1. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU V.

PEZA

Facts: The Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in
finding the PEZA liable for real property taxes to the Province of Bataan. In 1995, the PEZA was
created and granted the power to register, regulate, and supervise the enterprises located in the
economic zones. The City contends that due to the enactment of the LGC, specifically
withdrawing all tax exemptions and with the PEZA law of 1995 which did not have any
provisions on tax exemptions, it maintains that PEZA is liable for real property tax. Court ruled
that PEZA should be exempted from real property taxation since it is owned by the state.

Issue: WON the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the petition of declaratory relief by
PEZA against the city of Lapu-Lapu

Ruling: The trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief. In
the present case, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, specially, over the remedy. The trial court should have dismissed the PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief for lack of jurisdiction. We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a
petition for declaratory relief against the City.
 2. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs Hontanosa

FACTS:

Respondents Spouses Silverio, et al filed a case to seek the declaration of the nullity of the
promissory notes, real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had
executed in favor of the petitioner. They further sought damages and attorney's fees, and
applied for a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
petitioner from foreclosing on the mortgages against their properties.
the RTC denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss for being unmeritorious,[4] but granted the
respondents' application for preliminary injunction... the CA

ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC erred in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING + RATIO: No

The RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and unwarranted. the
application of the respondents was improper. Injunction only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be
settled. The respondents failed to prove that they would suffer an irreparable injury.
CHUA VS. TOTAL OFFICE PRODUCTS

Facts:
On December 28, 1999, respondent Total Office Products and Services, Inc., (TOPROS) lodged
a complaint for annulment of contracts of loan and real estate mortgage against herein petitioner Antonio
T. Chua before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He contended that the
action filed by TOPROS affects title to or possession of the parcels of land subject of the real estate
mortgage. He argued that it should thus have been filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where
the encumbered real properties are located, instead of Pasig City where the parties reside.
The Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. She reasoned that the action to annul
the loan and mortgage contracts is a personal action. Hence, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari.
 
Issues Ratio:

Whether or not, the petition for annulment of contract and cancellation of mortgage was properly
filed.

Ruling:
SC explained that: Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its
accessory real estate mortgage is a personal action. The Supreme Court ruled that a the proper venue for
a petition for annulment of loan and cancellation of real estate mortgage is lodge with the RTC exercising
jurisdiction over residence of the plaintiff or defendant, not in RTC where the property is located.
3. LARA'S GIFTS & DECORS, INC. vs. MIDTOWN INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC

Facts: Petitioner is one of respondent's customers. petitioner purchased from

respondent and various industrial construction materials.

petitioner failed to pay, prompting respondent to file on a Complaint 6 for Sum of Money
with Prayer for Attachment against petitioner.

The trial court held that petitioner failed to prove that the deliveries made by respondent
did not comply with the required specifications. Other than the self-serving denials of its
witnesses, no other evidence was offered by petitioner to prove that the materials
delivered were substandard.

Issue: Whether midtown's sales invoices have probative value, due execution and
authenticity are not established under section 20, rule 132 of the rules of court?

Ruling: Although petitioner stated that it is not admitting the due execution of the sales
invoices, petitioner's Answer failed to specifically deny or contest under oath the
genuineness or due execution of any of the sales invoices or any of the signatures of
petitioner's representatives or employees appearing therein. Furthermore, petitioner
failed to specify which of the sales invoices pertain to materials delivered which were
allegedly substandard and of poor quality.

.
5. G.R. NO. 198998, JUNE 19, 2019 (YBC VS. BII)
FACTS:
On 13 August 1998, plaintiff-appellee Young Builders Corporation (YBC for brevity) filed before
the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City (RTC) a complaint for collection of sum of money against
defendant-appellant Benson Industries, Inc.[(BII)] YBC claimed that it was contracted by [BII] for
the purpose of constructing [BII]'s commercial building pursuant to an accomplishment billing
basis.

On 21 November 2008, the RTC resolved the case in favor of YBC.

