2022.09.16 - Pendarvis Complaint Filed

2:22-cv-03142-BHH-MHC Date Filed 09/16/22 Entry Number 1 Page 1 of 92
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
John Trenton Pendarvis, ) 2:22−cv−03142-BHH-MHC

C/A No: _____________________
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs.
)
) COMPLAINT
Alan M. Wilson, Mark A. Keel, Hugh E.
) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq.)
Weathers, L.C. Knight, W. Jeffrey Young,
) (Jury Trial Demanded)
Robert D. Cook, Emory Smith, Jr., Joanne Lee,
)
David S. Jones, T. Stephen Lynch, Harley L.
)
Kirkland, Wesley Vorberger, Robert Kittle,
)
Adam L. Whitsett, Frank O’Neal, Jason Wells,
)
Glenn Wood, John Neale, Rhett Holden, Alden
)
G. Terry, Derek M. Underwood, J. Clint Leach,
)
Aaron Wood, John Stokes, Vanessa Elsalah,
)
Brittany Jeffcoat, Eva Moore, Ray Dixson,
)
Frank Thompson, Robert Krutak, Jonathan
)
Calore, Charlie Scrubbs, and Wayne Eaddy,
)
)
Defendants.
Plaintiff named herein, complaining of Defendants herein, would respectfully show unto this
Honorable Court and allege as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF CASE & PARTIES
1. Plaintiff John Trenton Pendarvis (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “Plaintiff,” “Pendarvis,”
or as “Trent”) is a citizen and resident of Dorchester County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, Trent was a 4th generation farmer, cultivating crops on family farmlands
in Dorchester County, South Carolina.
2. Pendarvis brings this lawsuit alleging violations of his constitutional rights by the defendants
in their individual capacities pursuant 42 U.S.C. §§1983 et seq., for the defendants’ conduct,
individually and in concert with others, under color of state law in falsely arresting Pendarvis,
maliciously prosecuting him, unlawful taking and destruction of his property, depriving him
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of due process and conspiring to do the same, then further conspiring to obstruct justice and
deny Pendarvis due process through intentional and willful discovery abuse in state court
actions. This conduct includes willfully attempting to mislead a state court judge to authorize
their seizure and destruction action, conspiring to seize and destroy the Pendarvis’ property
after that state court judge had refused to authorize such, then denying that the state court judge
had refused to authorize the seizure and destruction of the Pendarvis’ property, and the willful
and intentional obstruction of justice through discovery misconduct in both the criminal and
state court cases arising from these matters.
3. Pendarvis is informed and believes that all defendants holding constitutional offices, Class I
law enforcement positions and/or licenses to practice law had sworn duties to preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States. Those sworn duties included preserving,
protecting and defending Pendarvis’ Constitutional rights by refusing to act in such ways that
would violate his constitutional rights and/or speaking out and stopping others from acting in
such ways that would violate his constitutional rights and/or supervising those
agents/employees under their supervision in such a way to prohibit them from violating his
constitutional rights.
AGENCY HEAD DEFENDANTS
4. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Alan M. Wilson (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“WILSON”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, WILSON was the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina and
as such was the head of and supervisory agent of the South Carolina Attorney General’s Office
(SCAG). WILSON is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for
his conduct under the color of state law as the head of and supervisory agent/employee for
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SCAG and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights and/or to cover-up the constitutional violations against the Plaintiff.
Specifically, but not limited to, WILSON acted independently and/or conspired with the other
defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, cover-up the fact that his and/or the
other defendants’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or denied the
Plaintiff due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, SCAG, escape
liability.
5. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Mark A. Keel (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“KEEL”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, KEEL was the Chief for the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED)
and as such was the head of and supervisory agent of SLED. KEEL is being sued in his
individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law
as the head of and supervisory agent/employee for SLED and his efforts to act independently
and/or conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or to cover-up the
constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, KEEL acted
independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, cover-up the fact that his and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated
the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help
the other defendants and his agency, SLED, escape liability.
6. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Hugh E. Weathers (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“Weathers”), is a citizen and resident of Orangeburg County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, Weathers was the Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of
Agriculture (DAG) and as such was the head of and supervisory agent of DAG. WEATHERS
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is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under
the color of state law as the head of and supervisory agent/employee for DAG and his efforts
to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
and/or to cover-up the constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not
limited to, WEATHERS acted independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to
KEEL acting independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, cover-up the fact that his and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated
the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help
the other defendants and his agency, DAG, escape liability.
7. Plaintiff is informed and believes that L.C. Knight (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“KNIGHT”), is a citizen and resident of Dorchester County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, KNIGHT was the Sheriff for Dorchester County Sheriff’s Office
(DCSO) and as such was the head of and supervisory agent of DCSO. KNIGHT is being sued
in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of
state law as the head of and supervisory agent/employee for DCSO and his efforts to act
independently and/or conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or
to cover-up the constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to,
KNIGHT acted independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to violate the
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that his and/or the other defendants’
conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights and/or denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to
help the other defendants and his agency, DCSO, escape liability.
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SCAG DEFENDANTS
8. The following individual defendants listed in this section, along with WILSON, may
hereinafter collectively be referred to as “SCAG Defendants.”
9. Plaintiff is informed and believes that W. Jeffrey Young (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“YOUNG”), is a citizen and resident of Sumter County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, YOUNG was the Chief Deputy of the South Carolina Attorney General’s Office
(SCAG) and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of SCAG. YOUNG is being sued in
his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state
law as a supervisory agent/employee for SCAG and his efforts to act independently and/or
conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or to cover-up the
constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, YOUNG acted
constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that his and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated
the Plaintiff’s rights and/or denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help the other
defendants and his agency, SCAG, escape liability.
10. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Robert D. Cook (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“COOK”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, COOK was the Solicitor General (SG) and head of SCAG’s Solicitor General
Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of SCAG. COOK is being sued in his
as a supervisory agent/employee for SCAG and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire
with others to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or to cover-up the constitutional
violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, COOK acted independently
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and/or conspired with the other defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to
cover-up the fact that his and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights
and/or denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency,
SCAG, escape liability.
11. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Emory Smith, Jr. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“SMITH”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, SMITH was the Deputy Solicitor General (DSG) of SCAG’s Solicitor General
Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of SCAG. SMITH is being sued in his
as a supervisory agent/employee for SCAG and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire
violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, SMITH acted independently
SCAG, escape liability.
12. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Joanne Lee (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“LEE”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times relevant to
this action, LEE was the Administrative Coordinator (AC) with SCAG’s Solicitor General
Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of SCAG. LEE is being sued in her
individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for her conduct under the color of state
law as a supervisory agent/employee for SCAG and her efforts to act independently and/or
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constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, LEE acted
constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that her and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated
defendants and her agency, SCAG, escape liability.
13. Plaintiff is informed and believes that David S. Jones (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“JONES”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, JONES was an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) with SCAG’s Solicitor
General Division. JONES is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et
seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as an agent/employee for SCAG and his efforts
to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
and/or to cover-up the constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not
limited to, JONES acted independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to violate
the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that his and/or the other defendants’
help the other defendants and his agency, SCAG, escape liability.
14. Plaintiff is informed and believes that T. Stephen Lynch (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“LYNCH”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, LYNCH was the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) of SCAG’s Legal Services
Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of SCAG. LYNCH is being sued in
law as a supervisory agent/employee for SCAG and his efforts to act independently and/or
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constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, LYNCH acted
constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that his and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated
defendants and his agency, SCAG, escape liability.
15. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Harley L. Kirkland (hereinafter sometimes referred to
as “KIRKLAND”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, KIRKLAND was an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) with SCAG’s
Civil Litigation Division. KIRKLAND is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C.
§§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as an agent/employee for SCAG
and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s
Specifically, but not limited to, KIRKLAND acted independently and/or conspired with the
other defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that his
and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights and/or denied the Plaintiff
due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, SCAG, escape liability.
16. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Wesley Vorberger (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“VORBERGER”), is a citizen and resident of Greenville County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, VORBERGER was an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) with SCAG.
VORBERGER is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his
conduct under the color of state law as an agent/employee for SCAG and his efforts to act
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VORBERGER acted independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to violate the
help the other defendants and his agency, SCAG, escape liability.
17. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Robert Kittle (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“KITTLE”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, KITTLE was the Communications Director of SCAG and as such was a
supervisory agent/employee of SCAG. KITTLE is being sued in his individual capacity under
42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory
agent/employee for SCAG and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to
violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or to cover-up the constitutional violations
against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, KITTLE acted independently and/or
conspired with the other defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to cover-up
the fact that his and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights and/or
denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, SCAG,
escape liability.
SLED DEFENDANTS
18. The following individual defendants listed in this section, along with KEEL, may hereinafter
collectively be referred to as “SLED Defendants.”
19. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Adam L. Whitsett (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“WHITSETT”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, WHITSETT was General Counsel for SLED and as such was a
supervisory agent/employee of SLED. WHITSETT is being sued in his individual capacity
9
under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory
agent/employee for SLED and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to
against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, WHITSETT acted independently and/or
denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, SLED,
escape liability.
20. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Frank O’Neal (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“ONEAL”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, ONEAL was a Major for SLED’s Narcotics, Alcohol and Vice services and as
such was a supervisory agent/employee of SLED. ONEAL is being sued in his individual
capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as a
supervisory agent/employee for SLED and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with
others to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or to cover-up the constitutional
violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, ONEAL acted independently
SLED, escape liability.
21. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Jason Wells (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“WELLS”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, WELLS was a Captain for SLED’s Narcotics division and as such was a
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supervisory agent/employee of SLED. WELLS is being sued in his individual capacity under
42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory
against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, WELLS acted independently and/or
escape liability.
22. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Glenn Wood (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“WOOD”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, WOOD was a Lieutenant for SLED and as such was a supervisory
agent/employee of SLED. WOOD is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C.
§§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory agent/employee
for SLED and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or to cover-up the constitutional violations against the
Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, WOOD acted independently and/or conspired with
the other defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that his
due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, SLED, escape liability.
23. Plaintiff is informed and believes that John Neale (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“NEALE”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, NEALE was an agent/employee of SLED. NEALE is being sued in his individual
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capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as an
against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, NEALE acted independently and/or
escape liability.
24. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Rhett Holden (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“HOLDEN”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, HOLDEN was an agent/employee of SLED. HOLDEN is being sued in
law as an agent/employee for SLED and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with
violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, HOLDEN acted independently
SLED, escape liability.
DAG DEFENDANTS
25. The following individual defendants listed in this section, along with WEATHERS, may
hereinafter collectively be referred to as “DAG Defendants.”
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26. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Alden G. Terry (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“TERRY”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, TERRY was General Counsel for DAG and as such was a supervisory
agent/employee of DAG. TERRY is being sued in her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C.
§§1983, et seq, for her conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory agent/employee
for DAG and her efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the
Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, TERRY acted independently and/or conspired with
the other defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that her
due process, attempting to help the other defendants and her agency, DAG, escape liability.
27. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Derek M. Underwood (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as “UNDERWOOD”), is a citizen and resident of Newberry County, South Carolina. At all
times relevant to this action, UNDERWOOD was the Assistant Commissioner of DAG’s
Consumer Protection Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of DAG.
UNDERWOOD is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for
his conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory agent/employee for DAG and his
efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights and/or to cover-up the constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not
limited to, UNDERWOOD acted independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to
violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that his and/or the other
defendants’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights and/or denied the Plaintiff due process,
attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, DAG, escape liability.
13
28. Plaintiff is informed and believes that J. Clint Leach (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“LEACH”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, LEACH was the Assistant Commissioner of DAG’s External Affairs &
Economic Development Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of DAG.
LEACH is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct
under the color of state law as a supervisory agent/employee for DAG and his efforts to act
LEACH acted independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to violate the
help the other defendants and his agency, DAG, escape liability.
29. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Aaron Wood (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“WOOD”), is a citizen and resident of McCormick County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, WOOD was the Assistant Commissioner of DAG’s Agency Operations
Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of DAG. WOOD is being sued in his
as a supervisory agent/employee for DAG and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire
violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, WOOD acted independently
14
DAG, escape liability.
30. Plaintiff is informed and believes that John Stokes (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“STOKES”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, STOKES was a Program Manager of DAG’s Consumer Protection
Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of DAG. STOKES is being sued in his
as a supervisory agent/employee for DAG and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire
violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, STOKES acted independently
DAG, escape liability.
31. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Vanessa Elsalah (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“ELSALAH”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, ELSALAH was the Coordinator of DAG’s Hemp Program and as such
was a supervisory agent/employee of DAG. ELSALAH is being sued in her individual capacity
under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for her conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory
agent/employee for DAG and her efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to
against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, ELSALAH acted independently and/or
15
the fact that her and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights and/or
denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help the other defendants and her agency, DAG,
escape liability.
32. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Brittany Jeffcoat (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“JEFFCOAT”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, JEFFCOAT was the Coordinator in DAG’s Consumer Protection
Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of DAG. JEFFCOAT is being sued in
her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for her conduct under the color of state
law as a supervisory agent/employee for DAG and her efforts to act independently and/or
constitutional violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, JEFFCOAT acted
constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that her and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated
defendants and her agency, DAG, escape liability.
33. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Eva Moore (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“MOORE”), is a citizen and resident of Richland County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, MOORE was the Communications Director for DAG and as such was a
supervisory agent/employee of DAG. MOORE is being sued in her individual capacity under
42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for her conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory
agent/employee for DAG and her efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to
against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, MOORE acted independently and/or
16
the fact that her and/or the other defendants’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights and/or
denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help the other defendants and her agency, DAG,
escape liability.
DCSO DEFENDANTS
34. The following individual defendants listed in this section, along with KNIGHT, may
hereinafter collectively be referred to as “DCSO Defendants.”
35. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Ray Dixson (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“DIXSON”), is a citizen and resident of Dorchester County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, DIXSON was a Captain for DCSO and as such was a supervisory
agent/employee of DCSO. DIXSON is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C.
§§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory agent/employee
for DCSO and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the
Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, DIXSON acted independently and/or conspired with
due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, DCSO, escape liability.
36. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Frank Thompson (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“THOMPSON”), is a citizen and resident of Berkeley County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, THOMPSON was a Lieutenant for DCSO and as such was a supervisory
agent/employee of DCSO. THOMPSON is being sued in his individual capacity under 42
U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as a supervisory
17
agent/employee for DCSO and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to
against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, THOMPSON acted independently and/or
denied the Plaintiff due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, DCSO,
escape liability.
37. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Robert Krutak (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“KRUTAK”), is a citizen and resident of Berkeley County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, KRUTAK was a Deputy Sheriff for DCSO. KRUTAK is being sued in
law as an agent/employee for DCSO and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with
violations against the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, KRUTAK acted independently
DCSO, escape liability.
SC FORESTRY DEFENDANTS
38. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Jonathan Calore (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“CALORE”), is a citizen and resident of Lexington County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, CALORE was a supervisory agent/employee with the S.C. Forestry
Commission (hereinafter “FORESTRY”), serving as the “Assistant LE Chief.” CALORE is
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being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the
color of state law as a supervisory agent/employee for FORESTRY and his efforts to act
CALORE acted independently and/or conspired with the other defendants to violate the
help the other defendants and his agency, FORESTRY, escape liability.
39. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Charlie Scrubbs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“Scrubbs”), is a citizen and resident of Charleston County, South Carolina. At all times relevant
to this action, Scrubbs was an agent/employee with the S.C. Forestry Commission (hereinafter
“FORESTRY”). SCRUBBS is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §§1983,
et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as an agent/employee for FORESTRY and
his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the Plaintiff’s
Specifically, but not limited to, SCRUBBS acted independently and/or conspired with the other
defendants to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, to cover-up the fact that his and/or
the other defendants’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights and/or denied the Plaintiff due
process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, FORESTRY, escape liability.
40. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Wayne Eaddy (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
“EADDY”), is a citizen and resident of Clarendon County, South Carolina. At all times
relevant to this action, Scrubbs was an agent/employee with the S.C. Forestry Commission
(hereinafter “FORESTRY”). EADDY is being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C.
19
§§1983, et seq, for his conduct under the color of state law as an agent/employee for
FORESTRY and his efforts to act independently and/or conspire with others to violate the
Plaintiff. Specifically, but not limited to, EADDY acted independently and/or conspired with
due process, attempting to help the other defendants and his agency, FORESTRY, escape
liability.
NATURE OF ACTION
41. This is an action for compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs and all
other available damages proximately caused by the Defendants’ deliberate indifference of and
violation of the Plaintiff’s established constitutional rights.
42. Plaintiff’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§1983, et seq., and the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under the
common law, the statutory law, and the Constitution of the State of South Carolina, against the
Defendants. The Plaintiff’s claims would specifically include, but not be limited to, claims
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, §1985, §1986 & §1988(b).
43. During the time in question, the Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights were well established and well
known to the Defendants, including and not limited to, the Plaintiff’s right to bodily integrity,
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, right to Due Process, and all other
constitutional established and recognized as arising from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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44. During the time in question , the Defendants had actual and/or constructive knowledge that
their conduct posed an unreasonable risk of Constitutional injury to the Plaintiff and their
responses with that knowledge were subjectively and objectively unreasonable regarding the
offense(s) as alleged herein; and there is a causal link between their actions and the
Constitutional injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.
JURISDICTION/VENUE
45. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court by 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1367 (a), (b),
(c), (d), and 1343, and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201 and 2202.
46. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (2) & (3).
FACTUAL HISTORY AND TIMELINE

