Cs Gaza Cash Voucher Assistance Social Protection 220822 en

OXFAM CASE STUDY AUGUST 2022
LINKING CASH AND VOUCHER

ASSISTANCE WITH SOCIAL
PROTECTION
A case study in Gaza
Saed Saad, Sonja Read, Ben Mountfield
In the Gaza Strip, 80% of the population receives humanitarian assistance. The level of need is
overwhelming, and the political and socio-economic context has crippled the traditional social protection
system. Efforts to build a stronger social protection system are under way, and cash interventions are on
the rise.
This report explores the humanitarian cash assistance landscape in the Gaza Strip and how it interacts with
social protection. It sets out a vision for a social protection architecture that supports coherence,
protection, accountability and the building of resilient systems, and achieves complementarity between
actors and programmes. The report also provides recommendations on how the implementation of
programmes can be improved.
www.oxfam.org
CONTENTS
Figures and tables ................................................................................................................................ 3
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 3
Key takeaways ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Purpose ............................................................................................................................................. 4
Background ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Findings ............................................................................................................................................ 4
1 Social protection and humanitarian CVA in Gaza: the current landscape ....................................... 6
2 Framing the conversation around linking CVA and social protection ............................................. 7
3 Social protection programmes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ............................................. 9
4 Entry points to linking social protection and CVA ........................................................................ 11
5 Barriers to linking CVA with social protection .............................................................................. 14
6 Policies ........................................................................................................................................ 15
7 Nexus initiatives .......................................................................................................................... 15
8 Reflections on roles and responsibilities within the social protection ecosystem ...................... 16
9 Recommendations for programme and policy linkages ................................................................ 17
Annex 1: List of reviewed documents .................................................................................................. 26
Annex 2: List of key informants ........................................................................................................... 26
Notes................................................................................................................................................... 29
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 30
2 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Simplified model of CVA and social protection ........................................................................ 7
Figure 2: The space between CVA and social protection – now ............................................................. 8
Figure 3: The space between CVA and social protection – ideally ......................................................... 8
Figure 4: Continuum of interventions .................................................................................................... 8
Figure 5: Aspects of social protection systems – in Gaza the focus has been on provision ................ 17
Figure 6: Overview of a process to increase linkages between social protection and CVA .................. 19
Table 1: CVA actors operational in Gaza, according to the 5Ws ............................................................. 6

Table 2: Comparison between types of CVA and social protection programmes .................................... 9
ABBREVIATIONS
CVA Cash and voucher assistance
CWG Cash Working Group
GPC Gaza Protection Consortium
MoSD Ministry of Social Development
MPCA Multipurpose cash assistance
NGO Non-governmental organization
NSR National Social Registry
PA Palestinian Authority
PMTF Proxy means test formula
PNCTP Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme
SRSP Shock-responsive social protection
SPWG Social Protection Working Group (under the LACS mechanism)
UVAT Unified Vulnerability Assessment Tool

KEY TAKEAWAYS
PURPOSE
For more effective delivery of assistance to people in a context of complex crisis and to increase their resilience
to future shocks, this case study explores the relationship between humanitarian cash and voucher assistance
(CVA) and government social protection in Gaza. It discusses the current set-up, what the long-term goals for
linking social protection and CVA might be and the short-, medium- and long-term steps needed to get there.
The focus is on multipurpose cash assistance (MPCA) and CVA that cover basic needs. More specifically, the
topics addressed are:
• the similarities and differences between humanitarian CVA and the current social protection programmes in
Gaza, and the benefits of linking them;
• understanding what the current system is working towards in terms of achieving equity, efficiency or fairness
in the social protection system;
• policy and programme-related opportunities to align or integrate efforts;
• coordination needs and existing mechanisms;
• barriers to linking CVA and social protection;
• what nexus initiatives there are in CVA and social protection programming; and
• recommendations (short-, medium- and long-term) for policy and programme influencing coherent social
protection programming.
BACKGROUND
The largest government-implemented social protection programme in the Gaza Strip is the Palestinian National
Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP). At the same time, a proliferation of local and international actors also provide
social assistance. These include various Arab, Western and other international donors and organizations, UN
agencies and the Gaza Cash Working Group (CWG). The social protection ecosystem in Gaza can be described as
fragmented, with the various social protection and CVA programmes differing in terms of purpose, duration,
consistency, targeting and exiting. The Ministry of Social Development (MoSD)'s new plans include engaging CVA
actors in increased collaboration.
METHODOLOGY
A total of 26 key informant interviews were conducted for this study to gather views, including those of the MoSD,
humanitarian agencies, Arab donors, UN organizations, Western donors and social protection and CVA
programme participants. A review of relevant documents was carried out and a validation workshop was held
with key stakeholders.
FINDINGS
Entry points
The highest level of cooperation is happening around the targeting of programme participants, with both Arab
and Western agencies using MoSD lists. There are challenges resulting in some inefficiencies that need to be

addressed through better information sharing and increased communication, particularly at the strategic level;
these are prerequisites for coordination. All parties agree that crucial communication and coordination are
currently missing between many CVA actors and the MoSD; instead, temporary coordination and loose bilateral
and multilateral linkages exist between them. Existing coordination mechanisms could be made more inclusive to
bring together humanitarian agencies with the MoSD and UN agencies and better support nexus (interlinked
humanitarian, development and peace programming. There is space for capitalizing on the experience of
humanitarian agencies with CVA programmes and for greater transfer of technical expertise. There are upcoming
opportunities for aligning CVA with government plans and the Social Development Sector Strategy. WFP and
UNICEF are working in the social protection area by providing additional top-ups. Harmonized transfer values (the
amount paid to participants) consistent with participant profiles and programme aims are also seen as important
entry points.
Barriers
• Some of the barriers to linking CVA with social protection come from the limitations of the PNCTP itself. There
is a lack of incentives for humanitarian agencies to link CVA with formal social protection. PNCTP has general
limitations such as: it has limited type of data, it is not well updated, cash distribution process centralized
with the Ministry of Finance that provides the final information on who receives the cash from the program
and who is removed from the system. They also enjoy relative independence in their choices of targeting and
implementation.
• A lack of technical alignment between institutions includes differences in data management and monitoring
systems.
• With many actors engaged within the sector and with the recurrent nature of the emergencies, the MoSD
requires further capacity strengthening and resources to continue leading a responsive and inclusive
coordination mechanism. The absence of robust coordination mechanisms means that this task often
depends on motivated individuals. Meanwhile, other actors are required to coordinate formally with the MoSD
and other mutual actors.
• Politics and geographical division between the two different governments in Gaza and the West Bank
complicate simple communication. The PNCPT is managed by the Palestinian Authority, yet it has a limited
presence in Gaza. No-contact policies 1 also complicate coordination, while in addition, there are competitive
tensions between stakeholders.
Reflections on roles and responsibilities

As the intention is to move away from an aid economy in the medium term, a planned process is needed to
empower and capacitate the MoSD to take on its obligations as the national authority. Failure to support national
institutions will risk prolonging aid dependency. Humanitarian agencies need to be included in consultations and
planning in a complementary manner. Innovative economic interventions, with a focus on online efforts and
seeking investments, are needed to cater for programme participants who could be economically productive.
Recommendations
Improving coordination in this context will take time, and the recommendations are presented as a chronological
process. Regularity, consistency and increased systemic accountability, given the governance structures
available, will be more important than ambitious one-off efforts.

