A.C. No.

6622 July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, vs. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS,
FACTS:
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial consultant to assist the
latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with
different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for
every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid
by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos
from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was entitled
to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a
total of ₱ 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients. 9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes
supporting the computation of the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi
and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates 11 and proofs of payment made to the latter
by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for
having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July
2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S.
Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took
place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of
Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13
Respondent’s Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an employee of his
law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office 14 – but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a
major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job
as a financial consultant, resulting in the latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and
the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant
had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his law firm had an
agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate
rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the
rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a
Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi
and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said
company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed
messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two
other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the said Motion, he
attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO. 22 The
appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier
submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted
was a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July
1980.23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place at the
Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987. 24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a
marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In
the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that
the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the case. 25 Thus,
respondent was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents. 26 He disclosed that criminal
cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage
Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at
the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. 28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had
recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly
executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they
were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20
November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend the
hearing,30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the
nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name. 31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations
filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage
contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid. 33 The
other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for
contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still
subsisting.34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as
accused in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission
denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with
the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for
resolution.36
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. 37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the
nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge
should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent’s administrative
liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent. 38 On the second charge, the
Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to
point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01
and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that
complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying
two other women while the latter’s first marriage was subsisting. 40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. 41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the Commission
should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the
annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He
further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not
substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to
disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution
dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.44
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind
it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s share in the fees, if proven to
be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to
practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients
that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove
the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected
from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical
conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the
charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services through various
business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services and
to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated
the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the report to solicit
clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the
facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of
profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the
business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a
member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of
professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf;
or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which
purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure
professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the Complaint is a letterhead
of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that,
should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would render legal services related to the former’s
loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter
is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a
lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that
certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the
other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal
services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, we
affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this allegation,
complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3)
different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after
the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are
not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer
to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained
in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not
apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the
past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.  For the court to exercise its disciplinary
1âwphi1

powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 54 In this case,
complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the
latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he
resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO
documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had
filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare the second and the third
Marriage Contracts null and void.55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the
genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former’s
marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage
Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the
official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued
by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption
of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul
the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated
the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated
under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on
marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what
course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage
was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which
demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their
admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected
to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high
degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in
him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. 57 His acts of committing bigamy twice
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5170. November 17, 1999]
LILIA FERRER TUCAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL R. TUCAY, respondent.

Complainant Lilia F. Tucay, feeling deeply aggrieved by the immoral conduct of her husband
Atty. Manuel Tucay, seeks the latter's disbarment in the instant administrative proceedings.
Just a few days before their thirtieth anniversary or on 07 July 1993 to be exact, with the
first marriage still subsisting, respondent lawyers contracted another marriage with one
Myrna C. Tuplano, herself married since 1983 to a certain Florante T. Tabilog. Respondent
left the conjugal dwelling in July 1993 to cohabit with Myrna Tuplano.
Complainant also caused the filing of bigamy charge against respondent lawyer and his
second wife, which case still pends. In an attempt to defeat the early prosecution of the
criminal case, respondent filed a petition seeking the judicial declaration of nullity of
the second marriage. The petition was later dismissed due to lack of interest; subsequently,
however, respondent filed a second petition for the same purpose. In both petitions, he
averred that neither he nor the other supposed party to the second marriage was physically
present on the date of its alleged celebration thereby rendering void any such marriage, if at
all, under the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 3, and Article 6 of the Family Code.
The IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Jaime V. Vibar gave neither credence nor validity to the
explanation of respondent and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the disbarment
of Atty. Tucay for gross misconduct and failure to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of every member of the Bar.
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of
Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married
woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of
his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover
practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or
in his private life. A lawyer at no time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not
only are conditions precedent to his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands for his
continued membership in, a great and noble profession.
The Court concurs with the IBP-CBD and IBP Board of Governors in their findings and thus
accepts their recommendation that respondent lawyers, having ceased to meet and possess
the qualifications required of every lawyer, must forthwith be disbarred.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to disbar respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay immediately
upon his receipt of this Resolution.
G.R. AC-UNAV. April 30, 1957.]

