CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

MODULE 1
LESSON 1. Rule 128: General Provisions, related laws and Classification of Evidence
LESSON 2. Rule 129: Judicial Notice and Admission
LESSON 3. Rule 130 Admissibility of Evidence (Object and Documentary Evidence)
DIRECTIONS
As we go on with the lessons, there are cited Decisions of the Supreme Court
that will elaborate the lesson, as your activity, digest these cases based on the example
that will be provided to you. Also, there are questions posted as checking points in your
module, as your quiz, answer these questions briefly based on your own understanding
on the lesson. Write your case digest and answer in white intermediate paper by your
own handwriting. Submit your output to the means we had discussed, on or before the
target dates specified in the Overview. Follow the instruction properly to avoid receiving
a failing score. Please be guided in the following format of case digest:
CASE DIGEST
 
 
PEOPLE vs REGGIE BERNARDO
G.R. No. 198789, June 3, 2013
First Division
 
           Reggie Bernardo, the accused/appellant, was found by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals guilty of the complex crime of Murder and attempted murder.  On
appeal, the Supreme Court had the occasion to discuss the concept of denial and alibi
as a defense. 
 
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

     The victim Reah Calumag testified that the incident transpired on July 27,
2006 along the National Highway in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte around 11:45 a.m. while she
was aboard a motorcycle driven by her father, Efren Calumag (Efren). Three men on a
motorcycle going in the same direction as the Calumags appeared beside them and
shot them several times. Reah and Efren fell down. While Reah survived and was
treated for her wounds, Efren eventually died. It was while being treated at the hospital
that Reah described one of the assailants to the investigating policemen and told them
that she could recognize him if she would see him again.
 
On July 29, 2006, Reah went to the Sarrat Police Station upon being informed by
the Dingras police chief that they had in their custody a person who fitted the description
of one of the assailants as given by her. They then proceeded to the provincial jail
where a police line-up was conducted, during which she pointed to Bernardo as the
shooter. 
 
Version of the Defense
Bernardo interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He alleged that he was
inside the District Jail of Batac, Ilocos Norte when the crime was committed on July 27,
2006. He was originally a prisoner of the district jail and was ordered to be released on
July 21, 2006. He claimed that because he had nowhere to go, he asked and was
permitted by the Jail Warden to stay in jail. With the Jail Warden’s permission, he went
to Cabugao, Ilocos Sur on July 22, 2006 but returned to the district jail the following
morning. He narrated that on the day of the incident, he washed his clothes in the
morning and later on helped in preparing lunch. Afterwards, three jail guards
accompanied him to the Pag-IBIG Office in Laoag City using the district jail service.
They even dropped by Chairman Pungtilan’s residence to request for a certification and
there they were told that a shooting incident was reported over the radio. The self-
imposed extension of his stay allegedly lasted until July 28, 2006. 
 
 
 
The Issue Presented
 
The issue in this case is whether appellant’s denial and alibi could overturn the
positive identification of the victim
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
The decision of RTC and CA is affirmed finding accused-appellant guilty of the
complex crime of murder with attempted murder.
 
Bernardo asserts alibi and denial as defenses. He argues that he was in jail
when the crime was committed. Such alibi, while corroborated by the testimonies of
some of Batac District Jail guards, cannot prevail over the positive identification made
by Reah pinpointing Bernardo as one of the malefactors who shot Efren to death. The
identification of Bernardo as an assailant was positively and credibly established by the
prosecution in this case. It has been settled that affirmative testimony is far stronger
than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible
witness. Absent clear and convincing evidence, alibi and denial are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be proved, not only that the assailant was in
another place when the crime was committed, but that it was physically impossible for
him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission altogether. In this case, Bernardo claims the physical impossibility of having
committed the crime for the reason that he was still in jail when it was perpetrated. He
was ordered released by the RTC of Batac on July 21, 2006; hence, he was no longer a
detention prisoner during the commission of the crime. The Batac District Jail is in the
same province where the crime was committed and could be easily reached within thirty
to forty five minutes from BarangaySan Marcos, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte.  Having been
discharged from jail, Bernardo was also free to move around and was not subject to
strict monitoring. This was bolstered by the finding of the RTC that there was no record
that Bernardo stayed in jail on the day the crime was perpetrated. Undisputedly, there
was no physical impossibility for Bernardo to leave his cell and be present at the
shooting incident.

The alleged minor discrepancies in the testimony of Reah, the main prosecution
witness, identifying Bernardo as one of the perpetrators in the shooting incident were,
indeed, negligible. As the CA correctly emphasized, Reah was not only able to relate a
detailed story of what transpired on July 27, 2006 but more importantly, her testimony
was sufficient to convict Bernardo for the crime charged.

LESSON 1

I. INTRODUCTION:
This lesson will introduce you to the basic concept of evidence, its definition and
classification, and the general rule on admissibility of evidence which include the
discussion on the provision of the Bill of Rights and other laws that should be respected
by the law enforcers in collecting pieces of evidence during the course of their criminal
investigation.
II. OBJECTIVES:

After studying the module, you should be able to:

1. Define evidence, and other terms related to it;

2. Discuss how evidence will be admissible in court and identify admissible
evidence;
3. Identify and explain the provisions and the Bill of Rights enshrine in the
Philippine Constitution and other laws that expressly excluded some evidence
that may be collected by the law enforcers;
4. Define and discuss the different classifications of evidence.

III. LECTURE PROPER

RULE 128
SECTION 1. Evidence defined.— Evidence is the means, sanctioned by
these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter
of fact.(1)
 - When somebody accused us of wrong doing, we often say “Do you
have evidence?” thinking that the accuser should prove that his accusation is
correct. In the case of Spouses Boyboy vs. Atty. Yabut, Jr., A.C. No. 5225, April
29, 2003, the Supreme Court held, “We must emphasize that a mere charge or
allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge.

- In other words, evidence is not the object, document, or testimony

of the person; but the ways on how you can make the court believe that what
you are saying is true or that the documents or objects you presented in court
represent the truth. So, Evidence is the way on how you can show to the court
what is the truth and make the judge/court believed that it is the truth. If the court
did not believe in you, even though what you are saying is the truth, then, you
failed to establish sufficient evidence. And, you will lost the case.

✓ Checkpoint (Quiz) No. 1. Discussed in your own words how you

can establish the truth in court. Cite, example?
SEC. 2. Scope.—The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in
all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules.(2a)
The Rule on Evidence is being applied strictly in all courts being administered by
the Supreme Court, like: Municipal Trial Court (MTC); Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC); Municipal Trial Court in the Cities (MTCC); Regional Trial Court; Court of
Appeals; Sandiganbayan; Court of Tax Appeals; and Supreme Court. However, other
quasi-judicial body may adopt this Rule as suppletory character and not in strict sense.
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and not excluded by the Constitution, the law or these Rules.
(3 a)
- There are two tests of admissibility under Section 3:

o First is the relevancy of evidence to the issue raised before the court which
can be determined by establishing a connection between the evidence that
you have to the controversy, if there is a connection then your evidence is
relevant. However, the weight of relevancy counts, evidence that has direct
connection or relevancy is given higher weight than the evidence that has
remote connection or relevancy.

o Second is the competency of your evidence which means that they evidence
that you are presenting is not excluded by the Rules on Evidence or by any
law. The excluded evidence under the Rules will be discussed in Rule 130. On
the other hand, the following are some of the law that expressly excluded
certain evidence:
1. Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

Sec. 2 – The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be search and persons or things to be seized.
Sect. 2, also a guarantee against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint on
the physical liberty of a person. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibiton of
all searches and seizures but only of UNREASONBLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES. There is a valid search and collecting of evidence if the search was
done by virtue of a valid search warrant or when the search conducted fall under
the valid warrantless search which you already learned in your Subject: Criminal
Procedure.

Activity 1: Read and Digest:

G.R. No. 199042               November 17, 2014

DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the Petition1 filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the

Decision2 dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution 3 dated 18 October 2011 issued by
the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. The Information4 reads:

That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram knowing the same to [be a]
dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.5

PROSECUTION’S VERSION

Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI)
Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante
Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones. 6 Their
testimonies reveal that a Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo
Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After
recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3 Enrique
de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony Asiones, together with Resco,
proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the
Complaint lodged against him. They invited him to the police station. There, he
was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu
was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet
with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the
National Police District Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for
examination.7 DEFENSE’S VERSION

The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching
TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three others, invited him to go with them to the
police station. Informed that he had been identified as responsible for shooting
Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at the police station. 8

RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its
Decision9 dated 6 April 2009, convicted petitioner of the offense charged. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring

accused DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II,R.A. 9165. Henceforth,
this Court hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day as the minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months as
the maximum and to pay the fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00).

The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the government to be dealt with in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.10

The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH.11

RULING OF THE CA

On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. 70854 finding the
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12

On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 13 which the CA

denied in a Resolution14 dated 18 October 2011.

Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone issue:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING

THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND
THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING
OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG.

Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid
warrantless arrests, since it took place on the day of the alleged shooting
incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any warrant of arrest was
illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently, inadmissible. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed its Comment16 stating that the shabu confiscated from
petitioner was admissible in evidence against him; that the search conducted on
him was valid; and that he cannot raise the issue regarding the apprehending
officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first time
on appeal.

OUR RULING

We find the instant appeal meritorious.

Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.

Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting

officer show none of the above that would make the warrantless arrest lawful.
Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is
considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest.17

The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.

A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal

search.18 Records have established that both the arrest and the search were
made without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right to
contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived his
right to contest the legality of the search.

