Plaintiff-Appellee Accused-Appellants

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @
"PORDOY," accused-appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J : p
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision 1 dated 18 June 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision 2 dated 30
September 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein appellants
Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao" (Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @ "Pordoy"
(Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants were likewise ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of the deceased victims, i.e.,
Police Officer 3 Hernando P. dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and Technical Sergeant
Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of P50,000.00 each as moral
damages and P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of the
said victims. Similarly, appellants were directed to pay, jointly and severally,
Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan the amount of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees, as well as the costs of the suit.
Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel),
Brigido Abais @ "Bidok" (Brigido), Pedro Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro), Eduardo
Bacong, Sr. (Eduardo, Sr.), Eduardo Bacong, Jr. @ "Junjun" (Eduardo, Jr.),
Alejandro Abarquez (Alejandro), Ruben Bartolo @ "Yoyoy Bulhog" (Ruben),
Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo" (Arnel), Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok"
(Alfredo), Opao Casinillo (Opao) and other John Does, were charged in an
Amended Information 3 dated 3 October 2001 with the crime of double murder
with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [appellants and their co-accused],
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed
with assorted high-powered firearms and hand-grenade, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident
premidation (sic), taking advantage of their superiority in strength and
in numbers, and with intent to kill, ambush, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the persons of the following, namely[:]
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1. [PO3 Dela Cruz], [Philippine National Police (PNP)];
2. [T/Sgt. Dacoco], [Philippine Army (PA)];

3. [Private First Class (PFC)] Haron Angni, PA;
4. [PFC] Gador 4 Tomanto, PA;
5. Juanito Ibunalo; cHEATI
6. Mosanif 5 Ameril;
7. Macasubar 6 Tandayao;
8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan; 7 and
9. Jun Palanas
by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered
firearms thereby inflicting upon the persons of [PO3 De la Cruz],
[T/Sgt. Dacoco], [PFC] Haron Angni, [PFC] Ga[p]or Tomanto, Juanito
Ibunalo, M[o]sani[p] Ameril and [Macasuba] Tandayao gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of the death of
[PO3 De la Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco] and the serious wounding of said
[PFC] Haron Angni, [PFC] Ga[p]or Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosani[p]
Ameril and [Macasuba] Tandayao that without the medical assistance
would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny Tawan[-]tawan
and Jun Palanas were not hit. 8
When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their

counsel de parte 9 and counsel de oficio, 10 respectively; and their co-accused
Samuel, likewise assisted by counsel de oficio, 11 all entered separate pleas of
NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The rest of the accused in this case,
however, remained at large. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a

Motion to Discharge Accused [Samuel] to Be Utilized as State Witness, 12 which
the court a quo granted in an Order dated 12 February 2003. 13 Also, upon
motion of the prosecution, the court a quo issued another Order dated 17
March 2003, 14 directing the release of Samuel from detention following his
discharge as state witness.
As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba
Tandayao (Macasuba), Mosanip Ameril (Mosanip), PFC Gapor Tomanto (PFC
Tomanto), Merlina dela Cruz (Merlina), Senior Police Inspector Renato Salazar
(Senior P/Insp. Salazar), PFC Haron Angni (PFC Angni), Senior Police Officer 4
Raul Torres Medrano (SPO4 Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand Suaring
(SPO1 Suaring), Senior Police Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco (SPO2 Evasco), Senior
Police Officer 4 Emmie Subingsubing (SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo
(Juanito), Senior Police Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny
Tawan-tawan (Mayor Tawan-tawan), testified for the prosecution.
The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the
aforesaid prosecution witnesses is as follows:

On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
together with his security escorts composed of some members of the Philippine
Army, Philippine National Police (PNP) and civilian aides, to wit: (1) T/Sgt.
Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3) PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5) Juanito; (6)
Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a certain Jun, respectively, were in Tubod,
Lanao del Norte. In the afternoon, the group went home to Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan with
Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito. Sitting at the passenger seat of the
aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the back seat were
Mosanip, Jun, and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito. Those
seated on a wooden bench installed at the rear (open) portion of the said
yellow pick-up service vehicle were PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz
and T/Sgt. Dacoco. PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were sitting beside each other
facing the right side of the road while PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco were
both seated behind PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni facing the left side of the road.
15 HATICc
At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their
aforenamed co-accused, brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one located on the left side of the road going
to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed by appellants and their co-
accused to stay in the said waiting shed while they assembled themselves in a
diamond position on both sides of the road, which is more or less five (5)
meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and their co-accused
surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. 16
A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of
Mayor Tawan-tawan approaching towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del
Norte. The moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan
passed by the aforesaid waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened
fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered firearms. Both
Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto,
who was then sitting on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service
vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road firing at them in
a squatting position using an M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba was also able to
identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and
Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito to keep
on driving to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the
army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in
Curva, Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor Tawan-tawan then asked
assistance therefrom. 17
Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran

towards the house of Samuel's aunt located, more or less, 10 meters away
from the site of the ambush to get their bags and other stuff. The house of
Samuel's aunt was the place where appellants and their co-accused stayed
prior to the incident. Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused to the
house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants and their co-accused hurriedly ran
towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte. 18
On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-
tawan, namely, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered
injuries. In particular, Macasuba was slightly hit on the head by shrapnel;
Mosanip sustained injury on his shoulder that almost severed his left arm; PFC
Tomanto was hit on the right and left sides of his body, on his left leg and knee;
PFC Angni was hit on his left shoulder; and Juanito was hit on his right point
finger, right head and left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun were not injured. 19
HTSaEC
All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to Bontilao
Country Clinic in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and were later transferred
to Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital in Tibanga, Iligan City. PO3 Dela Cruz,
however, died before reaching the hospital while T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the
hospital. PFC Tomanto stayed at Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for 13 days
before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de
Oro City, and then in a hospital in Manila and Quezon City. PFC Angni stayed for
seven (7) days in Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital before he was transferred
to Camp Evangelista Hospital, where he was confined for one (1) month. PFC
Angni was transferred to V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City and was confined
therein for two (2) months. 20
On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of

the CAFGU went back to the site of the ambush but appellants and their co-
accused were no longer there. Not long after, SPO4 Medrano, Chief of Police of
Salvador Municipal Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and his troops
arrived. It was while inside the Salvador Municipal Police Station that SPO4
Medrano heard gunfire and he came to know that the group of Mayor Tawan-
tawan was ambushed prompting him and his troops to go to the scene of the
crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed SPO4 Medrano that appellant Wenceslao
was one of those responsible for the ambush. SPO4 Medrano and his troops,
then, conducted an investigation during which he noticed Samuel at the scene
of the crime. Upon interrogation Samuel denied any involvement in the
ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious, hence, he and
his fellow police officers arrested him and turned him over to a certain SPO4
Micabalo, Chief of Police of Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to
Lala Municipal Jail in Lanao del Norte. Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together
with the members of the CAFGU, PNP and the rest of the troops who were at the
scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints believed to be from the culprits.
They conducted a hot pursuit operation towards Barangay Lindongan,
Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, where appellants and their co-accused
were believed to have fled. They were able to recover an M-16 armalite rifle
caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4 Medrano then sent a Spot Report
and a follow-up report about the ambush. He did not, however, reveal the
identity of appellant Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant
Wenceslao could be arrested at the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also
informed the provincial headquarters about the incident through a radio
message. 21
The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring,

member of PNP Lala Municipal Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that there were
electrical supplies and radio antenna in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, left
by the malefactors. SPO1 Suaring, together with Samuel, Senior P/Insp. Salazar,
SPO4 Subingsubing and a certain SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, where they found the materials near the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) canal, which is 30 meters away from the house of
Samuel's aunt. These were photographed. 22
Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a
call from Barangay Kagawad Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a
black backpack was found in Mount Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
which is two (2) kilometers away from the highway. Immediately, SPO2 Evasco
and Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon went to the location. Upon inspection, they recovered
from the backpack an army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch
and one fragmentation grenade cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these to
the police station in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to
Senior P/Insp. Salazar. 23
On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying

appellants and their co-accused as the persons responsible for the ambush of
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. Samuel was, thereafter, incarcerated
at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in Tubod, Lanao del
Norte. 24 caIETS
On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush,
appellant Wenceslao was arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was arrested on 20
December 2001 while working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. It was
Senior P/Insp. Salazar who effected the arrest of the appellants. 25
Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant

Wenceslao presented as witnesses Armida Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey Paninsuro
(Jeffrey), Luzviminda Apolinares (Luzviminda), Rudy Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant
Teofanis Garsuta (Sgt. Garsuta) and Master Sergeant Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt.
Cudilla). Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, did not present any witness
other than himself.
Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house

with his family. At around 1:00 p.m., he went outside their house to clean the
pigsty and feed the pigs. Then, at around 2:30 p.m., Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a
certain Romy, who is a military personnel, arrived to get a copy of the election
returns of the 15 May 2001 elections upon the orders of Tanny Pepito, a
gubernatorial candidate. He told them that he has no copy of the returns. He
then advised them to get it to Atty. Aldoni Umpa (Atty. Umpa) who has a copy.
At that time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside the house while his wife
and nieces were just eight (8) to 10 meters away from them. After 10 minutes,
his visitors left. 26 Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao heard gunfire coming from
the direction of the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His nephew, Jeffrey,
approached and informed him that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the latter's group
were ambushed. After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again heard gunfire.
This time the bullets were already hitting the roof and walls of their house. He
then instructed Jeffrey, who is also a CAFGU member, to report the said
incident and to ask help from the members of the Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 27
When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not
know where his wife and the rest of the women, who were in their house, went
after the gunburst. After more or less 15 minutes, he walked barefooted and
unarmed towards Camp Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed
the former regarding the incident happened in their house. Not long after, a
certain Captain Esmeralda (Capt. Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo
Company of the Philippine Army, arrived. He also approached and informed
Capt. Esmeralda about the incident in their house. Capt. Esmeralda then
ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch appellant
Wenceslao's wife and relatives in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A six-
by-six truck returned to Camp Allere carrying appellant Wenceslao's wife and
relatives. 28 AEDcIH
On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his

wife and daughter, slept in his father's house located, more or less, 100 meters
away from Camp Allere and stayed there for five (5) days. Appellant
Wenceslao's wife then requested for transfer to their son's house in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she could no longer sleep because of what
happened at their house. Thus, they went to their son's house in Kolambugan,
Lanao del Norte, and stayed there for eight (8) days. During that period of time,
he did not hear of any case filed against him. No policemen even bothered to
arrest him. His wife, however, was still afraid, so they left the house of their son
and moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. They stayed there until
he was arrested on 29 August 2001. 29
Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or

less, a 15 minute-vehicle ride from his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao
del Norte, to the site of the ambush in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also,
from his house to Camp Allere it would only take, more or less, 5 minute-
vehicle ride. Appellant Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the vice-
mayoralty position in Salvador, Lanao del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during
the 2001 elections. Way back in the 1998 elections, he ran for mayoralty
position in the same locality against Mayor Tawan-tawan but he lost. On both
occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in the same political
party. Similarly, during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan in 1998, appellant
Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were charged with illegal possession of
firearm. 30
Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who

are appellant Wenceslao's wife, nephew and niece, respectively, corroborated
appellant Wenceslao's testimony on all material points. They all denied that
appellant Wenceslao has something to do with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-
tawan and his group. Nonetheless, Armida admitted that there is a road
connecting San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
There are also vehicles for hire plying the route of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to
San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa. 31
Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslao's
testimony with respect to the fact that on 5 June 2001, he, together with Jacob
Pepito and a certain member of the army intelligence group, went to the house
of appellant Wenceslao to get the election returns. However, he could not recall
anything unusual that happened while he was in the house of appellant
Wenceslao. They left the house of appellant Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m.
Still, no unusual incident happened thereafter. Rudy similarly revealed that he
did not go inside the house of appellant Wenceslao but merely waited for Jacob
Pepito and a member of the army intelligence group inside their vehicle parked
at a distance of, more or less, three (3) meters from the house of appellant
Wenceslao. As such, he did not hear the subject of the conversation between
appellant Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence
group. 32
Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the
afternoon of 5 June 2001, while he was at the legislative hall in Pigcarangan,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte, to secure the canvass of the elections, they received a
radio call from M/Sgt. Cudilla informing them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was
ambushed and the house of appellant Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt.
Esmeralda called them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. As they passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, they
stopped to get some information from the police officers therein. They
proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte. They arrived at Camp
Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he saw appellant Wenceslao
waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla. Appellant Wenceslao then requested that
his family and some personal effects be taken from his house. Thus, Capt.
Esmeralda ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant
Wenceslao's house. Upon reaching the house of appellant Wenceslao, nobody
was there. Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao's wife came out from the nearby
house. Then they ordered her to board a six-by-six truck after taking some
personal belongings of appellant Wenceslao in the latter's house. 33THADEI
M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June
2001, while he was at their command post at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, his detachment commander, a certain T/Sgt. Quijano, called and
informed him through radio that an ambush incident happened in his area of
responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He advised T/Sgt.
Quijano to verify the incident. M/Sgt. Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to
inform the latter about the said ambush incident. He, thereafter, prepared a
perimeter defense in the camp. In the second call of T/Sgt. Quijano, the latter
told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed. After about 15 minutes,
M/Sgt. Cudilla heard gunbursts from Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at Camp Allere.
M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2004, also at around 3:00
p.m., he saw appellant Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside Camp Allere
near Km. Post one. Appellant Wenceslao then informed him of the strafing
incident in his house. When their commanding officer arrived, appellant
Wenceslao approached the former. Thereafter, a platoon was organized
heading towards Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 34
Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was
also in his house in Purok 5, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to
his wife and children because his wife had just given birth in April 2001. In the
afternoon thereof, he heard a gunburst somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, followed by some commotion in the street. Later, his brother,
Joji Ajok, arrived and informed him that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his
house. 35
Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June

2001, he and his family transferred to the house of his parents-in-law at Camp
Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He so decided when he heard rumors that the
supporters of Atty. Umpa, the political rival of Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 2001
local elections, were being persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpa's supporters,
he got scared, prompting him to bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed
there until the following morning and then he left alone for Ozamis City,
Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for three (3) months. Thereafter, he
moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where he worked in the farm
of his friend. He stayed there until he was arrested on 20 December 2001. 36 cACTaI
Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an

instance that Atty. Umpa was harassed or intimidated by the group of Mayor
Tawan-tawan. He claimed that only Atty. Umpa's supporters were harassed. He
also revealed that prior to the ambush incident, there was never an instance
that he was threatened by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just presumed
that Atty. Umpa's supporters were being harassed by the people of Mayor
Tawan-tawan because others were already harassed. 37
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were

victims of the ambush, to be credible, categorical, straightforward, spontaneous
and consistent, coupled with their positive identification of the appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime and their lack of ill-motive to falsely testify
against them, vis-à-vis the defense of denial and alibi proffered by the latter,
the trial court rendered its Decision on 30 September 2005 finding appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial court's Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered finding [herein appellants Wenceslao and
Ricardo] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder, and the Court hereby sentences them to
suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the late [PO3 Dela Cruz] the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P50,000.00 for
and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of the late [T/Sgt. Dacoco] the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages plus P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto;
and to pay, jointly and severally, Ex-Mayor Johnny Tawantawan the
amount of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade
and the [G]arand pouch are hereby ordered turned-over to the Firearm
and Explosive Unit of the PNP Headquarters, Pigcarangan, Tubod,
Lanao del Norte, for proper disposition as authorized by law.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the [appellants]

shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison term provided
they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code. [Appellant Wenceslao] was arrested on 29 August 2001 and
detained since then up to the present. While [appellant Ricardo] was
arrested on 20 December 2001 and detained since then up to the
present.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without
prejudice on the part of the prosecution to prosecute the case against
the other accused who remain at-large, as soon as said accused are
apprehended. 38 [Emphasis supplied].
Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial court's

Decision to the Court of Appeals via Notice of Appeal, 39 and, thereafter,
submitted their respective appeal briefs.
In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF

THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE AND NOT
ORCHESTRATED LIES INTENDED TO FALSELY IMPUTE THE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY TO [APPELLANT WENCESLAO][;] DHAcET
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES

OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON
MINOR AND TRIVIAL POINTS[;]
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO

AND RICARDO] FAILED TO CAST ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THAT THESE WITNESSES HAD NO
IMPROPER AND NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE
[APPELLANTS][;]
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE

MILITARY MEN WHO ARE NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE
WITNESSES[;]
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANT WENCESLAO]

ABSCONDED AND IN IMPUTING MALICE ON THE ACT OF [APPELLANT
WENCESLAO] IN TEMPORARILY LEAVING HIS RESIDENCE[;]
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT WENCESLAO]

OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF
DOUBTFUL VERACITY[;]
VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF

[APPELLANT WENCESLAO] BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE WHICH ARE
NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR[.] 40
While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT
RICARDO] DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 41 aHTcDA
On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
affirming appellants' conviction of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals held
that the evidence on record disclosed that the alleged inconsistencies pointed
to by appellant Wenceslao refer only to minor matters. The same did not
damage the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan. Honest inconsistencies
on minor and trivial points serve to strengthen rather than destroy the
credibility of a witness to a crime. Moreover, since the prosecution witnesses
positively identified appellants in open court as among the perpetrators of the
ambush, the same must prevail over the alleged inconsistencies, as well as the
defense of denial and alibi interposed by the appellants. Denial is a negative
and self-serving assertion that cannot overcome the victim's affirmative,
categorical and convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi to prosper, it
must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was
impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission and not merely assert that he was somewhere else. As in the
present case, the trial court took judicial notice of the distance of seven (7)
kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where appellants reside, and
San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush incident took place.
Appellants, therefore, could not successfully invoke alibi as a defense because
it was not physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the
crime. 42 The Court of Appeals then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate
APPEALS are DENIED, and the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. 43
Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of

Appeals to this Court via Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution 44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the

parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desire. In lieu thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation 45
stating that it will no longer file a supplement to its Consolidated Appellee's
Brief 46 dated 14 December 2006 there being no transactions, occurrences or
events which have happened since the appellate court's Decision was
rendered.
Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs, 47

which were a mere rehash of the arguments already discussed in their
respective Appellant's Briefs 48 submitted before the appellate court. In his
Supplemental Brief, appellant Wenceslao reiterates that: the trial court and the
Court of Appeals committed reversible errors when they decided a question of
substance which is not in accord with established facts and the applicable laws.
49 He, once again, enumerated the following errors committed by the appellate
court, thus:
I.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they
ruled that the inconsistencies committed by the prosecution
witnesses are on minor and trivial points when these inconsistencies
are indicative of the innocence of [appellant Wenceslao][;]HAIDcE
II.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as

indicative of innocence of [appellant Wenceslao] the fact that the
authorities did not include in the police report the name of [appellant
Wenceslao] and did not arrest him immediately after the ambush, or
within a couple of months from the date of the ambush[;]
III.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when they deliberately refused or failed to consider and appreciate
the testimonies of the military officers who are neutral, impartial, and
objective witnesses[;]
IV.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to
consider the evidence for the defense despite the clear and
unmistakable proof of their honesty and integrity[;]
V.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately
[misinterpreted] the facts and [misapplied] the laws regarding "flight"
as an alleged indication of guilt[;]
VI.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted [appellant
Wenceslao] based on jurisprudence on " a l i b i " which are not
applicable in the case at bar 50 [Emphasis and italicized omitted].
Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies

of the prosecution witnesses would show these are tainted with glaring
inconsistencies, which are badges of lies and dishonesty, thus, casting doubts
on their credibility.
The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as follows: (1)
whether PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were already with Mayor Tawan-tawan
from Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to Tubod, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa, or
they merely hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan's vehicle on their way home
to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (2) if so, the place where PFC Tomanto and PFC
Angni hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan's vehicle; (3) the officer from whom
PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni got permission in order to go home to Salvador,
Lanao del Norte; (4) PFC Angni allegedly knew appellant Wenceslao prior to the
ambush incident on 5 June 2001 and he even saw appellant Wenceslao as
among the perpetrators of the ambush, yet, he did not mention the name of
the former in his affidavit; (5) Mayor Tawan-tawan should have mentioned the
name of appellant Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush
incident when he reported the same to SPO4 Medrano; (6) SPO4 Medrano
should have included the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he
transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP and should have
immediately caused his arrest if he truly participated in the ambush incident;
(7) it would no longer be necessary to discharge Samuel and to make him as
state witness if the victims of the ambush incident, indeed, saw the
perpetrators of the crime; and (8) if appellant Wenceslao was one of the
ambushers, Samuel would not have failed to mention the former in his sworn
statement.
Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated inconsistencies
only proved that he has no participation in the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan
and his companions. The declaration of his innocence is thus called for.
Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him. The motive
was to remove him, being the only non-Muslim leader, in the Municipality of
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, who has the courage to challenge the reign of Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his clan. It was also an act of revenge against him for
opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections. As to Samuel's motive,
appellant Wenceslao claims that it was for self-preservation, freedom, leniency
and some other consideration. Evidently, after Samuel's testimony, the latter
was released from jail.
Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5

June 2001 as can be gleaned from the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt.
Garsuta.
Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of
guilt. He justified his temporary absence from his residence by stating that it
was because of the traumatic experience of his wife, who had no peace of mind
since their house was riddled with bullets by lawless elements without any
cause.
With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the
determination of credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters
of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best
position to discern whether they are telling the truth. 51 Moreover, credibility, to
state what is axiomatic, is the sole province of the trial court. In the absence of
any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result
of the case, the trial court's findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses
will not be disturbed on appeal. 52 A careful perusal of the records of this case
revealed that none of these circumstances is attendant herein.
The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial
court places this case under the rule that factual findings are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court. No reason has
been given by appellants to deviate from the factual findings arrived at by the
trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were
victims of the 5 June 2001 ambush incident. As such, they actually witnessed
what exactly happened on that fateful day, especially Macasuba and PFC Angni,
who vividly saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road and in a
squatting position firing at them with his M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC
Angni, having seated behind the driver and on the rear (open) portion of the
yellow pick-up service vehicle, respectively, both facing the right side of the
road, were in such a position to see without any obstruction how appellant
Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle with his M-16 armalite rifle while they
were traversing the road of San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, on their way
home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Macasuba was also able to identify
appellant Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as
among the perpetrators of the ambush.
It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in
broad daylight, such that it would not be impossible for Macasuba and PFC
Angni to have seen and identified their assailants, particularly appellant
Wenceslao, who was once chief of Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), then
municipal councilor and twice elected vice-mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 53 IHDCcT
The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally

confirmed by Samuel, an accused-turned-state-witness, who, in his testimony
before the open court, narrated how appellants and their co-accused, Pedro,
Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao,
brought him in the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte;
assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road;
surreptitiously waited for the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group; and executed the ambush from the moment the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the aforesaid waiting shed.
Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities of
the appellants and their co-accused as the perpetrators of the ambush because
he was near the scene of the crime, i.e., merely five (5) meters away therefrom.
This is aside from the fact that appellants and their co-accused were the very
same people who brought him to the site of the ambush. Appellants and their
co-accused likewise stayed for a long period of time in the house of Samuel's
aunt prior to the ambush incident and Samuel is very well-acquainted with
these people for he himself resided therein. 54
Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution
witnesses, Macasuba, PFC Angni and Samuel, have firmly established the
identities of appellants as the perpetrators of the ambush. In addition, their
testimonies on who and how the crime was committed were characterized by
the trial court as simple and candid. Even their answers to questions were
simple, straightforward and categorical. Such simplicity and candidness in their
testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth, thus, strengthening
their credibility as witnesses.
Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao

that allegedly cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, this
Court finds them frivolous, trivial, minor, irrelevant and have nothing to do with
the essential elements of the crime charged, i.e., double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder. In the same manner, they do
not detract from the fact that Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group, which
includes PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni, were ambushed by appellants and their
co-accused on 5 June 2001 while on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle as
it passed by the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte.
And, said ambush resulted in the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and
injuries to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito.
It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to

minor details or collateral matters do not affect his or her credibility as these
variations are in fact indicative of truth and show that the witness was not
coached to fabricate or dissemble. An inconsistency, which has nothing to
do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a
conviction. 55
Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel's failure to name appellant Wenceslao in

their affidavits/sworn statements as one of the ambushers does not necessarily
render their testimonies implausible and unworthy of belief.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given
in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken
ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the
testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact
that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than
those stated in sworn statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate
for a variety of reasons. More so, because of the partial and innocent
suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In addition, an extrajudicial
statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statement, hence,
omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the
prosecution witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand
are superior to their extrajudicial statements. 56 Similarly, the failure of a
witness to immediately disclose the name of the culprit does not necessarily
impair his or her credibility. 57
A meticulous perusal of Samuel's sworn statement reveals that he

categorically mentioned therein the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the
ambushers. In his sworn statement, Samuel specifically stated that during the
ambush, he saw appellant Wenceslao at the other side of the road, just a few
meters away from the bridge, who, at that time armed with an M-16 rifle, was
likewise firing towards the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. 58 Above all, both PFC
Angni and Samuel positively identified appellant Wenceslao in open court as
one of those responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.
59 Such open court declaration is much stronger than their affidavits/sworn
statements.
Mayor Tawan-tawan's failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name of
appellant Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush and SPO4
Medrano's failure to include the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot
Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP would not inure
to appellant Wenceslao's benefit.
As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when Mayor
Tawan-tawan and SPO4 Medrano met at the scene of the crime, the former
immediately told the latter that appellant Wenceslao was one of the
ambushers. 60 This belied the claim of appellant Wenceslao that Mayor Tawan-
tawan did not tell SPO4 Medrano that he (appellant Wenceslao) was among the
ambushers. Also, SPO4 Medrano provided an explanation 61 for his failure to
state in his Spot Reports the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the
ambushers. And, even granting that his explanation would not have been
satisfactory, still, SPO4 Medrano's failure to mention appellant Wenceslao's
name in his Spot Reports was not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. More
especially because appellant Wenceslao was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate
the fact that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw
appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime. To note, appellants were
not the only persons accused of the crime; they were many including Pedro,
Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao.
In order to give justice to the victims of the ambush, especially those who have
died by reason thereof, all persons responsible therefor must be penalized.
Since Samuel knew all those who have participated in the ambush incident, his
testimony as to the other accused in this case is material to strengthen the
case of the prosecution against them. Unfortunately, the other accused in this
case remained at large until now.
As aptly observed by the trial court, thus: DTIaHE
. . . The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity

of the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses who are all in one
pointing to [herein appellant Wenceslao] as one of those who
participated in the ambush, and on the veracity of the testimonies of
the two prosecution eyewitnesses — [Macasuba and Samuel] — to the
effect that [appellant Ricardo] was among the people who perpetrated
the said ambush.
The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The
simplicity and candidness of their testimonies only prove that they
were telling the truth. Their answers to questions were simple,
straightforward and categorical; spontaneous, frank and consistent.
Thus, a witness who testifies categorically, spontaneously, frankly and
consistently is a credible witness. 62
Appellant Wenceslao's allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of

prosecution witnesses, including Samuel, have no leg to stand on.
The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of

appellant Wenceslao that the motive of the prosecution witnesses in testifying
against him was to remove him as the only non-Muslim leader in the
Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and that it was an act of revenge for
opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections. Appellant Wenceslao
failed to present an iota of evidence to support his aforesaid allegations. As
properly stated by the Court of Appeals, "[m]ere allegation or claim is not proof.
Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation." Also, it must be
emphasized that during the 1998 elections, it was Mayor Tawan-tawan who
won the mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly implausible for Mayor Tawan-
tawan, who emerged as the victor, to take revenge against the losing
candidate, appellant Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao failed to prove
any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses. It is settled that where
the defense fails to prove that witnesses are moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimonies are therefore
entitled to full weight and credit. 63
To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush.
Being the aggrieved parties, they all desire justice for what had happened to
them, thus, it is unnatural for them to falsely accuse someone other than the
real culprits. Otherwise stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution
witnesses to implicate an innocent person to the crime. It has been correctly
observed that the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victims,
more so, the victims themselves, in securing the conviction of the guilty would
deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the
culprits would gain immunity. 64
Contrary to appellant Wenceslao's assertion, this Court is convince that

his and appellant Ricardo's flight from the scene of the crime immediately after
the ambush is an evidence of their guilt. It is noteworthy that after the ambush
incident, appellant Wenceslao immediately left his residence and moved to his
father's house, then to his son's house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and
lastly to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested.
Appellant Ricardo did the same thing. From his residence in Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he transferred to his parents-in-law's house, then he
left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and thereafter, moved to Puting
Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until he was arrested on 20 December 2001. If
appellants were truly innocent of the crime charged, they would not go into
hiding rather they would face their accusers to clear their names. Courts go by
the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the
righteous are as bold as a lion." 65
Appellants' respective explanations regarding their flight fail to persuade

this Court. It bears emphasis that after the alleged strafing of appellant
Wenceslao's house, all he did is to move from one place to another instead of
having it investigated by the authorities. Until now, the alleged strafing of his
house remains a mystery. If that strafing incident truly happened, he would be
much eager to know who caused it in order to penalize the author thereof.
Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was allegedly afraid of being persecuted
for being one of the supporters of Mayor Tawan-tawan's political rival. His fear,
however, was more imaginary than real. The aforesaid claim of appellant
Ricardo was uncorroborated, hence, cannot be given any considerable weight.
In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, coupled with their positive identification of appellants as
among the perpetrators of the ambush, appellants' defense of denial and alibi
cannot prosper.
As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that appellants committed the crime. 66 For alibi to
prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not
enough to prove that appellants were somewhere else when the crime
happened. They must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at
the approximate time of its commission. 67 Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of
any weight in law. 68 A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and
constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. 69
In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their
respective houses in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the ambush
incident happened and they have no involvement whatsoever in the
commission thereof.
To corroborate appellant Wenceslao's testimony, the defense presented

Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslao's wife, nephew
and niece, respectively. This Court, however, cannot give credence to the
testimonies of these defense witnesses. Being appellant Wenceslao's relatives,
their testimonies are rendered suspect because the former's relationship to
them makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The
defense of alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by the appellant
himself and his relatives, and not by credible persons. 70 This Court further
quote with conformity the observation made by the trial court, viz.: IDaEHS
FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for

[herein appellant Wenceslao] were shattered by the testimony of
[Rudy], another witness for [appellant Wenceslao], who categorically
told the Court that during the time he and his companions Jacob Pepito
and a certain Romy were in the house of [appellant Wenceslao] in the
afternoon of 5 June 2001, there was no unusual incident that took
place, as well as no unusual incident that happened when they
left the house of [appellant Wenceslao] at about 2:45 in the
afternoon.
The foregoing testimony of [Rudy] clearly imparts that the visit of
[Rudy] and his companions to the house of [appellant Wenceslao], if
any, happened on another date. This will be so because if [appellant
Wenceslao] and his closely related witnesses are telling the truth that
Jacob Pepito, [Rudy] and Romy were in the house of [appellant
Wenceslao] talking about the said election returns during that fateful
afternoon, then definitely, [Rudy] should have had known of the
ambush incident, said incident being spreaded n throughout or
shall we say, "the talk of the town" that afternoon of 5 June
2001.
If the ambush incident occurred on the day [Rudy] and his
companions visited [appellant Wenceslao], then, no doubt that
[Rudy] will tell the Court about it. But his testimony was
otherwise. 71 [Emphasis supplied].
In the same breath, appellant Ricardo's defense of denial and alibi cannot
be given any evidentiary value as it was unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo
never presented any witness to support his claim that he was simply inside
their house attending to his wife and children during the time that the ambush
incident happened. This Court reiterates that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no
weight in law. Between the categorical and positive assertions of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused which are
uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the former indisputably
deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight. 72
Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the
scene of the crime in the afternoon of 5 June 2001. As observed by the trial
court and the appellate court, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both
appellants' reside, is only about seven (7) kilometers away from San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush took place. 73
All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate
court that, indeed, appellants were among the perpetrators of the ambush
against Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. Prosecution witnesses' categorical,
positive and straightforward testimonies, coupled with their positive
identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime, prevail over
appellants' defense of bare denial and alibi.
As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court,
convicted appellants of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and
double attempted murder. This Court believes, however, that appellants
should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of
two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as
the killing and wounding of the victims in this case were not the result of a
single act but of several acts of the appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code inapplicable.
Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle
boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets discharged from
their firearms when the said vehicle passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, resulted in the death of two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e.,
PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].
Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the

commission of the crime. Time and again, this Court, in a plethora of cases,
has consistently held that there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might
make. There are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to
wit: (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of
execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in
a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." 74
The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did
not allow the hapless victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any
opportunity to put up a decent defense. The attack was executed by appellants
and their-co-accused in such a vicious manner as to make the defense virtually
impossible. Under the circumstances, it is very apparent that appellants
had murder in their hearts when they waylaid their unwary victims. 75
Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, appellants
should be held liable for murder.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however,
cannot be appreciated as it is deemed absorbed in treachery. 76
Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of

evident premeditation, the circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. To
prove this aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a
lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime and the
execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 77 None of these elements could be gathered from the
evidence on record.
As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito, although they were injured during the ambush and were all
hospitalized, except for Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their injuries and
wounds were mortal or fatal such that without the timely medical assistance
accorded to them, they would have died. 78 However, it does not necessarily
follow that the crimes committed against the aforenamed victims were simply
less serious physical injuries. Also, even though Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun did
not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does not mean that no crime has
been committed against them. The latter were just fortunate enough not to
have sustained any injury on the occasion thereof. Since appellants were
motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba, Mosanip,
PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun,
appellants should be held guilty of attempted murder. aHcACT
What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether
the conviction of appellants must be for the separate crimes of two (2) counts
of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised

Penal Code which explicitly states that: 79
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however,

in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only
one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex
crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known
as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single
bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs
where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 80
Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the
circumstances present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a
compound crime.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and
wounding of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by
the appellants and their co-accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused
opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan
and his group. As a result, two security escorts died while five (5) of them were
wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts
of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had
hit the victims. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the
victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 81 each act by each gunman pulling the
trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
complex crime. 82
Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single

act but several individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime.
Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of
a "single act."
There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code despite the fact that several acts were performed by
several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to the death and/or
injuries to their victims.
In People v. Lawas, 83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of

their leader, Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As
a result, 50 persons died. It was there held that the killing was the result of
a single impulse as there was no intent on the part of the accused to
fire at each and every victim separately and distinctly from each
other. If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal
impulse, it constitutes a single offense. However, "single criminal impulse"
was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
in the said case because there was therein no evidence at all showing the
identity or number of persons killed by each accused. There was also no
conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, thus, collective criminal
responsibility could not be imputed upon the accused. Since it was
impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by each of them,
this Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of only one
offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them
responsible for 50 deaths. 84
Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as

this Court held in People v. Remollino, 85 the Lawas doctrine is more of an
exception than the general rule.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises
on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one
of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by
any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a
crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the
offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who
inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same
criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all. 86
The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged
conspiracy, among others. Although the trial court did not directly state that a
conspiracy existed, such may be inferred from the concerted actions of the
appellants and their co-accused, to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused
brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on the left side of the road where the
yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group
would pass; (2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter, assembled
themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for the
aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up
service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused
opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of
the victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the
house of Samuel's aunt to get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed
appellants and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and their co-accused fled.
Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of

the appellants and their co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They
were synchronized in their approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle boarded
by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a single criminal
impulse — to kill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the
accused persons had a common purpose and were united in its execution.
Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the
moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal
responsibility. 87
With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their
co-accused had assumed joint criminal responsibility — the act of one is the act
of all. The ascertainment of who among them actually hit, killed and/or caused
injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility
replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the
impossibility of determining who killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.
Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos, 88 People v. Abella, 89 People v.