1 SOCIAL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN
CVA IN GAZA: THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
The situation in the Gaza Strip is constantly evolving, with implications for the population's economic and social
status. In addition to the PNCTP, the largest government-implemented social protection programme, a
proliferation of local and international actors provide social assistance in Gaza through cash and vouchers.
These include various Arab, Western and other international donors and organizations, UN agencies and the CWG.
The CWG is a non-operational coordination body that is part of the humanitarian coordination structure in
Palestine, and it oversees multipurpose cash assistance (MPCA) as one of its many CVA activities. According to
the CWG 5Ws (who, what, when, where and why) from November 2021, 19 member organizations are currently
implementing CVA within 45 projects across the Gaza Strip, working through local partners to address
vulnerabilities across thematic sectors (Table 1).
Table 1: CVA actors operational in Gaza, according to the 5Ws
Organization Number of CVA projects as of November 2021

ACTED 4
Action Against Hunger 3
AISHA Association for Women and Child Protection 2
Catholic Relief Services 2
Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe 1
Gaza Protection Consortium - Norwegian Refugee Council, Mercy 1
Corps, Médecins du Monde France, and Humanity & Inclusion
Humanity & Inclusion 1

Islamic Relief 3
Mercy Corps 3
Norwegian Refugee Council 1
Oxfam 2
Palestine Association for Education and Environmental Protection 1
Palestinian Al Nakheel Association for Progress and Development 1
Première Urgence Internationale 3
Save the Children 7
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 1
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 5
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) 2
WEFAQ Society for Women and Childcare 1
Women's Affairs Center – Gaza 2
ANERA (not in the 5Ws)
Total 45
UN agencies UNRWA, WFP, UNICEF and the International Labour Organization (ILO) work with CVA programming and
social protection either through direct implementation to cover the basic needs of the population and provide
social security, or by supporting the MoSD to undertake this role. Several Arab donors and organizations have
implemented or are currently implementing cash interventions, most notably the Government of Qatar, with
monthly support of $100 apiece to around 95,000 poor families in Gaza. There have been some connections

between actors, but programmes remain independent of one another, and actors are largely unaware of each
other's actions and targeting mechanisms, so that implementation is uncoordinated. The social protection
ecosystem can hence be described as fragmented.
2 FRAMING THE CONVERSATION AROUND

LINKING CVA WITH SOCIAL PROTECTION
This paper frames the conversation regarding the links between CVA and social protection.
The topic may be approached with the assumption that linking CVA and social protection is automatically
desirable, with the implication that CVA and social protection should move closer together. However, this may
overlook a nuanced discussion on complementarity. In practice, CVA and social protection have different
purposes and there is a valuable space between them, begging the question: in which situations, what kind of
linking is desirable and what is not?
Linking social protection and CVA can be understood in a variety of ways, from adopting identical modes of
functioning to increased cooperation within a larger ecosystem of social assistance where actors' diversified
roles leave space for operational differences. The understanding in this case study is the latter, though the
implications of both are discussed throughout the paper. Either way, it is crucial that moving forward,
stakeholders articulate their intended meaning, because assumptions regarding the meaning of increased
linkages will affect the willingness of actors to work towards this goal.
Third, any future alignment of CVA and social protection requires an understanding of the current relationship in
relation to a goal. A simplified model of CVA and social protection places long-term, government-led social
protection at one end of a spectrum and short-term emergency support at the other (Figure 1). Five key
characteristics set these two things at either end of the spectrum: purpose, duration, consistency, targeting and
exit from the programme.
Figure 1: Simplified model of CVA and social protection
CVA Social protection
To meet one-off urgent needs To contribute to regular

Purpose
resulting from a shock ongoing household expenses
Duration Short-term Extended
A single payment or a Ongoing, consistent and

Consistency What's in
limited intervention predictable support
between?
Poverty plus specific criteria
(including but not always
Targeting Poverty
restricted to
the impact of the shock)
Graduation is rare and usually driven
Everyone exits at the end of the
Exit by a change in household
intervention
circumstances
The protracted nature of the crisis in Gaza has shaped the space in between, and this is currently filled by a
variety of medium and long-term support provided by international (both Arab and Western) donors and
humanitarian organizations (Figure 2). The situation is further complicated by factors such as the government
handing out ad hoc payments during emergencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) targeting the

PNCTP waiting list. Repeated CVA programmes have blurred the boundaries between CVA and social protection
because they serve a similar target group and are not limited to helping people recover from a shock.
Figure 2: The space between CVA and social protection – now

Humanitarian actors reaching out to potential
Cash-based social protection programme participants with Social
humanitarian action short-term interventions, but not necessarily in protection
response to shocks
In the ideal scenario, shock-responsive social protection (SRSP) would see a well-funded and well-functioning
social protection system take over some of the space currently occupied by CVA (Figure 3). However, this is not
realistic now or in the near future, notably due to the social protection system's inability to cater for the number
of people in need (the limitations are discussed below). This case study discusses navigating the relationship
between social protection and CVA in the immediate and medium term, with the long-term view of achieving a
solid SRSP system.
Figure 3: The space between CVA and social protection – ideally

Shock-responsive social protection (MoSD),
adaptive social protection
Support to current social protection programme
participants who have capacity to strengthen
Cash-based livelihoods and graduate from social protection Social
humanitarian action (development actors) protection
Creative programming from humanitarian and
development actors which is deliberately
nexus-focused
The continuum illustrated in Figure 4 shows the various cash programmes currently in operation 'scored' against
the five criteria – purpose, duration, consistency, targeting and exit from the programme – by the consultant
team, based on information provided through the document review and interviews. All scores are subjective and
provide an approximate visual location of each programme on the continuum. The programmes shown are
selected as indicative examples of programme types and are not intended as an exhaustive list. The continuum
shows the variety of programmes in terms of purpose, duration and consistency.
Figure 4: Continuum of interventions
The scoring shows the differences between various CVA and social protection programmes in the Gaza Strip in
terms of the five criteria. Although social assistance players in Gaza are considered to be working towards similar
objectives in terms of reducing poverty and vulnerabilities, they have different characteristics, agendas, funding
sources and delivery mechanisms. The key similarities and differences are illustrated in Table 2. In addition, an
important difference between Western donors and agencies and their Arab counterparts is that Arab
donors/agencies are not restricted by no-contact policies, which restrict Western actors in dealing with the
authorities.

Table 2: Comparison between types of CVA and social protection programmes
CVA by UN agencies and Arab donors PNCTP

Western NGOs
Purpose Various: as a Improvement of living Poverty reduction
complementary safety net conditions and poverty
for very vulnerable reduction
households, employment
schemes, shelter
reconstruction,
emergency response, etc.
Geographic scope Varies with institution and Gaza National: Gaza Strip and West
programme Bank
Frequency Typically monthly Monthly Quarterly: every three months
Duration Short-term, 3–6 months From five months to one Ongoing
year
Value Depending on the $100 NIS 750–1,800 ($224–539)
programme – noticeably
higher than PNCTP
Conditionality May be conditional None None
Targeting Selection according to Criteria related to Proxy means test formula
vulnerability criteria, unemployed youth, (PMTF). Details and weighting
could be using MoSD lists; breadwinners, partly are not open information, but
often excludes those not receiving PNCTP data collected includes
households receiving payments; using MoSD household assets and 'poverty
assistance from other lists indicators'
sources
Information CWG, GPC, Bilaterally with the MoSD; Information sharing through
sharing/ anonymized donor data recently with WFP the Social Protection Working
coordination Group (SPWG); donors;
bilaterally with actors
3 SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMMES IN THE

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
The Palestinian national cash transfer programme (PNCTP) is the MoSD's main social protection programme, and
also the focus of this case study. Besides the PNCTP, the MoSD offers other social protection services on a
smaller scale, including support to small enterprises, health insurance and psychological and social support for
women and girls; however, to date, most of these have been implemented only in the West Bank. Other parts of
the MoSD's work receive dedicated financing from the Arab League. Social protection support in Gaza in 2021
targeted the following groups:
• 2,629 children exposed to violence;
• 244 children in orphanages;
• 105 children of unknown parentage;
• 170 multiple birth children of three (triplets) or more;
• 450 students in vocational centres;
• 127 teenagers involved in crimes;
• 1,000 elderly people;

