US vs Taylor gr no. L-9726 Dec.

8, 1914
FACTS
On the September 25, 1913, Carson Taylor, the citing editor
and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city
of Manila of the bilingual newspaper known as the Manila
Daily Bulletin, a paper of general circulation which has the
English and Spanish versions, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the
honesty, virtue, and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as a
member of the bar of the Philippine Islands.
In addition, it published ad circulated a contempt and
ridicule article against the mentioned lawyer.
On September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious
defamation and libel in the English language of and
concerning the said Ramon Sotelo which has the headline of
"OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. — CRIMINAL
CHARGES FOLLOWS CIVIL SUIT."
On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O'donnell
was destroyed by fire.1awphil.net The house was insured for
P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the West
of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz & Co. are
the local agents, with an additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell
& Co.
On the article published, it discussed that one Atty. Ramon
Sotelo had been in conspiracy and fraud between the owner of
the burnt building so as to collect insurance. Atty. Sotelo
further contended that the article was of a certain false
and malicious defamation and libel. The CFI agreed to Atty.
Sotelo; hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Did the lower court erred in ruling that the defendant was
criminally liable under Act No. 277 as manager of Manila Daily
Bulletin?
HELD
YES. As per the Solicitor-General, the proof shows that the
defendant was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of
the crime charged against him, unless it is shown by the proof
that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly
responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter
contained in said alleged libelous article. From an examination
of the editorial page of said exhibit, we find that it shows that
the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin Publishing
Company," and that the defendant was its manager. There is not a
word of proof in the record which shows what relation the manager
had to the publication of said newspaper. For the foregoing
reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record
showing that the defendant was the “author, the editor, or the
proprietor” of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the
lower court must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the
defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de
officio.
DOCTRINE
By explained by the Supreme Court, common law crimes do not exist
in the Philippine islands. Thus, an act does not constitute a
crime when no law makes it so. In the instant case, although
libel is made a crime, the defendant is not the author, editor,
or proprietor of the said newspaper—instead, only its manager.
Neither does the proof show in the record that the manager played
a part in the publication of the article.

