1

Negligence as proximate cause- Art. 2179: controversy and which is the result of the
negligence of the defendants;
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the
sum of P 10,000. as moral damages for the
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff
CARBONEL, petitioners,
from his lifetime career as a marketing man;
vs.
mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched
LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and
the untold sorrows and frustration in life
experienced by plaintiff and his family since the
accident in controversy up to the present time;
FELICIANO, J:
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — of P 10,000.00 as damages for the wanton
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he disregard of defendants to settle amicably this
lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails- case with the plaintiff before the filing of this
and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing case in court for a smaller amount.
corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had
taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen (5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the
car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for attorney's fees;
General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and
and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car
headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)
headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck,
owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial
General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing court but modified the award of damages to the following extent:
in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not 1. The award of P15,000.00
parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the as compensatory damages
street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no was reduced
lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set to P6,460.71, the latter being
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had the only amount that the
earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. appellate court found the
Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer plaintiff to have proved as
Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the actually sustained by him;
following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision
by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed
2. The award of P150,000.00
into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered
as loss of expected income
some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a
was reduced
"nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
to P100,000.00, basically
because Dionisio had
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First voluntarily resigned his job
Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate such that, in the opinion of
cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had the appellate court, his loss of
parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. income "was not solely
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the attributable to the accident in
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in question;" and
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix
3. The award of P100,000.00
also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection
as moral damages was held
and supervision of the dump truck driver.
by the appellate court as
excessive and unconscionable
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against and hence reduced
Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered the latter: to P50,000.00.

(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum The award of P10,000.00 as
of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and the exemplary damages
replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff; and P4,500.00 as attorney's
fees and costs remained
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum untouched.
of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income for
plaintiff brought about the accident in This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on
a petition for review.
 2

Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of
findings of fact relating to the manner in which the dump truck was curfew without a valid curfew pass.
parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of which both courts
drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of Carbonel, On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home
the dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the proximate that night — both the trial court and the appellate court were
cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that completely silent.
both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and
Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was
not the way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather the The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of
reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene of the accident almost
smashed into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based
questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in some being barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people
way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's
Dionisio's negligence and made no further mention of it. We have car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio,
examined the record both before the trial court and the Intermediate on the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed
Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the at 30 kilometers per hour and had just crossed the intersection of
record sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to
appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took
relating to the alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his place. 3
car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if
there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony
parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" was hearsay and did not fag within any of the recognized exceptions
and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the him through official information and had not been given by the
injuries he sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's
between the parties in this case, without having to remand it back to objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of
the trial court after eleven years, compels us to address directly the Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records
contention put forward by the petitioners and to examine for exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of the res
ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay
which must bear upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an
and Carbonel. occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render
inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event,
or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and and not the result of reflective thought. 6
effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast
or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly
Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently
with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective,
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The
Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of
the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such
curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have purported to
the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence here describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch Dionisio was
consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency
treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his
Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along headlights, or whether his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just
with the contents of pockets together with Patrolman moments before the accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court
Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he
curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so.
his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his
certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be
Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a
of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to have resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We
authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than
This certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio that offered by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his
had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however, specify headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although
curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds
prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the before contact with the dump truck.
accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did
not have such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at
non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to the time of the accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimony
shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio
and whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights before smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and
the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious
condition. 7 This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the
 3

admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
before dinner with his boss that night. We do not believe that this "condition" still find occasional mention in the
evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the decisions; but the distinction is now almost
influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity
an act of reckless imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence at all, it must refer to the type of case where the
to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that forces set in operation by the defendant have
upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and
We are also aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect some new force intervenes. But even in such
different people differently. cases, it is not the distinction between "cause"
and "condition" which is important but the nature
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined of the risk and the character of the intervening
above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of cause. 9
the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than
he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from
the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and
thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private
out onto the road lane. respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the
dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in
words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more
hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver
consequence of the truck driver's negligence. owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had
created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in
merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and quote once more from Professor and Keeton:
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the
United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these intervening cause is one which in ordinary
arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that human experience is reasonably to be anticipated
even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and or one which the defendant has reason to
"condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already anticipate under the particular circumstances,
been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make this the defendant may be negligence among other
quite clear: reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or
the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary
distinguish between the active "cause" of the wind arising later wig spread it beyond the
harm and the existing "conditions" upon which defendant's own property, and therefore to take
that cause operated. If the defendant has created precautions to prevent that event. The person who
only a passive static condition which made the leaves the combustible or explosive material
damage possible, the defendant is said not to be exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of
liable. But so far as the fact of causation is fire from some independent source. ... In all of
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents these cases there is an intervening cause
which have played an important part in combining with the defendant's conduct to
producing the result it is quite impossible to produce the result and in each case the
distinguish between active forces and passive defendant's negligence consists in failure to
situations, particularly since, as is invariably the protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
case, the latter are the result of other active
forces which have gone before. The defendant
who spills gasoline about the premises creates a Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from
"condition," but the act may be culpable because liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial
of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the and important part of the risk, to which the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed
bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
the very risk which the defendant has created, the within the scope original risk, and hence of the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite
lapse of a considerable time during which the generally agreed that intervening causes which
"condition" remains static will not necessarily fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
affect liability; one who digs a trench in the defendant's responsibility.
highway may still be liable to another who fans
 4

Thus it has been held that a defendant will be account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the
required to anticipate the usual weather of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity
vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore
or even lightning; that one who leaves an his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own
obstruction on the road or a railroad track prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with
should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the
into it; ... peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or
omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping
The risk created by the defendant may include the out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the
intervention of the foreseeable negligence of forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our
others. ... [The standard of reasonable conduct law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff society and to allocate them among the members of society. To
against 'that occasional negligence which is one accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very
of the ordinary incidents of human life, and bonds of society.
therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant
who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of
to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix 16 in supervising its
exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court
liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to
even though the car is negligently driven; and overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that
one who parks an automobile on the highway Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his
without lights at night is not relieved of home whenever there was work to be done early the following
responsibility when another negligently drives morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part
into it. --- 10 of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is
parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand
subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we
Philippines). believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award
chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees
petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the
the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix
and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of
bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne
common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to
Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for
found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent
function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the appellate court.
harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of
contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory
negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. 13 The respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs
common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant against the petitioners.
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to SO ORDERED.
do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the
common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction
where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an ******************************************
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it
has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15 G.R. No. 112702 September 26, 1997

Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule vs.
in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not COURT OF APPEALS and CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER
believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, AND LIGHT CO., INC. (CEPALCO), respondents.
is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's
— was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not
G.R. No. 113613 September 26, 1997
simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the
petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or
"intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY, petitioner,
of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or vs.
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into
 5

COURT OF APPEALS and CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER PIA shall respect the right of ownership of and
AND LIGHT CO., INC. (CEPALCO), respondents. maintenance by CEPALCO of those assets inside PIE-MO
not covered by such purchase. . . .

According to PIA,5 CEPALCO proved no match to the power

ROMERO, J.: demands of the industries in PIE-MO that most of these companies
operating therein closed shop.6 Impelled by a "desire to provide cheap
power costs to power-intensive industries operating within the
Offered for resolution in these consolidated petitions for review Estate," PIA applied with the National Power Corporation (NPC) for
on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the National Power direct power connection which the latter in due course
Corporation (NPC) has jurisdiction to determine whether it may approved.7 One of the companies which entered into an agreement
supply electric power directly to the facilities of an industrial with the NPC for a direct sale and supply of power was the
corporation in areas where there is an existing and operating electric Ferrochrome Phils., Inc. (FPI).
power franchisee.
Contending that the said agreement violated its right as the authorized
On June 17, 1961, the Cagayan Electric and power Light Company operator of an electric light and power system in the area and the
(CEPALCO) was enfranchised by Republic Act No. 3247 "to national electrification policy, CEPALCO filed Civil Case No. Q-
construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat and power 35945, a petition for prohibition, mandamus and injunction before the
system for the purpose of generating and/or distributing electric light, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against the NPC.
heat and/or power for sale within the City of Cagayan de Oro and its Notwithstanding NPC's claim that it was authorized by its Charter to
suburbs" for fifty (50) years. Republic Act No. 3570, approved on sell electric power "in bulk" to industrial enterprises, the lower court
June 21, 1963, expanded the area of coverage of the franchise to rendered a decision on May 2, 1984, restraining the NPC from
include the municipalities of Tagoloan and Opol, both in the Province supplying power directly to FPI upon the ground that such direct sale,
of Misamis Oriental. On August 4, 1969, Republic Act No. 6020 supply and delivery of electric power by the NPC to FPI was
further amended the same franchise to include in the areas of violative of the rights of CEPALCO under its legislative franchise.
CEPALCO's authority of "generating and distributing electric light Hence, the lower court ordered the NPC to "permanently desist" from
and power for sale," the municipalities of Villanueva and Jasaan, also effecting direct supply of power to the FPI and "from entering into
of the said province. and/or implementing any agreement or arrangement for such direct
power connection, unless coursed through the power line" of
Presidential Decree No. 243, issued on July 12, 1973, created a "body CEPALCO.
corporate and politic" to be known as the Philippine Veterans
Investment Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC) vested with Eventually, the case reached this Court through G.R. No. 72085. 8 On
authority to engage in "commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural December 28, 1989, the Court denied the appeal interposed by NPC
and other enterprises" among other powers 1 and "to allow the full and on the ground that the statutory authority given to the NPC as regards
continued employment of the productive capabilities of and direct supply of power to BOI-registered enterprises "should always
investment of the veterans and retirees of the Armed Forces of the be subordinate to the 'total-electrification-of-the-entire-country-on-
Philippines." On August 13, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 538 was an-area-coverage basis policy' enunciated in P. D. No. 40," 9 We held
promulgated to create the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA), a further that:
subsidiary of PHIVIDEC, to carry out the government policy "to
encourage, promote and sustain the economic and social growth of
the country and that the establishment of professionalized Nor should we lose sight of the factual findings of the
management of well-planned industrial areas shall further this court a quo that petitioner-appellee CEPALCO had not
objective."2 Under Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 538, the first area for only been authorized by the Phividec Industrial Authority
development shall be located in the municipalities of Tagoloan and to provide electrical power to the Phividec Industrial Estate
Villanueva.3 This area forms part of the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate within which the FPI plant is located, but that petitioner-
Misamis Oriental (PIE-MO). appellee CEPALCO had in fact, supplied the latter's power
requirements for the construction of its plant, upon FPI's
application therefor as early as October 17, 1980.
As manager of PIE-MO, PIA granted the Ferrochrome Philippines,
Inc. (FPI) and Metal Alloys Corporation (MAC) authority to operate
in its area of development. On July 6, 1979, PIA granted CEPALCO It bears emphasis then that "it is only after a hearing (or an
a temporary authority to retail electric power to the industries opportunity for such a hearing) where it is established that
operating within the PIE-MO. 4 The Agreement executed by PIA and the affected private franchise holder is incapable or
CEPALCO authorized CEPALCO "to operate, administer, construct unwilling to match the reliability and rates of NPC that
and distribute electric power within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, direct connection with NPC may be granted." Here,
Misamis Oriental, such authority to be co-extensive with the petitioner-appellee's reliability as a power supplier and
territorial jurisdiction of PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, as defined in ability to match the NPC rates were never put in issue.
Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 538 and shall be for a period of five (5) years,
renewable for another five (5) years at the option of CEPALCO." The It is immaterial that petitioner-appellee's franchise was not
parties provided further that: exclusive. A privilege to sell within specified territory,
even if not exclusive, is a valuable property right entitled to
9. At the end of the fifth year, or at the end of the 10th year, protection against unauthorized competition.10
should this Agreement be thus renewed, PIA has the option
to take over the operation of the electric service and acquire Notwithstanding said decision, in September 1990, FPI filed a new
by purchase CEPALCO's assets within PIE-MO. This application for the direct supply of electric power from NPC. The
option shall be communicated to CEPALCO in writing at Hearing Committee of the NPC had started hearing the application
least 24 months before the date of acquisition of assets and but CEPALCO filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
takeover of operation by PIA. Should PIA exercise its petition for contempt against NPC officials led by Ernesto Aboitiz.
option to purchase the assets of CEPALCO in PIE-MO, On August 10, 1992, the trial court found the respondents in direct
 6

contempt of court and accordingly imposed upon them a fine of empowered to directly service all the
P500.00 each. requirements of a BOI registered
enterprise provided that, first, any
The respondent NPC officials challenged before this Court the affected private franchise holder is
judgment holding them in contempt of court through G.R. No. afforded an opportunity to be heard on
107809, (Aboitiz v. Regino). 11 In the Decision of July 5, 1993, the the application therefor and second,
Court upheld the contempt ruling and, after quoting the lower court's from such a hearing, it is established
decision of May 2, 1984 which the Court upheld in G.R. No. 72085, that said private franchise holder is
said: incapable or unwilling to match the
reliability and rates of NPC for directly
serving the latter (National Power
These directives show that the lower court (and this Court) Corporation v. Jacinto, 134 SCRA 435
intended the arrangement between FPI and CEPALCO to [1985]. National Power Corporation v.
be permanent and free from NAPOCOR's influence or Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 103
intervention. Any attempt on the part of NAPOCOR or its [1988]).14
officers and/or employees to strike a deal with FPI would
be a clear and direct disobedience to a lawful order and
therefore contemptuous. However, considering the "better and priority right" of PIA, the
committee recommended that instead of a direct power connection by
the NPC to FPI, the connection should be made to PIA "as a utility
The petitioners call the attention of the Court to the user for its industrial Estate at Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental." 15
statement of CEPALCO that "NAPOCOR has already
implemented in full" the May 2, 1984 decision of the lower
court as affirmed by this Court. They suggest that in view For its part, on November 3, 1989, CEPALCO filed with the Energy
of this, the decision no longer has any binding effect upon Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition praying that the ERB "order the
the parties, or to put it another way, has become functus discontinuance of all existing direct supply of power by the NPC
officio. Consequently, when they entertained the re- within petitioner's franchise area" (ERB Case No. 89-430). On July
application of FPI for direct power connection to 17, 1992, the ERB ruled that CEPALCO "is relatively efficient and
NAPOCOR, they were not disobeying the May 2, 1984 reliable as manifested by its very low system losses (far from the
order of the trial court and so should not be held in 14% standard) and very high power factors" and therefore
contempt. CEPALCO is technically capable "to distribute power to its
consumers within its franchise area, particularly the industrial
customers." It disposed of the petition as follows:
This argument must be rejected in view of our finding of
the permanence and comprehensiveness of the challenged
order of the trial court. "Permanent" is not a difficult word WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, when
to understand. It means "lasting or intended to last the petitioner has been proven to be capable of distributing
indefinitely without change." As for the scope of the order, power to its industrial consumers and having passed the
NAPOCOR was directed to "desist from effecting, causing, secondary considerations with a passing mark of 85%,
and continuing the direct supply, sale and delivery of judgment is hereby rendered granting the relief prayed for.
electricity from its power line to the plant of Ferrochrome Accordingly, it is hereby declared that all direct connection
Philippines, Inc., and from entering into and/or of industries to NPC within the franchise area of
implementing any agreement or arrangement for such CEPALCO is no longer necessary. Therefore, all existing
direct power connection, unless coursed through the power NPC direct supply of power to industrial consumers within
line of petitioner." (Emphasis supplied.) the franchise area of CEPALCO is hereby ordered
discontinued. . . . .16
Meanwhile, the NPC Hearing Committee12 proceeded with its
hearings. CEPALCO was duly notified thereof but it opted to However, during the pendency of the Aboitiz case in this Court or on
question the committee's jurisdiction. It did not submit any evidence. August 3, 1992, PIA contracted the NPC for the construction of a 138
Consequently, in its Report and Recommendation dated September kilovolt (KV) transmission line from Namutulan substation to the
27, 1991, the committee gave weight to the evidence presented by receiving and/or substation of PIA.17
FPI that CEPALCO charged higher rates than what the NPC would if
allowed to supply power directly to FPI. Although the committee As expected, on February 17, 1993, CEPALCO filed in the Regional
considered as unfounded FPI's claim of CEPALCO's unreliability as Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 68), a petition for certiorari,
a power supplier,13 it nonetheless held that: prohibition, mandamus and injunction against the NPC and some
officials of both the NPC and PIA. 18 Docketed as SCA No. 290, the
Form (sic) the foregoing and on the basis of the decision of petition specifically sought the issuance of a temporary restraining
the Supreme Court in the case of National Power order. However, after hearing, the prayer for the temporary
Corporation and Fine Chemicals (Phils.) Inc. v. The Court restraining order was denied by the court in its order of March 12,
of Appeals and the Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 1993.19 CEPALCO filed a motion for the reconsideration of said
84695, May 8, 1990, FPI is entitled to a direct connection order while NPC and PIA moved for the dismissal of the petition. 20
to NPC as applied for considering that CEPALCO is
unwilling to match the rates of NPC for directly serving On June 23, 1993, noting the cases filed by CEPALCO all seeking
FPI and that FPI is a duly registered BOI registered exclusivity in the distribution of electric power to areas covered by its
enterprises (sic). The Supreme Court in the aforestated case franchise, the court21 ruled that "the right of petitioner to supply
has ruled as follows: electric power in the aforesaid area to the exclusion of other entities
had been settled once and for all by the Regional Trial Court of
As consistently ruled by the Court Quezon City wherein petitioner obtained a favorable judgment."
pursuant to P.D. No. 380 as amended Hence, the petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.22
by P.D. No. 395, NPC is statutorily
 7

Forthwith, CEPALCO elevated the case to this Court through a The Board shall, after due notice and
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the hearing, exercise the following powers
issuance of a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order. and functions, among others:
The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 110686 but on August 18,
1993, the Court referred it to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Sec. 9, x x x           x x x          x x x
paragraph 1 of B.P. Blg. 129 conferring upon the appellate court
original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition and certiorari and
auxiliary writs.23 In the Court of Appeals, the petition was docketed e. Issue Certificate of Public
as CA-G.R. No. 31935-SP. Convenience for the operation of
electric power utilities and services, . . .
including the establishment and
On September 10, 1993, the Fifteenth Division of the Court of regulation of areas of operation of
Appeals issued a resolution24 denying the prayer for the issuance of a particular operators of public power
temporary restraining order on the strength of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. utilities and services, the fixing of
1818. It ruled that since the NPC is a public utility, it "enjoys the standards and specifications in all cases
protective mantle" of said decree prohibiting courts from issuing related to the issued Certificate of
restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving Public Convenience . . .
infrastructure and natural resource development projects of, and
operated by, the government.25
Moreover, NPC is not an administrative body as
jurisprudentially defined, and that the NPC cannot usurp a
However, on September 17, 1993, upon a motion for reconsideration power it has never been conferred by its charter or by other
filed by CEPALCO and a re-evaluation of the provisions of P.D. No. law — the power to determine the validity of direct
1818, the Court of Appeals set aside its resolution of September 10, connection agreement it enters into in violation of a power
1993 and held that: distributor's franchise.

. . . the project intended by respondent NPC, which is the Thus, considering that PIA professes to be and intends to
construction, completion and operation of the 138-kv line, engage in the business of a public power utility, it must first
is not in consonance with the intendment of said Decree apply for a public convenience and necessity (conferment
which is to protect public utilities and their projects and of operating authority) with the ERB. This may have been
activities intended for public convenience and necessity. the opportune time for ERB to determine whether to allow
The project of respondent NPC is intended to serve PIA to directly connect with NPC, with notice and
exclusively the needs of private entities, Metal Alloys opportunity for CEPALCO considering that, as the latter
Corporation and Ferrochrome Philippine in Tagoloan, alleges, this new line which NPC is installing duplicates
Misamis Oriental. that existing Cepalco 138 kv line which NPC itself turned
over to Cepalco and for which it was paid in full.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order directing the private respondents therein "to immediately cease Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the
and desist from proceeding with the construction, completion and petition, annulled and set aside the decision of the Hearing
operation of the 138-kv line subject of the petition." The NPC, PIA Committee of the NPC on direct connection with PIA, and ordered
and the officers of both were directed to explain why the preliminary the NPC "to desist from continuing the construction of that NPC-
injunction prayed for should not issue.26 Natumulan-Phividec 138 kv transmission line."31

In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision 27 of Without filing a motion for the reconsideration of said Decision, NPC
November 15, 1993 assailed herein. After ruling that the lower court filed in this Court on December 9, 1993, a motion for an extension of
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition below on the time within which to file "the proper petition." The motion which was
grounds of res judicata and litis pendentia, the Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 112702, was granted on December 20, 1993
confronted squarely the issue of whether or not "the NPC itself has with warning that no further extension would be granted. Thereafter,
the power to determine the propriety of direct power connection from NPC filed a motion praying that it be excused from filing the petition
its lines to any entity located within the franchise area of another on account of the filing by PIA in the Court of Appeals of a motion
public utility."28 for the reconsideration of the Decision of November 15, 1993. In the
Resolution of February 2, 1994, the Court noted and granted
Elucidating that the ruling of this Court in both G.R. No. 78609 (NPC petitioner' s motion and considered the case "closed and
v. Court of Appeals) 29 and G.R. No. 87697 (Del Monte [Philippines], terminated."32 This resolution was withdrawn in the Resolution of
Inc. v. Hon. Felix M. de Guzman, etc., etc., et al.) 30 categorically held February 8, 199533 in view of the "inadvertent clerical error"
that before a direct connection to the NPC maybe granted, a proper terminating the case, after the NPC had mailed its petition for review
administrative body must conduct a hearing "to determine which on certiorari on February 21, 1994.34
entity, the franchise holder or the NPC, has the right to supply
electric power to the entity applying for direct connection," the Court In the meantime, PIA filed a motion for reconsideration of the
of Appeals declared: appellate court's Decision of November 15, 1993 arguing in the main
that, not being a party to previous cases between CEPALCO and
We have no doubt that the ERB, and not the NPC, is the NPC, it was not bound by decisions of this Court. The Court of
administrative body referred to by the Supreme Court Appeals denied the motion on January 28, 1994 on the basis of stare
where the hearing is to be conducted to determine the decisis where once the court has laid down a principle of law as
propriety of direct connection. The charter of the ERB (PD applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to and apply the
1206 in relation to EO 172) is clear on this: principle to all future cases where the facts are substantially the
same.35 Hence, PIA filed a petition for review on certiorari which
was docketed as G.R. No. 113613.
 8

G.R. Nos. 112702 and 113613 were consolidated on June 15, 1994.36 directly to the industries within PIE-MO, notwithstanding the
operation of franchisee CEPALCO in the same area.
In G.R. No. 112702, petitioner NPC contends that private respondent
CEPALCO is not entitled to relief because it has been forum- It should be noted that there is yet pending another case, namely,
shopping. Private respondent had filed Civil Case No. Q-93-14597 in Civil Case No. 91-383, instituted by PIA against CEPALCO in the
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which had been forwarded Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental which apparently deals
to it by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Said case and the instant with a related issue — PIA' s franchise or authority to provide power
case (SCA No. 290) deal with the same issue of restoring CEPALCO' to enterprises within the PIE-MO.43 Hence, the principle of litis
s right to supply power to FPI and MAC. Petitioner thus contends pendentia which ordinarily demands the dismissal of an action filed
that because the principle of litis pendentia applies, although other later than another, should be considered under the primordial concept
parties are involved in the case before the Quezon City court, there is of "interest of justice," in order that a recurrent issue common to all
no basis for granting relief to private respondent CEPALCO "(s)ince cases may be definitively resolved.
the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by the respondent
court."37 Corollarily, petitioner asserts that because the main case The principal and common question raised in these consolidated
herein was dismissed "without trial," the respondent appellate court cases is: whether or not the NPC may supply power directly to PIA in
should not have accorded private respondent affirmative relief. 38 the PIE-MO area where CEPALCO has a directly franchise.
Petitioner PIA in G.R. No. 113613 asserts that it may receive power
Petitioner NPC's contention is based on the fact that on October 6, directly from the NPC because it is a public utility. It avers that P.D.
1992, private respondent CEPALCO filed against the NPC in the No. 538, as amended, empowers PIA "as and to be a public utility to
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Civil Case No. 62490, an action for operate and serve the power needs within PIE-MO, i.e., a specific
specific performance and damages with prayer for preliminary area constituting a small portion of petitioner's franchise coverage,"
mandatory injunction directing the NPC to immediately restore to without, however, specifying the particular provision which so
CEPALCO the distribution of power pertaining to MAC's empower PIA.44
consumption.39 However, no summons was served and the ex-parte
writ prayed for was not issued. Nevertheless, the case was forwarded A "public utility" is a business or service engaged in regularly
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where it was docketed as supplying the public with some commodity or service of public
Civil Case No. 93-14597. That case was pending when SCA No. 290 consequence such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. or telegraph service.45 The term implies public use and service.46

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case Petitioner PIA is a subsidiary of the PHIVIDEC with "governmental
neither on the grounds of res judicata nor ligis pendentia but on the and proprietary functions."47 Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 538 specifically
"only one unresolved issue, which is whether the NPC itself has the confers upon it the following powers:
power to determine the propriety of direct power connection from its
lines to any entity located within the franchise area of another public
utility."40 The Court of Appeals opined that the effects of litis a. To operate, administer and manage the PHIVIDEC
pendentia could not have resulted in the dismissal of SCA No. 290 Industrial Areas and other areas which shall hereafter be
because Civil Case No. Q-35945 which became G.R. No. 72085 was proclaimed, designated and specified in subsequent
based on facts totally different from that of SCA No. 290. Presidential Proclamation; to construct acquire, own,
lease, operate and maintain infrastructure facilities, factory
buildings, warehouses, dams, reservoirs, water
In invoking litis pendentia, however, petitioner NPC refers to this distribution, electric light and power systems,
case, SCA No. 290, and Civil Case No. 93-14597. SCA No. 290 and telecommunications and transportation networks, or such
Civil Case No. 93-14597 may both have the same objective, the other facilities and services necessary or useful in the
restoration of CEPALCO's right to distribute power to PIE-MO areas conduct of industry and commerce or in the attainment of
under its franchise aside from the fact that the cases involve the purposes and objectives of this Decree; (Emphasis
practically the same parties. However, litis pendentia may not be supplied.)
successfully invoked to cause the dismissal of SCA No. 290.
Clearly then, the PIA is authorized to render indirect service to the
In order to constitute a ground for the abatement or dismissal of an public by its administration of the PHIVIDEC industrial areas like the
action, litis pendentia must exhibit the concurrence of the following PIE-MO and may, therefore, be considered a public utility. As it is
requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the expressly authorized by law to perform the functions of a public
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief utility, a certificate of public convenience, as suggested by the Court
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) identity of Appeals, is not necessary for it to avail of a direct power
in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may be connection from the NPC. However, such authority to be a public
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is utility may not be exercised in such a manner as to prejudice the
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.41 As a rule, the second rights of existing franchisees. In fact, by its actions, PIA recognized
case filed should be abated under the maxim qui prior est the rights of the franchisees in the area.
tempore, potior est jure. However, this rule is not a hard and fast one.
The "priority-in-time rule" may give way to the criterion of "more
appropriate action." More recently, the criterion used was the Accordingly, in pursuit of its powers "to grant such franchise for and
"interest of justice rule."42 to operate and maintain within the Areas electric light, heat or power
systems," etc. under Sec. 4 (i) of P.D. No. 538 and its rule-making
power under Sec. 4 (1) of the same law, on July 20, 1979, the PIA
We hold that the last criterion should be the basis for resolving this Board of Directors promulgated the "Rules and Regulations To
case, although it was filed later than Civil Case No. 62490 which, Implement the Intent and Provisions of Presidential Decree No.
upon its transfer, became Civil Case No. 93-14795. In so doing, we 538."48 Rule XI thereof on "Utilities and Services" provides as
shall avoid multiplicity of suits which is the matrix upon which litis follows:
pendentia is anchored and eventually bring about the final settlement
of the recurring issue of whether or not the NPC may supply power
 9

Sec. 1. Utilities — It is the responsibility of the Authority Petitioner NPC attempted to abide by these rulings when it conducted
to provide all required utilities and services inside the a hearing to determine whether it may supply power directly to PIA.
Estate: While it notified CEPALCO of the hearing, the NPC is not the proper
authority referred to by this Court in the aforementioned earlier
x x x           x x x          x x x decisions, not only because the subject of the hearing is a matter
involving the NPC itself, but also because the law has created the
proper administrative body vested with authority to conduct a
a) Contracts for the hearing.
purchase of public
utilities and/or
services shall be CEPALCO shares the view of the Court of Appeals that the Energy
subject to the prior Regulatory Board (ERB) is the proper administrative body for such
approval of the hearings. However, a recent legislative development has overtaken
Authority; Provide said view.
d, however, that
similar contract(s) The ERB, which used to be the Board of Energy, is tasked with the
existing prior to the following powers and functions by Executive Order No. 172 which
effectivity of this took effect immediately after its issuance on May 8, 1987:
Rules and
Regulations shall Sec. 3. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions of the Board. —
continue to be in When warranted and only when public necessity requires,
full force and the Board may regulate the business of importing,
effect. exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing,
refining, marketing and importing, distributing energy
xxx xxx xxx resources. . . .

