenced, and the Court therein ruled, as follows:

Petitioner's contention that the judicial foreclosure and collection

cases enforce independent rights must, therefore, fail because
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the subject PN both refer
to one and the same obligation, i.e., Rafael's loan obligation. As
such, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of
that obligation. Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on
Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition for the
judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the
said loan, and, thereafter, a personal action for the collection
of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a
deficiency arising from foreclosure, without violating the
proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where
the ground for dismissal is either res judicata or litis
pendentia, as in this case.

xxxx

Further on the point, the fact that no foreclosure sale appears to

have been conducted is of no moment because the remedy of
foreclosure of mortgage is deemed chosen upon the filing of the
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 complaint therefor. In Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. CA, it
was explained:

x x x In sustaining the rule that prohibits mortgage creditors

from pursuing both the remedies of a personal action for
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, the Court
held in the case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Esteban
Icarangal, et al. that a rule which would authorize the
plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the
mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of
suits so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law and equity,
but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being
sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the
plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.
Hence, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the
suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an
action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court As to extrajudicial
foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the
mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any
court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with
the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.

As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure

proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred
from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection,
regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure
case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the
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 collection case is in order. (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

Contrary to petitioner's stance, the pronouncements in Bachrach

Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal and PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. v. Dai
apply to the instant case. Particularly, the PCI Leasing case is
squarely applicable; the CA committed no error in invoking the ruling
in said case. By failing to seek a deficiency judgment in Civil Case
No. CEB-22294 after its case for recovery of possession was
resolved, petitioner is barred from instituting another action for such
deficiency. Pursuant to Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, on the effect of judgments or final orders cited in the PCI
Leasing case, the judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-22294 is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the petitioner and respondents.

Petitioner's final claim to reversal is that there could be no identity of

causes of action between Civil Case No. CEB-22294 and Civil Case
No. CEB-24841 since the latter case was instituted for the specific
purpose of recovering the deficiency from respondents Eliezer, Sr.
and Elena Adlawan, who were supposedly liable as guarantors on
the continuing guaranty that accompanied the loan agreement
between petitioner and respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan.
However, with the final resolution of Civil Case No. CEB-22294,
petitioner's cause of action against respondents Eliezer, Sr. and
Elena Adlawan is likewise barred. The contract of guaranty is merely
accessory to a principal obligation; it cannot survive without the
latter. Under Article 2076 of the Civil Code, "(t)he obligation of the
guarantor is extinguished at the same time as that of the debtor, and
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 for the same causes as all other obligations." The resolution of Civil
Case No. CEB-22294 and the consequent satisfaction of
petitioner's claim therein bars further recovery via a deficiency
judgment as against respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan, who are
deemed to have paid their loan obligation. For this reason, their
obligation has been extinguished which should, in turn, operate to
the benefit of their corespondents, Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan
whose liability is based on guaranty, a mere accessory contract to
the loan obligation that cannot survive after the extinguishment of
the latter.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 15, 2013

Decision and April 24, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-C.V. No. 02899 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on official leave.

Footnotes

* Also spelled as Eliezar/Eleazar in some parts of the records.

1 Rollo, pp. 9-28.

2 Id. at 30-37; penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L.

Hernando (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and Maria
Elisa Sempio Diy.

3 Id. at 38-39; penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L.

:
 Hernando (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and Marie
Christine Azcarraga-Jacob.

4 Id. at 64-66; penned by Presiding Judge Macaundas M.

Hadjirasul.

5 Id. at 49.

6 Id. at 50-51.

7 Id. at 52.

8 Id. at 46, 53.

9 Id. at 43-48.

10 Id. at 54-63.

11 Id. at 64-66.

12 560 Phil. 84, 92-96 (2007).

13 Rollo, pp. 34-37.

14 Id. at 114-115.

15 Id. at 17.

16 Id. at 109-110.

17 Id. at 104-107.

18 Id. at 35.
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 19 Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 424, 437
(2004).

20 68 Phil. 287, 293-294 (1939).

21 Supra note 12.

22 Id. at 92-96.

23 595 Phil. 265, 280-282 (2008).

24 764 Phil. 576, 589-590 (2015).

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