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, v. HILARION M.

PERALTA, Respondent.

Ramon J. Diaz for Respondent.

The basic facts are the same as those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16,
1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez. On or before March 8, 1951, he
courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the
respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank
document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought
back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil
Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the
respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on
a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was
performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required
the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him.
After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived
with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously
married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article
350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present
complaint for immorality in this court.

Upon consideration of the records of G. R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this Court is of the
opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral
turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in making
love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and
existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is
hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So ordered.
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR.,
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground
of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became
acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He
begot with her a son. Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony.
The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972
The couple lived with the wife's mother, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from
his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown. Since then, he has never returned to the
conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. She discovered that he was living and cohabiting with
Natividad
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted
that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to
his son, Jun-Jun.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could not endure the
nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta
and San Andres Street) and her interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did
not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his
abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct.
Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981,
106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne
him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar
(Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Adm. Case No. 2474 September 15, 2004 EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., vs. ATTY. LEO J. PALMA,
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as
grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.

Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the
lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent
as his personal counsel.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa the complainant's
daughter in Hongkong. Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three
children.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
(complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent
misrepresented himself as "bachelor" before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c)
respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and
Eduardo Lorenzo.
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint 5 for disbarment. On March 20, 2003, Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it reduced
respondent’s penalty to only one (1) year suspension.
Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBP’s Report and Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its
members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another.17 Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may
reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject
of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.18
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that
he acted with "wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law."
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer, 19 however, professional competency alone
does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth
Hermosisima. The Certification20 from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on
December 19, 1971 at Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage 21 from the
Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondent’s subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That
Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P.
Lazatin, Elizabeth’s classmate and family friend.22
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. 23

Anent respondent’s argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court
with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a
subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in  In
re Almacen,33 a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, 34 or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not
affect its course,35 then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. 36

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take
before he is allowed to practice.
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1)
year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence
supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as
a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR,
complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in
said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor who stated that "there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation" and
challenged Estrada to "appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper forum." 6 Judge Caoibes set a
preliminary conference on October 12, 2000. Estrada confirmed that he filed the letter-complaint for immorality
against Escritor because in his frequent visits to the Hall of Justice of Las Piñas City, he learned from conversations
therein that Escritor was living with a man not her husband and that she had an eighteen to twenty-year old son by this
man. This prompted him to write to Judge Caoibes as he believed that employees of the judiciary should be
respectable and Escritor's live-in arrangement did not command respect. 7
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, 8 she was already a widow, her husband
having died in 1998.9 She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In
fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,

II. Issue
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct." To
resolve this issue, it is necessary to determine the sub-issue of whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom
should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees
are held administratively liable.
RULING

Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the
Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent's stance that her conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court
prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court's action would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. 454 We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at
respondent's claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the "compelling state interest" test. The government
must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state's
compelling interest which can override respondent's religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first
impression where we are applying the "compelling state interest" test in a case involving purely religious conduct. The
careful application of the test is indispensable as how we will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the
life of the respondent who stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is
ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to
override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its
interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
 G.R. No. 214016. November 24, 2021 ]
JHONNA GUEVARRA ET AL., VS. JAN BANACH
FACTS: Banach, a German citizen,6 met Guevarra through a certain Pastor Jun Millamina.7 He went on to court
Guevarra, visiting her almost every day, giving her gifts, and eventually telling her that he intended to marry her. 8
What Banach did not tell Guevarra, however, was that he had still been married to his third wife then. Instead, he told
her that he was a divorced man. He also concealed his true identity and made Guevarra and her family believe that his
name was Roger Brawner.9
Guevarra, who would confide in Banach her family problems, even including the chances of their family being
evicted from their home,10 eventually submitted to Banach's wooing as he offered her a better life. The two agreed to
get married, and Banach sent Guevarra P500,000.00 to buy a lot for their conjugal home. 11
Yet, when Guevarra found out about Banach's lies and deception, she broke up with him. 12
The breakup prompted Banach to sue Guevarra and her parents for damages bHe claimed that these acts amounted to
fraud, or at the very least, unjust enrichment.16
The crux of the matter is whether there is legal basis to order the return of the P500,000.00 that respondent gave
petitioner for their supposed conjugal home.
This case is different. Here, petitioner called off the engagement after she had discovered respondent's lies and
deception. As the Court of Appeals found, respondent's actions were tainted with fraud and deceit; he did not have the
purest intentions in marrying petitioner. He lied about his marital status, and even hid his true name from petitioner.
These acts suffice to justify the wedding's cancellation. Finding out that one's betrothed is still married to another
person, and that they are not who they say they are, are reasons enough to conclude bad faith.