Garcia 90 and People v. Pincalin, 91 this Court also applied Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code even though several acts were performed by the accused
and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. ICAcTa
I n People v. De los Santos, 92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive

days inside the national penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e.,
Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates were killed. Fourteen
(14) inmates were then convicted for the crime of multiple murder. The
existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime was duly proven. There
was, however, no discussion why the accused were convicted of a complex
crime instead of separate crimes.
In a similar case of People v. Abella, 93 involving the massacre of certain

prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that occurred
in the national penitentiary on 16 February 1958 (subject of De los Santos), all
the accused were also convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Conspiracy likewise attended the commission of the
crime. This Court applied the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the
ruling in the said case is predicated on the theory that "when for the attainment
of a single purpose which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed,
such acts must be considered only as one offense," a complex one. The
Lawas doctrine was equally applied although conspiracy had been duly proven.
This Court then stated that where a conspiracy animates several persons
with a single purpose "their individual acts in pursuance of that
purpose are looked upon as a single act — the act of execution —
giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious agreement produces a sole
and solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being." 94
People v. Garcia 95 and People v. Pincalin 96 have the same factual

background as De los Santos and Abella. They were the third and fourth cases,
respectively, of prison riots resulting to the killing of convicts by fellow convicts
while inside the national penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were convicted for
the complex crime of multiple murder and double attempted murder, while in
Pincalin the accused were convicted for the complex crime of double murder
and frustrated murder. In both cases, this Court found conspiracy to have
attended the commission of the crime.
In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin,

this Court, gave the same justification as in Abella: that both cases were
covered by the rule that "when for the attainment of a single purpose,
which constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such acts
must be considered as only one offense, a complex one."
Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates several persons with a
single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose
are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a
complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may
constitute a single complex offense. 97
We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine,
contrary to Lawas, that Article 48 is applicable even in cases where several acts
were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of
the crime. In Pincalin, this Court has already clarified that: [n]onetheless, this
Court further held that "in other cases where several killings on the same
occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be
applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses, as
opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided cases." 98
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to

the general rule stated in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the
peculiar circumstance of the cases.
It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad, 99 this Court, once again,
applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of the
case were not the same as in Lawas, De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin,
where this Court departed from the general rule.
In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a

volley of shots at the jeepney boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all
passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando), survived the ambush and
suffered only minor injuries. Conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.
Accused were convicted for the complex crime of murder and multiple
attempted murder. We there held that the case comes within the purview of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing L a w a s a n d Abella, it was
pronounced that although several independent acts were performed by the
accused, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed
Rolando; and that there was no evidence that the accused intended to fire at
each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On
the premise that the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill
Marlon Tugadi's group as a whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution,
giving rise to a single complex offense. 100
The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.
The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in

Pincalin, thus: where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated,
but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the
killings would be treated as separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did
not involve prisoners or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners.
As such, Abella would not apply.
To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number
of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was not proven therein,
joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each
accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear
evidence showing the number of persons actually killed by each of them.
Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty. HIAESC
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It
is as though each one performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each
one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the
several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48.
The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the
definitional phrase "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies." This is not an original reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, 101
the Court already recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes." As we observed in People v. Tabaco, 102 clarifying the applicability of
Article 48 of the [Revised Penal Code], [this Court] further stated in [ Hon.]
Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of
criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 103
With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of
attempted murder.
As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed
upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph 2,
Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal Code. 105
Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The
penalty prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should
be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article 51 106 of the Revised Penal
Code. Under paragraph 2, Article 61, 107 in relation to Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the same should be imposed in its medium period
pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64 108 of the Revised Penal Code. 109 Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of attempted murder, the
maximum shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, which is 8
years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correctional, in any of its periods, the
range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore, imposed
upon the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum,
for each count of attempted murder.
As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages

may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
and (5) temperate damages. 110
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result
of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the
death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof thereof. Moral
damages like civil indemnity, is also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
murder. 111 Therefore, the trial court and the appellate court properly awarded
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the
amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each deceased victims.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. In this case, treachery may no longer be considered as an
aggravating circumstance since it was already taken as a qualifying
circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior strength which would
otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages was already absorbed in
the treachery. 112 However, in People v. Combate, 113 this Court still awards
exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to deter
similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good. Thus, to deter
future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of each deceased victims is proper. 114
The said amount is in conformity with this Court's ruling in People v. Gutierrez.
115
Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts

covering the expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other expenses for
the death of the victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages may be recovered
where it has been shown that the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss
but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty as provided for under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code. 116 In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs
of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was
not proved with certainty. Thus, this Court similarly awards P25,000.00 as
temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victims. 117
The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito, are also entitled to moral, temperate and exemplary damages.
Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds
inflicted upon the aforesaid victims would naturally cause physical suffering,
fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. 118 It is only justifiable
to grant them moral damages in the amount of P40,000.00 each in conformity
with this Court's ruling in People v. Mokammad. 119
The award of P25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba,

Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito is also in order. It is beyond
doubt that these victims were hospitalized and spent money for their
medication. As to Macasuba, although he was not confined in a hospital, it
cannot be gainsaid that he also spent for the treatment of the minor injuries he
sustained by reason of the ambush. However, they all failed to present any
receipt therefor. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that they suffered
pecuniary loss; thus, it is only prudent to award temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 to each of them.
The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba,

Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito are awarded exemplary damages
in the amount of P30,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence. 120
This Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees, as well as costs of the suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-tawan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246 dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
(1) appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
murder thereby imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count; (2) appellants are also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven
(7) counts of attempted murder thereby imposing upon them the indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10
years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count; (3) other than the civil
indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the trial court and the
appellate court, appellants are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
exemplary and temperate damages in the amount of P30,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each deceased victims; and (4)
appellants are also directed to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba, Mosanip,
PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito the amount of P40,000.00 each as moral
damages, P25,000.00 each as temperate damages and P30,000.00 each as
exemplary damages.
Costs against appellants. SACTIH
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion with Associate Justices

Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring. Rollo , pp. 3-32.
2.Penned by Presiding Judge Jacob T. Malik. CA rollo, pp. 74-101.
3.Records, pp. 48-51.

4.Both in the Medical Certificate dated 3 January 2003 (see Records, p. 272) and in
the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 13 February 2003, Tomanto's first
name appears to be "Gador" and not "Gador."
5.Sometimes spelled as "Musanip" per his Affidavit-Complaint dated 11 June 2001

(see Records, p. 267) and "Mosanip" per Transcript of Stenographic Notes
dated 5 February 2003.
6.In the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 15 January 2003, Tandayao's first
name is "Macasuba" not "Macasubar."
7.Johnny Tawantawan was referred to as Mayor in the Amended Information

because at the time the ambush incident happened on 5 June 2001 he was
the incumbent Mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, though at the time the
Amended Information was filed his term of office has already expired. Also,
his surname is spelled as "Tawan-tawan" in most of the documents attached
in this case.
8.Records, pp. 48-49.

9.Per Certificate of Arraignment dated 16 April 2002 and RTC Order dated 16 April
2002. Id. at 98 and 101-102.
10.Per Certificate of Arraignment dated 4 June 2002 and RTC Order dated 4 June
2002. Id. at 103 and 106.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 141-144.
13.Id. at 168-170.
14.Id. at 185-186.
15.Testimony of Macasuba Tandayao, TSN, 15 January 2003, pp. 6-7 and 14;
Testimony of Mosanip Ameril, TSN, 5 February 2003, pp. 10-11 and 20;
Testimony of PFC Gapor Tomanto, TSN, 13 February 2003, pp. 3-5 and 17-18;
TSN, Testimony of PFC Haron Angni, 30 April 2003, pp. 3-4; Testimony of
Juanito Ibunalo, TSN, 4 September 2003, pp. 9-10; Testimony of Mayor
Johnny Tawan-tawan, TSN, 27 November 2003, pp. 5 and 10.
16.Testimony of Macasuba Tandayao, id. at 10; Testimony of PFC Gapor Tomanto,

id. at 6; Testimony of Samuel Cutad, TSN, 17 March 2003, pp. 15 and 17.
17.Testimony of Macasuba Tandayao, id. at 7 and 9-11; Testimony of Mosanip
Ameril, TSN, 5 February 2003, pp. 11-12 and 17-18; Testimony of PFC Gapor
Tomanto, id. at 4-6; Testimony of Samuel Cutad, id. at 8-9 and 16; Testimony
of PFC Haron Angni, TSN, 30 April 2003, pp. 4-6; Testimony of Juanito Ibunalo,
TSN, 4 September 2003, pp. 14-16; Testimony of Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan,
TSN, 27 November 2003, pp. 5-6.
18.Testimony of Samuel Cutad, id. at 9, 18-19 and 47.
19.Testimony of Macasuba Tandayao, TSN, 15 January 2003, pp. 8 and 16;

Testimony of Mosanip Ameril, TSN, 5 February 2003, p. 11; Testimony of PFC
Gapor Tomanto, TSN, 13 February 2003, p. 5; Testimony of PFC Haron Angni,
TSN, 30 April 2003, p. 6.
20.Testimony of Mosanip Ameril, id. at 12; Testimony of PFC Gapor Tomanto, TSN,
13 February 2003, p. 7; Testimony of PFC Haron Angni, TSN, 30 April 2003,
pp. 6-7; Testimony of Juanito Ibunalo, TSN, 4 September 2003, pp. 10 and 16.
21.Testimony of Samuel Cutad, TSN, 17 March 2003, p. 23; Testimony of SPO4

Raul Torres Medrano, id. at 4-7, 11-16 and 22.
22.Testimony of SPO1 Ferdinand Suaring, TSN, 14 August 2003, pp. 3-8.
23.Testimony of SPO2 Ivan Mutia Evasco, TSN, 14 August 2003, pp. 9-15.
24.Testimony of Samuel Cutad, TSN, 17 March 2003, pp. 31-44; Testimony of

Senior P/Insp. Renato Salazar, TSN, 26 March 2003, p. 8.
25.Testimony of Senior P/Insp. Salazar, id. at 3-5; Testimony of Wenceslao
Nelmida, TSN, 24 November 2004, p. 11; Testimony of Ricardo Ajok, TSN, 15
September 2004, p. 6.
26.Testimony of Wenceslao Nelmida, id. at 2-6 and 12; Testimony of Wenceslao
Nelmida, TSN, 4 January 2005, p. 5.
27.Testimony of Wenceslao Nelmida, TSN, 24 November 2004, p. 7.
28.Testimony of Wenceslao Nelmida, id. at 8-10.
29.Testimony of Wenceslao Nelmida, id. at 10-11; Testimony of Wenceslao

Nelmida, TSN, 4 January 2005, pp. 6-8.
30.Testimony of Wenceslao Nelmida, id. at 4; Testimony of Wenceslao Nelmida, id.

at 4 and 13; Court of Appeals Decision dated 18 June 2008. Rollo, pp. 25-26.
31.Testimony of Armida Nelmida, TSN, 26 May 2004, pp. 2-10; Testimony of Jeffrey
Paninsuro, TSN, 9 June 2004, pp. 2-14; Testimony of Luzviminda Apolinares,
TSN, 7 July 2004, pp. 2-8.
32.Testimony of Rudy Alegado, TSN, 4 August 2004, pp. 2-17.

33.Testimony of Sgt. Teofanis Garsuta, TSN, 11 August 2004, pp. 2-6, 11.
34.Testimony of M/Sgt. Pio Cudilla, TSN, 8 September 2004, pp. 2-10.
35.Testimony of Ricardo Ajok, TSN, 15 September 2004, pp. 2-4.
36.Testimony of Ricardo Ajok, id. at 4-6.

37.Testimony of Ricardo Ajok, TSN, 13 October 2004, pp. 3 and 5.
38.CA rollo, pp. 100-101.
39.Records, pp. 463 and 465.
40.CA rollo, pp. 15-16.

41.Id. at 110.
42.Rollo, pp. 28-31.
43.Id. at 31.
44.Id. at 39-40.
45.Id. at 48-50.
46.CA rollo, pp. 176-201.
47.Rollo, pp. 55-60 and 62-116.

48.CA rollo, pp. 10-72 and 108-122.
49.Rollo, p. 71.
50.Id. at 71-72.
51.People v. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, 22 September 2010, 631 SCRA 187, 208-209.
52.People v. Bondoy, G.R. No. 79089, 18 May 1993, 222 SCRA 216, 229.
53.Testimony of Macasuba Tandayao, TSN, 15 January 2003, p. 5; Testimony of

Ricardo Ajok, TSN, 15 September 2004, p. 2.

54.Testimony of Samuel Cutad, TSN, 17 March 2003, pp. 9 and 12.
55.People v. Ignas, 458 Phil. 965, 988 (2003).
56.People v. Astudillo, 449 Phil. 778, 790-791 (2003).
57.People v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 123939, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 52, 66.
58.Sworn Statement of Samuel Cutad. Records, p. 13.

59.Testimony of PFC Haron Angni, TSN, 30 April 2003, p. 5; Testimony of Samuel
Cutad, TSN, 17 March 2003, p. 4.
60.Testimony of SPO4 Raul Torres Medrano, TSN, 17 July 2003, pp. 4 and 17.
61.SPO4 Medrano did not reveal the identity of appellant Wenceslao so that if
warrant of arrest would be issued against him, he could be arrested at the
earliest possible time (Testimony of SPO4 Raul Torres Medrano, TSN, 17 July
2003, p. 11).
62.CA rollo, p. 94.
63.People v. Emoy, 395 Phil. 371, 384 (2000).
64.People v. Reynes, 423 Phil. 363, 382 (2001).

65.People v. Cañedo, 390 Phil. 379, 396 (2000).
66.People v. Veloso, 386 Phil. 815, 825 (2000).
67.People v. Lacatan, 356 Phil. 510, 521 (1998).
68.People v. Barde, supra note 51 at 211.

69.People v. Arofo, 430 Phil. 475, 484-485 (2002).
70.People v. Maceda, 405 Phil. 698, 711 (2001).
71.CA rollo, pp. 96-97.
72.People v. Hilet, 450 Phil. 481, 490-491 (2003).

73.Rollo, p. 31.
75.People v. Sanidad, 450 Phil. 449, 462-463 (2003).
76.People v. Cawaling, 355 Phil. 1, 42 (1998).

77.Id.
78.As evidenced by the Medical Certificates issued to Mosanip Ameril, PFC Gapor
Tomanto, PFC Haron Angni and Juanito Ibunalo. Records, pp. 268-273.
79.People v. Bermas, 369 Phil. 191, 237 (1999).

80.People v. Gaffud, Jr., G.R. No. 168050, 19 September 2008, 566 SCRA 76, 88;
People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, 29 June 2010, 622 SCRA 417, 435.
81.364 Phil. 259 (1999).

82.Id. at 278.
83.97 Phil. 975 (1955).
84.Campanilla, The Revised Penal Code (Book One) 2007, pp. 916-917 citing
People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480, 26 February 1991, 194 SCRA 432, 444-445;
People v. Orias, supra note 80 at 435-436 citing People v. Hon. Pineda, 127
Phil. 150, 155-156 (1967).
85.109 Phil. 607 (1960).
86.People v. Orias, supra note 80 at 433.
87.Id. at 434.
88.122 Phil. 55 (1965).

89.181 Phil. 285 (1979).
90.185 Phil. 362 (1980).
91.190 Phil. 117 (1981).
92.Supra note 88.

93.Supra note 89.
94.Id. at 311-313. (Emphasis supplied).
95.Supra note 90.
96.Supra note 91.

97.People v. Garcia, supra note 90 at 369-370 (emphasis supplied); People v.
Pincalin, supra note 91 at 125. (Emphasis supplied)
98.People v. Pincalin, id. at 126. (Emphasis supplied)
99.Supra note 75.

100.Id. at 463-464.
101.Supra note 84 at 154.
102.336 Phil. 771 (1997).
103.Id. at 802-803 citing People v. Hon. Pineda, supra note 84 at 154-155.

104.ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
105.People v. Molina, G.R. No. 184173, 13 March 2009, 581 SCRA 519, 540.
106.ART. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crime. —
The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.
107.ART. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating
the penalties which, according to the provisions of articles 50 to 57,
inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of
any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the
following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full
extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
108.ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three
periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three
periods, whether it be single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of
the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they

shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
109.People v. Molina, supra note 105 at 541.
110.Id. at 542.
112.People v. Elijorde, 365 Phil. 640, 652-653 (1999).

113.G.R. No. 189301, 15 December 2010, 638 SCRA 797.
114.People v. Buban, G.R. No. 170471, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 118, 134.
115.G.R. No. 188602, 4 February 2010, 611 SCRA 633, 647.
116.People v. Barde, supra note 51 at 220-221.

117.People v. Montemayor, 452 Phil. 283, 306-307 (2003); People v. Molina, supra
note 105 at 542-543.
119.G.R. No. 180594, 19 August 2009, 596 SCRA 497, 513.

nNote from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Orlando B. Consigna for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS

OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES GENERALLY NOT
DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — Time and again, we have ruled that when the
issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials,
the trial court's findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on
appeal, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted. . . . After a careful examination of the records, we
find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial court's assessment
of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-
appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola
and his companions.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES OF THE ACCUSED, ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT. — As between
the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and
the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a
settled rule that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the
accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his
bare denial and explanation.
3.ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; WHERE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE
PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WERE ACTUATED BY IMPROPER MOTIVE, THE
PRESUMPTION WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT SO ACTUATED AND THEIR
TESTIMONIES ARE ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. — There is no
evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of
any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would
testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well-
settled is the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate,
that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
4.CRIMINAL LAW; ACCUSED'S UNDISPUTED ACT OF FIRING THE GUN,
EQUIVALENT TO CRIMINAL INTENT. — Even assuming that he lacked criminal
intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban,
his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the
gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it
might produce, is equivalent to criminal intent.
5.ID.; DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE v. PAMA PEOPLE v. LAWAS
AND PEOPLE v. PINEDA, NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BENCH. — We hold
that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion
perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court's holding that a complex
crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4) victims
were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic
gun fires, meaning continuous" does not hold water. . . . The trial court
misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama . In said case, there was only
one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which
produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a
compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less
grave felonies. . . . The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. True, the
case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But
that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the
said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several
homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it
would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply
rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." . . . Furthermore, the trial
court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas is misplaced. The doctrine
enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the
individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the
deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-
appellant.
6.ID.; THE FIRING OF SEVERAL BULLETS BY THE ACCUSED ALTHOUGH
RESULTING FROM ONE CONTINUOUS BURST OF GUNFIRE CONSTITUTES
SEVERAL ACTS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A COMPLEX CRIME; CASES, OF
PEOPLE v. DESIERTO AND PEOPLE v. PARDO APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH.
— What is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People
vs. Desierto. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson
sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of
firing continuously. As stated therein: "In the case at bar, Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the five
persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon
each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the performance
by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it
is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short
space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that,
to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims,
corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus
made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from
every single act that produced the same. Although apparently he
perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet
each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim,
respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except
for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide
were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking
there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion
offenses." In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single
act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its
special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger
with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of
pressing, the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the
number of bullets which actually produced them. . . . The firing of several
bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire,
constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of
a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single missile
passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is
thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo we held that:
"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from
two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are
committed." . . . Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst
of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes.
The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every
death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of
reclusion perpetua.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J : p
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four

counts of Murder for shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case
No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo
Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims,
the informations in these four (4) cases identically read:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri,
Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one
[name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.
Contrary to Law." 1
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following

information with the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for
shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri,
province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo, inflicting
upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained by Jorge
Siriban, Jr., caused his death.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with
respect to the victim Sgt. Benito Raquepo) which would have produced
the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will." 2
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial

Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is
as follows:
"In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at
Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock
derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena
located at Aparri, Cagayan.
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were
assigned as guards to maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena
namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from
the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan.
Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to have been
also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the
presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit
arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued firearm.
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1)

Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with
the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda
II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo
Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company with the
deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP
Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group
of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the
cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario
Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the
Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-
gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar
Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the
mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was
seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the
arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in
the west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were
seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular
inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than
three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
At about ten(10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco

was seated as described above, he suddenly without warning or
provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle,
followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the
shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter
managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers
cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found
dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit
arena.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's
canteen, saw the accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at
a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the
accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling
him 'what is that that happened again Mario.' Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito
Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain peace and
order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking
snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the
cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from
inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco — ' Mario relax ka
lang ' — 'Mario keep calm .' They stood face to face holding their rifles
and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta
grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the
process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge
Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot
while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to adequate
medical treatment.
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1)

Antonio Chan — injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano —
injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario
Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their
complaints." 3
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the
Brief for the Accused-appellant is as follows:
"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit
Arena located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987,
accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the
basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on March
22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving
thereat at about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went
inside the cockpit arena to make some observations and found out that
there were several persons inside the said cockpit who were in
possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were seen in
different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother
to verify as to why the said persons were allowed to carry their
firearms because of his impressions that if they did not have the
authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surely have
confiscated the same from them. It was his belief then that they may
have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in
the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit, Accused thus
seated himself at the lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted
bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while
accused was seated at the lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of
the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his head.
Having been officially assigned to help in the maintenance of peace
and order in the cockpit and that his presence must be known, his
immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning
shot in the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon
cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by
burst of gun fire coming from different directions inside the cockpit
arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding
his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused)
rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta
and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax
lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito
Raquepo told him to relax lang, he all the time thought that the gun
reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said persons.
Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta
pressed the gun which he was holding downwards and grabbed said
gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said
gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge
Siriban, Jr. That because of such incident, accused had to run away, out
of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge Siriban who may
lay the blame on him. The following morning, accused surrendered to
the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not
on account of the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not know
at the time he surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge
Siriban, Jr. and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo." 4
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991,
found accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In giving credence
to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found
that:
"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the
prosecution and defense cannot agree on what actually transpired that
night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri,
Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject victims. For, while
the prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who
shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but
somebody else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning
shot upwards the roof of the cockpit arena.
In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility

versions. 'Where there are directly conflicting versions of the same
incident, the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce has to look for
some facts and circumstances which can be used as valuable tools in
evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony for after all,
the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial
evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et
al., L-46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case
of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA
180).
Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3)

eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman
Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims,
Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and
Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo,
Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3)
eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the
wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt.
Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat.
Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational
cases/incidents. As well stated in the above findings of facts,
prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually
saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front
row and in port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of
the late Mayor Arreola, and his group at the 4th row upper portion of
the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that
felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton
and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution witness
Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10) meters away from
the accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was
well-lighted at that time.
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire,
the accused was seen coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena
by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a
relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling — 'what is that
happened again Mario,' while the latter told him — 'Mario relax ka lang
keep calm.' After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the possession of
the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to
stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his
Commanding Officer, as corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while
in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun
went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo." 5
The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to
the cockpit arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken from his
possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was
already empty.
The court a quo said further:
"ATTY. VILLENA:
Q:When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it
had a magazine that time?
A:Yes, sir with magazine.
Q:Do you have the magazine now?

A:It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
Q:After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?
A:Yes, sir, I examined it.
Q:Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:Did you examine if there are live bullets?
A:No live bullets, sir." (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45,
March 26, 1990 session, stenographer L. Tamayo).
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:
"PROSECUTOR ATAL:
Q:You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you

surrendered this gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no
live ammunitions in the magazine?
A:There were two remaining bullets, sir.
Q:How many bullets in all?
A:Twenty, sir.
Q:You said you heard first seven gun reports?
A:Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct

examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L.
Tamayo).
MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found

inside the cockpit arena (Exh. 'R' & 'R-1', pp. 157-158, record).
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q:Showing to you Exh. 'R', do you know whose picture is this?
A:Picture of spent shells.
Q:How about Exh. 'R-1', do you know what is this?
A:The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose
Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as

adverse against the accused, is the fact that he was really arrested and
not that he voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police
Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. 'S', p. 188, record).
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco,

has still a pending case for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh.
'T', p. 187, record).
The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three

prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra
and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the
incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and convincing, in
regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the
deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270),
Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat. Romeo Regunton
(Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No.
10-284).
Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies

of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw
the accused rushing outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle,
immediately after the burst of successive and automatic gunfire inside
the cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the accused shoot the
four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their
corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all
circumstances, so as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 251; People vs.
Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved
reasonable leads to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to
the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. (People vs.
Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And,
in the face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish
his innocence LIES on the accused, as the ONUS PROBANDI from that
moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 150
SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of
things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and
under conditions where concealment is highly probable, and to require
direct testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and
would deny the proper protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167
SCRA 116).
As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the
wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that
accused Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged and thus be
held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in this case is
overwhelming, coming no less from accused's brothers PC personnel,
who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule
that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5[M],
Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court).
Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up

by the accused, even as it does not inspire confidence, hence, the
same deserves no credence.
The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards

the roof, and that he could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims
with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering the elevation of the 4th
step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, in relation to
where the accused was, the front row, in much lower elevation. The
accused further contends that he could not have shot aforesaid
victims, as maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially
to wound No. 2, inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola.
The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3)
eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman
Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up from
his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor
Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at the
bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters,
as it could have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood
up, which is a little bit west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were
then facing south, face to face with the accused. This is true and the
same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot
wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the
left portion of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2,
in his left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right
shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward.
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No.
1, is on the left side of his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right
base of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base through and
through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and his lower
back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of the
assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For
wound No. 2, the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but
there is a possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward and
the bullet ricocheted.
It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the
group of the late Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back
rests and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused must have
rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on the cemented back
rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and the
bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets
RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent
the cemented railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the
same is not too high so as to obviate the possibility of hitting the group
of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the accused
stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra
testified that his wound on his face and right abdomen must have been
caused by the debris of the said cemented railguard which was hit by
the bullets.
In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much

dispute as the evidence adduced is overwhelming and even the
defense admits that Siriban died due to gunshot wounds — inflicted
upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh. 'K'). cdt
The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the

prosecution witnesses, there being no competent evidence presented
for them to falsely testify against the accused. There is no issue of
motive, as the accused was clearly and positively identified.
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused
Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in the shooting to death of the
deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the
wounding of Benito Raquepo." 6
The dispositive part of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by
the balm of clear judicial conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario
Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged
against him:
1.In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-
270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317
(Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to
have been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex
crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code , the accused Mario Tabaco is
sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum
period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay
the heirs of the deceased victims — Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan
and Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of
P150,000.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the
appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the
accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by way of
total civil liability, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the
appropriate docket fees, in case of successful collection, both without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
2.In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated

Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one(1) day
Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4) months,
one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the
heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way
of death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of
medical expenses incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for
payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of successful collection;
both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
3.The M-14 rifle (Exh. 'K' and 'K-2') the corpus delicti, presently
deposited with 117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer
of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit to
the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the said M-14 rifle with
magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the rules.
4.The accused to pay the costs.

5.In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full
length of time, he underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23,
1987), provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall
be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as amended
by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs.
Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).
SO ORDERED." 7 (Emphasis ours)
Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused

still interposed the present appeal on the following grounds:
(1)The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of
murder in connection with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.
(2)The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide
on the death of Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by
Benito Raquepo.
(3)The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of

accused-appellant Tabaco.
The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and
again, we have ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility of
witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with
respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal, 8 unless there appears
in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 9 The
reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman,
10 thus:
"In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the
trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility.
Having the opportunity to obscene them on the stand, the trial judge is
able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication
that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may
not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will
affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or
looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were
shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the
basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict."
11
After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason

to set aside or disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of the
eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the
assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his
companions.
1.Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with
the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989,
categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they positively
identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-
mayor and his companions.
Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:
"COURT:
Q:You heard gun report, what can you say?

A:I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q:Who was that 'he' you are referring to?

A:Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q:Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those
gun reports come from?
A:Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
Q:What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
A:I had to seek shelter, sir.

Q:What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A:He was hit, sir.

PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
Q:You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of
weapon did he use if you know?
A:M-14, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what

happened to Regunton?
A:I came to know that he was dead, sir.
Q:Was that all you gathered?

A:Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q:How many shots did you hear?
A:Three (3) shots, sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q:You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or

automatic?
A:Successive, sir.
Q:You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated
on his right side?
A:None, sir.
Q:All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?

A:Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q:Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when
you first heard gun shot, will you please describe the stands
(position) of the accused?
A:Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing
on a forth [port] arm position).
xxx xxx xxx
Q:What did he do with the gun when you saw him?

A:He fired the gun, sir.
Q:To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?
A:To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q:You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and
returned, when you returned, what did you see?
A:I saw two dead persons, sir.
Q:Whose cadavers were these that you saw?

A:The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Q:How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?

A:Less than a meter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q:When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the
person passing as you mentioned?
A:They have similarity, sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q:When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola,
you and your companions?
A:We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.

Q:Where were you facing?
A:We were facing south the arena.

Q:Where did the first gun shot came from?
A:It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.

Q:From what direction?
A:Infront of us, sir.

Q:Where was he, was he in your front?
A:He was in the first row of seats.

Q:After the first gun shot, what happened?
A:Somebody was killed, sir.
Q:Who was that?
A:Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q:How many gun shot reports did you hear?
A:Many, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q:You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was
there in succession or automatic?
A:Automatic, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:Can you tell us your previous occupation?

A:An army man, sir.
Q:How long have you been employed with the army?

A:Five (5) years, sir.
Q:Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
A:I was outside the cockpit, sir." 12
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified,

thus:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q:You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was
on the first seat downward, is it not?
A:Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.
Q:Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?
A:It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.

xxx xxx xxx
Q:I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you
went to hide yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?
A:After the 3rd gun shot, sir.

Q:And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive
shot, is it not Mr. witness?
A:Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q:That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to
the first gun report, did you notice if he had a gun with him?
A:He passed by our back, sir.

Q:And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor
Arreola was shot?
A:He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.
Q:You mean to say the first gun report?

A:Yes, sir.
Q:And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A:The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir." 13
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:

"ATTY. ARRIOLA
Q:Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go
with Mayor Arreola?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:What part of the cockpit?
A:We went up to the bleacher, sir.

Q:Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the
cockpit?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:How were they arranged?
A:In rows, step by step, sir.

COURT:
Q:How many rows?

A:Four rows, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q:And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?
A:The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.
Q:And how about you?
A:We stood at their back west of them, sir.

Q:By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective
position of the place where you stayed?
A:The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the
fourth step, sir.

Q:And how about you, where did you stay also?
A:I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q:And how about Romeo Regunton?
A:He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q:While you were in that position together with your companions, do

you remember if there was untoward incident that happened?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:What was that untoward incident that happened?
A:That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola,
sir.
Q:Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:What kind of firearm?

A:M-14, sir.
Q:And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot
him?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
A:Because I saw it, sir.

Q:What did you do also?
A:When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was
also wounded.
Q:Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?

A:Yes, sir.
Q:What happened to him?

A:When I was wounded he also said, 'uncle I was also wounded.'
Q:What did you tell when he told you that?

A:I told him, 'you seek cover also my son'.
Q:How did Romeo Regunton took cover?

A:He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q:By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the
person of Mayor Arreola?
A:Probably more than 3 meters, sir." 14
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q:When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena
did you see the accused Mario Tabaco?
A:Before the shooting, sir.

Q:And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario
Tabaco for the first time prior to the shooting incident?
A:Probably 5 minutes before, sir.

Q:And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused
herein Mario Tabaco?
A:He sat on the first row of the seats.
Q:And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the
cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?
A:He sat a little bit west of us, sir.

COURT:
Q:How far?
A:Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
Q:A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the
western part o the cockpit?
A:A little to the west, sir.
Q:And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the
western part of the cockpit?
A:We were on the northwest.

Q:Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly
in front of you?
A:A little bit west of us, sir.
Q:It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position
with the late Arreola on the northwest when you according to you
saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what you mean?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he
allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what
you mean?
A:Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q:So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction
where you were together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario
Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit arena?
A:Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.

Q:And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the
accused Mario Tabaco considering that you were right behind the
late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your direct examination
you immediately sought cover?
A:I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired
three (3) shots.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know
that Mayor Arreola was dead already?
A:Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already
dead.
Q:And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards
Mayor Arreola?
A:Yes, sir, in our place.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Q:To whom the 3rd shot directed?

A:In our place, sir.
Q:No person was involved on the 3rd shot?

A:That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and
told me that he was also hit.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q:You don't know the person who shot him?
A:It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
Q:You do not know the person who shot him?
A:It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir." 15
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-

appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and his
companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another
eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident
is as follows:
"PROSECUTOR ABAD:

xxx xxx xxx
Q:How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?
A:More or less ten (10) meters, sir.

Q:Where was he at that specific time and place?
A:Inside the cockpit, sir.

Q:Where were you also?
A:I was at the stairs, sir.

Q:When you saw him what happened if any?
A:When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the
time when I got down, sir.
Q:Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?

A:It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
Q:How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
A:More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench
between them, sir.
Q:Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
A:With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time
I got down to hide myself, sir." 16
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q:So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you
heard gunfire?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the
cockpit arena?
A:When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor
and the gun went off and that's the time I took cover, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the
cockpit arena?
A:When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside." 17
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial

declaration of the abovenamed eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the
accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As between the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the
bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled
rule that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused
as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare denial
and explanation. 18
Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced
by accused-appellant, of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against accused-appellant
in the way that they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no
evidence and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption was that
they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit. 19
2.Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra
were not telling the truth when they testified that it was accused-appellant
who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his
companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-
Mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the Ex-
Mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level as the Ex-Mayor, and
the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher
level as the point of entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states
that he was seated at the first row which was the lowest while the Ex-Mayor
and his companions were seated at the fourth row which was the highest.
This contention, however, is untenable.
Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was
at the first row of seats of the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when
he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola
and his companions and fired at them. 20
The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot
wounds found on the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been
inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot
wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point of entry higher than the point of exit
because he must have already been lying down when his wound was
inflicted. 21
Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-
appellant's liability for the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal
wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt.
Benito Raquepo and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified
that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was
taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate of
the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside
the cockpit arena. While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw
the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the
accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun at
him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near
Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the
gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left
thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters away
from his left side, was hit at his testicles.
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the
other hand corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified
that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the
canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out
from the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun
report from inside the cockpit arena. He was then about one meter away
from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is
acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the
cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that
distance and position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He
also told accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he
saw accused-appellant change his gun position from port arm to horizontal
position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the
gun when accused appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on
both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple
and was able to take away the gun from accused-appellant.
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical
assistance but Siriban was not as lucky.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill
Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired
in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab
the gun from him, are without merit.
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant
because the latter changed his gun from port arm position to horizontal
position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt.
Raquepo. 22
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the
killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of
innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which is
by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is
equivalent to criminal intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts,
even if he did not intend the consequences thereof for, in accordance with
Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. cdasia
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder
charges and the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on
him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained the
single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:
"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317,
involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan
and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been prosecuted
under only one Information.
The law provides:
Art. 48.Penalty for complex crimes.

