1. [ G.R. NO. 141524.

September 14, 2005 ] Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to
dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO
Philippines, respectively.
FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA
AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, PETITIONERS, VS.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO
public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the
DEL MUNDO, NAMELY: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to
SALVADOR AND CARMEN, ALL SURNAMED DEL
declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
Development in default was granted for their failure to file an
HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, PRESIDING JUDGE,
answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del
BRANCH 43, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ROXAS,
Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them
ORIENTAL MINDORO, RESPONDENTS.
was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical
DECISION
admissions and matters that could be determined only after
CORONA, J. trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of
del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because
(Fresh Period Rule)
there were factual matters that could be determined only after
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, trial.[1]
Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan
filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the
injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines waiting for the trial proper.
and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon,
Josefa, Salvador and Carmen. In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed
petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had already
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or
Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July
declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration[3] which petitioners received on July Perforce the petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed
22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period
notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-
compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, renders the judgment final and executory.[8]
holding that it was filed eight days late.[5] This was received by
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
petitioners on July 31, 1998.  Petitioners filed a motion for
aforementioned decision.  This was denied by the Court of
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
Appeals on January 6, 2000.
September 3, 1998.[6]
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of
petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the
the appellate court:
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
I
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR
22, 1998  since  this  was  the  day  they  received  the final CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING
order of the trial court denying their motion for THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N.
reconsideration.  When  they  filed  their  notice  of  appeal  on ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS'
July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL
within the reglementary period for appeal.[7] TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL
MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
the petition.  It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should II
have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE
complaint.  According to the appellate court, the order was the ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION
"final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further: OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M.
ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS' APPEAL WAS FILED
OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE
LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right
AUGUST 3, 1998. to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. 
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
III [10]
 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides:
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER"
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders,
IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF
these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST
appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases,
AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF
the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the
WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH
notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
IV.
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and
IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE
a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
judgment or final order.
CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[9]
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. 
within which petitioners should have filed their notice of (emphasis supplied)
appeal.      
Based  on  the  foregoing,  an  appeal  should  be  taken within
15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right
from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this
it.  It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of
rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
or judgment that dismisses an action.[12] complaint which constituted the final order as it was what
ended the issues raised there.
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of
July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case
should be construed as the "final order," not the February of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered the
12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint.  Since they order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration
received their copy of the denial of their motion for as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day in the case.
reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when
they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998. Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners'
view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal — the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start
complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR? of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in
fact file their notice of  appeal on time?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the
trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial
of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March
the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but
appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According
this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the
notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed — for having 15-day appeal period.[15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed
been filed out of time. their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.  Petitioners,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.[19] 
fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the (emphasis supplied)
order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period
previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there
on Judicial Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d'
that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal
etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of
period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this
appeal[21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of
rule in similar cases,[16] premised on the long-settled doctrine
justice. We have since required strict observance of this
that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
reglementary period of appeal.  Seldom have we condoned late
period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
filing of notices of appeal,[22] and only in very exceptional
jurisdictional.[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated
instances to better serve the ends of justice.
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk
of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority
become final at some definite time fixed by law.[18]
v. Municipality of Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that
appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964
of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on
Revised Rules of Court read:
occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party
serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record of technicalities.
on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the
judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule,
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be
of Rule 37. followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in
the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by
the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and
perfected within the day following that in which the party justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to appeals from quasi-judicial agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law.  and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural Court.[32] The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.  Our the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural
laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[25] of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from 
July 22, 1998  (the date of receipt of notice denying their
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and
particularly Rules 42,[27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows independence of one thing from another.  It should, as a rule,
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.
reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may [33]
 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that
consist of 15 days or more. the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1,
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within reconsideration.
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30] 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days
to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso
the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts even referred to it in its assailed decision.
to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In
this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the assailed decision of the Court of
process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.  While Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  Accordingly, let the
we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for
courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to further proceedings.
deliver justice fairly.
No costs.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion
as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted  – from SO ORDERED.
receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt
of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or