Thus, choosing a person to marry is intimately connected to a person's autonomy. Any State interest in the institution
of marriage must not lead to an unjustified intrusion into one's individual autonomy and human dignity. 52 It must only
be done when public interest is imperiled. 53 It is not within the courts' competence to reach too far into intimate
relations. Courts, through litigation, should not dictate on or even pressure a person into accepting a life of marriage
with a person they reject. Courts must, as much as possible, refrain from meddling in these personal affairs.
The Constitution directs the State to "[value] the dignity of every human person and [guarantee] full respect for
human rights."54 Freedom of choice to associate or to identify forms part of one's dignity. 55 As much as the Family
Code provides that the "nature, consequences, and incidents [of marriage] are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation,"56 one's choice of intimate relations is also protected by the liberty 57 and human dignity58 clauses of the
Constitution.
An individual has the autonomy to choose whom to marry, or whether to marry at all. They must be free to make that
choice without any fear of legal retribution or liability. The decision on whether to marry is one that should be freely
chosen, without the pressures of a possible civil suit should a person realize that their intended partner is not right for
them. We recognize instances when the breach of one's commitment in an intimate relationship is a consequence of
their realization that marriage may not be the wisest path they could take given their circumstances.
For this reason, litigation to the sorrows caused by a broken heart and a broken promise must be discouraged.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The award of actual damages worth P500,000.00 is DELETED.
G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007
PEOPLE vs.CLEMENTE BAUTISTA,
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private
complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement was
reached. The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999.2
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight
physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an
Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by
First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The
Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20,
2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the Information was filed, the
60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already
elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but the RTC denied said petition and concurred
with the opinion of the MeTC.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein
it held that, indeed, the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with the
OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by the time the
Information was filed with the MeTC, reasoning as follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively
terminated the proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his designated alter
ego, to act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last day of
the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months
into the next year. To use once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was
"unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very much more than the
prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with
the court on June 20, 2000. x x x3 (Emphasis supplied)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed Orders of both courts below and Criminal Case
No. 344030-CR, entitled: "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, -versus- Clemente Bautista and Leonida Bautista,
Accused," is ordered DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA Decision. The Court gives due course
to the petition notwithstanding the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the
CA before the filing of herein petition. It is not a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.5
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of the 60-day
prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution
in this case is whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation
to file the proper criminal information against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philipppine Archipelago. (Emphasis
supplied)
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the
filing of an information against respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. The Court does not agree. It
is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive
period.6
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from
the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or
acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or negligence
should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte,7 it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All
that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 8
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the petitioner in the present petition
considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of
the Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the
information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in the filing of the information. The
Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong
purportedly inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors’ apparent lack of a sense of urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the
circumstances, the more appropriate course of action should be the filing of an administrative disciplinary action
against the erring public officials.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 02-
103990 is hereby REINSTATED.
Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a copy of herein Decision for appropriate action against
the erring officials.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created
all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision
are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for
four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
 avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she
did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons,  viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr.,
for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he
found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection
which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
 II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving
the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between
the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity
by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted
that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that
he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there
might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party,  i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did.
At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and
he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same
bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p.
330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not
go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it
is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation
in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D.
Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit
relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.

Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical
technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos
College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January,
1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship.
After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding
house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena
why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love
with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he
did not mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena
were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao
City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown,
Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino
convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He
secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in
Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He
was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He
went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-
taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something
amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married
for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married
Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife,
Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in
a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He
also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of
Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate
child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the
complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not
subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly
scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually
arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator
well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not
well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An
occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt
a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of
marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in
consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her
to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did
not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs.
Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in
the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera
vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a
child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs.
Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing
her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand
money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after
the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs.
Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by
him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse
because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became
pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389,
February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of
marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina
and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I
will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or
in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil.
586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a
married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a
child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs.
Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano
before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and
1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them
unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the
respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In
1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs.
Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs.
Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is
hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7204             March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata,
charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent
[Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter
dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of
filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded.
After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic)
her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West
Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered
again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt
so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner
of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and
forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a
state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the
car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case
with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired was
recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

Sent by - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer

complainant
At 5:33:46 pm
replied by - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
respondent (Does this mean I cannot see you
at 6:16:11 pm anymore)
sent by complainant - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage of the situation.
at 6:17:59 pm
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t have relationship
Sent by with her.
complainant
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it rightly it s
respondent an expression of feeling. S sri" (I’m very sorry. Its not taking advantage of
At 6:32:43 pm the situation, to put it rightly it is an expression of feeling)
Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my sincerity"
by respondent (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it again. Will you still see me so I can show you
at 6:42:25 pm my sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t
know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know what to do so you may forgive me.
I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying
"Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please next time behave na ko),
which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he met with
complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which
complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of
money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips
as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped
off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts
imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by
complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of
complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case
for the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband;
and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s fees and it was respondent who always paid for their
bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the
IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with
modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of
a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months.5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondent’s actuations shall have a rippling
effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society
today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater
caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I – x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing condition to
preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a
requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court,
which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their
legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended
from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect
the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it
and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight
and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right
hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No
intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously
with no reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City,
respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning
because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and
Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said … she opened my car and then
she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to
Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a
little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine.
After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said … it’s about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said
okay, let’s go. So when I said let’s go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed
me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been
dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before
she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of
my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when she’s already facing me I lightly kissed her on the
lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, that’s it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car
and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she opened
the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit
her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and that’s it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant,
or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore,
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., 18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her and
maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to maintain
the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of
appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently
established that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said
college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank in all
her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children,
lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage
in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever
them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to
the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there
can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with whom he
has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of
an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid
and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was
disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his
lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is expected of
members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare.26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the
head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered
offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to
agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she
must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, 28 disclosing a case that is
free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. 29 Thus, the adage that "he who
asserts not he who denies, must prove." 30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation
nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice.
We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the
respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also
via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that
Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he
could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to
warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires
consideration of a number of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the
primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to
preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. 34 Disciplinary
proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important
function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it
should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be
controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the
lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle,
with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause
loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the
moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as
to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as
well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense
should also be considered.36
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for
some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was
publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondent’s first offense, reprimand
would suffice.
We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it
was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct.
However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or
supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is
hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing
with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of Gross Immoral
Conduct and imposed upon him the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. 1 Respondent, who was already married with
three children, had an affair with complainant between 1996 to 1997, while he was reviewing for the bar until before
the release of the results thereof. Complainant got pregnant and respondent, who was then already a lawyer, executed
a notarized affidavit acknowledging the child as his with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the child,
however, respondent started to refuse recognizing the child and from giving her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking compassion and forgiveness from this Court.
He submitted certificates from government and civic organizations appreciating his services as a lawyer, certificates of
attendance from religious groups, and certificates of good moral character from judges and lawyers in Occidental
Mindoro.2
On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment thereon.3
On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution (No. 01-2003) recommending the
exoneration of respondent from administrative liability. It stated that the suspension of respondent, who has served as
Clerk of Court, Public Attorney and 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, would cause a great loss to the community;
that respondent has shown integrity and moral uprightness in the performance of his official functions; that the acts
imputed to him may be attributed to his "youthful indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended his ways after
taking his oath as member of the bar.4
The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its Comment dated August 15, 2003, stating that
the motion for reconsideration should be denied until respondent admits the paternity of the child and agrees to
support her.5
On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that respondent’s motion for reconsideration should
be denied since respondent has not truly repented as he is still not supporting his child. 6
On August 25, 2003, respondent’s wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a handwritten letter stating that respondent is
loving and "maasikaso" and while it is true that respondent had an affair with complainant, such was only
because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file the present case after respondent ended their
illicit affair. Complainant also used threat to compel respondent to sign the affidavit of acknowledgement and support.
Livelyn further avers that respondent is the sole breadwinner of the family and that their family will be gravely
affected by his suspension.7
On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP stating that if the acts acknowledging and
giving support to the child of the complainant are the proofs of his remorse, then he shall comply unconditionally. 8
On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on Livelyn’s letter.9
On January 13, 2004, complainant’s counsel said that while he sympathizes with Livelyn and her children, respondent
has not taken any move to support complainant and her child to repair the damage done to them.10
On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainant’s Comment, reiterated his willingness to support the child
if only to show his
remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed to complainant for the months of March to
December 2005 in the amount of ₱2,000.00 each.11
On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that it is unfair for her and her three
children that respondent had to support complainant’s daughter when it is not clear who the child’s father is. Livelyn
argues that complainant should have filed a case for support where the paternity of the child could be determined and
not use the present administrative case to get support from respondent.12
On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental
Mindoro, asking whether or not respondent is still connected with said office despite having been indefinitely
suspended by this Court. It replied on May 10, 2005 that respondent is still connected with their office; that he has
been regularly receiving his salary and benefits; and that this was the first time that they received communication
concerning respondent’s administrative case.13
Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued to discharge his duties and received salary
and benefits in connection therewith since he filed a timely motion for reconsideration thus the case has not yet
attained finality.14
In view of respondent’s show of repentance and active service to the community, the Court deems it just and
reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite period of two years suspension.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The indefinite suspension imposed on him by
the Court in its Decision dated March 6, 2003 is REDUCED to TWO YEARS suspension effective from date of
receipt of herein Resolution.
Complainant’s further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillo’s record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy
thereof be furnished the IBP, all courts throughout the country and the Department of Justice including the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro.
SO ORDERED.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes
1 The fallo reads as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct
and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
2 Rollo, pp. 154-175.

