Micheal Tan
Micheal Tan
486
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179367, January 29, 2014
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The records show that on January 17, 2002, agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) applied for the issuance of search warrants for the search
of a warehouse located on Camia Street, Marikina City, and of an office
located on the 3rd floor of Probest International Trading Building, Katipunan
Street, Concepcion, Marikina City, allegedly owned by Michael Tan a.k.a.
Paul D. Tan (respondent). The application alleged that the respondent had in
his possession counterfeit shampoo products which were being sold, retailed,
distributed, dealt with or intended to be disposed of, in violation of Section
168, in relation with Section 170, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise
known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.
On the same date, Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 1, granted the application and issued Search Warrant Nos.
02-2606 and 02-2607. Armed with the search warrants, the NBI searched the
premises and, in the course of the search, seized the following items:
(A) From [the respondent’s] office:
(a) 372 boxes each containing six (6) cases of Sunsilk Nutrient
Shampoo; and
(b) 481 boxes each containing six (6) cases Creamsilk Hair
Conditioner. [4]
The NBI thereafter filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint
against the respondent for violation of R.A. No. 8293, specifically Section
168 (unfair competition), in relation with Section 170, docketed as I.S. No.
2002-667.
xxxx
The State Prosecutor found that the petitioner failed to show the respondent’s
actual and direct participation in the offense charged. While the Certificate of
Registration of Probest International Trading shows that a certain "Paul D.
Tan" is the registered owner and proprietor of the office, there is no showing
that he is also the registered owner of the warehouse where the alleged
counterfeit Unilever shampoo products were found. There is also no evidence
to support the claim that the respondent was engaged in the sale of
counterfeit products other than the self-serving claim of the petitioner’s
representatives. Lastly, the State Prosecutor found that the pieces of
evidence adduced against the respondent, e.g. alleged counterfeit Unilever
shampoo products, by themselves, are not sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause that he is engaged in unfair competition.
On September 9, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ,
[8] which the Acting Secretary of Justice, Merceditas N. Gutierrez, dismissed
in her March 16, 2004 resolution. In the resolution, the Acting Secretary of
Justice affirmed the State Prosecutor’s finding of lack of probable cause.
The petitioner thereafter sought, but failed, to secure a reconsideration.
On October 19, 2004, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the Acting Secretary of Justice, et al., in deciding the case in the respondent’s
favor.
The CA, in a decision dated June 18, 2007, dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioner failed to establish facts and circumstances that
would constitute acts of unfair competition under R.A. No. 8293. The CA
took into account the insufficiency of evidence that would link the respondent
to the offense charged. It also ruled that the Acting Secretary of Justice did
not gravely abuse her discretion when she affirmed the State Prosecutor’s
resolution dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for insufficiency of evidence
to establish probable cause.
The present Rule 45 petition questions the CA’s June 18, 2007 decision and
August 16, 2007 resolution.
The Petition
The Issue
The Constitution itself allows (and even directs) court action where executive
discretion has been gravely abused. [13] In other words, the court may
intervene in the executive determination of probable cause, review the
findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-
existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary
investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice. [14]
This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act
amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is
fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner
must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he
reached. This requires the petitioner to establish that the
prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action
may be obtained. [emphasis supplied]
A careful analysis of the lower courts’ rulings and the records, however,
reveals that substantial facts and circumstances that could affect the result of
the case have been overlooked. While the ownership of the warehouse on
Camia Street, Marikina City, was not proven, sufficient evidence to prove the
existence of probable cause nevertheless exists. These pieces of evidence
consist of: (1) the result of the NBI agents’ search of the office and of the
warehouse; (2) Elmer Cadano’s complaint-affidavit; (3) Rene Baltazar’s
affidavit; (4) Unilever’s representatives’ claim that all the laborers present at
the warehouse confirmed that it was operated by Probest International
Trading; (5) other object evidence found and seized at the respondent’s office
and warehouse; (6) the NBI operatives’ Joint Affidavit; (7) the subsequent
seizure of counterfeit Unilever products from the respondent’s warehouse in
Antipolo City; and (8) other photographs and documents relative to the
counterfeit products.
First, a total of 1,238 assorted counterfeit Unilever products were found at,
and seized from, the respondent’s office located on the 3rd floor of Probest
International Trading Building, Katipunan Street, Concepcion, Marikina City.