(Emphasis supplied.) The Board shall, upon prior notice and hearing, exercise the
following, among other powers and functions:
It should be noted that the Rules and Regulations took effect thirty
(30) days after its publication in the Official Gazette on September (a) Fix and regulate the prices of
24, 1979 or more than three (3) months after the July 6, 1979 contract petroleum products;
between PIA and CEPALCO was entered into. As such, the Rules
and Regulations itself allowed the continuance of the supply of (b) Fix and regulate the rate schedule or
electric power to PIE-MO by CEPALCO. prices of piped gas to be charged by
duly franchised gas companies which
That the contract of July 6, 1979 was not renewed by the parties after distribute gas by means of underground
the expiration of the five-year period stipulated therein did not pipe system;
change the fact that within that five-year period, in violation of both
the contract and its Rules and Regulations, PIA applied with the NPC (c) Fix and regulate the rates of
for direct power connection. The pipeline concessionaires under the
matter was aggravated by NPC's favorable action on the application, provisions of Republic Act No. 387, as
totally unmindful of the extent of its powers under the law which, amended, otherwise known as the
in National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,49 the Court "Petroleum Act of 1949," as amended
delimits as follows: by Presidential Decree No. 1700;

. . . . It is immaterial whether the direct connection is (d) Regulate the capacities of new
merely an improvement or an increase in existing voltage, refineries or additional capacities of
as alleged by petitioner, or a totally new and separate existing refineries and license refineries
electric service as claimed by private respondent. The law that may be organized after the
on the matter is clear. PD 40 promulgated on 7 November issuance of this Executive Order, under
1972 expressly provides that the generation of electric such terms and conditions as are
power shall be undertaken solely by the NPC. However consistent with the national interest;
Section 3 of the same decree also provides that the
distribution of electric power shall be undertaken by
cooperatives, private utilities (such as the (e) Whenever the Board has determined
CEPALCO), local governments and other entities duly that there is a shortage or any
authorized, subject to state regulation. ( Emphasis petroleum product, or when public
supplied.) interest so requires, it may take such
steps as it may consider necessary,
including the temporary adjustment of
The same case ruled that "(i)t is only after a hearing (or an the levels of prices of petroleum
opportunity for such a hearing) where it is established that the products and the payment to the Oil
affected private franchise holder is incapable or unwilling to match Price Stabilization Fund created under
the reliability and rates of NPC that a direct connection with NPC Presidential Decree No. 1956 by
may be granted."50 As earlier stated, the Court arrived at the same persons or entities engaged in the
ruling in the later cases of G.R. Nos. 72085, 84695 and 87697. petroleum industry of such amounts as
may be determined by the Board,
 10

which will enable the importer to It may be argued that Section 26 of R.A. No. 7638 contains
recover its cost of importation. a repealing clause which provides that:

As may be gleaned from said provisions, the ERB is basically a price All laws, presidential decrees,
or rate-fixing agency. Apparently recognizing this basic function, executive orders, rules and regulations
Republic Act No. 7638 (An Act Creating the Department of Energy, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
Rationalizing the Organization and Functions of Government provisions of this Act, are hereby
Agencies Related to Energy, and for Other Purposes), 51 which was repealed or modified accordingly. . . .
approved on December 9, 1992 and which took effect fifteen days
after its complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers and, therefore, all provisions of E.O. No. 172 and related
of general circulation, specifically provides as follows: laws which are inconsistent with the policy, purpose and
intent of R.A. No. 7638 are deemed repealed. It has been
Sec. 18. Rationalization or Transfer of Functions of said, however, that a general repealing clause of such
Attached or Related Agencies. — The non-price regulatory nature does not operate as an express repeal because it fails
jurisdiction, powers, and functions of the Energy to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to
Regulatory Board as provided for in Section 3 of Executive be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the
Order No. 172 are hereby transferred to the Department. intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found on existing and prior acts of the
The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall same subject matter. Such being the case, the presumption
include all applicable funds and appropriations, records, against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction
equipment, property, and such personnel as may be regarding implied repeals shall apply ex propio vigore. For
necessary. Provided, That only such amount of funds and the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so
appropriations of the Board as well as only the personnel that, if repeal of particular or specific laws is intended, the
thereof which are completely or primarily involved in the proper step is to so express it. The failure to add a specific
exercise by said Board of its non-price regulatory powers repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be
and functions shall be affected by such transfer. repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the
The power of the NPC to determine, fix, and prescribe the new and the old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
rates being charged to its customers under Section 4 of Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377; City of Naga
Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, as well as the power vs. Agna, 71 SCRA 176, cited in Agpalo, Statutory
of electric cooperatives to fix rates under Section 16 (o), Construction, 1990 Edition, pp. 191-192).
Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended, are
hereby transferred to the Energy Regulatory Board. The
Board shall exercise its new powers only after due notice In view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that only the non-
and hearing and under the same procedure provided for in price regulatory functions of ERB under Section 3 of E.O.
Executive Order No. 172. 172 are transferred to the DOE. All other powers of ERB
which are not within the purview of its "non-price
regulatory jurisdiction, powers and functions" as defined in
Upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7638, then Acting Section 3 are not so transferred to DOE and accordingly
Chairman of the Energy Coordinating Council Delfin Lazaro remain vested in ERB.
transmitted to the Department of Justice the query of whether or not
the "non-power rate powers and functions" of the ERB are included
in the "jurisdiction, powers and functions transferred to the The determination of which of two public utilities has the right to
Department of Energy." Answering the query in the affirmative, the supply electric power to an area which is within the coverage of both
Department of Justice rendered Opinion No. 22 dated February 12, is certainly not a rate-fixing function which should remain with the
1993 the pertinent portion of which states: ERB. It deals with the regulation of the distribution of energy
resources which, under Executive Order No. 172, was expressly a
function of ERB. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No.
. . . we believe that since the provision of Section 18 on the 7638, the Department of Energy took over such function. Hence, it is
transfer of certain powers and functions from ERB to DOE this Department which shall then determine whether CEPALCO or
is clear and unequivocal, and devoid of any ambiguity, in PIA should supply power to PIE-MO.
the sense that it categorically refers to "non-price
jurisdiction, powers and functions" of ERB under Section 3
of E.O. No. 172, there is no room for interpretation, but Clearly, petitioner NPC's assertion that its "authority to entertain and
only for application, of the law. This is a cardinal rule of hear direct connection applications is a necessary incident of its
statutory construction. express authority to sell electric power in bulk" is now
baseless.52 Even without the new legislation affecting its power to
conduct hearings, it is certainly irregular, if not downright anomalous
Clearly, the parameters of the transfer of functions from for the NPC itself to determine whether it should supply power
ERB to DOE pursuant to Section 18, are circumscribed by directly to the PIA or the industries within the PIE-MO. It simply
the provision of Section 3 of E.O. No. 172 alone so that, if cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to exercise non-rate fixing
there are other "related" functions of ERB under other powers which now devolves upon the Department of Energy and to
provisions of E.O. No. 172 or other energy laws, these hear and eventually grant itself the right to supply power in bulk. 53
"related" functions, which may conceivably refer to what
you call "non-power rate powers and functions" of ERB,
are clearly not contemplated by Section 18 and are, On the other hand, ventilating the issue in a public hearing would not
therefore, not to be deemed included in the transfer of unduly prejudice CEPALCO although it was enfranchised by law
functions from ERB to DOE under the said provision. earlier than the PIA. Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been
favored by this Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the
government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights,
 11

privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee. Thus in Alger other passengers were family members and friends whom they
Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,54 the Court said. invited to an excursion to the beach after the visit to the construction
site. The group stayed at Lian beach until 5:30 p.m., when they
. . . Exclusivity is given by law with the understanding that decided to go back to Manila.
the company enjoying it is self-sufficient and capable of
supplying the needed service or product at moderate or The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-45, was owned by Salvador
reasonable prices. It would be against public interest where Salenga, father of one of the employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle
the firm granted a monopoly is merely an unnecessary was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was
conduit of electric power, jacking up prices as a traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back
superfluous middleman or an inefficient producer which to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner's
cannot supply cheap electricity to power intensive panel truck, bearing Plate No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the
industries. It is in the public interest when industries opposite direction. The panel truck was on its way to petitioner's
dependent on heavy use of electricity are given reliable and plant in Dasmariñas, Cavite after delivering some linen to the Makati
direct power at the lower costs thus enabling the sale of Medical Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a
nationally marketed products at prices within the reach of jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the
the masses. . . . brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to
swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a
WHEREFORE, both petitions in G.R. No. 112702 and 113613 are result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound
hereby DENIED. The Department of Energy is directed to conduct a lane.
hearing with utmost dispatch to determine whether it is the Cagayan
Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. or the National Power The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his
Corporation, through the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, which passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe and Dalmacio Salunoy, died.
should supply electric power to the industries in the PHIVIDEC Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were injured and
Industrial Estate-Misamis Oriental. taken to various hospitals.

This Decision is immediately executory. On December 4, 1980, private respondents filed this civil case for
damages before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
SO ORDERED. Branch, against petitioner.

On November 23, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, to which

the case was transferred following the reorganization of the judiciary,
rendered judgment for private respondents. The dispositive portion of
******************************************
its decision reads:

G.R. No. 119092 December 10, 1998 It is for the reasons stated above that the court is
persuaded to award the damages incurred by the
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., petitioner, plaintiffs as proved in the trial as follows:
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NICANOR BERNABE III, Actual or compensatory expenses:
JOSEFINA BERNABE, in their individual capacities and as
HEIRS OF JASON BERNABE, JOHN JOSEPH BERNABE,
VICTOR IGNACIO, JULIETA ENRIQUEZ and RAMON a. Charito Estolano
ENRIQUEZ, RENE TABLANTE, LEOMAR MACASPAC, JR., P35,813.87 (Exh. J)
CHARITO ESTOLANO, NENITA SALUNOY, in their
individual capacities and as HEIRS OF DALMACIO b. Nicanor Bernabe
SALUNOY, respondents. III 20,024.94

& Josefina C.
Bernabe
MENDOZA, J.:
c. Julieta, Ailyn &
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Bent panel truck 45,830.45 (Exh.
of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused QQ)
the death of three persons and the injuries of several others. The
accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on Josefina Enriquez
August 31, 1980. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of
those who died was the driver. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
and Josefina
found petitioner's driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident Valeiro
and accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents for
P472,262.30 in damages and attorney's fees. Its decision was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. It is here for a review of the d. Leonor
appellate court's decision. Macaspac 2,740.00

The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the e. Victor Rey
Project Management Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). They had just visited Ignacio 14,820.64
the construction site of a company project at Lian, Batangas. The (Exh. EEE)
 12

f. Rene Tablante m. Victor Ignacio

10,032.40 (Exh. 8,000.00 (Exh.
QQQ) DDD)

g. Nenita Salonoy, n. Rene Tablanta

widow; 20,000.00 8,000.00 (Exh.
FFF)
and Jack &
Manilyn, and finally the heirs of Jason Bernabe should be
awarded the sum of P50,000.00 for the latter's
children death. The heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should be
given the sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages
and unearned income.
Moral damages should also be awarded as
follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered
in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendant to pay
For the injuries sustained by: the amounts aforecited and to pay the further sum
of P50,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs.
a. Charito Estolano
P10,000.00 (Exh. SO ORDERED.
F)
As already stated, the Court of Appeals, to which the decision of the
b. Julieta P. trial court was appealed, affirmed the decision on January 26, 1995.
Enriquez 15,000.00 Hence, this appeal.
(Exh. MM)
First. Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of
c. Ailyn C. contributory negligence and, therefore, its liability should be
Enriquez 8,000.00 mitigated, if not totally extinguished. It claims that the driver of the
(Exh. NN) Cimarron was guilty or violation of traffic rules and regulations at the
time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil
d. Josefina R. Code, he was presumed to be negligent.
Enriquez 10,000.00
(Exh. OO) According to petitioner, the negligence consisted of the following.

e. Josefina P. 1. The Cimarron was overloaded because there were from 20 to 25

Valerio 2,000.00 passengers inside when the passenger capacity of the vehicle was
(Exh. PP) only 17.

f. Nenita Salonoy 2. The front seat of the Cimarron was occupied by four adults,
20,000.00 (Exh. including the driver.
DD)
3. The Cimarron had only one headlight on (its right headlight) as its
g. Nicanor Bernabe left headlight was not functioning.
III 8,000.00 (Exh.
Q)
Petitioner cites Art. III, §2 of R.A. No. 4136, known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides that "No person
h. Josephine operating any vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or
Bernabe 2,000.00 cargo in his vehicle than its registered carry capacity" and Art. IV,
(Exh. R) §3(e) which states that "Every motor vehicle of more than one meter
of projected width, while in use on any public highway shall bear two
i. John Joseph headlights. . . which not later than one-half hour after sunset and until
Bernabe 10,000.00 at least one-half hour before sunrise and whenever weather
conditions so require, shall both be lighted."
j. Manilyn G.
Salonoy 10,000.00 Petitioner asserts that the fact that its panel truck encroached on a
(Exh. EE) portion of the lane of the Cimarron does not show that its driver was
negligent. Petitioner cites the case of Bayasen v. Court of
k. Jack Salonoy Appeals,1 which allegedly held that the sudden swerving of a
10,000.00 (Exh. JJ) vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not
negligence per se. Petitioner further claims that even if
petitioner's swerving to the lane of respondents were considered
l. Leonor C. proof of negligence, this fact would not negate the presumption of
Macaspac 2,000.00 negligence on the part of the other driver arising from his
(Exh. AAA) violations of traffic rules and regulations.
 13

Petitioner likewise invokes the ruling in Mckee v. Intermediate A. The distance which my
Appellate Court,2 in which a driver who invaded the opposite lane vehicle swerved beyond the
and caused a collision between his car and a truck coming from middle line or center line to
the opposite lane, was exonerated based on the doctrine of last the left was about this
clear chance, which states that a person who has the last clear distance, sir (witness
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding demonstrating by using
the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the both hands the distance).
consequences of the accident.
ATTY. ALILING:
Petitioner contends that the ruling in that case should be applied
to the present case. According to petitioner, although the driver Can we stipulate that it is 1
of the panel truck was initially negligent, the driver of the foot, Your Honor.
Cimarron had the last opportunity to avoid the accident.
However, because of his negligence (i.e., the aforementioned
violations of traffic rules and regulations such as the use of only ATTY. GONZALES:
one headlight at night and the overcrowding at the front seat of
the vehicle), he was not able to avoid a collision with the panel A little more, 1 1/2 feet.
truck.
ATTY. ALILING:
We find the foregoing contention to be without merit.
1 1/4 feet.
First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of
the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the ATTY. GONZALES:
vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the violation of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the Between 1 1/4 and 1 1/2
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the feet.
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other The panel truck driver's testimony is consistent with the
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing testimonies of private respondents that the panel truck went out
cause of the injury.3 Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded of control and simply smashed into the Cimarron in which they
vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime were riding. Thus, Nicanor Bernabe III
certainly increases the risk of accident," 4 that because the testified:7
Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased
visibility," and that the tact that the vehicle was overloaded and
Q: And did you see how the
its front seat overcrowded "decreased [its]
accident happened?
maneuverability,"5 However, mere allegations such as these are
not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such
alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. A: I just saw a glare of
light. That is all and then
the impact.
Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case, there was no
way either driver could have avoided the collision. The panel
truck driver testified: 6 Q: Where did you see that
glare of light?
Q. You stated you were
following a jeepney along A: Coming in front ahead
the highway in Imus, of us.
Cavite, what happened
afterwards, if any? Q: When you say ahead of
you, was it . . . ?
A. The passenger jeepney I
was following made a A: Towards us.
sudden stop so I stepped on
the brakes.
x x x           x x x          x x x

Q. Upon stepping on your

Q: And from what did
brakes, what happened if
those glare of light come
any?
from.

A. The Mercedes Benz

A: Based on information I
(panel) suddenly swerved to
received, the light came
the left, sir.
from the headlights of a
certain panel owned by
Q. How big was the Sanitary Steam Laundry,
swerving to the left? Inc.
 14

x x x           x x x          x x x A Yes, sir,

Q: You said that the lights Q And what happened after

were going towards you. that?
Now, at what pace did these
lights come toward you? A After that, there was an
impact.
A: Fast pace.
Q All right. Will you tell the
Charito Estolano, another passenger who was seated in front of Court which bumped
the Cimarron, similarly testified that they just saw the panel which?
truck hurtling toward them. She said: 8
A We were bumped by the
Q Now, you said earlier vehicle which was coming
that you were involved in from the opposite direction.
an accident.
What was that accident? The foregoing testimonies show that the driver of the panel truck
lost control of his vehicle and bumped the Cimarron. Hence, even
A An approaching vehicle if both headlights of the Cimarron were lighted, it would have
hit us. been bumped just the same because the driver of the panel truck
could not stop despite the fact that he applied the brakes.
Q Now, why do you know Petitioner's contention that because of "decreased visibility,"
that there was the caused by the fact that the Cimarron allegedly had only one
approaching vehicle? headlight on, its driver failed to see the Cimarron is without any
basis in fact. Only its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only
one headlight on. The police investigator did not state in his
A There was a light which report or in his testimony that the Cimarron had only one
glared us and I knew that it headlight on.
came from a vehicle. We
were blinded.
Nor is there any basis in fact for petitioner's contention that
because of overcrowding in the front seat of the Cimarron there
Q Where was this vehicle was "decreased maneuverability" which prevented the Cimarron
headed for? driver from avoiding the panel truck. There is absolutely no basis
for this claim. There is nothing in the testimonies of the
A Headed for Cavite. passengers of the Cimarron, particularly Charito Estolano, who
was seated in front, which suggest that the driver had no elbow
Q Coming from? room for maneuvering the vehicle. To the contrary, from the
testimony of some of the witnesses, 9 it appears that the driver of
the Cimarron tried to avoid the collision but because of the
A Coming from Manila, I emergency created by the speeding panel truck coming from the
think. opposite direction he was not able to fully move his Cimarron
away from the path of the oncoming vehicle. We are convinced
Q So that, actually, in that no "manuevering" which the Cimarron driver could have
relation to your vehicle, it done would have avoided a collision with the panel truck, given
was coming from the the suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the
opposite direction? front seat was immaterial.

A Yes, sir. All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence of petitioner's driver. As the trial court noted,
the swerving of petitioner's panel truck to the opposite lane could
Q Now, you said that the
mean not only that petitioner's driver was running the vehicle at
light headed towards your
a very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger
vehicle. On which side of
jeepney ahead of it as well.
the highway was your
Tamaraw vehicle travelling
at that time? Petitioner's driver claimed that the distance between the panel
truck and the passenger jeepney in front was about 12
meters. 10 If this was so, he would have had no difficulty bringing
A We were on the right
his panel truck to a stop. It is very probable that the driver did
lane.
not really apply his brakes (which is why there were no skid
marks) but that finding the jeepney in front of him to be in close
Q Did you actually see this proximity, he tried to avoid hitting it by swerving his vehicle to
light from the vehicle the left. In the process, however, he invaded a portion of the
coming from the opposite opposite lane and consequently hit the Cimarron. Indeed, the
direction heading towards panel truck driver testified that his vehicle was running at the
your vehicle? speed of 60 miles per hour. 11 He tried to correct himself when
asked by petitioner's counsel whether the panel truck
 15

speedometer indicated miles or kilometers by saying that the . . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental
speedometer measured kilometers and not miles, but on cross and emotional, were conducted on their
examination his testimony got muddled. 12 would-be employees. No on-the-job training
and seminars reminding employees, especially
Be that as it may, whether the driver meant 60 miles per hour drivers, of road courtesies and road rules and
(which could be 96.77 kilometers per hour) or 60 kilometers per regulations were done. There were no
hour, the fact remains that the panel truck was overspeeding instructions given to defendant's drivers as to
because the maximum allowable speed for truck and buses on how to react in cases of emergency nor what to
open country roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, do after an emergency occurs. There was even
Cavite, is only 50 kilometers per hour. 13 failure on the part of defendant to present its
concerned employee's 204 file. All these could
only mean failure on the part of defendant to
The case of Bayasen, which petitioner invokes, cannot apply to exercise the diligence required of it of a good
this case. There was no swerving of the vehicle in that case but father of a family in the selection and
skidding, and it was caused by the fact that the road was wet and supervision of its employees.
slippery. In this case, the road was dry and safe. There was no
reason for the vehicle to swerve because of road condition. The
only explanation for this occurrence was human error. Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
senses. 15 Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert
extra care in the selection and supervision of their
Petitioner's reliance on the McKee case is also misplaced. In that employees. They must go beyond the minimum
case, the driver of the vehicle at fault, a truck, had an requirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista,
opportunity to avoid the collision but he ignored the signals from the office manager of petitioner in its Dasmariñas plant,
the other vehicle, a car, to slow down and allow it to safely pass said that petitioner has a policy of requiring job
the bridge. In this case, there was no such opportunity given the applicants to submit clearances from the police and the
Cimarron on the night of the mishap. Everything happened so NBI. In the case of applicants for the position of driver
quickly that before the passengers of the Cimarron knew it, the they are required to have at least two (2) years driving
vehicle had been bumped by the truck. experience and to be holders of a professional driver's
license for at least two years. But the supposed company
Second. On its liability as employer of the negligent driver, policies on employment were not in writing. Nor did
petitioner contends that the non-submission of the NBI clearance Bautista show in what manner he supervised the drivers
and police clearance of its driver does not mean that it failed to to ensure that they drove their vehicles in a safe way.
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. It argues that there is Third. With respect to the question of damages, we find no
no law requiring employees to submit NBI and police clearance reversible error committed in the award of actual damages to
prior to their employment. Hence, petitioner's failure to require private respondents. To justify an award of actual damages,
submission of these documents does not mean that it did not there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss.
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported
employees. On the other hand, it asserts that its employment of by receipts. 16 Here, the actual damages claimed by private
Herman Hernandez as a driver means that he had passed the respondents were duly supported by receipts and appear to have
screening tests of the company, including submission of the been really incurred.
aforementioned documents. Petitioner maintains that the
presumption is that the said driver submitted NBI and police
clearance. As to the moral damages awarded, we find them to be reasonable
and necessary in view of the circumstances of this case. Moral
damages are awarded to allow the victims to obtain means,
Petitioner likewise contends that the Court of Appeal's position diversion, or amusement to alleviate the moral suffering they had
that it failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and undergone due to the defendant's culpable action. 17 In this case,
supervision of its employees by not requiring its prospective private respondents doubtless suffered some ordeal because some
employees to undergo psychological and physical tests before of them lost their loved ones, while others lost their future.
employment has no basis in law because there is no law requiring Within the meaning of Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, they suffered
such tests prior to hiring employees. sleepless night, mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded
feelings. An award of moral damages in their favor is thus
The petitioner's contention has no merit. The Court of Appeals justified.
did not say that petitioner's failure to submit NBI and police
clearances of its driver was proof that petitioner failed to exercise The award of P50,000,00 to the heirs of Jason Bernabe as death
due diligence in the selection of its employees. What the Court of indemnity is likewise in accordance with law. 18 However, the
Appeals said was that petitioner's policy of requiring prospective award of P100,000 to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy,
employees to submit NBI and police clearance and to have at denominated in the decision of the trial court as "moral damages
least two (2) years experience as driver prior to employment was and unearned income" cannot be upheld. The heirs were already
not enough to prove the exercise of due diligence and that even included among those awarded moral damages. Marilyn Salunoy
this policy petitioner failed to prove by its failure to present the was ordered to be paid P10,000, Jack Salunoy, P10,000, and their
driver's NBI and police records during the trial. mother Nenita Salunoy, P20,000, as moral damages. The amount
of P100,000 was presumably awarded primarily for loss of
With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and earning capacity but even then the amount must be modified. In
physical tests prior to his employment, although no law requires accordance with our cases 19 on this question, the formula for
it, such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of determining the life expectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be
the exercise of due diligence. As the trial court said: 14 determined by applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus
the age of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46 years of age at the
 16

time of his death, as stated in his death certificate, then his life SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
expectancy was 22.6 years, or up to 68 years old.
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated May 30, 2002 and
Next, his net earnings must be computed. At the time of his Resolution dated November 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
death. Dalmacio Salunoy was earning more than P900.00 a G.R. CV No. 57435, entitled "Sebastian M. Baking, plaintiff-
month as bookkeeper at the PMCI so that his annual gross appellee, versus Mercury Drug Co. Inc., defendant-appellant."
earning was about P11,000.00. From this amount, about 50%
should be deducted as reasonable and necessary living expenses The facts are:
because it seems his wife occasionally finds work and thus helps
in the household expenses. On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to
the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up.   On the following
Based on the foregoing, his net earning capacity was P124,300.00 day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology examinations
computed as follows: 20 and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that respondent's blood sugar and
triglyceride were above normal levels.   Dr. Sy then gave respondent
net earning life Gross reasonable & two medical prescriptions - Diamicron for his blood sugar and
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
capacity (x) = expectany x annual less Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation
necessary (Alabang Branch) to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the
saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription
income living for Dormicum.   Thus, what was sold to respondent was Dormicum,
a potent sleeping tablet.
expenses
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine,
respondent took one pill of Dormicum on three consecutive days -
x = [2 (80-46)] x [P11,000 - P5,500] November 6, 1993 at 9:00 p.m., November 7 at 6:00 a.m., and
November 8 at 7:30 a.m.
3
On November 8 or on the third day he took the medicine, respondent
= 22.6 x 5,500 figured in a vehicular accident.   The car he was driving collided with
the car of one Josie Peralta.   Respondent fell asleep while driving. 
He could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its
= P124,300.00 impact.