PP. Vs Cabural gr no. 34105 feb. 4, 1983

FACTS
At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 14, 1960,
three masked men entered the building of the Kim San Milling
in Palao City of Iligan through an opening of the roof above
the kitchen where Pua Lim Pin Bebencio Palang, Sy Chua Tian
and Siao Chou were sleeping.
The masked men, at gunpoint, hogtied the four occupants of
the room and commanding them to lie on the floor, face down,
were all covered with blankets.
All the cabinets are ransacked and order Pua Lim Pin to open
the safe box however he cannot since he was only an
employee. They order also Sy Chua Tian and stated that "now
is 3:30, if by 4:00 the safe is not open we will kill you."
On th next room where the maids were sleeping, Restituta
Biosano Panchita Maghanoy and Agripina Maglangit have
retired after their chores were performed.
At about 2:00 o'clock the following morning, they were
awakened by two persons, one holding a pistol and the other
holding a hunting knife. The maids were all hogtied, made to
lie on the floor, face downward, and were all covered with
blankets
After two hours later, Agripina Maglangit had freed her
hands, which made her be separted from the group due to the
anger of the intuders. With his pistol pointed at her, he
took her outside the building to a secluded place within the
Kim San Compound
Here, with her hands tied, she was made to lie down flat on
the ground, raised her skirt, tied down her panties, and had
sexual intercourse with her. The rape having been
consummated,he pulled her left arm so she could stand up.
Agripina Maglangit recognized the features of the man that
raped her. She Identified her rapist to be the accused
Timoteo Cabural.
At about four o'clock that morning, all the intruders must
have left because the four men that were hogtied in the
other room noticed complete silence.
The accident having been reported, both the local police as
well as the Philippine Constabulary stationed in Iligan
conducted their investigation.
On September 19, 1960, the accused Leonide Cabual subscribed
to an affidavit before the same Fiscal. Magsalin regarding
his participation and that of -his co-accused in the robbery
of Kim San Milling in the early morning of September 14,
1960.
On September 21, 1960, (1) Timoteo Cabural, alias Romeo
alias Tiyoy (2) Benjamin Lasponia; (3) Leonide Cabual alias
Eddie; (4) Ciriaco Yangyang; (5) William Tate alias Negro;
(6) Fausto Dacera and, (7) Alfonso Caloy-on alias Pablo,
were charged before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte of the crime of Robbery in Band with Rape, in an
information filed by the City Fiscal of Iligan City.
September 14, 1960 in the City of Iligan Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction the said accused, in company with
one Fred Ybañez alias Godofredo Camisic and one John Doe.
They willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, rob
and carry away personal properties with a total value of
P9,435.50, belonging to the Kim San Milling Company,
Bebencio Palang, Agapito Tan, Restituta Boisano Panchita
Maghanoy, Catalina Boisano Pua Lim Pin and Sy Chua Tian to
the damage and prejudice of the said owners in the said sum
of P9,435.50, Philippine currency; and that on the occasion
or by reason of the said robbery, the above-named accused
except William Tate alias Negro, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
 carnal knowledge of one Agripina Maglangit, a woman, by
means of violence and intimidation and against her will.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 294 paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18 and
Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 12, Section 3, with the following aggravating
circumstances, to wit: that the said offense was committed
during night time and by a band; that it was committed with
the use of disguise; and that it was committed with the use
of a motor vehicle.
Upon arraignment, the defendants pleaded not guilty.On
October 14, 1971, this Court granted the motion of Leonide
Cabual to withdraw his appeal.
Appellant Cabural declared that from 2:00 in the afternoon
of September 13, 1960 to 3:00 in the early morning of
September 14, 1960, he was playing mahjong with Virginia
Cruz Maruhom and one Gomer. Ciriaco Yangyang also denied
participation in the commission of the crime considering
that at that time he was in Barrio Mentering attending the
counting of votes for the muse of the barrio fiesta.
ISSUE
Whether or not the all the accused are guilty of Robbery with
Rape?
HELD
NO. CABURAL ALONE was responsible for the rape on Agripina. We
agree with the lower court that Cabural alone was responsible for
the rape on Agripina. There is no evidence that his co-appellant
Yangyang and the other malefactors made advances on her. There is
no evidence that his co-appellant Yangyang and the other
malefactors made advances on her. Cabural was charged to suffer
the penalty under Art. 294 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
( reclusión temporal in its medium period to reclusión perpetua)
when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape.
Presidential Decree No. 767 which imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death "when the robbery accompanied with
rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons cannot be applied since only Cabural consummated the
crime of robbery with rape.

The extra-judicial confessions of Benjamin and Leonide point

to Cabural as the mastermind and the role each of them would play
in the commission of the crime. Their interlocking confessions
indicate how they would go to the scene of the crime, the manner
by which they would enter into the premises of Kim.
Fiscal Magsalin testified that said accused readily and
without hesitation signed their respective extra-judicial
confessions.
The alibi of the accused has no merit since there is still
no guarantee that he could not be at the scene of the crime.
Furthermore, the crime is aggravated by dwelling and nighttime.
The Chief Justice and the herein ponente (Justice Ramon C.
Aquino) are of the opinion that article 335 cannot be applied to
robbery with rape and that that offense should be penalized under
article 294(2) in which case reclusion perpetua should be
imposed. As the accused was charged with a crime against
property, he should not be convicted of a crime against chastity,
a private offense.
The writer of this decision is of the opinion that in
robbery with rape, the accused should be penalized under Article
294(2) of the Revised Penal Code because it is a crime against
property and not a crime against chastity a private offense.
RATIONALE:
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege
The other 3 accused couldn't be charged with robbery with rape by
just participating with the robbery while their mastermind
committed rape. They can only be penalized for the crime against
property and not a crime against chastity.