'When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
(as amended by Act. No. 400 n ). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).'
Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of

crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single
act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily means for
committing the other (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People
vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).
In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4)

separate Informations of murder, which should have been otherwise, as
the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been
prosecuted under one information, involving four (4) murder victims.
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one
single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning
continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four murdered
victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting
constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G.
3339; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July
21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we

say — as the deaths of Oscar Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan
and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317
respectively, were the result of one single act of the accused Mario
Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty — is the penalty
imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is
murder, the killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the
victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of
defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The
penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99
Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is
hereby reduced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the
four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson Magbanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72,
December 15, 1989).
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with
Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that the death of Jorge
Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one
single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty
imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is
HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion
temporal, which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being
no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and which is hereby imposed,
upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor
as the minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal,
as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of
Benito Raquepo.
It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. 'K', SN No.
1492932, 'K-2' — magazine of M-14 and Exh. 'L' — Memo Receipt of M-
14 issued to Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an automatic
powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so
powerful that the bullets can penetrate even more than five (5)
persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according
to witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented
rail guard separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit
arena, and causing wounds on his face and on his right shoulder.
Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. 'R' and 'R-1')."
23
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single
penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court
holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that
the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours)" 24
does not hold water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the
doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama 25 (not People vs. Dama, as cited by
the trial court), People vs. Lawas, 26 and People vs. Pineda. 27
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama . In said
case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was
only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of
complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces
two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was
more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four
victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered
the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the
weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously.
When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already
empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the
crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied.
On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid
down in People vs. Desierto 29 . The accused in that case killed five persons
with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-
14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable because the death of each of the five persons who were
killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the
two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the
accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is
true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short
space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is
that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the
victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused,
who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those
resulting from every single act that produced the same. Although
apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter
of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him
became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or
frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide
and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively
during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would
connect one of them with its companion offenses." (emphasis ours)
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of
pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special
mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his
finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the
trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets
which actually produced them. 30
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case of
Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that is
not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the said case
because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several
homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it
would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply
rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the
applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further
stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into
the law." 33 (emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco,
although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several
acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of
murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the
bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and
distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that:
"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single
act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a
complex crime, are committed."
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas
35 is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is
impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In
the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a
doubt, to the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire
cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The
accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he
has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial
court in finding accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one
(1) count of Homicide with frustrated homicide, the judgment appealed from
should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four
sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed. cdt
Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Information in Criminal Case No. 10-284; Rollo , p. 11.

2.Decision of the RTC dated January 14, 1991, p. 3; Rollo , p. 40.
3.Decision, supra, pp. 29-31; Rollo , pp. 66-68.
4.Brief for Accused-Appellant, pp. 16-18; Rollo , pp. 125-127.
5.Decision dated January 14, 1991, pp. 44-45; Rollo , pp. 81-82.
6.Decision, pp. 44-50; Rollo , pp. 81-87.
8.People vs. Sabal, 247 SCRA 263.
9.People vs. Malunes, 247 SCRA 317.

10.People vs. de Guzman, 188 SCRA 407.
11.Id., pp. 410-411.
12.TSN dated Match 19, 1990, pp. 20, 27-28, 33-39.
13.Id., pp. 44-51.

14.TSN dated March 26, 1990, pp. 9-15.
15.Id., pp. 16-25.
16.TSN dated May 15, 1990, pp. 13-14.
17.TSN dated August 7, 1990, pp. 4-5.

18.People vs. de Mesa , 188 SCRA 48.
19.People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148.
20.TSN dated March 19, 1990, pp. 44-45; TSN dated March 26, 1990, pp. 20-21.
21.TSN dated March 30, 1990, p. 33.

22.Decision, p. 9; Rollo , p. 46.
24.Ibid.
25.C.A. 44 O.G. 3339 [1947].

26.97 PHIL 975 (Unrep.) [1955].
27.20 SCRA 748 [1967].
28.The M-14 is an automatic firearm capable of firing 750 rounds per minute. By
actual timing, it takes just 1.6 seconds to empty an M-14 20-round magazine
on full automatic fire. (THE BOOK OF RIFLES, Smith, W.H.B. and Smith,
Joseph E., Castle Books, New York, 1977; pp. 4746-4747).
29.C.A. 45 O.G. 4542 [1948].
30.REYES, 1 THE REVISED PENAL CODE 655 [1993].
31.20 SCRA 748 [1967].

32.People vs. Pineda, Ibid. at 754.
33.Ibid.
34.79 PHIL 568 [1971].
35.97 PHIL 975 (Unrep.) [1955].

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Art. No. 400" in the original document.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 199892. December 10, 2012.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTURO

PUNZALAN, JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated April 29, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02816 denying the appeal of appellant Arturo
Punzalan, Jr. of the Decision 2 dated March 21, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Iba, Zambales and affirming his conviction for the complex crime of double murder
with multiple attempted murder, with certain modifications on the civil liability
imposed on appellant. 3
In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna,
SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang
were among the members of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval
Education and Training Command (NETC) at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. On
August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the "All-in-One"
Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred
to a nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they continued their drinking session.
Shortly thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued
regarding a flickering light bulb inside "Aquarius." 4 When SN1 Bacosa suggested that
the light be turned off ("Patayin ang ilaw"), appellant who must have misunderstood
and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa's statement belligerently reacted asking, "Sinong
papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosa's statement was directed at him.5 SN1 Cuya
tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant
in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling
unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table. 6
To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave "Aquarius" and
return to the NETC camp. They walked in two's, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1
Domingo in the first group, followed by the group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and
SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna in the last group, with each group at one arm's length
distance from the other. 7 Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which
was being manned by SN1 Noel de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time.
8 SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue
before proceeding to follow their companions. 9 HTAEIS
Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and
F1EN Dimaala flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate
number DRW 706. The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant, who
was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago ang
mga 'yan!," while pointing toward the direction of the navy personnel's group. Even
before he was given the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away
while uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga 'yan!" 10 While F1EN Dimaala was writing the
van's plate number and details in the logbook, he suddenly heard a loud thud.
Meanwhile, SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away towards the camp and
suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy personnel
prompting him to exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, "chief, binangga ang tropa!" SN1 De
Guzman then asked permission to go to the scene of the incident and check on the
navy personnel. 11
When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were
thrown away towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost
consciousness. 12 When they came to, they saw SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the
ground. 13 SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1 Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to
chase the van. 14
SN1 Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group and was
pushed away from the path of the speeding van. He was able to see the vehicle's
plate number. He also tried to chase the van with SN1 Bacosa but they turned around
when the vehicle made a U-turn as they thought that it would come back for them.
The vehicle, however, sped away again when other people started to arrive at the
scene of the incident. 15
SN1 De Guzman found SN1 Cuya administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation

(CPR) on SN1 Duclayna. He also saw the misshapen body of SN1 Andal lying some 50
meters away, apparently dragged there when the speeding van hit SN1 Andal. SN1
Cuya instructed SN1 De Guzman to get an ambulance but the car of the officer on
duty at that time arrived and they boarded SN1 Duclayna's body to the vehicle to be
brought to the hospital. 16 The other injured navy personnel, namely, SN1 Cuya, SN1
Bacosa, and SN1 Bundang, were brought to the infirmary for treatment. 17
Members of the local police soon arrived at the scene of the crime. Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 Roberto Llorico, the police investigator, found the bloodied lifeless
body of SN1 Andal lying on the side of the road. SPO1 Llorico was informed that
appellant was the suspect. Fortunately, one of the responding officers was appellant's
neighbor and led SPO1 Llorico to appellant's place where they found appellant
standing near his gate. Appellant appeared drunk and was reeking of alcohol. They
also saw the van parked inside the premises of appellant's place. Its front bumper was
damaged. When they asked appellant why he ran over the navy personnel, he simply
answered that he was drunk. The police officers then invited appellant to the police
station and brought the van with them. 18
A post mortem examination was conducted on the bodies of SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna by Dr. Jericho Cordero of Camp Crame Medical Division. Dr. Cordero's
findings were that the injuries sustained by SN1 Andal were fatal and caused by a
hard blunt object that hit his body. The force of the impact was such that the internal
organs like the kidneys, mesentery and spleen were also fatally injured. SN1 Andal
died of cardio-respiratory arrest as a result of massive blunt traumatic injuries to the
head, thorax and abdomen. On the other hand, SN1 Duclayna sustained fatal injuries
to the head and liver. The head and neck injuries were such that a lot of blood vessels
were ruptured and the fractures were embedded in the brain. The laceration on the
liver, also a mortal injury, was a blunt traumatic injury. 19
As regards the other navy personnel, SN1 Cuya suffered lacerated wounds on
the head and different parts of the body for which he was confined at the infirmary for
about eighteen (18) days; 20 SN1 Bacosa sustained injuries on his knee and left hand
and stayed in the infirmary for a day; 21 and SN1 Bundang suffered injuries to his right
foot. 22
Appellant was thereafter charged under an Information 23 which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 10th day of August 2002, at about 11:00 o'clock in
the evening, in Brgy. West Dirita, Municipality of San Antonio, Province of
Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van
with plate no. DRW 706, did there and then wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from behind with the use of the
said van, the following persons: Antonio Duclayna, Arnulfo Andal, Evelio
Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar Domingo, all members of
the Philippine [N]avy then assigned at the Naval Education and Training
Command in San Antonio, Zambales, thereby inflicting upon them the
following physical injuries, to wit:
DANILO CUYA:
"Head Injury, grade 1 (Lacerated wound 5.0 cm, accipito-parietal area,

(L) and lacerated wound, Lower lip) 2 to VA"
EVELIO BACOSA:
"Multiple abrasion, wrist, volar surface (L), 2nd digit, abrasion, dorsun,
(L) foot"
ERLINGER BUNDANG:
"Abrasion, medial maleolus, (R)"
ARNULFO ANDAL:
"Head Injury, Grade IV; (Depressed Fracture, Frontal: Lacerated wounds,
8.0 cm 3.0 cm. forehead, and 5.0 cm parietal, (R);
Avulsion, medial aspect, upper arm to elbow, hip and enguinal area, (L);
Multiple abrasion, anterior and posterior chest, knees and (R) foot-
secondary to VA"
ANTONIO DUCLAYNA:
"Head Injury, Grade IV (Lacerated wound, Contusion, Hematoma (R)
Parietal) secondary to VA"
which act of said accused directly caused the death of Arnulfo Andal and
Antonio Duclayna, and in so far as Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa and Erlinger
Bundang were concerned, said accused performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce said crime by reason of cause/s independent of
his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa and Erlinger Bundang, which prevented their
death, and finally as to Cesar Domingo, said accused commenced the
commission of the acts constituting Murder directly by overt acts, but was not
able to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause other than
accused's own desistance, that is due to the timely avoidance of the van
driven by accused, and that the commission of the crimes was attended with
treachery, evident premeditation, cruelty and use of a motor vehicle, and by
deliberately and inhuman[ely] augmenting the suffering of the victim Arnulfo
Andal, to the damage and prejudice of Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa, Erlinger
Bundang and Cesar Domingo and the family and heirs of the deceased Arnulfo
Andang and Antonio Duclayna.

When arraigned, appellant maintained his innocence. 24
After pre-trial, trial ensued and the prosecution presented evidence to establish
the facts stated above.
In his defense, appellant testified that in the evening of August 10, 2002, he was
drinking with Marvin Acebeda and Romeo Eusantos at the "Aquarius" videoke bar.
When he sang, the navy personnel who were also inside the bar laughed at him as he
was out of tune. He then stood up, paid his bills and went out. After a while, Acebeda
followed him and informed him that the navy personnel would like to make peace with
him. He went back inside the bar with Acebedo and approached the navy personnel.
When SN1 Bacosa appeared to reach out for appellant's hand, appellant offered his
hand but SN1 Bacosa suddenly punched appellant's right ear. To avoid further
altercation, appellant left the bar with Acebeda in tow. Appellant went home driving
his van, with the spouses Romeo and Alicia Eusantos who hitched a ride as
passengers. When they passed by the sentry, somebody threw stones at the van.
When he alighted and inspected the vehicle, he saw that one of the headlights was
broken. Thereafter, he saw SN1 Bacosa and another man approaching him so he went
back inside the van but the duo boxed him repeatedly on his shoulder through the
van's open window. When he saw the four other navy personnel coming towards him,
he accelerated the van. During the whole incident, Romeo was asleep as he was very
drunk while Alicia was seated at the back of the van. Upon reaching appellant's home,
the spouses alighted from the van and proceeded to their place. After 20 minutes,
police officers arrived at appellant's house and told him that he bumped some people.
Appellant went with the police officers to the police station where he was investigated
and detained. 25
Appellant's only other witness was Alicia Eusantos. She testified that she and her
husband hitched a ride with appellant in the evening of August 10, 2002. She did not
notice any unusual incident from the time they rode the vehicle until they alighted
from it. She learned about the incident on the following day only when her statement
was taken by the police. 26 DTEHIA
After the parties have rested their respective cases, the RTC of Iba, Zambales
found appellant guilty and rendered a Decision dated March 21, 2007 with the
following dispositive portion:
IN VIEW THEREOF, accused ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR. is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Double Murder qualified by
treachery with Attempted Murder attended by the aggravating circumstance
of use of motor vehicle and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.
For the death of SN1 Antonio Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal, civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 each is awarded to their heirs. This is in addition to
the amount of moral damages at P50,000.00 each for the emotional and
mental sufferings, plus P12,095.00 to the heirs of Duclayna representing
actual damages.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar
Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger Bundang P30,000.00 each or an
aggregate amount of P120,000.00 as indemnity for their attempted murder.
27
Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In his brief, 28 appellant
claimed that the trial court erred in not finding that he may not be held criminally
liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying
circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. His act of
increasing his vehicle's speed was reasonable and justified as he was being attacked
by two men whose four companions were also approaching. He asserted that the
attack against him by the two navy personnel constituted actual and imminent danger
to his life and limb. The sight of the four approaching companions of his attackers
"created in his mind a fear of greater evil," prompting him to speed up his vehicle to
avoid a greater evil or injury to himself. According to appellant, if he accidentally hit
the approaching navy men in the process, he could not be held criminally liable
therefor. The instinct of self-preservation would make one feel that his own safety is
of greater importance than that of another. 29
Appellant further faulted the trial court in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. He asserted that nothing in the records would show that
he consciously or deliberately adopted the means of execution. More importantly,
treachery was not properly alleged in the Information. 30
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the People of the
Philippines, refuted the arguments of appellant and defended the correctness of the
RTC Decision. In its brief, 31 the OSG claimed that the trial court rightly rejected
appellant's defense of avoidance of greater evil or injury. Appellant's version of the
events did not conform to the physical evidence and it was not consistent with the
testimony of his own witness.
The OSG also argued that treachery was appropriately appreciated by the trial
court. The Information was written in a way that sufficiently described treachery
where "the unsuspecting victims were walking towards their barracks and totally
unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind." 32
After considering the respective arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision dated April 29, 2011 with the following decretal
portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is Denied. The assailed Decision,
dated March 21, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch
69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-3492-I, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in
that Accused-Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of SN1 Antonio
Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal civil indemnity of Php75,000, moral damages
of Php75,000, temperate damages of Php25,000 and exemplary damages of
Php30,000. In addition to the foregoing damages, Accused-Appellant is as well
held liable to pay the heirs of SN1 Andal the amount of Php2,172,270.21 to
represent the amount of loss of earning capacity of SN1 Andal.
Accused-Appellant is likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, SN1

Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger
Bundang, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Php40,000 and
Php30,000, respectively. Award of temperate damages in the amount of
Php25,000 is proper in favor of SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bundang for
the unsubstantiated amount of pecuniary losses they suffered on account of
the injuries they sustained. SN1 Cesar Domingo, however, is not entitled to
temperate damages. 33
Hence, this appeal.
Both appellant and the OSG adopted the respective briefs they filed in the Court
of Appeals. 34
Is appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder?

After a thorough review of the records of this case and the arguments of the
parties, this Court affirms appellant's conviction.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the evidence presented and offered
by the prosecution credible and that the "prosecution witnesses had overwhelmingly
proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the Accused-Appellant." 35 The
Court of Appeals correctly observed that prosecution witnesses F1EN Dimaala and
SN1 De Guzman "positively identified accused-appellant as the one who hit and ran
over the victims." 36 The Court of Appeals further found:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, taken together, inevitably
showed the criminal intent of the Accused-Appellant to inflict harm on the
victims. They testified on the incident in a clear, concise, corroborative, and
straightforward manner. Thus, their testimonies must prevail over the
testimony given by the Accused-Appellant which, on the other hand, was
neither substantiated nor supported by any evidence.
The prosecution witnesses testified that they actually saw how Accused-
Appellant ran over the victims who were walking inside the NETC camp on the
night of August 10, 2002. Accused-Appellant, who was driving his van from
behind, suddenly bumped and ran over the victims. The victims were thrown
away, resulting in the instantaneous death of SN1 Duclayna and SN1 Andal
and causing injuries to the other victims.
xxx xxx xxx

Accused-Appellant's version of the crime, upon which the justifying
circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury is invoked, is baseless. This
is because his assertions anent the existence of the evil which he sought to be
avoided [did] not actually exist as [they] neither conformed to the evidence at
hand nor [were] [they] consistent with the testimony of his own witness, Alicia
Eusantos . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Accused-Appellant's own witness, Alicia Eusantos, not only failed to
corroborate his claim but also belied Accused-Appellant's claim that he was
attacked by the Philippine Navy personnel. Alicia Eusantos categorically
stated that she did not witness any unusual incident in the evening of August
10, 2002 while on board the Nissan Urvan Van driven by Accused-Appellant
while they were cruising the access road going to the NETC compound.
Accused-Appellant's claim, therefore, is more imaginary than real. The
justifying circumstance of Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury cannot be
invoked by the Accused-Appellant as the alleged evil sought to be avoided
does not actually exist. 37
Moreover, whether or not petitioner acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury is

a question of fact. It is an issue which concerns doubt or difference arising as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 38 In this connection, this Court declared in
Martinez v. Court of Appeals: 39 cIDHSC
[T]he well-entrenched rule is that findings of fact of the trial court in the
ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of the
evidence on record affirmed, on appeal, by the CA are accorded high respect,
if not conclusive effect, by the Court and in the absence of any justifiable
reason to deviate from the said findings.
This Court has combed through the records of this case and found no reason to
deviate from the findings of the trial and appellate courts. There is nothing that would
indicate that the RTC and the Court of Appeals "ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood
or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered,
will alter the outcome of the case." 40
Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke
avoidance of greater evil as a justifying circumstance, 41 the following requisites
should be complied with:
(1) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and
(3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing
it.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected appellant's self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of avoidance of greater evil. The trial and appellate courts noted
that even appellant's own witness who was in the van with appellant at the time of the
incident contradicted appellant's claim. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
concluded that the evil appellant claimed to avoid did not actually exist. This Court
agrees.
Moreover, appellant failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other
practical and less harmful means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or
injury may not befall one's self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and
with the least possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury
without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the
damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one's self,
then such course should be taken.
In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7
meters in width, 42 and the place was well-lighted. 43 Both sides of the road were
unobstructed by trees, plants or structures. 44 Appellant was a driver by occupation.
45 However, appellant himself testified that when he shifted to the second gear and
immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy personnel
approaching from in front of him, 46 he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the
approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply
sped away straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally
unmindful if he might run them over. 47 He therefore miserably failed to resort to
other practical and less harmful available means of preventing the evil or injury he
claimed to be avoiding.
The appreciation of treachery as a circumstance that qualified the killing of SN1
Duclayna and SN1 Andal and the attempted killing of the others is also correct. This
Court agrees with the following disquisition of the Court of Appeals:
We find that the RTC correctly appreciated the existence of treachery in
the commission of the offense. Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from any defense which the offended party might make. The elements of
treachery are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.
Accused-Appellant's act of running over the victims with his van from
behind while the victims were walking inside the NETC camp was a clear act of
treachery. The victims were not given any warning at all regarding the assault
of the Accused-Appellant. The victims were surprised and were not able to
prepare and repel the treacherous assault of Accused-Appellant. The
prosecution witnesses testified that after they had flagged down Accused-
Appellant's van, the latter accelerated and upon reaching the middle of the
road, it suddenly swerved to the right hitting the victims who were startled by
the attack.
xxx xxx xxx

A close review of the information would disclose that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was stated in ordinary and concise language and
the said act was described in terms sufficient to enable a layman to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enables the court to pronounce
proper judgment.
We quote pertinent portion of the information, which reads:
". . . the said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in
control of a Nissan Van with plate No. DRW 706, did then and there
willfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from
behind with the use of said van, . . . ."
Applying the Supreme Court's discussion in People vs. Batin, citing the
case of Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, to wit:
"The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to
be set forth in an Information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense. . . .
cSaADC
It is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as

distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the
information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule,
matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the
description of the offense, need not be averred. For instance, it is not
necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what
manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at
the trial.
We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information

is sufficient. Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein we
found the allegation of treachery sufficient without any further
explanation as to the circumstances surrounding it."
Clearly, We find that the information is sufficient as it not merely

indicated the term treachery therein but also described the act itself
constituting treachery. Such statement, without a doubt, provided the
supporting facts that constituted the offense, sufficiently alleging the
qualifying circumstance of treachery when it pointed out the statement,
"smash and hit from behind." 48 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor
on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victims. 49 The six navy personnel were
walking by the roadside, on their way back to their camp. They felt secure as they
have just passed a sentry and were nearing their barracks. They were totally unaware
of the threat to their life as their backs were turned against the direction where
appellant's speeding van came. They were therefore defenseless and posed no threat
to appellant when appellant mowed them down with his van, killing two of them,
injuring three others and one narrowly escaping injury or death. Beyond reasonable
doubt, there was treachery in appellant's act. This was sufficiently alleged in the
Information which not only expressly mentioned treachery as one of the
circumstances attending the crime but also described it in understandable language:
[T]he said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan
Van with plate no. DRW 706, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from behind with the use of
said van, the following persons: Antonio Duclayna, Arnulfo Andal, Evelio
Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar Domingo, . . . . 50
(Emphasis supplied.)
Use of motor vehicle was also properly considered as an aggravating
circumstance. Appellant deliberately used the van he was driving to pursue the
victims. Upon catching up with them, appellant ran over them and mowed them down
with the van, resulting to the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and injuries to the
others. 51 Thereafter, he continued to speed away from the scene of the incident.
Without doubt, appellant used the van both as a means to commit a crime and to flee
the scene of the crime after he committed the felonious act.
The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court
of Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime
contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and
committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of
the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and
SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1
Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo. 52 The crimes of murder and attempted
murder are both grave felonies 53 as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital
punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is
punished by prision mayor, 54 an afflictive penalty. 55
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, murder is punishable
b y reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 56 of the same Code provides that if the
penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and
there is an aggravating circumstance the higher penalty should be imposed. Since use
of vehicle can be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance, treachery, by
itself, being sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper imposable penalty — the higher
sanction — is death. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, 57
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty for the killing of each of
the two victims is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. 58 The
penalty of reclusion perpetua thus imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for
the complex crime that he committed is correct.
The awards of P75,000.00 civil indemnity and P75,000.00 moral damages to the
respective heirs of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna are also proper. These awards, civil
indemnity and moral damages, are mandatory without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder. 59
CHcETA
Moreover, in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, namely the

qualifying circumstance of treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of use
of motor vehicle, the award of P30,000.00 exemplary damages to the respective heirs
of the deceased victims is also correct. 60 In addition, it cannot be denied that the
heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was
not proved with certainty. Thus, the award of P25,000.00 temperate damages to the
heirs of each deceased victim is appropriate. 61
As it was proven that, at the time of his death, SN1 Andal had a monthly income
of P13,245.55, 62 the grant of P2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity is in order. 63
As to the surviving victims, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1
Domingo, the Court of Appeals correctly granted each of them P40,000 moral
damages for the physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar
injuries caused to them by the incident. 64 And as the crime was attended by
aggravating circumstances, each of them was properly given P30,000 exemplary
damages. 65
Finally, those who suffered injuries, namely, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1
Bundang, were correctly awarded P25,000 temperate damages each for the pecuniary
loss they suffered for hospitalization and/or medication, although no receipts were
shown to support said loss. 66
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02816 affirming the conviction of
appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. for the complex crime of double murder with multiple
attempted murder, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
him to pay the following:
(a) To the respective heirs of SN1 Arnulfo Andal and SN1 Antonio Duclayna:
(i) P75,000.00 civil indemnity;
(ii) P75,000.00 moral damages;

(iii) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and
(iv) P25,000.00 temperate damages;
(b) To the heirs of SN1 Andal, P2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity;
(c) To each of the surviving victims, SN1 Danilo Cuya, SN1 Evelio Bacosa,
SN1 Erlinger Bundang and SN1 Cesar Domingo:
(i) P40,000.00 moral damages; and

(ii) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and
(d) To SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Bundang, P25,000.00 temperate
damages each is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-28; penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices
Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.
2.CA rollo, pp. 16-50.
3.Rollo, pp. 27-28. In particular, the Court of Appeals ordered appellant to pay the
respective heirs of his victims SN1 Antonio Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal P75,000
civil indemnity, P75,000 moral damages, P30,000 exemplary damages and P25,000
temperate damages, plus P2,172,270.21 to the heirs of SN1 Andal representing SN1
Andal's loss of earning capacity. The Court of Appeals made the further
modifications of ordering appellant to pay each of his surviving victims, SN1 Evelio
Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger Bundang, P40,000
moral damages and P30,000 exemplary damages, plus P25,000 temperate
damages in favor of SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bundang for the pecuniary
losses they suffered on account of the injuries sustained.
4.Id. at 5.
5.Records, Vol. I, p. 199; testimony of SN1 Cesar Domingo, TSN, July 28, 2003, p. 7.
6.Rollo, p. 6.
7.Records, Vol. I, pp. 144-145; testimony of SN1 Evelio Bacosa, TSN, March 24, 2003, pp.
12-13.
8.Rollo, p. 6.
9.Records, Vol. I, pp. 290-291 and 370; testimonies of F1EN Alejandro Dimaala and SN1
Noel De Guzman, TSNs, May 26, 2004, pp. 3-4 and of January 19, 2005, p. 6,
respectively.
10.Id. at 290-297, 370-375.
11.Rollo, p. 7.
12.Id. at 6.
13.Records, Vol. I, pp. 83-84; testimony of SN1 Danilo Cuya, TSN, December 11, 2002, pp.
9-10.
14.Id. at 147; See also testimony of SN1 Evelio Bacosa, TSN, March 24, 2003, p. 15.
15.Id. at 202-203; testimony of SN1 Cesar Domingo, TSN, July 28, 2003, pp. 10-11.
16.Id. at 383-384; testimony of SN1 Noel De Guzman, TSN, February 23, 2005, pp. 4-5.
17.Id. at 86, 148 and 204; testimonies of SN1 Danilo Cuya, SN1 Evelio Bacosa and SN1
Cesar Domingo, TSNs, December 11, 2002, p. 12, March 24, 2003, p. 16 and July 28,
2003, p. 12, respectively.
18.Rollo, p. 8.
19.Id. at 8-9.
20.Id. at 6.
21.Id. at 7.
22.Records, Vol. I, p. 149; testimony of SN1 Evelio Bacosa, TSN, March 24, 2003, p. 17.
23.Id. at 2-3.
24.Rollo, p. 5.
25.Id. at 9-10.
26.Id. at 10.
27.CA rollo, p. 50.
28.Id. at 70-88.
29.Id. at 83-85.
30.Id. at 85-87.
31.Id. at 131-172.
32.Id. at 169.
33.Rollo, pp. 27-28.
34.Id. at 36-40; Manifestations of the OSG and appellant dated April 25, 2012 and May 21,
2012, respectively.
35.Id. at 13.
36.Id.
37.Id. at 16-20.
38.Republic v. Malabanan, G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 338, 345. In this
case, the Court stated: "There is a question of fact when the doubt [or difference]
arises as to the truth or [the falsehood] of the alleged facts."
39.G.R. No. 168827, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 176, 193.
40.People v. Belo, G.R. No. 187075, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 527, 536.
41.Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
xxx xxx xxx

4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage
to another, provided that the following requisites are present:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
42.Records, Vol. I, p. 317; testimony of F1EN Alejandro Dimaala, TSN of July 14, 2004, p. 6.
43.Id. at 386-387; testimony of SN1 Noel de Guzman, TSN, February 23, 2005, pp. 7-8.
44.Records, Vol. II, p. 736; TSN, May 15, 2006, p. 7; Exhibits "C-3" and "C-4."
45.Id. at 710; testimony of appellant, TSN, February 15, 2006, p. 2.
46.Id. at 717; TSN, February 15, 2006, p. 9.
47.Id. at 738; TSN, May 15, 2006, p. 9.
48.Rollo, pp. 16-17, 22-23.
49.People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 633, 644.
50.Records, p. 2.

51.See People v. Mallari, 452 Phil. 210, 222 (2003). This case has similarity to the case of
appellant herein: Mallari deliberately used his truck in pursuing the victim and, upon
catching up with the victim, Mallari hit him with the truck, as a result of which the
victim died instantly. The Court found that the truck was the means used by Mallari
to perpetrate the killing of his victim.
52.The crime committed against SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo,
is a case of multiple attempted murder because none of them was proven to have
suffered a mortal wound from the incident. This Court stated in Palaganas v. People
(G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 533 Phil. 169, 193 [2006]): "when the
accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in
his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because
of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated
homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s
sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime
committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent
to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not
fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury."
53.Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies, and light felonies. — Grave felonies are
those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of
their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Article 25 of this Code.
54.See Art. 248, Revised Penal Code defining and punishing the crime of murder, in
relation to Art. 250 of the same Code.
55.In fact, in this case, the murders of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna are sufficient to
constitute a complex crime as they are two grave felonies resulting from a single
act.
56.Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — . . . . In all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. When in the commission of the
deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall
be applied. . . . .
57.An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty, signed into law on June 24,
2006.
58.Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole . . . ."
59.People v. Camat, G.R. No. 188612, July 30, 2012.
60.People v. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 187, 220.
61.Id. at 220-221.
62.Philippine Navy pay slip of SN1 Andal for the period July 1-31, 2002; RTC records, vol.
II, p. 683.
63.This amount has been computed using the following formula established in
jurisprudence: Life Expectancy x (Gross Annual Income [GAI] less Living Expenses
[50% GAI]) Where Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of the deceased).
Thus: Unearned income =(2/3 [80 - 39]) ([P13,245.55 x 12] - [1/2 [P13,245.55 x
12]]
= (2/3 [41]) (P158,946.60 - P79,473.30)
= (2/3 [41]) (P79,473.30)
= (27.3333335) (P79,473.30)
= P2,172,270.21.
64.People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012.
65.Id.
66.Id.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139857. September 15, 2006.]
LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with modification the April 15, 1993
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in
Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of
estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999
Resolution 3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed

Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982.
She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the
member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities

concerning the release of loans were discovered. 4
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial

documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3625
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion

Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then
the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI),
entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out
loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao
by then and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda
Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine Currency, and by
signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda
Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear
that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and received the
amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never
granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the
cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did
then and there release to herself the same and received the loan of
P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and
benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still
refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in
the aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency. 5
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion,

within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being then
the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI),
entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out
loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent to
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda
Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that the said
Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on
the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said
Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan, received the loan of P4,000.00
when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never
received the same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in
her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent
design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to
herself the same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter
misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said
amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the
same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned
amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency. AcSIDE
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion,

within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI),
receiving payments to, and collection of the same and paying out loans
to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI
by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the
entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with
the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00, thus
making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the
aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth
and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and after the document was so falsified in the manner set
forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check
Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the
signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn
Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth
and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and in
furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud
PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same, and
received the amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her
own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and
prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500,
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion,

within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI)
receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and paying out
loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the
PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the
ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of
P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed
deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI
when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit
and was never granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in
the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the
Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis
Batulanon by signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus
making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of
P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never
received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there
release to herself the same and receive the loan of P5,000, and
thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the
said amount, and [despite] demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr.,
and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the
preparation of cash vouchers 9 testified that on certain dates in 1982,
Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four
different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A 10 for
P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash
Voucher No. 237A 11 for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda 12 Oracion; P3,
500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A 13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on
October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis
Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A. 14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not
eligible to apply for loan because they were not bona fide members of the
cooperative. 15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the
cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in
1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983. 16 Medallo stated
that pursuant to the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must
have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans. 17
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of
Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the
records that they were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein. 18
As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the
same was actually the handwriting of appellant. 19
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of
directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallo's testimony that Omadlao,
Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that
Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was
only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not
open to minors. 20
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980
before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans
made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through
the cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening
purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is
Batulanon's handwriting. 21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans
taken, only that in Arroyo's name was settled. 22
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo

who was presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and
was asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After
certifying that the said document reflected all the financial transactions of the
cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the Journal
with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash
Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the
other vouchers because the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one
who prepared the entries. 23
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did
not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the
same were signed by the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after
she personally released the money to them; 24 that the three were members of
the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the
board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify
to the correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become an
accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with
the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence; 25 that she signed the loan
application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor
but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the
documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity; 26 that contrary to the testimony
of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided
they are children of regular members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because
she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still has to pay off an existing
loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative refused
to accept her payments after the cases were filed in court. 27 She also declared
that one automatically becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative. 28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the
cooperative did not have by-laws yet. 29
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982,

because the cooperative had been registered since 1967. 30
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting

Batulanon as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila
Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled
case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of
ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL,
to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest
from the institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 31
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant
LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, AS
MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit, Inc. the
sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal
interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the
person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have
presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of
relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo. 33
She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an
element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been
prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are accounts
receivable by the cooperative. 34
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through

falsification of commercial document, appellant could be convicted of
falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it is the
allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not
the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v.
People, 35 we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no
concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. . . . That to which his attention should be directed, and in which
he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law
some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged
in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. . . . The
real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named
murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the
law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty
therefor. . . . If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner
alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately,
whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172,

paragraph 2 36 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed
any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that
the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage. 37
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act 38 of

falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e ., causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and
Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of
the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it
appear that they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not
in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.
IcHDCS
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the

Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not
PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of
Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she did not
apply for a loan with the cooperative.
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the

signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it appear that the
amounts stated therein were actually received by these persons. As to the
signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony and her familiarity with the
handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the
name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not
duty-bound to present the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallo's
eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by
any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is

no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a

compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been

prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its books as accounts
receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide
members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of
PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in
Ferlyn Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle
the loan to avoid legal prosecution with the understanding however, that she
will be reimbursed once the money is collected from Batulanon. 39
The Court of Appeals 40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are
private documents and not commercial documents because they are not
documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions 41 nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce or other commercial law. 42 Rather, they are private documents,
which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person
without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally
authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set
forth. 43
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to

establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to
prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein. 44 The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its
burden completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private

document, 45 it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged
with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a
private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime
to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the
necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
Thus, in People v. Reyes , 46 the accused made it appear in the time book of the
Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the
month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then
charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the
laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the
laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private
document.
In U.S. v. Infante, 47 the accused changed the description of the pawned

article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of
greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another
pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article
pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v.
Chan Tiao , 48 the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly
signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150
sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in
obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private
document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held
Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents
in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with

the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a
duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days.
Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is
entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the
range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four
(4) months. 49 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private

documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned penalties for each count of the
offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of
P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without
deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same
was settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the
money is recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality
of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and executory, the
interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is

estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the
acts that may constitute falsification are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any

act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or

proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine

document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to

be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that
of the genuine original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the

issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book. ScaHDT
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon
for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher based on the
Information charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The
records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon
did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by:
lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of
Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under
Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the
name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds
of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making
untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to
whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a
different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification.
Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is
also guilty of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case No.
3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis. 50
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art.
315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received
by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such

money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to

the prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the

offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there is
evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant) 51
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla, 52 the Court convicted the appellant of
estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road
Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used
it for personal purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of the
same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to
his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail
Road Company until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted, the
check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part
of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only
P125.66 in his account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he
deposited in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In
handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is
very evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here
discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or
diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in
itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is,
comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of
defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to
restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. . . .
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case,
we find all of the necessary elements of estafa . . . . That the money for
which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for
safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was
the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such had
immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping
and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise
of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter
the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was
a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility,
might also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have
become guilty of estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his
personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and
substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the
checks were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the
appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The
checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by
the appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no
value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket
as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.
xxx xxx xxx
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention
of the accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to himself. As
we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this
nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the
crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to
hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not
always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this
interpretation of the law to cases where officers of corporations convert
corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the
corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and
makes no distinction between permanent misappropriations and
temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case why it
should not be applied in its literal sense.
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is

charged is injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that the
only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad
Company during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It
is, however, well settled by former adjudications of this court that the
disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation, though
only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the
meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S.
vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.) 53
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon
holds the money for administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no
longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who
is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the
amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by
Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage
was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could
have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive
undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by
Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the
meaning of Article 315.
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was
P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, where the
amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being
no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to
an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following

MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is
found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of private documents and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit
Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The
interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment
until its satisfaction; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of

estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months ofprision
correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok
Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The
interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment
until its satisfaction. caSDCA
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 25-40. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena and concurred
in by Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Demetrio G. Demetria.
2. CA rollo, pp. 34-41. Penned by Judge Abednego O. Adre.