In addition, the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should be paid Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical
P50,000.00 as death indemnity. and mental state at the time of the collision, respondent returned to
Dr. Sy's clinic.   Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was
shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum,
Finally, the award of attorney's fees should be disallowed as the
instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
trial court did not give any justification for granting it in its
decision. It is now settled that awards of attorney's fees must be
Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
based on findings of fact and law, stated in the decision of the
Court (RTC), Branch 80 of Quezon City a complaint for damages
trial court. 21
against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20193.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision dated March 18,
MODIFIED in the sense that the award of P100,000.00 1997 in favor of respondent, thus:
denominated "for moral damages and unearned income" is
deleted, and in lieu thereof the amount of P124,300.00 for loss of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence,
earning capacity and the further amount of P50,000.00 for death
the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
indemnity are awarded to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy and the
against the defendant ordering the latter to pay mitigated damages as
award of P50,000.00 for attorney's fees is disallowed. In all other
follows:
respects the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
1. P250,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses;

******************************************
3. plus  ½% of the cost of the suit.

[ G.R. No. 156037, May 25, 2007 ]

SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed in toto the
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. RTC judgment. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
SEBASTIAN M. BAKING, RESPONDENT. was denied in a Resolution dated November 5, 2002.

DECISION Hence, this petition.

 17

Petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is not in states:
accord with law or prevailing jurisprudence.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the petition lacks merit not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
and, therefore, should be denied. for whom one is responsible.
The issues for our resolution are: x x x

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are

1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
negligence was the proximate cause of respondent's service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
accident; and occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees

2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorney's fees, and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
litigation expenses, and cost of the suit is justified. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: x x x

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage persons herein mentioned prove that they observed the diligence of a
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual good father of a family to prevent damage.
relation between the   parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for
by the provisions of this Chapter. the damages caused by the latter.   When an injury is caused by the
To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the
requisites must concur:  (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either
or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the such selection.   The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a
damage incurred by the plaintiff.[3] clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages. supervision of his employee.[6]   Here, petitioner's failure to prove that
it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily
public interest.   The health and safety of the people will be put into liable for damages caused by the latter.
jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree
of care and diligence in selling medicines.   Inasmuch as the matter of As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same to be in
negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of the trial order.   Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's
court affirmed by the Court of Appeals. wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
Obviously, petitioner's employee was grossly negligent in selling to besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to
Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. [7]
for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very
cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the award
the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by of moral damages when he testified that he suffered mental anguish
his physician.   The care required must be commensurate with the and anxiety as a result of the accident caused by the negligence of
danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the petitioner's employee.
superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. [4]
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be
respondent's negligence in driving his car. governed by its own peculiar facts.   However, it must be
commensurate to the loss or injury suffered. [8]   Taking into
We disagree. consideration the attending circumstances here, we are convinced that
the amount awarded by the trial court is exorbitant.  Thus, we reduce
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a the amount of moral damages from P250,000.00 to P50,000.00 only.
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred In addition, we also deem it necessary to award exemplary damages.
otherwise.   Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each Article 2229 allows the grant of exemplary damages by way of
case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, example or correction for the public good.   As mentioned earlier, the
and precedent.[5] drugstore business is affected with public interest.   Petitioner should
have exerted utmost diligence in the selection and supervision of its
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner's employees.   On the part of the employee concerned, she should have
employee been    careful in reading Dr. Sy's prescription.   Without been extremely cautious in dispensing pharmaceutical products.  Due
the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that to the sensitive nature of its business, petitioner must at all times
respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a maintain a high level of meticulousness.   Therefore, an award of
collision. exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is in order.

Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which On the matter of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled
that the reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in
 18

the decision of the court. [9]    Since the trial court's decision did not 2004 Decision affirmed the 27 July 2001 Decision 4 of the Regional
give the basis of the award, the same must be deleted.   In Vibram Trial Court (Branch 112) of Pasay City. The 15 November 2005
Manufacturing Corporation v. Manila Electric Company,[10] we held: Resolution modified the 28 October 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Likewise, the award for attorney's fees and litigation expenses should
be deleted. Well-enshrined is that "an award for attorney's fees must The Antecedent Facts
be stated in the text of the court�s decision and not in the
dispositive portion only" (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation On 2 April 1996, at around 6:45 p.m., the Twin Otter aircraft of
(Solidbank) v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 [1995] and Keng Philippine Airways Corporation (PAC) arrived at the Manila
Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 International Airport5 from El Nido, Palawan.6 In command of the
[1998]).  This is also true with the litigation expenses where the body aircraft was Ely B. Bungabong.7 With Bungabong in the cockpit was
of the decision discussed nothing for its basis. Michael F. Galvez as co-pilot.8
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.  The challenged Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57435
are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a) the award of Upon touchdown, the Twin Otter taxied along the runway and
moral damages to respondent is reduced from P250,000.00 to proceeded to the Soriano Hangar to disembark its passengers. 9 After
P50,000.00; (b) petitioner is likewise ordered to pay said respondent the last passenger disembarked, PAC’s pilots started the engine of the
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00; and (c) the award Twin Otter in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the
of attorney's fees and litigation expenses is deleted. other end of the airport.10 At around 7:18 p.m., Galvez contacted
ground control to ask for clearance to taxi to taxiway delta. 11 Rogelio
Costs against petitioner. Lim, ground traffic controller on duty at the Air Transportation
Office (ATO), issued the clearance on condition that he be contacted
SO ORDERED. again upon reaching taxiway delta intersection. 12

PAC’s pilots then proceeded to taxi to taxiway delta at about 7:19

****************************************** and 19 seconds.13 Upon reaching the intersection of taxiway delta,
Galvez repeated the request to taxi to taxiway delta, which request
was granted.14 Upon reaching fox 1, Galvez requested clearance to
G.R. No. 170414               August 25, 2010
make a right turn to fox 1 and to cross runway 13 in order to proceed
to fox 1 bravo.15 ATO granted the request. 16 At this point, the Twin
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, Otter was still 350 meters away from runway 13. 17 Upon reaching
vs. runway 13, PAC’s pilots did not make a full stop at the holding point
PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, ELY BUNGABONG, to request clearance right before crossing runway 13. 18 Without such
and MICHAEL GALVEZ, Respondents. clearance, PAC’s pilots proceeded to cross runway 13.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines’ (PAL) Boeing 737, manned by

pilots Rogelio Casiño and Ruel Isaac, was preparing for take-off
G.R. No. 170418 along runway 13. The PAL pilots requested clearance to push and
start19 on runway 13. Ernesto Linog, Jr., air traffic controller on duty
at the ATO issued the clearance. 20 Subsequently, at 7:20 and 18
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., ROGELIO CASIÑO, and seconds, Linog, Jr. gave PAL’s Boeing 737 clearance to take
RUEL ISAAC, Petitioners, off.21 Pilots Casiño and Isaac then proceeded with the take-off
vs. procedure.22 While already on take-off roll, Casiño caught a glimpse
PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, ELY BUNGABONG of the Twin Otter on the left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross
and MICHAEL GALVEZ, Respondents. runway 13.23

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x While the Twin Otter was halfway through runway 13, Galvez
noticed the Boeing 737 and told Bungabong that an airplane was
G.R. No. 170460 approaching them from the right side. 24 Bungabong then said, "Diyos
ko po" and gave full power to the Twin Otter. 25 The PAL pilots
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, DANILO ALZOLA, and attempted to abort the take-off by reversing the thrust of the
ERNESTO* LIM, Petitioners, aircraft.26 However, the Boeing 737 still collided with the Twin
vs. Otter.27
PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, ELY BUNGABONG,
and MICHAEL GALVEZ, Respondents, The Boeing 737 dragged the Twin Otter about 100 meters
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Intervenor. away.28 When the Twin Otter stopped, PAC’s pilots ran away from
the aircraft for fear it might explode. 29 While observing the Twin
DECISION Otter from a safe distance, they saw passengers running down from
the Boeing 737.30 When PAC’s pilots returned to the aircraft to get
their personal belongings, they saw that the Twin Otter was a total
CARPIO, J.: wreck.31

The Case At 7:21 and 2 seconds on that fateful evening, the PAL pilots
informed ATO’s control tower that they had hit another aircraft,
Before the Court are three consolidated petitions for review 1 of the 28 referring to the Twin Otter. 32 Bungabong suffered sprain on his
October 2004 Decision2 and the 15 November 2005 Resolution 3 of shoulder while Galvez had laceration on his left thumb. 33 An
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73214. The 28 October
 19

ambulance brought the two pilots to Makati Medical Center where The Court of Appeals gave weight to the 20 March 2003
they were treated for serious and slight physical injuries. 34 Decision39 on appeal of the RTC (Branch 108) of Pasay City in
Criminal Case No. 02-1979 acquitting Linog, Jr., who was convicted
On 7 May 1996, PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the Regional in the original Decision together with Alzola and Lim, of reckless
Trial Court (Branch 112) of Pasay City a complaint 35 for sum of imprudence resulting in damage to property with serious and slight
money and damages against PAL, Casiño, Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog, physical injuries in connection with the collision. Since Alzola and
Jr., and ATO’s traffic control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The Lim did not appeal, the judgment of conviction against them became
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as insurer of the final. Alzola and Lim were sentenced to arresto mayor or
Boeing 737 that figured in the collision, intervened. imprisonment for two (2) months.40

The Ruling of the Trial Court The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the trial court in the
criminal case has ruled that Linog, Jr. was not negligent, then the act
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In its 15
The trial court ruled that the proximate cause of the collision was the November 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals decreed:
negligence of Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., as ATO’s traffic control
supervisor, ground traffic controller, and air traffic controller,
respectively, at the time of the collision. The trial court further held WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the motions for
that the direct cause of the collision was the negligence of Casiño and reconsideration is MODIFIED in that the case against defendant-
Isaac, as the pilots of the Boeing 737 that collided with the Twin appellant ERNESTO LINOG, JR. is dismissed. The decision is
Otter. The decretal portion of the trial court’s decision reads: AFFIRMED in all other respects.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering SO ORDERED.41

defendants Philippine Air Lines and its pilots, Rogelio Casiño and
Ruel Isaac, and Air Transportation Office and its comptrollers, Hence, the instant consolidated petitions for review.
Danilo Alzola, Rogelio Lim and Ernesto Linog, Jr., jointly and
severally, to pay: In G.R. No. 170418, petitioners PAL, Casiño, and Isaac argue that
the Court of Appeals should have applied the emergency rule instead
a) Plaintiff Pacific Airways Corporation the amount of of the last clear chance doctrine. Petitioners claim that even if the
Php15,000,000.00 and the further amount of PAL pilots were negligent, PAL had exercised due diligence in the
Php100,000.00 a day from April 2, 1996 until it is fully selection and supervision of its pilots. Petitioners contend that the
reimbursed for the value of its RP-C1154 plane, as actual Court of Appeals awarded damages without any specific supporting
damages, and the amount of Php3,000,000.00, as proof as required by law. Petitioners also claim that the Court of
exemplary damages, and the amount of Php1,000,000.00, Appeals should have awarded their counterclaim for damages.
as and for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation;
In G.R. No. 170414, petitioner GSIS points out that PAC’s pilots
b) Plaintiffs Ely B. Bongabong36 and Michael F. Galvez, were the ones guilty of negligence as they violated the Rules of the
the amount of Php5,000.00 each, as actual damages; the Air, which provide that right of way belongs to the aircraft on take-
amount of Php500,000.00, as and for moral damages; off roll and the aircraft on the right side of another. GSIS stresses that
Php500,000.00 as and for exemplary damages, and the such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. GSIS posits
amount of Php50,000.00, as and for attorney’s fees; that PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez should be held solidarily liable to
pay GSIS the cost of repairing the insured aircraft.
c) Defendants are, likewise, ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, to plaintiffs the costs of this suit. In G.R. No. 170460, petitioners ATO, Alzola, and Lim call our
attention to the fact that PAC was a mere lessee, not the owner of the
SO ORDERED.37 Twin Otter. They argue that PAC, as mere lessee, was not the real
party-in-interest in the complaint seeking recovery for damages
sustained by the Twin Otter. Petitioners maintain that ground and air
PAL, Casiño, Isaac, GSIS, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., all traffic clearances were the joint responsibility of ATO and the pilots-
appealed the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals. in-command. Petitioners aver that Bungabong and Galvez were
negligent in asking for clearance to cross an active runway while still
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals 350 meters away from the runway. Petitioners claim that PAL had the
right of way and that PAC’s pilots had the last clear chance to
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not commit any prevent the collision.
reversible error. In its 28 October 2004 decision, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus: The Issue

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The The sole issue for resolution is who among the parties is liable for
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City dated negligence under the circumstances.
July 27, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
The Court’s Ruling
SO ORDERED.38
The petitions are meritorious.
PAL, Casiño, Isaac, GSIS, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., filed
their respective motions for reconsideration. The appellate court In a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be
denied for lack of merit all the motions for reconsideration except the raised. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions as when the
one filed by Linog, Jr. judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension
 20

of facts or the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts a position to determine if there was an aircraft on a take-off roll at the
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion. 42 runway. The collision would not have happened.

After thoroughly going over the evidence on record in this case, we ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr.
are unable to sustain the finding of fact and legal conclusion of the
Court of Appeals. The Rules of Air Control govern airplane traffic management and
clearance at the then Manila International Airport. It contains several
To ascertain who among the parties is liable for negligence, we must provisions indicating that airplane traffic management and clearance
refer to the applicable rules governing the specific traffic are not the sole responsibility of ATO and its traffic controllers, but
management of aircrafts at an airport. The Rules of the Air 43 of the of the pilots-in-command of aircrafts as well. The Rules of Air
Air Transportation Office apply to all aircrafts registered in the Control state:
Philippines.44 The Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter in this case were
both registered in the Philippines. Both are thus subject to the Rules 1.3 The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, whether
of the Air. In case of danger of collision between two aircrafts, the manipulating the controls or not, be responsible for the
Rules of the Air state: operation of the aircraft in accordance with the rules of the
air, except that he may depart from these rules in
2.2.4.7 Surface Movement of Aircraft. In case of danger of collision circumstances that render such departure absolutely
between two aircrafts taxiing on the maneuvering area of an necessary in the interest of safety. (Emphasis supplied)
aerodrome, the following shall apply:
1.5 The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall have final
a) When two aircrafts are approaching head on, or authority as to the disposition of the aircraft while he is
approximately so, each shall stop or where practicable, alter in command.51 (Emphasis supplied)
its course to the right so as to keep well clear.
3.1 Clearances are based solely on expediting and
b) When two aircrafts are on a converging course, the separating aircraft and do not constitute authority to
one which has the other on its right shall give violate any applicable regulations for promoting
way.45 (Emphasis supplied) safety of flight operations or for any other purpose.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, however, the Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter were not
both taxiing at the time of the collision. Only the Twin Otter was xxxx
taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on take-off roll. The Rules of
the Air provide: If an air traffic control clearance is not suitable to the pilot-in-
command of an aircraft, he may request, and, if practicable,
2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of an obtain an amended clearance. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
aerodrome shall give way to aircraft taking off or about to take
off.46 (Emphasis supplied) 10.1.5 Clearances issued by controllers relate to traffic and
aerodrome conditions only and do not relieve a pilot of any
Therefore, PAL’s aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, responsibility whatsoever in connection with a possible violation
not simply because it was on the right side of PAC’s aircraft, but of applicable rules and regulations.53 (Emphasis supplied)
more significantly, because it was "taking off or about to take off."
Therefore, even if ATO gave both PAL’s pilots and PAC’s pilots
PAC’s Pilots clearance to take off and clearance to cross runway 13, respectively,
it remained the primary responsibility of the pilots-in-command to
For disregarding PAL’s right of way, PAC’s pilots were grossly see to it that the respective clearances given were suitable. Since the
negligent. Gross negligence is one that is characterized by the want of pilots-in-command have the final authority as to the disposition of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is the aircraft, they cannot, in case a collision occurs, pass the blame to
a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a ATO for issuing clearances that turn out to be unsuitable.
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected.47 The clearance to cross runway 13, premature as it was, was not an
absolute license for PAC’s pilots to recklessly maneuver the Twin
We find it hard to believe that PAC’s pilots did not see the Boeing Otter across an active runway. PAC’s pilots should have stopped first
737 when they looked to the left and to the right before approaching at the holding point to ask for clearance to cross the active runway. It
the runway. It was a clear summer evening in April and the Boeing was wrong for them to have relied on a prematurely requested
737, only 200 meters away, had its inboard lights, outboard lights, clearance which was issued while they were still 350 meters away.
taxi lights, and logo lights on before and during the actual take-off Their defense, that it did not matter whether the clearance was
roll.48 The only plausible explanation why PAC’s pilots did not see premature or not as long as the clearance was actually granted, 54 only
the Boeing 737 was that they did not really look to the left and to the reveals their poor judgment and gross negligence in the performance
right before crossing the active runway. of their duties.

Records show that PAC’s pilots, while still 350 meters away, On the other hand, evidence on record shows that the air traffic
prematurely requested clearance to cross the active runway. 49 ATO controller properly issued the clearance to take off to the Boeing 737.
points out that PAC’s pilots should have made a full stop at the Nothing on record indicates any irregularity in the issuance of the
holding point to ask for updated clearance right before crossing the clearance. In fact, the trial court, in the criminal case for reckless
active runway.50 Had PAC’s pilots done so, ATO would by then be in imprudence resulting in damage to property with serious and slight
physical injuries in connection with the collision, ruled that air traffic
 21

controller Linog, Jr. was not negligent. The Court of Appeals, in its Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, 62 PAC and its pilots,
15 November 2005 Resolution, absolved Linog, Jr. of civil liability whose own gross negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
for damages based on his acquittal in the criminal case. of their own injuries, must bear the cost of such injuries. They cannot
recover damages. Civil Case No. 96-0565 for sum of money and
While Alzola and Lim, as found by the trial court in the criminal case damages, which PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed against PAL,
for reckless imprudence, may have been negligent in the performance Casiño, Isaac, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr. should have been
of their functions, such negligence is only contributory. 55 Their dismissed for lack of legal basis.
contributory negligence arises from their granting the premature
request of PAC’s pilots for clearance to cross runway 13 while the PAL’s Counterclaims
Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from runway 13. However, as
explained earlier, the granting of their premature request for We find supported by law and evidence on record PAL’s
clearance did not relieve PAC’s pilots from complying with the Rules counterclaim for actual or compensatory damages but only in the
of the Air. amount of US$548,819.9363 representing lease charges during the
period the Boeing 737 was not flying. The said amount cannot be
PAL’s Pilots claimed against the insurance policy covering the Boeing 737. In this
connection, the Civil Code provides:
Records show that PAL’s pilots timely requested clearance to take
off. Linog, Jr., ATO’s air traffic controller, duly issued the clearance Art. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured, and he has
to take off.56 Under the Rules of the Air, PAL’s aircraft being on received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss
take-off roll undisputedly had the right of way. 57 Further, the Rules of arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
Air Control provide: insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured
against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If
2.2.4.1 The aircraft that has the right of way shall maintain its the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover
heading and speed, x x x. 58 (Emphasis supplied) the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover
the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even if Casiño noticed from the corner of his eye a small
airplane taxiing on the left side and approaching halfway of fox 1, 59 it
was fairly reasonable for PAL’s pilots to assume that they may Under the law, GSIS, as insurer subrogee of PAL’s right to claim
proceed with the take-off because the taxiing aircraft would naturally actual or compensatory damages in connection with the repair of the
respect their right of way and not venture to cross the active runway damaged Boeing 737, is entitled to reimbursement for the amount it
while the Boeing 737 was on take-off roll. advanced. GSIS claims reimbursement for the amount of
US$2,775,366.84.64 In support of its claim, GSIS presented
statements of account, check vouchers, and invoices 65 proving
Applicable by analogy is the case of Santos v. BLTB,60 where the payment for the repair of the Boeing 737 in the total amount of
Court applied the principle that a motorist who is properly proceeding US$2,775,366.84. We find the claim fully supported by evidence on
on his own side of the highway, even after he sees an approaching record and thus we resolve to grant the same.
motorist coming toward him on the wrong side, is generally entitled
to assume that the other motorist will return to his proper lane of
traffic. With regard to PAL’s other counterclaims, settled is the rule that the
award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees is
discretionary based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
Proximate Cause actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the
injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable
After assiduously studying the records of this case and carefully levels.66 Understandably, Casiño and Isaac suffered sleepless nights
weighing the arguments of the parties, we are convinced that the and were temporarily unable to work after the collision. They are thus
immediate and proximate case of the collision is the gross negligence entitled to moral damages as well as exemplary damages considering
of PAC’s pilots. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in that PAC’s pilots acted with gross negligence. 67 Attorney’s fees are
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient generally not recoverable except when exemplary damages are
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result awarded68 as in this case. We thus deem the amounts of ₱100,000 in
would not have occurred.61 In this case, the fact that PAC’s pilots moral damages, ₱100,000 in exemplary damages, and ₱50,000 in
disregarded PAL’s right of way and did not ask for updated clearance attorney’s fees to be in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence and
right before crossing an active runway was the proximate cause of the appropriate given the circumstances.1avvph!1
collision. Were it not for such gross negligence on the part of PAC’s
pilots, the collision would not have happened. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. We SET ASIDE the 28
October 2004 Decision and the 15 November 2005 Resolution of the
The Civil Code provides that when a plaintiff’s own negligence is the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73214 affirming in toto the 27
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover July 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 112) of
damages. Pasay City. However, we SUSTAIN the dismissal of the case against
Ernesto Linog, Jr.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover Civil Case No. 96-0565 for sum of money and damages, filed by
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate Pacific Airways Corporation (PAC), Ely B. Bungabong, and Michael
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due F. Galvez, is DISMISSED for lack of legal basis.
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded. (Emphasis supplied) Pacific Airways Corporation, Ely B. Bungabong, and Michael F.
Galvez are ORDERED to solidarily pay:
 22

(1) Philippine Airlines, Inc. actual or compensatory At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle
damages in the amount of US$548,819.93; into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail
lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and
(2) Rogelio Casiño and Ruel Isaac individually moral truck helper Geraldino D.
damages in the amount of ₱100,000, exemplary damages in Lutelo 6 rushed him to the Parañaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at
the amount of ₱100,000, and attorney’s fees in the amount the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic
of ₱50,000; and Aguirre, 7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.

(3) the Government Service Insurance System, as insurer At the time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering
subrogee of Philippine Airlines, actual or compensatory Department, Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. He was 32 years
damages in the amount of US$2,775,366.84. old, had a life expectancy of sixty five (65) years, and an annual net
earnings of not less than seventy three thousand five hundred
(P73,500.00) pesos, 8 with a potential increase in annual net earnings
No pronouncement as to costs. of not less than ten percent (10%) of his salary. 9

SO ORDERED. On May 12, 1989, the heirs of the deceased demanded 10 from

respondents payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo
Raynera as a result of the vehicular accident. The respondents refused
to pay the claims.
******************************************
On September 13, 1989, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
CALALAS V. CA Court, Manila 11 a complaint12 for damages against respondents owner
and driver of the Isuzu truck.
******************************************
In their complaint against respondents, petitioners sought recovery of
G.R. No. 120027 April 21, 1999 damages for the death of Reynaldo Raynera caused by the negligent
operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail
lights.
EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors
RIANNA and REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners,
vs. In their answer filed on April 4, 1990, respondents alleged that the
FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents. truck was travelling slowly on the service road, not parked
improperly at a dark portion of the road, with no tail lights, license
plate and early warning device.
 

At the trial, petitioners presented Virgilio Santos. He testified that at

PARDO, J.: about 1.00 and 2:00 in the morning of March 23, 1989, he and his
wife went to Alabang, market, on board a tricycle. They passed by
The case is a petition for review certiorari of the decision of the the service road going south, and saw a parked truck trailer, with its
Court of Appeals, 1 reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch hood open and without tail lights. They would have bumped the truck
45, Manila. 2 but the tricycle driver was quick in avoiding a collision. The place
was dark, and the truck had no early warning device to alert passing
The rule is well-settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals motorists. 13
are generally considered final and may not be reviewed on appeal.
However, this principle admits of certain exceptions, among which is On the other hand, respondents presented truck helper Geraldino
when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the Lucelo. 14 He testified that at the time the incident happened, the
trial court, a re-examination of the facts and evidence may be truck was slowly traveling at approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per
undertaken. 3 This case falls under the cited exception. hour. Another employee of respondents, auto-mechanic Rogoberto
Reyes, 15 testified that at about 3:00 in the afternoon of March 22,
The antecedent facts are as follows: 1989, with the help of Lucelo, he installed two (2) pairs of red lights,
about 30 to 40 watts each, on both sides of the steel plates.  16 On his
part, traffic investigation officer Cpl. Virgilio del Monte 17 admitted
Petitioner Edna A. Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and that these lights were visible at a distance of 100 meters.
the mother and legal guardian of the minors Rianna and Reianne,
both surnamed Raynera. Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy
Orpilla were the owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck- On December 19, 1991, the trial court rendered decision in favor of
trailer with plate No. NXC 848, involved in the accident.1âwphi1.nêt petitioners. It found respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla
negligent in view of these circumstances: (1) the truck trailer had no
license plate and tail lights; (2) there were only two pairs of red
On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera lights, 50 watts 18 each, on both sides of the steel plates; and (3) the
was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the truck trailer was improperly parked in a dark area.
southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The
Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per
hour. 4 The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on The trial court held that respondents' negligence was the immediate
both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. and proximate cause of Reynaldo Raynera's death, for which they are
There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both jointly and severally liable to pay damages to petitioners. The trial
sides of the metal plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well lighted. court also held that the victim was himself negligent, although this
was insufficient to overcome respondents' negligence. The trial court
applied the doctrine of contributory negligence 19 and reduced the
 23

responsibility of respondents by 20% on account of the victim's own Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Reynaldo Raynera's
negligence. death was respondents' negligence in operating the truck trailer on the
highway without tail lights and license plate.
The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Court
All things considered, the Court is of the opinion of Appeals.
that it is fair and reasonable to fix the living and
other expenses of the deceased the sum of "Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
P54,000.00 a year or about P4,500.00 a month man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
(P150.00 p/d) and that, consequently, the loss or conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something,
damage sustained by the plaintiffs may be which a prudent and reasonable man would not do." 23
estimated at P1,674,000.00 for the 31 years of
Reynaldo Raynera's life expectancy. Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
Taking into account the cooperative negligence injury, and without which the result would not have occured." 24
of the deceased Reynaldo Raynera, the Court
believes that the demand of substantial justice are During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights.
satisfied by allocating the damages on 80-20 The photographs taken of the scene of the accident showed that there
ratio. Thus, P1,337,200.00 shall be paid by the were no tail lights of license plates installed on the Isuzu truck.
defendants with interest thereon, at the legal rate, Instead, what were installed were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the
from date of decision, as damages for the loss of steel plates, and one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck. With
earnings. To this sum, the following shall be regard to the rear of the truck, the photos taken and the sketch in the
added: spot report proved that there were no tail lights.

