Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41107 February 28, 1979

AMANDA L. VDA. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELO ABAGA MARGARITA D. JOSE, MARGARITA D, JOSE,
QUIRINO D, JOSE, TEOFILO D. JOSE, ET AL. respondents.

Angel C Ungson Jr. for petitioner.

Juan J. de Dios and Simplicio M. Sevilleja for private respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari king to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R.
No. 47331-R entitled "Amanda L. Vda. de dela Cruz, et al, plaintiffs-appellees, versus Marcelo
Abaga Margarita D. Jose, et al., defendants." The questioned decision ordered the setting aside of
the decision rendered by the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 115-TP-59 and 116-TP-
59 and proceedings subsequent thereto insofar as it affected the deceased defendant Felix Jose or
his heirs, the private respondents in this petition.

As narrated by the Court of Appeals in its decision, it appears that plaintiffs (herein petitioners) filed
an action for ejectment and collection of unpaid rentals against Felix Jose and 114 other tenants on
November 23, 1959 in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Tayug, Pangasinan. Their complaint alleged
that Felix Jose is a tenant over a 4.5 ha. landholding in plaintiffs' hacienda in Tayug Pangasinan,
paying a fixed rental of 850 kilos of palay per hectare per agricultural year, that he failed to pay in full
his rentals and despite plaintiffs' repeated demands, Felix Jose to vacate the land-holding and to pay
his obligation.   In a join answer through their counsel Atty. Fausto G. Cabotaje, defendant Felix Jose
1

and his 114 co-defendants denied the material averments of the complaint, alleging payment of all
the rentals of their respective landholdings. Thereafter, trial was commenced. However, as found by
the Court of Appeals, "before termination thereof, or on June 5, 1961, Felix Jose died at the Eastern
Pangasinan Provincial General Hospital in Tayug, Pangasinan (Record, Vol. 1, p. 509). It appears
that Jose's demise, no substitution of defendant was effected.  2

Then on March 29, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment against Felix Jose together with the other
defendants holding him liable to plaintiffs for 6,432 kilos of palay as unpaid rentals. Some of his co-
defendants then brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari where it was
docketed as G. R. No. L-19930-19935. However, the petition was dismissed on November 30, 1962
due to the petitioners' failure to file their brief (Appellee's Brief, pp. 2-8). Thereafter, on plaintiffs'
motion, the Court of Agrarian Relations issued an order of execution (Appendix B of Appellant's
Brief, pp. 54-60). On May 3, 1963, a writ of execution to effect ejectment was entered (Appendix C,
Appellants' Brief, pp. 60-69). To satisfy the award of damages under the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, the conjugal properties of the deceased Felix Jose and his wife were sold at
public auction. A certificate of sale dated July 31, 1969 was later issued in favor of plaintiff Amanda
L. Vda. de dela Cruz as highest bidder. The sheriff's final deed of sale followed on August 17, 1970.

On October 27, 1970, the heirs of the deceased defendant, through their new counsel, Atty. Juan V.
Landingin, filed a motion to substitute the deceased and to set aside as null and void the decisions,
orders, writ of execution and sale at public auction made and entered against the latter. The trial
court allowed the substitution "for the purposes of whatever proceedings may still be allowed in this
case" (p. 23, rollo) but denied the motion to set aside the decision, orders, writ of execution and the
public auction sale. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The substituted defendants
then appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising mainly the question of the validity of the lower court's
decision on the ground that despite it's awareness of the death of said defendant, no substitution
was ordered before decision was rendered on March 29, 1962.

The Court of Appeals found the appeal meritorious. Against its decision, a motion for reconsideration
was filed but was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, alleging mainly that the Court
of Appeals erred: 3

1. in entertaining an appeal from the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations, in

reversing the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations of March 29, 1962, setting
aside the same and the auction sale of July 2, 1969, the certificate of sale dated July
31, 1969, and the final deed of sale of August 17, 1979," with respect to Felix Jose,
considering that a period of more than eight (8) years had elapsed from the rendition
of the decision of the trial court to the filing of the motion for substitution:

2. in not considering the decision of the Supreme Court in cases G.R. Nos. L-19930-
19935 as having the effect of res judicata, based not only on the general application
of the Rule but on the basis of the agreement of the parties before the Court of
Agrarian Relations that the cases be heard jointly and one decision for all the cases
is sufficient;

3. in finding that the trial was still going on and not yet terminated when Felix Jose
died on June 5, 1961, and that the continuance of the trial after the death of
defendant, without each party having been substituted in accordance with the
aforesaid Rule amounts to lack of jurisdiction.