3 Id., p. 145.

4 Id., p. 192.

5 Id., pp. 184-185.

6 Id., p. 179.

7 Rollo, pp. 147-150.

8 Id., pp. 183-183a.

9 Id., p. 177.

10 Id., p. 218.

11 Id., p. 231.

12 Id., pp. 237-239.

13 Id., p. 242.

14 Id., p. 244.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4921 --- Carmelita I. Zaguirre, Complainant, versus Atty. Alfredo
Castillo, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is the Plea for Reconsideration1 filed by Atty. Alfredo A. Castillo of the March 6, 2003
Decision2 finding him guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law.
Atty. Castillo claimed that for the past years, he received commendations for exemplary performance and
contributions to public service and that he and his wife have been active in church. His employment as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro is their only source of income and suspending him from the practice of
law would affect his children. He insisted that the Court consider the sanctity of the family in imposing the penalty.
The IBP however prayed that the plea for reconsideration be denied because he had not really mended his ways since
he continues and still fails to recognize and support his child.3
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro informed this Court that Atty. Castillo continued to
discharge his functions and had been regularly receiving his salary and other benefits despite being indefinitely
suspended. According to Atty. Castillo, his indefinite suspension is not yet final in view of the pending motion for
reconsideration.
The majority would grant Atty. Castillo’s plea for reconsideration and reduce his penalty to two (2) years suspension
in view of respondent’s "show of repentance and active service to the community."
With due respect, I beg to disagree.
In the March 6, 2003 Decision, the Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Castillo based on its finding that he was grossly
immoral. He was also found to be unscrupulous because, after executing a notarized affidavit wherein he recognized
and undertook to give support to his child with Zaguirre, and his incriminating handwritten letter where
he bargained with Zaguirre concerning the monthly support of the child, 4 he subsequently denied his paternity and
reneged on his promise to give support. The Court was appalled at the reprehensible and amoral attitude of Atty.
Castillo when he justified his liaison with Zaguirre as merely the product of man’s polygamous nature.
The Court suspended Atty. Castillo until such time that he is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court,
that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of
every member of the profession.
I agree with the IBP’s finding that Atty. Castillo has not mended his ways because he continues and still fails to
recognize and support his child with complainant. He has not shown remorse for having maintained an affair with
Zaguirre and fathering her child.
Admittedly, he received commendations for his exemplary performance and contributions to public service. Unlike
the majority though, I hesitate to conclude that these commendations adequately proved respondent’s repentance.
Aside from the self-serving statement that "he has mended his ways and suffered so much because of the
embarrassment, ridicules and dislikes brought about by this event, especially to his family", 5 there is absolutely no
proof of respondent’s remorse. Besides, a lawyer must not only be exemplary in his public life, but equally important,
he must also be morally upright in his personal life.
I am distressed to note that in the pleadings submitted by respondent and his wife, they make it appear that they are
the aggrieved party. Thus, they claimed that if we "prolong these agonies, it will not only add anguish and anxiety but
also physical economic hardship upon the respondent and indirectly to his family which they already suffered and still
suffering".6
It must be emphasized that to this date, respondent has not yet served his penalty. Aside from a short leave of absence,
he continued to practice his profession and regularly received his salary and other benefits. So what economic
hardship is he talking about?
As early as August 28, 2003, respondent admitted that acknowledging complainant’s daughter and giving support
remain his undertakings. He even volunteered to comply unconditionally if they are the required proofs of his
remorse.7 He professed that he did not disown his responsibility to give support.
If, indeed, respondent was so remorseful and willing to comply unconditionally with his own undertaking, why then
did he wait until after the lapse of one (1) year and seven (7) months before attempting to give support to
complainant’s daughter. It was only on March 31, 2005, that respondent furnished us with photocopies of ten (10)
postdated checks payable to Zaguirre at P2,000.00 each.8 He failed to mention or offer a concrete or permanent
settlement.
In his Plea for Reconsideration, Atty. Castillo also claims that:
The respondent is now living in peace and happiness with his family. The darkness of the past has been buried beneath
the earth a long time ago.9
I am perplexed how Atty. Castillo can claim that he is now "living in peace and happiness with his family" while
complainant Zaguirre and her daughter are encountering hardships brought about by his non-support.
It is also revolting and ridiculous for respondent to remind this Court in his Plea for Reconsideration, that suspending
him from the practice of law would affect his children and that we should consider the sanctity of the family in
imposing the penalty. It must be mentioned, lest respondent has forgotten, that he was the one who undermined the
sanctity of marriage and family when he maintained an illicit affair with another woman during the subsistence of his
marriage. Respondent invokes the sanctity of marriage, yet his acts prove otherwise. 10 The moral delinquency that
affect the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.11
Initially, the Court suspended Atty. Castillo until such time that he is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court,
that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every
member of the profession. To date, I find no evidence of remorse or sincere repentance of respondent. There is a
dearth of evidence that he has instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness
required of every member of the legal profession.
As held in Delos Reyes v. Aznar:12
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper
person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting
moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
"When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet
the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. xxx In the
case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not
always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration
which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so
when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist
him" (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny Atty. Alfredo A. Castillo’s Plea for Reconsideration. His INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION must now immediately take effect.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 266             April 27, 1963

PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the
wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar; 1 that they were married on 27 December 1946 while he was still a
second year student of law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that after passing the bar examination and
becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the Bureau of
Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three
children. She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July 1956, this Court directed
the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice and a copy of the complaint. 3 The
respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter, which was received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring
that the complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for
the suspension or disbarment of a member of the Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer
could not be made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity in the filing of
the complaint because while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June 1956, and received at the Docket Section of this
Court on 2, July 1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L." 4 It was subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that the
respondent was cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children is not true because her very
informant, whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to the effect that the respondent was
employed in the Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children referred to by the
complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding. Attached to
his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant
with the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 October 1956, this Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the record of the case was
received by the Office of the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February
1957, 18 March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings during which the
complainant presented her evidence both oral and documentary and the respondent, who appeared in his own behalf,
cross-examined her witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but reserved the right to present
it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court charging the respondent with
abandonment of his wife and immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a child, and praying that
he be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by
mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed him to answer the same within 15 days from
receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958 the respondent filed in this Court a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground "that the charges contained therein are not based on and supported by the facts
and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." On 2 September 1958
this Court set the case for hearing on 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13 September 1958 the
respondent filed a motion praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first resolved or, that, should
it be denied, he be given a period of ten days within which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case
be returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing
of the case set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in abeyance pending resolution of his
motion. At the hearing of the case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared and was given a period
of 15 days within which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the Solicitor General the same
period of time from receipt of a copy of the respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958,
within the extension of time previously granted, the respondent filed his memorandum and on 17 November 1958,
also within the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in reply.
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may be considered, by the Supreme
Court in the final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in
the respondent's answer no statement is made as to any intention of introducing additional evidence, the case
shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the
same. (Emphasis supplied)
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in disbarment or suspension proceedings from
the practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after investigation and, should he
desire to present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer. Instead of doing what the rule requires, the
respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby
waiving his right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his
desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make known
his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in this Court.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a
second year law student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period
of two weeks after their wedding, they lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General del Pilar street in Camiling.
After two weeks, the respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at the Far Eastern University, 5 and she
remained in Camiling to practice her profession. While the respondent was still studying, he either returned to
Camiling once a week or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the respondent stayed
with her in Camiling for a week, and when she came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his
boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived with his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin
Felisa Bacera, who cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until about three or four months before his
graduation. On the day of his graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her by calling
her a "provinciana" and telling her that she was a nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless, being his
wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for the bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that three
days before the last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar examinations, she again came to see him.
Since then they became actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of the case. Through Mrs.
Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan
de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care
to either.
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3 June 1955 she lived and worked as maid,
laundress and cook for the respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and their child in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child named Angie
who was less than a year old at the time she lived with them. The couple slept together in the same room with their
daughter Angie and ate their meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out
somewhere. The respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to call the respondent "Jess". Corazon
Toledo is not the same person as the complainant.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 
1äwphï1.ñët

Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public
Highways in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He knows the respondent because he headed a
survey party that surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the landless. Sometime in March 1955 he
went to the respondent's place of residence and office at Moreno street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also
resided to apply for a parcel of public land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of residence and
office. Among those who lived with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the
latter only slept at the place whenever he was in town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person as
Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the respondent's place of residence and office, he saw a room
where the respondent, Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and shirts were hung. One day at about
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were repairing the front
mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad
introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of the station wagon in their proper places and while
he was helping Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask her for money to buy cigarettes.
His friends Nieva and Abad used to address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo."
The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another
woman who had borne him a child has been established by the testimony of Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose
sincerity and truthfulness have been put to a severe and searching test by the investigating Solicitor in the presence of
the respondent who appeared in his own behalf and cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. Asked by
the investigating Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or coached her on
what to testify or whether she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration, Marina Payot without
hesitation and in a straight forward manner answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is
the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair with his
paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify at the investigation; and that she was
not promised anything by way of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going further in his
investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-
feeling or grudge against him and his alleged paramour, which could be a motive for falsely testifying against them,
and she answered that she was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a sister; that they paid regularly
her salary of P15 a month; that they bought her a dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never scolded
her for she was a woman of few words, was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the reason she left them
was because she just felt lonesome for her parents. Further testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked how the
respondent's paramour looked, and she described her as a woman of fair complexion. Comparing her (Corazon) to the
complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer
figure, because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To find out if it was another and not the respondent
who lived with Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva, who lived with the respondent and
Corazon in the same house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had not.
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor asked him whether he was related to Claudio
Arellano, brother of the complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-law and added that he (Lino)
is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the complainant to testify at the hearing, he frankly
answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description of the respondent's paramour, the witness stated that
Corazon is fair in complexion, five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer
figure than the complainant.
The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere
maid, scant in education, and understands little English. She did not even finish the sixth grade of the elementary
course. The sharp and incisive questions propounded to her by the investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-
examination to which she was subjected by the respondent himself would have revealed herself if she was lying. The
apparent inconsistencies in her answers may be attributed to her innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure to
understand the questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to remember the dates asked of her
in the same way that a person of more than average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she was subjected to a
thorough examination by three lawyers and her confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers
to the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity and do not reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And
even if his testimony be discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted.
The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be taken into consideration for they were not properly
introduced in evidence during the investigation.
The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar. 6
THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.