(a) Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck
P33,412. was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed,
00, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road,
actually instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a
spent for danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land
funeral Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25 respondents
services, installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's
interment cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.
and
memorial
lot; We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of
the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of
avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of
(b) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable
him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service
(c) cost of suit. road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the
highway.
SO ORDERED. 20
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of
On January 10, 1992, respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to the 50-watts bulbs were on top of the steel plates, 26 which were visible
Court of Appeals. 21 from a distance of 100 meters . 27 Virgilio Santos admitted that from
the tricycle where he was on board, he saw the truck and its cargo of
iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters. 28 In light of these
After due proceedings, on April 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals circumstances, an accident could have been easily avoided, unless the
rendered decision setting aside the appealed decision. The appellate victim had been driving too fast and did not exercise dues care and
court held that Reynaldo Raynera's bumping into the left rear portion prudence demanded of him under the circumstances.
of the truck was the proximate cause or his death, 22 and
consequently, absolved respondents from liability.
Virgilio Santos' testimony strengthened respondents' defense that it
was the victim who was reckless and negligent in driving his
Hence, this petitition for review on certiorari. motorcycle at high speed. The tricycle where Santos was on board
was not much different from the victim's motorcycle that figured in
In this petition, the heirs of Reynaldo Raynera contend that the the accident. Although Santos claimed the tricycle almost bumped
appellate court erred in: (1) overturning the trial court's finding that into the improperly parked truck, the tricycle driver was able to void
respondents' negligent operation of the Isuzu truck was the proximate hitting the truck.
cause of the victim's death; (2) applying the doctrine of last clear
chance; (3) setting aside the trial court's award of actual and It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of
compensatory damages. another vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless
contradicted by other evidence". 29 The rationale behind the
The issues presented are (a) whether respondents were negligent, and presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of
if so, (b) whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of
death of Reynaldo Raynera. him.
 24

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid credit card and asked Pantaleon to sign the charge slip, which was
the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear then electronically referred to AMEX’s Amsterdam office at 9:20
vehicle. a.m.5

Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself At around 9:40 a.m., Coster had not received approval from AMEX
since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the for the purchase so Pantaleon asked the store clerk to cancel the sale.
Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident. The store manager, however, convinced Pantaleon to wait a few more
minutes. Subsequently, the store manager informed Pantaleon that
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari and AMEX was asking for bank references; Pantaleon responded by
AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. giving the names of his Philippine depository banks.
35895, dismissing the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-
50355, Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila.1âwphi1.nêt At around 10 a.m., or 45 minutes after Pantaleon presented his credit
card, AMEX still had not approved the purchase. Since the city tour
No costs. could not begin until the Pantaleons were onboard the tour bus,
Coster decided to release at around 10:05 a.m. the purchased items to
Pantaleon even without AMEX’s approval.
SO ORDERED.
When the Pantaleons finally returned to the tour bus, they found their
travel companions visibly irritated. This irritation intensified when
the tour guide announced that they would have to cancel the tour
****************************************** because of lack of time as they all had to be in Calais, Belgium by 3
p.m. to catch the ferry to London.6
G.R. No. 174269               August 25, 2010
From the records, it appears that after Pantaleon’s purchase was
POLO S. PANTALEON, Petitioner, transmitted for approval to AMEX’s Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m.;
vs. was referred to AMEX’s Manila office at 9:33 a.m.; and was
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent. approved by the Manila office at 10:19 a.m. At 10:38 a.m., AMEX’s
Manila office finally transmitted the Approval Code to AMEX’s
Amsterdam office. In all, it took AMEX a total of 78 minutes to
RESOLUTION approve Pantaleon’s purchase and to transmit the approval to the
jewelry store.7
BRION, J.:
After the trip to Europe, the Pantaleon family proceeded to the United
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent States. Again, Pantaleon experienced delay in securing approval for
American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) dated June 8, purchases using his American Express credit card on two separate
2009,1 seeking to reverse our Decision dated May 8, 2009 where we occasions. He experienced the first delay when he wanted to purchase
ruled that AMEX was guilty of culpable delay in fulfilling its golf equipment in the amount of US$1,475.00 at the Richard Metz
obligation to its cardholder –petitioner Polo Pantaleon. Based on this Golf Studio in New York on October 30, 1991. Another delay
conclusion, we held AMEX liable for moral and exemplary damages, occurred when he wanted to purchase children’s shoes worth
as well as attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. 2 US$87.00 at the Quiency Market in Boston on November 3, 1991.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS Upon return to Manila, Pantaleon sent AMEX a letter demanding an
apology for the humiliation and inconvenience he and his family
The established antecedents of the case are narrated below. experienced due to the delays in obtaining approval for his credit card
purchases. AMEX responded by explaining that the delay in
Amsterdam was due to the amount involved – the charged purchase
AMEX is a resident foreign corporation engaged in the business of of US$13,826.00 deviated from Pantaleon’s established charge
providing credit services through the operation of a charge card purchase pattern. Dissatisfied with this explanation, Pantaleon filed
system. Pantaleon has been an AMEX cardholder since 1980. 3 an action for damages against the credit card company with the
Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In October 1991, Pantaleon, together with his wife (Julialinda),
daughter (Regina), and son (Adrian Roberto), went on a guided On August 5, 1996, the RTC found AMEX guilty of delay, and
European tour. On October 25, 1991, the tour group arrived in awarded Pantaleon ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱300,000.00 as
Amsterdam. Due to their late arrival, they postponed the tour of the exemplary damages, ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱85,233.01
city for the following day.4 as litigation expenses.

The next day, the group began their sightseeing at around 8:50 a.m. On appeal, the CA reversed the awards. 8 While the CA recognized
with a trip to the Coster Diamond House (Coster). To have enough that delay in the nature of mora accipiendi or creditor’s default
time for take a guided city tour of Amsterdam before their departure attended AMEX’s approval of Pantaleon’s purchases, it disagreed
scheduled on that day, the tour group planned to leave Coster by 9:30 with the RTC’s finding that AMEX had breached its contract, noting
a.m. at the latest. that the delay was not attended by bad faith, malice or gross
negligence. The appellate court found that AMEX exercised diligent
While at Coster, Mrs. Pantaleon decided to purchase some diamond efforts to effect the approval of Pantaleon’s purchases; the purchase
pieces worth a total of US$13,826.00. Pantaleon presented his at Coster posed particularly a problem because it was at variance with
American Express credit card to the sales clerk to pay for this Pantaleon’s established charge pattern. As there was no proof that
purchase. He did this at around 9:15 a.m. The sales clerk swiped the AMEX breached its contract, or that it acted in a wanton, fraudulent
 25

or malevolent manner, the appellate court ruled that AMEX could not delay from the consequences of delay; thus, even if AMEX had a
be held liable for any form of damages. justifiable reason for the delay, this reason would not relieve it from
the liability arising from its failure to timely act on Pantaleon’s
Pantaleon questioned this decision via a petition for review on purchase.
certiorari with this Court.
In response to AMEX’s assertion that the delay was in keeping with
In our May 8, 2009 decision, we reversed the appellate court’s its duty to perform its obligation with extraordinary diligence,
decision and held that AMEX was guilty of mora solvendi, or Pantaleon claims that this duty includes the timely or prompt
debtor’s default. AMEX, as debtor, had an obligation as the credit performance of its obligation.
provider to act on Pantaleon’s purchase requests, whether to approve
or disapprove them, with "timely dispatch." Based on the evidence on As to AMEX’s contention that moral or exemplary damages cannot
record, we found that AMEX failed to timely act on Pantaleon’s be awarded absent a finding of malice, Pantaleon argues that evil
purchases. motive or design is not always necessary to support a finding of bad
faith; gross negligence or wanton disregard of contractual obligations
Based one ly, tual obligations. 271,ct; moral damages le. uitable that is sufficient basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages.
attorney'workers;plaitniff' the testimony of AMEX’s credit authorizer
Edgardo Jaurique, the approval time for credit card charges would be OUR RULING
three to four seconds under regular circumstances. In Pantaleon’s
case, it took AMEX 78 minutes to approve the Amsterdam purchase. We GRANT the motion for reconsideration.
We attributed this delay to AMEX’s Manila credit authorizer,
Edgardo Jaurique, who had to go over Pantaleon’s past credit history,
his payment record and his credit and bank references before he Brief historical background
approved the purchase. Finding this delay unwarranted, we reinstated
the RTC decision and awarded Pantaleon moral and exemplary A credit card is defined as "any card, plate, coupon book, or other
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, goods,
property, labor or services or anything of value on credit." 9 It traces
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION its roots to the charge card first introduced by the Diners Club in New
York City in 1950.10 American Express followed suit by introducing
its own charge card to the American market in 1958. 11
In its motion for reconsideration, AMEX argues that this Court erred
when it found AMEX guilty of culpable delay in complying with its
obligation to act with timely dispatch on Pantaleon’s purchases. In the Philippines, the now defunct Pacific Bank was responsible for
While AMEX admits that it normally takes seconds to approve bringing the first credit card into the country in the 1970s. 12 However,
charge purchases, it emphasizes that Pantaleon experienced delay in it was only in the early 2000s that credit card use gained wide
Amsterdam because his transaction was not a normal one. To recall, acceptance in the country, as evidenced by the surge in the number of
Pantaleon sought to charge in a single transaction jewelry items credit card holders then.13
purchased from Coster in the total amount of US$13,826.00 or
₱383,746.16. While the total amount of Pantaleon’s previous Nature of Credit Card Transactions
purchases using his AMEX credit card did exceed US$13,826.00,
AMEX points out that these purchases were made in a span of more To better understand the dynamics involved in credit card
than 10 years, not in a single transaction. transactions, we turn to the United States case of Harris Trust &
Savings Bank v. McCray14 which explains:
Because this was the biggest single transaction that Pantaleon ever
made using his AMEX credit card, AMEX argues that the transaction The bank credit card system involves a tripartite relationship between
necessarily required the credit authorizer to carefully review the issuer bank, the cardholder, and merchants participating in the
Pantaleon’s credit history and bank references. AMEX maintains that system. The issuer bank establishes an account on behalf of the
it did this not only to ensure Pantaleon’s protection (to minimize the person to whom the card is issued, and the two parties enter into an
possibility that a third party was fraudulently using his credit card), agreement which governs their relationship. This agreement provides
but also to protect itself from the risk that Pantaleon might not be that the bank will pay for cardholder’s account the amount of
able to pay for his purchases on credit. This careful review, according merchandise or services purchased through the use of the credit card
to AMEX, is also in keeping with the extraordinary degree of and will also make cash loans available to the cardholder. It also
diligence required of banks in handling its transactions. AMEX states that the cardholder shall be liable to the bank for advances and
concluded that in these lights, the thorough review of Pantaleon’s payments made by the bank and that the cardholder’s obligation to
credit record was motivated by legitimate concerns and could not be pay the bank shall not be affected or impaired by any dispute, claim,
evidence of any ill will, fraud, or negligence by AMEX. or demand by the cardholder with respect to any merchandise or
service purchased.
AMEX further points out that the proximate cause of Pantaleon’s
humiliation and embarrassment was his own decision to proceed with The merchants participating in the system agree to honor the bank’s
the purchase despite his awareness that the tour group was waiting credit cards. The bank irrevocably agrees to honor and pay the sales
for him and his wife. Pantaleon could have prevented the humiliation slips presented by the merchant if the merchant performs his
had he cancelled the sale when he noticed that the credit approval for undertakings such as checking the list of revoked cards before
the Coster purchase was unusually delayed. accepting the card. x x x.

In his Comment dated February 24, 2010, Pantaleon maintains that These slips are forwarded to the member bank which originally
AMEX was guilty of mora solvendi, or delay on the part of the issued the card. The cardholder receives a statement from the bank
debtor, in complying with its obligation to him. Based on periodically and may then decide whether to make payment to the
jurisprudence, a just cause for delay does not relieve the debtor in
 26

bank in full within a specified period, free of interest, or to defer holder. Unlike in the Novack and the City Stores cases, however, the
payment and ultimately incur an interest charge. cardholder in Gray paid an annual fee for the privilege of being an
American Express cardholder.
We adopted a similar view in CIR v. American Express International,
Inc. (Philippine branch),15 where we also recognized that credit card In our jurisdiction, we generally adhere to the Gray ruling,
issuers are not limited to banks. We said: recognizing the relationship between the credit card issuer and the
credit card holder as a contractual one that is governed by the terms
Under RA 8484, the credit card that is issued by banks in general, or and conditions found in the card membership agreement. 21 This
by non-banks in particular, refers to "any card x x x or other credit contract provides the rights and liabilities of a credit card company to
device existing for the purpose of obtaining x x x goods x x x or its cardholders and vice versa.
services x x x on credit;" and is being used "usually on a revolving
basis." This means that the consumer-credit arrangement that exists We note that a card membership agreement is a contract of adhesion
between the issuer and the holder of the credit card enables the latter as its terms are prepared solely by the credit card issuer, with the
to procure goods or services "on a continuing basis as long as the cardholder merely affixing his signature signifying his adhesion to
outstanding balance does not exceed a specified limit." The card these terms.22 This circumstance, however, does not render the
holder is, therefore, given "the power to obtain present control of agreement void; we have uniformly held that contracts of adhesion
goods or service on a promise to pay for them in the future." are "as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party
who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely." 23 The only
Business establishments may extend credit sales through the use of effect is that the terms of the contract are construed strictly against
the credit card facilities of a non-bank credit card company to avoid the party who drafted it.24
the risk of uncollectible accounts from their customers. Under this
system, the establishments do not deposit in their bank accounts the On AMEX’s obligations to Pantaleon
credit card drafts that arise from the credit sales. Instead, they merely
record their receivables from the credit card company and We begin by identifying the two privileges that Pantaleon assumes he
periodically send the drafts evidencing those receivables to the latter. is entitled to with the issuance of his AMEX credit card, and on
which he anchors his claims. First, Pantaleon presumes that since his
The credit card company, in turn, sends checks as payment to these credit card has no pre-set spending limit, AMEX has the obligation to
business establishments, but it does not redeem the drafts at full approve all his charge requests. Conversely, even if AMEX has no
price. The agreement between them usually provides for discounts to such obligation, at the very least it is obliged to act on his charge
be taken by the company upon its redemption of the drafts. At the end requests within a specific period of time.
of each month, it then bills its credit card holders for their respective
drafts redeemed during the previous month. If the holders fail to pay i. Use of credit card a mere offer to enter into loan agreements
the amounts owed, the company sustains the loss.
Although we recognize the existence of a relationship between the
Simply put, every credit card transaction involves three contracts, credit card issuer and the credit card holder upon the acceptance by
namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder and the the cardholder of the terms of the card membership agreement
merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit (customarily signified by the act of the cardholder in signing the back
card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the of the credit card), we have to distinguish this contractual relationship
credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the from the creditor-debtor relationship which only arises after the credit
credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment. 16 card issuer has approved the cardholder’s purchase request. The first
relates merely to an agreement providing for credit facility to the
Credit card issuer – cardholder relationship cardholder. The latter involves the actual credit on loan agreement
involving three contracts, namely: the sales contract between the
When a credit card company gives the holder the privilege of credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment
charging items at establishments associated with the issuer, 17 a which accepted the credit card; the loan agreement between the credit
necessary question in a legal analysis is – when does this relationship card issuer and the credit card holder; and the promise to pay between
begin? There are two diverging views on the matter. In City Stores the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment.
Co. v. Henderson,18 another U.S. decision, held that:
From the loan agreement perspective, the contractual relationship
The issuance of a credit card is but an offer to extend a line of open begins to exist only upon the meeting of the offer 25 and acceptance of
account credit. It is unilateral and supported by no consideration. The the parties involved. In more concrete terms, when cardholders use
offer may be withdrawn at any time, without prior notice, for any their credit cards to pay for their purchases, they merely offer to enter
reason or, indeed, for no reason at all, and its withdrawal breaches no into loan agreements with the credit card company. Only after the
duty – for there is no duty to continue it – and violates no rights. latter approves the purchase requests that the parties enter into
binding loan contracts, in keeping with Article 1319 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Thus, under this view, each credit card transaction is considered a
separate offer and acceptance.
Article 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and
the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute
Novack v. Cities Service Oil Co.  echoed this view, with the court
19
the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A
ruling that the mere issuance of a credit card did not create a qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
contractual relationship with the cardholder.
This view finds support in the reservation found in the card
On the other end of the spectrum is Gray v. American Express membership agreement itself, particularly paragraph 10, which
Company20 which recognized the card membership agreement itself clearly states that AMEX "reserve[s] the right to deny
as a binding contract between the credit card issuer and the card authorization for any requested Charge." By so providing, AMEX
 27

made its position clear that it has no obligation to approve any and all We originally held that AMEX was in culpable delay when it acted
charge requests made by its card holders. on the Coster transaction, as well as the two other transactions in the
United States which took AMEX approximately 15 to 20 minutes to
ii. AMEX not guilty of culpable delay approve. This conclusion appears valid and reasonable at first glance,
comparing the time it took to finally get the Coster purchase
approved (a total of 78 minutes), to AMEX’s "normal" approval time
Since AMEX has no obligation to approve the purchase requests of of three to four seconds (based on the testimony of Edgardo Jaurigue,
its credit cardholders, Pantaleon cannot claim that AMEX defaulted as well as Pantaleon’s previous experience). We come to a different
in its obligation. Article 1169 of the Civil Code, which provides the result, however, after a closer look at the factual and legal
requisites to hold a debtor guilty of culpable delay, states: circumstances of the case.

Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in AMEX’s credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, explained that having
delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands no pre-set spending limit in a credit card simply means that the
from them the fulfillment of their obligation. x x x. charges made by the cardholder are approved based on his ability to
pay, as demonstrated by his past spending, payment patterns, and
The three requisites for a finding of default are: (a) that the obligation personal resources.29 Nevertheless, every time Pantaleon charges a
is demandable and liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and purchase on his credit card, the credit card company still has to
(c) the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor’s determine whether it will allow this charge, based on his past
performance.26 credit history. This right to review a card holder’s credit history,
although not specifically set out in the card membership agreement,
Based on the above, the first requisite is no longer met because is a necessary implication of AMEX’s right to deny authorization for
AMEX, by the express terms of the credit card agreement, is not any requested charge.
obligated to approve Pantaleon’s purchase request. Without a
demandable obligation, there can be no finding of default. As for Pantaleon’s previous experiences with AMEX (i.e., that in the
past 12 years, AMEX has always approved his charge requests in
Apart from the lack of any demandable obligation, we also find that three or four seconds), this record does not establish that Pantaleon
Pantaleon failed to make the demand required by Article 1169 of the had a legally enforceable obligation to expect AMEX to act on his
Civil Code. charge requests within a matter of seconds. For one, Pantaleon failed
to present any evidence to support his assertion that AMEX acted on
purchase requests in a matter of three or four seconds as an
As previously established, the use of a credit card to pay for a established practice. More importantly, even if Pantaleon did prove
purchase is only an offer to the credit card company to enter a loan that AMEX, as a matter of practice or custom, acted on its customers’
agreement with the credit card holder. Before the credit card issuer purchase requests in a matter of seconds, this would still not be
accepts this offer, no obligation relating to the loan agreement enough to establish a legally demandable right; as a general rule, a
exists between them. On the other hand, a demand is defined as the practice or custom is not a source of a legally demandable or
"assertion of a legal right; xxx an asking with authority, claiming or enforceable right.30
challenging as due."27 A demand presupposes the existence of an
obligation between the parties.
We next examine the credit card membership agreement, the contract
that primarily governs the relationship between AMEX and
Thus, every time that Pantaleon used his AMEX credit card to pay Pantaleon. Significantly, there is no provision in this agreement
for his purchases, what the stores transmitted to AMEX were his that obligates AMEX to act on all cardholder purchase requests
offers to execute loan contracts. These obviously could not be within a specifically defined period of time. Thus, regardless of
classified as the demand required by law to make the debtor in whether the obligation is worded was to "act in a matter of seconds"
default, given that no obligation could arise on the part of AMEX or to "act in timely dispatch," the fact remains that no obligation
until after AMEX transmitted its acceptance of Pantaleon’s offers. exists on the part of AMEX to act within a specific period of time.
Pantaleon’s act of "insisting on and waiting for the charge purchases Even Pantaleon admits in his testimony that he could not recall any
to be approved by AMEX"28 is not the demand contemplated by provision in the Agreement that guaranteed AMEX’s approval of his
Article 1169 of the Civil Code. charge requests within a matter of minutes. 31

For failing to comply with the requisites of Article 1169, Pantaleon’s Nor can Pantaleon look to the law or government issuances as the
charge that AMEX is guilty of culpable delay in approving his source of AMEX’s alleged obligation to act upon his credit card
purchase requests must fail. purchases within a matter of seconds. As the following survey of
Philippine law on credit card transactions demonstrates, the State
iii. On AMEX’s obligation to act on the offer within a specific does not require credit card companies to act upon its cardholders’
period of time purchase requests within a specific period of time.

Even assuming that AMEX had the right to review his credit card Republic Act No. 8484 (RA 8484), or the Access Devices Regulation
history before it approved his purchase requests, Pantaleon insists Act of 1998, approved on February 11, 1998, is the controlling
that AMEX had an obligation to act on his purchase requests, either legislation that regulates the issuance and use of access
to approve or deny, in "a matter of seconds" or "in timely dispatch." devices,32 including credit cards. The more salient portions of this law
Pantaleon impresses upon us the existence of this obligation by include the imposition of the obligation on a credit card company to
emphasizing two points: (a) his card has no pre-set spending limit; disclose certain important financial information 33 to credit card
and (b) in his twelve years of using his AMEX card, AMEX had applicants, as well as a definition of the acts that constitute access
always approved his charges in a matter of seconds. device fraud.

Pantaleon’s assertions fail to convince us. As financial institutions engaged in the business of providing credit,
credit card companies fall under the supervisory powers of the
 28

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). 34 BSP Circular No. 398 dated [Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
August 21, 2003 embodies the BSP’s policy when it comes to credit principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
cards – observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) shall foster the development with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
of consumer credit through innovative products such as credit cards good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on
under conditions of fair and sound consumer credit practices. The all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
BSP likewise encourages competition and transparency to ensure in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
more efficient delivery of services and fair dealings with customers. because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
(Emphasis supplied) become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in
a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
Based on this Circular, "x x x [b]efore issuing credit cards, banks thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
and/or their subsidiary credit card companies must exercise proper responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
diligence by ascertaining that applicants possess good credit standing government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
and are financially capable of fulfilling their credit order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
commitments."35 As the above-quoted policy expressly states, the action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
general intent is to foster "fair and sound consumer credit practices." proper.

Other than BSP Circular No. 398, a related circular is BSP Circular In the context of a credit card relationship, although there is neither a
No. 454, issued on September 24, 2004, but this circular merely contractual stipulation nor a specific law requiring the credit card
enumerates the unfair collection practices of credit card companies – issuer to act on the credit card holder’s offer within a definite period
a matter not relevant to the issue at hand. of time, these principles provide the standard by which to judge
AMEX’s actions.
In light of the foregoing, we find and so hold that AMEX is neither
contractually bound nor legally obligated to act on its cardholders’ According to Pantaleon, even if AMEX did have a right to review his
purchase requests within any specific period of time, much less a charge purchases, it abused this right when it unreasonably delayed
period of a "matter of seconds" that Pantaleon uses as his standard. the processing of the Coster charge purchase, as well as his purchase
The standard therefore is implicit and, as in all contracts, must be requests at the Richard Metz’ Golf Studio and Kids’ Unlimited Store;
based on fairness and reasonableness, read in relation to the Civil AMEX should have known that its failure to act immediately on
Code provisions on human relations, as will be discussed below. charge referrals would entail inconvenience and result in humiliation,
embarrassment, anxiety and distress to its cardholders who would be
AMEX acted with good faith required to wait before closing their transactions. 39

Thus far, we have already established that: (a) AMEX had neither a It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good faith is presumed
contractual nor a legal obligation to act upon Pantaleon’s purchases and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging
within a specific period of time; and (b) AMEX has a right to review it.40 Although it took AMEX some time before it approved
a cardholder’s credit card history. Our recognition of these Pantaleon’s three charge requests, we find no evidence to suggest that
entitlements, however, does not give AMEX an unlimited right to it acted with deliberate intent to cause Pantaleon any loss or injury, or
put off action on cardholders’ purchase requests for indefinite acted in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or
periods of time. In acting on cardholders’ purchase requests, AMEX public policy. We give credence to AMEX’s claim that its review
must take care not to abuse its rights and cause injury to its clients procedure was done to ensure Pantaleon’s own protection as a
and/or third persons. We cite in this regard Article 19, in conjunction cardholder and to prevent the possibility that the credit card was
with Article 21, of the Civil Code, which provide: being fraudulently used by a third person.

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the Pantaleon countered that this review procedure is primarily intended
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and to protect AMEX’s interests, to make sure that the cardholder making
observe honesty and good faith. the purchase has enough means to pay for the credit extended. Even
if this were the case, however, we do not find any taint of bad faith in
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another such motive. It is but natural for AMEX to want to ensure that it will
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy extend credit only to people who will have sufficient means to pay
shall compensate the latter for the damage. for their purchases. AMEX, after all, is running a business, not a
charity, and it would simply be ludicrous to suggest that it would not
want to earn profit for its services. Thus, so long as AMEX exercises
Article 19 pervades the entire legal system and ensures that a person its rights, performs its obligations, and generally acts with good faith,
suffering damage in the course of another’s exercise of right or with no intent to cause harm, even if it may occasionally
performance of duty, should find himself without relief. 36 It sets the inconvenience others, it cannot be held liable for damages.
standard for the conduct of all persons, whether artificial or natural,
and requires that everyone, in the exercise of rights and the
performance of obligations, must: (a) act with justice, (b) give We also cannot turn a blind eye to the circumstances surrounding the
everyone his due, and (c) observe honesty and good faith. It is not Coster transaction which, in our opinion, justified the wait. In
because a person invokes his rights that he can do anything, even to Edgardo Jaurigue’s own words:
the prejudice and disadvantage of another.37
Q 21: With reference to the transaction at the Coster
While Article 19 enumerates the standards of conduct, Article 21 Diamond House covered by Exhibit H, also Exhibit 4 for
provides the remedy for the person injured by the willful act, an the defendant, the approval came at 2:19 a.m. after the
action for damages. We explained how these two provisions correlate request was relayed at 1:33 a.m., can you explain why the
with each other in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:38 approval came after about 46 minutes, more or less?
 29

A21: Because we have to make certain considerations and In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 45 we ruled that a person who
evaluations of [Pantaleon’s] past spending pattern with knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim
[AMEX] at that time before approving plaintiff’s request damages for the resulting injury:
because [Pantaleon] was at that time making his very first
single charge purchase of US$13,826 [this is below the The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is
US$16,112.58 actually billed and paid for by the plaintiff not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
because the difference was already automatically approved consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one
by [AMEX] office in Netherland[s] and the record of who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
[Pantaleon’s] past spending with [AMEX] at that time if he is not negligent in doing so.
does not favorably support his ability to pay for such
purchase. In fact, if the foregoing internal policy of
[AMEX] had been strictly followed, the transaction would This doctrine, in our view, is wholly applicable to this case.
not have been approved at all considering that the past Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic rule when travelling in
spending pattern of the plaintiff with [AMEX] at that time a tour group is that you must never be a cause of any delay because
does not support his ability to pay for such purchase.41 the schedule is very strict. 46 When Pantaleon made up his mind to
push through with his purchase, he must have known that the group
would become annoyed and irritated with him. This was the natural,
xxxx foreseeable consequence of his decision to make them all wait.