• 2,561 disabled persons;
• 30,000 women, including 4,254 divorcees, 12,843 widows, 3,829 single and 670 separated women, 386
women suffering from domestic violence and 8,105 other women more generally; 2 and
• 58,000 households receiving health insurance. 3
The PNCTP is considered to be a lifeline for 115,683 households across the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT); of
these, 79,629 4 (68.8%) are in Gaza, with 21% of Gazans depending on the quarterly payment. 5 The programme is
funded by the European Union (40–60%), the Palestinian Authority (PA) (40%) and the World Bank, which has
provided close technical support since 2010. The PNCTP selects programme participants using the proxy means
test formula (PMTF), which classifies households as living in 1) deep poverty, 2) poverty or 3) out of poverty,
based on expenses and consumption data. Data for the 34 variables used in the selection calculation are
weighted and the value of assistance of NIS 750–1,800 ($224–539) is determined. The PMTF is complemented by
verification visits which inform the final decision.
As part of the wider political landscape, the national social protection programme is subject to an internal
division between the West Bank and Gaza, the former of which is governed by the PA from Ramallah and the latter
by the de facto authorities. The governments in the West Bank and Gaza signed an agreement to implement the
national social protection programme under the leadership of the PA's MoSD with its local representatives in the
Gaza Strip. The effect of this division on the PNCTP is seen in differences in implementation between the two
regions: for example, capacity, skills and the number of available staff in Gaza are lower than in the West Bank
and do not yet seem to match the requirements of the new approaches that are planned.
Theoretically, the PNCTP is well set up and is able to cover 40% of households identified as poor and 80% of
those identified as deeply poor. 6 Practically, however, its efficiency is low and it is estimated that it is reaching
only 44% of households in deep poverty. 7 It has been shown to reduce poverty rates by 11.4% and rates of
extreme poverty by 20%. 8 Internal and external factors hamper the PNCTP's efficiency, including lack of funding,
the political division, the high level of needs, and potential errors of 20% in the PMTF inclusion and exclusion
mechanism, which affect in particular elderly people and disabled persons – although by international standards
these margins are considered to be acceptable. In addition to the high rate of exclusion/inclusion errors, social
protection services are failing to reach some poor households because the PMTF weightings in Gaza are
reportedly known by social workers and are manipulated to favour inclusion for social assistance.
The immediate obstacle that the cash-strapped PNCTP faces is meeting its financial commitments: the economic
and financial crisis, combined with heightened needs, prevented the programme from fulfilling its obligations
towards those it was meant to support in 2021, when only one of four payments was given out. The programme's
reliance on external financing, which has an uncertain future, remains a major threat. The Ministry of Finance
(MoF) makes decisions about PNCTP payments and the execution of the budget, and this can have a negative
impact on the programme's budget commitments. Most stakeholders consider that the PNCTP has not
demonstrated an ability to respond effectively during crises such as the war of 2014 and COVID-19, where its
response has been slow and has not matched the high level of needs. It lacks plans for emergencies, but UNICEF
is responding to this with a shock-responsive readiness assessment.
MoSD communication around the social protection programme has been limited. The complaints system has been
limited to a neglected complaints box, without any follow-up procedures and the programme does not reach out
to potential participants, relying mainly on people seeking help. However, the MoSD, with support from the World
Bank, is taking steps to improve communication. These efforts will address communication with other
stakeholders and with the community, complaints management, and how to identify and reach out to potential
participants.
The PNCTP is undergoing significant development, supported by the World Bank, to meet the needs of
households more comprehensively, to support the transition from relief to development and to coordinate social
assistance efforts by different actors. The MoSD is broadening its focus from monetary poverty to a
multidimensional poverty approach that considers family size, the elderly and disabled, and links households to
appropriate services. The National Social Registry (NSR), launched in December 2021, is described by the MoSD as
the first place where applicants' data is entered on the system. This is a unified and interoperable database for
processing, monitoring and documenting data and interventions linking with key public institutions such as the

Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior and private sector and NGO service providers, enhancing the optimal
use of resources and coordination between relevant actors. 9 Case management of programme participants will
be introduced and carried out by professional counsellors, covering various social issues including protection,
elderly people, children, early childhood, disability, and so on, with referrals to services provided by local
community-based organizations or service providers, whose expenses will be covered by the MoSD. These new
approaches have not yet been implemented in the Gaza Strip.
4 ENTRY POINTS TO LINKING CVA WITH

SOCIAL PROTECTION
In a context where resources are scarce and donor fatigue with humanitarian funding is growing, there has been
a general agreement that linking CVA and social protection is not just a convenient slogan but an essential step
for the better use of existing resources and to strengthen Gaza's fragile social protection system. In addition to
improved management of financial resources, the expected benefits of linking the two include reducing
duplication, enhancing coverage and increasing the fairness and effectiveness of assistance provided.
The three principal linkages (targeting, additional top-ups, and technical assistance) are outlined below,
followed by a discussion of additional possible entry points to establish linkages and integration across the
social protection system.
1. Targeting: Humanitarian CVA actors, Arab donors and UN agencies mainly use lists of programme participants
received from one of the ministries (MoSD, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Housing, depending on the
project), which often include people on the waiting list for the PNCTP. This can be seen as 'horizontal
expansion' of social protection. Organizations have additional sectoral focuses (protection, nutrition/food
security) that guide their selection processes, whereas the PNCTP's current focus is solely on poverty,
although it has been developing a shift to a multidimensional poverty approach that considers other
vulnerabilities. The CWG and the MoSD have developed a Unified Vulnerability Assessment Tool (UVAT) that
allows any humanitarian agency to run the data it has collected through the MoSD's PMTF and apply the
organization's sector-specific criteria. The UVAT system also cross-checks for households assessed
previously in the system. However, most humanitarian agencies do not use UVAT and some do not use MoSD
lists, preferring to support vulnerable people of their own selection. Some Arab donors use separate targeting
criteria defined by the MoSD instead of solely supporting participants in the PNCTP, in a deliberate attempt not
to replace government efforts; for example, about a third of the Qatari programme participant caseload are
from the PNCTP list.
The MoSD discourages parallel selection criteria outside of social protection and intends to centralize the
selection of programme participants through the NSR. The use of additional non-poverty indicators could, on
the one hand, improve targeting by better distinguishing needs, but it could also increase the number of
known needs and add to an already unmanageable burden. Some actors promote social protection targeting
of programme participants based on categories (e.g. elderly people, households with children under five)
rather than poverty.
A number of practical issues give rise to criticism and frustration in the area of targeting:
• Partners have concerns about challenges in response efforts during emergency times related to potential
affected beneficiaries' lists. These challenges include maintaining up-to-date information, duplication
between actors, and lack of quality of data.
• Some humanitarian agencies and UN agencies question the validity of the PMTF as a selection tool even
though the NSR is expected to improve targeting. In addition, the lack of funding for identified families will
continue to hamper the PNCTP's functioning regardless of its accuracy.
• Unifying targeting criteria could mean the cessation of aid to some people currently targeted by
humanitarian agencies who are not on MoSD lists, which may overlook some of those in need of
assistance. Changes to social protection moving away from a focus on poverty could have the same effect

on extremely poor people who do not fall into a vulnerable category; as one person receiving PNCTP
payments stated: 'MoSD cash assistance, even if insufficient, is important to cover household expenses.'
2. Additional top-ups are provided by some UN agencies to participants in the PNCTP (vertical expansion) and
have related operational links. For example, WFP provides top-up payments to increase the transfer value of
PNCTP payments, and UNICEF also provides child-sensitive top-ups.
3. Technical support and capacity sharing with the MoSD, notably by donors and international institutions, on
strategic questions such as the renewal of the National Social Development Strategy (see endnote 9),
technical and sectoral issues and implementation to improve the PNCTP can also be an issue. Not all topics
are considered appropriate for humanitarian agencies to offer to the MoSD, such as information management.
Other possible entry points include the following:

1. Better information sharing and increased communication go hand in hand with building trust and are
essential to improving coordination. All parties agree that crucial communication and coordination are
currently missing between many CVA actors and the MoSD, with just temporary coordination and loose
bilateral and multilateral linkages in place. Horizontally, there is some coordination between Arab donors (the
Qatar committee) 10 and the MoSD/Gaza and communication between some Western donors and INGOs with the
MoSD in Ramallah. Different relationships can be discerned between the MoSD and the international
community: Arab and some Western donors and UN agencies have closer relations with the MoSD, and they
share information more readily than Western INGOs. The social protection programme is also better
understood by UN agencies and donors that work closely with the system. NGOs experience difficulties in
obtaining information about how social protection works and what their expected role is. Information includes
decisions made at the MoSD level on approaches to targeting, approaches to responding to needs, changes
in structures, etc. The MoSD says that there is a lack of reciprocity and that it does not receive feedback from
CVA actors about which programme participants on its lists they have targeted, meaning that the lists are out
of date. A key strategic priority in Gaza is the interface between humanitarian agencies and the MoSD in
Ramallah and the local authorities in Gaza, with workarounds needed for the no-contact policy.
UNRWA provides a parallel assistance system serving the refugee population, but it has limited participation
in coordination mechanisms and other actors know very little about its activities. Parallel systems lead to
some tension and confusion among the population. New coordination was recently established between WFP
and Qatari grant payments to poor households, which is a good starting point that could be built on. Attempts
at collaboration also occurred between all parties to cope with and respond to COVID-19.
Meaningful dialogue about communication channels and differences in approach and practices is necessary,
through multilateral meetings, to solidify robust working relationships and develop solutions to complex
problems. Identifying the expectations, roles and objectives of each party will assist in understanding the
concerns, opportunities and threats of working together and reduce assumptions about and mistrust of other
actors. Contradictory information about the willingness of the parties to collaborate or share data has
resulted from individual conflict, competing agendas and some actors being keen to keep the situation as it
is. However, the underlying win-win situation, whereby both governments want funds and Western and Arab
international organizations want information, sets a foundation for cooperation.
2. Making existing coordination mechanisms more inclusive. Existing coordination structures do not bring
together all the actors needed to avoid fragmentation of the social protection landscape. The Social
Protection Working Group (SPWG) under the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS) is chaired by the MoSD
and EU, with technical support from UNICEF. The group has hitherto not included NGOs, and there have been
discussions about inviting the CWG to participate in the SPWG as a representative of humanitarian agencies.
However, this risks further excluding local NGOs, which have previously raised concerns about humanitarian
coordination meetings being held in English, hence excluding Arabic speaking actors. In addition,
coordination between the CWG and the MoSD over UVAT has not resulted in broad uptake among CWG
members, so dealing with the CWG alone may not be sufficient. The SPWG has seen many attempts to include
Arab donors, zakat and solidarity funds, but this has not been fruitful. Separate liaison efforts between the
MoSD and stakeholders using different coordination mechanisms are commendable for their effort but can be
exclusive and contribute to fragmentation. Actively expanding an existing structure such as the SPWG could
help to bridge the gap between social protection and CVA actors and government departments.

3. Harmonized transfer values that are consistent with participant profiles and programme aims. Currently,
transfer values differ between social protection (PNCTP), Arab donors and humanitarian agencies, while CWG
members use a commonly agreed methodology based on the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB). There are
significant differences in the amounts distributed by different projects, which are inconsistent with the
poverty status of programme participants, calling into doubt the 'fairness' of the overall ecosystem. For
example, families receiving assistance from the PNCTP assumed to be below the poverty line received just one
payment in 2021 of NIS 750–1,800 ($ 224 - 539) In contrast, those on the waiting list who were targeted by an
NGO could have received more than three times this amount. This does not necessarily mean that all transfer
values should be the same, as programme purposes differ (e.g. long-term vs short-term support). However,
programme participants in similar situations should receive similar support consistent with the programme's
aims, including long-term support to those living with chronic poverty, supplementing the PNCTP or recovery
from shocks.
4. Aligning CVA with government plans and the Social Development Sector Strategy. Communication between
stakeholders and the MoSD remains predominantly at the operational level and in the form of information
sharing at SPWG meetings. Some UN agencies and donors provide strategic support, but strategic
coordination has otherwise been limited. Aligning CVA with government plans and strategies under a
participatory approach would require consultation and joint planning. CVA is part of the MoSD's strategy 11 and
some activities and indicators could be carried out in conjunction with CVA actors, for example, in joint
monitoring and evaluation. The renewal of the strategy is an opportunity to look at converging points, and all
actors could take credit for any success. UN agencies are already involved in this process, but NGOs do not
seem to be. Since the NSR seeks to engage with NGOs, it is crucial to include them in the planning phase.
5. Further transfer of technical expertise from humanitarian agencies to the government. Humanitarian
agencies have learned lessons from experimenting with different transfer modalities and implementation
methods. One example of how the MoSD could apply these lessons would be to strengthen its payment
system. Expertise could be transferred through secondments, which have already taken place, or through
different forms of technical support.
Upcoming initiatives present opportunities to improve harmonization between actors and to work towards an
effective social assistance ecosystem:
• The MoSD sees the NSR as an entry point for all existing social assistance programmes to better cooperate for
increased efficiency and to make additional services available to programme participants. This could be an
opportunity for more links between Gaza-based projects and the national social protection system to share
data and coordinate efforts. However, the process of developing the NSR has not been very inclusive, and
NGOs are unclear about what their expected engagement with it is.
• The EU-funded Nexus project, 12 implemented by the ILO and Oxfam, aims to bring together all relevant social
protection actors under existing coordination mechanisms.
• A renewal of the national Social Development Sector Strategy is planned for 2023, which covers the PNCTP and
the role of CVA. This process could be enhanced through consultations and discussions with a wide range of
CVA partners.
• The social assistance roadmap for operationalizing the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus in Palestine
for 2021–24 13 lays out key participatory steps for addressing areas for improvement.
• Other improvements to the PNCTP are supported by the World Bank, such as communication with programme
participants.