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can

be conducted.1âwphi1 These searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle;
(2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5)
stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstance.19

The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not
of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
There could not have been a seizure in plain view as the seized item was
allegedly found inside the left pocket of accused-appellant’s pants. Neither was it
a stop-and-frisk situation. While thistype may seemingly fall under the consented
search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence." 20

Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal search;

that is, the consent mustbe unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 21 In this case, petitioner was merely
"ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket. The testimony of the police
officer on the matter is clear:

Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?

A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring out the thing
which I felt.

Q. : And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to bring out the
contents of his pocket?

A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic containing
shabu.22

The evidence obtained is not admissible.

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an
instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated
item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." 23 Without the
seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be sustained.
This being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the
officers in the handling of the confiscated drug.

As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates and encourages
the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and
security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with · deliberate care
and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end
never justifies the means."24

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011

and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED.
Sec. 3 – (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
- The rights guaranteed under this section cannot be ignored or challenge.
- A person cannot just open a closed communication or communication
intended by the owner to be confidential, without the consent of the owner of the
communication. Who is the owner, if the communication is not yet send by the
sender, he is the owner, but the moment that the letter or communication was
sent to the receiver, even though it did not yet reach the receiver, the receiver of
the letter or communication was the owner.
- It is expressly provided in paragraph 2 that any evidence obtained in
violation of Section 2 and Section 3, is inadmissible in any proceeding, whether
criminal, civil, or administrative in nature.
Sec. 12 – (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.

- This is the right of a person under custodial investigation which will

start when the person was deprived of his liberty by the authorities due
to alleged commission of the crime.

Activity 2: Case Digest

G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon

invitation and without the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against
him?

Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the
crime of highway robbery with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
62, of Gumaca, Quezon Province, under an information 1 dated February 8, 1989,
which reads as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of December 1988, along the Maharlika Highway at
Barangay Tinandog, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed
with bladed and pointed weapons, with intent to gain, by means of force,
violence, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away from one Freddie Saavedra, a Honda TMX
motorcycle with a sidecar bearing Plate No. DW 9961 valued at THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) Philippine currency, belonging to the said
Freddie Saavedra, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid
amount; and that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof, the said
accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
the said weapon said Freddie Saavedra, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple
stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

On arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The relevant facts established by the prosecution are as follows:

On December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie

Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, at Our Lady of Angeles Academy in
Atimonan, Quezon, where the latter is a third year high school student, to inform
her that he will drive both accused to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time,
however, that Freddie was seen alive. When the latter failed to return that
evening, Delfa, as early as 4:30 o'clock a.m. of December 6, 1988 inquired on his
whereabouts from relatives and friends. In the course of such inquiry, a certain
Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was discovered on
the diversion road at Barangay Malinao in Atimonan. Forthwith, they proceeded
to the said place and found him sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab
wounds in different parts of his body.

Meanwhile, relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle

was sighted at Barangay Malinao, Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led
by Lt. Carlos Santos proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered a blue
sidecar which they brought back with them to their headquarters. Subsequently,
Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in
connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases
reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an
explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he
and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the
consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the
motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa for a sum of
P4,000.00. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately
dispatched a team to retrieve the same.

After admitting that it was purchased from both the accused and upon failure to
present any document evidencing the purported sale, Teves voluntarily
surrendered it to the police who turned it over, together with the sidecar, to the
Atimonan Police Station for safekeeping.

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their

headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed
the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other
robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were
merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform
appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of
counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing. 2

Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that he had no participation in the offense
charged and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of
accused Amido to Teves. He recounted that sometime in December 1988, Amido
sought him at his house and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on was
being offered for sale. Upon proof shown that it was indeed registered under
Amido's name, he accompanied the latter to Manila on board the said motorcycle
and they approached Antonio Carandang. The latter, thereafter, brought them to
a certain Perlita Aguilar and Danilo Teves with whom the sale was finally
consummated. He allegedly received P150.00 as his commission.

Amido presented alibi as his defense. He alleged that although a tricycle driver
by occupation, he was at Barangay Malusak, Atimonan on the day in question,
some seven kilometers from the town, busy assisting in the renovation of his
mother's house. He narrated that the victim was his friend and, therefore, he
could not have participated in the gruesome death of the latter.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing considerations, this Court finds Herson

Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with
Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. He is further ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

Due to insufficiency of evidence, Lito Amido is hereby ACQUITTED of the

charges against him and the Provincial Warden of Quezon, Provincial Jail,
Lucena City, is hereby ordered to release from custody the person of said Lito
Amido, unless he is being detained thereat for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.3

Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite failure of the prosecution to

positively identify him as the culprit of the crime and to present clear and
convincing circumstantial evidence that would overcome his innocence.

In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside
and appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or

admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as
inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. Article III, Section 12,
paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution provides:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible against him.
Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438), 4 approved on May 15, 1992, reenforced
the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation, a pertinent provision5 of which reads:

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing
an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting"
officer for any violation of law.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement

authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation
begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken
into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. 6

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function
of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but
also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and
understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the
constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice. 7

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be

admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. 8

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must,
however, be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the
presence and with the assistance of counsel." 9 To reiterate, in People
v. Javar,10 it was ruled therein that any statement obtained in violation of the
constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.

The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was assisted by counsel
when he made such waiver, a finding evident from the testimony of Lt. Santos on
cross-examination, thus:

Q Now, when you brought Herson Tan to the Headquarters, did you tell him that
he is one of the suspects in the robbery slain (sic) that took place in Atimonan on
December 5, 1988?
A Yes, sir, and he was also suspect to the robbery case which was investigated
at Lucena Police Station. There were two (2) cases which were investigated on
Herson Tan.

Q Now, so in addition to the Atimonan case, you also took Herson Tan to your
custody in connection with another case that happened in Lucena?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you happened to have Herson Tan in your list as suspect in both cases
because Herson was previously incarcerated at Lucena City Jail in connection
with a certain case, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Just for curiosity sake, you invited him in your headquarters, is that what
happened in this case?

A Yes, sir.

Q And it just happened that without applying third degree to him he gave you that
information?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you notify him of his constitutional right to counsel before you propounded
questions to him?

A No, sir, because we are asking question only to him.

Q Before propounding question or information you sought to elicit from him, did

you inform him of his constitutional right not to testify against himself because he
is a suspect in these two (2) cases?

A No, sir, because we were just conversing.11 (Emphasis supplied)

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for
questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in
the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The
constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to
counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by
mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the
awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government." 12
 What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a
conviction. Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellant's
investigation which fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are
constrained to acquit the appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Gumaca, Quezon (Branch 62) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
HERSON TAN y VERZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless there is any other
lawful cause for continued detention. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan, Francisco and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Sec. 17 – No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The authorities even the court cannot force or compel any person to
provide evidence or any statement that can be used against him. Unless, he will waive
his right voluntarily and consciously.

2. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law)

 

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,

substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding Sec.s of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

3. REPUBLIC ACT NO.1405 (Bank Secrecy Law)

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give

encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and
to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by
 banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country.

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in

the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.

SECTION 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking

institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two
hereof any information concerning said deposits.

✓ Checkpoint (Quiz) No. 2. Discussed in your own words how an evidence

become admissible and cite examples?

SEC. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters.—Evidence must have such a relation to the

fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.(4a)
- Collateral matters are matters other than the fact in issue and which are
offered as a basis for inference as to the existence or non-existence of the facts in
issue. It is classified into three (3) namely, Antecedent circumstances, concomitant
circumstance, and subsequent circumstances.
2. Classification of Evidence
a. Object (Real)
 That which is directly addressed to the senses of the court and consists of
tangible things exhibited or demonstrated in open court, in an ocular
inspection, or at a place designated by the court for its view or observation of
an exhibition, experiment or demonstration
Documentary
 Evidence supplied by written instruments or derived from conventional
symbols, such as letter, by which ideas are represented on material
substances
Testimonial
  That which is submitted to the court through the testimony or deposition of a
witness
b. Relevant
 Evidence having any value in reason as tending to prove any matter provable
in an action
 Relevancy – logical relation of evidentiary fact to fact in issue
Material
 Evidence directed to prove a fact in issue
Competent
 One that is not excluded by law in particular case
c. Direct
 That which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption
Circumstantial
 The proof of the facts other than the fact in issue from which, taken either
singly or collectively, the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be
inferred as a necessary or probable consequence
d. Cumulative
 Evidence of the same kind and to the same state of facts
Corroborative
 Additional evidence of a different character to the same point for higher
probative value
e. Prima facie
 That which standing alone, unexplained or uncontradicted is sufficient to
maintain a proposition
Conclusive
 Class of evidence which the law does not allow to be contradicted
f. Primary or Best
 That which the law regards as affording greatest certainty of the fact in
question
Secondary or Substitutionary
 That which is inferior to the primary evidence and is permitted by law only
when the best evidence is not available
g. Positive
 The witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur
Negative
 The witness states that he did not see or know of the occurrence of a fact
 LESSON 2

I. INTRODUCTION:

Lesson 2 will discuss what are those facts or circumstances or things that
once it will be introduce in the Court there is no need to prove it considering that it is
considered judicial notice or it is known by the judge be reason of his position. These
can be considered as conclusive evidence wherein a party cannot present contradicting
evidence.

II. OBJECTIVES:

After studying the module, you should be able to:

1. Identify and cite example of those facts, circumstances or things that need
not be proven in court because it is judicial notice;
2. Discuss how facts, circumstances, or things may be considered as judicial
notice evidence will be admissible in court and identify admissible evidence;
3. Discuss why judicial admission is considered as conclusive evidence and
identify the exemption.