The Hemp Farming Act and legalization in South Carolina
47. In late December 2018, the United States Congress passed a Federal Farm Bill that legalized
the production of hemp, which is generally legally defined as the cannabis sativa L plant with
THC levels below federally defined levels.
48. Following the passage of the Federal Farm Bill legalizing the production of hemp, the South
Carolina General Assembly followed suit, with Gov. Henry McMaster signing the South
Carolina Hemp Farming Act into law on or about March 28, 2019.
49. South Carolina’s Hemp Farming Act (“the Act”) is contained within S.C. Code §46-55-10 et
seq. In passing the Act, the South Carolina General Assembly specifically found that “hemp
has the potential to provide a cash crop for South Carolina’s farmers with broad commercial
application that will enhance the economic diversity and stability of our state’s agricultural
industry.” See 2014 Act No.216, Section 1, findings.
50. In passing the Act, the South Carolina General Assembly provided statutory safeguards to
protect South Carolina farmers. Specifically, the General Assembly codified these safeguards
21
via S.C. Code §46-55-40, Corrective Action Plans. That statute provides that South Carolina
farmers “shall” be allowed “to conduct a corrective action plan if the commissioner, or his
designee, determines that the licensee negligently violated” the Act.
51. Included in S.C. Code §46-55-40, are the following specific examples of violations for which
a South Carolina farmer licensed under the Act shall be allowed to conduct a corrective action
plan:
a. Failing to provide a legal description and global positioning coordinates

of the land on which the licensee cultivates hemp;
b. Failing to obtain a proper license or other required authorization from

the commissioner; or,
c. Producing Cannabis sativa L with more than the federally defined THC
level for hemp.
See S.C. Code §46-55-40(A)(1)(a)(b)and(c).
52. The South Carolina General Assembly further safeguarded South Carolina farmers by
specifically directing that the corrective plans described in S.C. Code §46-55-40 were “the
sole remedy for negligent violations of this chapter, regulations promulgated pursuant to
this chapter, or the state plan. A licensee who violates a provision of this chapter, regulations
promulgated pursuant to this chapter, or the state plan shall not be subject to any criminal or
civil enforcement action.” S.C. Code §46-55-40(A)(3), emphasis added.
53. The South Carolina General Assembly directed WEATHERS and his agency to submit a “state
plan” to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) within sixty (60) days of the
effective date of the Act that proposed to regulate hemp production and was required to include
“a procedure to comply with the enforcement outlined in this act.” See 2019 Act No.14, Section
2(A)(4).
22
54. Pendarvis is informed and believes WEATHERS did not timely submit a “state plan” as
required by the Act, no “state plan” was submitted by WEATHERS prior to the administrative
and enforcement actions taken against him as detailed in this complaint, leading to state plan
for South Carolina not being approved by USDA until March 31, 2020:
55. Both WILSON and KEEL and their agents/employees and agencies have been vehemently and
publicly opposed to cannabis legalization efforts in South Carolina. This opposition is
exemplified by a joint press conference featuring WILSON and KEEL in January 2019 at
which WILSON referred to cannabis as “the most dangerous drug”:
23
and through a June 14, 2021, letter KEEL sent to leadership of South Carolina’s Behavioral
Health Services Association (BHSA) and Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse
Services (DAODAS) voicing his “disappointment” they were not opposing legalization of
medical marijuana in South Carolina by stating:
56. Pendarvis is informed and believes that ONEAL is a frequent speaker on behalf of KEEL and
SLED at various public and private functions with a presenter bio that states he “regularly
speaks and educates civic and community groups on the dangers of marijuana legalization and
the collateral damage it causes our country.”
The Plaintiff and the Hemp Farming Program
57. Subsequent to the passage of the Act and its signing into law, the DAG Defendants actively
promoted their Hemp Farming Program, going so far as to publish a logo for the South Carolina
program:
58. WEATHERS publicly pushed the Hemp Farming Program, stating in a press release on June
28, 2019, that “More hemp farmers means more opportunities to learn about hemp’s long-term
potential for South Carolina agriculture. Agribusiness is South Carolina’s largest industry, and
we welcome the chance to push it in new directions.”
59. TERRY and ENSALAH both solicit speaking engagements as “speakers” listed on U.S. Hemp
expos website.
24
60. With signing into law of the Act, and through promotion by DAG Defendants, South Carolina
went from approximately 256 acres of hemp being cultivated in 2018 to approximately 3,300
acres in 2019, with MOORE publicly stating on January 31, 2020 that the program had “grown
from 20 farmers in 2018 to 114 permitted farmers and 43 processors at the end of the 2019
season” and later announcing on April 2, 2020 that “some 350 people applied to farm hemp in
South Carolina this year.”
61. Pendarvis is a fourth-generation farmer, having begun farming on family farmlands in 1997,
farming over 2000 acres, primarily corn, cotton, peanuts and soybeans.
62. Pendarvis bought in to the DAG Defendants’ promotion of hemp as a potential cash crop and
applied to participate in the DAG Defendants hemp farming program, paying a $500 Dollar
application fee and being issued License #1992 on or about May 1, 2019:
63. To obtain the license described above, Pendarvis was required to enter in to a “Hemp Farming
Program Participation Agreement” (hereinafter “Agreement”).
64. Any South Carolina farmer wishing to grow hemp had to enter in to the Agreement in order to
be issued a hemp grower license.
65. Section VIII of the Agreement, titled “Plant Destruction,” stated:
25
a. Permitted Grower acknowledges and consents to the forfeiture or destruction,