3. Rollo , p. 41.
4. TSN, August 1, 1990, pp. 96-97.

5. CA rollo, pp. 16-17.
6. Id. at 18-19.
7. Id. at 14-15.
8. Id. at 20-21.
9. TSN, August 13, 1983, pp. 3-5.
10. Records, p. 230.

11. Id. at 238.
12. Also referred to as Godofreda in the Records.
14. Id. at 240; TSN, March 4, 1986, pp. 5, 7-8.

15. Id. at 234-237.
16. TSN, March 4, 1986, pp. 24-25.
17. Id. at 12-14.
18. TSN, August 1, 1990, pp. 101-106.
19. Id. at 10.
20. TSN, October 22, 1986, pp. 5-19.
21. TSN, June 10, 1987, pp. 14-15.
22. Id. at 19.

23. TSN, February 16, 1988, pp. 2-15.
24. TSN, November 14, 1988, pp. 5-6; 8-10 and 14-16.
25. Id. at 13.

26. Id. at 19-23.
27. TSN, March 29, 1988, p. 38.
28. Id. at 30-31.
29. Id. at 34.
30. TSN, March 28, 1990, p. 69.
31. CA rollo, pp. 40-41.

32. Rollo , p. 39.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 13.
35. G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, citing U.S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910).
36. Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.
— The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: . . .
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
37. Dizon v. People , G.R. No. 144026, June 15, 2006.
38. Although Batulanon signed the names of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo, her
act of falsification will not fall under Paragraph 1 of Article 171, which
requires that there must be an attempt or intent on the part of the accused
to imitate the signature of other persons. Such was not shown in this case
because the genuine signature of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo were never
offered in evidence. See Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II (15th ed.,
2001), pp. 205-206.
39. TSN, August 13, 1986, pp. 10-13.
40. Citing People v. Francisco, C.A., No. 05130-41-CR, August 23, 1966, 64 O.G.
537, 541, cited in Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II (14th ed.,
1998), p. 234. In People v. Francisco , the Court of Appeals ruled that "the
cash disbursement vouchers here in question are not negotiable instruments
nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce. They are
nothing more than receipts evidencing payment to borrowers of the loans
extended to them and as such are private documents only."
41. Monteverde v. People , 435 Phil. 906, 921 (2002), citing Luis B. Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 236, citing People v. Lizares,
C.A., 65 O.G. 7174.
42. Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II (14th ed., 1998), p. 235,
citing People v. Co Beng , C.A., 40 O.G. 1913.
43. U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596, 597 (1907).
44. People v. Caingat , 426 Phil. 782, 792 (2002).
45. A. Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review (9th ed., 1997), p. 464,
citing Cuello Calon, II, p. 261.
46. 56 Phil. 286 (1931).

47. 36 Phil. 146 (1917).
48. 37 Phil. 78 (1917).

49. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128213, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA
427, 435.
50. While the Information alleged that petitioner Batulanon also falsified the
"Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger" of Dennis Batulanon, she cannot
likewise be convicted of falsifying said document as it was not formally
offered in evidence.
51. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II (15th ed., 2001), p. 736.
52. 43 Phil. 186 (1922), cited in Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II (15th
ed., 2001), p. 750.
53. Id. at 189-191.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86163. April 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO

SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, AND
SIMPLICIO CANASARES, BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, defendant-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY; ELEMENT OF ASPORTATION; CONSTRUED. —

There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of
personal property belonging to another. This is known as the element of
asportation, the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession
of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi
(Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 67, citing 5 C.J. 607). In fact, if there is no
actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of
another is an essential part of the crime of robbery.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant insists that while the
"giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is because neither he
nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the
latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of which is that none of
those items were recovered from their persons. Those factual allegations are
contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified that
upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and
subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took
the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor
Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the
Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the
amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently
proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money demanded, and
the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and control of the Appellant
and his co-accused and completed the taking.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPPORTUNITY TO DISPOSE PERSONALITIES TAKEN; NOT
NECESSARY FOR CONSUMMATION. — It is no defense either that Appellant and
his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities taken. That
fact does not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the offender
gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose
of the same, the unlawful taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code
Annotated, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594). "The crime is consummated when the
robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short time, and it is not
necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he
should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of
the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it" (People
vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220 SW 2d 644; People vs. Beal, 39 P
2d 504; People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d 553).
4. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; REQUISITES.
— The "surrender" of the Appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in
their favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a surrender must have
the following requisites: (a) that the offender had not been actually arrested;
(b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his
agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary (People vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L-
62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The "surrender" by
the Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They were,
indeed, asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but they
refused until only much later when they could no longer do otherwise by force
of circumstances when they knew they were completely surrounded and there
was no chance of escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be
mitigating as when he gave up only after he was surrounded by the
constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan, et al., G.R., No. L-18523-26,
30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg, G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March
1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated
more by an intent to insure their safety. And while it is claimed that they
intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not despite several opportunities
to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs. Dimdiman, 106
Phil. 391 [1950]).
6. ID.; COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND

SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — Appellant and his co-
accused were charged in the Information with "Robbery with Serious Physical
Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention ("Art. 295, par. 3, in conjunction with Art.
267, RPC"), and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We agree with the Trial Court
that a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code has been
committed such that the penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal
Detention (Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or "reclusion perpetua to death," is to
be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery with Serious Physical
Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which is reclusion temporal.
7. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED IN CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 48, a complex

crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other."
The term "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did
then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The
phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to
facilitate and insure the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code,
Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99
Phil. 515). In this case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a
"necessary means" as it was selected by Appellant and his co-accused to
facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery. The
detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the robbery but was a
necessary means to commit the same. After the amount of P20,000.00 was
handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused to leave. The
victims were then taken as hostages and the demand to produce an additional
P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite for their release. The detention was
not because the accused were trapped by the police nor were the victims held
as security against the latter. The detention was not merely a matter of
restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a means of
extortion for an additional amount. The police and other authorities arrived only
much later after several hours of detention had already passed. And, despite
appeals to appellant and his co-accused to surrender, they adamantly refused
until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be turned over to them.
They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being handed to them, as
inadequate.
8. ID.; SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — he

elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. The
victims were illegally deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie),
and a minor (Minnie), a specified circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among
those detained. The continuing detention was also for the purpose of extorting
ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.), not only from
the detained persons themselves but even from the authorities who arrived to
rescue them.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; NOT MILITATED BY

FAILURE OF WITNESS TO MENTION THE ACT OF TAKING IN THE SWORN
STATEMENT. — It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen
the taking because the place was dark since the doors were closed and there
were no windows. It will be recalled, however, that Rodita was one of the
hostages herself and could observe the unfolding of events. Her failure to
mention the taking in her sworn statement would not militate against her
credibility, it being settled that an affidavit is almost always incomplete and
inaccurate and does not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries or
suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G.R. No. L-63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570;
People vs. Tan, et al., 89 Phil. 337 [1951]).
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT; ENTITLED TO
GREAT WEIGHT. — The fact that Rodita was an employee of Severino would not
lessen her credibility. The defense has not proven that she was actuated by any
improper motive in testifying against the accused. In the last analysis, the basic
consideration centers around the credibility of witnesses in respect of which the
findings of the Trial Court are entitled to great weight as it was in a superior
position to assess the same in the course of the trial (see People vs. Ornoza,
G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No.
L-38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J : p
Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City, * dated 29 August 1988, in Criminal Case No.
20092, finding him and his co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all
surnamed Canasares, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery
with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention" and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information filed against them reads:

"The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA,
REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO
CANASARES, whose maternal surnames, dated and places of birth
cannot be ascertained of the crime of ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION (Art. 294,
paragraph 3, in conjunction with Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused,
conspiring and confederating among themselves, working together and
helping one another, armed with guns and handgrenade and with the
use of violence or intimidation employed on the person of Severino
Choco, Mary Choco, Mimia Choco and Rodita Hablero, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry away, with
intent of gain, cash in the amount of P20,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist
watches, one (1) Lady's Seiko quartz wrist watch and one (1) Lady's
Citizen wrist watch and assorted jewelries, all valued at P50,000.00;
that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, Mary Choco
suffered serious physical injuries under paragraph 2 of Article 263,
Bienvenido Salvilla likewise suffered serious physical injuries and
Reynaldo Canasares also suffered physical injuries; that the said
accused also illegally detained, at the compound of the New Iloilo
Lumber Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City, Severino Choco, owner/
proprietor of said Lumber Company, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, who is
a minor, being 15 years of age, and Rodita Hablero, who is a salesgirl
at said Company; that likewise on the occasion of the robbery, the
accused also asked and were given a ransom money of P50,000.00;
that the said crime was attended by aggravating circumstances of
band, and illegal possession of firearms and explosives; that the
amount of P20,000.00, the ransom money of P50,000.00, two (2) Men's
wrist watches, two (2) Lady's wrist watches, one (1) .38 caliber
revolver and one (1) live grenade were recovered from the accused; to
the damage and prejudice of the New Iloilo Lumber Company in the
amount of P120,000.00."
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo
Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan was hatched about two days before.
The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they
entered the establishment, they met Rodita Habiero, an employee thereat who
was on her way out for her meal break and announced to her that it was a
hold-up. She was made to go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla
pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and
Mimie, the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told the former that all
they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get
a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the
defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four
accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no
heed. Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to
the office and kept there as hostages.
At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The
four accused also took turns eating while the others stood guard. Then,
Appellant told Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages
could be released. Severino answered that he could not do so because it was a
Saturday and the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of
the lumber yard. Major Melquiades B. Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of
Iloilo City, negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and appealed to
them to surrender with the assurance that no harm would befall them as he
would accompany them personally to the police station. The accused refused to
surrender or to release the hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and joined the
negotiations. In her dialogue with the accused, which lasted for about four
hours, Appellant demanded P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She
offered them P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty of raising more as it
was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive the same and to release
Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco in going out of the office. When they
were out of the door, one of the accused whose face was covered by a
handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the
padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which the latter, in turn,
gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back
to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio, and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to
appeal to the accused to surrender peacefully but they refused. Ultimatums
were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military
authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted
in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo
and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just
below the knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated. The medical
certificate described her condition as "in a state of hemorrhagic shock when
she was brought in to the hospital, and had to undergo several major
operations during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30,
1986."

For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon time of 12 April
1986 he and his co-accused entered the lumber yard and demanded money
from the owner Severino Choco. He demanded P100,000.00 but was given only
P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the office of the lumber yard. He
admitted that he and his co-accused kept Severino, his daughters, and Rodita
inside the office. He maintained, however, that he stopped his co-accused from
getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the P5,000.00 were all
left on the counter, and were never touched by them. He claimed further that
they had never fired on the military because they intended to surrender.
Appellant's version also was that during the gunfire, Severino's daughter stood
up and went outside; he wanted to stop her but he himself was hit by a bullet
and could not prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to
them to surrender but that they gave themselves up only much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced
each of the accused "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs."
Appellant Salvilla's present appeal is predicated on the following Assignments

of Error:
"1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was
consummated and in not holding that the same was merely attempted.
"2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender."
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.
The defense contends that "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as

distinguished from an attempt requires asportation or carrying away, in
addition to the taking. In other words, the crime of robbery/theft has three
consecutive stages: 1 ) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away or
asportation. And without asportation the crime committed is only attempted"
(Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla, Records, p. 317).
There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of

personal property belonging to another. This is known as the element of
asportation, the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession
of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi
(Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing 5 C.J. 607). In fact, if there is no
actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of
another is an essential part of the crime of robbery.
Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not.
And this is because neither he nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00
given by Severino nor the latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident;
proof of which is that none of those items were recovered from their persons.
Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the

lumberyard employee, testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put
P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn,
accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In
respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor
handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the padlocked
door and that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The
"taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16,
27-31). The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were within the
dominion and control of the Appellant and his co-accused and completed the
taking. prcd
"The State established a 'taking' sufficient to support a conviction of

robbery even though the perpetrators were interrupted by police and
so did not pick up the money offered by the victim, where the
defendant and an accomplice, armed with a knife and a club
respectively, had demanded the money from the female clerk of a
convenience store, and the clerk had complied with their instructions
and placed money from the register in a paper bag and then placed the
bag on the counter in front of the two men; these actions brought the
money within the dominion and control of defendant and completed
the taking." (Johnson vs. State, 432 So 2d 758).
"Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner and
absolute control of the property by the taker, even for an instant
constitutes asportation." (Adams vs. Commonwealth, 154 SW 381;
State vs. Murray 280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs. Commonwealth, 105 SE 2d
149) [emphasis supplied].
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to

dispose of the personalities taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the
crime. From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if
the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is
complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).
"The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of

the property, even if for a short time, and it is not necessary that the
property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have
actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the
lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it"
(People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220 SW 2d 644;
People vs. Beal, 39 P 2d 504; People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d 553).
Contrary to Appellant's submission, therefore, a conviction for consummated

and not merely attempted Robbery is in order.
It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen the taking
because the place was dark since the doors were closed and there were no
windows. It will be recalled, however, that Rodita was one of the hostages
herself and could observe the unfolding of events. Her failure to mention the
taking in her sworn statement would not militate against her credibility, it being
settled that an affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate and does
not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries or suggestions (People vs.
Andaya, G.R. No. L-63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570; People vs. Tan, et al.,
89 Phil. 337 [1951]).
The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino would not lessen her
credibility. The defense has not proven that she was actuated by any improper
motive in testifying against the accused.
In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers around the credibility of
witnesses in respect of which the findings of the Trial Court are entitled to great
weight as it was in a superior position to assess the same in the course of the
trial (see People vs. Ornoza, G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 495;
People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Anent the second assignment of error, the "surrender" of the Appellant and his
co-accused cannot be considered in their favor to mitigate their liability. To be
mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: (a) that the offender
had not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary
(People vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L-62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141). LibLex
The "surrender" by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these
requirements. They were, indeed, asked to surrender by the police and military
authorities but they refused until only much later when they could no longer do
otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they were completely
surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The surrender of the accused
was held not to be mitigating as when he gave up only after he was surrounded
by the constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan, et al., G.R., No. L-
18523-26, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg, G.R. No. L-33488,
29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was
motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. And while it is claimed that
they intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not despite several
opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs.
Dimdiman, 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we find the guilt of the
accused-appellant, Bienvenido Salvilla, established beyond reasonable doubt.
Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary to turn now to the

nature of the linked offenses involved and the penalty imposed by the Trial
Court.
Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the Information with "Robbery
with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention ("Art. 295, par. 3, in
conjunction with Art. 267, RPC"), and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We
agree with the Trial Court that a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code has been committed such that the penalty for the more serious
offense of Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or "reclusion
perpetua to death," is to be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for
Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary

means for committing the other." The term "necessary means" does not
connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense as a "necessary
means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and
would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary means" merely signifies
that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other
(Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent,
Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the crime of
Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as it was selected by
Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their
evil design to stage a robbery. LLpr
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-
71765-66, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 325) where the accused were convicted of
Robbery but acquitted in the case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was
held that "the detention is absorbed in the crime of robbery." For one, in Astor ,
there were two (2) separate Informations filed, one for Robbery and another for
Serious Illegal Detention. In the present case, only one Information was filed
charging the complex offense. For another, in Astor , the robbery had already
been consummated and the detention was merely to forestall the capture of
the robbers by the police. Not so in this case, where the detention was availed
of as a means of insuring the consummation of the robbery. Further, in Astor ,
the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery so that it was
held therein:
". . . were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival of the
police at the scene of the crime, they would have not anymore
detained the people inside since they have already completed their
job. Obviously, appellants were left with no choice but to resort to
detention of these people as security, until arrangements for their safe
passage were made. This is not the crime of illegal detention
punishable under the penal laws but an act of restraint in order to
delay the pursuit of the criminals by peace officers (People v. Sol, 9
Phil. 265; People v. Uday, 55 Phil. 167, cited in the Revised Penal Code,
Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed., p. 1337). Where the victims in a robbery case
were detained in the course of robbery, the detention is absorbed by
the crime of robbery (P. v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008, id .). In the case at bar,
the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery, and
although in the course thereof women and children were also held,
that threats to kill were made, the act should not be considered as a
separate offense. Appellants should only be held guilty of robbery."
In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the
robbery but was a necessary means to commit the same. After the amount of
P20,000.00 was handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused
to leave. The victims were then taken as hostages and the demand to produce
an additional P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite for their release. The
detention was not because the accused were trapped by the police nor were
the victims held as security against the latter. The detention was not merely a
matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a
means of extortion for an additional amount. The police and other authorities
arrived only much later after several hours of detention had already passed.
And, despite appeals to appellant and his co-accused to surrender, they
adamantly refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be
turned over to them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being
handed to them, as inadequate.
The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those of U.S. v. Sol, 9
Phil. 265 [1907] where the restraint was for no other purpose than to prevent
the victims from reporting the crime to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa,
92 Phil. 1085 [1953] where the victims were taken to a place one kilometer
away and shot in order to liquidate the witnesses to the robbery; from People v.
Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 [1953]; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all of
which cases were cited in Astor , and where the victims were only incidentally
detained so that the detention was deemed absorbed in robbery. llcd
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of the offense of
Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. The victims were illegally
deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie), and a minor (Minnie),
a specified circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those detained. The
continuing detention was also for the purpose of extorting ransom, another
listed circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.), not only from the detained
persons themselves but even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to
the robbery but a necessary means employed to facilitate it, the penalty
imposed by the Trial Court is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Proportionate

costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Penned by Judge Edgar D. Gustilo.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 109266. December 2, 1993.]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. HON. JUSTICE

FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division)
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; SANDIGANBAYAN; COLLEGIATE CHARACTER THEREOF

RENDERS BASELESS FEAR OF PREJUDICE AND BIAS ON PART OF INDIVIDUAL
MEMBER. — Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into
consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices
in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving
at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of
the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias
on the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA
688 [1969]).
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN T ATAD vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 159
SCRA 70, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — Tatad v. Sandiganbayan , 159
SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed was
an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the
simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein. In the case at bench,
there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because
of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original
information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first
reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately
thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was
first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of
petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors,
who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29,
1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal for a
draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in
March 1991.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A.
NO. 3019); TWO WAYS OF VIOLATING SECTION 3(e) THEREOF. — There are two
ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing any
undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. In Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held: "The use of the
distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section
3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the offense
of 'causing any undue injury to any party' as claimed by petitioners although
there may be instances where both elements concur."
4. I D . ; DELITO CONTINUADO; EXPLAINED; CONCEPT APPLIED TO
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER SPECIAL LAWS. — According to Cuello Calon, for
delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a
period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions
are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration
of the same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised
Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed). According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito
continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in
the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957
ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippines Criminal Law, p. 152). Padilla views
such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed., pp. 53-54) . . . The concept of delito
continuado, although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied
to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing
the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's
benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]). Under Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless
the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the
Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — We find that, technically, there
was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there
should only be one information to be filed against her. The 32 Amended
Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime"
and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." . . . In the case at bench, the
original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act —
that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that
the criminal act: (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law —
Executive Order No. 324 dated April 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one
offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or
about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim
the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word
"aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name
of the individual whose stay was legalized . . . The 32 Amended Informations
aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or
about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of
the application for the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a
single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same
document. Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing of the
motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or
injury.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; THEFT; "SINGLE LARCENY DOCTRINE"; DEFINED;
"SEPARATE LARCENY DOCTRINE;" EXPLAINED; RULE FOLLOWED IN AMERICAN
COURTS. — The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny"
doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or
different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many
courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there are
distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the
doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused for
one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (Annotation,
37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414). The American courts following the "single
larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one
continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same
"occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson,
81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v . Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539). An
American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional
guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense
(Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a
humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused
may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR
2d 1179).
DECISION
QUIASON, J : p
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
to set aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698
of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal
case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated on March 14, 1993,
which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo,
pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly
committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien
Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).LLphil
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA
162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as
she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of
Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that " (b)ona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding

Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992
at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which

Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for
arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42).
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the

grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner
intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the
motion to defer the arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars

(Rollo, pp. 47-48). The motion stated that while the information alleged that
petitioner had approved the application for legalization of "aliens" and gave
them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens.
According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities
of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R. No. 107598
(Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to
dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding
Justice Garchitorena and the motion for bill of particulars).
LLjur
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of

particulars, the prosecution stated categorically that they would file only one
amended information against petitioner.
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to admit

the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp.
61-126).
On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned

Resolution dated March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification
(Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a

resolution, admitting the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to
post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-
185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set for
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued
the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena
"to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his
disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the
resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the
32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on April
12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194). prcd
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for the disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
based on the publication of his letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine
Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of the information filed against
her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected
to change the conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public
statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo,
pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro

Benigno's column in the July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the
Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure order against
petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of the
Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:.
"I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of
Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would stop Miriam
Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship
because of graft charges against her. Some of the most perfidious
Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores
without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the
peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is
accused of is kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot
of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind of
perverse morality we can do without" (Rollo, p. 156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner

finds objectionable, reads as follows:
"(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her
cases are pending of her intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial
Court where she is charged with soliciting donations from people
transacting with her office at Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan
where she is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court
where her petition is still pending" (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of

Presiding Justice Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged before the
Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the
Alien Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information
filed against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the
hold-departure order was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting
the offense charged, thus: cdphil

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then
the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988
which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing
undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and
administrative functions of said accused" (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing
the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure
order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court,
with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in
the letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly,
there would have been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his
diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into

consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices
in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving
at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of
the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias
on the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA
688 [1969].)
Re: Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process
were violated by reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation. According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on
or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and
the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14). LLjur
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan , 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to

petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the
part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual
issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process

but it got snarled because of the complexity of the issues involved. The act
complained of in the original information came to the attention of the
Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the
Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in
motion. The investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto
dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned
to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a
panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the
charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy
of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached
the Ombudsman in March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us

involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598).
Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of the delay in the
preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those
petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of
action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any
offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official
acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and
that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the
policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried,
minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the
Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan
erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31). LLpr
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of

fact in the information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore,
petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens,
who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
execution of her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense
defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under
Executive Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in good faith the
policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses
or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are
matters of defense which she can establish at the trial. cdll
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege
that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government,"
there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by
causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:

"The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act
qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving
any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is
not an indispensable element of the offense of 'causing any undue
injury to any party' as claimed by petitioners although there may be
instances where both elements concur."
Re: Delito Continuado

Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the
petition that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against
petitioner, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one
amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted that petitioner
questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended
Informations, the splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the
furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity
of said plaint, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in
petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be filed
against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado

or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should
be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing
problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
LLphil
Accordingly to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be

a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision
violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent
or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (II
Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed).
Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of

several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the
perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Pen al Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal
Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from

one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only

one offense the following cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed

by the accused at the same place and at the same period of time (People v.
Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939]).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the
same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563
[1974]). prcd
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926]).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every
time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the
attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA
156 [1964]). The collections of the legal fees were impelled by the same
motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection
were made under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975
[1955]).
On other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period
from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July
1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961]). The said acts were committed
on two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and
falsifications to conceal the said offenses committed in August and October
1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one
purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66
Phil. 354 [1938]).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the
failure of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in
June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine
(People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976]).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of

collections from customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa
v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcrop of the Spanish

Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g.
violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered
following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156
[1964]).
U n d e r Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be

supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence,
legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time

creates a single offense or separate offenses has troubled also American
Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories
that have evolved in theft cases. llcd
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine,
that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different
owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts
have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there was a
distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the
doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused for
one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (Annotation,
37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the
commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving
the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson,
157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State
v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the

constitutional guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same
offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine
is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the
accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life
(Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with

performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for
legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i) committed
by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and
(iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the

original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original
information each amended information states the name of the individual whose
stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors
manifested that they would file only one amended information embodying the
legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12,
1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
"On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has
conceded categorically that the accusation against Miriam Defensor
Santiago consists of one violation of law represented by the approval of
the applications of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien
Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the
concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is categorical
that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . ." (Rollo, p. 59).
LibLex
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on

the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the application for the legalization
of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the
approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing of the motion

for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury.
The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows:
". . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the
damage and prejudice to the government is concerned, the same is
represented not only by the very fact of the violation of law itself but
because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the
country in granting citizenship to those not qualified" (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No.

16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution
dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that
the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed
to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to
18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case
number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding
Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned. llcd
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Puno, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason,
to the extent that opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate the thirty-two (32) Amended
Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one Information under
the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
thirty-two (32) Amended Informations, for that court seriously erred in not
granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those Informations. The grounds for my
submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my dissenting opinion 1
i n Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205
SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992]), which I beg leave to reproduce here:
"The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 16698 charges the petitioner as follows:
'That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior

or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the
legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the
government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to
the said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative
functions of said accused. LLpr
Contrary to law.'
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in
violation of the provisions of Executive Order No. 324 approved
applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position
that Executive Order 'does not allow the legalization of the same.'
Executive Order No. 324 entitled 'Waiving Passport Requirements

for Immigrants under Certain Conditions,' dated April 13, 1988, was
promulgated pursuant to Section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as
amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that.
'Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is
authorized:
(a) when the public interest so warrants:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants,
under such conditions as he may prescribe.'
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with
the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for waiver of
passport requirements during a 12-month period beginning on a date
to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides, among
other things, that the alien 'must establish that he entered the
Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided
continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to
the filing of his application.' llcd
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport

requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It is
clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that
petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or
minor children of qualified aliens — the latter being alien spouses or
parents who had entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and
who were themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements
under Executive Order No. 324 — to apply for waiver of passport
requirements and, after compliance with requirements of Executive
Order No. 324, approved such 'legalization.'
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal
sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No. 324
would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal
information in this case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 with
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then

Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was expressly
authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and
administer and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was
authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement that Executive
Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and administration of
Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or mechanical acts,
but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatory and
hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably,
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows: Cdpr
'11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein , the

Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may waive
exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the case of
individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity
or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be
waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation ,
namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens
likely to become public charges; (c) those relating to drug
offenses, except for so much of those provisions as relates to a
single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) those
relating to national security and members of subversive
organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied).
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to
waive grounds for exclusion of aliens under the Immigrations Act in two
(2) cases: (a) 'for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;' and
(b) 'for the public interest.' Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded
from entry into the Philippines include:
'(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as
may be required under the provisions of this Act.' 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of

persons in whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be
granted.
It will be seen then that the acts of petitioner, which the
information assumes to be criminal in nature, constituted official acts
of petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and
construing Executive Order No. 324 . There is no question that the
applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and
minor children of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by
petitioner `for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity.' It is also
not disputed that the said alien spouses and minor children did not fall
under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in paragraph
12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one
has pretended that petitioner had any personal or corrupt interest in
any of the cases of alien spouses and minor children of qualified aliens
she had acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance, that the fees
specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 either were not
collected by the Government or were misappropriated by petitioner
and converted to her own use. It may be noted, incidentally, that
paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the Commissioner 'in her discretion,
[to] charge a lower fee for the spouses and minor children below 21
years old of the applicant.' The criminal information, as noted above,
included an allegation of 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality.' It is
clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary
investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an allegation which is
actually a conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the
words 'wilfully, unlawfully and criminally' which are recited redundantly
in the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the
preliminary investigation showed no undue injury.' to the Government
and no unwarranted benefit or advantage' to the alien wives and minor
children of qualified aliens outside of the simple acceptance and
approval of the applications for waiver of passport requirements (so
called 'legalization') by petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation
or construction given by petitioner to Executive Order No. 324 is
correct — i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by
alien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of
qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before
January 1, 1984 and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and
conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for humanitarian
purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring family unity — there
would be no 'injury,' let alone an 'undue injury,' to the Government.
Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport requirements in the cases
of such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be deemed to be
an 'unwarranted' benefit to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of
Executive Order No. 324 be held to be correct. prLL
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that

contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or implementing
regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely
charged with the implementation of such a statute or regulation, are
entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself
has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by
such administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v. Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722
[1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29
SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37
SCRA 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958]).
But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be
incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible for
such interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable
personally, whether civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as
firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who has so
acted, something far graver than error of law or error of judgment must
be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions, personal
malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185
SCRA 346 [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made
during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly

done by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on
which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe,
further, that there is nothing to prevent this Court from addressing and
ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any
additional essential facts apart from those already admitted by
petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have legal
questions like that before this Court resolved at the earliest possible
opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go through
the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of
criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as
criminal is the very issue at stake.
LLphil
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not,

as a matter of law, constitute a crime. Indeed, if the acts which
petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very
serious consequences would follow for the administration of law and
government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the
criminal information here would appear to be that public officers
interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own
peril and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of
any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such interpretation and
application." (emphasis in the penultimate and ultimate paragraphs
supplied).
The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case No.
16698 back in 1 May 1991. Approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later,
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are still going on, and indeed
appear to me to be back to where the case was at the time the original
Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on the legal question which
petitioner in effect had asked us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), this
case should be terminated by now, one way or the other. Once more, I
respectfully submit that a public officer should not be compelled to go through
the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial,
if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan
to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations.
Romero, J ., dissent.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in

his dissent from the majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado
Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the decision in said case, however, having
become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the issues there
involved. cdrep
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266), I vote with
the majority in simply directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court by Mr.
Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended
Informations into a single Information.
Footnotes
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
1. Gutierrez, Griño-Aquino and Romero, JJ. joined in the dissent. Melencio-

Herrera, J. wrote a separate opinion, but adopted the substantive points
made in my dissenting opinion.
2. It is also pertinent to note the following classes of excluded aliens:
'(10) Persons who are members of a family accompanying an excluded alien,

unless in the opinion of the Commissioner of Immigration no hardship would
result from their admission;
(11) Persons accompanying an excluded person who is helpless from mental

or physical disability or infancy, when the protection or guardianship of such
accompanying person or persons is required by the excluded person, as shall
be determined by the Commissioner of Immigration;
(12) Children under fifteen years of age, unaccompanied by or not coming to
a parent, except that any such children may be admitted in the discretion of
the Commissioner of Immigration, if otherwise admissible;
xxx xxx xxx
(Section 29 (a), C.A. No. 613, as amended; emphasis supplied)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 58886. December 13, 1988.]
CONSUELO E. MALLARI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GUARANTEE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

EXPLAINED; BASIS FOR THE PRINCIPLE. — By the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy, it is understood that "when a person is charged
with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction
or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot
again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is
founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience." The rule against
double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of second
punishment but against being tried for the same offense. Without the
safeguard this rule establishes in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety
and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness
who might repeat his accusation as often as it is dismissed by the court and
whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than
his will and pleasure. The accused would never be free from the cruel and
constant menace of a never ending charge, which the malice of a
complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended over his head.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; REQUISITES. — To
raise the defense of double jeopardy, three (3) requisites must be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as that in the first.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR; CONTINUED
CRIME, CONSTRUED. — A comparison of the Informations filed in the two
cases under consideration as well as the findings of facts of the appellate
court tells us that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of acts
amount to what is known in law as a continued, continuous or continuing
offense. A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but
all arising from one criminal resolution. It is a continuous, unlawful act or
series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Although there are
series of acts, there is only one crime committed. Hence, only one penalty
shall be imposed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY ONE PENALTY SHOULD BE IMPOSED. — The
singularity of the offense committed by petitioner is further demonstrated by
the fact that the falsification of the two (2) public documents as a means of
committing estafa were performed on the same date, in the same place, at
the same time and on the same occasion. This Court has held in the case of
People v . de Leon, that the act of taking two or more roosters in the same
place and on the same occasion is dictated by only one criminal design and
therefore, there is only one crime of theft even if the roosters are owned by
different persons.
DECISION
FERNAN, J : p
Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, reiterated as Section 21,

Article III in the 1987 Constitution, provides that "(n)o person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is the
constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner Consuelo E. Mallari in
challenging the decision dated December 10, 1979 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Consuelo
Mallari," as well as the resolution of November 5, 1981 denying her motion
for reconsideration. Petitioner attains her objective.
cdasia
The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Consuelo E. Mallari, with three (3) others, was accused of the
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document before the then Court of
First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case No. 9800). As the other accused were
at large, the case proceeded only with respect to Consuelo Mallari, who,
upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty. Trial was conducted; after which, the
court rendered judgment finding Consuelo Mallari guilty of the crime charged
and sentencing her to imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify the
offended party Remegio Tapawan in the amount of P1,500.00 and to pay the
costs.
Petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
19849-CR, resulted in the affirmance of the trial court's decision with a
modification as to the penalty. In lieu of the straight penalty of one (1) year,
an indeterminate sentence of four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum,
to two (2) years and four (4) months, as maximum, was imposed on
petitioner. 1
In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner contended that the
decision in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR placed her twice in jeopardy of being
punished for the same offense as she had previously been convicted,
sentenced and probationed for the same offense in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Consuelo Mallari."
Unconvinced, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration
in the assailed resolution of November 5, 1981, to wit:
"The court will now resolve as to whether the accused might be
placed twice in jeopardy, the Court sustains the position taken by the
Solicitor-General that the acts of the accused in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR
are different and distinct from the acts committed in CA-G.R. No.
20817-CR. Considering that they were separate acts of deceit, they are
therefore two separate crimes." 2
Hence, the instant petition for review.