III. LECTURE PROPER

RULE 129

WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and tenitorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the National Government of the Philippines,
the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (la)
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.—A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.
Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the pre-trial and the
trial, the court, motu proprio or upon motion. shall hear the parties on the
propriety of taking judicial notice of any matter.
Before judgment or on appeal, the court, moto proprio or upon motion, may take
judicial notice of any matter and shall hear the parties thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case. (3a)
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, oral or written, made by the party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was not in fact made. (4a)

1. What do not need to be proved:

a. Matters of judicial notice
b. Judicial admissions
c. Facts presumed
d. Allegations in complaint or answer which are immaterial to the issue
e. Facts admitted or not denied in the answer, provided they have been sufficiently
alleged
f. Those which are the subject of an agreed stipulation of facts between the parties,
as well as judicial admissions made in the course of the proceedings
g. Technical admission – when defendant fails to specifically deny the allegations of
plaintiff
2. Doctrine of processual presumption – absent any evidence or admission, the foreign
law in question is presumed to be the same as that in the Philippines
3. Mandatory judicial notice [SLAPTONG]
a. States – existence, territory, political history, government, symbols of nationality
b. Law of nations
c. Admiralty and maritime courts and seals
d. Philippine – political constitution and history
e. Official acts
 Court cannot take judicial notice of a law or regulation that is not yet effective
 Decisions of SC are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice
f. Laws of nature
g. Measure of time
h. Geographical division
4. Discretionary judicial notice
a. Matters which are of public knowledge
 Common and general knowledge
  Indisputable
b. Matters capable of unquestionable demonstration
c. Ought to be known by judges because of their judicial functions
 Newspaper reports not subject to judicial notice
 Courts cannot take judicial notice of custom. Custom must be proved as a
matter of fact.
 Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned.
5. Judicial Admissions:
 Verbal or written; made by a party in course of the proceedings in the same case
 May only be contradicted by showing that:
a. Made through palpable mistake; or
b. No such admission was made.
 Admissions made in a pleading later amended: lose their status as judicial
admissions; become merely extra-judicial admissions which must be offered.
 A stipulation made during a criminal proceeding is tantamount to a judicial
admission and need not be signed as required by R118, §4 to be binding on the
accused.
 A court cannot take judicial notice of an admission made by a party in another
case even if the latter case is pending before the same sala or judge, except:
a. In the absence of objection;
b. With knowledge or upon request of the parties.

✓ Checkpoint (Quiz) No. 3. Identify and cite at least 2 examples of those

facts, circumstances or things that can be considered as judicial notice?

Activity No 3: Case Digest:

G.R. No. 159240             February 4, 2008

GREGORIO SILOT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68062 entitled "Estrella de la Rosa v. Gregorio Silot,
Jr." The appellate court had affirmed with modification the Joint Decision 2 dated
May 24, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Naga City, in Civil
Case Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750, and decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision dated May 24,
2000 of the RTC, Branch 61, Naga City in Civil Cases Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750
is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, deleting the award for nominal
damages and reducing the award of attorney's fees to Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos.

Other awards not otherwise modified or deleted stand.

SO ORDERED.3

As culled from the records by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts of this
case are as follows:

On January 19, 1996, petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. and respondent Estrella de la
Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of a dormitory-apartment
building on Lot 1-A-9-D, Bagumbayan Sur, Naga City. They expressly agreed
that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the total value of
the materials purchased for the project. Upon turnover in February 1997 of the
completed structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased
was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to
pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more than the amount due.
Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment but
the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her repeated demands fell on
deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against Silot.

Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he was
supposed to receive P1,281,872.404 but was only paid P1,008,000.00, thus still
leaving a balance of P273,872.40.

The two cases were consolidated by the trial court.

During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the
testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted
Goingo's proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as
mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of the
additional works mentioned were already accounted for; that Silot was paid for all
works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the total sum
was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is only P826,474.98; that de la Rosa
paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess payment
of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any demand from nor was
she confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance. 5
Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot
to return the overpaid amount, decreeing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, Civil Case No. 3736 is hereby ordered

DISMISSED for lack of merit; while in Civil Case No. 97-3750, defendant
Gregorio Silot is hereby ordered to return the amount of P191,525.02 to the
plaintiff, Estrella de la Rosa; to pay P100,000.00 for [a]ttorney's fees
and P50,000.00 as nominal damages.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence,
the instant petition wherein Silot assigned the following errors:

I.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in construing the admission ma[d]e by

Atty. San Jose on the purpose for the testimony of witness Ariel [Goingo] as
admission of evidence.

II.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding and ordering petitioner-

appellant to return the amount of P191,525.02 to respondent appellee and also
to pay P20,000.00 attorney[']s fees.7

Simply stated, petitioner is raising the following issues to be resolved: (1)

whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot, constituted
judicial admission of respondent's evidence; and (2) whether the appellate court
erred in ruling that Silot should return the claimed amount of P191,525.02 to de
la Rosa.

Petitioner Silot contends that his counsel Atty. San Jose merely admitted that the
subject of Goingo's testimony was that stated in the offer of testimony, but he did
not admit the truth or veracity of the testimony. Silot adds that Atty. San Jose
could not and should not have admitted the testimony because he had no special
power of attorney to enter into such stipulations or to compromise his client's
right without the latter's direct intervention. 8

Respondent de la Rosa counters that clients are bound by the admissions as

well as the negligence of their counsel. She enumerates several Court decisions
to support her contention, among them the following cases:

(1) Ongson v. People,9 where petitioner was held bound by his unqualified

admission that he received private complainant's demand letter with notice of
dishonor. The admission binds him considering that he never denied receipt of
the notice of dishonor.

(2) Republic v. Sarabia,10 where the Court held that an admission made in the

pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to him.

(3) People v. Genosa,11 Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran,12 Carandang v. Court of

Appeals,13 in which cases the Court held that judicial admissions are conclusive
upon the party making it and may not be contradicted in the absence of prior
showing that the admission had been made through palpable mistake, or no
admission was in fact made.

(4) People v. Razul14 and Lim v. Jabalde,15 where it was held that stipulations are

recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon
the parties.

Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes
arising from negligence of his own counsel. 16 The only exception to this rule is, as
the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross
that the client is deprived of his day in court. 17

In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in
this case. As the records would plainly show, Silot was not deprived of his day in
court. Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made by
his counsel. Said the appellate court:

…As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his
day in court. He was given every opportunity to be heard through his pleadings
and manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify. As quoted
earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly
asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-appellant Silot's counsel, if he would admit the
purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his
testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And
when asked by the judge if he will admit it, he answered that they will
admit P2,504,000.00.18

More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the
testimony of witness Goingo, whose presentation was dispensed with. In People
v. Hernandez,19 we held that admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with
proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during
trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the
official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused
in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that:
"[…] an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit […]
has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or
written stipulation, […] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive."
(Italics supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of
the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client.
When such admissions are made […] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of
some fact, […] they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the
trial.20 (Emphasis supplied.)

Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and
may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the admissions
had been made through palpable mistake.21

Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals,22 this Court emphasized the

consequence of admitting and dispensing with the testimony of the proposed
witness, thus:

The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any
further since his testimony as summarized in the offer made by counsel was
expressly admitted by opposing counsel. With the said admission, the testimony
of said witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by opposing counsel.
…23

On the issue of insufficient payment, Silot avers that he has rendered or provided
labor for the total amount of P1,281,872.40, and that de la Rosa has benefited
and profited from these labors.24 Without the labors provided by Silot, the
constructed building would not have been painted, provided with electrical works
and other works which were additional works on the building, and that to sanction
de la Rosa's claim would be to allow unjust enrichment on the part of de la
Rosa.25 However, this claim has been belied by the admission made by his own
counsel, as plainly manifest in the transcript:

Atty. Terbio

The purpose for which this witness will testify are the following: If admitted, we
are willing to dispense the testimony. He will testify that in consideration of the
33% as mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of
the additional works mentioned were all considered; he will testify that Silot was
paid of all works that was performed as well as all materials supplied were
considered, and that the sum total of which is P2,504,469.65 and 33% of which
is P826,474.98, and that De la Rosa paid the total amount of P1,018,000.00, and
therefore, there is an excess payment of P191,525.00; he will testify that De la
Rosa never received the demand or was confronted by Silot regarding an alleged
balance, now, if the counsel wish to admit this.
 ATTY. SAN JOSE

We admit that.

ATTY. TERBIO

Because these are all evidentiary and this has not been adequately covered.

ATTY. SAN JOSE

We will admit that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, given the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals did not err in
ordering petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P191,525.02
overpayment.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision

dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68062
is AFFIRMED. Petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. is hereby ordered to return the
amount of P191,525.02 to respondent Estrella de la Rosa, and to
pay P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against petitioner.

LESSON 3
I. INTRODUCTION:
This lesson will introduce you to the basic concept of what are those admissible
object and documentary evidence and what are those inadmissible object and
documentary evidence; particularly it will enhance the knowledge of the students on
how object and documentary evidence will become admissible or inadmissible in court.
II. Objectives:

After studying the module, you should be able to:

1. Discuss and identify the requirements so that object and documentary

evidence will become admissible;
2. Discuss and identify what are those object and documentary evidence that are
not admissible and their exemptions.