without compensation, of hemp material:
i. Found to have a measured delta-9 THC content of more than 0.3 percent
on a dry weight basis;
ii. Bearing off-label pesticide resideues (or believed by [DAG] to have had
pesticides applied off-label), regardless of the source or cause of
contamination; and
iii. Growing in an area that is not licensed by [DAG].
b. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Permitted Grower or processors may retain any

hemp that tests between three-tenths of one percent to one percent delta-9
tetrahydrocannabinol on a dry weight basis and recondition the hemp product
by grinding it with the stem and stalk. Hemp product must not exceed three-
tenths of one percent delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol.
66. The language of Section VIII quoted verbatim above is directly contradicted by the plain
language of the statute, which specifically directs that for two of the three listed conditions for
destruction from VIII, the corrective action plans as required under S.C. Code §46-55-40 are
the sole remedy.
67. Notably, there is no language in the Agreement outlining the procedure by which DAG will
enact enforcement, as was required in the Act. See 2019 Act No.14, Sec.2(A)(4). Specifically,
despite the WEATHERS having sworn a duty to uphold and protect the Constitution of the
United States and the State of South Carolina, nowhere in the Agreement is there any language
explaining how a finding by DAG that a violation of the Act has occurred can be challenged,
despite South Carolina’s Constitution specifically enshrining that due process right:
No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision of an

administrative agency affecting private rights except on due notice and an
opportunity to be heard; nor shall he be subject to the same person for both
prosecution and adjudication; nor shall he be deprived of liberty or property
unless by a mode of procedure described by the General Assembly, and he shall
have in all such instances the right to judicial review.
South Carolina Constitution, Art.I, Sec.22, emphasis added.
26
68. Pendarvis is informed and believes that the SC General Assembly’s requirements that certain
violations of the Act be afforded corrective action plans, is based on the inevitable variable
conditions encountered with farming, an occupation subject to unforeseen, unpredictable, and
uncontrollable environmental and market conditions.
Plaintiff’s Hemp Crops
69. Unfortunately, upon receiving his license, Pendarvis was confronted with the fickle nature of
farming. The very month Pendarvis was awarded his license, South Carolina publicly
acknowledged his farmlands were facing drought conditions:
70. These drought conditions were so extreme, that they ultimately led to the USDA designating
six (6) South Carolina counties as natural disaster areas, with WEATHERS publicly
acknowledging on October 31, 2019 the “flash drought” that had struck many South Carolina
farmers and warning “we may be seeing its effects for a long time.”
71. Despite the tough hand Mother Nature dealt farmers that year, Pendarvis was able to
successfully cultivate a healthy hemp crop:
27
Allegations of Plaintiff Violating Hemp Agreement
72. On July 30, 2019, ENSALAH visited Pendarvis’ Dorchester County property for a farm visit
pursuant to Pendarvis’ participation in the Hemp Farming Program. While ENSALAH was on
site, it was discovered that Pendarvis’ had planted his Dorchester County crop on coordinates
other than those that had been submitted to DAG. Pendarvis is informed and believes he sent
the correct coordinates via a text message during or immediately following ENSALAH’s visit.
73. On July 31, 2019, at 2:52 p.m., UNDERWOOD sent Pendarvis an email, courtesy copying
TERRY, titled “Narrative of Hemp Growing,” marking the importance as “high.”
28
74. Pendarvis responded back that afternoon, with the following email:
75. Apparently, that same day, UNDERWOOD spoke with Pendarvis on the phone and told
Pendarvis that he would need to submit an official amendment form for review.
76. The next day, Thursday, August 1, 2019, Pendarvis submitted a “Hemp Farming Program
Acreage Amendment Application”:
77. Via email dated that same Thursday, August 1, 2019, at 11:58 a.m., and which was courtesy
copied to ELSALAH and TERRY, UNDERWOOD told Pendarvis his case would be reviewed
“with our Attorney to determine if a willful violation of the grower’s agreement is present”
and “once we make a final decision, we will be in touch”:
29
78. Four days later, UNDERWOOD sent the following August 5 th email to WELLS, courtesy
copying ELSALAH, TERRY and ONEAL, at 11:51 a.m.:
79. That first August 5th email was immediately followed by a 12:30 p.m. email from
UNDERWOOD, sent to WELLS and ONEAL, courtesy copied to TERRY and ELSALAH,
with the subject heading “Memo to Enact Enforcement,” importance labeled “high,” and
containing the attachment “Memo to SLED 8-5-2019 Pendarvis.pdf”:
30
80. The memo attached to the August 5, 2019, email sent at 12:30 p.m. was:
81. Apparently, the August 5th memo went through a revision process, leading to another email
being sent by UNDERWOOD on August 6, 2019, at 9:45 a.m., to WELLS and courtesy copied
to ONEAL, TERRY and WEATHERS. This email is titled “Letter to enact enforcement
Pendarvis Hemp,” was designated “high” importance and had attached “SCDA SLED Memo
8-6-2019 Pendarvis.pdf,” wherein UNDERWOOD informed WELLS that he was attaching
“the memo regarding willful actions by Mr. Trent Pendarvis (permit #1992)”:
31
82. The memo attached to the August 6, 2019, email described above appears to be dated August
5th (despite being labeled as 8-6-2019 in the attachment line of the email) and has been edited
to include slightly different language and more information regarding Pendarvis’ alleged
“willful violation” of the Hemp Farming Program:
32
83. Within two (2) days, UNDERWOOD was asking the SLED Defendants for an update, sending
this August 8, 2019, 11:48 a.m. email, importance designated “high,” to WELLS and courtesy
copying ONEAL, TERRY, WEATHERS and ELSALAH:
84. ONEAL responded, replying that “we are having difficulty in what to address with so many
gray areas concerning enforcement…We are having to get AG opinions along the way and
the last thing we want to do is an action that will be perceived in a negative light by the
media or general assembly”:
85. Completely absent from the August 8th email above are any concerns about the due process
rights of Pendarvis. The SLED Defendants concerns are that they may be perceived “in a
negative light by the media or the general assembly,” despite the specific constitutional
rights implicated in any enforcement action and the SLED Defendants having taken oaths to
protect, preserve and defend those constitutional rights.
33
86. UNDERWOOD replied all to that email from ONEAL, letting the SLED Defendants know
DAG would not approve Pendarvis’ amendment application so there was no “deadline” to act
and to let him know “what we need to do to help.”
August 8, 2019 SCAG Opinion
87. The SCAG opinion ONEAL’s August 8th email referenced, was requested on behalf of the
SLED Defendants by WHITSETT via an August 6, 2019, email to JONES, seeking “specific
guidance…on the proper procedure in this matter”:
88. That email was forwarded by JONES to COOK the next morning:
34
…with Cook promptly replying about how the Act is an “ultra murky” statute, that gives “no
direction whatever to law enforcement”:
89. JONES later provides COOK with draft language via August 7, 2019, 5:10 p.m. email, noting
that “all the constitutional stuff is ripped from a 2017 opinion I wrote on seizures” and that “if
we want to talk about due process, there it is”:
90. On August 8, 2019, after getting COOK’s approval that it was “good to go,” JONES forwards
the final draft to LEE, directing her to tag it as “Constitutional law” with the description “An
35
opinion on the appropriate procedure to pursue enforcement of the Hemp Farming Act
with respect to hemp grown in violation of the Act”:
91. The opinion finalized by JONES and COOK on behalf of SCAG on August 8, 2019 (hereinafter
“August 8th Op.”) was addressed to WHITSETT and specifically provided the “specific
guidance” WHITSETT had requested “on the proper procedure” when enforcing a “willful
violation” of the hemp farming program.
92. The specific guidance on proper procedure contained within the August 8 th Op. was
specifically, but not limited to:
36
93. In addition to the “specific guidance” on “proper procedure” for enforcing willful violations
of the hemp farming program above, the August 8th Op. concluded by pointing out the DAG
Defendants need to promulgate regulations to address some of the numerous issues that had
been raised:
37
94. Pendarvis is informed and believes that the regulations suggested by SCAG should have been
covered within the “state plan” WEATHERS had been tasked by the General Assembly to
promulgate and submit to the USDA within sixty (60) days of the Act’s effective date (as
described above), which WEATHERS and the DAG Defendants failed to do. This is evidenced
by the “state plan” which was ultimately submitted and approved after the actions taken by
the Defendants to arrest and destroy Pendarvis’ hemp crop containing an entire section on
“Enforcement,” detailing “Adjudicatory Proceedings” in which “the Commissioner shall
notify the Permittee of the alleged violation as well as an opportunity to respond therein, by
certified mail, prior to any scheduled hearing date” (see State Plan, Sec.17(1(b)); “no penalty
shall be assessed, nor may any permit be suspended or revoked by the Commissioner prior to
the holding on an adjudicatory hearing” (Sec.17(1(d)); requiring the adjudicatory hearing to be
conducted pursuant to the S.C. Administrative Procedures Act (Sec.17(1(e)); and providing an
appeals process (Sec.17(2)).
Pre-litigation Known Conduct After the August 8 th Op. leading to Arrest & Destruction
95. On August 28, 2019, while NEALE was at Pendarvis’ farm collecting samples, Pendarvis
informed NEALE that there were two additional acres he had used for his allotment in Marion
Co., subsequently emailing to the DAG Defendants a 2nd Acreage Amendment Application at
approximately 10:38 a.m. (the acreage leading to this 2nd amendment application hereinafter
referred to as “Marion Co. crop”), providing the following location:
38
96. On Thursday August 29, 2019 at 11:53 a.m., UNDERWOOD sent Pendarvis an email that was
courtesy copied to ELSALAH and TERRY.
97. The attachment to the Thursday August 29, 2019, email above, was the following memo:
39
98. According to a written statement that UNDERWOOD emailed to WELLS (never identified or
produced by the SLED Defendants in either of the state civil cases or the state criminal
prosecution), Pendarvis called UNDERWOOD “several times” over the weekend following
that Thursday, August 29, 2019, email, but UNDERWOOD “waited until first of the week to
return his call.” UNDERWOOD described that phone call as:
40
99. On September 6, 2019, despite the communications above, JEFFCOAT began emailing
Pendarvis asking him about “the two additional acres you wish to amend to your license”:
100. On September 10, 2019, UNDERWOOD joined the effort, emailing Pendarvis,
JEFFCOAT, ELSALAH and TERRY at 4:52 p.m.:
101. Less than five minutes later, JEFFCOAT sends yet another email to Pendarvis, again
courtesy copying UNDERWOOD, ELSALAH and TERRY:
41
102. The next day, September 11, 2019, TERRY emails Pendarvis, courtesy copying
UNDERWOOD, JEFFCOAT and ELSALAH and specifically states DAG is being asked to
obtain information by SLED:
103. Having received the conflicting communications described above, Pendarvis had already
responded to TERRY’s September 11th 10:35 a.m. email by resubmitting the 2nd Acreage
Amendment Application via email dated September 11, 2019, 8:12 a.m. and noting it was the
same application “sent on August 28th for Trent Pendarvis”:
and immediately following that email with:
42
104. Sometime on the morning of September 19, 2019 (presumably before 11:45 a.m.), NEALE
obtained Arrest Warrant 2019A1810300867 for a “Miscellaneous/General Sessions
Misdemeanor Offense where no punishment provided by statute” from Dorchester County
Magistrate Judge Ryan D. Templeton. The warranted was prepared by NEALE with
assistance/review from WOOD. The affidavit portion of that warrant referenced an “attached
affidavit.” That affidavit was executed by NEALE and describes the offense as “Unlawful
Cultivation of Hemp – 1st Offense (CDR CODE 3554) CODE SECTION: 46-55-20(A)(1)”
and then contains the following “probable cause” sworn testimony by NEALE:
105. Notably absent from the warrant or affidavit is any notice that the SLED defendants were
going to seize and destroy Pendarvis’ hemp crop upon serving the requested arrest warrant or
that the SLED defendants had previously attempted to obtain judicial authorization for seizure
and destruction and that judicial authorization had been denied. WHITSETT has verified under
oath that information was not relayed to Magistrate Judge Templeton.
43
Arrest & Destruction of Dorchester County Hemp Crop
106. On September 19, 2019, at approximately 11:45 a.m., numerous Defendants showed up at
Pendarvis’ farm in Dorchester County. Pendarvis is informed and believes that specific
individual defendants present at his Dorchester County farm that day were ONEAL, NEALE,
WOOD, HOLDEN, STOKES, DIXSON, THOMPSON, KRUTAK, SCRUBBS and EADDY,
but he believes there may have been other individuals also present. At least one defendant,
THOMPSON, was outfitted as though they were serving a high-risk warrant on a violent
criminal:
107. Interactions between Pendarvis and some of the defendants at his Dorchester County farm
on September 19, 2019, are memorialized via a body-worn camera (BWC) video that has been
identified by SLED as being WOOD’s BWC.
108. That video shows a SLED Agent (believed to be NEALE), ONEAL and WOOD (not
visible, but present via audio since it is his BWC) having the following exchange with
Pendarvis beginning at the 11:49:00 timestamp and showing Pendarvis refusing to consent to
the destruction of his hemp crop and instead requesting due process (to call his lawyer):
44
-NEALE: We have got to something with this. So are you good with us,
cutting it down or…
-PENDARVIS: I’d rather you talk to my lawyer first.
-NEALE: Ok.
-ONEAL: Who’s your lawyer?
-PENDARVIS: I’ll get ahold of Mr. Charles Williams.
-ONEAL: Ok. (looking at NEALE and nodding) Go ahead then.
-NEALE: Well, right now (walking over to Pendarvis and grabbing his
arm) we are going to place you under arrest for growing hemp
without a license.
-ONEAL: Cultivating.
-PENDARVIS: For what?
-NEALE: Because this is not – this is an unlawful –
-ONEAL: We’ll serve the warrant here in just a minute. Tell you about –
what’s all involved.
109. At 11:50:21, as NEALE and ONEAL are cuffing his hands behind his back, Pendarvis asks
for due process a second time:
-PENDARVIS: Can I call my lawyer before y’all –
45
-WOOD: Yes, sir. Absolutely. Let them finish getting your knives and
stuff. Then they’ll take those cuffs lose for a second and we’ll
let you make that telephone call.
(ONEAL approaches WOOD and motions for him to follow)
-ONEAL: Hey, let me talk to you for a second.
ONEAL and WOOD walk away from Pendarvis and WOOD’s BWC mic is turned
off, after which there are no more assurances that Pendarvis will be allowed a call
while on the scene. Pendarvis is informed and believes STOKES (seen in image
below) is standing in proximity to ONEAL and WOOD when the “unrecorded”
conversation takes place, after which no more assurances of phone calls on site are
made.
At 11:52:11, after the mic cut-off conversation, Pendarvis continues to request due process by
asking to be able to contact his lawyer before the hemp crop is destroyed:
-PENDARVIS: I mean, I can’t call my lawyer before y’all mess with it –
-ONEAL: No, sir. You can call you lawyer down at the jail. We gonna cut
it regardless. Your lawyer can’t stop us from cutting it. It’s
growing in an unlawful location.
At 11:54:49:
-PENDARVIS: My lawyer can’t talk to y’all before y’all destroy it?—
-WOOD: We came here to handle this issue –
-PENDARVIS: I – I – I…I think my lawyer can explain my situation with the

