THE REPUBLIC OF LOMAR

SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The name "Republic of Lomar" was incorporated into the constitution of 1997 and
confirmed by the legal incorporation of a non-profit representative entity in 1998. The
diplomatic long-form name is "The Sovereign Non-Territorial Republic of Lomar" and
reflects its autonomous extra-territorial Sovereignty. This legal brief is based on a
document by Guy Stair Sainty which discussed that same issue regarding the Sovereign
Military Order of the Knight of Malta (S.M.H.O.M).

Historically the Republic is founded on the tradition of the Kingdom of Lomar (located in
the Polar regions). Nevertheless, it is clearly admitted that this affiliation is only
philosophical and literary, not directly territorial or historical. All the same, it is interesting
to note that the Polar regions are difficult to "claim territorially" in any credible manner.
Please refer to the University of Texas internet sites for more information about this issue.
It is not excluded that in the long term a territorial claim could be made by the Republic of
Lomar on a polar area if such a claim is supported by the Assembly of Citizens and
especially if environmental issues are at stake.

More directly relevant is the claim of the Republic of Lomar as a sovereign entity based on
the following facts:

a Sovereign non-territorial non-controllable jurisdiction of representation on the

Internet
a population/citizenry that is supranational
a Sovereign government
an international network of embassies and representatives
the issuing of internationally acceptable passports and identification documents
the existence of the Lomar immigration program that allows oppressed people
worldwide to relinquish their existing citizenship and freely adopt as only
citizenship and jurisdiction the Republic of Lomar
the likely establishment of full or partial diplomatic relations with other Sovereign
States within the next 5 years

THE RIGHT OF DIPLOMATIC LEGATION

The active and passive right to establish and exchange diplomatic relations is a prerogative
enjoyed only by Sovereign States. The principal relevant international conventions refer
solely to States. [3a] In more recent times, however, such privileges have also been
exercised by bodies such as the European Union which has not only accorded diplomatic
privileges to the representatives of member States, but has established diplomatic
delegations to non-member States. The essential difference between the protocols
established by international organizations is that they are not governed by International
Law, as are those between States, but by the specific legislation pertaining to those
organizations, and agreements between the organization and the State (as with the
European Union and non-member States).

In determining the status of the Republic of Lomar in International Law today, it is

necessary to examine the historic development of concepts of Sovereignty in International
Law. In doing so it is evident that the practical recognition of what Sovereignty and
statehood mean has been continually developing. In determining whether or not a State is
considered to be Sovereign, the world community has historically determined such status by
practical means, rather than relying exclusively on historic theoretical interpretations. It
has recognized the existence or otherwise of such Sovereignty and statehood in
international agreements and treaties, and in the decisions of competent courts. Such
determinations have frequently advanced legal definitions and have been criticized by
International Law specialists for so doing. Nonetheless, International Law is the creation of
Sovereign and non-Sovereign subjects of International Law, and not of legal theorists. In
determining what is the actual interpretation of Sovereignty, it is necessary to examine past
legal precedents and their present application, rather than rely on restrictive theories that
impose a narrower interpretation. In establishing these precedents and the current State of
International Law in relation to Sovereignty and Statehood, it is worthwhile tracing its
development and examining the commentaries of eminent authorities on the subject.

EARLY DEFINITIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

"That Nation is free which is not subject to any government of any other Nation." [7] The
word Sovereignty did not exist in ancient Greece or Rome, but was understood to be the
equivalent of "liber" and libertatis", which together combined to encompass Proculus’s
doctrine. Hugo Grotius, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, supported this concept.[8] Jean
Bodin,[9] however, argued that "Sovereignty" was subject to the limitations of Divine Law
and Natural Law, and by those obligations contracted on the basis of Sovereign Will to
other Sovereigns or individuals.

This may be further defined in two ways: (1) Sovereignty is the essence of a State, and
conditions its creation and existence; (2) Sovereign is he who has supreme power over a
territory and its inhabitants, unrestrained by any law or rule made by any other power on
earth. This supreme power is limited by (a) the Laws of God, and (b) obligations to other
States or individuals.[10] A further classic definition of Sovereignty is expressed as the
State exercising sole authority on its territory; having monopoly of legislation; monopoly of
constraint on its nationals; and monopoly of jurisdiction. These latter definitions, however,
suggest that States necessarily possess territory and populations, despite the fact that
International Law has conceded the qualities of Sovereignty and statehood to entities that
possess neither. A more recent writer has stated that "while the emergence of the State as a
form of rule is a necessary condition of the concept of Sovereignty it is not a sufficient
condition of it."[11]

P. Isoart has defined three essential characteristics for the birth of a State: (a) population, (b)
territory, (c) juridical, without acknowledging the broader interpretations recognized in
International law. [12] Again, by limiting statehood to entities that enjoy all of these three
aspects of Sovereignty, Isoart ignores the practical interpretation of International Law in
determining the qualities of a State.

SOVEREIGNTY AND THE HOLY SEE

The lack of any Sovereign territory is not an impediment to full recognition. Under the
1871 Law of Guarantees the Italian State unilaterally declared the Holy See[13] to be "a
subject of international law" and the Vatican as Italian territory. From 1870 until the
Lateran treaty of 1929, the Holy See was without territory under Italian law, occupying the
Vatican Palaces de facto but without Sovereign authority.[14] The Kingdom of Italy
considered the Vatican to be part of Italy, and this position was unchallenged by many of
the Powers. Nonetheless, a number of Sovereign States, including Austria-Hungary,
Prussia, Bavaria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, France, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Monaco,
Peru, Portugal, and San Salvador (and later Chile, Spain, Argentina. Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Russia and Uruguay) recognized the Holy See as Sovereign,
albeit with no territorial Imperium, exchanging reciprocal relations. In the period between
1870 and the signing of the Lateran Treaty, the Holy See signed thirteen Concordats, being
treated by each contracting State as a Sovereign State in International Law. Great Britain
had accredited ministerial representatives to the Pope until 1874, and the United States
ministerial representatives until 1867 and consular until 1872, after the loss of territorial
Sovereignty.

The Lateran treaty established the basis for exchanging reciprocal diplomatic relations
between Italy and the Holy See. It also established the existence of the "City of the Vatican"
as the "Sovereign Territory" of the Holy See. The treaty made special provision for those
customarily resident in the Vatican, acknowledging that even while they retained other
citizenship, they were subject to the Sovereign authority of the Holy See while on the
territory of the Vatican City. The Treaty was intended to solve the "Roman Question",
whose existence the Holy See did not acknowledge until the signature of the Treaty on 11
February 1929. This apparent change in the status of the Holy See did not lead to any
"upgrading" of relations with those States that were already accredited to the Supreme
Pontiff. Thus, the status of the Holy See as a Sovereign Power was apparently unaffected by
its loss of territory and population in 1870, and by its subsequent acquisition of both in
1929. Great Britain and the United States subsequently accredited diplomatic
representatives at a Ministerial rather than Ambassadorial level, accepting Apostolic
delegates whose responsibilities were limited solely to ecclesiastical, and not State matters.
Full reciprocal relations were delayed until the 1980s, when (Pro-) Nuncios were accredited
from the Holy See and Ambassadors sent to the Vatican. The decision to institute full
reciprocal relations, after some internal political controversy, may be attributed more to a
wish to improve relations with the Head of the Catholic Church than any perception of a
change in status of the Holy See.

That the Holy See does not exchange diplomatic relations on the basis of its possession of
the Vatican City State, but by virtue of its historic status, was argued successfully by the US
State Department when the decision of the United States to exchange full diplomatic
relations was challenged.[15] The establishment of the "City of the Vatican" in the Lateran
Treaty did not create a new Sovereign subject of International Law, since the new territory
was subordinated to the Sovereignty of the Holy See, which already existed as a Sovereign
State before the signing of the Treaty. The Holy See is a member of the international postal
union and uses Italian currency. Thus the same principal that is applied in recognizing the
Sovereignty of the Holy See may be applied to other jurisdictions, whether or not the latter
actually possesses "Sovereign territory".

"Sovereignty implies independence of the State of the Will of any other Power and the sole
right of Sovereign decisions in all matters concerning the State."[16] "Sovereignty means
independence and independence means Sovereignty…."[17] "Sovereignty, meaning
supreme power, may only exist with independent States inside but not outside the State, and
therefore may not be "external" (which is the definition of "independence").[18] But
Sovereignty is "not a basic element of the State … rather an autonomy of the State" and the
needs of the international community are today placed above those of individual States.[19]
"Sovereignty in International Law is defined as the Supreme Power of the State over its
territory and inhabitants, and independent of any external authority. As such it constitutes a
criterion of the State as a subject of International Law".[20]

These forthright definitions, each found in the work of a recent scholar,[21] are
nonetheless limited by the decisions of bodies competent to determine such matters. They
are also incompatible with the recognition of the attributions of Sovereignty recognized by
States in their dealings with the Holy See from 1870-1929, and in subsequent agreements
between the Holy See and other States when establishing diplomatic relations. Decisions by
the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, and by other competent bodies, allow
for a more extensive definition of Sovereignty and statehood, one which may be expressly
limited in some way, or which may not enjoy the more visible aspects of statehood: territory
and population. "The concept of absolute Sovereignty is condemned and definitively
rejected as inconsistent with the existence of International Law as a legal discipline".[22]

DEFINITIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE MODERN ERA

The narrow historic definitions of Sovereignty given above, if applied to many of the States,
both large and small, which compose the membership of the United Nations, would surely
lead to the conclusion that many had to some degree forfeited the qualities necessary for
true Sovereignty. "If the concept of Sovereignty is only a restatement of the permanent
problem of deciding the basis of government and obligations within a political community,
it is also nothing more – but is nothing less – than the restatement of that problem which is
made where the political community and its governance judged to be necessary to each
other and sufficient unto themselves…". [23]

This presents us with a basis for determining a broader definition of what comprises
Sovereignty, and what may limit it without the status of Sovereignty being forfeited
altogether. The most common limitation of the exercise of Sovereignty is imposed by
world economic interdependence. "Economic independence is irrelevant to the legal issue
of Sovereignty, since economic interdependence is an overriding fact."[24] The Republic of
Lomar is not a trading nation, but is self-supporting, enjoying considerable revenues in
freely given contributions from its members and also by issuing collectible post stamps.
Thus it is not subject to the restrictions of the exercise of Sovereignty imposed by the
various international agreements on trade.

Legal dependence in International law may of itself limit Sovereignty, but not destroy it, as
is demonstrated by the dependency of certain States within the European Union on financial
subsidies from the other member States through the medium of the Brussels commission. If
a treaty stipulates that a State is economically and politically dependent on another State,
however, a legal dependence is established, which could quantitatively diminish Sovereignty
to such a degree that independence was directly threatened. There is no such thing,
according to Kozowicz, as a "limitation of Sovereignty", only a "limitation of the exercise of
Sovereignty… Sovereignty may be limited in a quantitative sense, but not a qualitative
one".[25] The State remains independent as long as it has not abandoned its
independence of any other State; a body "which is subjected to International Law
through the intermediary of a foreign State is not a Sovereign State under
International Law".[26] By virtue of its supranational existence and "population"
(citizenry would be the proper term), the Republic of Lomar is a direct subject of
International Law, and has neither abandoned its independence to another State, nor
is it subject to the intermediary of any State, nor dependent economically on another
State.

Sovereignty can be limited by practical necessity and by treaty. The National or Municipal
(internal) law of States can be limited by International law, e.g. Diplomats (the
representatives of foreign States) enjoy diplomatic immunity, which is freedom of
communication, and jurisdictional immunity from internal law. It is also generally
considered that treaties which are properly ratified and approved are superior authority to
national law (i.e. as provided in Article 55, of the French Constitution, 4 Oct 1958). For
example, diplomats in the service of the S.M.H.O.M. are given the same privileges of
freedom of communication and diplomatic immunity as the representatives of other
Sovereign States, and it concedes similar privileges to those representatives of foreign
States accredited to it. The Republic of Lomar is engaged as party to ratify several
international agreements and treaties, and in treating with other powers (for example, in
negotiating the initiation of diplomatic relations or the status of its NGO entities within
those States), is generally treated as an equal, in accordance with international practice.

"A State which renounces its absolute equality of rights in individual relations faces –
depending on the extent of these renunciations – its own annihilation as a State under
International Law."[27] International Law,[28] however, has twice provided that the right
of a State to so limit its Sovereignty by entering into certain treaty obligations may be
prohibited. The Peace of Saint Germain of 10 Sep 1919, Article 88, declared that Austria’s
independence would be violated if there was any limitation of its right of decision in all
matters economic, political, financial or other as "different aspects of Independence being in
practice one and indivisible".[29] This article specifically declared, furthermore, that the
independence of that country was inalienable, unless consent to the contrary was obtained
from the Council of the League of Nations. On 4 Oct 1922, Austria, Great Britain, France,
Italy and Czechoslovakia signed a joined declaration under which Austria pledged not to
alienate its independence (breached by the Anschluss in 1938).

The second occasion also concerned Austria. The State Treaty for the Re-Establishment of
an Independent, Democratic Austria (Vienna, 15 May 1955, in force 27 July, 1955), between
the U.S.S.R., the U.K., the U.S.A., France and Austria, prohibited political or economic
union between Austria and Germany and no treaty was permitted between Austria and
Germany which could "impair its territorial integrity or political or economic
independence." [30] Thus International Law imposed an obligation on Austria (to prevent
its union with Germany) which, while designed to prevent the de facto loss of Austrian
Sovereignty, at the same time limited its practical exercise of that Sovereignty by
prohibiting it from doing something which other States could do with freedom.
Nonetheless, Austria was not considered to have forfeited its independence or Sovereign
status (which had been temporarily impeded by the Allied occupation from 1945-55), by
virtue of being subjected to such a restriction of Sovereignty. Such a limitation is self-
evidently at odds with the effects of the various treaties that have brought into existence the
European Union, and various other international free trade associations.

It has been asserted that International Law permits the existence of semi-Sovereign or
non-fully Sovereign States.[31] It would be preferable, however, to recognize that
historic narrow definitions of "Sovereignty" and "statehood" have been replaced in practice
by broader definitions which permit the existence of both concepts, even when seemingly
limited to some degree in the exercise of Sovereignty. This problem arose towards the end
of the colonial era, when certain States which evidently manifested many of the
characteristics of Sovereignty, had nonetheless ceded to a more powerful State, control over
some seemingly essential elements of statehood – such as external relations. "It is
obvious that for Sovereignty there must be certain amount of independence, but it is not in
the least necessary that for Sovereignty there should be complete independence. It is quite
consistent with Sovereignty that the Sovereign may in certain respects be dependent upon
another Power; the control, for instance, of foreign affairs, may be completely in the hands
of a Protecting Power,[32] and there may be agreements or treaties, which limit the
powers of the Sovereign even in internal affairs without entailing a loss of the position of a
Sovereign Power".[33]

It is interesting to compare here the positions of those dependencies of the British crown
which, however, despite enjoying Sovereignty over their own territory, control of their
population, judicial administration, and fiscal independence, are not considered "Sovereign"
States. The Channel Islands - Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark, are each united in a
personal union with the British Monarch, and each enjoy their own individual jurisdictions
entirely free of the control of the British Parliament.[34] The only attributes of
Sovereignty they do not enjoy, however, are the faculty to make international
agreements, and to enjoy any right of legation. Hence they are not considered
"Sovereign subjects" of International Law.

The case of the German Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia has also been cited in this
regard. These had been parts of the Czech Republic, which had first lost the Sudeten
Land[35] to Germany and later a large part of Slovakia to Hungary, before these two
provinces, returned to ancient names although not their ancient boundaries, were subsumed
by the German Reich. Article 6, of the German Decree of 16 March 1939 provided that
these provinces remained subjects of International Law, despite the loss of the right of
maintaining relations with other States, and their virtually total subordination to German
rule. To admit that these provinces could claim statehood would be mistaken, however.
Following the end of the War substantial claims were made against Germany for the
conduct of the governments of these so-called Protectorates, and not against the successor
State, the re-established independent Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, even if a State has
partially cut off its competence by conferring certain powers either on international organs,
or even on a foreign State, and if for all other matters it maintains the competence to act in
an autonomous way, "international politics will admit that Sovereignty exists".[36]

Korowicz, has argued that a mere claim to Sovereignty cannot of itself be considered to be
evidence of Sovereignty, even if that claim represents the continuation of once existing
Sovereignty over the territory in question.[37] The Sultan of Turkey’s claim to
Sovereignty over the island of Crete, entirely lost de facto in 1899, was considered by
theorists to be the "ghost of a hollow Sovereignty" which could not obscure the realities.
That argument is not universally sustainable, however, since the majority of the members of
the United Nations have determined that the Republic of (Mainland) China is Sovereign of
the Island of Taiwan, although in fact it has no control over the Island's territory, or
population, and no internal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, on the basis that Taiwan was
historically part of Mainland China, the Republic of China (Taiwan) was expelled from
membership of the United Nations. The latter Republic clearly fully exercises those
elements of Sovereignty defined above by Isoart and others, but is not considered the
equal of other Sovereign States by the world community. The Republic of Lomar has
never based its prerogative of Sovereignty or statehood on the basis of claimed Sovereignty
over territorial areas.
Recognition of Sovereign rights, without actual exercise of Sovereign jurisdiction over
territory (or even population), was a feature of relations between certain States during the
Second World War, from 1939-1945. The German invasions of Poland, Latvia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1939, and of Norway, Greece and
Yugoslavia in 1940, led to the establishment of governments-in-exile and of puppet
regimes in the occupied States. In each of these cases both Great Britain and the United
States continued to exchange mutual diplomatic relations with these governments-in-exile,
despite the latter’s loss of the exercise of Sovereignty over both territory and populations,
and that their claims to Sovereignty were mere "ghosts of a hollow Sovereignty." The
United States, nonetheless, maintained diplomatic relations with Germany until 1941, but
without recognizing the legitimacy of the occupations of neighboring States, nor their
incorporation into the Reich. In continuing recognition of the governments-in-exile, a
position followed not only by Great Britain and the United States but by many other States
which had accredited representatives to the occupied countries before 1939, their lack of
territory, population, and jurisdiction was not considered any impediment to recognition. A
number of States have also accorded recognition to the Palestinian Authority as if it was a
State, and in some cases this recognition was accorded when the Palestinian Liberation
Organization was an exile group claiming legal authority over the Palestinian population
governed de facto from 1967 by the government of Israel.

The UN is founded on the principle of "equal Sovereignty of all its members" (art 2, para 1,
of UN Charter). Hence, there must be a presumption that all States that have been admitted
to full membership of the United Nations General Assembly enjoy the attributes of
Statehood and Sovereignty in equal measure. A Sovereign State has "the fundamental right
to demand that other States treat it on a perpetually equal footing."[38] This must be so
even if it may appear that their Sovereignty is limited in a way which classic definitions of
Sovereignty would consider sufficient to impeach their claims to Sovereignty or
independent status. The initial draft of the Charter defined the basis of membership as
"Sovereign equality." This was in turn defined in the US State Department Report on the
Charter, 1944, as "(1) all States are juridically equal; (2) each State enjoys the rights
inherent in full Sovereignty; (3) the personality of the State is respected as well as its
territorial integrity and political independence; and (4) that each State should under
International Law comply faithfully with its international duties and obligations".

In defining Sovereignty, and statehood, it is necessary therefore to determine "how far the
limitations of Sovereignty of a State may go without the abolition of its character as a State
under International Law."[39] States can voluntarily surrender their Sovereignty, for
example, by joining a Federation, but recent precedent suggests that such an act does not
automatically forfeit Statehood. Article 13 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1936,
as amended in 1944 and 1947, provided that the Soviet Union was a Federal State.
Nonetheless, by Article 18 (a), of 1 Feb 1944, "each Union Republic has the right to enter
into direct relations with foreign States, and to contract agreements, and exchange
diplomatic and consular representation with them." By virtue of this latter article,
Byelorussia and the Ukraine, before the breakup of the Soviet Union, were both admitted to
full membership of the United Nations. Despite the fact that in no other regard did these
States enjoy the elements considered historically necessary to comprise Sovereignty, they
were admitted as Sovereign States purely on the basis of the right of legation and to
commit to international agreements as independent subjects of International Law.
That this was accepted by the other member States in practice as a matter of political
expediency,[40] to insure Soviet co-operation, does not negate the fact that the other
members of the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, treated these two States as
equals. Another example of a federated State enjoying the prerogatives of Sovereignty,
including the right of legation, was the Kingdom of Bavaria between 1870 and 1918, which
was part of the German Empire but maintained, and accredited, an international diplomatic
corps. The Republic of Lomar certainly enjoys greater factual independence than
either Byelorussia or Ukraine before the breakup of the Soviet Union.

A further example may be found in a case concerning France and its Protectorate,
Morocco.[41] The General Act of Algeciras of 7 April 1907 governed relations between
France and Morocco. This guaranteed three essential principles: "the Sovereignty and the
Independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the Integrity of his Domains, and economic liberty
without inequality". Morocco had surrendered to France the right to institute
administrative, juridical, educational, economic, financial and military reforms. France could
occupy the country militarily without permission, approve or not approve any decree of the
Sultan, and the Sultan could not conclude any international agreement or treaty without the
consent of the French government, nor contract any public or private loans or grants.
There was no time limit on these restrictions, nor any possibility of their denunciation by
the Sultan. Korowicz argued that Morocco had clearly surrendered the qualities of
Sovereignty, and statehood, to France, despite the guarantee of the three principles stated
above.[42] Nonetheless, the Treaty of Fez of 1912 was considered an agreement between
States, and the Public Court of International Justice stated "it is not disputed by the French
Government that Morocco, even under Protectorate, has retained its Personality as a State
in International Law….." In finding that Morocco remained a Sovereign State, the Court
maintained that it had voluntarily made an arrangement of a contractual character whereby
France undertook to exercise certain Sovereign powers in the name and on behalf of the
Sultan, in regard to both internal and external affairs.

An issue that arose in the post-World War II era, and which finds parallels elsewhere, is the
"satellization" of States. This has been interpreted as "the subjection by a State, using its
overwhelming power and military pressure, of a weaker State, the organization and separate
personality of which are maintained".[43] Korowicz stated that where satellization has led
to inequality and subordination, the lesser State might not be considered Sovereign,
defining this here as "independence, equality, and co-ordination with other
Sovereignties".[44] In order to maintain the nominal independence of satellite States, care
was taken (by the U.S.S.R.) to eliminate from its relations with the satellite States anything
which could be interpreted as legal dependence, inequality, subordination, and thus lack of
Sovereignty, even if this was in fact a fiction (as the events before and after the invasions of
Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, amply demonstrated). Jurists will make a
clear distinction between "factual" and "legal" satellization, as a "Jurist looks to at the legal
rules governing the intercourse of States, and if he finds nothing in them which indicate a
legal dependency of a State on another’s will and control, he can assume Sovereignty".[45]

The Principality of Monaco is in practical terms a satellite of the Republic of France. When
it became clear after World War One that the eventual heir to the Principality was a
German national, France stated that unless the succession law was changed, France would
absorb Monaco and the latter lose its independence. The Principality consequently changed
its law, and the Prince adopted as his heir a French national who would not have been able
to succeed under the historic succession laws of Monaco. Although relations between
Monaco and France are governed by a series of agreements between States, the terms of
these agreements impose various limitations on the Principality's exercise of Sovereignty
which would be considered by many jurists to so diminish its Sovereign status as to destroy
it altogether.
"Subjects of International Law may be defined as legal or physical persons upon whom
International Law directly imposes duties and confers rights. Sovereign subjects of
International Law are Sovereign States. They may also be called original subjects,
Sovereignty being inherent in them, stemming from them, and unconditionally applying to
them".[46]

Here then we may find a definition that may be applied without qualification to the Republic
of Lomar. The latter is not limited by Korowicz’s definitions of a "non-Sovereign subject of
International Law." Such entities are defined by him as created by and dependent on the will
of Sovereign (original) subjects, and may, like the latter, create International Law, but are
mere recipients of rights and duties under International Law whose international
personality, in its scope and duration, depends on the will of Sovereign subjects or of non-
Sovereign law-creating subjects.[47] International persons "may be divided into Sovereign
and non-Sovereign …. There is no Sovereignty of a subject of International Law whose
international personality may be abolished at any time whenever these Sovereign States
which have created it decide that it should be abolished".[48] Clearly the Republic of
Lomar does not fall into this category, and even without active claims to a historical
territory, it was not the possession of such territory which conferred upon the Republic its
Sovereign status, nor was it conferred by concessions by any other Sovereign State.

Although Sovereign, the Republic of Lomar does not have (a) have territory,[49] or (b) a
territorial population, both of which have been usually characterized as essential attributes
of Sovereignty. In fact, the Republic of Lomar does have a non-territorial population
and the distinction between territorial and non-territorial population is not taken
seriously by the majority of other Sovereign states. The (partial) lack of these attributes
has been held by some States to be an obstacle to according Lomar full diplomatic
recognition. Similarly, since it is not a member of the International Postal Union (unlike the
Vatican), its postage stamps are not valid for actual use except to countries with which
postal agreements would be established. These limitations, however, are common to the
position of the Holy See between 1870 and 1929, and indeed the latter, while possessing a
territory (the Vatican City), is not accorded international recognition by virtue of that
territory. The Holy See does not have a population in the ordinary sense, or citizens,
even though it accords passports to some of those resident in the Vatican or employed in its
service and Italy guarantees the Holy See's control of those persons ordinarily resident on
its territory. These Vatican personnel, with the sole exception of the Pope himself,
who is not a citizen of any State, are citizens of a variety of States and as such
potentially subjects to the laws of other States. In a similar fashion, most Lomar
citizens, including the members of the Sovereign Council, are likewise citizens of
other States. They are nevertheless entitled to Lomar passports and diplomatic passports
are usually accorded to members of the Sovereign Council, to members of the Republic's
diplomatic service and, on occasion, to senior administrative officials. States or territories
with which the Republic enjoys relations and others with which it has no relations at all
have accepted these passports. The lack of population or territory has not proved to be an
impediment to the Republic's recognition as a Sovereign State nor, to it treating with other
States as an equal.

THE STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LOMAR AS A SOVEREIGN ENTITY IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although it has been described as a Sovereign State, it can also be characterized as a

Sovereign persona, since it does not possess any territorial imperium.[58] It has been
proposed that like the Order of Malta, the Republic of Lomar is "a public international
organization, (non-Governmental in nature - applies to S.M.H.O.M), recognized in
International Law as having a personality in which inhere a number of rights and privileges,
distinctive in character...... For example, the international personality of the Order of Malta
is firmly established in International Law by its recognition on the part of States (...), and
impending recognition of the Republic of Lomar by Sovereign states entails the same
meaning.[59] This definition, however, is surely overly restrictive, as the lack of a
territorial imperium has not impeded its treatment as a State in the past, nor that of other
Sovereign States (i.e. the Holy See from 1870-1929).

The United Nations itself enjoys all the privileges of Sovereignty as a Sovereign subject of
International Law, but has neither territory, nor population. The European Union has also
acquired a similar status, without having territory or population, and has established its
own diplomatic corps that enjoys the privileges of immunity and freedom of communication
accorded to the Representatives of States. Laws of the European Union are now superior in
several regards to the Laws of States that are themselves members of the Union.

The Republic of Lomar issues its own passports, which have been accepted as valid
identification and/or travel documents, even by States with which it does not exchange
diplomatic relations. It also has its own postal service and stamps and plans to sign local
postal agreements.[60]

Our non-territorial entity of reference, the Order of Malta, enjoys full, mutual diplomatic
relations with seventy-five States and lesser relations with five other States.[61] It has been
accorded the status of Observer at the United Nations since 1994, enjoying the same
privileges as the Red Cross which include the right to address the Assembly, although not
to vote in its proceedings.[62]

The Relationship between the Republic of Lomar and the United States is irrelevant in
determining its international juridical status, since the Republic's jurisdictional citizenry
and officials are not in majority situated in that particular country - even though the
Republic operates legally in the US through a non-sovereign entity called "Republic of
Lomar Foundation".

Ultimately, it the opinion and conviction of the Sovereign Council that other Sovereign
nations will declare Lomar "a sovereign international entity, equivalent in all respects, even
though without territory, to a foreign State, and with which we have normal diplomatic
relations, so that it is beyond doubt that it is entitled to the juridical treatment accorded to
foreign States and thus also to the jurisdictional exemption within the aforementioned
limits and with regard to the activity concerning the performance of its public objectives"
(wording from an Italian Supreme court ruling on the status of the S.M.H.O.M).

The non-existence of full diplomatic relations between the Republic of Lomar and other
States does not necessarily imply that those State do not recognize the Order’s sovereign
status.[66] Relations between the Republic of Lomar and other States may exist at a formal
level without diplomatic recognition.

The Republic of Lomar has appointed Official Representatives to several UN-member

nations and International Organizations.
In conclusion it may be stated that there are historical precedents for asserting that
recognition of Sovereignty is not dependent on a State enjoying possession of supreme
power over a territory, or supreme authority over a population. In the case of the Republic
of Lomar, its Sovereign status in international law derives from its exercise of self-
government, its possession of a Chief of State,[68] its jurisdiction over a significant and
growing population of citizens, its independent powers of legation, its issuance of passports
according to international standards. Unlike the Order of Malta (S.M.H.O.M), the Republic
of Lomar does not currently maintain full diplomatic relations with other sovereign nations
but this situation is obviously temporary and due to the short history of the Republic and
linked to the recent emergence of new technological paradigms affecting the meaning of
national Sovereignty.

______________

FOOTNOTES

3a Annex XVIII, 19 March 1815, to the final text of the proceedings of the Congress of
Vienna of 9 June 1815; the Aix-la-Chapelle protocol of 21 November 1918, and the Vienna
convention of 18 April 1961. See Pezzana, op. cit. p. 3.

4 This tradition has since been superseded by the modern convention of according
precedence by the date of the letters of credence, the only exception being the Apostolic
Nuncio who, in Catholic States, is given the position of doyen automatically.

5 Details to be elaborated.

6 Details of this treaty and its implications to be added.

7 Proculus, Digest, LIX, 157.

8 1625, I. I. C.2., para 21.

9 Les six livres de la République" of 1576.

10 M. S. Korowicz, in Some Present Aspects of Sovereignty in International Law, Leyden,

1961.

11 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, London, 1966, p. 21.

12 For the State to exist he argues that it is necessary that the "comportment de la
population sur une territorie soit déterminer ou ordonner par une puissance indiscutée ….
La Souveraineté est donc l’expression juridique de cette puissance. Le Souveraineté est alors
un pouvoir automne et superérieur, reconnu dans un cadre territorial, determiné à un
appareil d’État de donner du direction et des ordres à une population et d’en assurer
l’exécution par la contrainte. ..La definition proposée fait apparaitre une première distinction
entre les gouvernments qui donnent des ordres et les gouvernés que les exécutent." Le
Souveraineté en XXieme siècle, Paris, 1971, p. 14.

13 The Holy See is those persons and bodies which comprise together the governance of the
Roman Catholic Church.
14 Indeed, the Law of Guarantees of 13 May 1871, established by the newly united Italy to
provide a framework for a solution to the Roman Question, was never accepted by the Holy
See. This law, while recognizing the qualities of a Sovereign in the person of the Supreme
Pontiff, merely permitted him the occupation of the Apostolic Palaces, rather than
recognizing either his proprietorship, or his ownership.

15 The State of Israel had claimed that its agreement to exchange diplomatic relations with
the Holy See was, in fact, an exchange with the Vatican City State, and that it did not
recognize the Roman Catholic Church. The Holy See does not accept this position.
Consequently relations between the Holy See and Israel have now been renegotiated, and as
of November 1997, Israel has accorded full recognition to the Roman Catholic Church and
to the authority that the Holy See enjoys over its institutions and priests.

16 Korowicz, op. cit., 9-10.

17 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 12.

18 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 15.

19 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 17.

20 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 108.

21 Korowicz, op. cit.

22 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 108.

23 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 26.

24 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 15.

25 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 108.

26 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 108.

27 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 35.

28 International Law means, "international rules accepted by Sovereign States." Korowicz,

op. cit. p. 18. It is created by Sovereign States, by Treaties and International agreements.

29 Public Court of International Justice, decision of the advisory committee on the

"Customs Regime between Germany and Austria" 5 Sep 1931.

30 Article 4, "Prohibition of Anschluss".

31 L. G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law, London, 1954, p. 86.

32 As was the case until recently of the Principality of Liechtenstein, which had ceded to
Switzerland control of its relations with States.
33 Duff Development Co. v. Government of Kelantan, Viscount Finlay, House of Lords
1924.

34 They are outside the European Union, for example, and are therefore not subject to the
jurisdiction of Brussels, like the United Kingdom.

35 The former Duchy of Teschen that had opted for union with Germany in 1919 but had
been forcibly united with the new Czech Republic.

36 Henri Rolin, Les Principes de Droit International Public, Hague Rec, vol 77, 1950, p.
326, cited in Korowicz, op. cit., p. 89.

37 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 90.

38 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 35.

39 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 86

40 It was considered that the U.S.S.R. needed two extra votes to balance the majority, who
were thought to be associated with the "Western" block.

41 The Rights of Nationals of the U.S.A. in Morocco, in France v. U.S.A., 1952,

International Court of Justice, Rep, 1952, p. 183, Judgement of 27 Aug, 1952.

42 Op. cit., p. 92-93.

43 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 94.

44 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 95.

45 Korowicz, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

46 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 102.

47 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 102.

48 Korowicz, op. cit., p. 103.