Q: Why did it take so long? We do not discount the fact that Pantaleon and his family did feel
humiliated and embarrassed when they had to wait for AMEX to
A: It took time to review the account on credit, so, if there approve the Coster purchase in Amsterdam. We have to
is any delinquencies [sic] of the cardmember. There are acknowledge, however, that Pantaleon was not a helpless victim in
factors on deciding the charge itself which are standard this scenario – at any time, he could have cancelled the sale so that
measures in approving the authorization. Now in the case the group could go on with the city tour. But he did not.
of Mr. Pantaleon although his account is single charge
purchase of US$13,826. [sic] this is below the US$16,000. More importantly, AMEX did not violate any legal duty to Pantaleon
plus actually billed x x x we would have already declined under the circumstances under the principle of damnum absque
the charge outright and asked him his bank account to injuria, or damages without legal wrong, loss without injury. 47 As we
support his charge. But due to the length of his membership held in BPI Express Card v. CA:48
as cardholder we had to make a decision on hand. 42
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private
As Edgardo Jaurigue clarified, the reason why Pantaleon had to wait respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his
for AMEX’s approval was because he had to go over Pantaleon’s credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages
credit card history for the past twelve months. 43 It would certainly be and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
unjust for us to penalize AMEX for merely exercising its right to loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
review Pantaleon’s credit history meticulously. recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
Finally, we said in Garciano v. Court of Appeals that "the right to loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such
recover [moral damages] under Article 21 is based on equity, and he cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone,
who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which
Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault." 44 As called damnum absque injuria.
will be discussed below, Pantaleon is not a blameless party in all this.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
Pantaleon’s action was the proximate cause for his injury injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
Pantaleon mainly anchors his claim for moral and exemplary plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
damages on the embarrassment and humiliation that he felt when the responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
European tour group had to wait for him and his wife for award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
approximately 35 minutes, and eventually had to cancel the contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty
Amsterdam city tour. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be
case, we have come to the conclusion that Pantaleon is the proximate awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause
cause for this embarrassment and humiliation. of the injury.

As borne by the records, Pantaleon knew even before entering Coster Pantaleon is not entitled to damages
that the tour group would have to leave the store by 9:30 a.m. to have
enough time to take the city tour of Amsterdam before they left the Because AMEX neither breached its contract with Pantaleon, nor
country. After 9:30 a.m., Pantaleon’s son, who had boarded the bus acted with culpable delay or the willful intent to cause harm, we find
ahead of his family, returned to the store to inform his family that the award of moral damages to Pantaleon unwarranted.
they were the only ones not on the bus and that the entire tour group
was waiting for them. Significantly, Pantaleon tried to cancel the sale Similarly, we find no basis to award exemplary damages. In
at 9:40 a.m. because he did not want to cause any inconvenience to contracts, exemplary damages can only be awarded if a defendant
the tour group. However, when Coster’s sale manager asked him to acted "in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
wait a few more minutes for the credit card approval, he agreed, manner."49 The plaintiff must also show that he is entitled to moral,
despite the knowledge that he had already caused a 10-minute delay temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may consider
and that the city tour could not start without him.
 30

the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be the opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres
awarded.50 Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction.
When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado were thrown
As previously discussed, it took AMEX some time to approve from the motorcycle.  Catubig died on the spot where he was thrown,
Pantaleon’s purchase requests because it had legitimate concerns on while Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital.
the amount being charged; no malicious intent was ever established
here. In the absence of any other damages, the award of exemplary On February 1, 1994, Cabanilla was charged with reckless
damages clearly lacks legal basis.1avvphi1 imprudence resulting in double homicide in Criminal Case No. M-15-
94 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Manjuyod-
Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of Negros Oriental.  After
Neither do we find any basis for the award of attorney’s fees and preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a Resolution on
costs of litigation. No premium should be placed on the right to December 22, 1994, dismissing the criminal charge against
litigate and not every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant Cabanilla.  It found that Cabanilla was not criminally liable for the
of attorney's fees.51 To be entitled to attorney’s fees and litigation deaths of Catubig and Emperado, because there was no negligence,
costs, a party must show that he falls under one of the instances not even contributory, on Cabanilla's part.
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 52 This, Pantaleon failed
to do. Since we eliminated the award of moral and exemplary Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC on July 19, 1995 a
damages, so must we delete the award for attorney's fees and Complaint for Damages against petitioner, seeking actual, moral, and
litigation expenses. exemplary damages, in the total amount of P484,000.00, for the death
of her husband, Catubig, based on Article 2180, in relation to Article
Lastly, although we affirm the result of the CA decision, we do so for 2176, of the Civil Code.  Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly
the reasons stated in this Resolution and not for those found in the liable because the latter's employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless
CA decision. and negligent in driving the bus which collided with Catubig's
motorcycle.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we SET ASIDE our May 8,
2009 Decision and GRANT the present motion for reconsideration. Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that the
The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 18, 2006 is proximate cause of the vehicular collision, which resulted in the
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was the sole negligence of Catubig
when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and
traversed the opposite lane of the road.  As a special and affirmative
SO ORDERED. defense, petitioner asked for the dismissal of respondent's complaint
for not being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of action, as
there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the selection
or supervision of its employee driver.
******************************************
In the Pre-Trial Order[4] dated June 10, 1997, the parties stipulated
[G.R. No. 175512, May 30 : 2011] that the primary issue for trial was whether or not petitioner should be
held liable for Catubig's death.  Trial then ensued.
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC., PETITIONER, VS. JOCELYN
CATUBIG, RESPONDENT. Police Officer (PO) 2 Robert B. Elnas (Elnas), [5] Emilio Espiritu
(Espiritu),[6] Dr. Norberto Baldado, Jr. (Dr. Baldado), [7] Peter
DECISION Cadimas (Cadimas),[8] and respondent[9] herself testified in support of
respondent's complaint.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
PO2 Elnas conducted an investigation of the collision incident. 
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the According to PO2 Elnas, the bus was running fast, at a speed of 100
Decision[1] dated November 17, 2005 and the Resolution[2] dated kilometers per hour, when it collided with the motorcycle which was
November 16, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815, trying to overtake a truck.  The collision occurred on the lane of the
which modified the Decision[3] dated January 26, 2000 of the bus. Catubig was flung 21 meters away, and Emperado, 11 meters
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, in Civil away, from the point of impact.  The motorcycle was totaled; the
Case No. 11360, an action for recovery of damages based on Article chassis broke into three parts, and the front wheel and the steering
2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code, filed by wheel with the shock absorbers were found 26 meters and 38 meters,
respondent Jocelyn Catubig against petitioner Vallacar Transit, Inc.  respectively, from the collision point.  In contrast, only the front
While the RTC dismissed respondent's claim for damages, the Court bumper of the bus suffered damage.
of Appeals granted the same.
Cadimas personally witnessed the collision of the bus and the
The undisputed facts are as follows: motorcycle. He recalled that he was then waiting for a ride to
Dumaguete City and saw the Ceres Bulilit bus making a turn at a
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the curve.  Cadimas signaled the said bus to halt but it was running fast.
franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348.  Cadimas also recollected that there was a cargo truck running slow in
Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as a regular bus driver the opposite direction of the bus.  Cadimas next heard a thud and saw
of petitioner. that the bus already collided with a motorcycle.

On January 27, 1994, respondent's husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr. Espiritu was the photographer who took photographs of the scene of
(Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in the accident. He identified the five photographs which he had taken
tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado of Catubig lying on the ground, bloodied; broken parts of the
(Emperado).  Catubig was the one driving the motorcycle.  While motorcycle; and the truck which Catubig tried to overtake.
approaching a curve at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to
overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to Dr. Baldado was the medico-legal doctor who conducted the post-
 31

mortem examination of Catubig's body.  He reported that Catubig of said accident conducted by petitioner, Cabanilla was declared not
suffered from the following injuries: laceration and fracture of the guilty of causing the same, for he had not been negligent.
right leg; laceration and fracture of the left elbow; multiple abrasions
in the abdominal area, left anterior chest wall, posterior right arm, Lastly, Maypa recounted the expenses petitioner incurred as a result
and at the back of the left scapular area; and contusion-hematoma just of the present litigation.
above the neck.  Dr. Baldado confirmed that Catubig was already
dead when the latter was brought to the hospital, and that the The documentary exhibits of petitioner consisted of the TSN of the
vehicular accident could have caused Catubig's instantaneous death. preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 held on May
25, 1994 before the MCTC of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the
Respondent herself testified to substantiate the amount of damages Province of Negros Oriental; Resolution dated December 22, 1994 of
she was trying to recover from petitioner for Catubig's death, such as the MCTC in the same case; and the Minutes dated February 17,
Catubig's earning capacity; expenses incurred for the wake and burial 1994 of the Grievance Proceeding conducted by petitioner involving
of Catubig, as well as of Emperado; the cost of the motorcycle; and Cabanilla.[15]
the costs of the legal services and fees respondent had incurred.
The RTC, in its Order[16] dated November 12, 1999, admitted all the
Respondent's documentary exhibits consisted of her and Catubig's evidence presented by petitioner.
Marriage Contract dated August 21, 1982, their two children's
Certificate of Live Births, Catubig's College Diploma dated March On January 26, 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision favoring
24, 1983, the list and receipts of the expenses for Catubig's burial, the petitioner.  Based on the sketch prepared by PO2 Elnas, which
sketch of the collision site prepared by PO2 Elnas, the excerpts from showed that "the point of impact x x x occurred beyond the center
the police blotter, the photographs of the collision, [10] and the Post lane near a curve within the lane of the Ceres bus[;]" [17] plus, the
Mortem Report[11] on Catubig's cadaver prepared by Dr. Baldado. testimonies of PO2 Elnas and Cadimas that the motorcycle recklessly
tried to overtake a truck near a curve and encroached the opposite
In an Order[12] dated October 6, 1998, the RTC admitted all of lane of the road, the RTC ruled that the proximate cause of the
respondent's aforementioned evidence. collision of the bus and motorcycle was the negligence of the driver
of the motorcycle, Catubig.  The RTC, moreover, was convinced
On the other hand, Rosie C. Amahit (Amahit)[13] and Nunally Maypa through the testimony of Maypa, the Administrative and Personnel
(Maypa)[14] took the witness stand for petitioner. Manager of the Dumaguete branch of petitioner, that petitioner had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
Amahit was a Court Stenographer at the MCTC who took the employee drivers, including Cabanilla.
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in Criminal Case No. M-15-94
against Cabanilla.  Amahit verified that the document being presented After trial, the RTC concluded:
by the defense in the present case was a true and correct copy of the
TSN of the preliminary investigation held in Criminal Case No. M- WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the
15-94 on May 25, 1994, and another document was a duplicate [herein petitioner] that the [herein respondent's] husband is the
original of the MCTC Resolution dated December 22, 1994 reckless and negligent driver and not the driver of the [petitioner], the
dismissing Criminal Case No. M-15-94. above-entitled case is hereby ordered dismissed.

Maypa is the Administrative and Personnel Manager at the [Petitioner's] counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit. [18]
Dumaguete branch of petitioner.  He started working for petitioner on
September 22, 1990 as a clerk at the Human Resources Development Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated
Department at the Central Office of petitioner in Bacolod City.  November 17, 2005, the appellate court held that both Catubig and
Sometime in November 1993, he became an Administrative Assistant Cabanilla were negligent in driving their respective vehicles. 
at the Dumaguete branch of petitioner; and in August 1995, he was Catubig, on one hand, failed to use reasonable care for his own safety
promoted to his current position at the same branch. and ignored the hazard when he tried to overtake a truck at a curve.
Cabanilla, on the other hand, was running his vehicle at a high speed
While he was still an Administrative Assistant, Maypa was of 100 kilometers per hour.  The Court of Appeals also brushed aside
responsible for the hiring of personnel including drivers and the defense of petitioner that it exercised the degree of diligence
conductors.  Maypa explained that to be hired as a driver, an exacted by law in the conduct of its business.  Maypa was not in a
applicant should be 35 to 45 years old, have at least five years position to testify on the procedures followed by petitioner in hiring
experience in driving big trucks, submit police, court, and medical Cabanilla as an employee driver considering that Cabanilla was hired
clearances, and possess all the necessary requirements for driving a a year before Maypa assumed his post at the Dumaguete branch of
motor vehicle of more than 4,500 kilograms in gross weight such as a petitioner.
professional driver's license with a restriction code of 3. The
applicant should also pass the initial interview, the actual driving and Thus, the Court of Appeals decreed:
maintenance skills tests, and a written psychological examination
involving defensive driving techniques.  Upon passing these WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed decision of the
examinations, the applicant still had to go through a 15-day trial court is modified.  We rule that [herein petitioner] is equally
familiarization of the bus and road conditions before being deployed liable for the accident in question which led to the deaths of Quintin
for work.  Maypa, however, admitted that at the time of his Catubig, Jr. and Teddy Emperado and hereby award to the heirs of
appointment as Administrative Assistant at the Dumaguete branch, Quintin Catubig, Jr. the amount [of] P250,000.00 as full
Cabanilla was already an employee driver of petitioner. compensation for the death of the latter.[19]
Maypa further explained the investigation and grievance procedure The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of
followed by petitioner in cases of vehicular accidents involving the petitioner in a Resolution dated November 16, 2006.
latter's employee drivers.  Maypa related that Cabanilla had been put
on preventive suspension following the vehicular accident on January Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
27, 1994 involving the bus Cabanilla was driving and the motorcycle
carrying Catubig and Emperado.  Following an internal investigation Petitioner asserts that respondent's complaint for damages should be
 32

dismissed for the latter's failure to verify the same.  The certification
against forum shopping attached to the complaint, signed by The same provision was again amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10, which
respondent, is not a valid substitute for respondent's verification that became effective on May 1, 2000.  It now reads:
she "has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic records." [20]  SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required
Petitioner cited jurisprudence in which the Court ruled that a pleading by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
lacking proper verification is treated as an unsigned pleading, which accompanied by affidavit.
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
Petitioner also denies any vicarious or imputed liability under Article personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code.  According to
petitioner, respondent failed to prove the culpability of Cabanilla, the A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based
employee driver of petitioner.  There are already two trial court on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and
decisions (i.e., the Resolution dated December 22, 1994 of the MCTC belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of Negros Oriental in pleading.
Criminal Case No. M-15-94 and the Decision dated January 26, 2000
of the RTC in the instant civil suit) explicitly ruling that the The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No.
proximate cause of the collision was Catubig's reckless and negligent 00-2-10, clearly provides that a pleading lacking proper verification
act.  Thus, without the fault or negligence of its employee driver, no is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
liability at all could be imputed upon petitioner. effect.  However, it also just as clearly states that "[e]xcept when
otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
Petitioner additionally argues, without conceding any fault or under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit."  No such law or
liability, that the award by the Court of Appeals in respondent's favor rule specifically requires that respondent's complaint for damages
of the lump sum amount of P250,000.00 as total death indemnity should have been verified.
lacks factual and legal basis.  Respondent's evidence to prove actual
or compensatory damages are all self-serving, which are either Although parties would often submit a joint verification and
inadmissible in evidence or devoid of probative value.  The award of certificate against forum shopping, the two are different.
moral and exemplary damages is likewise contrary to the ruling of
the appellate court that Catubig should be equally held liable for his In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,[21] we already pointed out that:
own death.
A party's failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is
Respondent maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly adjudged different from the party's failure to sign personally the verification. 
petitioner to be liable for Catubig's death and that the appellate court The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party,
had already duly passed upon all the issues raised in the petition at and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition
bar. defective.
The petition is meritorious. On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a
formal and not a jurisdictional requisite.  It is intended simply to
At the outset, we find no procedural defect that would have warranted secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and
the outright dismissal of respondent's complaint. correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party
Respondent filed her complaint for damages against petitioner on need not sign the verification.  A party's representative, lawyer or any
July 19, 1995, when the 1964 Rules of Court was still in effect.  Rule person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the
7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided: pleading may sign the verification.[22]

Sec. 6. Verification.--A pleading is verified only by an affidavit In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a pleading need
stating that the person verifying has read the pleading and that the not be verified, unless there is a law or rule specifically requiring the
allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge. same. Examples of pleadings that require verification are: (1) all
pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on
Verifications based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, Summary Procedure; (2) petition for review from the Regional Trial
information and belief," shall be deemed insufficient. Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule
41, Section 2; (3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional
On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect.  The Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, Section 1; (4)
foregoing provision was carried on, with a few amendments, as Rule petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals
7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court, viz: under Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme
Court under Rule 45, Section 1; (6) petition for annulment of
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4;
by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or (7) complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application
accompanied by affidavit. for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule
58, Section 4; (9)  application for appointment of a receiver under
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the Rule 59, Section 1; (10) application for support pendente lite under
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition for certiorari against the judgments,
knowledge and belief. final orders or resolutions of constitutional commissions under Rule
64, Section 2; (12) petition for certiorari, prohibition,
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for quo
on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and warranto under Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint for expropriation
belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for indirect contempt under
pleading." Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all
 33

complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate controversies under relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies; by the provisions of this Chapter.
(17) complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of
payment under the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation; and Art. 2180.  The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
(18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons
annulment of voidable marriages as well as petition for summary for whom one is responsible.
proceedings under the Family Code.
x x x x
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory
pleadings must be accompanied by a certificate against forum Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
which took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
of the 1997 Rules of Court.  It is not disputed herein that respondent's
complaint for damages was accompanied by such a certificate. x x x x

In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere
speculation.  When circumstances warrant, the court may simply There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that Article 2180 of
order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive the Civil Code - imputing fault or negligence on the part of the
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may employer for the fault or negligence of its employee - does not apply
thereby be served.[23] to petitioner since the fault or negligence of its employee driver,
Cabanilla, which would have made the latter liable for quasi-delict
We agree with petitioner, nonetheless, that respondent was unable to under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, has never been established by
prove imputable negligence on the part of petitioner. respondent.  To the contrary, the totality of the evidence presented
during trial shows that the proximate cause of the collision of the bus
Prefatorily, we restate the time honored principle that in a petition for and motorcycle is attributable solely to the negligence of the driver of
review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised.  It is not the motorcycle, Catubig.
our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already
considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction is limited to Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
lower court.  The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect.  A occurred.  And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
litigants.[24] continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
The above rule, however, admits of certain exceptions.  The findings immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive but may be the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
reviewed when: (1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
the trial court are contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the inference made by the his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, therefrom.[27]
absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate court, in making its findings, The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that Catubig's
goes beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to overtaking of a slow-moving truck ahead of him, while approaching a
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the judgment of the curve on the highway, was the immediate and proximate cause of the
Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) the collision which led to his own death, to wit:
Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the immediate and proximate cause of the collision is the reckless and
trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific negligent act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not Bus was running very fast.  Even if the Ceres Bus is running very
disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of fast on its lane, it could not have caused the collision if not for the
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo truck and
by the evidence on record.[25] encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while
approaching a curve.  As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin
The issue of negligence is basically factual. [26]  Evidently, in this case, Catubig, Jr. has not observed reasonable care and caution in driving
the RTC and the Court of Appeals have contradictory factual his motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver would have done
findings: the former found that Catubig alone was negligent, while under the circumstances.  Recklessness on the part of Quintin
the latter adjudged that both Catubig and petitioner were negligent. Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo truck while
approaching a curve in Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod,
Respondent based her claim for damages on Article 2180, in relation Negros Oriental.  Overtaking is not allowed while approaching a
to Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which read: curve in the highway (Section 41(b), Republic Act [No.] 4136, as
amended).  Passing another vehicle proceeding on the same direction
Art. 2176.  Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, should only be resorted to by a driver if the highway is free from
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage incoming vehicle to permit such overtaking to be made in safety
done.  Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual (Section 41(a), Republic Act [No.] 4136).  The collision happened
 34

because of the recklessness and carelessness of [herein

respondent's] husband who was overtaking a cargo truck while
approaching a curve.  Overtaking another vehicle while ******************************************
approaching a curve constitute reckless driving penalized not only
under Section 48 of Republic Act [No.] 4136 but also under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. G.R. No. 143363               February 6, 2002

The Court commiserate with the [respondent] for the untimely death ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,
of her husband.  However, the Court as dispenser of justice has to vs.
apply the law based on the facts of the case.  Not having proved by WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS,
preponderance of evidence that the proximate cause of the collision is GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL,
the negligence of the driver of the Ceres bus, this Court has no other SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
option but to dismiss this case.[28] (Emphases supplied.)
DECISION
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cadimas and PO2 Elnas
that Cabanilla was driving the bus at a reckless speed when the
collision occurred lack probative value. PARDO, J.:

We are unable to establish the actual speed of the bus from Cadimas's The Case
testimony for he merely stated that the bus did not stop when he tried
to flag it down because it was "running very fast." [29] The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding
PO2 Elnas, on the other hand, made inconsistent statements as to the petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in
actual speed of the bus at the time of the collision.  During the the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
MCTC, PO2 Elnas refused to give testimony as to the speed of either
the bus or the motorcycle at the time of the collision and an opinion
as to who was at fault. [30]  But during the trial of the present case The Facts
before the RTC, PO2 Elnas claimed that he was told by Cabanilla
that the latter was driving the bus at the speed of around 100 The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
kilometers per hour.[31]
"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin
As the RTC noted, Cadimas and PO2 Elnas both pointed out that the
Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed
motorcycle encroached the lane of the bus when it tried to overtake, on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James
while nearing a curve, a truck ahead of it, consistent with the fact that
Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva
the point of impact actually happened within the lane traversed by the and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
bus.  It would be more reasonable to assume then that it was Catubig
City.
who was driving his motorcycle at high speed because to overtake the
truck ahead of him, he necessarily had to drive faster than the truck. 
Catubig should have also avoided overtaking the vehicle ahead of "On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of
him as the curvature on the road could have obstructed his vision of Dipolog City rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which
the oncoming vehicles from the opposite lane. reads as follows:

The evidence shows that the driver of the bus, Cabanilla, was driving "‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
his vehicle along the proper lane, while the driver of the motorcycle, rendered in the following manner:
Catubig, had overtaken a vehicle ahead of him as he was approaching
a curvature on the road, in disregard of the provision of the law on
1. Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered
reckless driving, at the risk of his life and that of his employee,
to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the
Emperado.
following sums of money:
The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code flows from the negligence of their employees. [32]  a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss
Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
collision resulting in Catubig's death was his own negligence, and
there was no fault or negligence on Cabanilla's part, then such b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages
presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner, as incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
Cabanilla's employer, does not even arise.  Thus, it is not even
necessary to delve into the defense of petitioner that it exercised due
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorney’s fees;
diligence in the selection and supervision of Cabanilla as its
employee driver.
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.  damages; and to pay costs.
The Decision dated November 17, 2005 and Resolution dated
November 16, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815 2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr.
are SET ASIDE and the Decision dated January 26, 2000 of the and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, dismissing  amount of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of
Civil Case No. 11360 is REINSTATED. principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City;

SO ORDERED.
 35

3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators
commission of the tort and who was under special parental authority and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies
above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St. to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of
Mary’s Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents; the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized
liability. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in by the school or its teachers.9
this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is
IT IS SO ORDERED."’ (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205- a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally
206)." and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction,
or custody.10
"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995,
defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted
an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. connection to the accident.11
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high
school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant "In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between
15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
turtle. negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’
the accident."2 And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s academy appealed the decision to have occurred.’"12
the Court of Appeals.3
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming
the decision a quo, in toto.4
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy filed a motion or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
for reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Court of Appeals denied the motion.5
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and
Hence, this appeal.6 Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the
cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
The Issues of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness
of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents
petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and
Carpitanos. testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the
accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused
the jeep to turn turtle.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
award of moral damages against the petitioner.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
The Court’s Ruling authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that "those
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article
shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts
or omissions of the unemancipated minor" was unfounded.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 7 and 2198 of the
Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
students in the jeep. Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He
was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
special parental authority over a minor child while under their
 36

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of ******************************************
the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there 1. RES IPSA LOQUITOR: A. ELEMENTS
intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
G.R. No. 130003               October 20, 2004
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, JONAS AÑONUEVO, Petitioner.
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have vs.
occurred."13 HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME
VILLAGRACIA, Respondent.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent DECISION
Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy
had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, TINGA, J.:
petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
accident.
The bicycle provides considerable speed and freedom of movement
to the rider. It derives a certain charm from being unencumbered by
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable any enclosure, affording the cyclist the perception of relative liberty.
for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial It also carries some obvious risks on the part of the user and has
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. become the subject of regulation, if not by the government, then by
parental proscription.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of
act or omission.14 In this case, the proximate cause of the accident damages from the driver of the car which had struck him. The
was not attributable to petitioner. argument is hinged on the cyclist’s failure to install safety devices on
his bicycle. However, the lower courts agreed that the motorist
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, himself caused the collision with his own negligence. The facts are
the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death deceptively simple, but the resolution entails thorough consideration
indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the of fundamental precepts on negligence.
grant of attorney’s fees as part of damages is the exception rather
than the rule.15 The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under The present petition raises little issue with the factual findings of the
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 160, of Pasig City, as affirmed
justification.16 Thus, the grant of attorney’s fees against the petitioner by the Court of Appeals. Both courts adjudged petitioner, Jonas
is likewise deleted. Añonuevo ( Añonuevo ), liable for the damages for the injuries
sustained by the cyclist, Jerome Villagracia (Villagracia). Instead, the
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the petition hinges on a sole legal question, characterized as "novel" by
vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which
admitted this fact.1âwphi1 We have held that the registered owner of presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he was violating a
any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the to non-motorized vehicles.1
latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets."17 Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in
occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive
jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni
shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane
Carpitanos. was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s
The Fallo brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia
sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four
decision of the Court of Appeals 18 and that of the trial court. 19 The (4) operations.
Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the
liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy,
Dipolog City. On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages
against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the
RTC.2 He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo
No costs. before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter
was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. 3 Trial on the civil
SO ORDERED. action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC
rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo,
ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand
 37

Pesos (₱10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction
(₱20,000.00) for attorney’s fees, as well as legal costs. 4 Both with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil Code. 22 Its applicability is
defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to
presume that the law intended a broader coverage.
In a Decision5 dated 8 May 1997, the Court of Appeals Fourth
Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto6 . After the Court of Still, Añonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution7 dated analogy to all types of vehicles 23 . He points out that modern-day
22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo filed their travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the
respective petitions for review with this Court. Procter and Gamble’s number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as
petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the
1997. Añonuevo’s petition,8 on the other hand, was given due Code, the legislators "must have seen that only motor vehicles were
course,9 and is the subject of this Decision. of such public concern that they had to be specifically mentioned,"
yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the "inescapably become matter of public concern" so as to expand the
factual findings of the RTC. Among them: that it was Añonuevo’s application of the law to be more responsive to the times. 24
vehicle which had struck Villagracia; 10 that Añonuevo’s vehicle had
actually hit Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit
fracture;11 that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for command of the legislature, as embodied in Article 2185, a task
Villagracia, Añonuevo was "umaarangkada," or speeding as he made beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets, and not
the left turn into Libertad; 12 that considering Añonuevo’s claim that a creates, the law. However, since the Court is being asked to consider
passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the turn. the matter, it might as well examine whether Article 2185 could be
Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed; 13 and that interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles.
Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and
diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array
avoided.14 Notably, Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not of non-motorized vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions
dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made by the lower on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such
courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged negligence of as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more
Villagracia. Añonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet
part, nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these
Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court, which is not a trier of alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the
facts,15 is not compelled to review the factual findings of the lower term "motorized vehicles." If Añonuevo seriously contends that the
courts, which following jurisprudence have to be received with application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction
respect and are in fact generally binding. 16 today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical
experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized
Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting questions vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands
for resolution. Añonuevo’s arguments are especially fixated on a today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming
particular question of law: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty.
Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles. 17 In the Añonuevo’s characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between
same vein, Añonuevo insists that Villagracia’s own fault and motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past
negligence serves to absolve the former of any liability for damages. than to the present.