III. LECTURE PROPER

RULE 130
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
 A. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. Object as evidence.—Objects as evidence are those addressed
to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it
may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.(1a)

1. Admissibility of object evidence

a. Relevant to fact in evidence
b. Object must be authenticated before it is admitted
c. The chain of custody and integrity of the object evidence should be
established in court.

✓ Checkpoint (Quiz) No. 4. In your own words, discuss how object

evidence will be admissible in court, cite example (situational)?

Case Digest

G.R. No. 202206

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
TENG MONER y ADAM, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision 1 dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04399 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Teng Manery
Adam, which affirmed the Joint Decision 2 dated August 4, 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-05-133982
and Q-05-133983. Anent Criminal Case No. Q-05-133982, the trial court found
appellant Teng Moner y Adam (Moner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II (sale of dangerous drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In the
same judgment, Moner and his co-accused were acquitted of the charge of
violating Section 11, Article II (possession of dangerous drugs) of the same
statute which was the subject of Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983.

The crime of which Moner was convicted is described in the Information dated
April 25, 2005, as follows:
That on or about the 23 rd day of April, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction,
three point ninety-one (3.91) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.3

Subsequently, on May 16, 2005, Moner pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the

aforementioned charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs upon his arraignment. 4

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals presented the factual milieu of this
case in this manner:

To establish the guilt of accused-appellant, the prosecution presented three (3)

witnesses namely: P02 Joachim Panopio, P03 Junnifer Tuldanes and PO3 Edwin
Lirio.

The prosecution's evidence tends to establish the following facts:

On April 23, 2005, the police operatives of Las Piñas Police Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAIDSOTF) had arrested a certain Joel
Taudil for possession of illegal drugs. Upon investigation, they gathered from
Taudil that the source of the illegal drugs was Teng Moner (herein accused-
appellant) who hails from Tandang Sora, Quezon City.

As per this information, Police Chief Inspector Jonathan Cabal formed a team
that would conduct a buy-bust operation for the apprehension of accused-
appellant. The team was composed of himself, SP04 Arnold Alabastro, SPO1
Warlie Hermo, PO3 Junnifer Tuldanes, PO3 Edwin Lirio, PO2 Rodel Ordinaryo,
PO1 Erwin Sabbun and PO2 Joachim Panopio. The marked and boodle money
were given to PO2 Panopio who acted as the poseur-buyer.

Before proceeding with the buy-bust operation, the team prepared the pre-
operation report addressed to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
the authority to operate outside their jurisdiction and the coordination paper.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the Central Police District Office (CPDO), Camp
Karingal, Quezon City for proper coordination. Thereafter, the team together with
Taudil and a CPD-DIID personnel proceeded [to] No. 26 Varsity Lane, Barangay
Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Upon reaching the place they made a
surveillance and assumed their respective positions.

At the target area, P02 Panopio and Taudil went to accusedappellant's house.
While outside the gate, Taudil summoned accusedappellant and the latter came
out after a few minutes. The two men talked with each other in the Muslim
dialect. Taudil introduced PO2 Panopio as his friend to accused-appellant and
told him that PO2 Panopio was interested to buy shabu. PO2 Panopio asked for
the price of five (5) grams of shabu. Accused-appellant replied that the same
would cost him ₱8,000.00 and asked him if he has the money. When PO2
Panopio confirmed that he has the money with him, accused-appellant asked
them to wait and he went inside the house. When he returned after a few
minutes, he handed a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected
as shabu to PO2 Panopio who in turn gave him the marked and boodle money.
Accused-appellant was about to count the money when PO2 Panopio gave the
pre-arranged signal to his team and introduced himself as [a] police officer.

Accused-appellant resisted arrest and ran inside the house but PO2 Panopio
was able to catch up with him. The other members of the team proceeded inside
the house and they saw the other accused gather[ed] around a table re-
packing shabu. PO3 Lirio confiscated the items from them and placed the same
inside a plastic bag.

After accused-appellant and his co-accused were arrested, the team proceeded
to the Las Piñas City Police Station. The items confiscated from them were
turned over by PO2 Panopio to PO3 Dalagdagan who marked them in the
presence of the police operatives, accused-appellant and his co-accused. PO3
Dalagdagan prepared the corresponding inventory of the confiscated items. The
specimens were then brought to the police crime laboratory for testing. The
specimens yielded positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.

Consequently, a case for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 was filed
against accused-appellant and another for Violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. 9165 against him and his co-accused.

In refutation of the prosecution's version, the defense presented four (4)

witnesses, to wit: Judie Durado, Fatima Macabangen, accused-appellant and
Richard Pascual.

It is the contention of the defense that on April 23, 2005, accused-appellant and
his co-accused in Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983 were at the house located
along No. 26 Varsity Lane, Philam, Tan.dang Sora, Quezon City to prepare for
the wedding of Fatima Macabangen and Abubakar Usman to be held the
following day. While they were inside the house, several armed persons wearing
civilian clothes entered and announced that they were police officers. They
searched the whole house and gathered all of them in the living room.

The police officer who was positioned behind accused-appellant and Abubakar
dropped a plastic sachet. The former asked accused-appellant and Abubakar
who owns the plastic sachet. When accused-appellant .denied its ownership, the
police officer slapped him and accused him of being a liar. Thereafter, they were
all frisked and handcuffed and were brought outside the house. Their personal
effects and belongings were confiscated by the police officers. Then they
boarded a jeepney and were brought to [the] Las Piñas Police Station.

Upon their arrival, they were investigated. A police officer asked them to call up
anybody who can help them because they only needed money for their release.
Judie Dorado called up [his] mother. They saw the other items allegedly
confiscated from them only at the police station. At around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, they were brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City. From there, they went
to Makati for drug testing and were returned to Las Piñas Police Station.

Subsequently, cases for Violation of R.A. No. 9165 were filed against them. 5

After receiving the evidence for both sides, the trial court convicted Moner on the
charge of selling shabu while, at the same time, acquitting him and his co-
accused of the charge of possession of illegal drugs. The dispositive portion of
the August 4, 2009 Joint Decision of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders its Joint Decision as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133982:

The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM "GUILTY" beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 or illegal selling of three
point ninety-one (3.91) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and to pay a FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php500,000.00).

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983:

The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM, JUDIE DURADO Y

MACABANGEN, FATIMA MACABANGEN Y NUÑEZ, ABUBAKAR USMAN Y
MASTORA, GUIAMIL ABU Y JUANITEZ, NORODIN USMAN Y MASTORA,
RICHARD PASCUAL Y TANGALIN and AMINA USMAN-MONER "NOT
GUILTY" for violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165 considering that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The pieces of evidence subject matter of Crim. Case No. Q-05- 133983 are
hereby ordered to be safely delivered to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
for proper disposition.6

As can be expected, Moner elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which,
unfortunately for him, ruled to affirm the findings of the trial court and dispositively
held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated August 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-05- 133982 finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED. 7

Hence, Moner interposes this appeal wherein he reiterates the same errors on
the part of the trial court contained in his Brief filed with the Court of Appeals, to
wit:

A. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED ITS DECISION

DATED AUGUST 4, 2009 FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT MONER
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING SECTION 5,
ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165, WHEN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE THREE (3)
PROSECUTION WITNESSES (P02 JOACHIM P ANOPIO, P03 JUNNIFER
TULDANES, AND P03 EDWIN LIRIO) ARE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE AND
UNBELIEVABLE TO PROVE THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST.

B. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEN IT

RELIED SOLELY ON THE PERJURED TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES POLICE OFFICERS WHICH ARE FULL OF
INCONSISTENCIES.

C. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED

DECISION WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE DEFENSE WITNESSES WHO CLEARLY TESTIFIED THAT THERE WAS
REALLY NO BUY-BUST AND THAT APPELLANT MONER WAS NOT SELLING
ANY PROHIBITED DRUGS.

D. THE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED

DECISION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY PROVISION OF SEC. 19 OF
R.A. NO. 9165, ON THE MATTER OF PHYSICAL INVENTORY, AND PICTURE
TAKING OF THE EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM THE ACCUSED, AS
WELL AS THE PROVISION OF SECTION 86 THEREOF. 8

In sum, Moner maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
proof to sustain his conviction for the charge of sale of dangerous drugs. He
highlights the fact that the prosecution failed to present in court the informant
who pointed to him as a supplier of shabu. He also stresses that the buy-bust
operation was conducted without proper coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Likewise, he derides the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as inconsistent, incredible and unworthy of belief. Most
importantly, he underscores the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the
statutorily mandated procedure for the handling and custody of the dangerous
drugs allegedly seized from him.

The appeal is without merit.

For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or ·sale took
place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and
(3) that the buyer and seller were identified. 9

A perusal of the records of this case would reveal that the aforementioned
elements were established by the prosecution. The illegal drugs and the marked
money were presented and identified in court. More importantly, Police Officer
(PO) 2 Joachim Panopio (PO2 Panopio ), who acted as poseur-buyer, positively
identified Moner as the seller of the shabu to him for a consideration of
₱8,000.00.

With regard to Moner's contention that the prosecution's failure to present the
informant in court diminishes the case against him, we reiterate our
pronouncement on this matter in the recent case of People v. Lafaran10 :

It has oft been held that the presentation of an informant as witness is not
regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing
accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in
view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit
arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant's identity
is protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only
when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential in
obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be
disregarded. In the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed
by SPO2 Aro and PO3 Pera, their testimonies can take the place of that of the
poseur-buyer.

