1. Alawi vs.

Alauya (268 SCRA 628, February 24, 1997)

FACTS: Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company.

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the
words, "Free Postage - PD 26

Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation
of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the
rate of P4,338.00 a month.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on
the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary.

He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court.

SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my
will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the
letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD
26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic).

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a
mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District
Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution
was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred
that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the
Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a
scion of a Royal Family . . ."

ISSUES:
1. Was Alauya of malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith?
2. Was Alauya correct or justified in using the prefix Attorney for being a Shari’ah Bar
passer?
3. Did Alauya abuse his franking privilege?

HELD:
1. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
public safety and public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
 characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the
respect of the public for the judiciary."

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed
— however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a
right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and
an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for
most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at
all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.

2. No.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, "
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.
His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.

3. No. Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 26 October 21, 1972

 (1) Judges of the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Court of Industrial Relations,
Military Tribunals and City and Municipal Courts, may transmit in the mail, free of
charge, all official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of
judicial proceedings.
(2) The envelope or wrapper of the privileged mail matter shall bear on the left upper
corner the name, official designation and station of the official sending such mail matter
and on the right upper corner, the words: "Private or unauthorized use to avoid payment
of postage is penalized by fine or imprisonment or both".

Respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively

intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.