Its is easy to discern why Añonuevo chooses to employ this line of There is a fundamental flaw in Añonuevo’s analysis of Art. 2185, as
argument. Añonuevo points out that Villagracia’s bicycle had no applicable today. He premises that the need for the distinction
safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the
1948 municipal ordinance.18 Nor was it duly registered with the relative mass of number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis
Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance. for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these
Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine
brakes.19 Before this Court, Villagracia does not dispute these unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct
allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A
attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo’s own motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion.
negligence.20 Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized
contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in
Añonuevo from payment of damages. The Court of Appeals likewise inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or
acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracia’s bicycle, but collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor
characterized the contention as "off-tangent" and insufficient to vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass,
obviate the fact that it was Añonuevo’s own negligence that caused and greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.
the accident.21
There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he posed by the motor vehicle. As far back as 1912, in the U.S. v.
failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He Juanillo25 , the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of
posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. great speed, greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals,
The provision reads: "and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country
roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that people who travel on such roads." 26 In the same case, the Court
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of emphasized:
the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
 38

A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty
use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence
that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it per se.32 In Teague vs. Fernandez,33 the Court cited with approval
is absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a American authorities elucidating on the rule:
horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an
accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to "The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an
accommodate persons riding, driving, or walking. It is probably more inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury
agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was
out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation
understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury."
automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An (65 C.J.S. 1156)
automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which
a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the
circumstances.27 "The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or, according to
the decisions on the question, negligence per se, for the reason that
American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable
relationship between the motorist and the cyclist. Motorists are precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent
required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so
with bicyclists.28 While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing
the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may
reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the
that more is required from the former to fully discharge the duty than standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is
from the latter.29 negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the
absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial,
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission
and attached responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence
vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a
by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from
sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the such violation. x x x." (65 C.J.S. pp.623-628)
Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized
vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; "But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver
thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do
motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably
there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an
on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the
vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the
under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause
Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the
footing with other types of vehicles. law has no reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists
in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This
non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal court has applied these principles to speed limits and other
basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt regulations of the manner of driving." (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed.
Añonuevo’s thesis would unwisely obviate this distinction. 2d 14 at 15).

Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to "x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or
Villagracia, this should not preclude any possible finding of contributing toward an injury intervened between the violation of a
negligence on his part. While the legal argument as formulated by statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the
Añonuevo is erroneous, his core contention that Villagracia was result so remote that no action can be maintained. The test is to be
negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their
serious consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts character and in the natural and probable connection between the
were admitted by Villagracia himself. wrong done and the injurious consequence. The general principle is
that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
the place.30 However, the existence of negligence in a given case is prevent." (38 Am Jur 841)34
not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given
situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be In Teague, the owner of a vocational school stricken by a fire
reckless or negligent.31 resulting in fatalities was found negligent, base on her failure to
provide adequate fire exits in contravention of a Manila city
Añonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had ordinance.35 In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals36 , the
transgressed a municipal ordinance requiring the registration of failure of the petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance with city
bicycles and the installation of safety devices thereon. This view ordinances sufficed to support a finding of negligence. 37 In Cipriano
finds some support if anchored on the long standing principle v. Court of Appeals, 38 the Court found that the failure of the
of negligence per se. petitioner to register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in
accordance with the statute constituted negligence per se, thus
 39

holding him liable for the damages for the destruction by fire of a is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at
customer’s vehicle garaged therein. all, it is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his
obligation to the municipal government, which would then be the
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure
resulting from his violation of an ordinance? It cannot be denied that alone is not determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to
the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon
headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which
occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value, the particular circumstances reasonably require. 43 To determine if
Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the
against by the ordinance he violated. Añonuevo argues that violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine
Villagracia’s violation should bar the latter’s recovery of damages, Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous
and a simplistic interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate circumstances of the accident.
such an argument.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may
But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the
consider as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably
turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute
This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a
within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the intersection, standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be
whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal
hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury had relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained.
his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to
considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in
or before he had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Añonuevo had spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those
failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of others. 44
headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted
the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not
turn. grievous enough so as to negate monetary relief. In the absence of
statutory requirement, one is not negligent as a matter of law for
This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the failing to equip a horn, bell, or other warning devise onto a
mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in bicycle.45 In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does
establishing liability for damages. In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. not constitute negligence as a matter of law 46 but is a question for the
Court of Appeals,39 a collision between a truck and a privately-owned jury whether the absence of proper lights played a causal part in
Cimarron van caused the death of three of the van’s passengers. The producing a collision with a motorist.47 The absence of proper lights
petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance, may
Cimarron was committing multiple violations of the Land constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist
Transportation and Traffic Code40 at the time of the accident. Among is struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a
these violations: the Cimarron was overloaded at the time of the proximate cause of the collision;48 however, the absence of such lights
accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by four adults, will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident
including the driver; and the van had only one functioning headlight. was well illuminated by street lights, 49 if substitute lights were present
Similar as in this case, petitioner therein invoked Article 2185 and which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible, 50 if the motorist saw the
argued that the driver of the Cimarron should be presumed negligent. bicycle in spite of the absence of lights thereon, 51 or if the motorist
The Court, speaking through Justice Mendoza, dismissed these would have been unable to see the bicycle even if it had been
arguments: equipped with lights.52 A bicycle equipped with defective or
ineffective brakes may support a finding of negligence barring or
diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition
[It] has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron was a contributing cause of the accident.53
driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed,
petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the
injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the
Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or
contributed thereto. Negligence consisting in whole or in part, of mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation
says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the
headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident," injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. 54 Añonuevo had the
that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia
"decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.
overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased its
maneuverability." However, mere allegations such as these are not On this point, the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-worth
sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged citing:
negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. 41
[As] admitted by appellant Añonuevo, he first saw appellee
Sanitary Steam42 is controlling in this case. The bare fact that Villagracia at a distance of about ten (10) meters before the accident.
Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the Corrolarily, therefore, he could have avoided the accident had he
accident may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence [stopped] alongside with an earlier (sic) jeep which was already at a
on his part, but such negligence is without legal consequence unless it full stop giving way to appellee. But according to [eyewitness]
 40

Sorsano, he saw appellant Añonuevo "umaarangkada" and hit the leg ******************************************
of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30). This earlier (sic) jeep at a
full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but Añonuevo at an [G.R. No. L-12986. March 31, 1966.]
unexpected motion (umarangkada) came out hitting Villagracia (TSN
March 9, 1990 p. 49). Appellant Añonuevo admitted that he did not THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C.
blow his horn when he crossed Boni Avenue (TSN March 21, 1990 p. AFRICA and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, Petitioners-
47).55 Appellants, v. CALTEX (PHIL.) INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents-Appellees.
By Añonuevo’s own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good
distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda for the respondents.
as he made the turn, Añonuevo would have had ample opportunity to
avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Añonuevo had Bernabe Africa, etc. for the petitioners.
sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility
that the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the
accident.56 A motorist has been held liable for injury to or death of a SYLLABUS
bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into the bicyclist so as to
cause a collision.57
1. EVIDENCE; ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS; REQUISITES
Neither does Añonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal FOR ADMISSIBILITY. — There are three requisites for
connection between the safety violations imputed to Villagracia and admissibility of evidence under Sec. 35, Rule 123, Rules of Court: (a)
the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person,
these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public
appreciable against Villagracia. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the
we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
of proving Villagracia’s own liability. by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol., 3, p. 393).
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory
negligence.1âwphi1 The leading case in contributory 2. ID.; HEARSAY RULE; REPORTS NOT CONSIDERED
negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf58 clarifies that damages may be EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE. — The reports in question do
mitigated if the claimant "in conjunction with the occurrence, not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. The facts stated
[contributes] only to his injury."59 To hold a person as having therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any
that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an duty to do so.
impending danger to health and body. 60 To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not 3. ID.; ID.; REPORT SUBMITTED BY A POLICE OFFICER IN
proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES. — The report submitted
injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for own personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be
its occurrence.61 considered as an exception to the hearsay rule.

As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged 4. ID.; PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE
Añonuevo as solely responsible for the accident. The petition does DOCTRINE OF Res Ipsa Loquitur. — Where the thing which caused
not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to the injury complained of is shown to be under the management
imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment. course of things does not happen if those who have its management
Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence
meters away, thus he could no longer claim not having been of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of
sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that care. (45 C. J. 768, p. 1193.)
Añonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads
us to believe that even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped 5. ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE TO THE CASE AT
with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to BAR. — The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
brake in time to avoid the speeding car. Moreover, it was incumbent employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred
on Añonuevo to have established that Villagracia’s failure to have therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons
installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees
Añonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
such causal connection as not proven. whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
6. TORTS; INTERVENTION OF UNFORESEEN AND
UNEXPECTED CAUSE. — The intervention of an unforeseen and
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and
proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting
SO ORDERED. injury. (MacAfee Et. Al., v. Travers Gas Corp., Et Al., 153 S. W. 2nd
442.)

7. DAMAGES; LIABILITY OF OWNER OF GASOLINE

 41

STATION; CASE AT BAR. — A fire broke out at the Caltex service

station. It is started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank into 2. The Fire Department Report: —
the underground storage. The fire spread to and burned several
neighboring houses owned by appellants. Issue: Whether Caltex In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic)
should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants. Held: The subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand, the
question depends on whether the operator of the gasoline station was complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken
an independent contractor or an agent of Caltex. Under the license during the fire and which is submitted herewith. It appears in this
agreement the operator would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack
P1.00 for the use of the premises and all equipment therein. The which according to information gathered in the neighborhood
operator could sell only Caltex products. Maintenance of the station contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the gasoline
and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, pumps and the underground tanks."cralaw virtua1aw library
of Caltex. The operator could not assign or transfer his rights as
license without the consent of Caltex. Termination of the contract The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a
was a right granted only to Caltex but not to the operator. These certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline station
provisions of the contract show that the operator was virtually an and what the chief of the fire department had told him on the same
employee of Caltex, not an independent contractor. Hence, Caltex subject.
should be liable for damages caused to appellants.
The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by the
Court of Appeals and hence inadmissible. This ruling is now assigned
as error. It is contended: first, that said reports were admitted by the
DECISION trial court without objection on the part of respondents; secondly, that
with respect to the police report (Exhibit V-Africa) which appears
signed by a Detective Zapanta allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the
latter was presented as witness but respondents waived their right to
MAKALINTAL, J.: cross-examine him although they had the opportunity to do so; and
thirdly, that in any event the said reports are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of Rule 123, now Rule
This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision of the 130.
Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dismissing petitioners’ second amended complaint against The first contention is not borne out by the record. The transcript of
respondents. the hearing of September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170) shows that the
reports in question, when offered as evidence, were objected to by
The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old counsel for each of respondents on the ground that they were hearsay
Civil Code. It appears that in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire and that they were "irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent." Indeed,
broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street in the court’s resolution only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6 were
and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed admitted without objection; the admission of the others, including the
from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening disputed ones, carried no such explanation.
of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The
fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the On the second point, although Detective Capacillo did take the
personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among witness stand, he was not examined and he did not testify as to the
them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo facts mentioned in his alleged report (signed by Detective Zapanta.)
Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as All he said was that he was one of those who investigated "the
its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of location of the fire and, if possible, gather witnesses as to the
them was attributed as the cause of the fire. occurrence." and that he brought the report with him. There was
nothing, therefore on which he need be cross-examined; and the
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed contents of the report, as to which he did not testify, did not thereby
to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in become competent evidence. And even if he had testified, his
the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. testimony would still have been objectionable as far as information
gathered by him from third persons was concerned.
The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain
reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves, that is,
Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of without further testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the
the Philippines. Portions of the first two reports are as scope of section 35, Rule 123 which provides that "entries in official
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
1. Police Department Report: — enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948,
while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a tank truck, There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just
plate No. T-5292 into underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
Station located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
burning match stick near the main valve of the said underground such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
Leandro Flores in pulling of the gasoline hose connecting the truck knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
with the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, by him personally or through official information. (Moran,
the flames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.)
spouting. It burned the truck and the following accessories and
residences."cralaw virtua1aw library Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered
 42

here. Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to the explanation that the injury arose from defendant’s want of care.’
cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal
knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was "And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official observed due care and diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit Co. v.
information? As to some facts the sources thereof are not even Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 68). This rule is known by the name
identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly
employee at the gas station where the fire occurred; to Leandro applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the
Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being plaintiff had every right to be on the highway, and the electric wire
transferred at the time to the underground tank of the station; and to was under the sole control of defendant company. In the ordinary
respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V- course of events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair weather
Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their and injure people, unless they are subjected to unusual strain and
statements as "official information acquired by the officers who stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and
prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only supervision; just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse
must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the windows to injure passersby unless some one was negligent. (Byrne
duty to give such statements for record. 1 v. Boadle, 2 H & Co. 22; 159 Eng. Reprint 299, the leading case that
established that rule). Consequently, in the absence of contributory
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay negligence (which is admittedly not present) the fact that the wire
rule: the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in
officers through official information, not having been given by the the installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by
informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Chief Baron Pollock, if there are any facts inconsistent with
negligence, it is for the defendant to prove.’"
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and
origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not lay
to presume negligence on the part of appellees. Both the trial court down doctrines binding on the Supreme Court, but we do not
and the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine in the instant consider this a reason for not applying the particular doctrine of res
case on the grounds that "as to (its) applicability . . . in the ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a high]y combustible
Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite," and that while the material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken.
rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, "in the case at On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it
bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine." The arises almost invariably from some act of man. A case strikingly
question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine similar to the one before Us is Jones v. Shell Petroleum Corporation,
has actually been applied in this jurisdiction in the case of Espiritu v. Et Al., 171 So. 447;
Philippine Power and Development Co. (C.A. G. R. No. L-324O-R,
September 20, 1949), wherein the decision of the Court of Appeals "Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city of Hammon
was penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes now a member of the which in the year 1934 was leased to the Shell Petroleum Corporation
Supreme Court. for a gasoline filling station. On October 8, 1934, during the term of
the lease, while gasoline was being transferred, from the tank wagon,
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as also operated by the Shell Petroleum Corporation, to the underground
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph tank of the station, a fire started with resulting damages to the
building owned by Jones. Alleging that the damages to his building
"In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while the plaintiff-appellee and amounted to $516.95, Jones sued the Shell Petroleum Corporation for
other companions were loading grass between the municipalities of the recovery of that amount. The judge of the district court, after
Bay and Calauan, in the province of Laguna, with clear weather and hearing the testimony, concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a
without any wind blowing, an electric transmission wire, installed recovery and rendered judgment in his favor for $427.82. The Court
and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed this judgment, on the ground
Co., Inc. alongside the road, suddenly parted, and one of the broken the testimony failed to show with reasonable certainty any negligence
ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. on the part of the Shell Petroleum Corporation or any of its agents or
As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts carried by employees. Plaintiff applied to this Court for a Writ of Review which
the wire and was knocked unconscious to the ground. The electric was granted, and the case is now before us for decision."cralaw
charge coursed through his body and caused extensive and serious virtua1aw library
multiple burns from skull to legs, leaving the bone exposed in some
parts and causing intense pain and wounds that were not completely In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the mishap."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Plaintiff’s petition contains two distinct charges of negligence —
The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the one relating to the cause of the fire and the other relating to the
plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence but the spreading of the gasoline about the filling station.
appellate court overruled the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Other than an expert to asses the damages caused plaintiff’s building
by the fire, no witnesses were placed on the stand by the defendant.
"The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiff’s
evidence to place appellant on its defense. While it is the rule, as "Taking up plaintiff’s charge of negligence relating to the cause of
contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual negligence, the fire, we find it established by the record that the filling station and
or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the tank truck were under the control of the defendant and operated
that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the by its agents or employees. We further find from the uncontradicted
defendant, it is also a recognized principle that ‘Where the thing testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses that fire started in the underground
which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the tank attached to the filling station while it was being filled from the
exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the tank truck and while both the tank and the truck were in charge of
ordinary course of things does not occur if those having such control and being operated by the agents or employees of the defendant,
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the extended to the hose and tank truck, and was communicated from the
 43

burning hose, tank truck, and escaping gasoline to the building owned performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal
by the plaintiff. observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Those facts, descriptive of the location
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline
defendants failure to explain the cause of the fire or to show its lack station in question, strengthen the presumption of negligence under
of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for
ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the doctrine may be more stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy
successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them. the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. There is
no more eloquent demonstration of this than the statement of Leandro
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to Flores before the police investigator. Flores was the driver of the
be under the management of defendant or his servants and the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without assistance, was
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when
those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords the fire broke out. He said: "Before loading the underground tank
reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the there were no people, but while the loading was going on, there were
accident arose from want of care. (45 C. J. #768, p. 1193). people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is
about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank." He
"This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the tank truck
approved and adopted by the courts of last resort. Some of the cases to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole"
in this jurisdiction in which the doctrine has been applied are the he heard someone shout "fire."cralaw virtua1aw library
following, viz.; Maus v. Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25 So. 977;
Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice etc., Co., 111 La. 522, 35 So. 731, 64 Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring
L.R.A. 101, 100 Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of
115 La. 53, 38 So. 892; Bents, v. Page, 115 La. 560, 39 So. defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high
599."cralaw virtua1aw library enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was the
concrete wall was only 2 1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably
force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants’
and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring
who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees houses.
and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer
happened because of want of care. to the second amended complaint that "the fire was caused through
the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or permission of
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano of the Manila answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and
Police Department (Exh. X-1 Africa) the following negligently threw a lighted match in the premises." No evidence on
appears:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph this point was adduced, but assuming the allegation to be true —
certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken
"Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed that the Caltex against Boquiren — it does not extenuate his negligence. A decision
Gasoline Station complained of occupies a lot approximately 10 m x of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the
10 m at the southwest corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo. The present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here: "It is the
location is within a very busy business district near the Obrero rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent owe a
Market, a railroad crossing and very thickly populated neighborhood degree of protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate
where a great number of people mill around throughout the day until with a danger involved . . . we think it is the generally accepted rule
late at night. The circumstances put the gasoline station in a situation as applied to torts that ‘if the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct
primarily prejudicial to its operation because the passersby, those actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the
waiting for buses or transportation, those waiting to cross the streets fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the
and others loafing around have to occupy not only the sidewalks but effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a
also portion of the gasoline station itself. Whatever be the activities substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the
of these people smoking or lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded actor from liability.’ (Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, p.
and this constitute a secondary hazard to its operation which in turn 1184, #439. Stated in another way, ‘The intervention of an
endangers the entire neighborhood to conflagration. unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a
wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence
"Furthermore, aside from precautions already taken by its operator directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the
the concrete walls south and west adjoining the neighborhood are resulting injury.’ (MacAfee Et. Al. v. Traver’s Gas Corp., Et Al., 153
only 2 1/2 meters high at most and cannot avoid the flames from S.W. 2nd 442.)
leaping over it in case of fire.
The next issue is whether Caltex should be held liable for the
"Records show that there have been two cases of fire which caused damages caused to appellants. This issue depends on whether
not only material damages but desperation and also panic in the Boquiren was an independent contractor, as held by the Court of
neighborhood. Appeals, or an agent of Caltex. This question, in the light of the facts
not controverted, is one of law and hence may be passed upon by this
"Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated, this gasoline Court. These facts are: 1) Boquiren made an admission that he was an
service station is also used by its operator as a garage and repair shop agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline
for his fleet of taxicabs numbering ten or more, adding another risk to station and all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised control
the possible outbreak of fire at this already small but crowded over Boquiren in the management of the station; (4) the delivery
gasoline station."cralaw virtua1aw library truck used in delivering gasoline to the station had the name
CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at the
The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees.
 44

(Exhibit T-Africa; Exhibit U-Africa; Exhibit X-5 Africa; Exhibit X-6

Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa). "To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not
bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the contracting
In Boquiren’s amended answer to the second amended complaint, he parties, should there be a controversy as to what they really had
denied that he directed one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the intended to enter into, but the way the contracting parties do or
truck into the tank and alleged that the "alleged driver, if one there perform their respective obligations stipulated or agreed upon may be
was, was not in his employ, the driver being an employee of the shown and inquired into, and should such performance conflict with
Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the owners of the gasoline station." It is true the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former must
that Boquiren later on amended his answer, and that among the prevail over the latter." Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. v.
changes was one to the effect that he was not acting as agent of Firemen’s Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil.
Caltex. But then again, in his motion to dismiss appellants’ second 757).
amended complaint the ground alleged was that it stated no cause of
action since under the allegations thereof he was merely acting as "The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of
agent of Caltex, such that he could not have incurred personal creating the apparent relationship of employer and independent
liability. A motion to dismiss on this ground is deemed to be an contractor, and of avoiding liability for the negligence of the
admission of the facts alleged in the complaint. employees about the station; but the company was not satisfied to
allow such relationship to exist. The evidence shows that it
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the immediately assumed control, and proceeded to direct the method by
equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted at the which the work contracted for should be performed. By reserving the
service station in question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But right to terminate the contract at will, it retained the means of
Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would reveal compelling submission to its orders. Having elected to assume
the nature of their relationship at the time of the fire. There must have control and to direct the means and methods by which the work has
been one in existence at that time. Instead, what was presented was a to be performed, it must be held liable for the negligence of those
license agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case, since performing service under its direction. We think the evidence was
it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the one- year sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury." (Gulf Refining Company
period it was intended to operate. This so-called license agreement v. Rogers 57 S.W. 2d 183).
(Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on November 29, 1948, but made
effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in the station belonged
namely, March 18, 1948. This retroactivity provision is quite to Boquiren. But no cash invoices were presented to show that
significant, and gives rise to the conclusion that it was designed Boquiren had bought said gasoline from Caltex. Neither was there a
precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility with respect to the sales contract to prove the same.
fire, as shown by the clause that Caltex "shall not be liable for any
injury to person or property while in the property herein licensed, it As found by the trial court the Africas sustained a loss of P9,005.80,
being understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an after deducting the amount of P2,000.00 collected by them on the
employee, representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."cralaw insurance of the house. The deduction is now challenged as erroneous
virtua1aw library on the ground that Article 2207 of the new Civil Code, which
provides for the subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the insured,
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can was not yet in effect when the loss took place. However, regardless of
hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under that the silence of the law on this point at that time, the amount that
agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of should be recovered must be measured by the damages actually
P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein. He suffered, otherwise the principle prohibiting unjust enrichment would
could sell only Caltex products. Maintenance of the station and its be violated. With respect to the claim of the heirs of Ong, P7,500.00
equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, of was adjudged by the lower court on the basis of the assessed value of
Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee the property destroyed namely, P1,500.00, disregarding the testimony
without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed of one of the Ong children that said property was worth P4,000.00.
to be from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter We agree that the court erred, since it is of common knowledge that
until terminated by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex the assessment for taxation purposes is not an accurate gauge of fair
could at any time cancel and terminate the agreement in case market value, and in this case should not prevail over positive
Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct the evidence of such value. The heirs of Ong are therefore entitled to
business with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex. Termination P10,000.00.
of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to
Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of the Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-
control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants, and ordered to pay
was virtually an employee of the former. them the aforesaid sums of P9,005.80 and P10,000.00, respectively,
with interest from the filing of the complaint, and costs.
"Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his
position to the company and the latter could remove him or terminate
his services at will; that the service station belonged to the company ******************************************
and bore its tradename and the operator sold only the products of the
company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged to the
company and were just loaned to the operator and the company took G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
charge of their repair and maintenance; that an employee of the
company supervised the operator and conducted periodic inspection PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO
of the company’s gasoline and service station; that the price of the S. PASCUAL, Petitioners,
products sold by the operator was fixed by the company and not by vs.
the operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator indicated SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA B.
that he was a mere agent, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the SARANGAYA, Respondents.
operator was an agent of the company and not an independent
contractor should not be disturbed. DECISION
 45

CORONA, J.: 1. ₱2,070,000.00 - representing the value of the 2-storey residential

building and the 3-door apartment;
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking to annul the decisions of the Court of 2. ₱5,922,350.00 - representing the value of the jewelries, appliances,
Appeals (CA) dated June 29, 2000 and March 31, 2001, respectively, [furniture], fixtures and cash;
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21 of Santiago, Isabela. 3. ₱8,300.00 – a month for [lost rental] income from July 1995 until
such time that the premises is restored to its former condition or
In 1986, respondent spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva payment for its value, whichever comes first;
Sarangaya erected a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey
commercial building fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela. 4. ₱2,000,000.00 – for moral damages;
The building was known as "Super A Building" and was subdivided
into three doors, each of which was leased out. The two-storey
residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of 5. ₱1,000,000.00 – for exemplary damages, and
the building. On the left side of the commercial building stood the
office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita). 6. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 15% of the total amount to be
awarded to the plaintiffs.2
In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (petitioner-
corporation), through its branch manager and co-petitioner During the trial, respondents presented witnesses who testified that a
Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door few days before the incident, Pascual was seen buying gasoline in a
of the "Super A Building," abutting the office of Matsushita. container from a nearby gas station. He then placed the container in
Petitioner-corporation renovated its rented space and divided it into the rear compartment of the car.
two. The left side was converted into an office while the right was
used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a In his answer, Pascual insisted that the fire was purely an accident,
company-provided vehicle he used in covering the different towns a caso fortuito, hence, he was not liable for damages. He also denied
within his area of supervision. putting a container of gasoline in the car’s rear compartment. For its
part, petitioner-corporation refused liability for the accident on the
On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not ground that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in
bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned to Santiago and, the selection and supervision of Pascual as its branch manager.
after checking his appointments the next day, decided to "warm up"
the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the After the trial, the court a quo ruled in favor of respondents. The
ignition key, the engine made an "odd" sound and did not start. decretal portion of the decision read:
Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again
stepped on the accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine
but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations judgment
flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted is hereby rendered ORDERING the defendants, Bienvenido Pascual
from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when and Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily to
suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the the plaintiffs spouses Gaudencio and Primitiva Sarangaya the total
whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his sum of Two Million Nine Hundred Four Thousand Eight Hundred
face, legs and arms. and Eighty Pesos ([₱]2,904,880.00) as actual damages with legal
interest thereon from December 12, 1995 until fully paid. 3 (emphasis
supplied)
Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they
heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air
and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their The court a quo declared that, although the respondents failed to
belongings, furniture and appliances. prove the precise cause of the fire that engulfed the garage, Pascual
was nevertheless negligent based on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.4 It did not, however, categorically rule that the gasoline
The city fire marshall conducted an investigation and thereafter
container allegedly placed in the rear compartment of the car caused
submitted a report to the provincial fire marshall. He concluded that the fire. The trial court instead declared that both petitioners failed to
the fire was "accidental." The report also disclosed that petitioner-
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they employed the necessary
corporation had no fire permit as required by law. care and diligence in the upkeep of the car. 5 Contrary to the claims of
petitioner-corporation, the trial court also found that it failed to
Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for "Reckless employ the diligence of a good father of a family, as required by law,
Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Damage in (sic) Property"1 was filed in the selection and supervision of Pascual.
against petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, petitioner-corporation
was asked to pay the amount of ₱7,992,350, inclusive of the value of With respect to the amount of damages, the trial court awarded to
the commercial building. At the prosecutor’s office, petitioner respondents no more than their claim for actual damages covering the
Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the complaint, which was cost of the 2-storey residential building and the commercial building,
granted. including their personal properties. It explained:

Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict According to the plaintiff Gaudencio Sarangaya III, he made a list of
against petitioners for a "sum of money and damages," alleging that what was lost. His list includes the commercial building that was
Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation
burned which he valued at ₱2,070,000.00. The defendants take
lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of exception to the value given by the plaintiff and for this purpose they
Pascual as its employee. They prayed for payment of the following
submitted the tax declaration of the building which states that the
damages:
market value is ₱183,770.00. The Court takes judicial notice that the
valuation appearing on the tax declaration of property is always lower
 46

[than] the correct value thereof. Considering that the building that quo for the reception of additional evidence by the Plaintiffs-
was burned was a two-storey residential house with a commercial Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants anent Plaintiffs-
building annex with a total floor area of 241 square meters as stated Appellees’ claim for actual damages.8 (emphasis supplied)
in the tax declaration, mostly concrete mixed with narra and other
lumber materials, the value given by the plaintiffs of ₱2,070,000.00 Via this petition, petitioners ascribe the following errors to the
is reasonable and credible and it shall be awarded to the plaintiffs. appellate court:

The other items listed are assorted [furniture] and fixtures totaling (a) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE
₱307,000.00 assorted appliances worth ₱358,350.00; two filing DOCTRINE OF ["RES IPSA LOQUITUR"] IN THE PRESENT
cabinets worth ₱7,000.00 and clothing and other personal effects CASE;
costing ₱350,000.00, household utensils costing ₱15,000.00. The
Court finds them reasonable and credible considering the social and
financial stature of the plaintiffs who are businessmen. There could (b) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
be no question that they were able to acquire and own quite a lot of PERLA NEGLIGENT IN THE SUPERVISION OF PASCUAL,
home furnishings and personal belongings. The costing however is AND CONSEQUENTLY, VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE
high considering that these belongings were already used for quite FIRE BECAUSE PERLA FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE OF
some time so a 20% depreciation should be equitably deducted from SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEE’S CARE AND UPKEEP OF
the cost of acquisition submitted by plaintiffs. Thus, the total amount COMPANY VEHICLES REQUIRED BY THE SUPREME COURT
recoverable would be ₱1,037,350.00 less 20% or a total of ON TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES; AND
₱829,880.00. The ₱5,000.00 representing foodstock can also be
ordered paid to the plaintiffs. x x x.6 (c) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED
THE REMAND OF THE CASE TO RTC ISABELA FOR
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court again ruled in RECEPTION OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE BY THE
favor of respondents but modified the amount of damages awarded SARANGAYA SPOUSES ON THEIR CLAIM FOR ACTUAL
by the trial court. It held: DAMAGES.9

x x x the Decision of the Court a quo is AFFIRMED, with the Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or
modification that the Appellants are hereby ordered to pay the the transaction speaks for itself." 10 It relates to the fact of an injury
Appellees, jointly and severally, the total amount of ₱600,000.00 by that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
way of nominal damages under Articles 2222 and 2223 of the New plaintiff’s prima facie case.11 The doctrine rests on inference and not
Civil Code, with interest thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from on presumption.12 The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition
the date of the Decision of this Court.7 of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence
when direct evidence is lacking.13
The appellate court was in accord with the trial court’s findings that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was correctly applied in determining The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows
the liability of Pascual and that petitioner-corporation, as the the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it
employer, was vicariously liable to respondents. Nonetheless, for and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege
respondents’ failure to substantiate their actual loss, the appellate negligence in general terms.14 In such instance, the plaintiff relies on
court granted nominal damages of ₱600,000 to them. proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. 15

Petitioners and respondents filed their respective motions for The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability
reconsideration. on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he
exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the
defendant’s responsibility to show that there was no negligence on
In their MR, petitioners contested the findings of fact of the appellate his part.16
court. They denied any liability whatsoever to respondents but this
was rejected by the CA for lack of merit. Thus, the present appeal.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
Respondents, on the other hand, argued in their MR that the award of
nominal damages was erroneous. They prayed that, in lieu of the
award of nominal damages, the case should instead be remanded to 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
the trial court for reception of additional evidence on their claim for someone is negligent;
actual damages. The CA granted respondents’ MR. Hence they did
not appeal the CA’s decision to us. According to the CA: 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge and
Anent Plaintiffs-Appellees’ plea that, in lieu of the Court’s award of
nominal damages, the case be remanded to the Court a quo, in the 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
interest of justice, to enable them to adduce evidence to prove their or contribution on the part of the person injured.17
claim for actual damages, we find the same meritorious.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not
Accordingly, the Decision of the Court is hereby amended to read as ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. "Ordinary" refers to the
follows: usual course of events.18 Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it
is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this
Court a quo appealed from is AFFIRMED. The award of nominal case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the
damages is set aside. Let the records be remanded to the Court a doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw
 47

the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact which the employer becomes liable to the party aggrieved by its
negligent and responsible for the accident. employee if he fails to prove due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employees. 24 The
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case burden of proof that such diligence was observed devolves on the
may be stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged employer who formulated the rules and procedures for the selection
negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily and hiring of his employees.
prudent person in the same situation would have employed? 19 If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit records.25 While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have
any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision
condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.
have known that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips,
was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate
care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and
inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. 26 To fend off
car. vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was
Pascual attempted to exculpate himself from liability by insisting that incumbent on them.27 Here, petitioner-corporation’s evidence hardly
the incident was a caso fortuito. We disagree. included any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in
performing his functions. It also did not have any guidelines for the
maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that
The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on
when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was or inventories of its properties either. Based on these circumstances,
independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the
event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it condition of Pascual’s car or its serviceability.
was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render
it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the
person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in Petitioner-corporation’s argument that the liability attached to
any course of conduct that aggravated the accident. 20 employers only applies in cases involving the supervision of
employees in the transportation business is incorrect. Article 2180 of
the Civil Code states that employers shall be liable for the damage
In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate caused by their employees. The liability is imposed on all those who
cause or contributory cause of the injury or loss. 21 In a vehicular by their industry, profession or other enterprise have other persons in
accident, for example, a mechanical defect will not release the their service or supervision.28 Nowhere does it state that the liability
defendant from liability if it is shown that the accident could have is limited to employers in the transportation business.
been prevented had he properly maintained and taken good care of
the vehicle.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
The circumstances on record do not support the defense of Pascual.
Clearly, there was no caso fortuito because of his want of care and decision29 of the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.
prudence in maintaining the car.
Costs against petitioners.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that
triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive SO ORDERED.
control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the
fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker,
he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper
functioning. No other person, not even the respondents, was charged
******************************************
with that obligation except him.

Where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988
have been under the management or control of a certain person and,
in the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner,
had that person used proper care, the inference is that it occurred vs.
because of lack of such care. 23 The burden of evidence is thus shifted INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO
to defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY
prevent the accident from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly CORPORATION, respondents.
failed.
Edralin S. Mateo for petitioner.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that
respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car Orlando L. Espinas for respondent Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corp.
and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was
parked in a building they owned.
Roberto T. Vallarta for respondent Godofredo Isidro.
On the second assigned error, we find no reason to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals. The relationship between the two
petitioners was based on the principle of pater familias according to
 48

SARMIENTO, J.: counsel for P5,000.00 and P200.00 per court

appearance; that he suffered sleepless nights,
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are 1) the humiliation, wounded feelings which may be
decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court 2 in AC-G.R. CV estimated at P30.000.00.
No. 01055, entitled "Pedro T. Layugan, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
Godofredo Isidro, Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff- On May 29, 1981, a third-party complaint was
Appellee, versus Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation, Third filed by the defendant against his insurer, the
Party Defendant- Appellant, "which reversed and set aside the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the
decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch third-party plaintiff, without admitting his
XXVI, Cabanatuan City, and also dismissed the complaint, third liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-
party complaint, and the counter claims of the parties and 2) the party defendant is liable to the former for
resolution 4 denying the plaintiff-appellee's (herein petitioner) motion contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue
for reconsideration, for lack of merit. of their contract under Insurance Policy No.
11723 which covers the insurer's liability for
The findings of fact by the trial court which were adopted by the damages arising from death, bodily injuries and
appellate court are as follows: 5 damage to property.

xxx xxx xxx Third-party defendant answered that, even

assuming that the subject matter of the complaint
is covered by a valid and existing insurance
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages policy, its liability shall in no case exceed the
against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that on May limit defined under the terms and conditions
15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva stated therein; that the complaint is premature as
Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were no claim has been submitted to the third party
repairing the tire of their cargo truck with Plate defendant as prescribed under the Insurance
No. SU-730 which was parked along the right Code; that the accident in question was
side of the National Highway; that defendant's approximately caused by the carelessness and
truck bearing Plate No. PW-583, driven gross negligence of the plaintiff-, that by reason
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the of the third-party complaint, third-party
plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and defendant was constrained to engage the services
hospitalized at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research of counsel for a fee of P3,000.00.
and Medical Center and the Our Lady of Lourdes
Hospital; that he spent TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (Pl0,000.00) and will incur more Pedro Layugan declared that he is a married man
expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; with one (1) child. He was employed as security
that because of said injuries he would be deprived guard in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, with a
of a lifetime income in the sum of SEVENTY salary of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (600.00) a
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00); and that he month. When he is off-duty, he worked as a truck
agreed to pay his lawyer the sum of TEN helper and while working as such, he sustained
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00). injuries as a result of the bumping of the cargo
truck they were repairing at Baretbet, Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya by the driver of the defendant. He
As prayed for by the plaintiffs counsel, the Court used to earn TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00)
declared the defendant in default on October 12, to THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00)
1979, and plaintiff's evidence was received ex- monthly, at the rate of ONE HUNDRED PESOS
parte on January 11, 1978 and February 19, (Pl00.00) per trip. Due to said injuries, his left leg
1980. The decision on behalf of the plaintiff was was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk.
set aside to give a chance to the defendant to file Prior to the incident, he supported his family
his answer and later on, a third-party complaint. sufficiently, but after getting injured, his family is
now being supported by his parents and brother.
Defendant admitted his ownership of the vehicle
involved in the accident driven by Daniel GODOFREDO ISIDRO, defendant/third-party
Serrano. Defendant countered that the plaintiff plaintiff, testified that his truck involved in this
was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being vehicular accident is insured with the Travellers
a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; Multi Indemnity Corporation covering own
that the truck allegedly being repaired was damage and third-party liability, under vehicle
parked, occupying almost half of the right lane policy No. 11723 (Exh. "1") dated May 30, 1978;
towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the that after he filed the insurance claim the
curve; that the proximate cause of the incident insurance company paid him the sum of
was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in P18,000.00 for the damages sustained by this
installing the early warning device, hence the truck but not the third party liability.
driver of the parked car should be liable for
damages sustained by the truck of the herein
defendant in the amount of more than DANIEL SERRANO, defendant driver, declared
P20,000.00; that plaintiff being a mere bystander that he gave a statement before the municipal
and hitchhiker must suffer all the damages he police of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya on May 16,
incurred. By way of counterclaim defendant 1979; that he knew the responsibilities of a
alleged that due to plaintiffs baseless complaint driver; that before leaving, he checked the truck.
he was constrained to engage the services of The truck owner used to instruct him to be
 49

careful in driving. He bumped the truck being IPSA LOQUITUR" WITH PROPER JURIS-
repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the PRUDENTIAL (sic) BASIS.
same was at a stop position. From the evidence
presented, it has been established clearly that the The crux of the controversy lies in the correctness or error of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by decision of the respondent court finding the petitioner negligent
defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. The police under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur (The thing speaks for
report confirmed the allegation of the plaintiff itself).<äre||anº•1àw> Corollary thereto, is the question as to who is
and admitted by Daniel Serrano on cross- negligent, if the doctrine is inapplicable.
examination. The collision dislodged the jack
from the parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to
the ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained The respondent corporation stresses that the issues raised in the
injuries on his left forearm and left foot. The left petition being factual, the same is not reviewable by this Court in a
leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later petition for review by certiorari. 9
on amputated (Exh. "C") when gangrene had set
in, thereby rendering him incapacitated for work Indeed, it is an elementary rule in the review of decisions of the Court
depriving him of his income. (pp. 118 to 120, of Appeals that its findings of fact are entitled to great respect and
Record on Appeal.) will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court. 10 For if we have to
review every question of fact elevated to us, we would hardly have
xxx xxx xxx any more time left for the weightier issues compelling and deserving
our preferential attention.11 Be that as it may, this rule is not
inflexible. Surely there are established exceptions 12 —when the
Upon such findings, amply supported by the evidence on record, the Court should review and rectify the findings of fact of the lower
trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads as court, such as:
follows: 6
1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the surmise, or conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
defendant is hereby ordered: 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; 5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the
a) To pay the plaintiff SEVENTY THOUSAND issues of the case if the findings are contrary to the admission of both
(P70,000.00) PESOS actual and compensatory the appellant and the appellee; 6) the findings of the Court of Appeals
damages; are contrary to those of the trial court; 7) the said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
b) TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for based; 8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
attorney's fees; main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and 9)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted on record.
c) FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS for
moral damages; and
Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtain in the instant case to warrant a
deviation from the general rule.
d) To pay the costs of this suit. On the third-party
complaint, the third-party defendant is ordered to
indemnify the defendant/third party plaintiff-. From its finding that the parked truck was loaded with ten (10) big
round logs 13 the Court of Appeals inferred that because of its weight
the truck could not have been driven to the shoulder of the road and
a) The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) concluded that the same was parked on a portion of the road 14 at the
PESOS for actual and compensatory damages; time of the accident. Consequently, the respondent court inferred that
and the mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the parked
truck.15 The inference or conclusion is manifestly erroneous. In a
b) The costs of this suit. large measure, it is grounded on speculation, surmise, or conjecture.
How the respondent court could have reversed the finding of the trial
The Intermediate Appellate Court as earlier stated reversed the court that a warning device was installed 16 escapes us because it is
decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint, the third-party evident from the record that really such a device, in the form of a
complaint, and the counter- claims of both appellants. 7 lighted kerosene lamp, was installed by the driver of the parked truck
three to four meters from the rear of his parked truck. 17 We see this
negative finding of the respondent appellate court as a misreading of
Hence, this petition. the facts and the evidence on record and directly contravening the
positive finding of the trial court that an early warning device was in
The petitioner alleges the following errors. 8 proper place when the accident happened and that the driver of the
private respondent was the one negligent. On the other hand, the
respondent court, in refusing to give its "imprimatur to the trial
1. WHETHER UPON THE GIVEN FACTS,
court's finding and conclusion that Daniel Serrano (private
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
respondent Isidro's driver) was negligent in driving the truck that
ACTED CORRECTLY IN REVERSING AND
bumped the parked truck", did not cite specific evidence to support
SETTING ASIDE AND DISMISSING THE
its conclusion. In cavalier fashion, it simply and nebulously adverted
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT.
to unspecified "scanty evidence on record." 18

2. WHETHER THE INTERMEDIATE

On the technical aspect of the case, the respondent corporation would
APPELLATE COURT ACTED CORRECTLY
want us to dismiss this petition on the ground that it was filed out of
IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF "RES
time. It must be noted that there was a motion for extension, 19 albeit
 50

filed erroneously with the respondent court, dated March 19, 1986, Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable.
requesting for 30 days from March 20, 1986, to file the necessary
petition or pleading before the Supreme Court". Also, on April 1, The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the
1986, an appearance of a new lawyer for the petitioner before the rear of the parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was
Supreme Court" with motion 20 was filed, again erroneously, with the placed.28 Moreover, there is the admission of respondent Isidro's
Court of Appeals, requesting for 20 days extension "to file the driver, Daniel Serrano, to Wit: 29
Petition for Review on Certiorari." Likewise a similar motion 21 was
filed with this Court also on April 1, 1986. On the other hand, the
instant petition for review was filed on April 17, 1986 22 but it was Question No. 8 (by Patrolman Josefino Velasco)
only after three months, on August 1, 1986, in its comment 23 that the —Will you narrate to me in brief how the
respondent corporation raised the issue of tardiness. The respondent accident happens (sic) if you can still remember?
corporation should not have waited in ambush before the comment
was required and before due course was given. In any event, to exact Answer: (by Daniel Serrano)
its "a pound of flesh", so to speak, at this very late stage, would cause
a grave miscarriage of justice. Parenthetically, it must be noted that That on or about 10:40 p.m.,
private respondent Isidro did not raise this issue of late filing. 15 May 1979 while driving
Isuzu truck at Baretbet,
We now come to the merits of this petition. Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and
at KM 285, I met another
The question before us is who was negligent? Negligence is the vehicle who (sic) did not dim
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those his (sic) lights which
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human cause (sic) me to be blinded
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and with intense glare of the light
reasonable man would not do24 or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he that's why I did not notice a
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, parked truck who (sic) was
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the repairing a front flat tire.
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers When I was a few meters
injury.25 away, I saw the truck which
was loaded with round logs. I
step (sic) on my foot brakes
In Picart vs. Smith, 26 decided more than seventy years ago but still a but it did not function with
sound rule, we held: my many attempts. I
have (sic) found out later that
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a the fluid pipe on the rear
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing right was cut that's why the
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which breaks did not function.
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? (Emphasis supplied).
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. 30 But
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent, still
bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence
Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm
like a parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee
has the right to be on the highway. He argues that since the parked when gangrene had set in. 31
cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and limb and property, it
was incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who claims It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of
to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing
motorist negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of the evidence. It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the
peril of a parked vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of proving invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to
that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for, escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the respondent
as previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on court committed reversible error.
the road, while the immobile cargo truck had no business, so to
speak, to be there. Likewise, Isidro proffers that the petitioner must
show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he The respondent court ruled: 32
(petitioner) himself, provided an early warning device, like that
required by law, or, by some other adequate means that would xxx xxx xxx
properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked
vehicle posed considering the time, place, and other peculiar In addition to this, we agree with the following
circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the arguments of appellant Godofredo Isidro which
case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa would show that the accident was caused due to
loquitur, evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the the negligence of the driver of the cargo truck:
driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner
herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. 27
xxx xxx xxx
 51

... In the case at bar the caused by an agency or instrumentality under

burden of proving that care exclusive control and management of defendant,
and diligence was (sic) and that the occurrence was such that in the
observed is shifted evidently ordinary course of things would not happen if
to the plaintiff, for, as reasonable care had been used.
adverted to, the motorists
have the right to be on the In this jurisdiction we have applied this doctrine in quite a number of
road, while the immobile cases, notably in Africa et al. vs. Caltex, Inc., et al., 35 and the latest is
truck has no business, so to in the case of F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. CA.36
speak, to be there. It is thus
for the plaintiff to show to the
satisfaction of a reasonable The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to
mind that the driver and he the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
himself did employ early may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
warning device such as that specific proof of negligence. 37 The doctrine is not a rule of
required by law or by some substantive law 38 but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
other adequate means or convenience. 39 The rule, when applicable to the facts and
device that would properly circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not
forewarn vehicles of the dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the
impending danger that the part of the party charged. 40 It merely determines and regulates what
parked vehicle posed shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
considering the time, place plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. 41 The doctrine
and other peculiar can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
circumstances of the involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
occasion. Absent such proof available. 42 Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of
of care, as in the case at bar, inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is
will evoke the presumption of overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents
negligence under the doctrine evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the
of res ipsa loquitur, on the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the
part of the driver of the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances
parked cargo truck as well as attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. 43 Finally, once the actual
plaintiff who was fixing the cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the
flat tire of said truck. (pp. 14- plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and
17, Appellant's Brief). the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been
(Emphasis supplied). so completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can
reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, 44 as in this
case.
At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper
resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res
ipsa loquitur. The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art.
2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently,
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to
accident arose from want of care. 33 Or as Black's Law the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision
Dictionary 34 puts it: he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. 45 In
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses
Rebuttable presumption or inference that that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities
that instrumentality causing injury was in as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful
defendant's exclusive control, and that the in driving. 46
accident was one which ordinarily does not
happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the
loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence first place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities
of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on
fact that accident happened provided character of the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake
accident and circumstances attending it lead fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact
it would not have occurred and that thing which that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in
caused injury is shown to have been under his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no
management and control of alleged record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not
wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial
Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 133, 155. Under doctrine Court given the facts established at the trial 47 The private respondent
of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a
permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive
produces substantial evidence that injury was it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that
 52

Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the
the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from insurance on their house and the contents thereof.
solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we
concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages
by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of against petitioner, praying for a judgment in their favor awarding
evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and
directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) costs. The Court of First Instance held for private respondents:
truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of
his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders
if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against the
prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as defendant:
employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has
not ceased. 1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs
the amount of P80,000.00 for damages suffered
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of by said plaintiffs for the loss of their house, with
the respondent court as well as its Resolution denying the petitioner's interest of 6% from the date of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision Complaint on January 23, 1975, until fully paid;
of the trial court, dated January 20, 1983, is hereby REINSTATED in
toto. With costs against the private respondents. 2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P50,000.00 for the loss of plaintiffs'
SO ORDERED. furnitures, religious images, silverwares,
chinawares, jewelries, books, kitchen utensils,
clothing and other valuables, with interest of 6%
from date of the filing of the Complaint on
January 23, 1975, until fully paid;
******************************************
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs
G.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988 the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages,
P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00
F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner, as and by way of attorney's fees;
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as 4. With costs against the defendant;
substituted by his wife LUZ ALMONTE MABLE and children
DOMING, LEONIDAS, LIGAYA, ELENA, GREGORIO, JR.,
5. Counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of
SALOME, ANTONIO, and BERNARDO all surnamed merit. [CA Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 29-30.]
MABLE, respondents.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on

Luis S. Topacio for petitioner. November 19, 1979, affirmed the decision of the trial court but
reduced the award of damages:
Mauricio M. Monta for respondents.
WHEREFORE, the decision declaring the
defendants liable is affirmed. The damages to be
awarded to plaintiff should be reduced to
CORTES, J.: P70,000.00 for the house and P50,000.00 for the
furniture and other fixtures with legal interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint until
This petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals puts in full payment thereof. [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo,
issue the application of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. p. 35.]

The essential facts of the case are not disputed. A motion for reconsideration was filed on December 3, 1979 but was
denied in a resolution dated February 18, 1980. Hence, petitioner
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was filed the instant petition for review on February 22, 1980. After the
situated adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Sometime in comment and reply were filed, the Court resolved to deny the petition
August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached for lack of merit on June 11, 1980.
Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be
constructed between the shop and private respondents' residence. The However, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the granted, and the petition was given due course on September 12,
early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's 1980. After the parties filed their memoranda, the case was submitted
shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to for decision on January 21, 1981.
put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to
private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were razed
to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never discovered. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred:
The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the
burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable
substances.
 53

1. In not deducting the sum of P35,000.00, which private respondents thereof to the neighboring houses. [Africa v.
recovered on the insurance on their house, from the award of Caltex (Phil.), Inc., supra; Emphasis supplied.]
damages.
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty
2. In awarding excessive and/or unproved damages. of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its
property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently
3. In applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the facts of the complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply
instant case. with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by
the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-
29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]
The pivotal issue in this case is the applicability of the common law
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the issue of damages being merely
consequential. In view thereof, the errors assigned by petitioner shall The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to find
be discussed in the reverse order. petitioner liable for the loss sustained by private respondents.

1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant 2. Since the amount of the loss sustained by private respondents
case petitioner objects to, may be stated as follows: constitutes a finding of fact, such finding by the Court of Appeals
should not be disturbed by this Court [M.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23882, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA
Where the thing which caused the injury 559], more so when there is no showing of arbitrariness.
complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of In the instant case, both the CFI and the Court of Appeals were in
things does not happen if those who have its agreement as to the value of private respondents' furniture and
management or control use proper care, it affords fixtures and personal effects lost in the fire (i.e. P50,000.00). With
reasonable evidence, in the absence of regard to the house, the Court of Appeals reduced the award to
explanation by the defendant, that the accident P70,000.00 from P80,000.00. Such cannot be categorized as arbitrary
arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), considering that the evidence shows that the house was built in 1951
Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 for P40,000.00 and, according to private respondents, its
SCRA 448.] reconstruction would cost P246,000.00. Considering the appreciation
in value of real estate and the diminution of the real value of the peso,
the valuation of the house at P70,000.00 at the time it was razed
Thus, in Africa, supra, where fire broke out in a Caltex service cannot be said to be excessive.
station while gasoline from a tank truck was being unloaded into an
underground storage tank through a hose and the fire spread to and
burned neighboring houses, this Court, applying the doctrine of res 3. While this Court finds that petitioner is liable for damages to
ipsa loquitur, adjudged Caltex liable for the loss. private respondents as found by the Court of Appeals, the fact that
private respondents have been indemnified by their insurer in the
amount of P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house and its
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, contents has not escaped the attention of the Court. Hence, the Court
considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture holds that in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, amount of P35,000.00 should be deducted from the amount awarded
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be as damages. Said article provides:
found thereon.
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of insured, and he has received indemnity from the
petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of insurance company for the injury or loss arising
Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its out of the wrong or breach of contract
shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a city complained of, the insurance company is
ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the wrongdoer or the person who violated the
shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop [CA contract. If the amount paid by the insurance
Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.] company does not fully cover the injury or loss,
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's the deficiency from the person causing the loss or
failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances injury. (Emphasis supplied.]
would suffice to support a finding of negligence.
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are only entitled to
to the neighboring houses were it not for another recover the deficiency from petitioner.
negligent omission on the part of defendants,
namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall On the other hand, the insurer, if it is so minded, may seek
high enough to prevent the flames from leaping reimbursement of the amount it indemnified private respondents from
over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2- petitioner. This is the essence of its right to be subrogated to the
1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it rights of the insured, as expressly provided in Article 2207. Upon
consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which payment of the loss incurred by the insured, the insurer is entitled to
would predictably crumble and melt when be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may
subjected to intense heat. Defendant's negligence, have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act
therefore, was not only with respect to the cause
of the fire but also with respect to the spread
 54

caused the loss [Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co., Inc., decision6 of 21 December 1990 of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial
G.R. No. L-27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 323.] Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 9492.