Thus, we concur with the appellate court's finding that there is no need to present
the informant because PO2 Panopio, who acted as the poseur-buyer, had
testified in court. Furthermore, the other members of the buy-bust team, namely
PO3 Junnifer Tuldanes (PO3 Tuldanes) and PO3 Edwin Lirio (PO3 Lirio ), gave
clear and credible testimonies with regard to the criminal transaction that was
consummated by appellant and PO2 Panopio.

In addition, we rule that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses that were pointed out by Moner consist merely of minor variances that
do not deviate from the main narrative which is the fact that Moner sold illegal
drugs to a poseur-buyer. It has been held, time and again, that minor
inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy
the witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.11 It bears stressing, too, that the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by
the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if
not conclusive effect.12
Lastly, we can give no credence to Moner's contention that the prosecution failed
to prove an unbroken chain of custody in consonance with the requirements of
law.

To ensure that the drug specimen presented in court as evidence against the
accused is the same material seized from him or that, at the very least, a
dangerous drug was actually taken from his possession, we have adopted the
chain of custody rule. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) has expressly defined
chain of custody involving dangerous drugs and other substances in the following
terms in Section 1 (b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002:

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and

custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition[.]

In relation to this, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently provides the
following:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof[.]

Furthermore, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of

Republic Act No. 9165 relevantly states:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis
supplied.)

We have consistently ruled that noncompliance with the requirements of Section

21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will not necessarily render the illegal drugs seized or
confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter
of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs have been preserved, i.e., the illegal
drugs being offered in court as evidence is, without a specter of doubt, the very
same item recovered in the buy-bust operation. 13

With regard to the foregoing, Moner asserts that he should be acquitted of the
criminal charges levelled against him specifically because of the following serious
lapses in procedure committed by the apprehending officers: (a) the physical
inventory was not conducted at the place where the seizure was made; (b) the
seized item was not photographed at the place of seizure; and (c) there was no
physical inventory and photograph of the seized item in the presence of the
accused, or his representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The aforementioned concerns can be squarely addressed by a careful and

assiduous review of the records of this case accompanied by a liberal application
and understanding of relevant jurisprudence in support thereof. Both object and
testimonial evidence demonstrate that the apprehending officers were able to
mark the dangerous drugs seized and to prepare a physical inventory of the
same at the Las Piñas Police Station which was the place where Moner and his
co-accused were brought for processing. The following excerpts lifted from the
transcript of the testimony of PO2 Panopio during trial confirm this fact:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, after your team recovered [the] evidence on top of the table
inside the house, arrested those persons whom you identified a while ago and
also arrested Teng Moner recovered from him the buy-bust money, what
happened next?

A We brought them to the police headquarters.

Q In what headquarters did you bring the persons arrested?

A We brought them to Special Action ... SAID-SOTF Las Piñas Police Station.

xxxx

Q Now, I would like to inform you that under Section 21 of the Republic Act 9165,
the arresting officer immediately after the arrest of the accused or the person
buy-bust for possession must prepare the inventory of seized evidence.

A Yes, sir.

Q What do you mean by "yes"?

A We did prepare an inventory, sir.

Q So, you are aware of that provision?

A I just forgot the Section 21, sir.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q You do not know that doing an inventory is a requirement under Section 21?

A Yes, your Honor.

PROS.: (to the witness)

Q Now, you said that you are aware of Section 21 an inventory must be made.
Do you know whether your team complied with that provision of the law upon
reaching the station?

A Yes, sir,

Q What do you mean by "yes"?

A We made an Inventory Report, sir.

Q Where is now that Inventory Report?

A It's with the documents I submitted earlier in court, sir.

xxxx

PROS: (to the Court)

This piece of document handed by the witness your Honor, the Inventory of
Property Seized be marked as Exhibit "OOO".

COURT: (to the witness)

Q That is the original, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, your Honor.

xxxx

PROS.: (to the Court)

Q The signature of PO3 Rufino G. Dalagdagan under the heading "Received By:"
be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "OOO-1"; the list of the articles appearing
[in] the body of Exhibit "OOO" be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "OOO-
2". This Receipt of Property Turned-Over, your Honor, which states: "I, P03
RUFINO G. DALAGDAGAN OF SAID-SOTF, LAS PINAS CITY POLICE
STATION, SPD hereby acknowledge received (sic) the items/articles listed
hereunder [from] PO2 JOACHIM P. PANOPIO" and may we request, your honor
that letters appearing on the top of the name TENG MONER ADAM, ET AL.
(RTS) be marked as Exhibit "OOO-3"

PROS.: (to the witness)

Q Who prepared this Exhibit "OOO"?

A PO3 Rufino Dalagdagan, sir.

Q These items listed [in] the body of marked as Exhibit "OOO", who made these
items?

A I, myself, sir.

Q Now, showing to you this Exhibit marked as "OOO-3" particularly on [the]

letters RPS appearing inside the parenthesis, who placed that entry (RPS)?
A Police Officer Dalagdagan, sir.

Q Where were you at the time when this (RPS) marked as Exhibit "OOO-3" was
made?

A I was inside the office, sir.

Q Where were those persons whom your team arrested when this evidence
marked as Exhibit "OOO" was made?

A They were also inside the office, sir.

xxxx

Q You said a while ago that in consideration with the buy-bust money, you
received from the accused, Teng Moner, that plastic sachet containing shabu.
Upon reaching the station, what happened to the plastic sachet, subject matter of
the buy-bust operation?

A I turned it over, sir.

Q To whom?

A PO3 Dalagdagan, sir.

Q And before you turned it over to the investigator, PO3 Dalagdagan,

that shabu subject matter of the buy-bust operation, what did you do with it?

A He placed [the] markings on it, sir.

Q Showing to you several pieces of evidence placed inside the brown envelope.
Kindly look at the same and pick from these several items that plastic sachet,
subject matter of the buy-bust operation?

A (Witness picked from the bunch of evidence the plastic sachet which already
marked as Exhibit "P" and he read [the] markings "TMAU1-23APR05".)

Q Now, you also stated a while ago that you were the one who personally
recovered the buy-bust money used in the operation from the possession of the
accused, Teng Moner. If the same would be shown to you, would you be able to
identify it?

A Yes, sir.

xxxx
Q Now, you also stated that the Request for Laboratory Examination was made
by the investigator, Now, who delivered the plastic sachet subject matter of the
buy-bust operation for laboratory examination?

A We did, sir.14 (Emphases supplied.)

Judging from the cited testimony, it is apparent that the apprehending officers
were able to substantially comply with the requirements of the law regarding the
custody of confiscated or seized dangerous drugs. When cross-examined by the
defense counsel during trial about the reason behind the buy-bust team's
noncompliance with standard procedure, PO3 Tuldanes, one of the
apprehending officers, gave the following response:

ATTY. PALAD: (to witness)

Q Meaning you had no time to make the inventory right at the scene of the
alleged buy-bust?

A Yes, sir, because we were immediately instructed to pull out from the area.

Q Was there any threat on your lives that you immediately pulled out from the
said area?

A It was not our area - Area of Responsibility - so we just wanted to make sure,
for security and immediately left, sir.

Q So this fear for security, you did not follow this photographing/inventory?

A We did not do that anymore, sir, because our security was at risk. 15

Verily, the circumstances that the buy-bust team proceeded first to the Central
Police District (CPD) Station, Camp Karingal in Quezon City and, from there,
they were accompanied by a police officer from the CPD to the target location,
aside from proving that it was a legitimate police operation, supported the
existence of a security risk to the buy-bust team. These additional precautions
taken by the buy-bust team underscored their unfamiliarity with the location of the
operation and, in fact, corroborated the above-quoted testimony that the buy-bust
team believed there was a threat to their security.

With regard to the accused’s allegation that the buy-bust team failed to
coordinate with the PDEA before proceeding with the operation that nabbed
Moner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals declare in unison that the
requisite prior coordination with PDEA did happen. Likewise, our own review did
not provide any reason for us to disbelieve said established fact.
To reiterate, noncompliance with the chain of custody rule is excusable as long
as there exist justifiable grounds which prevented those tasked to follow the
same from strictly conforming to the said directive. The preceding discussion
clearly show that the apprehending officers in this case did not totally disregard
prescribed procedure but, instead, demonstrated substantial compliance with
what was required. It was likewise explained that the divergence in procedure
was not arbitrary or whimsical but because the buy-bust team decided that they
could not linger at the crime scene as it would unduly expose them to security
risks since they were outside their area of responsibility.

Notably, in the recent case of Palo v. People, 16 we affirmed a conviction for

illegal possession of dangerous drugs despite the fact that the seized illegal
substance was only marked at the police station and that there was no physical
inventory or photograph of the same:

The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the police
station, and not at the place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of the
seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon immediate
confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical
inventory nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items as these would be used in determining the
guilt or innocence of the accused.17

With regard to the third breach of procedure highlighted by Moner, this Court
cites People v. Usman18 wherein we declared that the chain of custody is not
established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons by
law. In that case, the police officers who arrested and processed the accused did
not perform the prescribed taking of photographs under the law but,
nevertheless, the assailed conviction was upheld. The Court reasoned thus:

[T]his Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should
ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain
an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x. 19

In the case at bar, the records indicate that the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items had been preserved despite the procedural infirmities that
accompanied the process. On this score, we quote with approval the disquisition
of the Court of Appeals:

The record shows that upon the arrest of accused-appellant, the shabu and

marked money were confiscated from him by P02 Panopio. Accused-appellant
was immediately brought to the Las Piñas Police Station where the items
confiscated from him were turned-over by P02 Panopio to P03 Dalagdagan, the
investigator-on-case. The latter received the confiscated items and marked them
in the presence of P02 Panopio and accused-appellant. An inventory of the
confiscated items was also made.

