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12NAIR SERVICE SOCIETY LTS. V REV. FR. K.G. ALEXANDER On 12 February 1968 - Judgement - LawyerServices
12NAIR SERVICE SOCIETY LTS. V REV. FR. K.G. ALEXANDER On 12 February 1968 - Judgement - LawyerServices
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Judgment Text
1. This is an appeal by certificate from the judgment of the High
Gouri of Kerala, December 23, 1965, reversing the decree of the
Sub-Court, Mavelikara. By the judgment and decree under appeal
the suit of the first respondent, Rev. Father K. C. Alexander
(shortly the plaintiff) was decreed in respect of the suit lands of
which he had sought possession from the appellant, Nair Service
Society Ltd. (shortly the Society or the first defendant) and some
others who are shown as respondents 2 to 6. The facts in this
appeal are as follows:
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2. The plaintiff filed a suit in forma pauperis on October 13, 1942
against the Society, its Kariasthan (Manager) and four others for
possession of 131.23 acres of land from Survey Nos. 780/1 and
780/2 of Ranni pakuthy in the former State of Travancore and for
mesne profits past and future with compensation for waste. The
suit lands are shown as L (1) on a map Ex. L prepared by
Commissioners in CMA. 205 of 1110 ME. and proved by pw.10,
The two Survey Nos. are admittedly Government Poramboke
lands. The plaintiff claimed to be in possession of these lands for
over 70 years. In the year 1100 M. E. a Poramboke case for
evicting him from an area shown as L (2) measuring 173.38 acres,
but described in the present suit variously as 160,161 and 165
acres, was started under the Travancore Land Conservancy
Regulation IV of 1094 M. E. (L. C. case No. 112/1100 M. E.) by
Pathanamthitta Taluk Ctitchery. This land is conveniently
described as 160 acres and has been so referred to by the High
Court and the Sub-Court. The plaintiff was fined under the
Regulations and was evicted from the 160 acres. The society
applied for Kuthakapattam lease of this area on August 11, 1938.
The lease was granted but has not been produced in the case. It
was for 165 acres and the Society was admittedly put in
possession of it on July 24, 1939, or thereabouts. The lease was
for 12 years. Plaintiff's case was that on 13/16 October, 1939 a
number of persons acting on behalf of the Society trespassed
upon and took possession of the suit lands (131.23 acres) in
addition to the 160 acres. The plaintiff therefore, claimed
possession of the excess land from the Society its Manager and
defendants 3 to 6, who were acting on behalf of the Society. The
plaintiff also claimed mesne profits and compensation for, waste.
4. The suit went to trial on 13 issues. The main issues were (a)
whether the plaintiff was in possession of Lands L(1) for over 70
years and bad, improved these lands; (b) whether the first
defendant was entitled to possession of any area in excess of the
first Kuthakapattom for 12 years; and (c) whether the trespass
was on 13/16 October, 1939 or whether the plaintiff was evicted
on July 24,1939 by the Government from the suit land in addition
to the 160 acres in respect of which action was taken in the Land
Conservancy case. Other issues arose from the rival claims for
mesne profits and compensation to which reference has already
been made. The suit was dismissed by the trial judge against the
Society but was decreed against defendants 3 to 6 in respect of
land L(1)(a) with mesne profits and compensation for waste. The
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trial judge held that the possession of the plaintiff dated back
only to 1920-21 and that he was evicted from portion L(1)(b) as
per plan AZ and that the Society was in possession from the time
it entered into, possession of 160 acres. The trial judge held that
as the land was Poramboke and the plaintiff has been ousted by
Government he could not claim possession. The subsequent
grant of Kuthakapattom (Ex. 1) was not considered relevant and
the suit was decided, on the basis of the facts existing on the date
of the commencement of the suit. The trial judge, however, held
that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession he would
also be entitled to mense profits at the rate of Rs. 3392/- from
October 16,1939. The defendants' improvements were estimated
at Rs. 53,085/-. Possession of L(1) (a) was decreed with costs,
mesne profits past and future, and compensation for waste
against defendants 3 to 6
8. To begin with we are concerned with three areas. The land
Conservancy case concerned L(2) or 160 acres. The other two
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areas are L(1)(a) 55.47 acreas and L(1)(b) 75.76 acres. These total
to 291.23 acres. The suit was filed to obtain possession of 131.23
acres, that is to say, 291.23 acres minus the 160 acres. The
Society attempted to disclaim all interest in L (1) (a) and even
attempted to deny that defendants 3-6 were in possession of it.
This was not allowed for very good reasons. In the written
statement no distinction was made between L(1)(a) and L(1)(b).
Although amendments were allowed no amendment of the
written statement to withdraw L(1)(a) from dispute was asked for.