5 BARRIERS TO LINKING CVA WITH SOCIAL
PROTECTION
Lack of incentives for humanitarian agencies to link CVA with social protection: humanitarian agencies have
some reluctance to what linking CVA with a social protection system
could entail, despite recognising that humanitarian aid should Humanitarian principles could be used
complement country systems. Agencies have often expended to argue both for and against linking
considerable time and effort to develop technically sound delivery CVA with social protection:
mechanisms, and the changes required to align with social protection independence and protection of
would risk downgrading their quality. Without any detail on how they programme participants on one side,
and effective and sustainable aid
would align, they do not believe that this will necessarily achieve better delivery on the other.
results. In addition, agencies are required by humanitarian principles to
protect the best interests of programme participants. These factors
make certain compromises, such as using MoSD targeting or transfer values, difficult for humanitarians to
accept. For example, the PNCTP-aligned UVAT selection system has not gained traction as agencies would have
had to adopt a new standardized assessment and scoring process for MPCA.
A restricted official presence in the Gaza Strip: The internal political division within the MoSD in Gaza can be seen
as an extension of the overall Palestinian division. This has resulted in no common vision for an inclusive
coordination mechanism between different stakeholders. For example, the official presence of the MoSD in its
current form in Gaza allows for loosely linked efforts between stakeholders to take place in the social protection
sphere. There was a recent positive agreement to have the MoSD in Ramallah represented in Gaza by official
personnel to improve the coordination and collaboration between the de-facto government in Gaza and the
official Ramallah government. It is hoped that this agreement will provide increased steer and direction for all
stakeholders.
The fragmentation and siloed provision of services results in a lack of synergy and duplicated efforts, which
hinders the achievement of comprehensive poverty reduction goals. The shortage of funding is one factor, and
without financing the implementation of social protection and the new NSR, which brings together social
protection efforts, remains theoretical. In addition, the definition of the complementary way in which CVA actors
should work in relation to the social protection system is complicated by the instability of the system. Budget
crisis that the PA is suffering from places extra burden on social protection programmes as it is not being
prioritized for funding. Some donors intervene directly in Gaza through infrastructure and construction projects or
fund NGOs. All stakeholders expect high levels of transparency from the MoSD and, in some cases, are hesitant
about accepting the MoSD as a central coordinating force, while recognizing that that would be ideal. This
includes programme participants interviewed for this case study, among whom the idea of linking Western or
Arab CVA with social protection raised concerns about favouritism, dishonesty and inefficiency.
Political and geographical division with two different governments: social protection is directly managed by the
PA in the West Bank, while in Gaza the de facto government and representative staff of the PA carry out activities.
Even though there are PA personnel in the MoSD in Gaza, most of the staff are from the de-facto government and
communication is variable. Although there are clear lines of communication between the de-facto personnel and
Ramallah personal, political instability can affect these communication lines. Some Arab donors only have a
presence in Gaza, complicating their participation in coordination mechanisms based in Ramallah. The political
and geographical divisions make communication and coordination difficult, rendering such efforts slow and
complicated. The PNCTP's shift to multidimensional poverty has started in the West Bank with support from
UNICEF, the ILO and WFP are going to introduce targeted services for disabled and elderly people. However, this
multidimensional shift has not begun in Gaza.
Reliance on individual action in the absence of inclusive and comprehensive coordination mechanisms: The
energy-consuming nature of coordination and the lack of a clear and inclusive coordination mechanism mean
that coordination efforts rely on individuals believing in the importance of the issue. Individuals who hold key

coordination positions within the different representative parties are not always able, competent or aware of the
actions needed, which hinders coordination efforts.
Lack of technical alignment between institutions: There is no clear resolution for the issue of transfer values,
where raising them is financially unmanageable for the government and lowering them is unacceptable for
humanitarian agencies and donors. The MoSD's poverty targeting differs from the targeting of the humanitarian
sector. Arab donors are not traditionally part of coordination efforts as they approach aid to Palestine from a
different angle. Humanitarian agencies follow standards in areas of work such as data management and
monitoring that would raise the bar above what might be manageable for the PNCTP.
Competitive tensions: Regardless of intention, humanitarian agencies compete with the MoSD for funding and
credibility. This competitive set-up needs to be recognized and addressed and efforts made at rapprochement.
There are also contradictory ideas regarding the role of humanitarian agencies, and the lack of communication
means that there is no space available to resolve misunderstandings. Conflicting agendas and a lack of
coordination between donors also limit the ability to unite CVA efforts.
No risks were identified in linking social protection and CVA in principle. Still, if this is not done carefully, it could
result in lower-quality support, a lack of accountability and assistance not reaching those in need.
6 POLICIES
The PNCTP is not grounded in legislation but it features in the National Social Development Strategy, last updated
in 2021. However, the policies are little known to humanitarian agencies and other actors. The value of a legal
framework is debatable given the stalled political and democratic processes, where all policies are passed by
presidential decree. However, the planned 2023 update to the Social Development Sector Strategy provides an
opportunity to include entry points for improved institutional arrangements regarding CVA and social protection
links. In the Palestinian context, social protection is easily politicized, and political interests are seen to prioritize
other issues, challenging effective policy change. The political division also hampers advocacy efforts. Public
government documents reflect the intention to coordinate social protection efforts under a single umbrella, but
until now this has not been seen in the experience of humanitarian agencies.
7 NEXUS INITIATIVES
Nexus initiatives have focused on developing a shock-responsive social protection system, but these efforts are
only in their early stages. The MoSD's new approaches are contributing to the transition from relief to
development and driving a shift towards a rights-based, cross-sectoral and shock-responsive model. The EU has
drafted a social assistance roadmap for operationalizing the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus in
Palestine for 2021–2024. It is meant to be led by the MoSD and is still being discussed. Oxfam is working on
enhancing the responsiveness of the social protection system, including international communities and national
organizations, through implementing social policy with a focus on SRSP. Oxfam supports continuous dialogue
between all parties to inform a policy in which cross-nexus efforts can be harnessed to meet nationwide targets
related to the provision of social protection. UNICEF is planning to conduct a shock-responsive readiness
assessment that will examine the response of the social protection programme, including different aspects of
financing, human resources (HR), data management, real-time monitoring and follow-up, and the legal
framework and agreements.
The EU is funding the ILO, UNICEF and Oxfam to work with the government to strengthen cross-nexus coherence
and responsiveness in the Palestinian social protection sector and to enhance coordination across government
and non-governmental actors and initiatives to increase programmatic coherence for multi-year planning and

financing strategies. 14 The MoSD has shown interest and a desire to improve the links between social protection
and CVA interventions; however, the general challenges have hindered efforts to bring together the main actors
for open dialogue about the nexus and mechanisms for enhancing SRSP. Fragmented funding sources for
humanitarian and development causes make it difficult to measure the nexus and bridge the gap between
interventions.
There is increasing realisation that nexus programming is relevant and required in emergency response set ups
and plans. During the May escalation of conflict, humanitarian agencies struggled to obtain quality lists of
vulnerable and affected people, and insufficient coordination between government departments led to delays.
Humanitarian agencies have stated that if lists of programme participants are available, they can respond to an
emergency within 24 hours. This highlights the importance of establishing preparedness measures to allow for
smoother transition from relief to development,
8 REFLECTIONS ON ROLES AND

RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE SOCIAL
PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM
Opinions differ on the role of the MoSD in linking and coordinating CVA with social protection and also differ on
whether it is appropriate for NGOs and INGOs to lead such initiatives. These perspectives cannot be easily
reconciled. The authors believe that, as the intention is to move away from an aid economy in the medium term, a
planned process is needed to empower and capacitate the MoSD as the national authority. This view is supported
by the fact that this is a protracted crisis in a middle-income country whose administration is mostly functioning,
where it is counter to good humanitarian practice for agencies to lead. 15 Failure to support national institutions
will risk prolonging aid dependency and will prioritize short-term results over long-term ones.
The MoSD can have a greater influence to demonstrate its effectiveness through strengthening the abilities of
personnel working and liaising with humanitarian agencies and through enhanced transparency. This is likely to
build stronger trust in working with Western and Arab donors to encourage more funding, collaboration,
transparency and competency so that Western and Arab stakeholders can trust the working mechanisms of the
MoSD will help to get more funding and encourage humanitarian and development partners to cooperate with it.
With the MoSD in the driving seat and considering the problems raised by the internal division, some supporting
leadership roles to be carried out by UN agencies or the CWG are welcomed and needed.
In terms of effective use of resources, targeting is one of the most critical coordination points. However, this
does not mean that all actors would need to adopt the same targeting
criteria. Some differences between actors are desirable since they
Discussions about linking social
supply complementary services to the programme. As it is widely protection to CVA are burdened by
accepted that the PNCTP has a stable and solid structure, which makes the fact that the number of people
it less flexible. However, within the ecosystem there is a need for agile seeking social protection in Gaza
and attentive players who are close to communities and who can is untenable. The common goal of
identify vulnerable people missed by the social protection system – this the social protection ecosystem
should be to cater to people
is the role of NGOs and local communities. There is a benefit when NGOs according to their capacities and
retain some flexibility in targeting to identify groups that the system may needs, and various actors playing
be missing. For NGOs delivering CVA, having a unique character to their diversified roles towards that goal.
programmes is crucial to demonstrate added value to donors. If CVA is
well organised with humanitarian agencies, it could complement social protection in correcting exclusion errors.
The current social assistance programmes target people who could be economically productive but are
unemployed or who need assets to recover from a shock. The disproportionate focus on providing relief from
deprivation over other aspects of social protection, such as prevention and promotion of incomes and capacities