Thereafter, the request for laboratory examination was prepared by P03

Dalagdagan and signed by P/C Insp. Jonathan A. Cabal. The specimen together
with the request was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame,
Quezon City by P02 Panopio and the other police officers. There, it was received
by PSI Michael S: Holada, who delivered the specimen and request for
laboratory test to the forensic chemist PIS Maridel C. Rodis. After examination,
the specimen submitted for testing proved positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The result of the test was reduced to writing
and signed by the forensic chemist. It was duly noted by P/Sr. Supt. Ricardo
Cacholaver. It is worth stressing that the prosecution and defense had agreed to
dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist and stipulated among others
that she could identify the documents and the specimens she
examined.20 (Emphases supplied and citations omitted.)

Anent Moner' s allegation that the buy-bust team asked money from him and his
former co-accused in exchange for their liberty, it must be emphasized that the
said allegation only came to light when defense counsel asked appellant what
happened when he and his former co-accused were brought to the Las Piñas
Police Station.21 Curiously, however, defense counsel did not confront any of the
prosecution witnesses regarding the said accusation. More importantly, based on
the record, no criminal or administrative· case relating thereto was ever filed by
Moner or any of his former co-accused against their alleged extortionists.
Nevertheless, on this particular issue, we would like to reiterate our ruling that the
defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts
with disfavor for it can just easily be concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 22

At this juncture, it bears repeating that in cases involving violations of the

Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. 23 Admittedly, the buy-bust team
did not follow certain aspects of procedure to the letter but this was excusable
under the saving clause of the chain of custody rule and prevailing jurisprudence.
As a consequence thereof, their arrest of Moner in the performance of their duty
cannot be described as having been done so irregularly as to convince this Court
to invalidate the credibility and belief bestowed by the trial court on the
prosecution evidence. Accordingly, Moner must provide clear and convincing
evidence to overturn the aforesaid presumption that the police officers regularly
performed their duties but the records show that he has failed to do so. Absent
any proof of mishandling, tampering or switching of evidence presented against
him by the arresting officers and other authorities involved in the chain of
custody, the presumption remains.

This is not the first time that this Court has been confronted with the question of
whether or not to uphold the conviction of a person arrested for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs who had been positively identified by credible witnesses as the
perpetrator of said crime but the manner by which the evidence of illegal drugs
was handled did not strictly comply with the chain of custody rule. To reiterate
past pronouncements, while ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should
be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain. 24 Unfortunately; rigid obedience to procedure creates
a scenario wherein the safeguards that we set to shield the innocent are likewise
exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment. Realizing the inconvenient
truth that no perfect chain of custody can ever be achieved, this Court has
consistently held that the most important factor in the chain of custody rule is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. 25

We find it apropos to highlight this Court's discussion in Zalameda v.

People, 26 which was restated in the recent case of Saraum v. People27

We would like to add that noncompliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly
the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated
and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section
3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is
no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the
evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the court x x x.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to
noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if
there is noncompliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight -
evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be
given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in
each case.

Stated differently, if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the
manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the consequence relates not to
inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather
to the weight of evidence presented for each particular case. In the case at bar,
the trial court judge convicted Moner on the strength of the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses despite an imperfect chain of custody concerning
the corpus delicti.
It should be noted that Section 21(a) of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165
provides that:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items. (Emphases supplied.)

The above-quoted provision recognizes that the credibility of the prosecution's

witnesses and the admissibility of other evidence are well within the power of trial
court judges to decide. Paragraph (5), Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution vests upon the Supreme Court the following power, among others:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

Jurisprudence explains the above-quoted constitutional provision m the following

manner:
Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized
a power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment
of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the
Supreme Court the "power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." However,
these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to
"repeal, alter or supplement" such rules.

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the
previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress' subsidiary
and corrective power. This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to
observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court's power to
promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court with Congress." 28

The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts is a traditional power of this Court. 29 This includes the power to promulgate
the rules of evidence.

On the other hand, the Rules of Evidence are provided in the Rules of Court
issued by the Supreme Court. However, the chain of custody rule is not found in
the Rules of Court. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was passed by the
legislative department and its implementing rules were promulgated by PDEA, in
consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies under and
within the executive department.

In the United States, the chain of custody rule is followed by the federal courts
using the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Court of
Appeals applied this rule in United States v. Ricco30 and held as follows:

The "chain of custody" rule is found in Fed. R. Evid. 901, which requires that the
admission of an exhibit must be preceded by "evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." x x x.

x x x As we have pointed out, the "chain of custody' is not an iron-clad

requirement, and the fact of a ‘missing link' does not prevent the admission of
real evidence, so long as there is sufficient proof that the evidence is what it
purports to be and has not been altered in any material respect." x x x.

According to Cornell University's online legal encyclopedia, "[r]ules of evidence

are, as the name indicates, the rules by which a court determines what evidence
is admissible at trial. In the U.S., federal courts follow the Federal Rules of
Evidence, while state courts generally follow their own rules." 31 In the U.S. State
of Alaska, for example, the "chain of custody" rule is found in Alaska Evidence
Rule 901(a).32
Evidence is defined in Section 1 of Rule 12833 as "the means, sanctioned by
these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter
of fact." Section 2 of the same Rule provides that "[t]he rules of evidence shall be
the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided
by law or these rules."

Furthermore, the said Rule provides for the admissibility of evidence, and states
that "[ e ]vidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or these rules." The Rules of Admissibility provide that "[ o ]bjects as
evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is
relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the
court. "34

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is important to distinguish if a

matter is a proper subject of the rules of evidence, which as shown above are
promulgated by the Court, or it is a subject of substantive law, and should be
passed by an act of Congress. The Court discussed this distinction in the early
case of Bustos v. Lucero35:

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may
be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. (60 C. J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates ·the rights and duties which give
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52
C. J. S., 1026.)

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from
the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who
commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is
eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence -

which is "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and
circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings" - is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private
law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law
transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and
practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) The entire rules of
evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole
code of evidence embodied in these Rules.
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme
Court said:

"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the
constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of
evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650;
Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. Missouri,
107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443. And
there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a
defense available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his
offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to
fall within the constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L.
ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed.,
1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is now well settled that statutory changes in
the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a
defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his
disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the
class of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the
disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law.
Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim.
Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of evidence after the
indictment so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously
held inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18
Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which changes the place of trial, Gut vs. Minnesota, 9
Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals,
creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382, 38
L. ed., 485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 570."

xxxx

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact

definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree.
(Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a
line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and
procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties
affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition.
(State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme
Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution
must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect
the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but
operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the
Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure
existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a
power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure,
adding new and different rules without regard to their source and discarding old
ones.

To emphasize, the distinction in criminal law is this: substantive law is that which
declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing
them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the
steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. 36

Based on the above, it may be gleaned that the chain of custody rule is a matter
of evidence and a rule of procedure.1âwphi1 It is therefore the Court who has the
last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Relevant portions of decisions
elucidating on the chain of custody rule are quoted below:

Saraum v. People37:

The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled
the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized
movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they
were seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court.x x x.
(Citation omitted.)

Mallillin v. People38 :

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the

elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral
certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in
these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond
doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice
to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of
guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite
to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that

the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.  It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
 the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
(Citations omitted.)

These are matters well within the powers of courts to appreciate and rule upon,
and so, when the courts find appropriate, substantial compliance with the chain
of custody rule as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
have been preserved may warrant the conviction of the accused. This is the
rationale, grounded on the constitutional power of the Court, to pass upon the
credibility and admissibility of evidence that underlies the proviso in Section 21(a)
of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165.

To conclude, this Court has consistently espoused the time-honored doctrine that
where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are
not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and
value, which have been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the
case.39 We do not believe that the explainable deviations to the chain of custody
rule demonstrated by the police officers involved in this case are reason enough
to overturn the findings of the trial court judge, who personally observed and
weighed the testimony of the witnesses during trial and examined the evidence
submitted by both parties.

In light of the foregoing, we are compelled to dismiss the present appeal and
affirm the conviction of Moner for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED for lack

of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04399 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. - Documents as evidence consist of writings,
recordings. photographs or any material containing letters, words sounds
numbers figures, symbols, or their equivalentt or other modes of written
expression offered as proof of their contents. Photographs include still
pictures, drawings, stored images. x-ray films, motion pictures or videos.
(2a)

Production of documents under this rule and Under Rule 27 (modes of discovery),
distinguished.
RULE 130 RULE 27
Production is procured by mere notice Production is by proper motion in the
to adverse party, and requirements for trial court, and is permitted only upon
such notice must be complied with as a good cause shown (mode of discovery)
condition precedent for the subsequent
evidence by the proponent
Presupposes that the document to be Contemplates situation wherein
produced is intended as evidence for document is either assumed to be
the proponent who is presumed to favorable to the party in possession
have knowledge of its contents, thereof OR that the party seeking its
secondary evidence thereof being production is not sufficiently informed
available in case of its non-production of the contents of the same

1. BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – (a) When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, recording, photograph or
other records. no evidence is admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
a. When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice, or the original cannot be obtained by local judicial processes or
procedures;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office; and
e. When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue. (3a)