paperwork I got.
At 11:54:49:
46
-WOOD: I know the Department of Agriculture sent you a letter several

weeks ago.
-PENDARVIS: And they told me to wait and they’d get back with me. I never
heard anything from them. I asked him then, did I need to get
my attorney to contact him. He said, “you wait and I’ll call you
back.” So…that’s what I did.
-WOOD: Yes, sir.
-PENDARVIS: But if I’d have known different, I could’ve got my attorney to

contact y’all ahead of time.
At 11:55:38, as NEALE, ONEAL, STOKES and THOMPSON look on:
-WOOD: I mean, they turned it over to us to handle –
-PENDARVIS: Well, that’s what I’m asking. Can I call my lawyer and let y’all
talk to him now.
-WOOD: (as ONEAL shakes his head in the background) We’ve got a
directive to come here today.
-ONEAL: We’ll talk to your lawyer later.
-PENDARVIS: I mean – How y’all gonna destroy my whole crop?
At 11:56:19, as NEALE, WOOD, STOKES and THOMPSON look on:
47
-ONEAL: Well, we’re out here because the Department of Ag called us out
here.
At 11:57:16, as NEALE, WOOD, STOKES and THOMPSON look on:
-ONEAL: We’ll discuss the details with you later, we’ve got – we’ve got
what the Department told us and – and now what you’re telling
us. We’ll be glad to talk to you with your lawyer –
-PENDARVIS: Well that’s what I don’t understand. How can y’all – why are
y’all gonna destroy before my attorney can get with y’all and –
and they – with the Department?
-ONEAL: Let me read this warrant to you, sir.
At 12:00:51:
-PENDARVIS: I really think I should be able to talk to my attorney before y’all

destroy it
-WOOD: This is where we’re at, sir.
-PENDARVIS: I mean, I asked the lady that the other say. And she told me no,
that she would get back with me.
-WOOD: We’ve been in contact with the Department of Agriculture and