(Figure 5), makes the size of the needs unmanageable. Thousands of beneficiaries were on the PNCTP waiting list
in the year 2021-2022 before the COVID-19 pandemic, and the May hostilities resulted in the deterioration of
socio-economic conditions. Meeting such needs of vast numbers of people by expanding the PNCTP may
perpetuate aid dependency. The NSR can be used to distinguish between the needs of diverse groups: those who
cannot take care of themselves (traditional social protection programme participants), those in need of services,
and those who can be engaged in a labour or income generation programme.
Figure 5: Aspects of social protection systems – in Gaza the focus has been on provision
PROVISION
PREVENTION
of relief from
of deprivation
deprivation
PROMOTION
TRANSFORMATION
of incomes and
of social inclusion
capacities
Source: R. Sabates-Wheeler and S. Devereux. (2007). Social Protection for Transformation. IDS Bulletin 38, Issue 3, Institute of Development
Studies (IDS), Brighton. https://gsdrc.org/document-library/social-protection-for-transformation/
A common goal of the social protection ecosystem should be to keep people off the PNCTP and waiting list by
providing economic pathways (promotion) to those who can be economically productive but who lack assets or
opportunities: for example, providing CVA to cover basic needs during an employment programme. International
and national partners must work together on concerted economic development efforts and ensure that these are
linked with social protection and with CVA.
The implementation of government-coordinated social assistance requires mechanisms to ensure quality,

transparency and representation of the target population's interests in evaluating PNCTP applications, the
grounds for selection, how data is updated and verified, work oversight, data management systems and external
evaluation committees. NGOs, including local civil society organizations, can play an important role in ensuring
accountability of the system as part of the MoSD's plans around the NSR if enabled to do so. Some stakeholders
close to the MoSD have said that they are open to such collaboration.
9 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAMME

AND POLICY LINKAGES
Improving coordination in this complicated context is a long process and must be a joint undertaking. It cannot
be a one-off effort. Instead, it should be recognized as a process that ties together diverse efforts around social
assistance and building mutual acceptance and trust over an extended period of time. If it is agreed that the

long-term goal is for the government to assist those members of the population who cannot support themselves,
then the immediate and medium-term steps should pursue this goal. Hence the recommendations below are
conceptualized as a chronological process.
The process is also a shift from an operational to a more strategic level. Regularity and consistency will be more
important than a sudden ambitious jump to a harmonious system involving all actors, who may not initially be
eager to join coordination mechanisms and explore constructive links of complementarity. The process can
involve a smaller group of actors but remain open to anyone interested without forcing joint efforts, with smaller-
scale action serving as a positive model, and then expanding it to the wider pool of actors. Fragmentation should
be avoided, but this does not mean that everyone should aim to do the same thing. The recommendations below
are aimed at the broad spectrum of social protection and CVA actors and outline steps, focusing on the
immediate and medium-term, that are necessary to build a more coherent social protection ecosystem. An
overview is presented in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Overview of a process to increase linkages between social protection and CVA
• Increase opportunities for • Develop dialogue from If government-led SRSP is

constructive dialogue information-sharing on strategic the ideal goal, agree on a
• MoSD to engage with HAs as issues roadmap for addressing
partners, and be supported in Medium • Focus on trust and transparency the gaps. This would
Immediate leadership of social protection term in social protection Long term require plans for the
social protection system
• Increase coordination on • Technical improvements to to work better and to be
operational priorities social protection ecosystem better funded in earlier
• Focus on feasible entry points steps.
Immediate actions Medium-term actions Long-term actions

Increase constructive dialogue and coordination between actors
Lead: MoSD; co-lead: humanitarian agencies and Arab Lead: MoSD; co-lead and support: UN agencies Western humanitarian agencies
organizations and World Bank, donors, humanitarian agencies, • Avoid protracting aid dependency by
• Seek opportunities for dialogue and information Arab organizations undermining national institutions.
sharing between the MoSD and CVA actors, • Shift dialogue from 'this is what we do' to 'this Supporting them and improving their
particularly Western humanitarian agencies and is what we plan' and eventually to 'how can we capacity should be a primary focus.
Arab organizations/donors. Topics of exchange do this better together?'.
include: • Develop further the information sharing and
o Information sharing between those social coordination protocol from 'Immediate
protection and CVA actors who do not usually objectives' by identifying roles and
communicate and update on new developments. responsibilities between social protection and
Simply increasing contact can reap benefits in CVA actors. These are likely to be developed
the medium and long term. through a series of discussions about the
o Clarifying data needs of each agency and mutual complementary roles and objectives of the
expectations (e.g. MoSD expectations regarding actors.
feedback on shared lists of programme • MoSD to organise consultations and
participants and how it intends to use the data). humanitarian agencies to input into the 2023
o The aims of each agency in the social protection National Social Development Strategy and
ecosystem need to be discussed, partly because discuss practical and strategic linkages

the role of the humanitarian agencies is relative between the MoSD and humanitarian agencies
too . This will also help identify areas of using e.g. the social assistance roadmap.
complementarity. • Plan for emergencies by assigning roles and
o Review common ways forward, e.g. using the discussing data sharing and response trigger
social assistance nexus roadmap and inviting indicators.
feedback on it from a diverse range of • With an existing coordination mechanism such
stakeholders, including humanitarian agencies, as the SPWG, set up a learning agenda for
to truly enable it to be a collective effort. improving working together e.g. evaluating
Lead: MoSD, co-lead: UN agencies and World Bank, responses to previous shocks such as COVID-
donors (EU) 19 and escalations of conflict.
• Organise regular inclusive coordination meetings. • Humanitarian agencies and donors should
These meetings should be led by the MoSD and treat the West Bank and Gaza as a single
supported by international organizations, UN entity, with sensible differentiation to fit the
agencies, INGOs, NGOs and representatives of context. Promote changes to the PNCTP to be
donors and potentially other government applied across the Palestinian territories,
departments. The SPWG seems to be best suited for including implementation of the new
this purpose. Inclusiveness is key: at minimum, approaches and unifying the NSR list across
consider a core membership and observer the OPT.
membership status that is open to any stakeholder; Humanitarian agencies
communicate openly about coordination
mechanisms and invite all stakeholders to take • Advocate for humanitarian agencies having
part; and consider accessibility (e.g. possible options in engaging with MoSD data on
language barriers for local civil society actors). programme participants and targeting based
Include local civil society to strengthen local on agreement and programme objectives: 1)
capacities and voices. Focus initially on discussing the MoSD provides humanitarian agencies with
and coordinating targeting and the quality of lists of initial lists for further selection according to
programme participants. their criteria (similar to UVAT) and verified data
are fed back to the MoSD; 2) humanitarian
Humanitarian agencies, Arab donors and organizations agencies select directly from the community
• Regularly attend coordination meetings organised and then feedback their data to the NSR. A
by the MoSD. focus on the type of data needed for a specific
• Identify common social protection advocacy sector or project can be agreed upon to avoid
objectives between Western and Arab humanitarian overly lengthy data collection forms and to
agencies and donors, capitalizing on the fact that avoid sharing unnecessary data.
the latter are not restricted by no-contact policies. • Document agreed efforts for linking social
Lead: MoSD; co-lead and support: UN agencies and protection to CVA in a case study to showcase
World Bank, donors, humanitarian agencies, Arab any successes. This does not need to be
organizations comprehensive or to include all parties, but
e.g. representatives from Arab donors, the
MoSD, the de facto authorities, humanitarian