By the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, it is
understood that "when a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without
the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the
same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason,
justice and conscience." 3
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three (3) requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. 4
With the prior conviction by a final judgment of petitioner for the crime
of estafa thru falsification of public document in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR, there
is no question that the first and second requisites above enumerated are
present in the case at bar. The problem then lies with the third requisite. Is
the crime charged in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR the same as in this case (CA-
G.R. No. 19849-CR)?
We rule in the affirmative.
The Information in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR reads:
"That on or about December 15, 1970 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused CELESTINO HALLAZGO, a Notary Public
for and in the City of Manila and accused CARLOS SUNGA, DOMINGO
ESPINELLI and CONSUELO MALLARI, all private individuals, conspiring,
and confederating together with others whose true names and
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JULIA S.
SACLOLO thru falsification of a public document in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused having somehow obtained possession
of T.C.T. No. 42694, issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite, belonging to Leonora I. Balderas and duly registered in the
latter's name and by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to said Julia S. Saclolo to the effect
that said Leonora I. Balderas was badly in need of money and that she
was offering the aforesaid lot as collateral for a loan of P1,500.00 then
executing, forging and falsifying a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
acknowledged before accused CELESTINO HALLAZGO, Notary Public for
and in the City of Manila and entered in the latter's notarial register as
Doc. No. 3719, Page No. 75, Book No. XII, Series of 1970 and therefore
a public document, by then and there signing and/or causing to be
signed the signature 'Leonora I. Balderas,' thereby making it appear as
it did appear in said document, that said Leonora I. Balderas had
participated in the execution of this Deed of Real Estate Mortgage by
signing her name thereon when in truth and in fact as the said accused
or any of them to sign her name thereon and by means of other deceits
of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing said Julia Saclolo
to give and deliver as in fact the latter gave and delivered to said
accused the said amount of P1,500.00 said accused well knowing that
their manifestations were false and untrue and were made solely for
the purpose of obtaining as in fact they did obtain the said amount of
P1,500.00 which, one (sic) in their possession, they did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, misappropriate, misapply and
convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of said Julia S. Saclolo in said amount of P1,500.00, Philippine
Currency." 5
The Information in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR, on the other hand, reads:

That on or about the 15th day of December, 1970 in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the accused Celestino Hallazgo, a Notary Public for
and in the City of Manila, and accused Carlos Sunga, Domingo Espineli
and Consuelo Mallari, all private individuals, conspiring and
confederating together with others whose true names and
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Remegio G.
Tapawan thru falsification of a public document, in the following
manner, to wit: the accused having somehow obtained possession of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42695 issued by the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Cavite, belonging to Leonora I. Balderas and duly
registered in the latter's name, and by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representations which they made to said Remigio G.
Tapawan to the effect that said Leonora I. Balderas was badly in need
of money and that she was offering the aforesaid lot as collateral for a
loan of P1,500.00, then executing, forging and falsifying a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage acknowledged before accused Celestino Hallazgo,
Notary Public for and in the City of Manila and entered in the latter's
Notarial Register as Doc. No. 3718; Page No. 75, Book No. XII, Series of
1970, and therefore a public document, by then and there signing
and/or causing to be signed the signature 'Leonora I. Balderas' over the
typewritten name 'LEONORA I. BALDERAS' thereby making it appear, as
it did appear in said document, that said Leonora I. Balderas had
participated in the execution of said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage by
signing her name thereon neither had she authorized said accused or
anyone of them to sign her name thereon, and by means of other
deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing said
Remegio B. Tapawan to give and deliver as in fact the latter gave and
delivered to said accused, the amount of P1,500.00 . . . " 6
In CA-G.R. No. 20817, the Court of Appeals made the following

observations: aisadc
". . . Testifying for the prosecution, witness Remegio Tapawan

explained how Julia Saclolo became the mortgagee of the land in
question by declaring that the accused Consuelo E. Mallari herein after
referred to as the appellant, whom he had known since childhood came
to his house in Rosario, Cavite on December 10, 1970, bringing two (2)
land titles both in the name of Leonora Balderas and told him that she
wanted to mortgage the titles for P1,500.00 each because she and her
cousin Leonora Balderas were in great need of money to pay some
taxes with the Bureau of Customs where they have some goods
impounded. Not having enough money Tapawan refused. The
appellant, however, returned on December 15, 1970 with two titles
and pleaded anew with Remegio Tapawan and his wife for assistance
because of her and Balderas' great need of money. Tapawan gave in
but because he had only P1,500.00 while the accused needed
P3,000.00 he took her to his mother-in-law, Julia Saclolo and was able
to secure the amount of P1,500.00. On the information given by
Consuelo Mallari that the deed of mortgage would be prepared in the
office of Atty. Celestino Hallazgo at M.H. del Pilar, Manila where the
mortgagor Leonora Balderas would show up, Tapawan proceeded to
the place indicated. Immediately upon Tapawan's arrival, Atty. Hallazgo
phoned someone and within 20 minutes the person arrived whom
Consuelo Mallari and Atty. Hallazgo introduced to Remegio Tapawan as
Leonora Balderas. Thereafter, the mortgage deeds where prepared —
one in favor of Julia Saclolo and the other in favor of Remegio Tapawan
for P1,500.00 each. The mortgage loan of P3,000.00 was accordingly
delivered to the person who posed as Leonora Balderas. Consuelo
Mallari and Domingo Espinelli, assigned as witnesses to the said
documents. Later, during the preliminary investigation at the Fiscal's
Office, Tapawan learned that he was folled (sic) because the person
who posed as Leonora Balderas was a man by the name of Carlos
Sunga, who, at the time the mortgage was constituted, was dressed in
a woman's attire. Neither Remegio Tapawan nor Julia Saclolo were able
to recover a portion of the mortgage loan." 7
Similarly, the findings of facts in CA-G.R. No. 19849 ran thus:

"REMEGIO TAPAWAN stated that sometime on December 10,
1970, his townmate Consuelo E. Mallari saw him at his house, when she
begged him and his wife to lend her cousin Leonora Balderas some
amount to pay taxes and customs duties for imported fruits impounded
in the Bureau of Customs offering as a collateral two (2) Certificates of
Title, two deeds of sale, and four (4) tax declarations all in the name of
Leonora Balderas. Consuelo returned on December 15, and reiterated
her request. Since he had only P1,500.00 at that time he convinced his
mother-in-law Julia Saclolo, to shell out additional amount of P1,500.00.
Consuelo and he then proceeded to the Office of Atty. Celestino
Hallazgo in Ermita, Manila for the preparation of the documents. This
attorney called up Leonora Balderas who arrived shortly accompanied
by three (3) persons one of whom is the helper of Atty. Hallazgo,
Domingo Espinelli. This Leonora Balderas was introduced to him by
Atty. Hallazgo and Consuelo who claimed her to be a cousin 'whom I
should help.' When the two (2) deeds prepared by Atty. Hallazgo one
for him and the other for Julia Saclolo were ready, they were signed by
him, Mallari, Espinelli, Balderas and the attorney, after which he
delivered the money to the person introduced as Leonora Balderas." 8
A comparison of the Informations filed in the two cases under

consideration as well as the findings of facts of the appellate court tells us
that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of acts amount to
what is known in law as a continued, continuous or continuing offense.
A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all
arising from one criminal resolution. It is a continuous, unlawful act or series
of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent
force, however long a time it may occupy. Although there are series of acts,
there is only one crime committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be
imposed.
The crime of estafa thru falsification of public document committed by
Consuelo Mallari, although consummated through a series of acts, was "set
on foot" by the single intent or impulse to defraud Remegio Tapawan of a
total amount of P3,000.00. And contrary to the appellate court's observation,
there was only one deceit practised by petitioner on the two (2) victims, i.e.,
that being in need of money, Leonora Balderas was willing to mortgage two
(2) lots as security for a loan of P3,000.00. It was, in fact, by mere play of
fate that the second victim, Julia Saclolo, should be dragged into the swindle
by reason of Tapawan having only P1,500.00 at that time. That there were
two (2) victims, however, did not accordingly convert the crime into two
separate offenses, as the determinative factor is the unity or multiplicity of
the criminal intent or of the transactions. For "the fact should not be lost
sight of that it is the injury to the public which a criminal action seeks to
redress, and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to
individuals." 9
The singularity of the offense committed by petitioner is further
demonstrated by the fact that the falsification of the two (2) public
documents as a means of committing estafa were performed on the same
date, in the same place, at the same time and on the same occasion. This
Court has held in the case of People v. de Leon, 10 that the act of taking two
or more roosters in the same place and on the same occasion is dictated by
only one criminal design and therefore, there is only one crime of theft even
if the roosters are owned by different persons. cdtai
It has also been ruled that when two informations refer to the same
transaction, the second charge cannot prosper because the accused will
thereby be placed in jeopardy for the second time for the same offense. 11
Petitioner, having already been convicted of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public document in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR, it
stands to reason that she can no longer be held liable for the same crime in
this case. The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not against
the peril of second punishment but against being tried for the same offense.
12 Without the safeguard this rule establishes in favor of the accused, his
fortune, safety and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the
complaining witness who might repeat his accusation as often as it is
dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other
limitation or restriction than his will and pleasure. 1 3 The accused would
never be free from the cruel and constant menace of a never ending charge,
which the malice of a complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended
over his head. 14
NEMO BIS PUNITUR PRO EODEM DELICTO. No man is punished twice for
the same fault or offense.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment of
conviction in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR is set aside on the ground of double
jeopardy. No costs. cdll
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. P. 26, Rollo ; Associate Justice Jorge R. Coquia, ponente; Associate Justices

Nestor B. Alampay and Isidro C. Borromeo, concurring.
2. Pp. 28 & 110-111 Rollo .
3. Melo v. People , 85 Phil. 766.

4. People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166.
5. P. 61, Rollo .
6. Pp. 2-3, Original Records.
7. Decision in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR, pp. 76-77, Rollo; Associate Justice

Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., ponente; Associate Justices Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. and
Ambrosio M. Geraldez, concurring.
8. P. 22, Rollo .
9. U.S. v. Gustilo , 19 Phil. 208.

10. 49 Phil. 437, reiterated in People v. Jaranilla, 55 SCRA 563.
11. People v. Sales , G.R. No. L-8925, May 21, 1956.

12. People v. Ylagan , 58 Phil. 851.
13. Martin, Freedom Constitution of the Philippines, 1st ed., p.316.
14. Julia v. Sotto , 2 Phil. 247.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006.]
URBANO M. MORENO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J : p
In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails

the Resolution 2 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June
1, 2005, affirming the Resolution 3 of the Comelec First Division dated
November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified him from running for the
elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the
July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running

for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final
judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4)
Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August
27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of
action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case
of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that
under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge
of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended
as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly
terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a
result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July
15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Samar for preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating
Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong
Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for
reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First
Division was affirmed. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. 5 Since Moreno was
released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall
commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to
Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective local office. EIAScH
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local
Government Code take precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by
Moreno and the Probation Law because it is a much later enactment and a
special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local
officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local
Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and
not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent
election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his
previous misconduct.
In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the
Office of the Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec 7
definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense
involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation.
The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists
and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his
arguments and pointing out material differences between his case and Dela
Torre v. Comelec which allegedly warrant a conclusion favorable to him.
According to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral turpitude covered by the
first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner
in that case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and
only after appealing his conviction, such that he could not have been eligible
for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation
within the period specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a
result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code does not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of
the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code, which reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
[Emphasis supplied.]
xxx xxx xxx
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on

whether Arbitrary Detention, the crime of which Moreno was convicted by final
judgment, involves moral turpitude falling under the first part of the above-
quoted provision. The question of whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime
involving moral turpitude was never raised in the petition for disqualification
because the ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its
assailed resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from running for a local
elective office within two (2) years from his discharge from probation after
having been convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a
determination that the crime of Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is
not decisive of this case, the crucial issue being whether Moreno's sentence
was in fact served. aDcETC
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our

pronouncement therein that the grant of probation does not affect the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based
primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was
convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in
this case. At any rate, the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence"
should have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and
to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the
provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code.
The Court's declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the

Local Government Code, we should add, ought to be considered an obiter in
view of the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled to probation because he
appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which, however, affirmed his
conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment
of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which
is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who,
although already eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only
after failing in his appeal. 9
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at

first glance. The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and
common sense, means the confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility
for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly clear and unambiguous
provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Court's attention
because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened
the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their
sentence because they were granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been

disqualified because he did not serve the adjudged sentence having been
granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant
on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the
paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of

suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling,
and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period 11 imposed upon Moreno were similarly
suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not
even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty
of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be

equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of probation, 12 the probationer does not serve the
penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with
all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. 13
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the
real issue in this case. They focused on the fact that Moreno's judgment of
conviction attained finality upon his application for probation instead of the
question of whether his sentence had been served. HDTcEI
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying
the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally
disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an
offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2)
years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served
their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should
not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified
from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of
ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even
begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging
Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he
final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability
for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus,
when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed
terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction
were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local

Government Code which gives room for judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion
will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code

afford us no clue as to the intended meaning of the phrase "service of
sentence," i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify those who have
been granted probation. The Court's function, in the face of this seeming
dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local
Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus
interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace
and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a
deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted. 15 Thus, the
Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified
for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not
be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the
State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1)
day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on
probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable. 16
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of
this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for
a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse
into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders
not covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code

was enacted in 1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was
decided. When the legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of
our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification
from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the
purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to
disqualify probationers. CDAcIT
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be
construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local
Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special
legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions
of such earlier statute. 17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that
broadens the scope of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec
committed an egregious error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was
not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram,
Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the
time of his conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have
obtained a fresh mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram,
Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant
words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v.
Comelec 18 where he said that "it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission

on Elections en banc dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division
dated November 15, 2002, as well as all other actions and orders issued
pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections
is directed to proceed in accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-
Nazario, Garcia and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 3-19.
2. Id. at 20-26; Penned by Commissioner F.A. Tuason, Jr.
3. Id. at 27-31; Penned by Commissioner R.Z. Borra.
4. No. L-59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148.

5. Comelec Resolution No. 4801, otherwise known as the "Guidelines on the Filing
of Certificates of Candidacy in Connection with the Synchronized Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections," has a similar provision in Sec. 3(a)
thereof.
6. Rollo , pp. 37-47.
7. 327 Phil. 1144 (1996).
8. Rollo , pp. 60-70.
9. Lagrosa v. People, G.R. No. 152044, July 3, 2003, 405 SCRA 357.
10. Art. 86 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalties of reclusion
perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto
mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments
provided by the Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by
law in the future.
11. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 43.
12. Presidential Decree No. 968 (1976), as amended, Probation Law of 1976. Sec.
14. The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not more than one (1) year shall not exceed two (2) years,
and in all other cases, said period shall not exceed six (6) years.
13. Presidential Decree No. 968 (1976), as amended, Probation Law of 1976. Sec.
10.
14. Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 120721, February 23,
2005, 452 SCRA 162.
15. Santos v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 642, 652 (1999).

16. Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, Probation Law of 1976, Sec. 9.
17. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No.
159647, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 414.
18. 327 Phil. 521 (1996).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 182748. December 13, 2011.]
ARNEL COLINARES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
ABAD, J : p
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all
that it takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted
homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation
on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel
Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. 1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in
the evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside
with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck
Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 1/2 inches in diameter.
Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he
saw Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck
him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later
learned that Arnel had hit him. aHICDc
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since
he happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a
barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate 2 showing that
Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline
area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially
fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel
claimed self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening
when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel
asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than
reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed
Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The
latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head
with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab
him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the
same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister's house. On September 4,
2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-
wedding party on the night of the incident. His three companions were all
drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated
argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide
with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA
entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in
the absence of evidence to support it. 3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this
Court on petition for review. TEAICc
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel
and the Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or
not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide
with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled
to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that
makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation
law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues
that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained
once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck
Rufino on the head with a stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel
is guilty of frustrated homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower
offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not
he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court.
The Court's Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first
and that he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a
stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of
showing that he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to
him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and
convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would
be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.
4 ADCETI
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-

defense requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured
committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that
is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3)
that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation. 5
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused,
the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-
defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression
contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent
danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or
with a weapon. 6
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of
unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist
blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one
corroborated Arnel's testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel's only
other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having
a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any
medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of
Rufino and his companions. 7
In contrast, the three witnesses — Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias —
testified that Arnel was the aggressor. Although their versions were mottled
with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The
witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared
to Arnel's testimony, the prosecution's version is more believable and
consistent with reality, hence deserving credence. 8
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor,
would he be liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on
Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in
fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused's
intent to take his victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and
convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. 9
And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means
the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he
inflicted on his victim. 10 cEaCAH
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was
so forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his
weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel
inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted,
not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People , 11 we ruled that when the
accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon
and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely
medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If
the victim's wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or
attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent,
depth, and severity of the victim's wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that
"head injuries are always very serious," 12 he could not categorically say that
Rufino's wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the
wounds actually are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from
becoming fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to
go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only
refers to the length of the wound not the depth of the
wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the
layer of scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is
broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it
lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not
measure the depth. 13 ADCTac
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no
indication that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result
of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely
required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr.
Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require
surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we
give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus — the problem the
contusion that occurred in the brain.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and
suturing the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but
some of them would rather go home and then come back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up. 14
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to

support the prosecution's claim that Rufino would have died without timely
medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted
homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for
probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him
for frustrated homicide. ESaITA
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should
be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this
new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation
upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere
privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4
of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction." 15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for
frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from
applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point
is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have.
What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his
maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows
him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the
trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation,
taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who
appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing
himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of
conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated
homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard position, it
will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court's annulled
judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the
severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme
Court's judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will
also have to bend over to the trial court's judgment — even if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial
court's erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse
errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there? AEDCHc
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel

to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v.
Court of Appeals 16 that the probation law requires that an accused must not
have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But
there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
I n Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the
accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term
of one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision
correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still,
he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to
apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation.
The Court would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to
save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and
probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself
of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the
part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at
hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for
probation as an 'escape hatch' thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's
affirmance of his conviction." 17
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have
allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal
and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I
choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow
Arnel to now seek probation under this Court's greatly diminished penalty
will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco . It remains that those who will
appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of
the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted
his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime
called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow
him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty.
Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of
the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and
four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
probation. aTEADI
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to

probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is
one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a
harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco , the Probation Law must
not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of
the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose. 19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial court's judgment
of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the
probation law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from
a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct
judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong
crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How
can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court
now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with
its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It
would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a
penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months
maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could
say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the
RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind
precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny
Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court
imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court,
subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES
the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and
four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena
the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner
applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case
has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. HSEcTC
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo,
Perez, Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Brion and Bersamin, JJ., join Justice Peralta's concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Peralta, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Villarama, Jr., J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Sereno, J., I join Justice Peralta and Villarama.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join Justice Villarama.
Separate Opinions
PERALTA, J., dissenting and concurring:
I concur with the disposition of the majority as to the conviction of the
accused.
However, as to the question relating to the application of the Probation
Law in this case, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion.
Probation is not a right granted to a convicted offender. Probation is a
special privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified offender, 1 who
does not possess the disqualifications under Section 9 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 968, 2 otherwise known as the Probation Law of 1976. Likewise,
the Probation Law is not a penal law for it to be liberally construed to favor
the accused. 3
In the American law paradigm, probation is considered as an act of
clemency and grace, not a matter of right. 4 It is a privilege granted by the
State, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. 5 In the recent
case of City of Aberdeen v. Regan, 6 it was pronounced that:
The granting of a deferred sentence and probation, following a
plea or verdict of guilty, is a rehabilitative measure and, as such, is
not a matter of right but is a matter of grace, privilege, or clemency
granted to the deserving. 7
In this jurisdiction, the wisdom behind the enactment of our own
Probation Law, as outlined in the said law, reads: EcIDaA
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender

by providing him with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses. 8
Originally, P.D. No. 968 9 allowed the filing of an application for
probation even if an appeal had been perfected by the convicted offender
under Section 4, thus:
Section 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at
any time of said defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation
shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate
court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of
a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
10
Thereafter, the filing of an application for probation pending appeal

was still allowed when Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No.
1257. 11
However, with the subsequent amendment of Section 4 of P.D. No. 968
by P.D. No. 1990, 12 the application for probation is no longer allowed if the
accused has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Section 4
of the Probation Law now reads: TAScID
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of

this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall
be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
13
The reason for the disallowance is stated in the preamble of P.D. No.
1990, thus:
WHEREAS, it has been the sad experience that persons who
are convicted of offenses and who may be entitled to probation still
appeal the judgment of conviction even up to the Supreme Court,
only to pursue their application for probation when their appeal is
eventually dismissed;
WHEREAS, the process of criminal investigation, prosecution,
conviction and appeal entails too much time and effort, not to
mention the huge expenses of litigation, on the part of the State;
WHEREAS, the time, effort and expenses of the Government in
investigating and prosecuting accused persons from the lower courts
up to the Supreme Court, are oftentimes rendered nugatory when,
after the appellate Court finally affirms the judgment of conviction,
the defendant applies for and is granted probation;
WHEREAS, probation was not intended as an escape hatch and
should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice,
but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are
willing to be reformed and rehabilitated;caSEAH
WHEREAS, it becomes imperative to remedy the problems

abovementioned confronting our probation system. 14
In Sable v. People, 15 the Court stated that "[Section 4 of] the Probation
Law was amended to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments
of conviction even if the sentence is probationable, for the purpose of
securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails
in his bid." 16 Thus, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated; who manifest
spontaneity, contrition and remorse. 17
Verily, Section 4 of the Probation Law provides that the application for
probation must be filed with the trial court within the 15-day period for
perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within such period is intended to
encourage offenders, who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, to
avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity. 18 If the application for
probation is filed beyond the 15-day period, then the judgment becomes
final and executory and the lower court can no longer act on the application
for probation. On the other hand, if a notice of appeal is perfected, the trial
court that rendered the judgment of conviction is divested of any jurisdiction
to act on the case, except the execution of the judgment when it has
become final and executory.
In view of the provision in Section 4 of the Probation Law that"no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction," prevailing
jurisprudence 19 treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies
because the law is unmistakable about it. 20
However, it has been proposed that an appeal should not bar the
accused from applying for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the
penalty to within the probationable limit, as this is equitable.
In this regard, an accused may be allowed to apply for probation even
if he has filed a notice of appeal, provided that his appeal is limited to the
following grounds:
1. When the appeal is merely intended for the correction of
the penalty imposed by the lower court, which when corrected would
entitle the accused to apply for probation; and
2. When the appeal is merely intended to review the crime
for which the accused was convicted and that the accused should
only be liable to the lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
crime for which he was originally convicted and the proper penalty
imposable is within the probationable period. HEIcDT
In both instances, the penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime
committed by the accused is more than six years; hence, the sentence
disqualifies the accused from applying for probation. Thus, the accused
should be allowed to file an appeal under the aforestated grounds to seek a
review of the crime and/or penalty imposed by the trial court. If, on appeal,
the appellate court finds it proper to modify the crime and/or the penalty
imposed, and the penalty finally imposed is within the probationable period,
then the accused should be allowed to apply for probation.
In addition, before an appeal is filed based on the grounds enumerated
above, the accused should first file a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the trial court anchored on the above-stated grounds and
manifest his intent to apply for probation if the motion is granted. The
motion for reconsideration will give the trial court an opportunity to review
and rectify any errors in its judgment, while the manifestation of the accused
will immediately show that he is agreeable to the judgment of conviction and
does not intend to appeal from it, but he only seeks a review of the crime
and/or penalty imposed, so that in the event that the penalty will be
modified within the probationable limit, he will apply for probation.
What Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal from the
judgment of conviction, thus:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. 21
An appeal from the judgment of conviction involves a review of the
merits of the case and the determination of whether or not the accused is
entitled to acquittal. However, under the recommended grounds for appeal
which were enumerated earlier, the purpose of the appeal is not to question
the judgment of conviction, but to question only the propriety of the
sentence, particularly the penalty imposed, as the accused intends to apply
for probation. If the appellate court finds it proper to modify the sentence,
and the penalty finally imposed by the appellate court is within the
probationable period, the accused should be allowed to apply for probation
after the case is remanded to the trial court for execution. ADETca
It is believed that the recommended grounds for appeal do not

contravene Section 4 of the Probation Law, which expressly prohibits only an
appeal from the judgment of conviction. In such instances, the ultimate
reason of the accused for filing the appeal based on the aforestated grounds
is to determine whether he may avail of probation based on the review by
the appellate court of the crime and/or penalty imposed by the trial court.
Allowing the aforestated grounds for appeal would give a qualified convicted
offender the opportunity to apply for probation if his ground for appeal is
found to be meritorious by the appellate court, thus, serving the purpose of
the Probation Law to promote the reformation of a penitent offender outside
of prison.
On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in
the following instances:
1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a
crime where the penalty imposed is within the probationable period or
a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and
2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the
merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer
for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a
conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime
in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the
probationable period.
Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as Section 4 of
the Probation Law prohibits granting an application for probation if an appeal
from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused.
There is wisdom to the majority opinion, but the problem is that the law
expressly prohibits the filing of an application for probation beyond the
period for filing an appeal. When the meaning is clearly discernible from the
language of the statute, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
22 Thus, the remedy is the amendment of Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, and not
adaptation through judicial interpretation. cTECHI
VILLARAMA, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I join the majority in ruling that petitioner should have been convicted
only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and that the maximum of the
indeterminate prison term imposed on him should be lowered to four months
o f arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum. However, I disagree with their conclusion (by 8-7
vote) that on grounds of fairness, the Court should now allow petitioner the
right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
I submit the following principles which should be controlling on the
present issue:
1. Probation being a mere privilege, this Court may not grant as
relief the recognition that accused-appellant may avail of it
as a matter of right.
2. The probation law is not a penal statute and therefore the
principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable.
With the enactment of P.D. No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976), this Court
held that the rule that if the accused appeals his conviction solely to reduce
the penalty, such penalty already probationable, and the appellate court
grants his appeal he may still apply for probation, had already been
abandoned. We explained that the intention of the new law is to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 1 Thus, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is not probationable, and the appellate
court modifies the penalty by reducing it to within the probationable limit,
the same prohibition should still apply and he is not entitled to avail of
probation.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 2 the Court categorically declared that
"[P]robation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace of
clemency or immunity conferred by the court to a seemingly deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed
by law for the offense of which he stands convicted." Subsequently, the
Court noted that the suggestion in Francisco that an appeal by the accused
should not bar him from applying for probation where such appeal was solely
for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the
probationable range — may not be invoked by the accused in situations
when he at the same time puts in issue the merits of his conviction. 3 The
ponencia found the factual milieu in Francisco not on fours with this case.
However, the accused here did not even raise the issue of his entitlement to
probation either as an alternative prayer to acquittal or as principal relief. HESIcT
The majority reasoned that since the trial court imposed a (wrong)
penalty beyond the probationable range, thus depriving the accused of the
option to apply for probation when he appealed, the element of speculation
that the law sought to curb was not present. Noting that the accused in this
case claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated homicide, the majority opined that said accused
had, in effect, sought to bring down the penalty as to allow him to apply for
probation.
I cannot concur with such proposition because it seeks to carve out an
exception not found in and contrary to the purpose of the probation law.
The pronouncement in Francisco that the discretion of the trial court in
granting probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused, underscored the
paramount objective in granting probation, which is the reformation of the
probationer. This notwithstanding, the majority suggests that remorse on the
part of the accused is not required, or least irrelevant in this case because
"the Court cannot expect petitioner to feel penitent over a crime, which the
Court now finds, he did not commit", as he only committed attempted
homicide.
It must be stressed that in foreclosing the right to appeal his conviction
once the accused files an application for probation, the State proceeds from
the reasonable assumption that the accused's submission to rehabilitation
and reform is indicative of remorse. And in prohibiting the trial court from
entertaining an application for probation if the accused has perfected his
appeal, the State ensures that the accused takes seriously the privilege or
clemency extended to him, that at the very least he disavows criminal
tendencies. Consequently, this Court's grant of relief to herein accused
whose sentence was reduced by this Court to within the probationable limit,
with a declaration that accused may now apply for probation, would diminish
the seriousness of that privilege because in questioning his conviction
accused never admitted his guilt. It is of no moment that the trial court's
conviction of petitioner for frustrated homicide is now corrected by this Court
to only attempted homicide. Petitioner's physical assault on the victim with
intent to kill is unlawful or criminal regardless of whether the stage of
commission was frustrated or attempted only. Allowing the petitioner
the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty glosses over the
fact that accused's availment of appeal with such expectation amounts to
the same thing: speculation and opportunism on the part of the accused in
violation of the rule that appeal and probation are mutually exclusive
remedies.
The ponencia then declares that the question in this case is ultimately
one of fairness, considering the trial court's erroneous conviction that
deprived petitioner of the right to apply for probation, from which he had no
way of obtaining relief except by appealing the judgment.
Such liberality accorded to the accused, for the reason that it was not
his fault that the trial court failed to impose the correct sentence, is
misplaced. ICAcHE
It is settled that the Probation Law is not a penal statute. 4 In the

matter of interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced that
"the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the
categorical provisions of the law." 5 In applying Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 968 to this
and similar cases, the Court must carefully tread so as not to digress onto
impermissible judicial legislation whereby in the guise of interpretation, the
law is modified or given a construction which is repugnant to its terms. As
oft-repeated, the remedy lies in the legislature and not judicial fiat.
I therefore maintain my dissent to the pronouncement in the ponencia
recognizing the right of petitioner Arnel Colinares to apply for probation.
Footnotes
1.Records, p. 25.
2.Id. at 2.
3.Rollo , pp. 109-128. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with
Associate Justices Magdangal M. de Leon and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring.
4.People v. Dagani , G.R. No. 153875, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 64, 73-74.

5.Oriente v. People , G.R. No. 155094, January 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 348, 359.
6.People v. Se , 469 Phil. 763, 770 (2004).
7.Records, pp. 245-246 (TSN, May 5, 2004, pp. 28-29).

8.People v. Enfectana , 431 Phil. 64, 76 (2002).
9.People v. Pagador , 409 Phil. 338, 351 (2001).

10.Rivera v. People, 515 Phil. 824, 832 (2006).
11.G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533, 555-556.
12.Records, p. 82 (TSN, June 17, 2002, p. 6).
13.Id. at 83-84 (id. at 7-8).

14.Id. at 84-85 (id. at 8-9).
15.Sec. 4, Presidential Decree 968 also known as the Probation Law of 1976,
provides: SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with
the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver
of the right to appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
16.313 Phil. 241, 255 (1995).

17.Id.
18.Yusi v. Honorable Judge Morales , 206 Phil. 734, 740 (1983).

19.Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16, at 273.
PERALTA, J., dissenting and concurring:

1.Sable v. People, G.R. No. 177961, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 619, 625.
2.Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be

extended to those:
(a) Sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six

years;
(b) Convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the
public order;
(c) Who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a
fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos;
(d) Who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree;
and
(e) Who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions
of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
3.Pablo v. Castillo , G.R. No. 125108, August 3, 2000, 337 SCRA 176, 181; Llamado
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 566, 577.
4.People v. Anderson , 50 Cal. 4th 19, 235 P.3d 11 (2010).
5.Dean v. State, 57 So.3d 169 (2010).
6.170 Wash. 2d 103, 239 P.3d 1102 (2010).

7.Emphasis supplied.
8.P.D. No. 968, Section 2.

9.Establishing a Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefor and Other
Purposes, July 24, 1976.
10.Emphases supplied.
11.Amending Certain Sections of Presidential Decree Numbered Nine Hundred and

Sixty-Eight, Otherwise Known as The Probation Law of 1976, December 1,
1977.
SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as

the Probation Law of 1976, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the

court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but
before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend the
execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing
of the application for probation and he may submit his comment on such
application within ten days from receipt of the notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with
notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed
a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a
pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is
filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court,
said application shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of
the judgment of the appellate court.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis

supplied.)
12.Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, Otherwise Known as The Probation Law
of 1976, October 5, 1985.
13.Emphasis supplied.
14.Italics supplied.
15.Supra note 1.
16.Id. at 627.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19.Sable v. People, supra note 1; Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108747,
April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 384; Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850,
June 29, 1989, 174 SCA 566.
20.Sable v. People, supra note 1, at 628.
21.Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

22.Pablo v. Castillo , supra note 3, at 181.
VILLARAMA, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

1.Bernardo v. Balagot, G.R. No. 86561, November 10, 1992, 215 SCRA 526, 531.
2.G.R. No. 108747, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 384.

3.See Lagrosa v. People, G.R. No. 152044, July 3, 2003, 405 SCRA 357, 362.
4.Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989).