they are – uh – in line and lined up with everything we’re here
for.
110. All told, Pendarvis requested due process before his hemp crop was destroyed at least
seven (7) times (as memorialized on WOOD’s BWC video). All those requests for due process
by Pendarvis were ignored by the Defendants on the scene.
48
111. Pendarvis’ was transported by KRUTAK to the Dorchester County Detention Center where
he was booked.
112. While Pendarvis was being transported to the detention center, the on-scene Defendants
proceeded to destroy his hemp crop by bushhogging Pendarvis’ fields with SC Forestry
equipment:
turning thriving fields of hemp:
into barren lots like this:
49
113. Pendarvis is informed and believes that FORESTRY agents/employees SCRUBBS and
EADDY assisted with the destruction of his hemp crop, using FORESTRY equipment.
114. Before taking and destroying Pendarvis’ hemp crop without providing him due process,
the on-scene Defendants made sure to get videos and selfies to memorialize their “crime-
fighting” work:
115. On September 20, 2019, both KEEL and WEATHERS publicized written statements to the
media “FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE” on Pendarvis’ arrest:
1
Plaintiff is unsure of the identity of the person pictured in the bed of the truck taking photo/video,
but is informed and believes that the person in the four (4) selfies is STOKES, who was specifically
identified by NEALE as being “Other Personnel” involved in the SLED “Report of Investigation.”
50
116. Also on September 20, 2019, counsel retained to defend Pendarvis on the criminal charges
sent evidence preservation correspondence to KEEL which requested the preservation and
production of the following:
51
117. Via correspondence dated November 4, 2019, WHITSETT responded to Pendarvis’
counsel’s September 20, 2019, correspondence:
118. Via correspondence dated January 22, 2020, the First Circuit Solicitor’s Office produced
Rule 5/Brady material to Pendarvis’ attorney on the criminal case.
52
119. Of note, in neither of the two responses above, did the SLED defendants identify and/or
produce any AG opinions requested or produced after the August 8th AG Op. or any
communications with Chief Administrative Judge for the First Circuit.
Pre-litigation Known Conduct – Marion County Case
120. On or about September 25, 2019, Pendarvis’ counsel became aware that the SLED and
DAG Defendants intended to conduct the same seizure and destruction action on two (2) acres
of his hemp allotment that he had planted in Marion County on land owned by a friend, Lawton
Drew. These were the two acres subject to the 2nd Acreage Amendment Application that
Pendarvis had emailed DAG on August 28, 2019 and was subsequently emailed numerous
times about in early September by DAG Defendants, before resending to DAG via email on
September 11, 2019 (hereinafter “Marion crop”).
121. Subsequent to learning that the SLED and DAG Defendants intended to seize and destroy
the Marion crop, on September 26, 2019, Pendarvis’ attorneys filed a Petition for an Ex Parte
Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas (hereinafter
“Marion Case,” see C/A No.: 2019-CP-33-00675).
122. On September 26, 2019, the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, through order issued
by the Hon. William H. Seals, Jr., temporarily restrained and issued a preliminary injunction
against SLED and DAG, temporarily restraining and enjoining on a preliminary basis SLED
and DAG from entering onto the property “for the purposes of destroying the hemp crop
planted thereon.” That Order specifically ordered that the parties would be given an
opportunity to be heard in a hearing on the merits at a later date.
53
123. Subsequent to the above, Pendarvis’ attorneys began communicating with both
WHITSETT and TERRY the filings, the Court’s order and trying to coordinate dates for a
hearing.
124. On October 7, 2016, SLED filed Response in Opposition Ex Parte Temporary Order and
Preliminary Injunction and Request to Dissolve Such Order. SLED devoted an entire page in
that filing to allegations that the Marion hemp crop was “too hot” (i.e., had tested above 0.03%
delta-9 dry weight). See p.6, October 7, 2019, SLED Response, Marion case.
125. Nowhere in their October 7, 2016, filing did SLED mention a) that no one had ever noticed
Pendarvis about any of his hemp being “too hot,” or b) that the very statute and participation
agreement SLED was citing as justification for their enforcement action specifically allows
that hemp testing too hot can be “reconditioned.” See S.C. Code §46-55-40(A)(1-4) and Sec.
XIII(b) of Hemp Participation Agreement.
126. On October 8, 2019, Pendarvis filed a Supplemental Memorandum in the Marion case. In
that filing, Pendarvis argued he had never been given any notice about any of his crop being
“too hot,” pointing out the SLED lab report attached to SLED’s response in opposition was
dated September 24, 2019 (well after the August 28, 2019 “official response” correspondence
from DAG that SLED cited in support of their argument and which did not mention the “too
hot” issue at all) and providing his own lab report dated September 27, 2019 showing the
Marion crop testing a Total THC% of 0.26%, within the statutory THC limits.
127. Pendarvis’ October 8, 2019, Supplemental Memo also noted that DAG had notified SLED
that it was finding Pendarvis in “willful violation” as early as the August 5, 2019, Memo from
UNDERWOOD to NEALE (exhibit D to the Oct. 8th Supp Memo) and that SLED had in
response, requested the Aug. 8th Op. from SCAG (exhibit E to the Oct. 8th Supp Memo).
54
Pendarvis then quoted verbatim from the Aug. 8 th Opinion’s “Conclusion” section before
noting that “Defendant SLED did none of the above…”
128. On October 8, 2019, the parties in the Marion case appeared before Judge Seals in Horry
County for a hearing on the merits regarding the injunctive relief requested by Pendarvis in the
Marion County case. As the issue being contested at the time was the “enforcement” efforts,
SLED argued on behalf of the Defendants. The Court heard arguments from both sides and
took the matter under advisement to allow for sufficient time to review the submitted materials.
129. Of note, during the October 8, 2019, SLED’s trial counsel conceded the “too hot” issue
during oral argument, stating “I’m not going to get into the weight issue because Patrick’s
right. I learned yesterday via talking to the investigator that yeah, I might test four of these
plants and they may be out of compliance but these two plants might be in compliance.”
130. Later that day, via email timestamped 3:10 p.m., the Court notified the parties that the
preliminary injunction was being granted and providing instructions to Pendarvis’ attorneys to
draft a proposed order.
131. On November 8, 2019, the Court e-filed an Order on the Marion case. In that Order, the
Court specifically noted the protection against unconstitutional takings citizens have pursuant
to case law, the Federal Due Process clauses (found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments)
and the South Carolina Constitution:
55
56
132. The Court’s November 8, 2019 Order in the Marion case specifically discussed the August
8th Op, citing to Pendarvis’ Supplemental Memo and its exhibits.:
133. On December 9, 2019, SLED, through new counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal in the Marion
case, appealing the November 8, 2019, Order leaving the injunctive relief in place during the
pendency of the declaratory judgment action.
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134. On January 13, 2020, Pendarvis’ served SLED and DAG with interrogatories (IROGs) and
requests for production (RFPs) in the Marion case.
135. On February 20, 2020, Pendarvis’ counsel sent an email to SLED’s counsel and TERRY
inquiring of the status of responses to the January 13, 2020, discovery requests in the Marion
case.
136. On February 25, 2020, having received no response to the February 20, 2020, email,
Pendarvis’ counsel noted the failure by SLED or DAG to respond and that a motion to compel
would be filed. Later that day, SLED’s counsel sent an email that he was traveling out of state,
had provided the discovery to his client, but requested a 30-day extension. Pendarvis’ counsel
responded noting the new deadline with an extension would be March 13, 2020, and that was
fine, provided “your clients actually produce responses and not form objections with no
information” specifically noting a “recent case with SLED has been like pulling teeth.”
137. On April 1, 2020, DAG provided discovery responses in the Marion case.
138. Of note in DAG’s April 1, 2020, discovery responses, in response to IROG#12, which
asked DAG to “list with specificity all contact/communications between the Defendants about
the Plaintiffs and/or their crops in both Marion and Dorchester Counties,” DAG identified a
single communication:
139. Of note in DAG’s April 1, 2020, discovery responses, in response to IROG#13, which
asked DAG to list with specificity all contact/communications between you and any third party
regarding the Plaintiffs, DAG identified only:
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The documents produced contemporaneously did not contain numerous emails between the
DAG defendants and SLED defendants that were later produced in the Dorchester County state
case, a fact best exemplified with the DAG produced documents in the Marion case being 52
pages produced versus 195 pages produced in the Dorchester case. Nor were there any
communications the DAG defendants engaged in/were copied on with the SCAG defendants
identified or produced (other than the identification of the letter to SCAG identified in
IROG#13 answer above).
140. Of note in DAG’s April 1, 2020 response to IROG#17, which asked DAG to list with
specificity “every prosecutor/attorney general, judicial officer, clerk of court and/or other court
personnel the Defendants communicated with about seizing and destroying the Plaintiffs’ crops
in both Dorchester and Marion Counties,” identify if the information of the communication
was subsequently share with other parties and if so, identify the other parties, DAG identified
only:
141. Via April 2, 2020, emails, Pendarvis’ counsel inquired of SLED’s counsel the status on
SLED’s discovery responses and was told by SLED’s counsel that draft responses had been
done, documents requested but not received, and that he would be checking with WHITSETT
on the status.
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142. On May 15, 2020, SLED filed their initial brief and designation of matter for the Marion
County appeal. At no time in any filing at the trial level, or in any appellate filing, did SLED
ever identify or refer to any attorney general opinion other than the August 8, 2019, AG Op.
143. On July 28, 2020, SLED finally produced discovery responses for the Marion case, 197
days late. Notably, in responses WHITSETT participated in answering, SLED did not identify
or produce any AG opinion requested, created or amended after the August 8th AG Op. and
SLED flat-out refused to identify or produce anything related to the Dorchester County crop.
SLED’s IROG#17 answer in the Marion case is a perfect example of SLED’s obstructionist
conduct:
2
The response that Plaintiff’s counsel was copied on every communication from SLED to any
prosecutor or judicial officer related to this matter ignores numerous communications between the
SLED Defendants and SCAG Defendants after the Marion case was filed and ignores the fact that
the previous communications with SCAG Defendants and Judge Diane S. Goodstein’s office were
directly related to establishing the legal authority to conduct the enforcement actions that SLED
conducted on the Dorchester crop and then attempted to conduct on the Marion crop.
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144. Via Rule 11 correspondence dated February 18, 2021, Pendarvis notified Attorney
Lindemann of deficiencies in SLED’s discovery responses in the Marion case. Specifically,
Pendarvis noticed that SLED’s objections to providing “any information relative to any matters
in Dorchester County as such is irrelevant and immaterial” were improper under the rules. That
the evidence sought was reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence and as such,
demanded the production of such evidence. Pendarvis also noted that the blanket “any
communications to and from Adam Whitsett are privileged as attorney-client communications”
was improper without an adequate privilege log. Pendarvis demanded the noticed deficiencies
be cured within fourteen (14) days or warned that a motion would be filed seeking sanctions.
145. On March 12, 2021, having received no response from SLED or their attorney regarding
their deficient discovery responses, Pendarvis filed a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses
from SLED on the Marion case. In that motion, Pendarvis argued that SLED’s attempt to deny
discovery related the Dorchester County crop was not credible because there had actually never
been a referral to SLED about the Marion County crop, only a referral for the Dorchester
County crop, pointing out “SLED cannot refuse producing discovery of information related to
Dorchester since the entire Marion Couny matter arises from the Dorchester matter. The two
cannot be separated.” 3/12/2021 Motion, p.7.
146. In the March 12, 2021 Marion County motion to compel, Pendarvis specifically argued:
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3/12/2021 Motion, p.7.
147. In the March 12, 2021 Marion County motion to compel, Pendarvis specifically noticed
SLED that despite their interrogatory answers having stated “there are numerous emails and
memorandum from the Attorney General as well as the Department of Agriculture” and
“communications with the Attorney General’s Office included opinions from the Attorney
General. This includes emails between Adam Whitsett and David Jones,” no such
communications had been produced. Pendarvis specifically noticed SLED that “if there are
communications that involved other parties/agencies, those need to be produced” and any
claims of privilege needed to actually comply with the requirements of Rule 26(b)(5)(A)
SCRCP to clearly identify what was being withheld.
148. On March 10, 2022, less than two (2) hours before a hearing on Pendarvis’ Marion County
motion to compel was to be heard, KEEL’s attorney contacted Pendarvis’ counsel by
telephone, asking if the hearing was necessary since they had subsequently produced
“everything” in the Dorchester County case. Pendarvis’ counsel noted that KEEL had not
produced everything, as there had been specific discovery identified, yet not produced in either
case despite multiple notices. KEEL subsequently produced 79-pages of missing discovery.
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Dorchester County State Civil Case
149. On August 23, 2021, Pendarvis filed a civil complaint in the Dorchester County Court of
Common Pleas, C/A No.: 2021-CP-18-01486 (hereinafter “Dorchester case”). That complaint
was filed against KNIGHT, KEEL and WEATHERS in their official capacities and John
Doe(s), asserting causes of action for False/unlawful arrest/imprisonment and assault and
battery against KEEL in his official capacity and outrage, abuse of process,
defamation/defamation per se, negligence/gross negligence/recklessness and conversion
against all defendants.
150. Upon serving the state case summons and complaint, Pendarvis also served discovery
requests upon the defendants. In addition to interrogatories and requests for production,
Pendarvis also served KEEL with two (2) requests for admission (RFAs) pursuant to Rule 36
SCRCP:
151. Pendarvis asked those RFAs because he knew about the August 8 AG Op., had never seen
any judicial authorization for the seizure and destruction of his hemp crop, had never been
afforded an opportunity to be heard to challenge any findings that led to the destruction of his
hemp crop and could not understand why KEEL would ask the SCAG defendants for an
opinion about the appropriate procedure to take in his case and then not follow that procedure.
152. Via email dated October 15, 2021, KEEL’s attorney asked for a twenty-one (21) day
extension to respond to Plaintiff’s written discovery requests. Plaintiff’s counsel responded
back that same day agreeing to an extension provided “we get full and complete answers” (a
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condition necessitated by the discovery conduct already being engaged in by SLED in the
Marion case and detailed above):
153. The same day that extension was requested, KEEL responded to Pendarvis’ request for
admissions (RFAs) as such:
154. Via Rule 11 correspondence dated November 9, 2021, Pendarvis notified KEEL that he
believed KEEL’s responses to RFA#1 and RFA#1 were “bad faith efforts to evade properly
responding under the rules.”
155. Specifically, Pendarvis noticed that KEEL’s response to RFA#1 was improper:
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and pointed out that KEEL should be well aware of the distinction between arrest and
seizure/destruction since he had specifically requested an Attorney General opinion to instruct
him “on the appropriate procedure to pursue enforcement of the Hemp Farming Act with hemp