US vs Tamporong Gr no. L-9527 Aug 23, 1915

FACTS
The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of
Baguio for having played the game of chance called "monte" in
violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of
First Instance, where they were again tried and convicted upon
the same charge. An appeal was allowed to this court because the
validity of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question during the
trial of the cause in the court.
At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal
procedure in force in this jurisdiction prior to the promulgation
on the 23d day of April, 1900, of General Orders No. 58.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Ordinance No. 35 is valid.
2. Whether or not the SC is required under the law to examine the
evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendants.
HELD
1. Yes. Ordinance No. 35 is valid. The Court did not elaborate on
this question because the Court held that the case at bar was on
all fours with the case of US v. Joson, which held the validity
of the assailed Ordinance.
2. No. The SC looked at the intent of the framers of several laws
to answer the 2nd issue The Court held that Act No. 1627 was
ambiguous because it did not explicitly allow or prohibit the SC
to examine issues of facts on appeals. Section 43 of General
Order No. 58 was amended by said Act, which now reads: "From all
final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of
similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now
provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to
the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. The convicted party
may appeal from any final judgment of a justice of the peace in a
criminal cause to the Court of First Instance by filing a notice
of appeal with such justice within fifteen days after the entry
of judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall
forward to the Court of First Instance all original papers and a
transcript of all docket entries in the cause, and the provincial
fiscal shall thereupon take charge of the cause in behalf of the
prosecution. The judgment of the Court of First Instance in such
appeals shall be final and conclusive, except in cases involving
the validity or constitutionality of a statute or the
constitutionality of a municipal or township ordinance." The
Court first differentiated a "writ of error" from an "appeal."
The former brings up the record in an action of law for review of
questions of law only. The latter, on the other hand, involves a
rehearing of both the facts and the law. This was the original
pracitce. This previous practice was that no appeals whatsoever
were allowed to the SC from judgments of CFIs in cases
originating in the justices' courts. The framers amended this
practice to the extent only 1
CRIMINAL LAW 1 A.Y. 1819– JUDGE PIMENTEL of providing a way by
which statutory questions could be reviewed by the SC. The
amendment was not meant to give to the SC the power to rehear
questions of fact. Jurisprudence showed that in appeals, only the
constitutionality of an ordinance or law could be raised in
appeals to the SC. The Court used at least 14 other cases to show
that in the last 10 years, the ruling has not changed. SC did not
have the power to review facts touching the guilt or innocence of
an accused person. WHEREFORE, Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
RATIO/s
1. For the issue at hand, the SC merely wrote, “The first
question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the case
of the United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. 01). The cases are on
all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the case is
unnecessary.” Nothing more.
2.1 The SC has revisited prior laws to ascertain the intention of
the „framers‟ of the amended section of Act No. 1627; the latter
being ambiguous in the sense that it did not explicitly allow nor
prohibit SC to examine issues of facts on appeals. The SC found,
in light of former practices and from further understanding the
circumstances in which the framers of the amended law were
subject to, that the amendment was not meant to confer in them
the jurisdiction of reviewing questions of fact.
2.2 The SC further distinguished their holding from Loeb vs.
Columbia Township Trustees, and Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water
Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City. These two latter cases were taken to
the US SC directly from the circuit courts as writs of error,
(not as appeals) where the US SC does not only have jurisdiction
to review constitutional questions but also every other question
properly arising.
2.3 In at least fourteen other cases, the SC has showed that the
ruling for this issue in the last 10 years has remained uniform.
And that the court, since its organization, never held that it
had the power to review facts touching guilt of an accused
person, ONLY as to when the appeal involved the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a
municipal or township ordinance.
Doctrine
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD INSTANCE; EXTENT OF
REVIEW. — Under the Spanish criminal procedure, appeals from
justices’ courts were allowed only to Courts of First Instance.
By section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this procedure has been
so amended that appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in such
cases when the validity or constitutionality of a statute is
involved. This amendment of the procedure does not carry with it
the right of review of the facts, but is confined to the purpose
stated — that is, of determining the validity or
constitutionality of the statute or ordinance upon which the
judgment was predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that such
has uniformly been the interpretation of section 43 by this
court.