SEC. 4. ORIGINAL OF DOCUMENT. —

(A). AN "ORIGINAL" OF A DOCUMENT IS THE DOCUMENT ITSELF OR ANY COUNTERPART
INTENDED TO HAVE THE SAME EFFECT BY A PERSON EXECUTING OR ISSUING IT. AN
"ORIGINAL" OF A PHOTOGRAPH INCLUDES THE NEGATIVE OR ANY PRINT THEREFROM. IF
DATA IS STORED IN A COMPUTER OR SIMILAR DEVICE, ANY PRINTOUT OR OTHER OUTPUT
READABLE BY SIGHT OR OTHER MEANS, SHOWN TO REFLECT THE DATA ACCURATELY, IS AN
"ORIGINAL."
(B) A "DUPLICATE" IS A COUNTERPART PRODUCED BY THE SAME IMPRESSION AS THE
ORIGINAL, OR FROM THE SAME MATRIX. OR BY MEANS OF PHOTOGRAPHY, INCLUDING
ENLARGEMENTS AND MINIATURES, OR BY MECHANICAL OR ELECTRONIC RE-RECORDING, OR
BY CHEMICAL REPRODUCTION, OR BY OTHER EQUIVALENT TECHNIQUES WHICH ACCURATELY
REPRODUCE THE ORIGINAL.
(C ) ADUPLICATE IS ADMISSIBLE TO THE SAME EXTENT AS AN ORIGINAL UNLESS (1) A
GENUINE QUESTION IS RAISED AS TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE ORIGINAL. OR (2) IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS UNJUST OR INEQUITABLE TO ADMIT THE DUPLICATE IN LIEU OF THE
ORIGINAL. (4A)

1. General Rule: When the subject of an inquiry is the contents of a document, no

evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. (If only the fact
of execution/existence/surrounding circumstances only is involved, Rule does not
apply)
2. Exceptions to Best Evidence Rule:
a. Original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
b. When the original is in the custody of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the only fact sought to
be established is the general result of the whole; and
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
3. Meaning of “original” document
a. The one the contents of which are the subject of an inquiry
b. If in 2 or more copies executed:
ii. At or about the same time; AND
iii. With identical contents
 Then all copies are originals
c. If entry is
i. Repeated in regular course of business, with
ii. One being copied from another;
iii. At or near the time of the transaction,
 Then all entries are originals

2. SECONDARY EVIDENCE

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.—When the original document has

been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.(4a)

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control.—If the

document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he must
have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory
proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may
be presented as in the case of its loss.(5a)

Sec. 7. Summaries. — When the contents of documents, records, photographs, or

numerous accounts are voluminous and cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established is only the general result
of the whole, the contents of such evidence may be presented in the form of a
chart. summary. or calculation.
The originals shall be available for examination or copying. or both, by the
adverse party at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be
produced in court. (n)
Sec. 8. Evidence admissible when the original document is a public record. —
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (7)
Sec. 9. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. — A party who calls for
the production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it
as evidence. (8)

4. If original is unavailable:
 Order of proof (but can be changed at court’s discretion):
a. Existence
b. Execution: Established by
i. Person who executed it;
ii. The person before whom its execution was acknowledged
iii. Any person who was present and saw it executed, and recognized the
signature;
iv. Any person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously
confessed the execution thereof
c. Loss or Destruction
 If there are several original copies, all copies must be accounted for
before secondary evidence may be received.
 d. Contents
5. Proof of Contents of Lost Original or Original in custody/control of adverse party
(Secondary Evidence) – in order stated:
a. A copy
b. A recital of its contents in an authentic document
c. Testimony of witnesses
6. What must be proven if original in possession of adverse party
a. Opponent’s possession of original
b. Reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original
c. Satisfactory proof of its existence
d. Failure or refusal of opponent to produce original in court
 By opponent’s failure to produce the document on demand, he is now
forbidden to produce the document in order to contradict the other party’s
copy/evidence of its contents

3. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Sec. 10. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, as between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he or she put in issue in a verified pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (9a)

1. General Rule: When the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement
2. Exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule: when a party puts in issue in his pleadings:
[FIVE]
a. Intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement
b. Failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties;
c. Validity of the written agreement; OR
d. Existence of other terms agreed upon subsequent to the execution of the written
agreement
NOTE: Parol = evidence aliunde whether oral or written which tends to deny or
contradict documented agreement.
 A “Receipt” or a “Deed” is not an exclusive memorial and facts contained therein
may be shown irrespective of the terms of the document.
 Distinction must be made between “statements of fact” expressed in an
instrument and the “terms” of the contractual act. The former may be varied by
parol evidence.

Checkpoint (Quiz) No. 5. In your own words, distinguish best evidence rule
from parole evidence role? cite examples of the different exemptions of
best evidence rule and parole evidence rule? I am not asking for the
exemptions, what I am asking is one example in every exemption.

4. INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS

SEC. 11. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning.—The language of a

writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its
execution, unless the parties intended otherwise.(8)
SEC. 12. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions.—In the construction
of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction
is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.(9)
SEC. 13. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions.—In the
construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a
general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former.
So a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it.(10)
SEC. 14. Interpretation according to circumstances.—For the proper construction of an
instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the
subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed
in the position of those whose language he or she is to interpret.(11)
SEC. 15. Peculiar signification of terms.—The terms of a writing are presumed to have
been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show
that they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used
and understood, in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be
construed accordingly.(12)
SEC. 16. Written words control printed.—When an instrument consists partly of written
words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the
latter.(13)
SEC. 17. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings.—When the
characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the
language is not understood by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering
the characters, or who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters
or the meaning of the language.(14)
SEC. 18. Of two constructions, which preferred.—When the terms of an agreement
have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to
prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when
different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken
which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision is made.(15)
SEC. 19. Construction in favor of natural right.—When an instrument is equally
susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it,
the former is to be adopted.(16)
SEC. 20. Interpretation according to usage.—An instrument may be construed
according to usage, in order to determine its true character.(17)

Activity 5: Case Digest:

G.R. No. 168387               August 25, 2010

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO
ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO,
ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.

When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue
whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of
the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and
into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to
determine such intent.

Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting
parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording
which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise
would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat
the very purpose of agreements.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the October 7, 2003 Decision, 2 as
well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP
No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of Agrarian

Reform Adjudication Board, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision, dated 17 January 2001, rendered by the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of
Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998, is REINSTATED. Costs
against respondents.

SO ORDERED.4

The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication

Board (DARAB) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in turn, contained the following
dispositive portion:

Accordingly, judgment is rendered:

1. Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI [of] the

Murong property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly TCT No. 43258);

2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in the name[s]
of Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively, as they are disqualified
to become tenants of the Lantap property;

3. Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its rightful
beneficiary, herein tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez under reasonable terms and
conditions;

4. Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and Salun-at; and
ordering the latter to pay 20 cavans of palay per hectare at 46 kilos per cavan
unto [respondents] plus such accrued and unpaid rentals for the past years as
may be duly accounted for with the assistance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby instructed to assist the
parties execute their leasehold contracts and;

5. The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be observed until
otherwise modified or dissolved by the appellate body.

SO ORDERED.5

Factual Antecedents

Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of

agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is located
at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the
other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong
property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap property is
tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi) 6 (who is the husband7 of
respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by
petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz). 8

The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong,

Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the
mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually
consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were
issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was
issued for the Murong property. It contained the following description:

Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m. more

or less from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,

thence N. 28 deg. 20 ‘E., 200.00 m. to point 2;

thence S. 61 deg. 40 ‘E., 100.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 28 deg. 20 ‘W., 200.00 m. to point 4;

thence N. 61 deg. 40 ‘W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;

Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on

the southeast, and southwest by public land; and on the northwest by Public
Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearings true.
Declination 0131 ‘E. Points referred to are marked on plan H-176292. Surveyed
under authority of sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in]
December 1912-March 1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm.
This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No. 159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.9
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap
property and contained the following description:

Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 ‘W., 1150.21

m. from BLLM No. 122, Irrigation project,

thence N. 61 deg. 40’E., 200.00 m. to point 2;

thence N. 28 deg. 20’E, 100.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 61 deg. 40’E, 200.00 m. to point 4;

thence S. 28 deg. 20’W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning; containing an

area of 2.0000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, southeast, and southwest by
Public land; and on the northwest by Road and public land. Bearings true.
Declination 0 deg. 31’E., points referred to are marked on plan H-105520.
Surveyed under authority of Section 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with
existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land
Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and approved on January 6, 1932. Note: This
is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag Townsite K-27. All corners are B.I.
Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.10

Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in "Bagabag Townsite,

K-27," without any reference to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.

On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from
RBBI. The Deed of Sale11 described the property sold as follows:

x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and

unconditionally x x x that certain parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of
Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and more particularly bounded and
described as follows, to wit:

Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan x x x x Containing an area of 2.000

hectares. Bounded on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by Public Land;
and on the NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and
Santos Navarrete. Bearing true. Declination 013 ‘B. Points referred to are marked
on plan H-176292.

of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee
simple in accordance with the Land Registration Act, its title thereto
being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62096 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.

As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention
the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the
property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property.
There is no evidence, however, that respondents took possession of the Murong
property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who continued to be
the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership
over the Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of
respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of the other respondents), continued
working on the other property -- the Lantap property -- without any evidence that
he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was
annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, 1994. 12

Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20 13 and 2114 of

Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,15 executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the
Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an agricultural land
located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however,
is the title corresponding to the Lantap property). 16

After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of ₱90,000.00
to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez17 and Dela Cruz18 on September 5, 1991.
Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated in
Barangay Murong.19 The CLOAs were registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.

On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the
respondents and almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the
petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint 20 before the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation
of petitioners’ CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of
respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in
favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on respondents’ theory that
the Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents
by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based
their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which
pertains to the Murong property.