grown in violation of the Act” and the AG opinion had specifically told KEEL he “should seek
judicial authorization for the seizure of illegally-grown hemp in order to ensure that the
grower receives due process…” 11/9/2021 Rule 11 letter, p.4. Pendarvis noticed KEEL that:
156. Pendarvis also noticed KEEL his RFA#2 response that the reference to “SLED’s action”
is vague and ambiguous was not credible since the “action” referred to was the action identified
through the only other RFA served (the seizure and destruction of the crop) and violated Hon.
Joseph J. Anderson Jr.’s oft-cited discovery opinion’s instruction on making such objections
(“If the party believes that the request is vague, that party shall attempt to obtain clarification
prior to objecting on this ground.” – Curtis v. Time Warner Ent’ment-Advance/Newhouse
P’ship, C/A No.: 3:12-cv-2370-JFA, May 13, 2013, p.3). Nevertheless, Pendarvis proceeded
to clarify for KEEL what he was referring to by “action”:
157. Pendarvis’ November 9, 2021, Rule 11 letter further noticed KEEL that his discovery was
deficient in that he had failed to produce a Rule 33 verification (despite such being specifically
demanded) and that KEEL had only produced discovery Bates stamped SLED-001-089, yet
referenced Bates stamped pages beyond those numbered pages.
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158. KEEL refused to cure the deficiencies noticed via Pendarvis’ November 9, 2021, Rule 11
letter.
159. As noted above, at the last minute before a motion hearing on Pendarvis’ motion to compel
in the Marion Co. case, KEEL produced 79-pages of missing discovery. After review of that
missing discovery, Pendarvis sent KEEL another Rule 11 letter on March 14, 2022.
160. In the March 14, 2022, Rule 11 letter, Pendarvis specifically noticed KEEL that the newly
produced discovery showed his responses to RFA#1 and RFA#2 were bad faith efforts to evade
properly responding under the rules. Pendarvis specifically pointed out email correspondence
between WHITSETT and Gil Gatch, then law clerk to the Hon. Dianne S. Goodstein, Chief
Administrative Judge for Dorchester County. That correspondence was courtesy copied to
NEALE, ONEAL and WELLS and shows that KEEL specifically sought the very judicial
approval which KEEL had specifically denied seeking, via an ex parte submission of a
proposed Hemp/Marijuana Seizure Order and Order of Destruction:
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161. Pendarvis noted the obvious evasiveness of KEEL’s original response to RFA#1
explaining in detail NEALE’s actions to obtain the arrest warrant, yet ignoring all the actions
NEALE, ONEAL and WHITSETT took to obtain the very judicial approval RFA#1 had
specifically requested KEEL admit to seeking.
162. The proposed order submitted by NEALE and WHITSETT on September 11, 2019, was
drafted by WHITSETT and ordered “the destruction of all of the plants at the above-listed
property location in any manner and at such time and in such manner deemed appropriate by
SLED. A copy of the July 10, 2019, Attorney General’s Opinion on this issue is attached
hereto and hereby incorporated herein.”
163. The inclusion/submission of the July 10th AG opinion is notable in that it is not the opinion
specifically requested by KEEL for the appropriate procedure in enforcing Pendarvis’ alleged
willful violation and does not contain the specific warnings by SCAG defendants that “SLED
proceed with the utmost care to fully ensure that the grower and all interested parties
receive due process.” That July 10th AG Op. specifically does not have the instruction to seek
judicial authorization by providing “notice to the grower and an opportunity for them to be
heard in a hearing.”
164. Pendarvis believes the submission of the July 10th AG Op. instead of the August 8th AG
Op. was an intentional and willful attempt on the part of KEEL, WHITSETT, NEALE and
ONEAL to mislead the Court into signing an ex parte order authorizing SLED’s seizure and
destruction of Pendarvis’ Dorchester Co. hemp crop in direct contradiction of the “proper
procedure” they had sought and obtained specifically for his case via the August 8 th AG Op.
165. When specifically asked to admit this misleading conduct to the Court was intentional,
KEEL, through responses verified under oath by WHITSETT, denied and instead blamed
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Judge Goodstein (See KEEL’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Second Set of RFAs dated May 20, 2022
and WHITSETT executed Verification dated May 31, 2022 in Dorchester case):
166. KEEL made similar claims via correspondence to WILSON dated September 23, 2019,
when he attempted to post-seizure/destruction obtain a “formal” opinion from the SCAG
defendants by claiming that following the issuance of the August 8th Op. “SLED attempted to
secure an order of destruction from a circuit court as discussed in the August opinion; however,
the court would not entertain such. While no specific reasoning was provided by the
court…”
167. Judge Goodstein did not refuse “to entertain” SLED’s attempts to comply with the August
8th AG Op. because the SLED defendants were specifically attempting to avoid following the
proper procedure of the August 8th AG Op, by seeking an ex parte order of destruction without
a hearing.
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168. Judge Goodstein’s law clerk specifically notified WHITSETT that while the judge would
not sign the SLED defendants proposed order ex parte, she would be glad to give them a
hearing on the matter:
169. Rather than accept Judge Goodstein’s offer to conduct the actual “proper procedure”
proscribed by the August 8th AG Op. he had requested, KEEL, through WHITSETT, refused:
170. Pendarvis noticed KEEL via his March 13, 2022, Rule 11 letter that his response to RFA#2
was a bad faith effort to evade properly responding under the rules, as the above-emails show
KEEL did seek judicial approval to destroy Pendarvis’ hemp crop and that judicial approval of
that action was denied.
171. Pendarvis demanded that the bad faith responses be amended:
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172. KEEL refused to amend and correct his responses, willfully and intentionally obstructing
justice and denying/delaying discovery and due process in the Dorchester County state case.
Known Conspiracy Conduct to Date
173. Despite the ongoing and repeated attempts to deny/delay discovery in the state cases, as
that discovery has painstakingly come about, it has established conduct amongst the defendants
to conspire to violate Pendarvis’ constitutional rights, deny him civil and criminal protections
afforded him by law, take his property unlawfully, deny him of due process and obstruct
justice.
174. After refusing Judge Goodstein’s offer to have a hearing and comply with actual advice
given by the August 8th AG Op., the SLED defendants conspired with the DAG and SCAG
defendants to “amend” the opinion and take Pendarvis’ hemp crop in violation of his due
process rights.
175. According to KEEL’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Second Set of IROGs in the Dorchester case
dated April 18, 2022, that conspiring began between WELLS and UNDERWOOD after Judge
Goodstein refused to sign the proposed ex parte order without a hearing on September 11,
2019:
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176. Emails withheld and not identified by KEEL at all in the state cases, but subsequently
obtained by Pendarvis’ via subpoena to the SCAG defendants show that WELLS, ONEAL,
NEALE, WHITSETT and WOOD were all planning to seize and destroy Pendarvis’
Dorchester Co. hemp crop the day before his arrest and any “amended” AG opinion was
sought or obtained:
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177. In response to a specific subsequent interrogatory referencing the unidentified and
unproduced email above, KEEL has identified that WELLS’ “contact” at FORESTRY as
CALORE, who helped set up the FORESTRY agents/employees SCRUBBS and EADDY who
showed up with FORESTRY equipment and destroyed Pendarvis’ crop.
178. Pendarvis is informed and believes the reason for not identifying and producing the above
September 18, 2019, email is obvious: it shows how the SLED and DAG defendants conspired
with the SCAG defendants to violate Pendarvis’ due process rights the August 8 th AG Op. had
warned KEEL to protect.
179. Pendarvis is informed and believes that conspiracy is further supported by the email
exchanges which occurred on the morning of his arrest, September 19, 2019. Those emails
begin at 7:20 am, with WHITSETT emailing COOK:
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180. WHITSETT has verified under oath that “Chief” in the above-email is KEEL, showing
KEEL’s personal involvement in violating Pendarvis’ rights.
181. Thirty minutes later, at 7:50 am, WHITSETT forwards COOK the email WELLS had sent
the day before titled Plan for Destruction of Hemp Field in Dorchester Co. – Trent Pendarvis.
COOK in turn forwards that email to JONES at 7:57 a.m.
182. In an attempt to further justify their action, WHITSETT sends JONES and COOK the
following email at 8:34 a.m.:
At that time, no one had ever noticed Pendarvis that any of his plants were “too hot” nor
allowed him the opportunity specifically allowed for under the Act to “recondition” the plants.
183. By 10:11 a.m., JONES and COOK “amended” their August 8 th AG Op. to agree with
SLED’s “conclusion in the abstract that if there has been a valid consent as you describe, no
judicial authorization for seizure upon notice from the Department of Agriculture that it has
found hemp grown unlawfully in willful violation of applicable law,” claiming that:
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184. Pendarvis is informed and believes that the issuance of this “amended” emailed opinion
was a fait accompli provided by the SCAG defendants as legal cover for the SLED, DAG and
DCSO defendants to arrest Pendarvis without affording him the specific protections of the Act
and take Pendarvis property’ in violation of his due process rights, a course of action that was
already set in motion to the point that agents/equipment were merely waiting on this email to
come through before acting. COOK and JONES conduct in providing this legal cover to the
SLED, DAG and DCSO defendants’ unconstitutional acts was so vital, that they got an
“attaboy” from WHITSETT:
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185. Pendarvis is informed and believes that email communications show that the DAG
defendants willfully and intentionally withheld notice from Pendarvis that he was being found
in “willful violation” of the hemp act at the request of the SLED defendants, who wanted to
deny Pendarvis any opportunity to be heard in challenging such finding. Pendarvis believes
the August 28, 2019, email from UNDERWOOD to WELLS and ONEAL, courtesy copied to
TERRY and ELSALAH is a good example of such conduct:
186. Despite knowing that the SLED defendants intended to seize and destroy his hemp crop
with no opportunity to be heard in challenge of the willful violation finding, the DAG
defendants stood silent, denying Pendarvis the notice to inform his legal counsel of the planned
seizure and destruction of his hemp crop and seek legal remedy to such action.
187. Pendarvis is informed and believes that UNDERWOOD went so far as to share his “sample
email” to Pendarvis with WELLS and ONEAL, courtesy copying TERRY, so that all those
defendants knew how/when Pendarvis was being notified of his “willful violation” and that
UNDERWOOD and/or DAG was providing Pendarvis with no notice as to how to challenge
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that administrative finding nor any opportunity to be heard in challenging that administrative
finding.
188. Pendarvis is informed and believes that the SLED defendants were aware that the
administrative finding of a “willful violation” had not been made by an impartial decision
maker, rather it had been made by the same DAG defendants who were coordinating with the
SLED defendants to try to help them seize and destroy Pendarvis’ hemp crop.
189. Pendarvis is informed and believes WEATHERS was specifically copied with the
“rejection letter” for Pendarvis’ amendment applications via August 28, 2019, email and, thus,
was fully aware of the actions and conduct being taken by his agents against Pendarvis.
190. Pendarvis is informed and believes the SLED and DAG defendants were aware that
Pendarvis did not understand the seizure and destruction of his hemp crop was being pursued
for the alleged “willful violation” and that they sought to limit any such explanation and
information from being provided to him as evidenced by the following emails shared amongst
multiple SLED and DAG defendants following Pendarvis receiving his “official response”
from UNDERWOOD:
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191. Pendarvis is informed and believes that DAG defendants JEFFCOAT and UNDERWOOD
continued to attempt to assist SLED defendants in enforcement action against him after DAG
had found him in willful violation by sending emails to Pendarvis asking him to provide the
location of the Marion Co. hemp crop, some such emails being courtesy copied to TERRY and
ENSALAH.
192. Pendarvis is informed and believes that the DAG defendants coordinated their public
comments about Pendarvis’ arrest and the seizure/destruction of his hemp crop as noted by this
September 18, 2019, email:
3
Plaintiff would note that in the state case discovery, WEATHERS has redacted out pretty much
any email sent internally that his general counsel, Alden TERRY, was included on and that this
conduct is just more discovery abuse meant to deny due process: “Information – in and of itself –
does not become privileged merely because it was communicated to an attorney.” In re Mt. Hawley
Ins. Co., 427 S.C. 159, 167-168 (2019). “Courts have consistently refused to apply privilege to
information that the client intends his attorney to impart to others…or which the client intends
shall be published or made known to others…” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356
(4th Cir. 1984).
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193. Pendarvis is informed and believes that the SLED and DAG defendants coordinated their
public statements about his arrest and the destruction of his hemp crop, as evidenced by emails
back and forth on September 20, 2019, sharing the agencies’ press releases:
194. After receiving SLED’s press release, MOORE shared DAG’s release again with LEACH,
TERRY and UNDERWOOD before issuing it at 12:32 p.m. on September 20, 2019:
195. Pendarvis is informed and believes that the defendants’ conduct violating his constitutional
rights has continued since the time of his arrest and the destruction of his hemp crop. Such
conduct includes, but is not limited to, the continued willful and intentional bad faith discovery
conduct in the State cases meant to obstruct justice and deny him due process, as well as the
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post-arrest and seizure attempts to establish more “legal cover” for their conduct in the wake
of legal counsel appearing on behalf of Pendarvis.
196. KEEL’s request for such “legal cover” continued when Pendarvis filed for the TRO in
Marion County.
197. In emails neither identified nor produced by KEEL in either state case, but obtained via
subpoena to the SCAG defendants, the SCAG defendants continued attempts to provide the
SLED defendants legal cover for violating Pendarvis’ constitutional rights:
198. SMITH, YOUNG, COOK, WILSON, LYNCH, KIRKLAND and VORBARGER all
communicated about giving KEEL the “help” he really needed:
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199. COOK, having conspired with WHITSETT to “amend” the August 8 th AG opinion via
email on September 19, 2019, as the SLED and DCSO defendants sat ready to take Pendarvis’
hemp crop without due process, wanted to be kept “advised” of the Marion Co. case:
200. KIRKLAND, VORBERGER and SMITH conferred with WHITSETT over the phone on
September 26, 2019, who was supposed to stop by their office to meet with them the next day.
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None of those communications were ever disclosed by KEEL in either state case, despite
discovery requests in both specifically asking for all communications about Pendarvis to be
described with specificity:
201. WHITSETT and TERRY specifically shared Judge Seals’ October 8, 2019 email informing
the parties he was granting Pendarvis’ motion for preliminary injunction with SMITH. Via
email dated October 22, 2019, WHITSETT and TERRY told SMITH that the Court’s ruling
“effectively ends this case and renders the entire Hemp licensure program meaningless.”
202. SMITH in turn forwarded that email to COOK on October 22, 2019, quoting from a section
of Pendarvis’ memo that specifically discussed SLED’s obtaining the August 8 th AG Op. only
to ignore it. That email appears to have included as an attachment, SLED’s “Return to TRO,”
thus providing SMITH, COOK and the SCAG Defendants with the arguments SLED had made
in response to the TRO, namely the failure to argue or refer to any attorney general opinion
other than the August 8th AG Op.
203. In short, KEEL and WEATHERS and their agents have repeatedly refused to