To begin with, the Court of Appeals found that the defendant Felix Jose died before the termination
of the trial, contrary to petitioner's claim that when d defendant died, the trial was already terminated
(p. 11, rollo) and hence, there was no denial of due process. Whether defendant died before or after
termination of trial is not all that important because one thing is certain; that he died before the
rendition of judgment. This fact was known to the judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 48-49), who in his decision placed the word "dead" in parenthesis beside the
name of Felix Jose (Appendix A, Appellants' Brief, p. 49). The Court of Appeals took this into
consideration when it held that the decision of said court was a "patent nullity" insofar as Felix Jose
was concerned. As stated by the Appellate Court, no substitution of the deceased was ordered by
the trial court, in disregard of the provisions of Rule 3, Sec. 17, Rules of Court which reed thus:

SEC. 17. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty
(30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to
appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified
 by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or a administrator and the court may be appoint guardian
ad litem for the minor heirs.

In Caseñas vs. Resales (19 SCRA 466). Caisip vs. Cabangon (109 Phil. 154) and Bonilla vs.
Barcena (71 SCRA 495), this Court held that in case of the death of a party and due notice is given
to the trial court, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative of the deceased to appear
for him in the manner outlined in the aforementioned Rule. Considering that the complaint was for
ejectment of the tenants, (defendant, being one of them) the provisions of said section and the
rulings in the aforementioned cases are indeed applicable to the present case, where the action or
the claim is not extinguished on account of Section 9, RA 1199, (now RA 6389, Code of Agrarian
Reforms) which provides in effect that in case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural
lessee, the leasehold shall continue between the lessor and the persons enumerated in said Section
which include the descendants of the deceased. But as noted by the Court of Appeal:   it appears
4

that no legal representative was ever summoned to appear in court; that no legal representative
appeared to be substituted, and that plaintiffs did not procures the appointment of such legal
representatives." As a result the "continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party
thereto dies, without such having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to
lacks of jurisdiction."  The same ruling was given in the earlier case of Ferreria vs. Gonzales (104
5

Phil 143), where this Court set aside the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations because "no
valid substitution was effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for
the purpose of making the decision binding upon her either personally or as legal representative of
the estate of her deceased mother." Assuming that jurisdiction was ever acquired at the outset over
defendant Felix Jose, it was:

inevitably impaired on the death of the protestee pending the proceedings below
such that unless and until a legal representative is for him duly named and within the
jurisdiction of the trial court, no adjudication in the cause could have been accorded
any validity or binding effect on any party, in representation of the deceased, without
trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court which is the very essence of
the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process.  6

The need therefore for substitution is based on the right of a party to due process. Summing up then
the previous ruling of this Court in the afore-cited cases, and noting that Rule 3, Sec. 17, Revised
Rules of Court uses the word "shall", one infers that substitution is indeed a mandatory requirement
in actions surviving the deceased. It has been held that in "statutes relating to procedure ... every act
which is jurisdictional or of the essence of the proceedings or is prescribed for the protection or
benefit of the party affected, is mandatory."   The petitioners, however, take the contrary view,
7

pointing to the case of Lota vs. Tolentino (90 Phil. 831) to argue that the said section involves only a
procedural requirement (Petitioners' Brief, p. 16). A reading of the said case shows that the nature of
the action filed by the plaintiff was purely personal since it was for accounting and liquidation of the
partnership, and on defendant's death, the claim was extinguished.

In any case, substitution should be ordered even after judgment has been rendered since
proceedings may still be taken as was done in this case — like an execution; and the legal
representative must appear to protect the interests of the deceased and in all such proceedings.   In 8

this instance, however, the Court of Appeals found that there is "no showing that the appellant's
were notified of the decision dated March 29, 1962 or of the auction sale held thereafter.   Petitioners
9

take issue with the Appellate Court on this point. But since the present petition is for review on
certiorari, where "only questions of law may be raised," (R. 45, Sec. 2, Revised Rules of Court), this
Court has held in a number of cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are; in general,
final and conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737; Ramirez Te. Corp. vs. Bank of
America, 32 SCRA 191; Castro vs. Tamporong 78 Phil. 804 to name a few), except when:  10

1 the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

2 the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3 there is a grave abuse of discretion

4 the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5 the Court of Appeals is making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee.

None of the above exceptions however applies to the case at bar, so there is no reason to disturb
the findings of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners also contend that since two of the private respondents were co-respondents with their
father in the complaint before the Court of Agrarian Relations, petitioners "believe that they were
supposed to have represented their father in the appeal to the Supreme Court. "Likewise, they
maintain that the decision of the Court in the said appeal operated as res judicata on all matters
which might have been litigated and decided before the judgment became final (pp. 79, rollo).

With reference to the first objection, it is worthy to note that the herein private respondents were
sued in their individual capacity for their separate and respective obligations. The dismiss of he
appeal by the Supreme Court for failure of the petitioners to file their brief or memorandum within the
prescribed period could not, therefore, bar the heirs of the deceased from questioning all the
proceedings particularly if the fact is considered that there could not have been a final judgment on
the merits since in the first place, jurisdiction over the deceased defendant was lacking in the lower
court, as heretofore shown. Accordingly there can be no res judicata as contended by petitioner.  11

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We hereby affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.