The attempt consisted of oral arguments which the Court did not
entertain. Even in the High Court the written statement was
sought to be amended as late as December 14,1965, the last day
of the arguments. The application had two prayers, About the
second of the two prayers we shall say something later but the
amendment we are dealing with was not only belated but also an
afterthought The High Court rightly pointed out that a defendant,
who after trial of the suit for 16 years orally asks for the
withdrawal of an admission in the written statement, cannot be
allowed to do so. Therefore, the dispute covered the entire
131.23 acres and the Society was claiming to be in possession.
The plaint had asserted that defendants 2-6 were in possession
and that defendant 2 was acting for the Society. In reply the
Society claimed to be in possession: It, however, led evidence on
its own behalf that L(1)(a) was not it its possession. That could not
be considered in view of the admission in the pleadings. The
contrary admission of the plaintiff that defendants 3-6 were in
possession was cited before us as it was before the High Court.
But the High Court has already given an adequate answer when it
observed that the plaintiff only said he had heard this. Therefore,
we are of opinion that the issue was joined between the plaintiff
and the Society with respect to the entire suit land.
The Mahazar Ex. AG, proved by the Village Munsiff who was
personally present, establishes that eviction was from 160 acres.
The High Court judgment mentions the names of several other
witnesses who have also deposed in the same way. The High
Court also points out that the rubber quotas from the rubber
trees continued to be in the name of the plaintiff except in 160
acres in which the quotas were transferred to the name of
Government. All this was very clear evidence. Further even if
some more area was taken over from the plaintiff, it would be
small and not as much as 131.23 acres or even 75.76 acres. It is to
be noticed that the Society applied on August 11, 1939 for grant
of a Kuthakapattom only in respect of 165 acres and this was on
the basis of possession. If the Society was in possession of 291.23
acres, it would not have omitted on August 11, 1939 to apply for
the additional area as well. Another application was made for a
second Kuthakapattom in respect of the additional land on the
basis of possession but only after certain events happened. On
September 29, a complaint (Ex. AO) was made by Phillippose
Abraham (P. W. 8), the Manager of the plaintiff, that the land was
trespassed upon by the Society's men who had harvested the
paddy. On October 2,1939 the second defendant made a counter
complaint Ex. AS. This made a mention of 'land from which the
1st accused (plaintiff) was evicted'. It is, however, to be seen that
in the Mahazar (Exs. AT, AT-1 and AT-2) the encroached area is
shown as 160 acres. On October 13,1939 one Krishnan Nair made
a complaint (Ex. AH) against plaintiff's men of beating and
dacoity. On October 16, the servants of the plaintiff were
arrested. Bail was delayed and was only granted on October
20,1939. On October 24,1939 the plaintiff complained of
dispossession. The case of dacoity was virtually withdrawn and
the accused were discharged. The High Court accepted the plea
that the false charge of dacoity and the arrest were a prelude to
dispossession and a ruse to get the servants of the plaintiff out of
the way. On looking into the evidence we cannot say that this
inference is wrong.
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10. The Society, however, draws attention to several
circumstances from which it seeks to infer the contrary. We do
not think that they are cogent enough to displace the other
evidence. We may, however, refer to them. The Society first refers
to plaintiff's application (Ex. 16) on July 28, 1939 that he was
dispossessed of suit buildings and requesting that 160 acres be
correctly demarcated. In other documents also the plaintiff
complained of eviction from land in excess of 160 acres and
dispossession from buildings. The Society submits that the
evidence showed that there were no buildings in 160 acres and
that only bamboo huts were to be found. The map Ex. L shows
some buildings in L(2). It is more likely that as these buildings
were close to the western boundary between L(2) and L(1), the
plaintiff hoped that he would be able to save them as on
admeasurement they would be found outside 160 acres. It may
be mentioned that in addition to 160 acres, land 20 acres in
extent was further encroached upon. This land is shown in plan
Ex. BB and represents little extensions all round the 160 acres. If
this area was taken into account and 160 acres admeasured then,
there was a possibility of the buildings being saved. This is a more
rational explanation than the contention that as many as 131.23
acres were additionally taken in possession when the plaintiff
was dispossessed from 160 acres. We have therefore, not
departed from the finding of the High Court which we find to be
sound.
11. Failing on the facts, the Society takes legal objections to the
suit. According to the learned counsel for the Society the suit in
ejectment, based on Possession in the character of a trespasser
was not maintainable. His contention is that a trespasser's only
remedy is to file a suit under S.32 of the Travancore Limitation
Regulation (VI of 1100) as amended by Regulations IX of 1100 and
1 of 1101, but within 6 months. This section corresponds to S.9 of
the Indian Specific Relief Act. Now if dispossession was by
Government the suit could not be filed because there was a bar
to such a suit. If dispossession was by the Society a suit under
S.32 was competent. The question is whether after the expiry of 6
months a regular suit based on prior possession without proof of
title was maintainable. This is the main contention on merits
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although it has many branches. We now proceed to consider it.
12. This aspect of the case was argued by Mr. Nambiar with great
elaboration for a number of days. The argument had many facets
and it is convenient to deal with some facets separately because
they have no inter connection with others and some others
together. The main argument is that a suit by a trespasser does
not lie for ejectment of another trespasser after the period of 6
months prescribed by S.32 of the Travancore Limitation Act (VI of
1100). The provisions of the Travancore Specific Relief Act (XIII of
1115) are in pari materia and also ipsissima verba with the Indian
Specific Relief Act and are set out below.
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No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit
instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such
order or decree be allowed".
Exception. Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing
to establish his title to such property and to recover possession
thereof.
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Mr. Nambiar submits that S.8 refers to suits for possession other
than those under S.9, and while question of title is immaterial in
suits under S.9, under S.8 a suit for ejectment must be on the
basis of title. In other words in a suit under S.8 title must be
proved by a plaintiff but under S.9 he need not. Once the period
of six months has been lost a suit brought within 12 years for
obtaining possession by ejectment must be based on title and
not bare prior possession alone.
The question in that case in the words of the Full Bench was
"With great respect we are unable to agree with this view. S.8 of
the Act provides that a person entitled to the possession of
specific immovable property may recover it in the manner
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, by a suit
for ejectment on the basis of title. S.9 gives a summary remedy to
a person who has without his consent been dispossessed of
immovable property, otherwise than in due course of law, for
recovery of possession without establishing title, provided that
his suit is brought within six months of the date of dispossession.
The second paragraph of the section provides that the person
against whom a decree may be passed under the first paragraph
may, notwithstanding such decree, sue to establish his title and
to recover possession. The two sections give alternative remedies
and are in our opinion mutually, exclusive. If a suit is brought
under S.9 for recovery of possession, no question of title can be
raised or determined. The object of the section is clearly to
discourage forcible dispossession and to enable the person
dispossessed to recover possession by merely proving title, but
that is not his only remedy. He may, if he so chooses, bring a suit
for possession on the basis of his title. But we do not think that
he can combine both remedies in the same suit and that he can
get a decree for possession even if he fails to Drove title. Such a
combination would, to say the least of it, result in anomaly and
inconvenience. In a suit under S.9 no question of title is to be
determined, but that question may be tried in another suit
instituted after the decree in that suit. If a claim for establishment
of title can be combined with a claim under S.9, the court will
have to grant a decree for possession dispossession being
proved, in spite of its finding that the plaintiff had no title and
that title was in the defendant."
15. We agree as to a part of the reasoning but with respect we
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cannot subscribe to the view that after the period of 6 months is
over a suit based on prior possession alone, is not possible. S.8 of
the Specific Relief Act does not limit the kinds of suit but only lays
down that the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil
Procedure must be followed. This is very different from saying
that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after the
expiry of 6 months. Under S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself
all suits of a civil nature are triable excepting suits of which their
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. No prohibition
expressly barring a suit based on possession alone has been
brought to our notice, hence the added attempt to show an
implied prohibition by reason of S.8 (S. 7 of the Travancore Act) of
the Specific Relief Act. There is, however, good authority for the
contrary proposition. In Mustapha Sahib v. Santha Pillai,. ILR. 23
Mad. 179 at 182 Subramonia Ayyar J observes:
"that a party ousted by a person who has no better right is, with
reference to the person so ousting, entitled to recover by virtue
of the possession he had held before the ouster even though that
possession was without any title."
17. Mr. Nambiar also relies in this connection upon S.110 of the
Indian Evidence Act and claims that in the case of the Society
there is a presumption of title. In other words, he relies upon the
principle that possession follows title, and that after the expiry of
6 months, the plaintiff must prove title. That possession may
prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this
presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. When
the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone
decides. In this case S.110 of the Evidence Act is immaterial
because neither party had title. It is for this reason that Mr.
Nambiar places a greater emphasis on the plea that a suit on
bare possession cannot be maintained after the expiry of 6
months and that the Society has a right to plead jus tertii. The
first must be held to be unsubstantial and the second is equally
unfounded.
Mr. Nambiar strongly relies upon the above exposition of the law
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and upon institutional comments by Wiren "The Plea of Jus tertii
in ejectment" (1925) 41 LQR. 139, Hargreaves "Terminology and
Title in Ejectment (1940) 56 LQR. 376 and Holdsworth's article in
56 LQR. 479.
The difference in the two cases and which made Asher v. Whitlock
prevail was indicated in that case by Mellor J thus:
"In Doe v. Barnard the plaintiff did not rely on her own
possession merely, but showed a prior possession in her
husband, with whom she was unconnected in point of title. Here
the first possessor is connected in title with the plaintiff; for there
can be no doubt that the testator's interest was devisable."
The effect of the two cases is that between two claimants, neither
of whom has title in himself, the plaintiff if dispossessed is
entitled to recover possession subject of course to the law of
limitation. If he proves that he was dispossessed within 12 years
be can maintain his action.
23. Mr. Nambiar pressed upon us the view that we should not
accept Perry v. Clissold. It must be remembered that that case
was argued twice before the Privy Council and on the second
occasion Earl of Halsbury, L. C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey,
Robertson, Atkinson, Sir Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson beard
the case. Lord Macnaghten's judgment is brief but quite clear. Mr.
Nambiar relies upon two other cases of the Privy Council and a
reference to them is necessary. In Dharani Kanta Lahiri v. Garbar
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Ali Khan 25 MLJ. 95 PC. a suit in ejectment was filed. The plaintiffs
failed to prove that the lands of which they complained
dispossession were ever in their possession within 12 years
before suit and that the lands were not the lands covered by a
sanad which was produced by the defendants. The case is
distinguishable. It is to be noticed that Lord Macnaghten was the
President of the Board and the judgment of the Board, December
5, 1912, did not base the case on Doe v. Barnard or even refer to
it. The second is Mahabir Prasad v. Jamuna Singh 92 I. C. 31 P. C.
In this case the Board observed as follows:
After observing this the Board held that the defendant had failed
to prove his point. The observation does not lead to the
conclusion that a defendant can prove title in another
unconnected with his own estate. The case is not an authority for
the wider proposition.
24. The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding onus but
we approve of the dictum in Perry v. Clissold, No subsequent case
has been brought to our notice departing from that view. No
doubt a great controversy exists over the two cases of Doe v.
Barnard and Asher v. Whitlock but it must be taken to be finally
resolved by Perry v. Clissold. A similar view has been consistently
taken in India and the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act
has given approval to the proposition accepted in Perry v. Clissold
and may be taken to be declaratory of the law in India. We hold
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that the suit was maintainable.
25. It is next submitted that the High Court should not have given
its assistance to the plaintiff whose possession was unlawful to
begin with especially when, by granting the decree, an illegality
would be condoned and perpetuated. In support of this case the
Society relies on the provisions of Regulation IV of 1091 and other
connected Regulations and rales. It points out that under
Regulation IV of 1091, it was unlawful for anyone to occupy
Government land and a * punishment of fine in addition to
eviction was prescribed, and all crops and other products were
liable to confiscation. If eviction was resisted the Dewan could
order the arrest and detention in jail of the offender. S.18 barred
Civil Courts from taking any action in respect of orders passed
under the said Regulation except only when it was established
that the land was not government land. The civil court, it is
submitted, could not grant a decree for possession nor set up the
possession of a person who was an offender under the
Regulation.
26. In our opinion these submissions are not well founded. The
Regulations were intended to regulate the relation of
Government and persons but had no bearing upon the relations
between persons claiming to be in possession. Further the
penalty was a fine for wrongful occupation and in no sense a
punishment for crime. The illegality of the possession was thus
not a criminal act and the regaining of lost possession cannot be
described as an action to take advantage of one's own illegal
action. In fact the plaintiff was not required to rely upon any
illegality which is the consideration which makes courts deny
their assistance to a party. The Society relied upon the oft-quoted
observations of Lord Mansfiled C. J. in Hillman v.
27. The Society next argues that Since it has got a second
Kuthakapattom we must relate it back to the original
dispossession and treat it as a statutory order under the Saws of
Travancore. It refers us to the Travancore Survey and"
Boundaries Regulation of May 1942 (R.9), the Land Conservancy
Regulation (as amended from time to time), the Puduval Rules
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and the Land Assignment kegu-Iat.ipris and some other rules to
show that the forest lands were property of Government and the
plaintiff could not be said so be holding land under a grant from
Government but the Society is. We think that this argument is of
the same character as the argument about jus tertii. The case is
between two persons neither of whom had any right to the suit
lands and were trespassers one after the other. No question of
implementing a statutory order arises. The grant of the second
Kuthakapattom is not related back to the grant of the original
grant and can only be considered if and when it is pleaded. It is
therefore not necessary to consider this point at the moment
when we are not in possession of the case of the plaintiff which
he may setup in answer to this case.
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