Petitioners filed their Answer21 and insisted that they bought the Murong property
as farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed
good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the owner of the Murong
property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest belief that they were
buying the Murong property, and occupied and exercised acts of ownership over
the Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what respondents Espejos
repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the Lantap property, as evidenced
by their continued occupation and possession of the Lantap property through
respondent Nemi.
RBBI answered22 that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the
buy-back transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a grave
mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the disposition of its
acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules and regulations.

OIC-RARAD Decision23

The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed
of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on respondents’ Deed
of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD
concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong property. On the other
hand, since the petitioners’ VLTs referred to TCT No. T-62836, which
corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners’
CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the particular description
contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is the Murong property, the OIC-
RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical error.

Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the
actual tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they were disqualified to
become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the cancellation of their
CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant
of the Lantap property, Nemi.

The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners’ only right as the actual tillers of the
Murong property is to remain as the tenants thereof after the execution of
leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.

DARAB Decision24

Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision.
It ruled that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona
fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. There being no
evidence that the DAR field personnel were remiss in the performance of their
official duties when they issued the corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners,
the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails. This conclusion is made
more imperative by the respondents’ admission that petitioners are the actual
tillers of the Murong property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.

As for respondents’ allegation that they bought back the Murong property from
RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they failed to support their allegation with substantial
evidence. It gave more credence to RBBI’s claim that respondents repurchased
the Lantap property, not the Murong property. Respondents, as owners of the
Lantap property, were ordered to enter into an agricultural leasehold contract
with their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant of the Lantap property.

The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the
CLOAs issued to appellants as they are by operation of law qualified
beneficiaries over the landholdings; there is nothing to quiet as these titles were
awarded in conformity with the CARP program implementation; and finally, the
Board declares that all controverted claims to or against the subject landholding
must be completely and finally laid to rest.

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the assailed

decision is ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby rendered, declaring:

1. Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona fide tenant-
tillers over the Murong property and therefore they are the qualified beneficiaries
thereof;

2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396 issued in the
name of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz
respectively, covered formerly by TCT No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong
property as valid and legal;

3. Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an agricultural leasehold contract with

bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over the Lantap property, [the latter] being
the subject matter of the ‘buy back’ arrangement entered into between
[respondents] and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Incorporated, and other incidental
matters are deemed resolved.

SO ORDERED.25

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling
that they repurchased the Lantap property, while the petitioners were awarded
the Murong property. They were adamant that the title numbers indicated in their
respective deeds of conveyance should control in determining the subjects
thereof. Since respondents’ Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the
property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to them was the Murong
property. On the other hand, petitioners’ VLTs and CLOAs say that they cover
the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be understood that they were
awarded the Lantap property. Respondents added that since petitioners are not
the actual tillers of the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to
their lack of qualification.

The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in
Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to
its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the object of the
sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by
TCT No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then that is the property that the
respondents repurchased.

The CA further ruled that as for petitioners’ VLTs, the same refer to the property
with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property.
The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in
Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error. The CA
ruled that the technical description contained in the TCT is more accurate in
identifying the subject property since the same particularly describes the
properties’ metes and bounds.

Both the RBBI26 and petitioners27 filed their respective motions for

reconsideration, which were separately denied. 28

On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this Court. 29 RBBI raised the issue that the
CA failed to appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean hands
because they misled RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that the two lots were
not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they be declared free from any liability to the
parties as it did not enrich itself at anyone’s expense. RBBI’s petition was
dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said Resolution reads:

Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition for
review on certiorari, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of sufficient
showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case.30

Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality. 31 Entry of
judgment was made in that case on December 15, 2004. 32

On July 27, 2005,33 petitioners filed the instant petition.

Issues

Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the
Court’s determination:

What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBI’s Petition for Review on
Certiorari, which assailed the same CA Decision

II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the
subject of the contracts

III

What are the subject properties of the parties’ respective contracts with RBBI

Our Ruling

Propriety of the Petition

Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues
which are beyond the province of Rule 45.34

The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the
appellate court’s rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as
inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the
admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the Court’s authority to
review.35

Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review
the same. The rule that a petition for review should raise only questions of law
admits of exceptions, among which are "(1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record."36

In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general
rule because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through its
erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be discussed below.
Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing bodies below are sufficient
for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Rule 45.

First Issue
Dismissal of RBBI’s appeal

Respondents maintain that the Court’s earlier dismissal of RBBI’s petition

for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible
error in the appellate court’s decision in favor of the respondents. 37

We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBI’s earlier petition in G.R. No.
163320 because it failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA
Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors in the appellate
court’s decision but simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the
respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the identity of the properties
and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued
that respondents did not come to court with clean hands.

These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate
court’s Decision. It is the appellant’s responsibility to point out the perceived
errors in the appealed decision. When a party merely raises equitable
considerations such as the "clean hands" doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis
and cogent arguments to support his claim, there should be no surprise if the
Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is
dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily
mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the
appellant’s inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even procedural
lapses.

RBBI’s failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not
prejudice petitioners who were not parties to RBBI’s appeal, especially because
petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately and
effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his right to
appeal an adverse decision just because another party had already appealed
ahead of him,38 or just because the other party’s separate appeal had already
been dismissed.39

There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against
RBBI. RBBI executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the
commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for cancellation of CLOA
was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two properties
involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive
only between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action. 40 Thus, when the vendor (in this case RBBI)
has already transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees
are not bound by any judgment which may be rendered against the vendor. 41

Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?

Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed
of Sale between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the property
that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated that its
subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the title for the Murong
property – then the property repurchased by the respondents was the Murong
property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between petitioners and
RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 – the title for the Lantap property – then the
property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap property.

Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to
determine the subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of the
contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately expressed in
their contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that
should be applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.

Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The
Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other
evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a
general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of
undetected tampering with the document. 42

In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule
because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is
admitted by the parties that the respondents’ Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-
62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located
in Barangay Murong.

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately
and correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale,
petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the
parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-
62836).

As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836
(corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the
petitioners, and the reference to "Barangay Murong" was a typographical error.
On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to "Barangay Murong"
reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere
error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an
apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the
parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the
instruments.

The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents
and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of
the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears
that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which
provides:

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered

as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.43

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party
seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement
or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed
Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol
Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to
the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that
would contradict such terms.

However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case
at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed
between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule
130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
"between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule
may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a
privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim
on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument. 44

Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule,
as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties thereto;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Here, the petitioners’ VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described
the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they
also describe the subject property as being located in "Barangay Murong." Even
the respondents’ Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence
Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-62096" (Murong property), but RBBI contended that
the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in
issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an
examination of the parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to determine the
true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the
intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a
contract,45 not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or
ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere
typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code
involving the interpretation of contracts:

Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control.

If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter
shall prevail over the former.

Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of
documents is likewise enlightening:

Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. – For the proper

construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be
shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language
he is to interpret.1âwphi1

Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was
intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were
intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen
from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.

Third issue

Determining the intention of the parties

regarding the subjects of their contracts

We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the
respondents was the Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After the
execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts of
ownership that could show that they indeed knew and believed that they
repurchased the Murong property. They did not take possession of the Murong
property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the possession
of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from
the respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold rentals for using the
Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents.

Aside from respondents’ neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the
Murong property, there is one other circumstance that convinces us that what
respondents really repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi
(husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling the Lantap property,
without turning over the supposed landowner’s share to RBBI. This strongly
indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not RBBI) as the
owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly spouses Elenita
and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI retained ownership of the Lantap property,
how come they never complied with their obligations as supposed tenants of
RBBI’s land? The factual circumstances of the case simply do not support the
theory propounded by the respondents.

We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners was the Murong property, and not the
Lantap property. When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were already
the tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had been paying rentals to RBBI
accordingly. It is therefore natural that the Murong property and no other was the
one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI with the execution of the VLTs.
Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs, petitioners remained in possession of
the Murong property, enjoying and tilling it without any opposition from anybody.
Subsequently, after the petitioners completed their payment of the total purchase
price of ₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials
conducted their investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty, did not reveal any anomaly.
Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the Murong property and
were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR officials issued CLOAs in
petitioners’ favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer to the land in Barangay
Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the Murong property,
undisturbed by anyone for several long years, until respondents started the
controversy in 1997.

All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners

support their position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong
property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no contrary
evidence of the parties’ actuations to indicate that they intended the sale of the
Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-
62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken belief that the said
title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not farfetched considering
that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular barangay where the property is
located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by a road and public land.
Hence, were it not for the detailed technical description, the titles for the two
properties are very similar.

The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners’ argument that their VLTs were
intrinsically ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by asking why
petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their contract. 46 A cause of
action for the reformation of a contract only arises when one of the contracting
parties manifests an intention, by overt acts, not to abide by the true agreement
of the parties.47 It seems fairly obvious that petitioners had no cause to reform
their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners) never had any
dispute as to the interpretation and application thereof. They both understood the
VLTs to cover the Murong property (and not the Lantap property). It was only
much later, when strangers to the contracts argued for a different interpretation,
that the issue became relevant for the first time.

All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between
respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while
the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396
of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. In
consequence, the CA’s ruling against RBBI should not be executed as such
execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein. Although the CA’s
decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI with the
dismissal of RBBI’s petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of
petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the CA
decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed

October 7, 2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
January 17, 2001 Decision of the DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The
Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the
Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of
the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register
of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary corrections to the
titles of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs against
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

END OF MODULE 1