• Draft initial information sharing and coordination agencies, and a UN agency. Present results to
protocols to be discussed and agreed on. Determine other actors and invite them to participate in
what information needs to be shared, why, how, coordination efforts e.g. raise awareness
with who, how it will be used and what possible through the CWG among humanitarian
bottlenecks there are that need to be resolved in agencies about what it means to align with the
order for actors to accept sharing data. Keep as a social protection system and what the benefits
working document to expand according to the are.
readiness of stakeholders. • Advocate for a social protection–CVA
• Discuss targeting: Identify and agree on the lists ecosystem where under the umbrella of an
that the MoSD should be holding, and who gets agreed strategy, actors play complementary
access to them; agree when the PMTF should be rather than identical roles, implying possibly
used for targeting and when not (this may require a different but coherent programme designs
conversation about roles and responsibilities – see such as transfer values and selection criteria.
medium-term recommendations). • Produce research on aid dependency and
Western humanitarian agencies strategies for reducing this.
• Determine an effective way to coordinate actions in • Conduct a comparison to study the parallel
Gaza given the no-contact policy and division, systems of social protection–CVA in Gaza to
potentially proposing creative solutions such as determine the real gaps, no-go areas and
communicating through Arab partners. areas of agreement.
• Investigate well-functioning coordination The MoSD and government
mechanisms between government and • Create a governmental committee consisting
humanitarian agencies, such as that between the of representatives of different ministries or
housing ministry and INGOs for shelter projects, and departments that have positive or negative
draw lessons from these. effects on the coordination process. The
committee should be responsible for
facilitating and supporting relationships and
solving problems with humanitarian actors.
‘Supporting and developing the MoSD as the central coordinating leaders’
Lead: MoSD; co-lead and support: UN agencies and Lead: MoSD; co-lead and support: UN agencies Lead: MoSD; co-lead and support: UN agencies
World Bank, donors, humanitarian agencies, Arab and World Bank, donors, humanitarian agencies, and World Bank, donors
organizations Arab organizations • Explore methods for innovative financing of
• The MoSD to continue work on the NSR as a • Discuss and agree with partners the concepts the PNCTP.
participatory process by organizing consultations of accountability and transparency. Include in
on how actors could engage with it: 1) ask for coordination protocols mechanisms by which
feedback on the plans and answer questions; 2) transparency is ensured to demonstrate that
discuss expected collaboration around the NSR; 3) the MoSD is a reliable partner.
discuss mechanisms by which humanitarian

agencies and especially local civil society can feed • Continue OCHA's initiative of secondments,
back monitoring data, suggestions and concerns. exchanging employees between UN agencies
and the MoSD to enhance understanding of the
organizational structure, systems and
strategies of the different parties.
• Identify areas where social protection can
benefit from the experience of CVA delivery
mechanisms and ways of working, such as
payment systems and monitoring tools. To link
CVA and social protection, humanitarian
agencies need to compromise on issues
including data sharing and some degree of
independence in order to cooperate on
practical issues.
MoSD
• Aim to engage the gatekeeper MoF in
coordination mechanisms where sensible and
possible.
• Frame the need for coordination as a financial
incentive, especially when engaging with the
MoF. For example, introducing stronger
payment systems for the PNCTP would place
the government in a stronger position in the
eyes of donors.
Create a technically sound social protection ecosystem
Focusing advocacy on technical issues of the PNCTP at Lead: MoSD; co-lead and support: UN agencies
this point may have limited effectiveness given the and World Bank, donors, humanitarian agencies,
financial limitations of the system. Arab organizations
• Create a unified system that determines the
transfer value for each intervention in line with
expected fairness and the poverty status of
programme participants. Transfer values
should be coherent and in line with the
purpose of the programme. A sound
methodology is needed to determine them.
• Establish a social protection–CVA external
reporting system to enhance the concept of
inclusiveness vertically and horizontally

between governmental and humanitarian
actors.
• Centrally document the sources of funding for
social assistance in Palestine so as to be able
to evaluate the efficiency of the social
protection ecosystem.
Humanitarian agencies
• Advocate for risk assessments before major
changes to the social protection system such
as moving away from poverty-based targeting
for the PNCTP, as this may risk excluding poor
people without other vulnerabilities.
Enhance trust in and transparency of the social protection system
Humanitarian agencies Humanitarian agencies

• Ensure that the interests of programme • Supporting MoSD targeting by conducting
participants are fairly represented in the research and learning reviews.
MoSD's new approaches: that the system is
transparent and that participants are well
targeted.
Lead: MoSD; co-lead and support: UN agencies
and World Bank, donors, humanitarian agencies,
Arab organizations
• Ensure that there is a feedback mechanism to
the MoSD for Arab, Western and local civil
society and donors on the social protection
system in general, e.g. in common coordination
meetings or consultations on the NSR or other
matters, to hold the duty bearer accountable
and to ensure that diverse views are
represented. Local civil society should be
included in such efforts.
Reduce the social protection programme participant base
Lead: MoSD; co-lead and support: UN agencies Humanitarian agencies, Arab organizations
and World Bank, donors (EU) • Create income generation opportunities by
• Make a part of the PNCTP conditional upon devising innovative, online-focused and/or
improving sources of income if the profile of large-scale employment strategies to shift

the participant is suitable for it, providing people in Gaza off the waiting list and off of
necessary services and support. social protection. This is likely to require a
change in mindset and delivery
mechanisms for many INGOs from small-
scale local income generation projects.
Include this in organizational strategies
such as Oxfam's Economic Justice
Programme.
• Cooperate with the MoSD's Palestinian
economic empowerment institution,
Ministry of Labour, and Ministry of
Agriculture.
UN agencies and World Bank, donors (EU)
• Support the government in creating a
large-scale labour programme that focuses
on online exports of skills and products and
work together with universities, perhaps
focusing on candidates with large and poor
family backgrounds, to encourage
investments and start-ups, with the aim of
injecting cash into Gaza from outside.
• Engage with relevant Gazan institutions for
quality work to improve the local economy
and food production, to increase public
trust in local institutions.
Address structural barriers with duty bearers abroad
Western humanitarian agencies

• Step up political advocacy in Europe to
address structural barriers, to defend the
right of Palestinian civil society to voice
criticism against Israeli actions and to
counter efforts that aim to undermine
international law and the rights of
Palestinians.
Western donors (EU)
• Donors to review imposed no-contact
policies, for themselves and as imposed on

humanitarian agencies, which hamper
effective aid coordination. For example, aim
to waive the no-contact policy at least for
the MoSD or other crucial coordination
mechanisms and use evidence of the
negative effects of such policies.
This case study is very much the result of the reflections of various key informants, although it may not reflect fully or comprehensively the view of individual interviewees
or that of their organizations. We want to thank them for their precious time and contribution.

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MoSD – Gaza. (2021). Factsheet on the occasion of the International Day of Persons with Disabilities in the Gaza
Strip (‫)ﻧﺷرة ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻣﻧﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﯾوم اﻟدوﻟﻲ ﻟﻸﺷﺧﺎص ذوي اﻹﻋﺎﻗﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗطﺎع ﻏزة‬.
MoSD – Gaza. (2021). Factsheet on the occasion of the International Day of Older Persons ( ‫ﻧﺷرة ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻣﻧﺎﺳﺑﺔ اﻟﯾوم‬
‫)اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ ﻟﻛﺑﺎر اﻟﺳن‬.
MoSD – Gaza. (2021). Factsheet on the occasion of World Children's Day (‫)ﻧﺷرة ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻣﻧﺎﺳﺑﺔ ﯾوم اﻟطﻔل اﻟﻌﺎﻟم‬.
Prime Minister’s Office 2021. Public Policies - National Development Plan 2021-2023.

Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Devereux, S. (2007). Social Protection for Transformation, IDS Bulletin 38, Issue 3,
Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Brighton, pp.23–28. https://gsdrc.org/document-library/social-
protection-for-transformation/
Social Protection Working Group. (2021). Operationalising the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus in
Palestine: Proposed roadmap 2021- 2024 for Social Assistance. [Draft].
Smith, G. (2020). Linking CVA and Social Protection in the MENA Region: Iraq Case Study. Cash Learning Partnership
(CALP). https://www.calpnetwork.org/publication/linking-cva-and-social-protection-in-the-mena-region-
iraq-case-study/
Smith, G. (2020, 2021). Linking CVA and Social Protection in the MENA Region: Lebanon Case Study. CALP.
https://www.calpnetwork.org/publication/linking-cva-and-social-protection-in-the-mena-region-
lebanon-case-study/
Smith, G. (2020, 2021). Linking CVA and Social Protection in the MENA Region: Yemen Case Study. CALP.
https://www.calpnetwork.org/publication/linking-cva-and-social-protection-in-the-mena-region-yemen-
case-study/
United Nations. (2018). Chapter 1: ‘Social Protection and social progress’. In: Promoting Inclusion through Social
Protection: Report on the World Social Situation 2018.
https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/publication/2018-world-social-
situation#:~:text=Universal%20social%20protection%20is%20a,social%20protection%20systems%20in%20
place
ANNEX 2: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

No. Name Organization
1 Manal Ramadan MoSD
2 Mohammed Nassar MoSD
3 Salah Lahham and Jane Waite WFP
4 Vanessa Moreira da Silva World Bank
5 Luca Sangalli Cash Working Group
6 Mikolaj Radlicki and Alessia Gaza Protection Consortium
Volpe
7 Iain Murray and Yaser Shalabi UNICEF
8 James Canonge ILO
9 Mamoun Bseiso Consultant, Arab and Western NGOs
10 Ayman Abo Raey Qatari committee (Gaza Reconstruction Committee)
11 Stephanie Rousseau EU
No. Profile Affiliation Men Women Total

1 Community leaders Local committees, 1 2 3
representatives of NGOs
2 Youth Participants in CVA programme 1 1 2
and social protection
3 Widows and divorced women Participants in CVA only 5 5
Married women Participants in social protection

4 People with disabilities Participants in social protection 1 1 2
5 Elderly people Participants in CVA only 2 1 3
Total 5 10 15

NOTES
1 As a result of counter-terrorism legislation, a restrictive policy of no contact with Hamas is in force, whereby
most international governments and donors have imposed restrictions on international and local
humanitarian organizations in Gaza in order to prevent contact with Hamas. Hamas is the Palestinian political
party which controls the government structures in Gaza and has acted as the de-facto authority there since
2007.
2 MoSD – Gaza. (2021). Factsheet: Women; Factsheet on the occasion of the International Day of Persons with
Disabilities in the Gaza Strip; Factsheet on the occasion of the International Day of Older Persons; Factsheet
on the occasion of World Children's Day.
3 MoSD – Gaza. (2021). Factsheet: Cash Transfer Program.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 ILO. (2021). On the road to universal social protection: A social protection floor assessment in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. https://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_831347/lang--en/index.htm
7 Ibid.
8 Oxfam. (2019). Responsiveness of the Palestinian national cash transfer programme to shifting vulnerabilities in
the Gaza Strip. https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/responsiveness-of-the-palestinian-national-
cash-programme-to-shifting-vulnerabi-620989/
9 World Bank. (2021). International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development
Association, International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Assistance
Strategy for the West Bank And Gaza for the Period FY22-25. https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-
palestinian-territory/west-bank-and-gaza-world-bank-country-assistance-strategy
10 The Gaza Reconstruction Committee was established in October 2012 by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
It administers and implements grants from the Government of Qatar assigned to reconstruct Gaza Strip.
11 State of Palestine. (2017). Social Development Sector Strategy 2017–2022.
https://andp.unescwa.org/plans/1222
12 The full title of the project is ‘Increasing Public Awareness and Responsiveness in the Palestinian Social
Protection System’.
13 Internal multi-agency document.
14 Oxfam. (2021). Concept note for the implementation agreement with Oxfam: ‘Increasing Public Awareness and
Responsiveness in the Palestinian Social Protection System’.
15 Sphere. (2018). Sphere Handbook. Core Humanitarian Standard, Commitment 3.
https://spherestandards.org/humanitarian-standards/core-humanitarian-standard/

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank the consulting team of Sonja Read, Ben Mountfield and Saed Saad for their dedicated and
insightful work. This case study was written with the inputs of the Cash Working Group, the Cash Learning
Partnership in the Middle East and North Africa, UN agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs working in the sector in Gaza.
Thanks also go to Najla Shawa, Food Security and Livelihoods Manager; Mohammed Saed Rashid, Cash
Programming Officer; Mohammed Ammar, Saving Lives Programme Manager; and Shane Stevenson, Oxfam Country
Director in OPT, who all provided inputs, facilitated discussions and carried out consultations throughout the
process. Finally, we would like to acknowledge Josh Alcock and Helen Bunting for their efforts in editing and
reviewing the document and for their dedicated support.

© Oxfam International August 2022
This paper was written by Saed Saad, Sonja Read and Ben Mountfield. It is part of a series of papers written to inform public
debate on development and humanitarian policy issues.
This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education,
and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered
with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for
translation or adaptation, permission must be secured and a fee may be charged. Email [email protected].
The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.
Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-78748-938-7 in August 2022.
DOI: 10.21201/2022.9387
Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK.
OXFAM
Oxfam is an international confederation of 21 organizations, working with its partners and allies, reaching out to millions of
people around the world. Together, we tackle inequalities to end poverty and injustice, now and in the long term – for an
equal future. Please write to any of the agencies for further information or visit www.oxfam.org.
Oxfam America (www.oxfamamerica.org) Oxfam IBIS (Denmark) (www.oxfamibis.dk)

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Oxfam Canada (www.oxfam.ca) Oxfam Mexico (www.oxfammexico.org)
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OXFAM CASE STUDY AUGUST 2022

LINKING CASH AND VOUCHER

Saed Saad, Sonja Read, Ben Mountfield

Key takeaways ...................................................................................................................................... 4

3 Social protection programmes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ............................................. 9

4 Entry points to linking social protection and CVA ........................................................................ 11

5 Barriers to linking CVA with social protection .............................................................................. 14

7 Nexus initiatives .......................................................................................................................... 15

9 Recommendations for programme and policy linkages ................................................................ 17

Annex 1: List of reviewed documents .................................................................................................. 26

Annex 2: List of key informants ........................................................................................................... 26

2 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

Table 1: CVA actors operational in Gaza, according to the 5Ws ............................................................. 6

3 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

4 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

Reflections on roles and responsibilities

5 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

Table 1: CVA actors operational in Gaza, according to the 5Ws

Organization Number of CVA projects as of November 2021

Humanity & Inclusion 1

6 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

2 FRAMING THE CONVERSATION AROUND

Figure 1: Simplified model of CVA and social protection

CVA Social protection

To meet one-off urgent needs To contribute to regular

Duration Short-term Extended

A single payment or a Ongoing, consistent and

7 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

Figure 2: The space between CVA and social protection – now

Figure 3: The space between CVA and social protection – ideally

Figure 4: Continuum of interventions

8 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

CVA by UN agencies and Arab donors PNCTP

3 SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMMES IN THE

9 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

10 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

4 ENTRY POINTS TO LINKING CVA WITH

11 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

Other possible entry points include the following:

12 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

13 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

14 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

15 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

8 REFLECTIONS ON ROLES AND

16 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

The implementation of government-coordinated social assistance requires mechanisms to ensure quality,

9 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAMME

17 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

18 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

• Increase opportunities for • Develop dialogue from If government-led SRSP is

Immediate actions Medium-term actions Long-term actions

19 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

20 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

21 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

22 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

Humanitarian agencies Humanitarian agencies

23 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

Western humanitarian agencies

24 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

25 Linking Cash and Voucher Assistance and Social Protection

CWG – Gaza. Cash for Work – Basic Standards.

CWG – Gaza. (2021). Emergency May 2021 #2.

CWG. (2021). Gaza CWG 5Ws November 2021. Available at: