2 Leviste v. Court of Appeals
2 Leviste v. Court of Appeals
DECISION
CORONA, J : p
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law
for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be
required, 1 is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question:
what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in
the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final
adjudication? 2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both
the accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring the
accused's presence at trial. 3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused
who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time
immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. 4 An accused not
released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his
conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is
denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. 5
Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused's
interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review,
opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential
hardships of prison. 6 On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in
protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. 7
Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal
include the prevention of the accused's flight from court custody, the
protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of
delay in punishment. 8 Under what circumstances an accused may obtain
bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of
society and those of the accused. 9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant
of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In
the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should
be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for
strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by
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the trial court. 10 cDCEIA
THE FACTS
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio
Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the
lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. 11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. 12 Pending appeal,
he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or
possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for bail. 13 It
invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the
discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised
"with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established
jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It
found that petitioner
. . . failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his
continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health
or put his life in danger. . . . Notably, the physical condition of
[petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his
personal physician. 14
A FINAL WORD
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Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
Separate Opinions
PERALTA, J., dissenting:
Consequently, in its Order 5 dated January 14, 2009, the trial court
canceled petitioner's bail bond, ruling that:
Accused Jose Antonio Leviste y Casals was charged with the
crime of Murder, a capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The accused is presently
out on bail. After trial, the accused was however convicted of Homicide,
a lesser offense than that charged in the Information. Accused was
accordingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Prior to the effectivity of the above provisions, the governing rule in the
granting or cancellation of bail was encapsulated in Administrative Circular
No. 12-94, 10 stating that:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in
custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence
of guilt is strong.
SO ORDERED. 13
Ultimately, after the trial of the case, the trial court found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, not murder as
originally charged, demonstrating the consistency of the trial court's findings
in the bail hearing and in the actual trial of the said case. Nevertheless, the
CA, in denying petitioner's application for bail, relied on Section 7, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court insisting that the evidence of guilt of the petitioner was
strong. By ruling thus, the CA has not accorded respect to the factual
findings of the trial court. It is a time-honored legal precept, in this regard
that the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect by
appellate courts and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court
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has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstance of
sufficient weight or significance which, if considered, would alter the
situation. 14 Moreover, there seems to be a disparity between the
pronouncement of the CA that the trial court found the evidence of guilt of
the petitioner strong and the explanation of why the former considered it to
be so. The CA ruled that:
From the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court, the
prosecution had demonstrated that appellant's guilt is strong,
after finding that accused failed to satisfy the requirements of
self-defense to justify the shooting of the victim. Said court
carefully and meticulously evaluated the evidence on record and ruled
that the claim of appellant that the victim was the aggressor deserves
disbelief considering that evidence at the scene of the crime indicated
that the victim could not have fired the gun apparently placed in his
hand; appellant's conduct in refusing to be subjected to paraffin test is
not the natural tendency of a person claiming self-defense; and neither
was appellant threatened or intimidated by the victim's averred
pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the victim.
And even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression, the
trial court found that the five (5) gunshot wounds (four) [4] shots even
aimed at head, a vital organ were not reasonable means to repel the
same, and the evidence demonstrated a determined effort on the part
of the appellant to kill the victim and not just to defend himself.
However, appellant was convicted of the lesser offense
(homicide) since the qualifying circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation and cruelty or ignominy, alleged in the
Amended Information, were not duly proven at the trial. 15
Footnotes
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1.Section 1, Rule 114, RULES OF COURT.
2.Verilli, Donald, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical
Perspectives, 82 Columbia L.Rev. 328 (1982).
3.Id.
4See Section 5, Rule 114, RULES OF COURT.
9.Keller, supra.
10.Yap v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202 (2001).
11.Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case No. 07-179 penned by Judge
Elmo M. Alameda. Rollo, pp. 198-235.
12.Notice of Appeal dated January 14, 2009. Id., p. 238-241.
20.Id., p. 345.
21.Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998).
22.441 Phil. 705 (2002).
23.Id.
24.Regalado, Florenz, II REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 417 (Tenth Revised Edition
[2004]).
Justice Regalado was Vice-Chairman and, later, Co-Chairman of the
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which proposed the present
(2000) rules on criminal procedure (Rules 110-127 of the Rules of Court).
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It should be noted, however, that Justice Regalado speaks of application for
bail pending appeal in cases "wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years is imposed." (Emphasis supplied) A
careful reading of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 does not impose
the limit of "not more than 20 years."
33.Id.
34.United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (1926) (Butler, Circuit Justice).
35.S e e D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (1959) (Douglas, Circuit
Justice).
Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court, in his capacity as a
Circuit Justice, was one of the first judges to discuss the definition of
"substantial question." He equated the phrase with an issue that is "fairly
debatable." Later, he provided additional guidance to district courts trying to
determine whether a defendant's appeal would raise a fairly debatable issue:
[T]he first consideration is the soundness of the errors alleged. Are they, or
any of them, likely to command the respect of the appellate judges? It is not
enough that I am unimpressed. I must decide whether there is a school of
thought, a philosophical view, a technical argument, an analogy, an appeal
to precedent or to reason commanding respect that might possibly prevail.
(Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351 (1955) (Douglas, Circuit Justice)
See also United States v. Barbeau, 92 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D. Alaska 1950),
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aff'd, 193 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 968 (1952);
Warring v. United States, 16 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D.Md. 1954); United States v.
Goo, 10 F.R.D. 337, 338 (D. Hawaii 1950).
36.Luna v. Arcenas, supra note 21 quoting 2 Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice
416, 418.
Thus, the general rule and one of the fundamental rules of appellate
procedure is that decisions of a trial court which "lie in discretion" will not be
reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal, at law or in equity
(Cuan v. Chiang Kai Shek College, Inc., G.R. No. 175936, 03 September 2007,
532 SCRA 172, 187-188).
37.Section 10, Rule 114, RULES OF COURT.
38.The express mention of one implies the exclusion of all others not mentioned.
39.Regalado, Florenz, II REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 273 (Fifth Revised Edition
[1988]).
40.See Herrera, supra note 19, p. 457.
41.In particular, in the United States, the history of bail pending appeal has been
divided by one scholar on the matter into four distinct periods: (1st period)
1879 to 1934, (2nd period) 1934 to 1956, (third period) 1956 to 1984 and
(post-1984 period) 1984 to present. The first period, during which the rules
on the matter were just being developed, showed liberality in the grant of
bail pending appeal. The second period produced a more restrictive rule, one
which limited bail to defendants who could prove that their appeal would
raise "a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate
court." The third period saw the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1966
establishing a standard wherein bail may be allowed pending appeal unless it
appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay. Under that standard,
the court could deny bail if the defendant was a flight risk or a danger to the
community. Hence, bail pending appeal was again favored. The post-1984
period is determined by the enactment and implementation of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984. The law was purposely designed to make restrictive the
allowance of bail pending appeal. As the Act's legislative history explains,
prior law had "a presumption in favor of bail even after conviction" and
Congress wanted to "eliminate" that presumption. (Keller, supra note 5.)
42.Obasa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 281.
43.Id.
44.Id. See also Yap vs. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.
45.Id.
46.See Obosa v. Court of Appeals and Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra. See also
Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, p. 492 (2009).
PERALTA, J., dissenting:
1.Rollo, pp. 36-45.
2.Id. at 150-154.
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3.Id. at 164-197.
4.Id. at 198-235.
5.Id. at 236-237.
6.Id. at 238-239.
7.Id. at 47.
8.Id. at 16.
9.334 Phil. 253 (1997).
10.Dated October 1, 1994, amending the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
11.Supra note 9.
12.Id.
13.Rollo, p. 197. (Emphasis supplied.)
14.People of the Philippines v. Dizon, 329 Phil. 685, 695 (1996), citing People v.
Gomez, 229 SCRA 138 (1994).
15.Rollo, p. 44. (Emphasis supplied.)
16.Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202 (2001) citing Obosa v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 9.
17.Rollo, p. 22.
18.69 years and 7 months old upon the filing of his petition.
19.Manifestation dated November 25, 2009; rollo, pp. 327-328.