The huge volume and the location where these shampoos were found (inside
a box under a pile of other boxes located inside the respondent’s office) belie
the respondent’s claim of personal consumption. Human experience and
common sense dictate that shampoo products (intended for personal
consumption) will ordinarily and logically be found inside the house,
specifically, inside the bathroom or in a private room, not in the consumer’s
office.
Second, the failure to prove that the respondent is the owner of the
warehouse located on Camia St., Marikina City, does not automatically free
him from liability. Proof of the warehouse’s ownership is not crucial to the
finding of probable cause. In fact, ownership of the establishment where the
counterfeit products were found is not even an element of unfair competition.
While the respondent may not be its owner, this does not foreclose the
possibility that he was the manufacturer or distributor of the counterfeit
shampoo products. Needless to say, what is material to a finding of
probable cause is the commission of acts constituting unfair
competition, the presence of all its elements and the reasonable belief,
based on evidence, that the respondent had committed it.
Third, the result of the NBI’s search conducted on January 17, 2002
(yielding to several boxes of counterfeit shampoo sachets) and the NBI’s
Joint Affidavits in support of the application for search warrants serve as
corroborating evidence. The striking similarities[17] between the genuine
Unilever shampoo sachets and the counterfeit sachets seized by the NBI
support the belief that the respondent had been engaged in dealing,
manufacturing, selling and distributing counterfeit Unilever shampoo
products.
Fourth, there were also allegations that the respondent’s laborers and
warehousemen who were present during the search had confirmed that the
warehouse was being maintained and operated by Probest International
Trading. The NBI investigators who served the search warrant also claimed
that several persons, introducing themselves as the respondent’s relatives and
friends, had requested them to seize only a portion of the counterfeit
shampoo products. Whether these claims are admissible in evidence or
whether they should be excluded as hearsay are matters that should be
determined not in a preliminary investigation, but in a full-blown trial.
In Lee v. KBC Bank N.V., [18] citing Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas,
[19] we held that:
Finally, the subsequent events that occurred – after the filing of the
petitioner’s complaint and the institution of its appeal to the CA – are too
significant to be ignored.
In its motion to reconsider the CA’s decision, [21] the petitioner pointed to the
reports it received sometime in October 2005 that the respondent had
resumed its operations involving counterfeit Unilever products. Notably, these
significant reports, albeit supported by the subsequent seizure of large
quantity of counterfeit Unilever shampoos[22] in the respondent’s
warehouse[23] (located at No. 13 First Street Corner Sevilla Avenue, Virginia
Summerville Subdivision, Barangay Mambugan, Antipolo City), were ignored
by the CA. We, however, find that this development is significant, although
they were not part of the mass of evidence considered below. Even without
them and based solely on the evidentiary materials available below, we
conclude that sufficient grounds exist to indict the respondent for unfair
competition.
It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not
depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense, or on the
admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented. As previously discussed,
these matters are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case. [27] As
held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales:[28]
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. xxx The term does not mean "actual or positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Guided by this ruling, we find that the CA gravely erred in sustaining the
Acting Secretary of Justice’s finding that there was no probable cause to
indict the respondent for unfair competition. The dismissal of the complaint,
despite ample evidence to support a finding of probable cause, clearly
constitutes grave error that warrants judicial intervention and correction.
SO ORDERED.
[2]
Id. at 49-58; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Noel G. Tijam.
[3] Id. at 59.
[4] Id. at 50-51.
[5] Id. at 174-179.
[6] Id. at 176-178.
[7] Id. at 180-181.
[8] Id. at 140-173.
[9]
Baron A. Villanueva, et al. v. Edna R. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969,
January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 679, 685.
[10]
Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013, 694
SCRA 185, 199.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Elma v. Jacobi, G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 20, 56-57.
"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
[15] First Women’s Credit Corp. v. Hon. Perez, 524 Phil. 305, 309 (2006).
[17] Rollo, pp. 76-78.
[18] G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 117, 129; emphasis
supplied.
[21] CA rollo, pp. 439-458.
[22] Id. at 466-467.
[23] Rollo, p. 280.
[24] Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), 554 Phil. 86, 101
(2007).
[25] Casing v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192334, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA
500, 509.
[28] G.R. No. 180165, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 631, 640-641; emphasis
ours.