identify/produce responsive discovery and/or comply with the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure in a continued attempt to deny Pendarvis due process and obstruct discovery.
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204. Pendarvis is informed and believes that there were no emergent cirsumstances that
supported denying him notice and an opportunity to be heard at hearing. It was simply the will
of the defendants that he not be afforded his due process rights and they conspired together to
violate his rights.
205. Pendarvis is informed and believes that none of the defendants were ever provided with an
order authorizing the seizure and destruction of his hemp crop, yet all of the defendants stood
by and allowed his property to be taken in violation of his due process rights, despite his vocal
challenges to the legality of doing so.
206. Pendarvis is informed and believes that KEEL, through WHITSETT, specifically told
WILSON and the SCAG defendants that Judge Goodstein had refused to authorize the seizure
and destruction of Pendarvis’ hemp crop.
207. Pendarvis and is informed and believes that when NEALE appeared in front of Dorchester
County Magistrate Judge Ryan Templeton to obtain the arrest warrant for Pendarvis, NEALE
failed to inform Judge Templeton that they intended to seize and destroy Pendarvis’ hemp crop
or that Judge Goodstein had specicially refused to authorize such action.
208. Pendarvis is informed and believes that ONEAL specifically contacted Judge Goodstein’s
law clerk “to ascertain which judge was the appropriate one in Dorchester County to contact
to secure pre-seizure judicial authorization for the seizure of Pendarvis’” hemp crop. Despite
having been told Judge Goodstein was the appropriate Judge for such judicial authorization,
and knowing that Judge Goodstein had refused to authorize such conduct withouth having a
hearing, ONEAL led and was the on-scene decision-maker for KEEL on September 19, 2019,
seizing and destroying Pendarvis’ hemp crop, specifically refusing to allow anyone to let
Pendarvis contact his lawyer prior to the destruction of the crop.
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209. The criminal charges against Pendarvis were dismissed on or about August 5, 2022, with
the Solicitor’s Office specifically noting on the General Sessions tracking sheet that there was
insufficient evidence to prove Pendarvis’ actions were willful.
210. Neither the SLED or DAG defendants issued any press release regarding the dismissal of
the criminal charges against Pendarvis.
211. Both the SLED defendants and the SCAG defendants have repeatedly claimed that the
Hemp Farming Act is unclear and does not adequately explain the enforcement process, with
the SCAG defendants citing as much in their opinions and even going so far to monitor press
stories and respond to media about how unclear the law is, lest they and their opinion(s) be
portrayed in a negative light:
212. Pendarvis is informed and believes the emails above show the SCAG defendants are
complaining about being denied similar “notice” and “oppoturnity to be heard” they conspired
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with the other Defendants to deny him, with the noted exception their liberty or property were
not being taken.
213. Notably, the article SCAG Defendants were concerned about contained KEEL’s response
that “his agency sought proper legal advice before taking action in every step of the case,”
neglecting to inform the media and the public how he and his agency ignored the legal advice
the SCAG Defendants had provided in their August 8th AG Op., a fact the SCAG Defendants
did not care to share with the reporter or the public. See Gregory Yee, Arrest of SC hemp farmer
underscores growing pains for budding industry, The Post & Courier, October 3, 2019.
214. Despite the claimed ‘murky” nature of the Act, the South Carolina General Assembly
clearly wanted to protect South Carolina farmers from the arbitrary actions taken against
Pendarvis by specifically directing that the corrective action plans described in S.C. Code §46-
55-40 were “the sole remedy” for negligent violations and a licensee with such violations “shall
not be subject to any criminal or civil enforcement action.” S.C. Code §46-55-40(A)(3).
215. Plaintiff is informed and believes that WEATHERS and the DAG defendants were aware
at the time Pendarvis was being arrested and his hemp crop was being destroyed without due
process, that WEATHERS had failed to submit a plan within sixty (60) days of the effective
date of the Act that adequately including “a procedure to comply with the enforcement outlined
in this act.” See 2019 Act No.14, Section 2(A)(4).
216. Pendarvis is informed and believes that since his arrest and the destruction of his hemp
crop without due process, WEATHERS has submitted a state plan in accordance with S.C.
Code §46-55-10 et seq. that actually includes the procedures for enforcement and that those
procedures require notice, an opportunity to be heard and no action by the Commissioner “prior
to the holding of an adjudicatory hearing” which “shall be conducted in accordance with the
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requirements of the South Carolian Administrative Procedure Act” and further includes a
section on how to appeal the findings of such hearings.
217. Pendarvis is informed and believes that the DAG, SCAG, SLED, DCSO and FORESTRY
defendants all knew such procedures did not exist at the time they conspired with the other
defendants to seize and destroy Pendarvis’ hemp crop and/or stood idly by allowing such to
happen.
218. Pendarvis is informed and believes that through their conduct documented above the
defendants recklessly, intentionally and willfully violated his constitutional rights and denied
him the specific protections of the Act.
FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS – 4TH, 8TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS – FALSE
ARREST/IMPRISONMENT AGAINST SLED AND DCSO DEFENDANTS)
219. Plaintiff incorporates each of the preceding paragraphs herein as if set forth verbatim.
220. At all times mentioned herein, the SLED and DCSO defendants were acting under the color
or pretense of South Carolina State law, customs, practices, usage, and/or policy. Additionally,
during the time period in question, the Defendants were well aware of the Pendarvis’
constitutional rights, including his right to due process, to be free from false
arrest/imprisonment and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
221. As described above, the SLED and DCSO defendants obtained and executed an arrest
warrant versus Pendarvis for a willful violation of the hemp farming act, through misleading
omissions to the magistrate (specifically that the Chief Administrative Judge for the circuit had
refused to approve their action), while knowingly and intentionally depriving Pendarvis of the
protections afforded him under the act (specficially his statutory right to a corrective action
85
plan being the sole remedy for a negligent violation, pursuant to S.C. Code §46-55-40), without
need and in bad faith.
222. That after the SLED defendants used force on Pendarvis and handcuffed him, DCSO
defendants took Pendarvis into custody and transported him to the detention center.
223. As a direct and proximate result of the SLED and DCSO defendants conduct, Pendarvis
suffered deprivations of his rights secured by the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.
224. At all times relevant to this action, the SLED and DCSO defendants knew or should have
known of the wrongfulness of their conduct and the risk of substantial harm to the Plaintiff.
225. The Plaintiff was harmed and suffered injury in violation of the Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights through the acts and omissions of the SLED and DCSO defendants.
FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS – 4TH, 8TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS – MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION AGAINST SLED AND DAG DEFENDANTS)
rights through the acts and omissions of the SLED and DAG defendants.
227. At all times mentioned herein, the SLED and DAG defendants were acting under the color
or pretense of South Carolina State law, customs, practices, usage, and/or policy. Additionally,
during the time period in question, the Defendants were well aware of Pendarvis’ constitutional
rights, including his right to due process, to be free from false arrest/imprisonment and to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.
228. As described above, the SLED and DAG defendants instituted the criminal prosecution
against Pendarvis and pushed for their continued prosecution while knowing that Pendarvis
had been deprived of the protections afforded him under the Hemp Farming Act and S.C.
86
Constitution (specficially his statutory right to a corrective action plan being the sole remedy
for a negligent violation, pursuant to S.C. Code §46-55-40 and his constitutional right under
Art. I, §22 of the South Carolina Constitution to challenge DAG’s finding), without need and
in bad faith.
229. Further, both the SLED and DAG defendants attempted to further their desired criminal
prosecution of Pendarvis by knowingly and intentionally withholding relevant and/or
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence that, once obtained through other means,
successfully helped get the criminal charges dismissed.
230. That the criminal charges against Pendarvis were ended in his favor, specifically they were
dismissed with the Solicitor’s Office finding there was not enough evidence to support that
Pendarvis had acted willfully.
231. That Pendarvis is informed and believes that the SLED defendants specifically opposed
the dismissal of the criminal charges.
232. That Pendarvis is informed and believes that there was no probable cause to institute the
criminal proceedings against him. Specifically, had Pendarvis been provided the statutory
protections he was entitled to under the Act, the sole remedy for the alleged violations would
have been corrective action plans.
233. That the SLED and DAG defendants acted maliciously, as evidenced through their conduct
described in the factual allegations above.
234. That Pendarvis suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a
consequence of the legal proceedings against him.
87
235. As a direct and proximate result of the SLED and DAG defendants conduct, Pendarvis
suffered deprivations of his rights secured by the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.
236. At all times relevant to this action, the SLED and DAG defendants knew or should have
known of the wrongfulness of their conduct and the risk of substantial harm to the Plaintiff.
rights through the acts and omissions of the SLED and DAG defendants.
FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS – OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE
& DENYING THE PLAINTIFF RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AGAINST ALL
DEFENDANTS)
239. At all times mentioned above, the Defendants were all acting under the color or pretense
of South Carolina State law, customs, practices, usage, and/or policy.
240. Additionally, during the time period in question, the Defendants were well aware of
Pendarvis’ constitutional rights, including his rights to:
a. due process of law;
b. to be free from unnecessary and unwarranted force;
c. to be free from false arrest and/or imprisonment;
d. to be free from the deprivation of property without due process of
law;
e. to be free from the deprivation of liberty without due process of law;
and,
88
f. to the fair, efficient and speedy administration of justice through the
criminal and civil justice system.
241. As described through the factual allegations above, the Defendants conducted themselves
repeatedly in violation of the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, specifically seeking to deny him
due process and obstruct justice.
242. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants acts and omissions, the Plaintiff suffered
deprivations of his rights secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
243. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants knew or should have known of the
wrongfulness of their conduct and the risk of substantial harm to the Plaintiff, but they
repeatedly violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights despite that knowledge.
244. That the Defendants had notice and knowledge that the Plaintiff was being denied his due
process rights prior to the instigation of the State cases by the Plaintiff.
245. That despite having the notice and knowledge that the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
being violated prior to the instigation of the State cases, the Defendants conspired to impede,
hinder, obstruct and/or defeat the due course of justice with the intent to deny the Plaintiff the
equal protection of the law. Specifically, but not limited to, those Defendants conspired to deny
facts they know to be true to shield themselves and others from civil liability for the violation
of the Plaintiff’s civil rights.
246. Plaintiff was harmed and suffered injury because of the Defendants violation of the
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and that harm has been exacerbated by the conduct of the
Defendants in conpiring to impede, hinder, obstruct and/or defeat the due course of justice with
the intent to deny the Plaintiff the equal protection of the law.
89
FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(NEGLECT TO PREVENT CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS –
OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE & DENYING THE PLAINTIFF RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)
248. At all times mentioned above, when the Defendants violated Pendarvis’ constitutional
rights, they were acting under the color or pretense of South Carolina State law, customs,
practices, usage, and/or policy.
249. Additionally, during the time period in question, the Defendants were well aware of
Pendarvis’ constitutional rights, including his right to due process, to be free from false
arrest/imprisonment, and to be free from malicious prosecution.
250. As described above, the Defendants repeatedly have violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection under the law.
251. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants acts and omissions, the Plaintiff has
suffered deprivations of his rights secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
252. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants knew or should have known of the
wrongfulness of their conduct and the risk of substantial harm to the Plaintiff, but they
repeatedly vioalted the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
253. That the Defendants had notice and knowledge that they and/or other Defendants were
violating the Plaintiff’s civil rights prior to the instigation of the State cases.
254. That despite having the notice and knowledge that they and/or other Defendants were
violating the Plaintiff’s civil rights prior to the instigation of the State case, the Defendants
conspired to impede, hinder, obstruct and/or defeat the due course of justice with the intent to
90
deny the Plaintiff the equal protection of the law. Specifically, but not limited to, the
Defendants conspired to deny facts they know to be true to shield themselves and others from
civil liability for the violation of the Plaintiff’s civil rights.
255. Plaintiff was harmed and suffered injury because of the Defendants violations of the
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and that harm has been exacerbated by the conduct of the
Defendants in conpiring to impede, hinder, obstruct and/or defeat the due course of justice with
the intent to deny the Plaintiff the equal protection of the law.
256. That Defendants had knowledge of the wrongs that were conspired to be done against the
Plaintiff as described above, had the power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of
those wrongs, but neglected or refused to do so, causing further and/or exacerbating the harm
to the Plaintiff.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court entered judgment against the Defendants and
award him:
i. Actual and consequential damages to compensate the Plaintiff for his out-of-
pocket expenses, pain, suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, and the indignity
he has suffered because of the Defendants’ conduct and the violation of his civil
rights;
ii. Punitive damages;
iii. Attorneys’ fees and costs recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
iv. Such further relief as is allowed by law and that the Court deems just and proper.
91
REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY
The Plaintiff, John Trenton Pendarvis, hereby demands a trial by jury on all claims so
triable.
Respectfully submitted by:
WUKELA LAW FIRM
s/Patrick J. McLaughlin
Patrick J. McLaughlin (Fed. ID No. 9665)
PO Box 13057
Florence, SC 29504-3057
Phone: (843) 669-5634
Fax: (843) 669-5150
E-mail: [email protected]
-and-
WILLIAMS & WILLIAMS
C. Bradley Hutto (Fed. ID. No. 2024)
P.O. Box 1084
Orangeburg, SC 29116
Phone: (803)534-5218
Fax: (903)536-6298
Florence, SC [email protected]
September 16, 2022 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
92