Aggrieved, [BII] filed [an] appeal [to the CA] assailing the RTC's decision finding it liable to YBC.
The CA ruled that BII's appeal was impressed with merit, finding that YBC failed to prove that it
was entitled to collect any balance from BII. YBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated September 14, 2011.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the YBC to the SC
is with merit?

RULING:
NO. The Petition is without merit.

The Rules require that only questions of law should be raised in a certiorari petition filed under
Rule 45. The Court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual
findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding or conclusive on the parties and upon this
Court." Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to
the Court.
 6. BANDILLION VS LA FILIPINA UYGONCO COORPORATION

FACTS
Petitioners filed a complaint for violation of labor standard laws against the latter
before the DOLE Region VI. Dole Secretary held LFUC liable for underpayment of wages,
non-payment of holiday pay, rest day pay, and overtime pay and remanded the case to the
DOLE-Regional Office VI for the appropriate computation of the workers' individual
entitlements.
Meanwhile, CA found that DOLE-VI Regional Director arrived at its computations of the
payment due to the workers without any evidence from the parties, and without considering the
fact that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) has a final decision upholding as
valid the dismissal of most of the employees. CA held that due process was not observed. Hence,
petitioner for review on certiorari by employees to SC.

ISSUES:

1. WON the case decided by the CA was rendered moot and academic by LFUC's filing of a
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director.

RULING
LFUC's filing of a motion for reconsideration before the DOLE-VI Regional Director
rendered moot and academic its petition for certiorari then pending with the Court of Appeals;
Hence, with the filing of the said motion before DOLE Region VI, the pending
petition for certiorari in the appellate court served no more valid purpose, and should have
been dismissed, if not withdrawn by the petitioner therefrom as it had become moot, and
there evidently was already a better, plain, speedier and adequate remedy available to
LFUC.
7. GALANG VS PEAK HOLD

FACTS: This case is a review on certiorari on the decision of the RTC of Caloocan City
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner Ma. Victoria M. Galang (Galang) for annulment of
deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure proceedings on the ground of forum shopping. The
original complaint for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure proceedings
alleged that: Galang is the registered owner of a lot located at Deparo, Caloocan City; While the
Annulment Case was pending, Peakhold filed an ExParte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession over the subject lot to which Galang filed her opposition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that Galang committed forum shopping.

RULING: Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, and all raising the same issues, either pending in or already resolved
by some other court, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision in a certain court.
The Court finds that Galang correctly declared in the Amended Complaint in the Annulment
Case that she did not commence any action or proceeding which involves the same causes of
actions, reliefs, and issues in any court, tribunal, or agency at the time she filed the said
Amended Complaint, or anytime thereafter, the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the
Annulment Case on the ground of forum shopping.
8. JESUS G. REYES v. GLAUCOMA RESEARCH FOUNDATION,
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that: he was hired by respondent corporation as administrator of the
latter's EyeReferral Center (ERC) and
that he has not been receiving his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14th month...
pay for 2004... petitioner did not receive any response from Agulto... petitioner was
informed... that he is no longer the Administrator of the ERC;
there is no employer-employee relationship between them;... petitioner was not dismissed as
he was the one who voluntarily severed his relations with respondents.
The CA held that the LA was correct in ruling that, under the control test and the economic
reality test, no employer-employee relationship existed between... respondents and
petitioner.
Issues:
NO

COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT NO

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN RESPONDENTS AND
PETITIONER.
Ruling:
CONTROL TEST

Indeed, the power of the employer to control the work of the employee is considered the
most significant determinant of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.[
In the present case, petitioner contends that, as evidence of respondents' supposed control
over him, the organizational plans he has drawn were subject to the approval of respondent
corporation's Board of Trustees.
9. MULTISTIQ, INC. AND JUDITH M. LABURADA, vs. MINDS VIEW GRAPHIC ADS

FACTS: A conditional contract of sale for a printer was entered into by Petitioner Multistiq and
Respondent Minds View. Pursuant to this, petitioner delivered several defective printers. For this
reason, respondent stopped the payment of installments. This forced petitioner to cancel their
contract. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for recovery of possession and replevin for the printers
with the RTC of Pasig. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss before the RTC of Davao alleging litis
pendentia and forum shopping.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Minds View is guilty of forum shopping.

RULING: AFFIRMATIVE. All of the elements of litis pendentia are present and thus there is forum
shopping.. In this instance, Minds View split its cause of action for the recovery of the amount it paid
under the contract which is not allowed under the rules. Consequently, it could have been pleaded in
the case pending before the RTC of Pasig. As to the third requisite, the sameness of both cases is
such that any decision in one case would constitute a res judicata in the other.
10. BROWN ARANETA vs ARANETA

Spouses Juan and Michelle decided to separate after 7 years of marriage.. In the entirety of
their de facto separation, both of the children were in the custody of Michelle. She filed for a
temporary restraining order but this was denied by the court. Juan was given visitation right
and Michelle was declared in default.

Then in Muntinlupa City, Michelle instituted a petition for TPO and PPO pursuant to
RA9262. Her TO in Muntinlupa was granted. Juan Ignacio filed a Motion to Dismiss
[Petition] with Prayer to Lift [PO] anchored on several grounds such as litis pendentia, TC of
Makati already had jurisdiction of the case over identical subject matter, issues and parties
and Michelle's filing for PO constitutes forum shopping.

ISSUE: W/O Michelle committed forum shopping

RULING: Yes. The court ruled that Michelle committed forum shopping and pointed that
even if she withdrew the protection order in Makati Court, it is only after it was denied. Also,
there is nothing in the decision of the CA declaring that all issuances of the RTC of Makati
were void for lack of jurisdiction over Michelle, the court said that this posture was meant to
deceive and mislead the court.
11. PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. TORMIL REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

On November 5, 1998, Tormil sent letters14 to Edgardo and Augustus (for the law office) and
Pro-Guard asking them to validate their possession/enter into a lease contract with Tormil and
at the same time settle their past and current rentals. Since these letters were ignored, Tormil,
on November 16, 1998 sent them separate demands to vacate the premises and pay the
monthly rental of P20,000.00 from the time of their occupation thereof until the same are
actually turned over to Tormil.15 As these were unheeded, Tormil asserting right of possession
based on its ownership of the Pasay properties, filed before the Pasay City Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) separate ejectment suits against Edgardo and Augustus, and Pro-Guard16 which
were raffled to Branch 44. The cases were later on consolidated. In its complaints, Tormil stated
that it deemed prudent to have the ownership issue over the premises resolved first in the SEC
case before it filed the ejectment cases in order to prevent complication. It thus averred that
the occupancy by defendants of units in Torres Building pending resolution of the SEC Case was
out of tolerance.
Issue:
Whether reckoning point of payment of the rentals is from the time of occupation of the
property.

Held
No. While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer suit, is entitled to the fair rental
value for the use and occupation of the unit in the building, such compensation should not be
reckoned from the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the time of the demand
to vacate.

“In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the
property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his
right to possess.”27 In other words, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became
illegal. Additionally, the Rules of Court requires the filing of such action within a year after the
withholding of possession,28 meaning that “if the dispossession has not lasted for more than
one year, [then] an ejectment proceeding (in this case unlawful detainer) is proper x x x.”29

Here, from the moment Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit in March 1994 up to November
15, 1998, the right of Pro-Guard to possess the premises was not challenged. It was only after
Tormil prevailed over Manuel in its ownership of the same that it terminated Pro-Guard’s right
to possess the unit it was occupying through a letter to vacate dated November 16, 1998.
Hence, it is only from that point that Tormil is considered to have withdrawn its tolerance of
Pro-Guard’s occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guard’s possession became unlawful at that same
moment. This is supported by the allegation in the complaint for ejectment that Tormil initiated
the same not because of non-payment of rentals, but because of withdrawal of tolerance.
Tolerance or “[t]oleration is defined as ‘the act or practice of permitting or enduring something
not wholly approved of,”30 while tolerated acts are “those which by reason of neighborliness
or familiarity, the owner of the property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give
to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of
friendship or courtesy.”
12. MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY v. FELICIDAD VILLAMENA, GR No. 192477, 2016-07-27

Facts:

plaintiff filed against defendant a complaint for "Nullification of Deed of Sale and of the Title
Issued" pursuant thereto alleging that she is the owner of a parcel of land with improvements
located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title

A letter from defendant corporation dated June 12, 1997, informed plaintiff that TCT No.
204755 over aforesaid property had been cancelled and TCT No. C-319464 was issued in lieu
thereof in favor of defendant corporation on the strength of a purported Special Power of
Attorney executed by Dominador Villamena, her late husband, appointing her, plaintiff
Felicidad Villamena, as his attorney-in-fact and a deed of absolute sale purportedly executed by
her in favor of defendant corporation on May 21, 1997, the same date as the Special Power of
Attorney.

The Special Power of Attorney dated May 21, 1997 is a forgery. Her husband Dominador died
on June 22, 1991. The deed of sale in favor of defendant corporation was falsified.

What plaintiff executed in favor of Mamarco was a deed of real estate mortgage to secure a
loan of P100,000.00 and not a deed of transfer/conveyance.

On August 19, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendant corporation in default for
failure of aforesaid defendant to file its answer as of said date despite the filing of an Entry of
Appearance by its counsel dated May 4, 1998.

On September 10, 1998 defendant corporation filed its Answer with Counterclaim which denied
the allegations in the complaint; alleged that plaintiff and her daughter Lolita accompanied by a
real estate agent approached the President of Momarco for a loan of P100,000.00; offered their
house and lot as collateral; and presented a Special Power of Attorney from her husband. She
was granted said loan. Aforesaid loan was not repaid. Interests accumulated and were added to
the principal. Plaintiff offered to execute a deed of sale over the property on account of her
inability to pay. Plaintiff presented to defendant corporation a deed of sale and her husband's
Special of Power Attorney already signed and notarized.

Under the order dated October 15, 1998, the petitioner was declared in default, and its answer
was ordered stricken from the records. Thereafter, the RTC allowed the respondent to present
her evidence ex parte.

the RTC rendered the default judgment nullifying the assailed deed of absolute sale and the
transfer certificate of title issued pursuant thereto; and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan, City to cancel the petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-319464, and to
reinstate the respondent's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 204755.
It concluded that the act of the petitioner's counsel of formally entering an appearance in the
case had mooted the issue of defective service of summons; and that the respondent had duly
established by preponderance of evidence that the purported special power of attorney was a
forgery.

the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the default judgment upon finding that the
RTC did not commit any error in declaring the petitioner in default and in rendering judgment in
favor of the respondent who had successfully established her claim of forgery by
preponderance of evidence.

Issues:

whether or not the CA gravely erred in upholding the default judgment of the RTC; in ordering
its answer stricken off the records; in allowing the respondent to adduce her evidence exparte;
and in rendering the default judgment based on such evidence.

Ruling:

The petitioner claims denial of its right to due process, insisting that the service of summons
and copy of the complaint was defective, as, in fact, there was no sheriff's return filed;... that
the service of the alias summons on January 20, 1998 was also defective; and that, accordingly,
its reglementary period to file the answer did not start to run.

Under Section 3,[12] Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the three requirements to be complied with
by the claiming party before the defending party can be declared in default are: (1) that the
claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare the defending party in default;
(2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare it in default; (3) the claiming
party must prove that the defending party failed to answer the complaint within the period
provided by the rule.[13] It is plain, therefore, that the default of the defending party cannot be
declared motu proprio.

Principles:

A default judgment is frowned upon because of the policy of the law to hear every litigated
case on the merits. But the default judgment will not be vacated unless the defendant
satisfactorily explains the failure to file the answer, and shows that it has a meritorious defense.
13. Royal Plain View, Inc. vs. Mejia

Facts:

- Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land in Magdum, Tagum City, Davao del
Norte which was registered under the name of Dominador Ramones (Dominador) as
owner.

- Dominador executed a Contract of Sale in favor of Bias Mejia (Bias), father of respondent
Nestor C. Mejia (Nestor), involving 6 hectares on the western portion of the subject land

- Nestor and Royal Plains View, Inc. entered into Deed of Conditional Sale involving that
said parcel of land registered in the name of Dominador.

The Deed of Conditional Sale was later revoked and a new deed was executed between
Nestor and petitioner Corporation, represented by Renato. 19 The new Deed of Conditional
Sale stated that petitioner Corporation had paid respondent the amount of P1,972,000.00
and the remaining balance was to be paid in 40 equal monthly installment of P150,000.00
starting on July 1, 2007 and ending in June 2010.

- Nestor rescinded the Deed of Conditional Sale alleging that petitioners (Renato and the
Corporation) had defaulted in the payment of the monthly installments agreed upon. 

- Royal Plain Views, Inc. filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Instrument
denominated as Rescission of Conditional Sale, Specific Performance, Sums of Money, etc.
against Nestor Mejia and the heirs of the spouses Ramones. Nestor did not file an Answer.
Hence, he was declared in default in an Order by the RTC.

Nestor was already declared in default in the RTC, the CA required him to file his Appellee's
Brief.

Issue/s:

the propriety of filing an appellee's brief by respondent Nestor despite the fact that he was
declared in default in the trial court

Ruling:

The Court found nothing irregular when the CA required respondent Nestor, who has been
declared in default in the trial court, to submit his appellee's brief.

A defending party declared in default loses his standing in the trial court and his right to
adduce evidence and to present his defense, this, however, does not impliedly suggest a
loss of all his/her rights in the stages of the case after the default judgment. This can be
clearly inferred from the wordings of Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Default is not meant to punish the defendant, but to enforce the prompt filing of the answer
to the complaint. Its existence is justified on the ground that it is the one final expedient to
induce defendant to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so
without unnecessary delay.

The provision that the defaulting party cannot take part in the trial only meant that he/she
has already lost his/her standing in the trial court. In other words, the effect of the
judgment of default is limited only to those stages in the prosecution of the case which
terminated with and included in the judgment of the trial court on the merits.

Thus, in this case, whether or not respondent Nestor (a party in default) can file an
appellee's brief is a question which should obviously not be decided by any order or
judgment by default of the trial court, but by the appellate court. To hold otherwise would
result to the detestable consequence that the trial court has the power by its default order
or judgment to interfere with or to control the procedure in the appellate court.
14. MARCELINO DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 169122 (2010)
Facts
Julio domingo executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land in favor of Marcelino’s wife,
Carmelita. Domingo’s filed a case of annulment of the deed of absolute sale alleging that Julio’s signature
was forged. RTC ruled that Julio’s signature was forged and ordered Marcelino and his wife to deliver
possession of the property to the Domingo’s.
Appeals were filed in several venues. Last of which was the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
filed in the CA by Marcelino. CA dismissed outright the petition. One reason for the dismissal was because
there was no written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of the preferred mode of personal service
in violation of the ROC which makes the petition deemed not filed.
Marcelino claims that the failure to incorporate a written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu
of preferred mode of personal service was not vital because Sec. 11, Rule 13 is merely directory and it is
incumbent upon the court to use discretion in determining whether substantial justice will be served (or
rights unjustifiably prejudiced).
Issue
Whether or not filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.”
Held
Personal Service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to
be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of postal service.
Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be
done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation
as to why the service or filing was not done personally. Sec. 11 gives the court the discretion to consider a
pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes were resorted to and no written explanation was made as
to why personal service was not done in the first place. Personal Service and Filing is the general rule (or
mandatory when practicable) and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.
15. Aguilar v. Benlot, et al.
GR No. 232806
January 21, 2019

Facts:

Petitioner Edgardo Aguilar was elected and had served as Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms. After his last term, in 2010, he was elected Barangay Kagawad and
ranked third. During the same elections, his sister was elected Punong Barangay while
Leonardo Oralde and Emiliana Mancao were elected Barangay Kagawads and ranked first
and second. The day after they took their oaths of office, Arias, Oralde and Mancao resigned
from their respective positions due to personal reasons and familial obligations. Then,
petitioner succeeded as Punong Barangay, being third in rank.

Subsequently, Oralde and Mancao were appointed back as barangay kagawads by the City
Mayor and petitioner’s sister, on the other hand, was hired as an employee of the city
government.

Herein respondents filed a Complaint before the Ombudsman against the petitioner, and
Arias, Oralde, and Mancao for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees and Dereliction of Duty. Their contention was that the
concerted resignations were part of the plan to enable petitioner to serve a fourth
consecutive term in circumvention of the three-term limit.

The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint when the petitioner was re-elected as Punong
Barangay and Arias and Oralde as Barangay Kagawads in the 2013 elections. Tey cite the
applicability of the Aguinaldo Doctrine, also known as the Doctrine of Condonation.
However, the Ombudsman later reconsidered its Decision, finding that the said doctrine
can no longer be applied to Petitioner and Arias. Thus, they were decided to have
committed grave misconduct.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Ombudsman denied. CA dismissed due to the lack of
explanation as to why the petition was neither personally filed before the CA nor
personally served to the parties. Petitioner filed for an MR before the CA. He explained that
his failure to personally file and serve the petition was due to an honest mistake. CA did not
find the reasons advanced by the petitioner compelling. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition and in failing to decide the case on its merit

Held:

No. The Court finds that while the CA had good reason to find petitioner’s belated
explanation unsatisfactory, the present case merits the relaxation of the rules. It must be
clarified that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 ROC, personal service and filing is the
general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing is the exception. Henceforth,
whenever personal service or filing is practicable, it is mandatory. If personal service or
filing is not practicable, resort to other modes may be had, but must be accompanied by a
written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with.

In determining the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the

importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involve therein, and the prima
facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11, Rule 13. The
Court rules that while the CA could not be faulted for not finding merit in the petitioner’s
belated explanation, having judicial notice of the proximity of the counsel’s offices to the
CA, to the ombudsman, and with each other, the CA should have also considered the prima
facie merit of the petitioner’s case. The Court ruled that while petitioner is guilty of Grave
Misconduct, an analysis of the questions of law warrant that he benefit from the doctrine of
condonation prevailing at that time. Hence, petition granted.
 16. PENOSA VS DONA

FACTS:

This case originated from a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Macrosman Dona (respondent) against the petitioners, which was tried and decided under the
Rule on Summary Procedure.

The MTC rendered its Decision, in favor of the petitioners on the ground that respondent has no cause
of action against the petitioners which the RTC reversed. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the
CA. The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition For failure to include in their petition the required
explanation on why personal service upon the respondent was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the herein petition is hereby DISMISSED
OUTRIGHT. Strict compliance with this rule is mandated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition

[Yes] RULING: Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service
and filing. - Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally.
17. Bario Fiesta Restaurant, et al. Vs. Helen C. Beronia
G.R. No. 206690. July 11, 2016

Facts:
Beronia was hired as receptionist at one of their restaurants. An incident happen whereby her employer
Cristobal then gave her a termination of employment. However, she was later asked to report back to
work. She accepted the request. She signed a contract to work as waitress during which she was made
to train new cashiers. On July 30, 2009, she was completely discharged. Before the end of July 2009, the
petitioners notified Beronia of the expiration of her contract on July 30, 2009. She left the work premises
peacefully on July 30, 2009, only to return sometime in August asking that she be hired again. They
decided, however, not to employ her anymore. Beronia then filed the complaint for illegal dismissal,
which they believed she did to spite them for the termination of her employment in November 2008.

ISSUE:
Is the 15 day reglementary period to file the motion extendible

Ruling of the SC:

No. There is no question that the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA's June 21,
2012 decision 138 days beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing the motion.
Under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution should be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice. If no appeal or motion for
reconsideration is filed within this period, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered
by the clerk in the book of entries of judgment as provided under Section 10 of Rule 51. The said period
is non extendible
18. Philippine Savings Bank vs. Josephine Papa GR No. 200469
Facts:

This is a case wherein, PSB filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Papa, wherein it
alleged that Papa obtained flexi-loan, also executed a PN for it – wherein such PN provides additional
interest in case of default. Papa failed to pay, despite repeated demands

Papa apparent admission in her Answer could not be taken against her, in fact she denied any liability to
PSB and never admitted the genuineness and due execution of the PN. Although PSB filed the MR, it
appears that service of the said motion was made 2day late as PSB availed a private courier service
instead of the modes of service prescribed under the ROC MR is deemed not to have been made on the
date it was deposited to the private courier for mailing but rather on November 11, 2009 – the date it was
actually received by Papa

Issue: W/N the MR was served out of time, YES

Ruling:

PSB is correct that filing and service are distinct from each other. Indeed, filing is the act of presenting the
pleading or other paper to the clerk of court; whereas, service is the act of providing a party with a copy of
the pleading or paper concerned.

Very clearly, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13, Section 7 for an effective service
by ordinary. Thus, the RTC is correct when it denied PSB's motion for reconsideration, which, for all
intents and purposes, can be effectively considered as not filed.
19. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondents. G.R. No. 230144, THIRD DIVISION, January 22,
2018, VELASCO JR.,/ 

Facts:

In 2003, Respondent BCDA filed a complaint against herein petitioner The Manila Banking
Corporation (TMBC) seeking to expropriate a parcel of land in Pampanga registered in the
name of TMBC. BCDA alleged that the subject property was classified as agricultural land

In 2005, the RTC declared that BCDA has clearly established its lawful right to take the property
sought to be expropriated for public use or purpose upon the payment of just compensation.

The Commissioners did not come up with a group report, but made individual reports after their
ocular inspection. Each party suggested different price which according to them was based at
the time of taking

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in awarding just compensation at the rate of P75 per square meter,
instead of P250 per square meter as originally ordered by the RTC in its September 4, 2012
Decision, or P190 per square meter as reconsidered by the RTC in its 2014 Order. (NO) 

Held:

The CA was correct in reversing the trial court and in fixing the just compensation at P75 per
square meter  There is no question that at the time of taking of the subject property, it was
classified as agricultural land, based on the records of the Municipal Assessor's Office of Porac,
Pampanga.
20. UNITED PULP AND PAPER CO., INC., vs. ACROPOLIS CENTRAL GUARANTY
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 171750

FACTS

UPPC argues that the undertaking of Acropolis is to secure any judgment rendered by the RTC in its
favor.  It points out that because of the posting of the counter-bond by Acropolis and the dissolution
of the writ of preliminary attachment against Unibox and Ortega, UPPC lost its security against the
latter two who had gone bankrupt. 
Acropolis, on the other hand, contends that it was not a party to the compromise agreement. Neither
was it aware of the execution of such an agreement which contains an acknowledgment of liability on
the part of Unibox and Ortega that was prejudicial to it as the surety.   Accordingly, it cannot be
bound by the judgment issued based on the said agreement. 

ISSUE:   Whether the execution of the compromise agreement between UPPC and Unibox and
Ortega was tantamount to a novation which had the effect of releasing Acropolis from its obligation
under the counter-attachment bond.

RULING: 

the compromise agreement specifically stipulated that the surety shall continue to be liable, unlike in
the case at bench where the compromise agreement made no mention of its obligation to UPPC. The
terms of the Bond for Dissolution of Attachment issued by Unibox and Acropolis in favor of UPPC
are clear and leave no room for ambiguity.

Based on the foregoing, Acropolis voluntarily bound itself with Unibox to be solidarily liable to
answer for ANY judgment which UPPC may recover from Unibox in its civil case for collection.