5.Pablo v. Castillo , G.R. No. 125108, August 3, 2000, 337 SCRA 176, 170.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 227704. April 10, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUSAN

SAYO y REYES and ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON , accused-
appellants.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J : p
Subject of this appeal 1 is the Decision 2 of June 26, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04914 which affirmed the Decision 3
dated September 23, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City,
Branch 261, convicting accused-appellants Susan Sayo y Reyes (Sayo) and
Alfredo Roxas y Sagon (Roxas) (collectively referred to as accused-
appellants) for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2003. 4
Facts
On November 16, 2005, accused-appellants were indicted under the

following Information: 5
That on November 15, 2005, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused Susan Sayo, willfully and
unlawfully, did then and there, recruit and transport minors [AAA], 6
15 years old, [BBB], 7 16 years old, together with [CCC], 8 by taking
advantage of their vulnerability, for the purpose of prostitution and
sexual exploitation; while accused Alfredo Roxas, in conspiracy with
accused Sayo, did then and there, willfully, and unlawfully, own,
manage and operate a room in his apartment in Pasig City used as a
prostitution den, receive and harbor said trafficked persons, also by
taking advantage of their vulnerability and for the purpose of
prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Contrary to law. 9
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
The prosecution's and defense's contrasting versions of the events, as
summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The Prosecution's Evidence
The combined testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC known as the
"plaza girls" disclosed that several months prior to November 15,
2005, these "plaza girls" have been under the control and supervision
of SAYO as commercial sex workers. AAA testified in open court that
she was only fifteen (15) years old at the time she began working for
SAYO in December 2004. The Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office showed that she was born on May 2, 1990.
Same is true with BBB who testified that she was born on November
11, 1989 and thus, indeed, a minor during their rescue on November
15, 2005.
The "plaza girls" were introduced to SAYO on different
occasions in 2004 by other "plaza girls." SAYO then started to act as a
pimp providing them with male customers for a certain percentage.
The "plaza girls" give her a flat rate of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) for every
male customer who will pay them Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00)
and Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) for every Seven Hundred Pesos
(P700.00) paying customer. CAIHTE
SAYO would regularly furnish AAA, BBB and CCC with male
customers on the average five (5) customers per week. Whenever
they have customers, SAYO would bring them either to a motel or to
ALFREDO ROXAS's house who provides them a room for One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00) for thirty (30) minutes use of the room. ROXAS also
provides condom for the male customers at Thirty Pesos (P30.00).
On November 3, 2005, the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group-Women and Children Complaint Division (CIDG-WCCD)
received a letter from the International Justice Mission (IJM), an
International Non-Government Human Rights Organization,
requesting for police assistance on the possible rescue of three (3)
minors exploited for prostitution in Pasig City.
Acting on said request, PO2 Leonardo So conducted on
November 8, 2005 further surveillance to confirm the veracity of the
report. It was verified and confirmed that there were rampant
offerings of minor prostitutes at the Pasig Plaza, specifically by a pimp
named SUSAN SAYO. Hence, on November 15, 2005, the CIDG-WCCD
headed by Superintendent Sotera P. Macatangay conceptualized an
entrapment operation called "Oplan Sagip Angel." A team was
organized composed of WCCD operatives, representatives from IJM
and DSWD-NCR for the rescue operation.
During the briefing, PO3 Anthony Ong, PO2 Leonardo So and an
agent from IJM were designated to act as poseur-costumers. Then,
one (1) five hundred peso bill and fifteen (15) one hundred peso bills
amounting to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) were prepared and
sent to PNP-Crime Laboratory for Ultra Violet Powder dusting. The
peso bills would be utilized during the entrapment operation as
payments to the owner of the apartment/room, for the pimp and for
the services of the "plaza girls."
The "Oplan Sagip Angel" operatives proceeded to the target
area in Pasig City. The three men who were tasked to pretend as
customers stayed in front of the church at the Pasig Plaza. They were
approached by SAYO who bluntly asked if they wanted women and
she further inquired if they wanted 15 year-old girls. The three
customers agreed to take the 15 year-old girls offered by SAYO for
Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) each. Thereafter, SAYO informed the
three customers about a room in Baltazar Street which they could
rent for P100.00 for each couple. The customers agreed on the price.

Meanwhile, SAYO informed the "plaza girls" on November 15,
2005 that they have customers for that night. AAA, BBB and CCC met
SAYO at the Pasig Plaza. There, she introduced them to the three
men. The three male customers were actually the agents of the CIDG-
WCCD and IJM. After the negotiation was concluded, all of them
proceeded to the house of ALFREDO ROXAS at No. 638 Baltazar
Street, Brgy. Sto. Tomas, Pasig City on board a tricycle. Upon
reaching the house, they were greeted by "FRED" ROXAS who openly
discussed with SAYO in front of the customers and the ["]plaza girls["]
regarding the transaction for the night. ROXAS told that the room rate
for each couple is P100.00. AAA saw the customers gave to ROXAS
the Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00).
The undercover agents, SAYO and ROXAS talked about the
payment for the girls' services outside the house. When the Nine
Hundred Pesos (P900.00) was handed by one of the customers to
SAYO to cover the payment for the services of AAA, BBB and CCC, the
CIDG-WCCD agents announced that it was a raid. At that point, PO3
Anthony Ong executed the pre-arranged signal, in reaction to which,
the back-up operatives who were deployed in different strategic
locations rushed towards them and arrested SAYO and ROXAS.
Recovered from the possession of ALFREDO ROXAS was the
marked money amounting to Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00), the
payment for the use of the room for sexual activities while the Nine
Hundred Pesos (P900.00) intended for the sexual services to be
provided by the "plaza girls" was recovered from SUSAN SAYO.
Thereafter, the two [accused-]appellants and the "plaza girls" were
brought to the headquarters of CIDG-WCCD in Camp Crame Quezon
City for investigation, documentation and medico-legal examination.
After staying there for a day, the "plaza girls" were brought under the
care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in
Marilac Hills, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
The [Defense's] Evidence
xxx xxx xxx
SAYO testified on direct examination that on November 15,
2005, between 9:00 to 9:30 o'clock in the evening, while barking for
jeepney passengers in front of the Pasig Cathedral Church, she saw
CCC, AAA and BBB together with the three male persons. This group
of men and CCC approached her and arrested her. CCC asked her to
accompany them to ALFREDO's house in exchange for One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00). SAYO agreed and they boarded a tricycle heading
towards Sto. Tomas, Pasig City. Thereat, SAYO was surprised when a
man suddenly grabbed her arm when she alighted from the tricycle.
She was taken to a dark place and hauled immediately to a vehicle
and brought to jail where she met for the first time her co-accused
ROXAS. HEITAD
xxx xxx xxx

ALFREDO ROXAS, on the other hand, claimed that on the night
of November 15, 2005, he was sleeping in his house in Baltazar
Street, Sto. Tomas. He was awakened by the barks of the dogs. He
went outside to see for himself what was that commotion all about.
He saw CCC and Susan [Sayo] along with the men[,] AAA and BBB.
One of the men asked him if they could rent his room since it was the
birthday of [CCC's] compadre, but he refused. After rejecting their
request for several times, the male persons forced him to accept the
money which turned out to be dusted with ultra violet powder. He
admitted having known CCC, AAA and BBB for about 6 to 7 months
prior to the incident. As for SAYO, he just only met her on that day of
November 15, 2005 in front of the church in the Pasig Plaza. When
asked how he came to know CCC, AAA and BBB, he said that they
were just introduced to him by someone in their place. 10
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC promulgated its Decision 11 on September 23, 2010.
The RTC first discussed the procedural infirmity in the Information as it
contained more than one offense. Under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information must charge only one offense
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.
Sayo was charged with recruiting and transporting AAA and BBB
(minors), as well as CCC (of legal age) for prostitution. In the same
Information, Roxas was separately accused of managing and operating a
room in his apartment to be used for prostitution. Thus, the Information was
duplicitous. Be that as it may, the RTC held that the accused-appellants had
waived any objection to the Information as they failed to object prior to their
arraignment. Citing Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, 12 the RTC held that
with the waiver, the accused may be charged and convicted of as many
offenses as those charged in the Information and proved during trial. 13
On the substantive issue, the RTC held that the prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The
testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC were clear, categorical, and corroborative
of each other's testimony. The testimony of the arresting officer, PO2
Anthony Ong (PO2 Ong), was also categorical and straightforward regarding
the investigation, pre-surveillance, entrapment procedure, and arrest of the
accused-appellants. 14
On the other hand, both accused-appellants merely interposed the
defenses of denial and alibi which are both inherently weak defenses. For
denial to prosper, there must be strong evidence that the accused was not
capable of committing the crime. For alibi, the accused must prove that he
was at some other place which made it physically impossible for him to be at
t h e locus criminis at the time of commission. Contrary to the accused's
defenses, the RTC held that in fact, both the accused in this case were
arrested as a result of an entrapment operations. 15
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision held:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations,
accused SUSAN SAYO y REYES is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4
(a, e) and Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208 insofar as minors AAA and BBB,
and is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two
Million Pesos ([P]2,000,000.00) insofar as minors AAA and BBB are
concerned.
Accused ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON is likewise found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under
Section 5 (a) and Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208, insofar as minors AAA
and BBB are concerned, and is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos ([P]2,000,000.00).
As for complainant [CCC] who was no longer a minor at the time
of commission of the offense, accused Susan Sayo is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in persons
under Section 4 (a, e) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00). Accused Alfredo Roxas y Sagon is likewise
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in
persons under Section 5(a) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
SO ORDERED. 16
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, by
adding an award of moral and exemplary damages, but only to AAA and
BBB. There was no discussion on the omission of CCC in the award of
damages. 17 ATICcS
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of
the trial court dated September 23, 2010 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified:
(1) SUSAN SAYO Y REYES is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 (a) (e) qualified by
Section 6 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208 insofar as minors AAA and BBB
are concerned and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT without eligibility for parole and to pay a fine of
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). In addition, she is ordered to pay
each AAA and BBB P500,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00
as exemplary damages.
(2) ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON is likewise found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (a) qualified by
Section 6 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, insofar as minors AAA and BBB are
concerned, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT without eligibility for parole and to pay a fine of
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). In addition, he is ordered to pay
each AAA and BBB P500,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00
as exemplary damages.
(3) As for the complainant CCC, who was no longer a minor
at the time of the commission of the offense, SUSAN SAYO Y REYES
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 (a)
(e) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Twenty
(20) years and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (a) of R.A. 9208 and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Fifteen (15) years
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
SO ORDERED. 18 ETHIDa
Accused-appellants filed a Notice of Appeal 19 on July 30, 2015, which

was given due course by the CA in its Resolution 20 dated August 20, 2015.
Both plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellants manifested before the Court
that they would not be filing supplemental briefs. 21
In a Certification 22 issued on May 12, 2017, the Correctional Institution
for Women, Bureau of Corrections, certified that Sayo had died on November
30, 2011 due to multiple organ failure, secondary to cervical cancer,
attaching thereto the Certificate of Death 23 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar.
Issue
Whether the guilt of Roxas was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
Sayo's death extinguished her

criminal and civil liability
At the outset, the Court notes that Sayo had already died on November
30, 2011. Thus, the death of Sayo extinguished her criminal liability. Article
89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
Likewise, the civil liability of Sayo arising from her criminal liability is
extinguished upon her death. The rules on the effect of the death of the
accused on civil liability pending appeal are summarized in People v.
Bayotas: 24
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number
2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above. 25 cSEDTC
Applying these established rules in the instant case, the death of Sayo
extinguished her criminal and civil liability inasmuch as she is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action is also extinguished, as it
is grounded on the criminal action. 26
Thus, the Decision of the Court will now solely focus on the criminal
liability of Roxas.
Affirmed factual findings of the RTC
are afforded great respect by the
Court
Upon judicious review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the
factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The Court upholds the
findings of the courts a quo that Roxas knowingly leased a room in his house
for the purpose of prostitution.
It is an established doctrine in appellate review that factual findings of
the trial court, including its assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
probative weight of their testimonies, as well as of the documentary
evidence, are accorded great weight and respect, especially when these are
affirmed by the CA, as in this case. 27
As correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the testimonies of
AAA, BBB, and CCC were direct, straightforward, and corroborative of each
other's testimonies. Likewise, the testimony of the arresting officer, PO2 Ong
detailed the conduct of the whole entrapment procedure. On the other hand,
Roxas merely interposed the weak defenses of denial and alibi. The positive
identification and testimonies of the witnesses greatly outweigh Roxas' bare
denials.
However, the Court deems it fit to modify the legal conclusions of the
courts a quo, with regard to the offense committed and the appropriate
penalty.
Roxas committed Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons as defined
under Section 5 (a) of RA 9208
Roxas was convicted of Qualified Trafficking of Persons, under Section
5 (a) in relation to Section 6 of RA 9208 in connection with minors AAA and
BBB and was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). With regard to CCC, who was of legal age at
the time of the offense, Roxas was convicted of Trafficking in Persons under
Section 5 (a) of RA 9208 and was sentenced to imprisonment of fifteen (15)
years and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
The courts a quo committed serious error in convicting Roxas for
Qualified Trafficking of Persons and Trafficking in Persons as the offenses
proscribed under Section 5 of RA 9208 are properly denominated as Acts
that Promote Trafficking in Persons.
Thus, the Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction and holds
that he is guilty of one count of violation of Section 5 (a) of RA 9208 for Acts
that Promote Trafficking in Persons and not Trafficking in Persons, qualified
or otherwise.
There are four punishable acts under RA 9208: (1) Acts of Trafficking in
Persons under Section 4; 28 (2) Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons
under Section 5; 29 (3) Violation of the Confidentiality Rule under Section 7
30 in relation to Section 10 (d); and (4) Use of Trafficked Persons under
Section 11. 31
The offense of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 and Acts that
Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 of RA 9208 are separate and
distinct offenses with their own corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides
for qualifying circumstances of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4, which
when alleged and proved, will merit the imposition of the maximum penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not
more than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) under Section 10 (c).
The relevant portions of the provisions are quoted below:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful
for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following
acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or
receive a person by any means, including those done under the
pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. — The
following acts which promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall
be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used
any house, building or establishment for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 10 of RA 9208 provides for the penalties of the above:
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following penalties
and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in
this Act:
(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts
enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under
Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00)[.]
Thus, Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve
trafficking in persons, such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring,
receiving, buying, offering, selling, or trading persons to engage in
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those
acts that promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned predicate acts of
Trafficking in Persons. AaCTcI
In arriving at its Decision, the RTC reasoned:

As for accused Alfredo Roxas, based on the evidence adduced
during trial, the prosecution was able to establish that Alfredo Roxas
owned a house/apartment; that said house/apartment had a room;
that the room was offered for lease for every paying customer of the
complainants; that accused Roxas, in consideration of the sum of One
Hundred (100) pesos, would allow the complainants and her (sic)
customers to use the room and engage in sex therein; that Roxas had
knowledge of the fact that the complainants engaged in sex for a fee
as he cleaned the room after the complainant and her customer
finished using it; that, moreover, he sold condoms to complainant's
male customers before using the room. All of these acts promoted
trafficking in persons as defined under Section 5 of [RA
9208]. 32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The RTC found that Roxas violated Section 5 (a) of RA 9208 for
knowingly leasing a room for the purpose of prostitution. Unfortunately, in
spite of this, it still convicted Roxas of Qualified Trafficking in Persons as
regards minors AAA and BBB and Trafficking in Persons as regards CCC. The
CA, for its part, affirmed the RTC's ruling.
The RTC and the CA thus committed serious error as the proper
denomination of the offense is Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under
Section 5 (a). In this regard, it should be noted that the offenses punished
under Section 5 cannot be qualified by Section 6 as what the latter seeks to
qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of trafficking. To be
sure, this was clarified in the amendatory law, RA 10364 33 or the Expanded
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012 where Section 6 was amended
accordingly:
SEC. 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. —
Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be
considered as qualified trafficking:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(d) When the offender is a spouse, an
ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the
offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
"xxx xxx xxx
"(f) When the offender is a member of the
military or law enforcement agencies;
"(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of
trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes
insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS);
"(h) When the offender commits one or more
violations of Section 4 over a period of sixty (60) or more
days, whether those days are continuous or not; and
"(i) When the offender directs or through
another manages the trafficking victim in carrying out the
exploitative purpose of trafficking." (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As can be gleaned from the above amendment, only violations of
Section 4 on Trafficking in Persons can be qualified. Section 5 on Acts that
Promote Trafficking in Persons, being separate and distinct offenses, cannot
be qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor. The clarificatory
amendment, being beneficial to the accused, must be applied in his favor. 34
Accordingly, Roxas' conviction of Qualified Trafficking in Persons and
Trafficking in Persons as well as the sentence of life imprisonment and a fine
of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) must be modified.
The denomination of his conviction is corrected to Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 (a) of RA 9208 with the appropriate
penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Roxas is liable for moral and
exemplary damages to AAA, BBB,
and CCC
The award of damages is likewise modified. Moral damages are
prescribed under Articles 2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act or omission. SDHTEC
xxx xxx xxx

ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order
named. (Emphasis supplied)
In turn, exemplary damages are awarded in addition to moral damages
by way of example or correction for the public good:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed,
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the
offended party.
Moral and exemplary damages of P500,000.00 and P100,000.00,
respectively, are ordinarily awarded in cases of Trafficking in Persons as a
prostitute. The ratio for the award of damages in said cases was explained in
People v. Lalli: 35
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an
analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute
without one's consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a
day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no
doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a
prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary
damages is likewise justified. 36
In the instant case, while the Information alleged that Roxas "received
and harbored" AAA, BBB, and CCC, it was not proven during the trial that
Roxas directly participated in their prostitution or solicited or assigned
customers for them. However, his act of renting out a room in his house
promoted and facilitated their prostitution. Roxas profited from the rental of
the room and his actions are just as deplorable.
I n Planteras, Jr. v. People , 37 the Court set the award of moral and
exemplary damages at P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 in cases of Acts that
Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 (a) of RA 9208.
Thus, Roxas is liable to pay moral and exemplary damages to AAA,
BBB, and CCC of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 each. The monetary awards
due to the victims shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from finality of judgment until full payment. 38 AScHCD
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to:

1. DECLARE accused-appellant ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON, GUILTY
o f ACTS THAT PROMOTE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS under
Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, for which he
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15)
years and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
as provided for under Section 10 (b) of the same law.
2. ORDER accused-appellant ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON to PAY
AAA, BBB, and CCC, the amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00
each, as moral and exemplary damages, subject to legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until full
payment.
3. DISMISS the case insofar as accused-appellant SUSAN SAYO y
REYES is concerned, in view of her death.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, J.C. Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, * J., is on leave.
Footnotes
* On leave.
1. See Notice of Appeal, CA rollo, pp. 131-133.
2. Rollo , pp. 2-16. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, with

Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy concurring.
3. CA rollo, pp. 14-21. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Leili Cruz Suarez.
4. AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF
TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES, May 26, 2003.
5. CA rollo, pp. 6-7.

6. The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information
which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her
immediate family, or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect
her privacy, and fictitious initials shall, instead, be used, in accordance with
People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]) and Amended Administrative
Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. CA rollo, p. 6.
10. Rollo , pp. 4-7.

11. CA rollo, pp. 14-21.
12. 474 Phil. 139 (2004).

13. CA rollo, pp. 17-18.
14. See id. at 19-20.

15. Id. at 20.
16. Id. at 20-21.

17. See CA Decision, rollo, pp. 2-16.
18. Id. at 15.

19. CA rollo, pp. 131-133.
20. Id. at 134.

21. Rollo , pp. 29-32, 41-45.
22. Id. at 24.

23. Id. at 26.
24. 306 Phil. 266 (1994).
25. Id. at 282-283.

26. See People v. Egagamao , 792 Phil. 500, 508 (2016).
27. See People v. Aguirre , G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017, 845 SCRA 227,
238.
28. SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person,
natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;
(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or material, economic or other

consideration, any person or, as provided for under Republic Act No. 6955,
any Filipino woman to a foreign national, for marriage for the purpose of
acquiring, buying, offering, selling or trading him/her to engage in
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of

acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel plans consisting of tourism
packages or activities for the purpose of utilizing and offering persons for
prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation;
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
(f) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons for the purpose of

involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(g) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport or abduct a person, by means of threat
or use of force, fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, or intimidation for the
purpose of removal or sale of organs of said person; and
(h) To recruit, transport or adopt a child to engage in armed activities in the
Philippines or abroad.
29. SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. — The following acts which
promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house,

building or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
(b) To produce, print and issue or distribute unissued, tampered or fake

counseling certificates, registration stickers and certificates of any
government agency which issues these certificates and stickers as proof of
compliance with government regulatory and pre-departure requirements for
the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
(c) To advertise, publish, print, broadcast or distribute, or cause the

advertisement, publication, printing, broadcasting or distribution by any
means, including the use of information technology and the internet, of any
brochure, flyer, or any propaganda material that promotes trafficking in
persons;
(d) To assist in the conduct of misrepresentation or fraud for purposes of
facilitating the acquisition of clearances and necessary exit documents from
government agencies that are mandated to provide pre-departure
registration and services for departing persons for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
(e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and entry of persons from/to the
country at international and local airports, territorial boundaries and seaports
who are in possession of unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel documents
for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
(f) To confiscate, conceal, or destroy the passport, travel documents, or
personal documents or belongings of trafficked persons in furtherance of
trafficking or to prevent them from leaving the country or seeking redress
from the government or appropriate agencies; and
(g) To knowingly benefit from, financial or otherwise, or make use of, the
labor or services of a person held to a condition of involuntary servitude,
forced labor, or slavery.
30. SEC. 7. Confidentiality. — At any stage of the investigation, prosecution and

trial of an offense under this Act, law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
judges, court personnel and medical practitioners, as well as parties to the
case, shall recognize the right to privacy of the trafficked person and the
accused. Towards this end, law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges
to whom the complaint has been referred may, whenever necessary to
ensure a fair and impartial proceeding, and after considering all
circumstances for the best interest of the parties, order a closed-door
investigation, prosecution or trial. The name and personal circumstances of
the trafficked person or of the accused, or any other information tending to
establish their identities and such circumstances or information shall not be
disclosed to the public.
In cases when prosecution or trial is conducted behind closed-doors, it shall

be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of
printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio,
producer and director of a film in case of the movie industry, or any person
utilizing tri-media facilities or information technology to cause publicity of
any case of trafficking in persons.
31. SEC. 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. — Any person who buys or engages the
services of trafficked persons for prostitution shall be penalized as follows:
(a) First offense — six (6) months of community service as may be

determined by the court and a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); and
(b) Second and subsequent offenses — imprisonment of one (1) year and a
fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
32. CA rollo, p. 19.

33. AN ACT EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9208, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO INSTITUTE
POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND
CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," February 6,
2013.
34. Ortega v. People, 584 Phil. 429 (2008).
35. 675 Phil. 126 (2011).

36. Id. at 159.
37. G.R. No. 238889, October 3, 2018.

38. People v. Jugueta , 783 Phil. 806 (2016).

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 168641. April 27, 2007.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CLEMENTE

BAUTISTA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of the

Philippines assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 22,
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784, reversing the Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 19, Manila and dismissing the criminal case for slight physical
injuries against respondent on the ground that the offense charged had already
prescribed.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-
accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe
Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of
Malate, Manila, but no settlement was reached. The barangay chairman then
issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999. 2 EHCDSI
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein
respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8,
1999 recommending the filing of an Information against herein respondent.
Such recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by
First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval
cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground
that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription
from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had
already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but
the RTC denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC. EDcICT
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22,
2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed, the 60-day
prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint
with the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded
that the offense had prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the
MeTC, reasoning as follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution
of ACP Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively terminated the
proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP or
ACP Sulla, his designated alter ego, to act on the resolution is extended
up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last
day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only
on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year.
To use once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the
proceedings at the CPO was "unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very
much more than the prescriptive period of only two (2)
months. The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when
filed with the court on June 20, 2000. . . . 3 (Emphasis supplied)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed
Orders of both courts below and Criminal Case No. 344030-CR, entitled:
"People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, — versus — Clemente Bautista and
Leonida Bautista, Accused," is ordered DISMISSED. Costs de oficio. SIAEHC
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the
foregoing CA Decision. The Court gives due course to the petition
notwithstanding the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration
of the decision of the CA before the filing of herein petition. It is not a condition
sine qua non for the filing of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 5
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively
interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the
criminal action for slight physical injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution
in this case is whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation to file the proper criminal
information against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor. CAScIH
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses . — The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is

absent from the Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an information
against respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. The Court
does not agree. It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal's office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. 6
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City
Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that
an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled
from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until
such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
caSDCA
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the
information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the
interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte , 7 it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account
of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 8
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked
by the petitioner in the present petition considering that the delay occurred not
in the conduct of preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the
Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor to file the information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the
delay in the filing of the information. The Court will not be made as an unwitting
tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong
purportedly inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing
the proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors' apparent lack of a sense of
urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the circumstances, the more
appropriate course of action should be the filing of an administrative
disciplinary action against the erring public officials. EIDTAa
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 02-103990 is
hereby REINSTATED.
Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a copy of
herein Decision for appropriate action against the erring officials.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (retired) and concurred in

by Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Magdangal M. De Leon;
rollo, pp. 31-44.
2. Section 410 (c), Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as Local
Government Code provides:
Section 410. (c) Suspension of prescriptive periods of offense — While the

dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration the prescriptive
periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be
interrupted upon filing the complaint with the punong barangay . The
prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the
complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action
issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such
interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint
with the punong barangay .
3. Rollo , p. 42.
4. Id. at 43.
5. Almora v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 23, 35 (1999); Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Hantex Trading Co., Inc., G.R. No. 136975, March 31, 2005, 454
SCRA 301, 320.
6. Arambulo v. Laqui, Sr. , 396 Phil. 914, 923 (2000); Francisco v. Court of
Appeals, 207 Phil. 471, 477 (1983); People v. Olarte , 125 Phil. 895, 902
(1967).
7. People v. Olarte, id.

8. Id.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152662. June 13, 2012.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MA. THERESA

PANGILINAN, respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J : p
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for review on
certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C.
Malolos."
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil
action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela
City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department

of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed

the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with
her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00
and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks
totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan on 3
February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31 on 7 June
2000. DaAISH
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the

Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil
action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela
City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department
of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed

the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with
her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00
and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks
totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18

November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan on 3
February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC; Branch 31 on 7 June
2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion
in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The

criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads: ECaHSI
. . . Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03

February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court
itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was
worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two
counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed
when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the
appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is

hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed
to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153. 4
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review 5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.

In a resolution 6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition
to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring
respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001

Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22
had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
. . . this Court reckons the commencement of the period of
prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to
[respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this
period that the [respondent] was notified by the private [complainant]
of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace
period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had,
pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or
until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against
the petitioner before the proper court.CDESIA
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and

8 9 1 5 2 (sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the
said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall

be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes 7 the Supreme Court held that
the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended,
are 'judicial proceedings', which means the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed
in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with
Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal

ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both
ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Zaldivia v. Reyes 8 likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. 9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.
According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs
the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of
criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. 10
It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant
Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of
the subject BP Blg. 22 cases. EHSITc
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied
on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 11
that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the
"judicial proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In
relying on Zaldivia, 12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent
jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, 13 the Supreme Court ruled
that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal's Office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3
February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to
file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No.
3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the

petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with
the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the
decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are
allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint
before the City Prosecutor's Office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a
special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are

anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by
petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are
therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 14 and Section
1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 15 Respondent pointed
out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as
amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between
offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and
offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted
the period of prescription of such offense. DaHcAS
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent's claim that the OSG failed to attach
to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002
decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A
perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is
a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to
the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the
OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA
reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had
already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law applicable to BP
Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: (a) . . .; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) . . .
.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are

instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment

of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be
tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. Cdpr
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, 16 this Court ruled that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes
of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling
was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et al. v. Court of Appeals,
et al. 17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal's Office also
suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Respondent's contention that a different rule should be applied to cases

involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between
cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is
not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican, 19 Ingco, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan, 20 Brillante v. CA, 21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 22
cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings
for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of
prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al., 23 the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act
and the Securities Regulation Code effectively interrupts the prescription period
because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ
in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice , 24 which is

in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before
the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties,
especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. EHTSCD
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of
1995" is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent
was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and
the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent

on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of
proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised
before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition
to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered
that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of
Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent's own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that
caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte, 25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the

right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender
is to file the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED.

The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations
for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Rollo , pp. 33-66.
2.Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justices Eubulo
G. Verzola and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 162-170.
4.Rollo , p. 133.
5.Id. at 134-167.
6.Id. at 169.
7.G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 277.
8.Id.
9.CA rollo, pp. 167-168.
10.Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
11.Supra note 7 at 284-285.
12.Supra.
13.Calderon-Bargas v. RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 162, G.R. Nos. 103259-61, 1
October 1993, 227 SCRA 56; Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, 30 May 1983,
122 SCRA 538; Ingco v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 112584, 23 May 1997, 272
SCRA 563.
14.Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription

shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago.
15.Section 1. Institution of criminal actions. — Criminal actions shall be instituted

as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period
of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special
laws.
16.G.R. No. L-22465, 28 February 1967, 19 SCRA 494, 500.
17.207 Phil. 471, 477 (1983).
18.Supra note 7.
19.328 Phil. 1272 (1996).
20.Supra note 13.
21.483 Phil. 568 (2004).

22.G.R. No. 168662, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 303.
23.G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008, 567 SCRA 354, 415-416.
24.G.R. No. 167571, 25 November 2008, 571 SCRA 549, 562.
25.Supra note 16.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 212719. June 25, 2019.]
INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY,

NAMELY: VENANCIO A. ROXAS, SATURNINO V. PARAS,
EDGARDO G. MANUEL, HERMINILDO V. CRUZ, ALLAN F.
TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P. MONDEJAR,
ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN O. CRISANTO, EDGAR
ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO, JOSENEL ALVARAN, and
CRISENCIO NERI, JR., petitioners, vs. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE
LIMA, Department of Justice; and SECRETARY MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Department of the Interior and Local
Government, respondents.
ATTY. RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., petitioner-intervenor,
WILLIAM M. MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, AND

ARESENIO C. CABANILLA, petitioners-intervenors.
[G.R. No. 214637. June 25, 2019.]
REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA, JIMMY E. ACLAO,

WILFREDO V. OMERES, PASCUA B. GALLADAN, VICTOR M.
MACOY, JR., EDWIN C. TRABUNCON, WILFREDO A.
PATERNO, FEDERICO ELLIOT, and ROMEO R. MACOLBAS ,
petitioners, vs. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, Department of
Justice; SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Department of
the Interior and Local Government; ACTING DIRECTOR
FRANKLIN JESUS B. BUCAYU, Bureau of Corrections; and
JAIL CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT DIONY DACANAY MAMARIL,
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases 1 is the

legality of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592, 2 which states:
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. — Considering that
these Rules provide for new procedures and standards of behavior for
the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4 of
Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management, Screening
and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the
same Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic
Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring
and of special time allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in
application as these privileges are likewise subject to the
management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC. 3
The Case
On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law
R.A. No. 10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or
t h e Revised Penal Code (RPC) . 4 For reference, the modifications are
underscored as follows:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term
of imprisonment. — Offenders or accused who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the
effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except
in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously
twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their
sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in
writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years .
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a
period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense
charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the
same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment
for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall
be the actual period of detention with good conduct time
allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court
m a y motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused:
Provided, finally , That recidivists, habitual delinquents,
escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall
be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability . — Criminal liability
is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while
he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his
sentence.
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any
offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment
pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted
prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention
center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following
deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior
during detention;
2 . During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-three days
for each month of good behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days
for each month of good behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of
good behavior during detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall
be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to
numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study,
teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement
to the above allowances for good conduct.
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. — A deduction of one
fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner
who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of
his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this
Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of
two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in
case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or
catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully
justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the
Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted
shall not be revoked. (Emphases ours)
Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by
respondents Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A.
Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became effective on April 18, 2014. 5
Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that
directs the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time
allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring
(TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground
that it violates Article 22 of the RPC. 6
G.R. No. 212719
On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction) 7 was filed against respondents
DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J.
Evangelista acting as the attorney-in-fact 8 of convicted prisoners in the New
Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely: Venancio A. Roxas, Saturnino V. Paras, Edgardo
G. Manuel, Herminildo V. Cruz, Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C. Marquez, Julito P.
Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang, Jonathan O. Crisanto, Edgar Echenique,
Janmark Saracho, Josenel Alvaran, and Crisencio Neri, Jr. (Roxas, et al.) .
Petitioners filed the case as real parties-in-interest and as representatives of
their member organizations and the organizations' individual members, as a
class suit for themselves and in behalf of all who are similarly situated. They
contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and
beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in
accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law
it implements. They are puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of
Corrections (BUCOR) and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP) to retroactively apply the law when the prisoners' records are
complete and the distinctions between the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and R.A. No. 10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners submit that the simple
standards added by the new law, which are matters of record, and the
creation of the Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC)
should not override the constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and
due process of law aside from the principle that penal laws beneficial to the
accused are given retroactive effect.
Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr.
filed a Petition (In Intervention). 9 He incorporates by reference the Roxas, et
al., petition, impleads the same respondents, and adds that nowhere from
the legislative history of R.A. No. 10592 that it intends to be prospective in
character. On July 22, 2014, the Court resolved to grant the leave to
intervene and require the adverse parties to comment thereon. 10
Another Petition-in-Intervention 11 was filed on October 21, 2014. This
time, the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) served as counsel for William
M. Montinola, Fortunato P. Visto, and Arsenio C. Cabanilla (Montinola, et al.),
who are also inmates of the NBP. The petition argues that Section 4, Rule I of
the IRR is facially void for being contrary to the equal protection clause of
the 1987 Constitution; it discriminates, without any reasonable basis,
against those who would have been benefited from the retroactive
application of the law; and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the
authority of respondents to promulgate. In a Resolution dated November 25,
2014, We required the adverse parties to comment on the petition-in-
intervention. 12
On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Consolidated Comment 13 to the Petition of Roxas, et al., and Petition-in-
Intervention of Atty. Saguisag, Sr. More than two years later, or on July 7,
2017, it filed a Comment 14 to the Petition-in-Intervention of Montinola, et al.
G.R. No. 214637
On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 15 was

filed by Reynaldo D. Edago, Peter R. Torida, Jimmy E. Aclao, Wilfredo V.
Omeres, Pascua B. Galladan, Victor M. Macoy, Jr., Edwin C. Trabuncon,
Wilfredo A. Paterno, Federico Elliot, and Romeo R. Macolbas (Edago, et al.),
who are all inmates at the Maximum Security Compound of the NBP, against
DOJ Secretary De Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas, BUCOR Acting Director
Franklin Jesus B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief Superintendent (Officer-in-Charge)
Diony Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the petition are as follows:
A.
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 10592 WAS ISSUED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND THEREBY VOID AND ILLEGAL FOR BEING
CONTRARY AND ANATHEMA TO R.A. 10592.
a. R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have
prospective application.
b. Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code providing that penal laws that
are beneficial to the accused shall have retroactive
application.
c. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and
the intent of Congress when it enacted R.A. 10592.
B.
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENTS WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
a. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.
b. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due
process. 16
Per Resolution 17 dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered
to file their comment to the petition. In compliance, BJMP Chief Mamaril filed
a Comment 18 on December 10, 2014, while the OSG did the same on
February 9, 2015 19 in behalf of all the respondents.

Subsequently, Edago, et al., filed a Motion with Leave of Court to File
and Admit Reply, 20 attaching therein said Reply. On July 28, 2015, We
granted the motion and noted the Reply. 21
The Court's Ruling
The petition is granted.
Procedural Matters
Actual case or controversy
Respondents contend that the petition of Edago, et al., did not comply
with all the elements of justiciability as the requirement of an actual case or
controversy vis-à-vis the requirement of ripeness has not been complied
with. For them, the claimed injury of petitioners has not ripened to an actual
case requiring this Court's intervention: First, the MSEC has not been
constituted yet so there is effectively no authority or specialized body to
screen, evaluate and recommend any applications for time credits based on
R.A. No. 10592. Second , none of petitioners has applied for the revised
credits, making their claim of injury premature, if not anticipatory. And third,
the prison records annexed to the petition are neither signed nor certified by
the BUCOR Director which belie the claim of actual injury resulting from
alleged extended incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately
filed this case after obtaining their prison records and computing the
purported application of the revised credits for GCTA under R.A. No. 10592.
We disagree.
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided unless the
following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case. 22 As to the requirement of actual case or
controversy, the Court stated in Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't. of
the Rep. of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al.: 23
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The
limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution
as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted
and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. x x x.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of. 24
There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there
is a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the
prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL while
petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the Constitution
and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as
the challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and
those detained and convicted prisoners who are similarly situated. There
exists an immediate and/or threatened injury and they have sustained or are
immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the act
complained of. In fact, while the case is pending, petitioners are languishing
in jail. If their assertion proved to be true, their illegal confinement or
detention in the meantime is oppressive. With the prisoners' continued
incarceration, any delay in resolving the case would cause them great
prejudice. Justice demands that they be released soonest, if not on time.
There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation
of the MSEC. Petitioners Edago, et al., correctly invoked Our ruling in
Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre. 25 There, We dismissed the novel theory that
people should wait for the implementing evil to befall on them before they
could question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional, and held that "[by]
the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act." Similar to Pimentel, Jr. , the real issue in this
case is whether the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by Section 4,
Rule 1 of the IRR, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it.
Concrete acts are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. 26
An actual case may exist even in the absence of tangible instances when the
assailed IRR has actually and adversely affected petitioners. The mere
issuance of the subject IRR has led to the ripening of a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act. If this Court cannot await the adverse
consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe
for judicial intervention, 27 the same can be said for an IRR. Here, petitioners
need not wait for the creation of the MSEC and be individually rejected in
their applications. They do not need to actually apply for the revised credits,
considering that such application would be an exercise in futility in view of
respondents' insistence that the law should be prospectively applied. If the
assailed provision is indeed unconstitutional and illegal, there is no better
time than the present action to settle such question once and for all. 28
Legal standing
We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress

which may claim any injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the
legislative function to amend, modify or repeal laws and that the challenged
acts of respondents have no direct adverse effect on petitioners, considering
that based on records, there was no GCTA granted to them.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By
real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-
interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced."
"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a
generalized grievance. The concept has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute
must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must [be] shown that he
has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he
is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. 29
In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the
IRR because they are prisoners currently serving their respective sentences
at the NBP. They have a personal stake in the outcome of this case as their
stay in prison will potentially be shortened (if the assailed provision of the
IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their dates of release will be delayed (if
R.A. No. 10592 is applied prospectively). It is erroneous to assert that the
questioned provision has no direct adverse effect on petitioners since there
were no GCTAs granted to them. There is none precisely because of the
prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the act complained
of rather than an evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further, the
submission of certified prison records is immaterial in determining whether
or not petitioners' rights were breached by the IRR because, to repeat, the
possible violation was already fait accompli by the issuance of the IRR. The
prison records were merely furnished to show that respondents have
prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and that petitioners will be affected
thereby.
Propriety of legal remedy:
Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as

well as the petitions-in-intervention, should be dismissed because such
petitions are proper only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR is an
administrative issuance of respondents made in the exercise of their rule-
making or quasi-legislative functions.
True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate
remedy to assail the validity of the subject IRR as it was issued in the
exercise of respondents' rule-making or quasi-legislative function.
Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that "petitions for certiorari
and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials." 30 In
Araullo v. Aquino III, 31 former Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Lucas P.
Bersamin, explained the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, thus:
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for
certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar
remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is
expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our
present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari
evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery,
or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the
inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending
before them, so as to give the party more sure and
speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior
court to determine from an inspection of the record
whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered
without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if
allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury
to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available.
If the inferior court acted without authority, the record
was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ
o f certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior
court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not
proceeding according to essential requirements of law
and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our
judicial system remains much the same as it has been in
the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the
exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is
largely regulated by laying down the instances or
situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court
may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or
officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose,
viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of
discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means
either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal
or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted
in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or
excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition
by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination
of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or
proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while
prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action,
and is directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature
and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper
remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to
desist from further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entity's or person's
jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is
to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in
order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior
court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate
an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing
or threatening to perform functions without or in excess
of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the
trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary
restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the
writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
Jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but
also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit
or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to
set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry
provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or
affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or
by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the
republican system of checks and balances. 32
In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive
issues raised herein so as to finally resolve the question on the validity of
Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR, which is purely legal in nature. This is also
because of the public importance of the issues raised, 33 and the interest of
substantial justice, 34 not to mention the absence of any dispute as to any
underlying fact. 35
Hierarchy of courts
Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition, as
well as the petitions-in-intervention, should still be dismissed for failure to
observe the rule on hierarchy of courts. According to them, this Court's
jurisdiction over actions assailing the validity of administrative issuances is
primarily appellate in nature by virtue of Section 5 (2) (a), Article VIII of the
Constitution. 36 An action assailing the validity of an administrative issuance
is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, which, under Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129 , the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has exclusive
original jurisdiction. Further, a petition for declaratory relief filed before the
RTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the proper remedy to
question the validity of the IRR. 37
Indeed, under Section 19 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 , the question presented
here is a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, which exclusively and
originally pertained to the proper RTC. 38 Fundamentally, there is no doubt
that this consolidated case captioned as petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and illegality of Section 4 Rule 1 of
the IRR; thus, partaking the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over
which We only have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5 (2) (a),
Article VIII of the Constitution. In accordance with Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules, the special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to
this Court in exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, and those of transcendental
importance and of first impression. 39 As the petitions clearly and specifically
set out special and important reasons therefor, We may overlook the Rules.
Here, petitioners Edago, et al., are correct in asserting that R.A. No. 10592
and its IRR affect the entire correctional system of the Philippines. Not only
the social, economic, and moral well-being of the convicts and detainees are
involved but also their victims and their own families, the jails, and the
society at large. The nationwide implications of the petitions, the extensive
scope of the subject matter, the upholding of public policy, and the
repercussions on the society are factors warranting direct recourse to Us.
Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense
substantive justice on the numerous affected inmates. It is a must to treat
this consolidated case with a circumspect leniency, granting petitioners the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case rather than lose their
liberty on the basis of technicalities. 40 It need not be said that while this
case has been pending, their right to liberty is on the line. An extended
period of detention or one that is beyond the period allowed by law violates
the accused person's right to liberty. 41 Hence, We shunt the rigidity of the
rules of procedure so as not to deprive such birthright. 42 The Court
zealously guards against the curtailment of a person's basic constitutional
and natural right to liberty. 43 The right to liberty, which stands second only
to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot he lightly taken away.
44 At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to liberty that
cannot be taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes

provided by law. 45
Substantive Issues
Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC,
however, a penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall
be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are the
rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity of
laws. 46
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect) is well entrenched. 47 It has been sanctioned since the old
Penal Code. 48
x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took
effect in these Islands until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle
underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an
exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when
the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried
over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines
through article 22 x x x. This is an exception to the general rule that
all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the
following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward,
not backward); lex de futuro, judex de præterito (the law provides for
the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form
with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and
good law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known
aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one
distinguished author has put it, the exception was inspired by
sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science. 49
According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a
right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right
of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and
regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule
founded on principles of strict justice." 50
Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article
22 of the RPC applies to said Code 51 and its amendments, 52 as well as to
special laws, 53 such as Act No. 2126, 54 Presidential Decree No. 603, 55 R.A.
No. 7636, 56 R.A. No. 8293, 57 R.A. No. 8294, 58 R.A. No. 9344, 59 and R.A.
No. 10586, 60 to cite a few.
But what exactly is a penal law?
A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by
jurisprudence as follows:
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.
61
Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions
defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation. 62
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for
an offense committed against the state which, under the Constitution,
the Executive has the power to pardon. In common use, however, this
sense has been enlarged to include within the term "penal statutes"
all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish
penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressly
prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission. 63
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. 64
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to
substantive laws, not procedural rules. 65 Moreover, the mere fact that a law
contains penal provisions does not make it penal in nature. 66
In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies
because R.A. No. 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become
an integral part of the RPC as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago,
et al., further argue that if an amendment to the RPC that makes the
penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot be applied
retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties
lighter should be considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the
RPC.
We concur.
While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or
provide/prescribe/establish a penalty 67 as it addresses the rehabilitation
component 68 of our correctional system, its provisions have the purpose
and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further
reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate
analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence,
calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No.
10592 actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are
similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their
respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more
onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of
time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in
extending their sentence and increasing their punishment. 69 Evidently, this
transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.
In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM,
and STAL, respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would
indicate the need for "new procedures and standards of behavior" to fully
implement the law by the BUCOR (as to persons serving their sentences
after conviction) and the BJMP (as to accused who are under preventive
detention). It is alleged that the amendments introduced are substantial and
of utmost importance that they may not be implemented without a thorough
revision of the BUCOR and the BJMP operating manuals on jail management.
In particular, the establishment of the MSEC is said to be an administrative
mechanism to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR
superintendents and the BJMP jail wardens must follow uniform guidelines in
managing, screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct of prisoners
prior to their recommendation to the heads of the two bureaus on who may
be granted time allowances.
Respondents fail to persuade Us.
Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner
who chose to stay in the place of his confinement despite the existence of a
calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions
of R.A. No. 10592 are mere modifications of the RPC that have been
implemented by the BUCOR prior to the issuance of the challenged IRR. In
view of this, the claim of "new procedures and standards of behavior" for the
grant of time allowances is untenable.
It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was
enacted, 70 prisoners have already been entitled to deduct the period of
preventive imprisonment from the service of their sentences. In addition,
good conduct time allowance has been in existence since August 30, 1906
upon the passage of Act No. 1533. 71 Said law provided for the diminution of
sentences imposed upon convicted prisoners in consideration of good
conduct and diligence. 72 Under Act No. 1533 and subsequently under Article
97 of the RPC, the time allowance may also apply to detention prisoners if
they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to
them. 73 Such prerequisite was removed by R.A. No. 10592.
Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations,
as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Public Instruction, the wardens or
officers in charge of Insular or provincial jails or prisons were mandated to
make and keep such records and take such further actions as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of Act No. 1533. 74 When the RPC took
effect on January 1, 1932, 75 the Director of Prisons was empowered to grant
allowances for good conduct whenever lawfully justified. 76 With the
effectivity of R.A. No. 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority is now vested
on the Director of the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden of a
provincial, district, municipal or city jail. 77
Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as
the recommending body for the grant of GCTA and TASTM. 78 They are
tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the behavior and conduct of a
detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify whether said
prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring activities. 79
The creation of the MSEC, however, does not justify the prospective
application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law was its
formation set as a precondition before its beneficial provisions are applied.
What R.A. No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the
DILG are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations on the classification
system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be necessary to
implement its provisions. 80 Clearly, respondents went outside the bounds of
their legal mandate when they provided for rules beyond what was
contemplated by the law to be enforced.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department
of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot
be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress. 81
The contention of Edago, et al., stands undisputed that, prior to the
issuance of the assailed IRR and even before the enactment of R.A. No.
10592, a Classification Board had been handling the functions of the MSEC
and implementing the provisions of the RPC on time allowances. While there
is a noble intent to systematize and/or institutionalize existing set-up, the
administrative and procedural restructuring should not in any way prejudice
the substantive rights of current detention and convicted prisoners.
Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of
behavior in granting GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In essence, the
definition of what constitutes "good conduct" has been invariable through
the years, thus:
Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any
of the rules of the prison, and has labored with diligence and fidelity
upon all such tasks as have been assigned to him." 82
BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good
behavior and who has no record of breach of discipline or violation of
prison rules and regulations." 83
IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory
behavior of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active
involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive participation in
authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds
coupled with faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and
regulations." 84
Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on
his behavior or conduct while in prison. 85 Likewise, the certificate/diploma
issued upon successful completion of an educational program or course (i.e.,
elementary, secondary and college education as well as vocational training)
forms part of the record. 86 These considered, the Court cannot but share
the same sentiment of Roxas, et al. It is indeed perplexing why it is complex
for respondents to retroactively apply R.A. No. 10592 when all that the MSEC
has to do is to utilize the same standard of behavior for the grant of time
allowances and refer to existing prison records.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592
is DECLARED invalid insofar as it provides for the prospective application of
the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study,
teaching and mentoring, and special time allowance for loyalty. The Director
General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with
reasonable dispatch the time allowances due to petitioners and all those who
are similarly situated and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release
from imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are being
confined thereat for any other lawful cause.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, A.B.
Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J.C. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier
and Inting, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Jardeleza * J., is on wellness leave.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I concur with the finding that Rule I, Section 4 of the Implementing

Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is invalid. I add that it is, as
separately raised in the Petitions, void ab initio as it violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As such, applying the
prospectivity rule amounts to a cruel and unusual punishment for those
currently serving their penalties before the law took effect insofar as they
are treated differently from others.
Indeed, Section 4 is not only invalid based on Article 22 1 of the
Revised Penal Code alone, but the Constitution itself. In my view, Article 22
finds its anchor on Article III, Section 1 2 and Article II, Section 11 3 of the
Constitution.
I
Respondents allege that this case is not justiciable and that this Court
does not have jurisdiction over the remedies that petitioners availed of.
They are mistaken.
To recapitulate, the courts' authority to "settle justiciable controversies
or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the
courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights" 4 is an
aspect of judicial power that is anchored on Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Judicial review, as an aspect of judicial power, is the competence to: (1)
settle actual controversies and enforce rights conferred by law; and (2)
determine grave abuse of discretion by any government instrumentality.
Jurisprudence refers to these two (2) judicial powers as the courts' traditional
and expanded powers of judicial review, respectively. 5
The courts' traditional power of judicial review applies whether the

offense alleged violates a statute or the Constitution, or both. Clearly, the
source of rights that are legally demandable and enforceable may be a
constitutional provision, a statute, or an administrative issuance. The
traditional power of judicial review may not involve a constitutional question.
Thus, a trial court may simply determine the facts based on the
evidence presented, and interpret and apply the relevant law invoked.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for mandamus may entail
a reading of the relevant law and its application to a given set of facts. In
such cases, when there is concurrent jurisdiction and when only a statute is
involved, this Court will seriously inquire as to whether the judicial principle
of respect for the hierarchy of courts should be applied.
If only Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is involved here, as the
majority seems to have ruled in the ponencia of my esteemed colleague,
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, then the consolidated Petitions could
have been considered as petitions for mandamus. Thus, the issue would
simply have been whether respondents had a legal duty to implement the
rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
In such case, reference to Province of North Cotabato v. Government of
the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 6 Pimentel,
Jr. v. Aguirre, 7 and Araullo v. Aquino III 8 would not have been necessary.
However, in my reading of the pleadings, the constitutionality of the
questioned provision implementing Republic Act No. 10592 was raised.
Specifically, petitioners claim that the provision and its non-implementation
to those serving their sentence or preventively detained before the law took
effect violate the due process and equal protection clauses. In my view, we
should also rule on these issues. After all, Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code is founded on the concepts of fairness enshrined in the due process
clause and non-discrimination expressed in the equal protection clause.
In the exercise of our traditional power of judicial review for
constitutional adjudication, this Court only passes upon the constitutionality
of a statute if "it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned." 9 A controversy is deemed justiciable if the following are
present: (1) an actual case or controversy over legal rights, which require
the exercise of judicial power; (2) standing or locus standi to bring up the
constitutional issue; (3) the constitutionality issue was raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) resolving the constitutionality issue is essential to the
disposition of the case or its lis mota. 10
Additionally, an actual case or controversy is present when the issues
raised are ripe for adjudication or the challenged statute has a direct,
adverse effect on the party that raised its constitutionality. Absent an actual
case or controversy, this Court's decision would be a mere advisory opinion
that "is inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and
weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law." 11 Angara v. Electoral
Commission 12 explained the reason behind the requirement of justiciability
of a constitutional issue:
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because
the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. 13
On the other hand, this Court's expanded power of judicial review
requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion by any
government branch or instrumentality. This expanded power is often
mistaken for the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. But the expanded power is decidedly more
expansive than a Rule 65 petition, which is limited to the review of judicial
and quasi-judicial acts. 14
Nonetheless, despite this Court's broad power under its expanded
power of judicial review, an actual case or controversy, or "a legally
demandable and enforceable right[,] must exist as basis, and must be shown
to have been violated" 15 for the case to be justiciable.
Here, petitioners want to strike down Rule I, Section 4 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592, which
states:
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. — Considering that
these Rules provide for new procedures and standards of behavior for
the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4 of
Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management, Screening
and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the
same Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic
Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring
and of special time allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in
application as these privileges are likewise subject to the
management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC.
Rule V, Section 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations directs
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, and wardens of local government units to create
a committee that will manage, screen, and evaluate the entitlement of
inmates to good conduct time allowance:
SECTION 3. Management, Screening and Evaluation
Committee (MSEC). —
a. The Director of the BUCOR, Chief of the BJMP and Wardens
of various provinces, cities, districts and municipalities are
mandated to assess, evaluate and grant time deduction to
a deserving prisoner, whether detained or convicted by
final judgment, in the form of [good conduct time
allowance], [special time allowance for loyalty] and [time
allowance for study, teaching and mentoring] as prescribed
by these Rules through the creation of the MSEC.
b. The composition of the MSEC shall be determined by the
Director of the BUCOR, Chief of the BJMP or Wardens of
Provincial and Sub-Provincial, District, City and Municipal
Jails, respectively. Membership shall not be less than five
(5) and shall include a Probation and Parole Officer, and if
available, a psychologist and a social worker.
c. The MSEC shall prepare minutes of every meeting to
record each proceeding.
After considering the inmates' conduct and behavior, the Management,
Screening and Evaluation Committee recommends the appropriate good
conduct time allowance to which a detained or convicted prisoner is entitled.
16 The authorized official 17 then acts on this recommendation. Once
granted, the time allowances shall be irrevocable. 18

Petitioners are correct that the prospective application of Republic Act
No. 10592 robs them of the opportunity to avail of the good conduct time
allowance and substantially decrease their time behind bars.
In ruling that an actual case or controversy existed in this case, this
Court cited Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre 19 and reasoned that there was no need
to "wait for the implementing evil to befall" 20 before people could question
an illegal or unconstitutional act, because "[by] the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said
to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act."
21
We should read Pimentel, Jr. more carefully.

Pimentel, Jr. involved the propriety of Sections 1 and 4 of
Administrative Order No. 372. Section l required government agencies, state
universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations,
and local government units to implement measures that would reduce their
annual expenditure for non-personal services by at least 25%. On the other
hand, Section 4 ordered that 10% of the internal revenue allotment released
to local government units be withheld. 22
Pimentel, Jr. upheld the validity of Section 1 as a legitimate exercise of
the executive branch's supervisory power insofar as it directs government
instrumentalities and local government units to undertake cost reduction
measures in response to the economic difficulties facing the nation.
Pimentel, Jr. clarified that despite its tone, Section 1 was merely advisory,
and was not mandatory. Thus, no legal sanction would be meted on a
government instrumentality or local government unit that failed to submit its
own planned cost reduction measures. 23
However, Pimentel, Jr. struck down Section 4 for directly contravening
the constitutional mandates that the internal revenue allotment: (1) should
be released directly to the concerned local government unit every quarter;
and (2) cannot be the subject of any lien or holdback by the national
government. 24
In arguing for the ripeness of the Petition in Pimentel, Jr. , this Court
declared that the mere violation of the Constitution or any statute "is
enough to awaken judicial duty." 25 Nonetheless, it admitted that the issue
of prematurity was not raised by any of the parties. 26 Furthermore, an
actual case or controversy existed in Pimentel, Jr. because the directive to
withhold 10% of the internal revenue allotment was immediately executory
and would cause a direct and adverse effect on the local government units,
as represented by petitioners-intervenors League of Provinces of the
Philippines and League of Leagues of Local Governments. 27 Hence, it was
not the mere passage of Administrative Order No. 372 that was objected to
i n Pimentel, Jr. , but its direct detrimental effect on local government units
and their fiscal autonomy.
As with Pimentel, Jr. , there is a similar immediate danger here.
Petitioners will suffer a direct injury under Republic Act No. 10592's
Implementing Rules and Regulations. While the entitlement to time credits is
not automatic and is contingent upon the Management, Screening and
Evaluation Committee's positive assessment of an inmate's application for
time credits, the law's prospective application means that an inmate's
application for time credits will be dismissed outright and will not even be
considered by the recommending authority.
II
I also concur with the ponencia 28 that Rule I, Section 4 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 violates the
well-entrenched principle that laws are applied prospectively. Nonetheless,
penal laws that are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect, as
contained in Article 22 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not the sole basis for
the invalidity of Republic Act No. 10592's prospective application. It also
violates the inmates' constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws 30
and against "cruel, degrading[,] or inhuman punishment." 31
Equal protection is covered under the mantle of due process, as unfair
discrimination goes against the very nature of justice and fair play. Equal
protection demands that similar subjects be treated similarly; to do
otherwise would be to confer an unwarranted favor to some at the expense
of others who are similarly situated. 32
The equal protection clause ensures equality, not identity of rights.
Hence, it is not required for a statute to affect every single person the same
way. 33 Since a classification is a tacit recognition of an existing inequality or
difference, its validity shall be upheld if it is based on a reasonable or
rational basis:
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments
of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 34
Thus, a valid classification must contain the following requisites to
hurdle the test of reasonableness: (1) it is based on substantial differences;
(2) it is relevant to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing
conditions; and (4) it equally applies to all members of the same class.
Here, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
10592 states that the award of time credits to detained or convicted
prisoners was meant to:
a) redeem and uplift valuable human material towards economic
and social usefulness;
b) level the field of opportunity by giving an increased time
allowance to motivate prisoners to pursue a productive and law-
abiding life; and
c) implement the state policy of restorative and compassionate
justice by promoting the reformation and rehabilitation of
prisoners, strengthening their moral fiber and facilitating their
successful reintegration into the mainstream of society. 35
Yet, by directing a prospective application of the statute, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations distinguishes prisoners who were
detained or convicted before Republic Act No. 10592 took effect from those
who were detained or convicted after its effectivity.
Respondents explain that a prospective application was necessary in
light of the "new procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good
conduct time allowance" 36 and the "creation of a Management, Screening
and Evaluation Committee[.]" 37 But the supposed innovations and new
procedures are mere modifications or reiterations of practices already in
place even before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 10592, as the ponencia
38 has exhaustively discussed. Even the creation of the Management,
Screening and Evaluation Committee as a recommendatory body was not a

new innovation, as a Classification Board was already recommending time
allowances and implementing its approved recommendations. 39
Thus, if the statute's intention was to "redeem and uplift valuable
human material towards economic and social usefulness[,]" 40 there was no
reasonable basis to distinguish between the detained or convicted prisoners
before and after Republic Act No. 10592 took effect. Not only was the
distinction irrelevant to the statute's purpose, it also unjustly treats similarly
situated prisoners under different standards, all because it used the arbitrary
metric of when they were detained or convicted.
Likewise, the unreasonable discrimination created by the law's
Implementing Rules and Regulations violates petitioners' right against "cruel,
degrading[,] or inhuman punishment." 41
Republic Act No. 10592 aims to uphold the State policy of restorative
and compassionate justice by promoting prisoner rehabilitation and
successful reintegration into mainstream society. But despite its avowed
purpose, it capriciously denies the same opportunity of rehabilitation and
reintegration to a big segment of the inmate population.
This blatant discrimination amounts to a cruel and unusual
punishment, creating a disproportionate impact 42 on inmates who were
detained or incarcerated prior to Republic Act No. 10592's enactment. They
end up serving sentences lengthier than inmates who were convicted after
Republic Act No. 10592 took effect, despite committing similar crimes.
Although not a penalty, the prospective application of Republic Act No.
10592 penalizes inmates by withholding from them the benefits of the good
conduct time credits without any justifiable reason, squarely placing it under
the constitutional ban for being "flagrantly and plainly oppressive[.]" 43
Finally, the prospective application of Republic Act No. 10592 does not
advance its guiding policy of restorative and compassionate justice. This is
because it implies that all inmates detained or convicted prior to its
effectivity can no longer be rehabilitated for a successful reintegration into
society, effectively trampling upon their dignity as human beings.
As such, Section 4 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 10592 must be struck down, and its retroactive application
be allowed to benefit prisoners who are not habitual criminals.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petitions and Petitions-in-
Intervention.
Footnotes
* On wellness leave.
1. G.R. No. 212719 and G.R. No. 214637 were consolidated per Resolution dated
June 16, 2015 (Rollo [G.R. No. 214637], pp. 281-284).
2. AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98 AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
3. Rollo (G.R. No. 212719), p. 46; rollo (G.R. No. 214637), p. 220.
4. R.A. No. 10592 took effect on June 6, 2013 (See Rollo [G.R. No. 212719], pp. 25,
29, 188, 623 and rollo [G.R. No. 214637], p. 415).
5. Rollo (G.R. No. 212719), pp. 21, 25, 188, 623; rollo (G.R. No. 214637), pp. 12,
18, 241, 415.
6. Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
7. Rollo (G.R. No. 212719), pp. 3-45.
8. Id. at 57-58.
9. Id. at 144-148.
10. Id. at 152-153-C.
11. Id. at 186-193.
12. Id. at 202-203-C.
13. Id. at 264-279.

14. Id. at 622-643; rollo (G.R. No. 214637), pp. 414-433.
15. Rollo (G.R. No. 214637), pp. 3-80.
16. Id. at 24-25.
17. Id. at 142-144.

18. Id. at 163-215.
19. Id. at 238-268.
20. Id. at 285-334.
21. Id. at 335-336.

22. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Enrique, et al., 798 Phil. 227, 287-288 (2016).
23. 589 Phil. 387 (2008).
24. Id. at 480-481.
25. 391 Phil. 84 (2000). The case was cited in John Hay Peoples Alternative
Coalition v. Lim, 460 Phil. 530, 546 (2003); La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Asso., Inc.
v. Ramos, 486 Phil. 754, 789-790 (2004); Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose
Ass'n., Inc. v. Sec. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457, 472 (2006); Province of North
Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't. of the Rep. of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), et al., supra note 23, at 483-484; and Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders' Ass'n., Inc. v. Hon. Executive Sec. Romulo, et al., 628 Phil. 508,
524 (2010).
26. See Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't. of the Rep. of the Phils. Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al., supra note 23, at 483-484.
27. See Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Ass'n., Inc. v. Sec. Gozun, supra note
25.
28. See Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Ass'n., Inc. v. Hon. Executive Sec.
Romulo, et al., supra note 25.
29. Rosales, et al. v. Energy Regulatory Board (ERC), et al., 783 Phil. 774, 788
(2016), citing Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor Bautista, et al., 762 Phil. 233, 248-249
(2015).
30. Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 (1997); Ermita v. Aldecoa-Delorino , 666
Phil. 122, 132 (2011).
31. Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457 (2014).
32. Id. at 528-531. (Citations omitted; italics in the original)
33. See GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC , 742 Phil. 174, 210 (2014), citing Dela
Llana v. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, et al., 681 Phil. 186, 193-195
(2012).
34. See The Chairman and Executive Director, Palawan Council for Sustainable
Development, et al. v. Lim, 793 Phil. 690, 698-701 (2016); Quinto, et al. v.
COMELEC, 621 Phil. 236, 259-260 (2009); and Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co., Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, 543 Phil. 318, 328-
332 (2007).
35. Gios-Samar, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao v.
Department of Transportation and Communications, and Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.
36. SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxx xxx xxx
37. Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
xxx xxx xxx
38. See The Chairman and Executive Director, Palawan Council for Sustainable
Development, et al. v. Lim, supra note 34.
39. See Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of
Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018; Clark Investors and
Locators Ass'n., Inc. v. Sec. of Finance, et al., 763 Phil. 79, 94 (2015); and
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Sec. Defensor, 529 Phil. 573, 586
(2006).
40. See Five Star Mktg. Co., Inc. v. Booc , 561 Phil. 167, 184 (2007).
41. See Gov't. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 550
Phil. 63 (2007) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines Pangasinan Legal Aid v.
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413, July 25, 2017, 832 SCRA 396.
42. See Bongalon v. People, 707 Phil. 11, 19 (2013).
43. See People v. De los Santos, 277 Phil. 493, 502 (1991). It is not amiss to point
leather that aside from being constitutionally protected, the right to liberty is
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which the
Philippines is a signatory (See Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, et al.,
589 Phil. 1, 51 [2008] and Barbieto v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 619
Phil. 819, 840 [2009]).
44. Quidet v People, 632 Phil. 1, 12 (2010), People v. Jesalva, 811 Phil. 299, 307
(2017); Rimando v. People , G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017; People v.
Gimpaya, G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018; and Villarosa v. People , G.R.
Nos. 233155-63, July 17, 2018 (En Banc Resolution).
45. Brown Madonna Press, Inc., et al. v. Casas, 759 Phil. 479, 501 (2015).
46. See Sr. Insp. Valeroso v. People, 570 Phil. 58, 61-62 (2008) and People v.
Alcaraz, 56 Phil. 520, 522 (1932). See also United States v. Macasaet , 11
Phil. 447, 449-450 (1908); People v. Carballo , 62 Phil. 651, 653 (1935);
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 749 (2001); and Nasi-Villar v.
People, 591 Phil. 804, 811 (2008).
47. People v. Quiachon , 532 Phil. 414, 427 (2006), as cited in Ortega v. People,
584 Phil. 429, 453 (2008); People v. Tinsay , 587 Phil. 615, 630 (2008); and
People v. Adviento, et al., 684 Phil. 507, 524 (2012). See also People v.
Bagares, 305 Phil. 31, 39 (1994); People v. Zervoulakos, 311 Phil. 724, 734
(1995); and People v. Canuto, 555 Phil. 337, 348 (2007).
48. Escalante v. Santos, 56 Phil. 483, 488 (1932), citing Laceste v. Santos, 56 Phil.
472 (1932).
49. Laceste v. Santos, supra , at 475.
50. Sr. Insp. Valeroso v. People, supra note 46, at 77, citing People v. Moran , 44
Phil. 387, 408 (1923).
51. In Escalante v. Santos (supra note 48, at 487-488), the Court held:
And lest it be doubted that article 22 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
said Code, Representative Quintin Paredes adds the following:
"The use of the words 'penal laws' in general, instead of 'this Revised Penal
Code and any other penal laws' in article 22, may give room for a doubt as to
whether said article meant to include in the phrase 'penal laws' the same
Revised Penal Code that was establishing the provision. But this doubt, I
think, should not be entertained inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code is itself
a penal law and the phrase 'penal laws' is broad enough to include all laws
that are penal in character."
See Laceste v. Santos (supra note 46), wherein the last paragraph of Article
344 of the RPC was applied instead of Section 2 of Act No. 1773 and Article
448 of the old Penal Code; and Escalante v. Santos (56 Phil. 483 [1932]) and
Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons (57 Phil. 133 [1932]), wherein Article 315
Paragraph 3 of the RPC was applied instead of Article 534 Paragraph No. 3 of
the old Penal Code.
52. See People v. Avila (283 Phil. 995 [1992]) on Article 135 of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 6968; Lamen v. Dir. of Bureau of Corrections (311 Phil.
656 [1995]), People v. Zervoulakos (311 Phil. 724 [1995]), Danao v. CA (313
Phil. 354 [1995]), People v. Flores (313 Phil. 227 [1995]), Villa v. Court of
Appeals, 377 Phil. 830 (1999), and People v. Alao (379 Phil. 402 [2000]) on
R.A. No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law; and People v. Quiachon (532 Phil.
414 [2006]), People v. Canuto (555 Phil. 337 [2007]), People v. Tinsay (587
Phil. 615 [2008]), People v. Isang (593 Phil. 549 [2008]), People v. Adviento,
et al. (684 Phil. 507 [2012]), and People v. Buado, Jr. (701 Phil. 72 [2013]) on
R.A. No. 9346 or the Anti-Death Penalty Law.
53. Go v. Dimagiba , 499 Phil. 445, 460 (2005).
54. United States v. Almencion , 25 Phil. 648 (1913).

55. People v. Garcia, et al., 192 Phil. 311 (1981).
56. People v. Hon. Pimentel, 351 Phil. 781 (1998).
57. Savage v. Judge Taypin, 387 Phil. 718 (2000).
58. People v. Narvasa , 359 Phil. 168 (1998); Cadua v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil.
627 (1999); People v. Valdez , 401 Phil. 19 (2000); People v. Montinola , 413
Phil. 176 (2001); and Sr. Insp. Valeroso v. People, 570 Phil. 58 (2008).
59. Estioca v. People , 578 Phil. 853 (2008); Ortega v. People, 584 Phil. 429 (2008);
and Madali, et al. v. People , 612 Phil. 582 (2009).
60. Sydeco v. People, 746 Phil. 916 (2014).

61. See United States v. Parrone , 24 Phil. 29, 35 (1913), as cited in People v.
Moran, supra note 50, at 398.
62. See Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, supra note 46, as cited in Nasi-Villar v.
People, supra note 46.
63. Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367 (1937). See also Hernandez v. Albano, et
al., 125 Phil. 513, 520-521.
64. Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251, 275 (1999), citing Lorenzo v.
Posadas, supra note 63 and Hernandez v. Albano, et al., supra note 63.
Lacson was cited in Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 380, 387 (2003) and
Salvador v. Mapa, Jr., 564 Phil. 31, 45 (2007), which was cited in Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto, et al., 572
Phil. 71, (2008).
65. See Magtoto v. Hon. Manguera, 159 Phil. 611, 629 (1975) and subsequent
cases wherein the Court held that Section 20 Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, which declared inadmissible a confession obtained from a
person under investigation for an offense who has not been informed of his
right to remain silent and to counsel, applies only to those obtained after the
Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973.
66. See Juarez v. Court of Appeals, 289 Phil. 81, 91 (1992).

67. Good conduct allowances that may be earned while serving sentence are under
Chapter 2 Title 4 (on partial extinction of criminal liability), not Title 3 (on
penalties), of Book 1 of the RPC (See Article 94, RPC). On the other hand, the
arrest and temporary detention of accused persons is not considered as a
penalty but one of the measures of prevention or safety (See Article 24 [l],
RPC).
68. Section 1, Rule II of the IRR of R.A. No. 10592 states:
The credit for preventive imprisonment, as well as the increase in the time
allowance granted for good conduct and exemplary services rendered or for
loyalty, seek to:
a. redeem and uplift valuable human material towards economic and social
usefulness;
b. level the field of opportunity by giving an increased time allowance to

motivate prisoners to pursue a productive and law-abiding life; and
c. implement the state policy of restorative and compassionate justice by
promoting the reformation and rehabilitation of prisoners, strengthening their
moral fiber and facilitating their successful reintegration into the mainstream
of society.
In Frank v. Wolfe (11 Phil. 466, 471 [1908]), this Court held that Act No.
1533, which is the predecessor of Article 97 of the RPC, has a double
purpose: it is intended to encourage the convict in an effort to reform, and to
induce him to acquire habits of industry and good conduct which will not be
forgotten after he has served his sentence; and it is intended as an aid to
discipline within the various jails and penitentiaries.
During the period of interpellations, Senator Joker P. Arroyo inquired on the

purpose of Senate Bill No. 3064, which eventually became R.A. No. 10592.
Senator Francis G. Escudero replied that (1) it is to decongest the jails; (2) to
put a premium reward to inmates for good behavior; and (3) to emphasize a
rehabilitative rather than a purely penal system as far as the service of
sentence of certain accused are concerned (See Senate Journal, Session No.
17, September 11, 2012, p. 332).
69. See Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (1967).
70. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE TO PERSONS SENTENCED IN ANY

CRIMINAL CAUSE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CERTAIN CLASSES OF CRIMES,
OF ONE-HALF OF THE PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT UNDERGONE BY THEM,
REPEALING SECTION NINETY-THREE OF THE "PROVISIONAL LAW FOR THE
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PENAL CODE TO THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS," AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
71. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE DIMINUTION OF SENTENCES IMPOSED UPON
PRISONERS CONVICTED OF ANY OFFENSE AND SENTENCED FOR A DEFINITE
TERM OF MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS AND LESS THAN LIFE IN CONSIDERATION
OF GOOD CONDUCT AND DILIGENCE.
72. All prisoners who were actually undergoing sentence when the Act took effect
were entitled to diminution of their sentences for the time served since
January 1, 1900 (See Section 6, Act No. 1533).

73. See Section 5 of Act No. 1533; Section 4, Chapter 4, Part III, Book 1, BUCOR
Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000 (Rollo [G.R. No. 212719], p. 81); and
City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella, 416 Phil. 634, 657 (2001), citing
Baking, et al. v. The Director of Prisons, 139 Phil. 110 (1969). In such case,
the credit shall be deducted from the sentence as may be imposed in the
event of conviction (See Section 5 of Act No. 1533 and Section 4, Chapter 4,
Part III, Book 1, BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000, Rollo [G.R.
No. 212719], p. 81).
74. Act No. 1533, Sec. 7.

75. Capulong v. People , 806 Phil. 465, 477 (2017) and Basilonia, et al. v. Judge
Villaruz, et al., 766 Phil. 1, 8 (2015).
76. RPC, Art. 99.
77. R.A. No. 10592, Sec. 5.

78. The composition of the MSEC shall be determined by the Director of the
BUCOR, Chief of the BJMP or Wardens of Provincial and Sub-Provincial,
District, City and Municipal Jails, respectively. Membership shall not be less
than five (5) and shall include a Probation and Parole Officer, and if available,
a psychologist and a social worker (See Sections 3 [b], 4 [c] and 7 [c], Rule V,
IRR of R.A. No. 10592).
79. See Sections 4 (b) and 7 (b), Rule V, IRR of R.A. No. 10592.
80. R.A. No. 10592, Sec. 7.
81. GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, supra note 33, at 227.
82. Sec. 1 (a).

83. Sec. 1, Chapter 4, Part III, Book 1 (Rollo [G.R. No. 212719], p. 81)
84. Rule III, Sec. 1 (p).
85. Section 3 (n), Part 1, Book 1, BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000
(Rollo [G.R. No. 212719], p. 70).
86. Section 19, Chapter 2, Part V, BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000
(Rollo [G.R. No. 212719], p. 94).
LEONEN, J., concurring:
1. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 22 provides:
ARTICLE 22. Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws. — Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this
2. CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
4. Lopez v. Roxas, 124 Phil. 168, 173 (1966) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc].
5. Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC

Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116, 137-139 (2016)
[Per J. Brion, En Banc] and Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 525-527 (2014)
[Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
6. 589 Phil. 387 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
7. 391 Phil. 84 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
8. 737 Phil. 457 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

9. Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97
Phil. 806, 809 (1955) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc].
10. Macasiano v. National Housing Authority , 296 Phil. 56, 63-64 (1993) [Per C.J.
Davide, Jr., En Banc].
11. J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 661 (2013)
[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
12. 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
13. Id. at 158-159.
14. Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC
Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., et al., 802 Phil. 116, 142 (2016)
[Per J. Brion, En Banc].
15. Id. at 140.
16. Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule V,
sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Procedures for the Grant of Good Conduct Time Allowance. —
The following procedures shall be followed in the grant of GCTA:
a. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall give special considerations to
satisfactory behavior of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active
involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive participation in
authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds. It is
understood that in all instances, the detained or convicted prisoner must
faithfully obey all prison/jail rules and regulations;
b. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall each create the MSEC or such
appropriate number of MSECs tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the
behavior or conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner;
c. After due consideration of the behavior or conduct shown by a detained or
convicted prisoner, the MSEC shall then recommend to the appropriate
official the appropriate GCTA that may be credited in favor of said prisoner
ranging from the minimum of the allowable credit to the maximum credit
thereof;
d. Acting on the recommendation of the MSEC, the appropriate official
named in Section 1 of Rule VIII hereof shall either:
1. Approve the recommendation and issue a certification granting GCTA to

the prisoner for the particular period;
2. Disapprove the recommendation if the prisoner recommended is not

qualified to be granted the benefit or that errors or irregularities attended the
evaluation of the prisoner; or
3. Return the recommendation, without action, for corrections as regards the
name, prison number or other clerical or inadvertent errors, or for the further
evaluation of the conduct or behavior of the prisoner concerned.
e. The appropriate official concerned shall ensure that GCTAs are processed
each month and that there is proper recording of a prisoner's good behavior
in the jail or prison records.
17. Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule
VIII, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Who Grants Time Allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the

following officials shall grant allowances for good conduct:
a) Director of the Bureau of Corrections;
b) Chief if the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology; and/or
c) Warden of a Provincial, District, City or Municipal Jail.
18. Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule
VIII, sec. 2.
19. 391 Phil. 84 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
20. Ponencia , p. 10.
21. Id. citing Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 391 Phil. 84 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En
Banc].
22. Id. at 97.
23. Id. at 104-105.
24. Id. at 105-106.

25. Id. at 107.
26. Id. at 108.
27. Id. at 94.
28. Ponencia , pp. l7-20.

29. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 22 provides:
ARTICLE 22. Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws. — Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
31. CONST., art. III, sec. 19 (1) provides:
SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
32. The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 298 Phil. 502, 512-513 (1993) [Per J.
Cruz, En Banc].
33. See Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union , 158 Phil. 60 (1974) [Per J.
Zaldivar, En Banc].
34. Id. at 87.

35. Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule II,
sec. 1.
36. Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule I,
sec. 4.
37. Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule I,
sec. 4.
38. Ponencia , pp. 20-23.
39. Id. at 24.
40. Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule II,
sec. 1.
41. CONST., art. III, sec. 19.
42. J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679,
August 15, 2017, 837 SCRA 160, 196 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
43. People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc].

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163753. January 15, 2014.]
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. , petitioner, vs. HANZ

CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO
CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA CALAPIZ, respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his absolution
from civil liability.
The Case
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the decision
promulgated on February 20, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the judgment rendered on August 6, 1999 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Oroquieta City ordering him to pay moral
damages despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries charged against him. 2 aSTAHD
Antecedents
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz
brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental
Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz
was attended to by the petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz
also undergo circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the
parents' consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision
on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following day, Hanz complained of
pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His testicles were swollen. The
parents noticed that the child urinated abnormally after the petitioner
forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality
as normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over
his parents' protestations, and was directed to continue taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the
abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming
that the ulceration was brought about by Hanz's appendicitis, the petitioner
referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a
damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was
operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and
reconstructed, Hanz's parents brought a criminal charge against the
petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On
April 17, 1997, the information 3 was filed in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to which the latter pleaded not guilty on May
22, 1998. 4 Under the order of April 30, 1999, the case was transferred to the
RTC pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99. 5
At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses, including Dr.
Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the physician who had operated
on Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that
Hanz had been diagnosed to have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury
left secondary to trauma that had necessitated the conduct of two
operations to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily
explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr.
Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that had caused the injury.
aDSHIC
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended that at

the time of his examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995, he had found an
accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from
the penis that had required immediate surgical operation; that after
performing the appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his parents'
consent by using a Congo instrument, thereby debunking the parents' claim
that their child had been cauterized; that he had then cleared Hanz on
January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found no
complications when Hanz returned for his follow up check-up on February 2,
1995; and that the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the
penis had been brought about by Hanz's burst appendicitis.
Ruling of the RTC
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999, 6 the RTC acquitted the
petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence. It held that
the Prosecution's evidence did not show the required standard of care to be
observed by other members of the medical profession under similar
circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the petitioner was liable for
moral damages because there was a preponderance of evidence showing
that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by the
petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court renders
judgment acquitting the accused, Dr. Encarnacion Lumantas, of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, but ordering
him to pay Hanz Calapiz P50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, 7 sustaining the award of moral
damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had been acquitted of the
crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily mean that he had not
incurred civil liability considering that the Prosecution had preponderantly
established the sufferings of Hanz as the result of the circumcision.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion on April 28, 2004. 8
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner's civil liability despite
his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit. TAaIDH
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also

civilly liable. 9 Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged
does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of
Appeals, 10 the Court elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by
our law as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of
the accused, viz.:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict,
civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment
shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." 11 SDTIaE
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused

does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the
civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution's evidence insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC
did not err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act
complained of based on mere preponderance of evidence. 12 In this
connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the
evidence did not require that the complainant's recovery of civil liability
should be through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.
13
The petitioner's contention that he could not be held civilly liable

because there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration.
The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral
certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant
evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable. 14 With the RTC and the
CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands
of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that
the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their
uniform findings. In that regard, the Court need not analyze and weigh again
the evidence considered in the proceedings a quo. The Court, by virtue of its
not being a trier of facts, should now accord the highest respect to the
factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a
clear showing by the petitioner that such findings were tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. SCaIcA
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although

we have long advocated the view that any physical injury, like the loss or
diminution of the use of any part of one's body, is not equatable to a
pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil
damages should be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The
assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of one's body.
The usual practice is to award moral damages for the physical injuries
sustained. 15 In Hanz's case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision
performed by the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other
procedures on his penis in order to repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his
physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of P50,000.00
awarded as moral damages. DHTCaI
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest of 6%
per annum should then be imposed on the award as a sincere means of
adjusting the value of the award to a level that is not only reasonable but
just and commensurate. Unless we make the adjustment in the permissible
manner by prescribing legal interest on the award, his sufferings would be
unduly compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of interest should be
from the filing of the criminal information on April 17, 1997, the making of
the judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
February 20, 2003, with the modification that legal interest of 6% per annum
to start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 25-30; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired), with
Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice
Edgardo F. Sundiam (retired/deceased) concurring.
2. Id. at 13-20.
3. Id. at 21-24.

4. Records, p. 174.
5. Id. at 413.
6. Rollo , pp. 13-20.
7. Id. at 25-30.
8. Id. at 33.
9. Article 100, Revised Penal Code.
10. G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 387, 397.
11. Section 2, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
12. Article 29, Civil Code.
13. Romero v. People , G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009, 593 SCRA 202, 206.
14. Id.
15. Ong v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117103, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA
387, 398.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 210148. December 8, 2014.]
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA , petitioner, vs. MARLA OLIVA,

respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated
June 28, 2013 and the Resolution 3 dated November 22, 2013 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 finding petitioner Antonio L.
Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of Marina Arabit Oliva (Marina
Oliva) despite having been acquitted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information 4 for

Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death 5 of
Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006,
Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate
number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in
Quezon City, ran her over. 6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to
receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein
respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle. 7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem
Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said
date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading towards the island near the
flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate
number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla,
who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her
mother's death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the
autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police Senior
Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following
the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven
by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident. 8 TIDHCc
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to
Dismiss (demurrer) 9 asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified
by any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the
victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence of how the incident
transpired. 10

The MeTC Ruling
In an Order 11 dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya's demurrer and dismissed the case for
insufficiency of evidence. It found that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were wanting in material details and that they failed to sufficiently
establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him. 12
Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses individually,

the MeTC found that: (a) Marla merely testified on the damages sustained by
her family but she failed to identify Daluraya as the driver of the vehicle that hit
her mother; (b) Serrano also did not identify Daluraya as the driver of the said
vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez,
while he did investigate the incident, likewise declared that he did not witness
the same. 13
Marla moved for reconsideration, 14 which the MeTC denied in an Order 15

dated November 4, 2010, clarifying that the grant of Daluraya's demurrer had
the effect of an acquittal and that reconsideration of its Order granting
Daluraya's demurrer would violate the latter's right against double jeopardy. 16
With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same,
holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that
Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva's demise. 17
Aggrieved, Marla appealed 18 to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 76 (RTC), insisting that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the
civil liability of Daluraya, 19 which finding was not precluded by the dismissal of
the criminal aspect of the case.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 20 dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal

and affirmed the MeTC's ruling, declaring that "the act from which the criminal
responsibility may spring did not at all exist." 21
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration 22 which, although filed beyond

the reglementary period, was nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC found
the same without merit and thus, sustained the factual findings and rulings of
the MeTC in its Order 23 dated May 10, 2012. CAHaST
Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via petition for review,
maintaining that Daluraya must be held civilly liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 24 dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and
reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of
PhP152,547.00 as actual damages, PhP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
PhP50,000.00 as moral damages. 25 In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC's
Order showed that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such,
Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability. 26
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of evidence to support
its finding that Daluraya must be held civilly liable: (a) the inadmissible sworn
statement executed by Daluraya where he admitted that he drove the subject
vehicle which hit Marina Oliva; (b) the conclusion derived from Serrano's
testimony that the woman he saw crossing the street who was hit by a Nissan
Vanette with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who eventually died, are
one and the same; (c) the Philippine National Police Referral Letter of one Police
Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying Daluraya as the suspect in the case
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the death of Marina
Oliva, and stating that he brought the victim to the Quezon City General
Hospital for treatment but was declared dead on arrival; and (d) the subject
vehicle was registered in the name of Daluraya's aunt, Gloria Zilmar, 27 who
authorized him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC. 28
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration, 29 which the CA denied in a

Resolution 30 dated November 22, 2013, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva's death despite
his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability. 31 In Manantan v. CA, 32 the Court expounded on
the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects
on the civil liability of the accused, as follows: EcICSA
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects

on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict,
civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. 33
In Dayap v. Sendiong, 34 the Court explained further:

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict
may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the

court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect
of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has
not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the
case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.
What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set
the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce
evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render
judgment on the civil aspect of the case. 35 (Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state
"whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of
the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist." 36
A punctilious examination of the MeTC's Order, which the RTC sustained,
will show that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in
material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused
precisely committed the crime charged against him." 37 Furthermore, when
Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC's Order acquitting Daluraya, said
court reiterated and firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to
establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped
Marina Oliva" 38 and that "there is no competent evidence on hand which
proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina
Oliva." 39 ICTaEH
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as

affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya's acquittal was anchored on reasonable
doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand of the case to the courta quo
for the reception of Daluraya's evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose
that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime
ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-
existent by the nature of such acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28,

2013 and the Resolution dated November 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated September 8, 2011 and the Order dated May 10, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, * Leonardo-de Castro and Reyes, ** JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1899 dated December 3, 2014.
** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1892 dated November 28,
2014.
1. Rollo , pp. 10-20.
2. Id. at 203-208. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with Associate
Justices Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting, concurring.
3. Id. at 217.
4. Id. at 48.
5. See Certificate of Death; id. at 59.
6. Id. at 203.
7. Id. at 25.
8. Id. at 26.
9. Not attached to the records of this case. See id. at 12.
10. Id. at 12-13.
11. Id. at 145-147. Penned by Judge Nadine Jessica Corazon J. Fama.
12. Id. at 147.
13. Id. at 146.
14. Not attached to the records of this case.
15. Rollo , pp. 148-150.
16. Id. at 148.
17. Id. at 149.
18. See Appellant's Memorandum dated April 18, 2011; id. at 151-169.
19. Id. at 159-161.

20. Id. at 45-46. Penned by Presiding Judge Alexander S. Balut.
21. Id. at 46.
22. Dated October 21, 2011. (Id. at 175-184.)
23. Id. at 47.
24. Id. at 203-208.
25. Id. at 208.

26. Id. at 206.
27. See Motion to Release Vehicle dated January 11, 2005; id. at 190-191.
28. Id. at 207.
29. Dated July 19, 2013; id. at 209-215.
30. Id. at 217.
31. Lumantas v. Calapiz, G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014.
32. 403 Phil. 299 (2001).
33. Id. at 308-309; citations omitted.
34. 597 Phil. 127 (2009).
35. Id. at 141, citing Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 544 Phil. 431, 444 (2007)
and Salazar v. People , 458 Phil. 504, 515-517 (2003).
36. RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, Section 2.
37. Rollo , p. 147.
38. Id. at 149.
39. Id. at 150.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 192123. March 10, 2014.]
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been

pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He
had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-
through operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an
imperforate anus. 1
The antecedents are as follows:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 2 with an
imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a
surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the
abdominal wall, 3 enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached
to the side of his body. 4
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the
Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. 5 Dr. Leandro Resurreccion
headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr.
Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr.
Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr.
Solidum). 6 During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, 7 and
went into a coma. 8 His coma lasted for two weeks, 9 but he regained
consciousness only after a month. 10 He could no longer see, hear or move.
11
Agitated by her son's helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz

Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila against
the attending physicians. 12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an
information solely against Dr. Solidum, 13 alleging: — DICSaH
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines,

the said accused, being then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng
Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked to administer the
anesthesia on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO,
represented by his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been
born with an imperforate anus [no anal opening] and was to undergo
an operation for anal opening [pull through operation], did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the
care and diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate under said
circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using
100% halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a
consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD
ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect
called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in
the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable
of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to law. 14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but
was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369
(The Family Courts Act of 1997 ), 15 where it was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries, 16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR.
FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal
of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto
mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN (10)
DAYS of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify, jointly and
severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu
Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of P500,000.00
as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay
the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional
liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED. 17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their
solidary liability, 18 the RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the
damages, modifying its decision as follows: ETDAaC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr.

Fernando Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum and to indemnify jointly and severally with
Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages
and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled. 19

Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum, 20
pertinently stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit
to undergo a major operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused
himself testified that pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure that
the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate anus,
the child was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal
that he was suffering from any known ailment or disability that could
turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint that the nature of the
operation itself was a causative factor in the events that finally led to
hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable
hypothesis except to attribute the accident to a failure in the proper
administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case.
The High Court elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA
584 —
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court
is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of
injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where
the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred
to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and
why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the
patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to
produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of
care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no
other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the
patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.IaAEHD
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the
act complained of and the injury sustained, and in line with the
hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial
court the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of
arbitrariness or disregard of material facts that might affect the
disposition of the case. People v. Paraiso, 349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in
criminal cases. Although it creates a presumption of negligence, it
need not offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the
opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he has
no criminal intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the
constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower
court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED. 21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his
motion on May 7, 2010. 22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE PETITIONER'S
CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S
OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING
THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE
PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS BREACHES THE
CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE

PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE
TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER, AND NO OVERDOSING IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
ANESTHETIC AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE
ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY ONE (1%) PERCENT AND THE
APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA
MACHINE. THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR (sic) CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE
LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE. cCTIaS
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS

NOT JUSTIFIED THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER. ASSUMING THAT THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL
CONSIDERATION, IT SHOULD BE ONLY AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE,
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF
ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE AWARD IS SO EXCESSIVE, AND
NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS. 23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a)
whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein; and
(b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.

Applicability of the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care." 24 It is simply "a recognition of the
postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very
nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence
on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury
in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience
and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may
be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa
loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge."
25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People 26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances
of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement
of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and
helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. 27
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively explained in Ramos v.
Court of Appeals, 28 where the Court said —
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this
doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the
circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a
character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that
harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases
presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine
whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit
a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or
that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on
the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly
within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by
anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons
of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient
has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill
and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of
physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest
conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-
expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the
patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may
be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show
not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the
doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury
sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is
no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the
patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. cEDaTS
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the

following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the
patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the
body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the
wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out
a tooth while a patient's jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of
his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the
influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for
appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur
has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all
cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of
proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon
the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations
in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if
due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the
failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more
unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice.
It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the
merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or
surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment
did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired
result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The real
question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation
any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine
performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary
professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent
cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such
extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be
utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by
evidence of exculpation, if he could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following
essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a
kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. 29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that
the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic
agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum,
and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not
have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was
undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of
his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus,
Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the
physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing
loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency
of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate,
scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the
process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of
anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the
negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists
attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of
oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them
to administer atropine to the patient. 30 STIcEA
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in

Swanson v. Brigham, 31 relevant portions of the decision therein being as
follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall
Swanson to a hospital for the treatment of infectious mononucleosis.
The patient's symptoms had included a swollen throat and some
breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the patient was
restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His
inspection of the patient's air passage revealed that it was in
satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone
call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having
respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be administered
and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m.,
the hospital called a second time to advise the doctor that the patient
was not responding. The doctor ordered that a medicine be
administered, and he departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the
physician who had been on call at the hospital had begun attempts to
revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the patient
died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the
patient died between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result
of a sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also found that the air
passage had been adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior
to death. He did not know what caused the air passage to suddenly
close.
xxx xxx xxx
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for
the treatment of infectious mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But
that is not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury
rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably
caused by someone's negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298,
474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself enough to warrant the
application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d
472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case — Res Ipsa Loquitur
§ 24:10 (1972). The evidence presented is insufficient to establish the
first element necessary for application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The
acute closing of the patient's air passage and his resultant asphyxiation
took place over a very short period of time. Under these circumstances
it would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent.
There was no palpably negligent act. The common experience of
mankind does not suggest that death would not be expected without
negligence. And there is no expert medical testimony to create an
inference that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
Court next determines whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of
Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence. EASCDH
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the

interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. 32 Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily
doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act. 33
Dr. Solidum's conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure
to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered
on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the
CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround.
He affirmed the findings and conclusions in his report except for an
observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become the storm
center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of information
regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child.
He declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane
and said that based on the records it should have been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record — A portion of the chart in the record
was marked as Exhibit 1-A and 1-B to indicate the administration at
intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract — A portion of this record that reads as
follows was marked Exhibit 3A. 3B — Approximately 1 hour and 45
minutes through the operation, patient was noted to have bradycardia
(CR = 70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately administered. However,
the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational agent was shut off, and the
patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4
0.2 mg was given. However, the patient did not respond until no
cardiac rate can be auscultated and the surgeons were immediately
told to stop the operation. The patient was put on a supine position and
CPR was initiated. Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially
while continuously doing cardiac massage — still with no cardiac rate
appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45
secs, patient's vital signs returned to normal. The entire resuscitation
lasted approximately 3-5 mins. The surgeons were then told to proceed
to the closure and the child's vital signs throughout and until the end of
surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and RR = 20-22 cycles/min
(on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract
that the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of
ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or another,
he read it as 100% halothane. He was asked to read the anesthesia
record on the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only
sheepishly note I can't understand the number. There are no clues in
the clinical abstract on the quantity of the anesthetic agent used. It
only contains the information that the anesthetic plan was to put the
patient under general anesthesia using a nonrebreathing system with
halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45 minutes
after the operation began, bradycardia occurred after which the
inhalational agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100%
oxygen. It would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido
said should be read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen
introduced after something went amiss in the operation and the
halothane itself was reduced or shut off. ADaSET
The key question remains — what was the quantity of halothane

used before bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertido's admission is that there was no
overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum stakes
his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the assurance
that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never leaving the
operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature
but leaving behind the other members of his team Drs. Abella and
Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he administered only
a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr.
Abella whose initial MA in the record should be enough to show that
she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the
things that happened. She revealed that they were using a machine
that closely monitored the concentration of the agent during the
operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidum's interpretation of the
anesthesia record itself, as he takes the bull by the horns, so to speak.
In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the quantity of
halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%) delivered at time
intervals of 15 minutes. He studiedly mentions — the concentration of
halothane as reflected in the anesthesia record (Annex D of the
complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) — The numbers indicated
in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that only 1%
halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo for his
entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which
is only one percent cannot be summated because halothane is
constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire
operation.
xxx xxx xxx
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC
argued that the volte-face of Dr. Vertido on the question of the dosage
of the anesthetic used on the child would not really validate the non-
guilt of the anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was
not 100% as initially believed, he was nonetheless unaware of the
implications of the change in his testimony. The court observed that
Dr. Vertido had described the condition of the child as hypoxia which is
deprivation of oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the results of the CT
Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a failing central nervous system
such as stupor, loss of consciousness, decrease in heart rate, loss of
usual acuity and abnormal motor function, are manifestations of this
condition or syndrome. But why would there be deprivation of oxygen if
100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court,
whether oxygen or halothane was the object of mistake, the
detrimental effects of the operation are incontestable, and they can
only be led to one conclusion — if the application of anesthesia was
really closely monitored, the event could not have happened. 34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence
beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA were
insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack
of precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to
Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of Appeals 35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack
of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or
the present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila
Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et al. , this Court stated that in
accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in
the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the
treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would
use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this
aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to
establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that
the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. IDCHTE
xxx xxx xxx

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the
part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and
the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital,
Inc., where the attending physician was absolved of liability for the
death of the complainant's wife and newborn baby, this Court held
that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury,
however, it must be shown that the 'injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening
efficient causes.' In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in what
it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of.' And 'the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.'"
An action upon medical negligence — whether criminal, civil or
administrative — calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each
of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to
the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in
accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his
profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physician's failing to act in
accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there
must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act
or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the
patient. 36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the
patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of
care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient.
Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular physician in a
particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly
technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide
guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict.
As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be
determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a
specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the
specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised
by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of
care may be higher than that required of the general practitioner. 37 HSIaAT
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of

a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it
does not depend, therefore, on any individual physician's own knowledge
either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine
whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the
patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is
required. The judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard
of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts. 38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what
standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if
not impossible, to determine whether the first three elements of a
negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an
anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman of the Committee on
Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists that
investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly
focused on how his Committee had conducted the investigation. 39 Even
then, the report of his Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum, 40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old
male who underwent a pull-thru operation and was administered
general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents. The patient, at
the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-sigmoid and
pulling it down in preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia.
The anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the
triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to block it
but despite the administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest
ensued. As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures were
administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less
than five (5) minutes and that oxygen was continuously being
administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become manifest,
patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the
administration of anaesthesia, the committee find that the same were
all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of medical
care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of
the anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, was also presented as a Prosecution witness, but his
testimony concentrated on the results of the physical examination he had
conducted on Gerald, as borne out by the following portions of his direct
examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON
Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?

WITNESS
General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction

of Anesthesia and in this case, halothane was used as a sole
anesthetic agent.
xxx xxx xxx

Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned
that after one hour and 45 minutes after the operation, the
patient experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now
as a doctor, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to
what cause of the slowing of heart rate as to Gerald Gercayo? IHcTDA
WITNESS
Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a
bradycardia of time because is some reason one way or another
that might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON
What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is

a possibility, we're talking about possibility here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?

A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that
situation.
FISCAL CABARON
Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing
of heart rate, now what is the immediate cause of the slowing of
the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS
Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the
heart rate is when you do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the
vagal receptors are located at the lateral part of the neck, when
you press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate that
produce bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the

deficiency in the supply of oxygen by the patient, would that also
cause the slowing of the heart rate?
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if
there is a hypoxia or there is a low oxygen level in the blood, the
normal thing for the heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia
but a . . . to counter act the Hypoxia that is being experienced by
the patient (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general
anesthesia using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications probably were contributory to the production of
hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir. 41
On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his

interpretation of the anesthesia record and the factors that could have
caused Gerald to experience bradycardia, viz.:
ATTY. COMIA
I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly
read to this Honorable court your last paragraph and if you will
affirm that as if it is correct?
DAHSaT
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane

probably will be contributory to the production of Hypoxia and . . .
"
ATTY. COMIA
And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?
WITNESS
Based on the records, I know the . . .
Q 100%?
A 100% based on the records.
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a

doctor but will you kindly look at this and tell me where is 100%,
the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at this
Doctor, this Xerox copy if you can show to this Honorable Court
and even to this representation the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0
and then call me.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COMIA
Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if
there is, you just call me and even the attention of the Presiding
Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by one.
WITNESS
Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?

ATTY. COMIA
I'm asking you, just answer my question, did you see there 100%
and 100 figures, tell me, yes or no?
WITNESS
I'm trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA
Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also
temporarily, because this is just a xerox copy presented by the
fiscal, that the percentage here that the Halothane administered
by Dr. Solidum to the patient is 1% only so may we request that
this portion, temporarily your Honor, we are marking this
anesthesia record as our Exhibit 1 and then this 1% Halothane
also be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COMIA
Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there
are so many factors that contributed to Hypoxia is that correct?
WITNESS
Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that

contributed to what you call hypoxia and according to you, when
this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other factors that might
lead to this Hypoxia at the time of this operation is that correct?
WITNESS
The possibility is there, sir.

Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some
or it might be due to operations being conducted by the doctor at
the time when the operation is being done might also contribute
to that hypoxia is that correct?
A That is a possibility also.

xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COMIA
How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald,
Doctor? prcd
WITNESS
Well, that is a major operation sir.

Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this
Gerald, there is a possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed
to some risk is that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that

correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir. 42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained

that Gerald's operation for his imperforate anus, considered a major
operation, had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same condition. 43 He
then corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane had been
administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen. 44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate
properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo
and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." 45 However,
the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in
administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido's findings
did not preclude the probability that other factors related to Gerald's major
operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led
Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his
report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal
routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding
side effects did occur." 46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the
hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to
Dr. Solidum's guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of
guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey: 47
. . . is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of
it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by
sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to
accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed
the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the
defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act
on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life,
you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the
possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not
immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot now find and
declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been
established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing
so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really
no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused.
That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr.
Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the
bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum
civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not
allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence. AaIDHS

Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability,
we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of
expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with
Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising
from the offense charged. 48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the
CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with
Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr.
Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which
rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that
the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the
following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings.
Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset.
The RTC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect.
Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when
subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here.
The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should
first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any
kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art,
occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is
engaged in industry. 49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital,
was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work. 50 Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was
engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee
of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the
operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a
consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was
adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here),
the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20,
2 0 1 0 ; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no
pronouncement on costs of suit. TIAEac
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Imperforate anus is a defect that is present from birth (congenital) in which the
opening to the anus is missing or blocked. The anus is the opening to the
rectum through which stools leave the body.
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001147.html. Visited on
March 3, 2014.
2. Rollo , p. 55.
3. http:/www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ostomy.html. Visited on March 3, 2014.

4. Rollo , p. 10.
5. Id. at 53.
6. Id. at p. 10.
7. Bradycardia is an abnormally slow heart rate of less than 60 beats per minute. A
normal heartbeat is between 60 and 100 beats per minute.
http:/www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/c/9339/23653.html. Visited on March 3,
2014.
8. Rollo , p. 55.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 11.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 51A-52.

14. Id. at 51A.
15. Id. at 53.

16. Id. at 53-81.

18. Id. at 551-554.
19. Id. at 561.
20. Rollo , pp. 10-21; penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III (retired), with
Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Franchito N.
Diamante concurring.
21. Id. at 12-21.

22. Id. at 22.
23. Id. at 30-31.

24. Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 187926, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 336, 351.
25. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA
584, 599.
26. Supra note 24, at 352.
27. Id.
28. Supra note 25, at 600-603.
29. Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, G.R. No. 130547, October 3, 2000, 341
SCRA 760, 771.

31. 571 P.2d 217, 18 Wash. App. 647; Wash. Ct. App. 1917.
32. Gaid v. People , G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 489, 497.
33. Id. at 495.
34. Rollo , pp. 87-91.

35. G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997, 282 SCRA 188, 200-202.
36. Flamm, Martin B., Medical Malpractice and the Physician Defendant, Chapter
11,Legal Medicine, Fourth Edition (1998), pp. 123-124, American College of
Legal Medicine, Mosby, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri.
37. Id. at 123-124.

38. Id. at 124.
39. TSN of December 1, 1999.

41. TSN of November 11, 1997, pp. 16-31.

42. TSN of November 11, 1997, pp. 44-53.
43. TSN of December 10, 1997, pp. 2-3.
44. Id. at 5-10.

45. Rollo , p. 51.
46. TSN of December 10, 1997, p. 13.

47. 91 Fed. Rep. 864, 868.
48. Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.

49. Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus , First Edition (2000), National Book Store,
Inc., p. 263.
50. Id. at 264.

Plaintiff-Appellee Accused-Appellants

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiﬀ-appellee, vs.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com

2. [T/Sgt. Dacoco], [Philippine Army (PA)];

4. [PFC] Gador 4 Tomanto, PA;

5. Juanito Ibunalo; cHEATI

When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their

Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution ﬁled a

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2022 cdasiaonline.com

Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran

On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of

The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring,

On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying

Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant

Appellant Wenceslao testiﬁed that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house

On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his

Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or

Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeﬀrey and Luzviminda, who

Appellant Ricardo also conﬁrmed that on the early evening of 5 June

Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the [appellants]

Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial court's

In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANT WENCESLAO]

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT WENCESLAO]

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF

Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of

In a Resolution 44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the

Appellants, on the other hand, ﬁled their separate Supplemental Briefs, 47

The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as

Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies

Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5

The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally

Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao

It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to

Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel's failure to name appellant Wenceslao in

A meticulous perusal of Samuel's sworn statement reveals that he

. . . The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity

Appellant Wenceslao's allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of

The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of

Contrary to appellant Wenceslao's assertion, this Court is convince that

Appellants' respective explanations regarding their ﬂight fail to persuade

To corroborate appellant Wenceslao's testimony, the defense presented

FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for

5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].

Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the

Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of

The concept of a complex crime is deﬁned in Article 48 of the Revised

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however,

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single

In People v. Lawas, 83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of

Signiﬁcantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of

Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos, 88 People v. Abella, 89 People v.

I n People v. De los Santos, 92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive

In a similar case of People v. Abella, 93 involving the massacre of certain