2022.09.16 - Pendarvis Complaint Filed

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2:22-cv-03142-BHH-MHC Date Filed 09/16/22 Entry Number 1 Page 1 of 92

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

John Trenton Pendarvis, ) 2:22−cv−03142-BHH-MHC

Honorable Court and allege as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF CASE & PARTIES

1. Plaintiff John Trenton Pendarvis (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “Plaintiff,” “Pendarvis,”

in Dorchester County, South Carolina.

state court cases arising from these matters.

AGENCY HEAD DEFENDANTS

the other defendants and his agency, SLED, escape liability.

the other defendants and his agency, DAG, escape liability.

hereinafter collectively be referred to as “SCAG Defendants.”

defendants and his agency, SCAG, escape liability.

SCAG, escape liability.

SCAG, escape liability.

defendants and her agency, SCAG, escape liability.

defendants and his agency, SCAG, escape liability.

collectively be referred to as “SLED Defendants.”

supervisory agent/employee of SLED. WHITSETT is being sued in his individual capacity

SLED, escape liability.

SLED, escape liability.

hereinafter collectively be referred to as “DAG Defendants.”

to as “UNDERWOOD”), is a citizen and resident of Newberry County, South Carolina. At all

Consumer Protection Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of DAG.

Economic Development Division and as such was a supervisory agent/employee of DAG.

DAG, escape liability.

DAG, escape liability.

defendants and her agency, DAG, escape liability.

hereinafter collectively be referred to as “DCSO Defendants.”

agent/employee of DCSO. THOMPSON is being sued in his individual capacity under 42

DCSO, escape liability.

Commission (hereinafter “FORESTRY”), serving as the “Assistant LE Chief.” CALORE is

violation of the Plaintiff’s established constitutional rights.

under 42 U.S.C. §1983, §1985, §1986 & §1988(b).

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Constitutional injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.

(c), (d), and 1343, and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201 and 2202.

FACTUAL HISTORY AND TIMELINE

THC levels below federally defined levels.

industry.” See 2014 Act No.216, Section 1, findings.

designee, determines that the licensee negligently violated” the Act.

a. Failing to provide a legal description and global positioning coordinates

b. Failing to obtain a proper license or other required authorization from

See S.C. Code §46-55-40(A)(1)(a)(b)and(c).

civil enforcement action.” S.C. Code §46-55-40(A)(3), emphasis added.

publicly opposed to cannabis legalization efforts in South Carolina. This opposition is

which WILSON referred to cannabis as “the most dangerous drug”:

medical marijuana in South Carolina by stating:

the collateral damage it causes our country.”

The Plaintiff and the Hemp Farming Program

we welcome the chance to push it in new directions.”

South Carolina this year.”

Program Participation Agreement” (hereinafter “Agreement”).

be issued a hemp grower license.

65. Section VIII of the Agreement, titled “Plant Destruction,” stated:

a. Permitted Grower acknowledges and consents to the forfeiture or destruction,

iii. Growing in an area that is not licensed by [DAG].

b. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Permitted Grower or processors may retain any

the sole remedy.

No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision of an

South Carolina Constitution, Art.I, Sec.22, emphasis added.

conditions encountered with farming, an occupation subject to unforeseen, unpredictable, and

uncontrollable environmental and market conditions.