US vs. Peñalosa
FACTS
Marcosa Peñalosa and Enrique Rodriguez were married on the 3rd of
May, 1901. However, it appeared from the evidence that Peñalosa
was not 21 years old on the day of her marriage and contracted
marriage without the consent of her father violating Article 475
of the old Penal Code. Peñalosa stated that she believed that she
was born in 1879; that so her parents had given her to understand
ever since her tenderest age; that she had not asked them
concerning her age because her father had given her to so
understand since her childhood. Rodriguez, on the other hand,
stated to have received a letter from Peñalos two days before
their marriage in which she said that she was 21 years of age.
This letter was shown to the clergyman who married them. Further,
Rodiguez had no suspicion that Peñalosa was a minor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused are guilty of violating Article 475 of
the old Penal Code.
RULING
NO. One cannot be convicted under Article 475 when by reason of a
mistake of fact there does not exist the intention to commit the
crime. As stated by Peñalosa in the trial, she believed that she
was born in 1879; that so her parents had given her to understand
ever since her tenderest age; that she had not asked them
concerning her age because her father had given her to so
understand since her childhood. Her father was present in the
court room as the complaining witness. If his daughter was
deviating from the truth it would have been an easy matter for
him to have testified denying the truth of what she had stated.
It is evident that he was interested in the conviction of his
daughter, and the fact that the complaining witness did not
contradict her obliges us to accept as true the statements of the
witness. Being true, they disclose that she acted under a mistake
of fact; that there was no intention on her part to commit the
crime provided for and punished in Article 475. As for the
husband, it has been proved that two days before the marriage was
celebrated he received a letter from the woman in which she said
that she was 21 years of age. This letter was showed to the
clergyman who married them. Peñalosa, when the marriage ceremony
was performed took an oath before the clergyman, in the presence
of her husband, that she was 21 years of age. Rodriguez testifies
that he had no suspicion that the she was a minor. This statement
has not been contradicted and is proper to consider that it
suffices to demonstrate that the defendant acted under a mistake
of fact, and in conformity with the principle laid down in this
opinion he has not been guilty of a violation of Article 475 in
connection with Article 13, No. 3, nor in any other manner.
US vs. Apego
FACTS
Spouses Pio and Maria Bautista returned to their home from
Nasugbu. Before entering the house, the spouses called Genoveva
Apego, Maria’s sister, who was inside. As there was no reply, Pio
led the way and opened the door; he was followed by Maria who,
once inside, lit a match and then a kerosene lamp. In the mean
time, Pio went to the place where Genoveva was, who, startled,
immediately awoke, seized a pocketknife which was in a box at her
side, and attacked and struck Pio in the breast. Maria, who was
not aware of the aggression, asked Genoveva why empty tin cans
and other articles were scattered about the azotea of the house,
realizing that the spouses were already home, she got up in front
of the said spouses; at this moment Maria advised her to reflect,
but Genoveva immediately ran out of the house, asking for help;
it was then that the Maria noticed that her husband was seriously
wounded. Few moments after Pio was brought to the hospital, he
died. Genoveva was charged with Murder before the CFI of
Batangas, but it was ruled that she was only guilty of homicide
as there was no qualifying circumstances present. In her defense,
Genoveva argued that someone touched her left arm which awoke
her. She believed that somebody was trying to abuse her, thus
seizing the pocketknife and struck the person holding her.
ISSUE
Whether or not Genoveva can be held criminally liable for the
crime charged.
RULING
It cannot be denied that, upon the Genoveva's awakening, startled
at feeling somebody grasp her left arm and believing that an
attempt was being made against her honor, she understood that
there was a positive unlawful aggression from which she had to
defend herself. It is also undeniable that there was no previous
provocation on her part; but it is unquestionable that, in making
use of this deadly weapon, even in the defense of her person and
rights, by decidedly wounding him who had touched her or caught
her by the arm, the Genoveva exceeded her right of defense. Since
there was no real need of wounding Pio who had merely caught her
arm, and perhaps did so to awake her, as she was asleep and had
not replied to Maria’s calls; Further, Pio performed no other act
of aggression as might have indicated a decided purpose to commit
an attempt against her honor than merely to catch her by the arm.
Although she believed that there was an attempt to her honor and
she had to defend herself, once awake and provided with an
effective weapon for her defense, there was no just nor
reasonable cause for striking a blow in the center of the body,
where the principal vital organs are seated, of the man who had
not performed any act which might be considered as an actual
attempt against her honor. Thus, it is concluded that in the
commission of the crime there was present the circumstance of
incomplete exemption from responsibility. For the foregoing
reasons it is our opinion that, with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, the defendant, Genoveva Apego, should be, as she
is hereby, sentenced to the penalty of two years of prision
correccional, to the accessories of article 61, to pay an
indemnity of five hundred pesos to the heirs of the deceased,
and, in case of insolvency, to subsidiary imprisonment which
shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to the
payment of the costs of both instances. In computing the time of
the sentence, credit shall be allowed for one-half of the time of
imprisonment suffered by the defendant while awaiting trial.
 PEOPLE VS. GERVERO
Facts
1. Victims Hernando Villegas (Hernando), Jose Villegas (Jose),
and Benito Bausug, Jr. (Bausug) were members of the Civilian
Volunteer Organization (CVO). 2. Accused were members of the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), and were
carrying firearms. They approached the victims and asked money
from Hernando, and the latter gave them Php 20. One of the
accused (Bañes) remarked, “Is that the only amount you can give
when you just received money from your wife?” The other accused
(Castigador), took the money and said “You just watch out.” Later
in the evening, a burst of gunfire from where the victims were
walking was heard. A shout was heard, “This is Hernando, a CVO!”
and someone replied, “Birahi na! (Shoot now!)”. 4. The accused
interposed the defense of mistake of fact, claiming that they
thought the victims were members of the New People’s Army (NPA).
The accused were given oral instructions by Senior Inspector
Benigno Baldevinos to conduct a tactical patrol and combat
operations against the NPA. They were told to use the password
“Simoy”, to which the response would be “Amoy”.

ISSUE
Whether the defense of mistake of fact applies in this case
RULING
No, mistake of fact finds on application in this case. As early
as in the case of People v. Oanis and Galanta, 15 the Court has
ruled that mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness: In support of the theory
of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants
rely on the case of US. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is
ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake
is committed without fault or carelessness Here, there was no
reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because they
were traversing an open area which was illuminated not only by
moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In addition, the witnesses
testified that the victims were conversing and laughing loudly.
It must be borne in mind that it was not the first time that the
accused had seen the victims as, in fact, accused Bañes and
Castigador met Hernando just a few hours before the shooting.
Moreover, they all reside in the same town and, certainly, the
accused who were all members of the CAFGU would know the
residents of that town so as to easily distinguish them from
unknown intruders who might be alleged members of the NPA. Also,
when Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself and shouted,
“This is Hernando!” However, instead of verifying the identities
of the victims, the accused continued to fire at them. One of
them even shouted, “Birahi na!” (“Shoot now!”). In addition, when
the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At
that point, they could no longer claim that they didn’t recognize
the victims; and still not contented, they sprayed them with
bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds, Hernando 16
gunshot wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds . PEOPLE VS.
BAYAMBAO FACTS: On the night of the incident, Bayambao was
informed by his wife that someone threw stones at their house. He
then took his revolver and went down. Since he saw no one, he was
about to ascend the staircase, when he saw a black figure rushing
towards him with its hands lifted up as if it was going to strike
him. Bayambao was frightened and thought that the black figure
was an outlaw, thus, he fired his revolver at the black figure,
but it turned out that the black figure was his brother-in-law.
After realizing that it was his brother-in-law, he went straight
to the latter and embraced him asking for forgiveness as he
thought that his brother-in-law was an outlaw. His brother
replied stating that he also thought that Bayambao was an outlaw.
The lower court found him guilty of murder. The reason why
Bayambao thought that his brother in law was an outlaw was
because days before the incident, a soldier killed two outlaws.
Being a tax collector for the government, he feared that they are
being targeted by them. ISSUE: Whether or not Bayambao is
criminally liable for murder? RULING: NO. Bayambao acted from the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an ill at least equal in
gravity, in the belief that the deceased was a malefactor who
attacked him with a kampilan or dagger in hand, and for this
reason, he was guilty of no crime and is exempt from criminal
liability. Furthermore, his ignorance or error of fact was not
due to negligence or bad faith, and this rebuts the presumption
of malicious intent accompanying the act of killing. This case is
analogous to the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong where the Court
acquitted the accused, thus, the Court deem that the doctrine
laid in Ah Chong to be applicable in this case. Therefore,
Bayambao was acquitted