Under Article 2207, the real party in interest with regard to the The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
indemnity received by the insured is the insurer [Phil. Air Lines, Inc.
v. Heald Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 1031, (1957).] Whether or not the Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the
insurer should exercise the rights of the insured to which it had been Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete
subrogated lies solely within the former's sound discretion. Since the City from January 9, 1978 to September 1989.
insurer is not a party to the case, its identity is not of record and no Between 1987 and September, 1989 she was also
claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer has to the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics
claim his right to reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the and Gynecology at the said Hospital.
insured.
Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications as to private patient sometime before September 21,
the damages awarded for the loss of private respondents' house, 1988.
considering their receipt of P35,000.00 from their insurer: (1) the
damages awarded for the loss of the house is reduced to P35,000.00;
and (2) the right of the insurer to subrogation and thus seek In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr.
reimbursement from petitioner for the P35,000.00 it had paid private Batiquin, with the assistance of Dr. Doris
respondents is recognized. Teresita Sy who was also a Resident Physician at
the same Hospital, C.I. and O.R. Nurse Arlene
Diones and some student nurses performed a
SO ORDERED. simple caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the
Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital and after 45
minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child,
Rachel Acogido, at about 11:45 that morning.
****************************************** Thereafter, Plaintiff remained confined at the
Hospital until September 27, 1988 during which
period of confinement she was regularly visited
G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996 by Dr. Batiquin. On September 28, 1988 Mrs.
Villegas checked out of the Hospital. . . and on
DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN that same day she paid Dr. Batiquin, thru the
BATIQUIN, petitioners, latter's secretary, the amount of P1,500.00 as
vs. "professional fee". . . .
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and
FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS, respondents. Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas
began to suffer abdominal pains and complained
  of being feverish. She also gradually lost her
appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain
medicines. . . which she had been taking up to
December, 1988.
Throughout history, patients have consigned their fates and lives to
the skill of their doctors. For a breach of this trust, men have been
quick to demand retribution. Some 4,000 years ago, the Code of In the meantime, Mrs. Villegas was given a
Hammurabi1 then already provided: "If a physician make a deep Medical Certificate by Dr. Batiquin on October
incision upon a man with his bronze lancet and cause the man's death, 31, 1988. . . certifying to her physical fitness to
or operate on the eye socket of a man with his bronze lancet and return to her work on November 7, 1988. So, on
destroy the man's eyes, they shall cut off his hand." 2 Subsequently, the second week of November, 1988 Mrs.
Hippocrates3 wrote what was to become part of the healer's oath: "I Villegas returned to her work at the Rural Bank
will follow that method of treatment which according to my ability of Ayungon, Negros Oriental.
and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain
from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. . . . While I continue The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring
to keep this oath unviolated may it be granted me to enjoy life and and bothered Mrs. Villegas no end despite the
practice the art, respected by all men at all times but should I trespass medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When
and violate this oath, may the reverse be my lot." At present, the the pains became unbearable and she was rapidly
primary objective of the medical profession if the preservation of life losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at
and maintenance of the health of the people. 4 the Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City on
January 20, 1989.
Needless to say then, when a physician strays from his sacred duty
and endangers instead the life of his patient, he must be made to The evidence of Plaintiffs show that when Dr.
answer therefor. Although society today cannot and will not tolerate Ma. Salud Kho examined Mrs. Villegas at the
the punishment meted out by the ancients, neither will it and this Holy Child's Hospital on January 20, 1989 she
Court, as this case would show, let the act go uncondemned. found Mrs. Villegas to be feverish, pale and was
breathing fast. Upon examination she felt an
The petitioners appeal from the decision 5 of the Court of Appeals of abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus
11 May 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30851, which reversed the which she suspected to be either a tumor of the
 55

uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which could different versions serve only to weaken their
be cancerous. She had an x-ray taken of Mrs. claim against Defendant Batiquin.19
Villegas' chest, abdomen and kidney. She also
took blood tests of Plaintiff. A blood count All told, the trial court held in favor of the petitioners herein.
showed that Mrs. Villegas had [an] infection
inside her abdominal cavity. The results of all
those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest The Court of Appeals reviewed the entirety of Dr. Kho's testimony
that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to and, even without admitting the private respondents' documentary
which the latter agreed. evidence, deemed Dr. Kho's positive testimony to definitely establish
that a piece of rubber was found near private respondent Villegas's
uterus. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. court, holding:
Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge
inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and
right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus 4. The fault or negligence of appellee Dr.
behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material Batiquin is established by preponderance of
on the right side of the uterus embedded on [sic] evidence. The trial court itself had narrated what
the ovarian cyst, 2 inches by 3/4 inch in size. This happened to appellant Flotilde after the caesarean
piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described operation made by appellee doctor. . . . After the
as a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a second operation, appellant Flotilde became well
"rubber glove". . . and which is [sic] also "rubber- and healthy. Appellant Flotilde's troubles were
drain like". . . . It could have been a torn section caused by the infection due to the "rubber" that
of a surgeon's gloves or could have come from was left inside her abdomen. Both appellant;
other sources. And this foreign body was the testified that after the operation made by appellee
cause of the infection of the ovaries and doctor, they did not go to any other doctor until
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by they finally decided to see another doctor in
Mrs. Villegas after her delivery on September 21, January, 1989 when she was not getting any
1988.7 better under the care of appellee Dr. Batiquin. . . .
Appellee Dr. Batiquin admitted on the witness
stand that she alone decided when to close the
The piece of rubber allegedly found near private respondent Flotilde operating area; that she examined the portion she
Villegas's uterus was not presented in court, and although Dr. Ma. operated on before closing the same. . . Had she
Salud Kho Testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for exercised due diligence, appellee Dr. Batiquin
examination,8 it was not mentioned in the pathologist's Surgical would have found the rubber and removed it
Pathology Report.9 before closing the operating area.20

Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the The appellate court then ruled:
piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, 10 a Progress Record,11 an
Anesthesia Record,12 a Nurse's Record,13 and a Physician's Discharge
Summary.14 The trial court, however, regarded these documentary Appellants' evidence show[s] that they paid a
evidence as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or total of P17,000.00 [deposit of P7,100.00 (Exh.
persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the G-1-A) plus hospital and medical expenses
facts therein stated. . . . Except for the Medical Certificate (Exhibit together with doctor's fees in the total amount
"F"), all the above documents were allegedly prepared by persons P9,900.00 (Exhs. G and G-2)] for the second
other than Dr. Kho, and she merely affixed her signature on some of operation that saved her life.
them to express her agreement thereto. . . ." 15 The trial court also
refused to give weight to Dr. Kho's testimony regarding the subject For the miseries appellants endured for more than
piece of rubber as Dr. Kho "may not have had first-hand knowledge" three (3) months, due to the negligence of
thereof,16 as could be gleaned from her statement, thus: appellee Dr. Batiquin they are entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
A . . . I have heard somebody exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00
that [sic] says [sic] there is and attorney's fees in the amount of P25,000.00.
[sic] a foreign body that goes
with the tissues but unluckily The fact that appellant Flotilde can no longer bear
I don't know where the children because her uterus and ovaries were
rubber was. 17 removed by Dr. Kho is not taken into
consideration as it is not shown that the removal
The trial court deemed vital Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that of said organs were the direct result of the rubber
when she confronted Dr. Kho regarding the piece of rubber, "Dr. Kho left by appellee Dr. Batiquin near the uterus.
answered that there was rubber indeed but that she threw it What is established is that the rubber left by
away."18 This statement, the trial court noted, was never denied nor appellee caused infection, placed the life of
disputed by Dr. Kho, leading it to conclude: appellant Flotilde in jeopardy and caused
appellant fear, worry and anxiety. . . .
There are now two different versions on the
whereabouts of that offending "rubber" — (1) WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment,
that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as dismissing the complaint for damages is
testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment
Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. is hereby entered ordering defendants-appellees
The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two to pay plaintiffs-appellants the amounts of
 56

P17,000.00 as and for actual damages; discharge inside the

P100,000.00 as and for moral damages; abdomen, there was an
P20,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and ovarian cyst on the left and
P25,000.00 as and for attorney's fees plus the side and there was also an
costs of litigation. ovarian cyst on the right
which, on opening up or
SO ORDERED.21 freeing it up from the uterus,
turned out to be pus. Both
ovaries turned out. . . to have
From the above judgment, the petitioners appealed to this Court pus. And then, cleaning up
claiming that the appellate court: (1) committed grave abuse of the uterus, at the back of the
discretion by resorting to findings of fact not supported by the uterus it was very dirty, it
evidence on record, and (2) exceeded its discretion, amounting to was full of pus. And there
lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it gave credence to testimonies was a [piece of] rubber, we
punctured with contradictions and falsities. found a [piece of] rubber on
the right
The private respondents commented that the petition raised only side. 24
questions of fact, which were not proper for review by this Court.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. The phrase relied upon by the
While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber
petition for review on certiorari, there are exceptions, among which in private respondent Villegas's abdomen, and that she sent it to a
are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a
conflict, when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the pathologist.25 Not even the Pathologist's Report, although devoid of
evidence on record, or when the appellate court misapprehended the any mention of a piece of rubber, could alter what Dr. Kho saw.
facts.22 Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not
be based on other than first-hand knowledge for, as she asserted
After deciphering the cryptic petition, we find that the focal point of before the trial court:
the instant appeal is the appreciation of Dr. Kho's testimony. The
petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the Q But you are sure you have
following portion of Dr. Kho's testimony: seen [the piece of rubber]?

Q What is the purpose of the A Oh yes. I was not the only

examination? one who saw it. 26

A Just in case, I was just The petitioners emphasize that the private respondents never
thinking at the back of my reconciled Dr. Kho's testimony with Dr. Batiquin's claim on the
mind, just in case this would witness stand that when Dr. Batiquin confronted Dr. Kho about the
turn out to be a medico-legal foreign body, the latter said that there was a piece of rubber but that
case, I have heard somebody  she threw it away. Although hearsay, Dr. Batiquin's claim was not
that [sic] says [sic] there is [s objected to, and hence, the same is admissible 27 but it carries no
ic] a probative value.28 Nevertheless, assuming otherwise, Dr. Batiquin's
foreign body that goes with th statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho found a piece of rubber
e tissues but unluckily I don't  near private respondent Villegas's uterus. And even if we were to
know where the rubber was. doubt Dr. Kho as to what she did to the piece of rubber, i.e., whether
It was not in the Lab, it was she threw it away or sent it to Cebu City, we are not justified in
not in Cebu. 23 (emphasis distrusting her as to her recovery of a piece of rubber from private
supplied) respondent Villegas's abdomen. On this score, it is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some
The petitioners prefer the trial court's interpretation of the facts and disbelieve his testimony with respect to other facts. And it
above testimony, i.e., that Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece has been aptly said that even when a witness is found to have
of rubber was based on hearsay. The Court of Appeals, on deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required
the other hand, concluded that the underscored phrase was that the whole of his uncorroborated testimony be rejected, but such
taken out of context by the trial court. According to the portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. 29
Court of Appeals, the trial court should have likewise
considered the other portions of Dr. Kho's testimony, It is here worth noting that the trial court paid heed to the following
especially the following: portions of Dr. Batiquin's testimony: that no rubber drain was used in
the operation,30 and that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin's
Q So you did actually gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon
conduct the operation on her? removing her gloves.31 Moreover, the trial court pointed out that the
absence of a rubber drain was corroborated by Dr. Doris Sy, Dr.
Batiquin's assistant during the operation on private respondent
A Yes, I did. Villegas.32 But the trial court failed to recognize that the assertions of
Drs. Batiquin and Sy were denials or negative testimonies. Well-
Q And what was the result? settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative
testimony.33 Of course, as the petitioners advocate, such positive
testimony must come from a credible source, which leads us to the
A Opening up her abdomen,
second assigned error.
there was whitish-yellow
 57

While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured injury permits an inference of
Dr. Kho's testimony, a regarding of the said testimony reveals no negligence where plaintiff
such infirmity and establishes Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho produces substantial evidence
was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. Furthermore, no that [the] injury was caused
motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Kho, by an agency or
leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired.34 The trial court's following instrumentality under [the]
declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with exclusive control and
which Dr. Kho handled the piece of rubber, it was not prepared to management of defendant,
doubt Dr. Kho's credibility, thus only supporting our appraisal of Dr. and that the occurrence [sic]
Kho's trustworthiness: was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not
This is not to say that she was less than honest happen if reasonable care had
when she testified about her findings, but it can been used.
also be said that she did not take the most
appropriate precaution to preserve that "piece of x x x           x x x          x x x
rubber" as an eloquent evidence of what she
would reveal should there be a "legal problem" The doctrine of [r]es ipsa
which she claim[s] to have anticipated. 35 loquitur as a rule of evidence
is peculiar to the law of
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, negligence which recognizes
her positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in that prima facie negligence
private respondent Villega's abdomen] prevails over the negative may be established without
testimony in favor of the petitioners. direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court has of negligence. The doctrine is
had occasion to delve into the nature and operation of this doctrine: not a rule of substantive law,
but merely a mode of proof
or a mere procedural
This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: convenience. The rule, when
"Where the thing which causes injury is shown to applicable to the facts and
be under the management of the defendant, and circumstances of a particular
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of case, is not intended to and
things does not happen in those who have the does not dispense with the
management use proper care, it affords requirement of proof of
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an culpable negligence on the
explanation by the defendant, that the accident party charged. It merely
arose from want of care." Or determines and regulates
as Black's Law Dictionary puts it: what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing facilitates the burden of
speaks for itself. Rebuctable plaintiff of proving a breach
presumption or inference that of the duty of due care. The
defendant was negligent, doctrine can be invoked when
which arises upon proof that and only when, under the
[the] instrumentality causing circumstances involved,
injury was in defendant's direct evidence is absent and
exclusive control, and that not readily available.36
the accident was one which
ordinary does not happen in In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are
absence of negligence. Res present. First, the entire proceedings of the caesarean section were
ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private
evidence whereby negligence respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or
of [the] alleged wrongdoer the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private
may be inferred from [the] respondent Villegas's body, which, needless to say, does not occur
mere fact that [the] accident unless through the intersection of negligence. Second, since aside
happened provided [the] from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no
character of [the] accident other operation which could have caused the offending piece of
and circumstances attending rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
it lead reasonably to belief have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr.
that in [the] absence of Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
negligence it would not have presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res
occurred and that thing which ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving
caused injury is shown to behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas's abdomen
have been under [the] and for all the adverse effects thereof.
management and control of
[the] alleged wrongdoer. . . .
Under [this] doctrine As a final word, this Court reiterates its recognition of the vital role
. . . the happening of an the medical profession plays in the lives of the people, 3 7 and the
State's compelling interest to enact measures to protect the public
 58

from "the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc.
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease (JAM) admitted ownership of the subject passenger bus and that
or trauma."38 Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the interest of his Dimayuga was under its employ. However, it denied the allegations
patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best in the Complaint, and claimed that the accident occurred due to the
talent and skill."39 Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner gross negligence of
endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her
profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention of the legal Ramirez. As counterclaim, JAM sought payment of ₱100,000.00 for
standards set forth for professionals, in general, 40 and members of the the damages sustained by the bus, ₱100,000.00 for loss of income,
medical profession,41 in particular. and ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus ₱3,000.00 per court
appearance of counsel.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of 11 May 1994 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30851 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.

Costs against the petitioners. Tan proffered testimonial evidence, summarized by the RTC, and
quoted by the CA, as follows:
SO ORDERED.
LUZ PALANCA TAN, 47 years old, married, a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and a businesswoman, testified to the facts stated in the
complaint that: She is engaged in the business of nets and ropes, and
****************************************** egg dealership based [in] Santa Cruz, Laguna. She supplies her
products to her customers [in] San Pablo and Lucena. On March 14,
1997, while at home, she was informed by her husband that one of
G.R. No. 183198               November 25, 2009 their jeepneys, which was loaded with eggs, was bumped by a JAM
Transit bus when the latter overtook the jeepney. The vehicle was
LUZ PALANCA TAN, Petitioner, driven by one Alexander Ramirez, who has one "Monching" as a
vs. companion. As a result of the accident, she incurred damages in the
JAM TRANSIT, INC., Respondent. amount of ₱650,000.00 based on the following computation:
₱400,000.00 as actual damage sustained by the jeepney, from an
DECISION estimate (Exhibit "D") furnished by Plantilla Motors; ₱142,000.00
for the lost value of the egg shipment, based on a certification issued
by the Calauan Police Station; and ₱15,000.00, for the hospitalization
NACHURA, J.: and treatment of the driver and his companion. The jeepney is duly
registered as evidenced by its registration receipt (Exhibit "G"). On
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules cross examination, she testified that Ramirez, the jeepney driver
of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated June 2, 2008 of when the accident occurred, was under her employ since 1993 and is
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89046 and the still working for her.
reinstatement of the Decision3 dated December 20, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna in Civil On redirect, the plaintiff testified that prior to March 13, 1997, the
Case No. SC-3838. day the accident happened, Ramirez has not met any vehicular
accident and that it was only in the aforestated date when he figured
The antecedents are as follows— in one. On re-cross, she testified that she has no knowledge of
Ramirez’ prior experience as a driver. She did not ask Ramirez for
In her Complaint, petitioner Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she his NBI or police clearance prior to her hiring the said driver. On
was the owner of a passenger-type jitney with plate number DKF- additional redirect, the plaintiff testified that she is satisfied with the
168. On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00 a.m., the said jitney figured performance of Ramirez as a driver as he is kind.
in an accident at an intersection along Maharlika Highway, Barangay
Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit ALEXANDER RAMIREZ, 35 years old, married, resident of Sta.
passenger bus bound for Manila, bearing plate number DVG-557 and Cruz, Laguna, and a driver testified that: He knows the plaintiff Luz
body number 8030. The bus was driven by Eddie Dimayuga Palanca Tan because she is his manager. He worked for her as a
(Dimayuga). driver sometime in 1993. He sometimes drove a jeepney or a truck.

At the time of the collision, Tan’s jitney was loaded with quail eggs On March 13, 1997, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, he
and duck eggs (balot and salted eggs). It was driven by Alexander M. reported for work at his employer’s warehouse located [in]
Ramirez (Ramirez). Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, Pagsawitan, Sta. Cruz. He got the passenger jeep loaded with salted
negligent, imprudent, and not observing traffic rules and regulations, eggs, "balot" and quail eggs for delivery to Lucena City upon
causing the bus to collide with the jitney which was then, with care instruction of Tan. In going to Lucena City, he chose to drive on the
and proper light direction signals, about to negotiate a left turn Maharlika Road at San Isidro, Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna
towards the feeder or barangay road of Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, because it is better than the road along Brgy. Dayap of the same
Laguna going to the Poblacion. The jitney turned turtle along the municipality. However, while at the Maharlika Road, he met an
shoulder of the road and the cargo of eggs was destroyed. Ramirez accident at around 5:00 a.m. The jitney turned turtle.
and his helper were injured and hospitalized, incurring expenses for
medical treatment at the Pagamutang Pangmasa in Bay, Laguna. Tan PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES, 37 years old, married, resident of
prayed for damages in the amount of ₱400,000.00 for the damaged Calauan, Laguna, and a member of PNP-Calauan, Laguna, testified
jitney, ₱142,210.00 for the destroyed shipment, ₱20,000.00 for that: He was on police duty as of March 14, 1997. On that day, he
moral damages, attorney’s fees of ₱20,000.00 plus ₱1,000.00 per issued a certification (Exhibit "B") pertaining to a vehicular accident
court appearance of counsel, and other reliefs warranted under the which occurred earlier. He came to know of the accident as relayed to
premises.
 59

their office by a concerned citizen. He proceeded to the place of the Exhibit "B" - Certification issued by the Calauan Municipal
accident, which was at Maharlika Highway, in an intersection at Police Station regarding the vehicular accident;
Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna for an investigation. Upon reaching
the place, as a rule followed by police officers, he inquired from Exhibit "C" - PNP-Calauan Police Report regarding the
some of the residents about the incident. As relayed to him, the jitney shipment;
jeepney with Plate No. 168 was going towards the direction of San
Isidro, followed by another jeepney, a truck and then by a JAM
Transit bus. The bus overtook the jeepney it was following then side Exhibit "D" - Estimate of damages sustained by the jitney,
swept the jeepney (which figured in the accident) dragging it along from A. Plantilla Motors Repair Shop;
("nakaladkad") towards the sampaguita gardens. [NOTE: The
testimony of the witness regarding the information gathered was Exhibit "E" - Six (6) photographs depicting the site of the
ordered by the Court to be deleted.] Then, he went personally to the vehicular accident;
place where the incident happened.
Exhibit "F" - Four (4) pages of receipts representing
He stated it was cloudy that day. He described the highway where the hospital and medical expenses paid by the plaintiff for
incident happened as having a double straight yellow line which injuries sustained by her driver and helper in the accident;
prohibits overtaking on both sides of the road. The said place is near
the intersection of Maharlika Highway and the barangay road leading Exhibit "G" - Certificate of Registration of plaintiff’s
to Brgy. San Isidro. jitney;

On cross examination, he stated he cannot remember if he was with Exhibit "H" - Driver’s license of Eddie Dimayuga,
other police officers during the investigation of the incident but he defendant’s bus driver;
can recall having interviewed a certain Mercy Ponteiros and one
Rodel, who are both residents of the place.
Exhibit "I" - Sketch of the site where the vehicular accident
occurred.5
On redirect, he stated that the witness Mercy Ponteiros is still
residing at Brgy. Bangyas[.]
On the other hand, JAM offered the following testimonial evidence –
On additional direct examination, he stated that the accident site is
still fresh in his mind and he drew a sketch (Exhibit "F" to "F-7") of EDGARDO DIMAYUGA, 49 years old, married, resident of Sta.
the said place. He identified in the sketch the direction of the Cruz, Laguna and bus driver of JAM Transit Inc., testified that: He
highway which leads to Manila and to Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The road, has been a passenger bus driver since 1983. He was previously
per his approximation, was about 10 meters wide, with the shoulder employed with the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB).
about 5 meters except that it was diminished to about 2 meters on He was employed with JAM Transit since 1992. He has a
account of some encroachment. The highway has a painted professional driver’s license, D-12-78-008462562.
crosswalk. It also has a yellow line without any cut which means no
vehicle could overtake from both sides of the road. He showed in the On March 14, 1997, he reported for work. He met an accident while
sketch the spot where the jitney and the bus were at the time of the driving a bus. The other vehicle involved, a jitney, belongs to Luz
incident. Shown the photographs (Exhibits "E" to "E-6"), he stated Palanca Tan and driven by Alexander Ramirez. The accident
that they are truly reflective of the scene of the incident, the damages happened along the intersection of Maharlika Highway, Brgy.
in both the jeepney and the bus, as of March 13, 1997. Bangyas at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning. He was driving the
bus with a speed of 40 km/h when suddenly, a vehicle overtook the
On cross, he stated that what he saw was the situation after the bus from the right side going to Calauan. He was not able to evade
incident. He came to learn of the accident at around 5:10 in the the vehicle as there was no way for him to do so. The front portion of
morning from a report received by their office, as relayed by a the bus and the mirror were destroyed.
concerned citizen. He remembers that SPO4 Rogelio Medina, now
retired, as one of his companions at the accident site. The site is about On cross examination, he stated that his route as of March 14, 1997
a kilometer away from their police station. He can recall the scene of was Sta. Cruz-Lawton. He cannot recall the bus conductor who was
the incident because of the photographs. The persons he investigated on Bangyas, Calauan. He stated he was not able to evade the jitney as
were the jitney driver, his "pahinante" (helper) and some people in there was no way for him to avoid the situation, causing the jitney to
the vicinity. He could not remember the names of those persons but be dragged to the side. Nothing else happened after the bus hit the
they were listed in the police blotter. jeepney. He and other persons took the driver from the jeepney and
brought him to a hospital.
RODRIGO CONDINO, 38 years old, married, resident of Victoria,
Laguna and a mechanic, testified that: He is a mechanic of Plantilla On redirect, he stated that bus conductors change duties every two or
Motors at Bubucal, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. He knows the plaintiff Luz three days.6
Tan as he and his chief (mechanic) repaired the jeepney owned by the
latter after it figured in an accident on March 13, 1997. He came to
JAM did not offer any documentary counter-evidence.
know of the accident when the said vehicle was brought to their
motor shop. They made an estimate (Exhibit "D") of the damage
sustained by the said vehicle, which amounted to ₱450,000.00.4 Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC found the JAM
passenger bus driver at fault as he was then violating a traffic
regulation when the collision took place. Thus, the RTC ruled in
Tan also formally offered as exhibits the following documents:
favor of Tan and disposed as follows—

Exhibit "A" - Articles of Incorporation of JAM Transit,

Inc.;
 60

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the
who are hereby adjudged to pay the plaintiff jointly and solidarily, doctrine do not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
the following: It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting plaintiff to
present, along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
1. actual damages of ₱142,210.00 for the lost and damaged circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or
cargoes; ₱400,000.00 for the destroyed jitney; ₱1,327.00 presumption of negligence, and thereby placing on defendant the
medical expenses of the jitney driver and his companion, burden of going forward with the proof. 9 Still, before resort to the
for a total amount of [₱543,537.00]; doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:
2. ₱10,000.00 as moral damages;
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone’s negligence;
3. ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
4. Costs of suit[.] control of the defendant or defendants; and

SO ORDERED.7 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would

make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. 10
Aggrieved, JAM appealed to the CA. The CA granted the appeal and
dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was nothing on Was petitioner able to establish the above requisites? We answer in
record that supported the RTC’s finding that the JAM passenger bus the affirmative. We do not subscribe to the finding of the CA that
was overtaking Tan’s jitney. The CA noted that Ramirez only petitioner had direct access to the evidence surrounding the accident,
testified that, on March 14, 1997, he met an accident at around 5:00 but since she failed to present it, the doctrine would not operate to
a.m., while transporting eggs along Maharlika Road in San Isidro, apply. While Ramirez took the witness stand, he was only able to
Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, causing the jitney he was testify that he drove along Maharlika Highway in San Isidro,
driving to turn turtle. The CA also observed that the Certification Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, Tan’s passenger jitney loaded
(Exhibit "B") made no mention that the JAM passenger bus was with salted eggs, balot and quail eggs for delivery at around 5:00 a.m.
overspeeding or that it was overtaking the jitney; and, thus, there was when he met an accident, causing the vehicle to turn turtle.
no evidence as to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent Obviously, Ramirez had no vivid recollection of how the passenger
in connection with the vehicular accident. The CA held that the jitney was actually hit by the JAM passenger bus. Further, for some
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct unknown reasons, the other possible eyewitnesses to the mishap were
evidence is nonexistent or not accessible. It further said that Tan had not available to testify. With the dearth of testimonial or direct
access to direct evidence as to the precise cause of the mishap, such evidence, should petitioner now be left without remedy? The answer
that the circumstances of the vehicular accident or the specific act is NO.
constituting the supposed negligence of Dimayuga could have been
testified to by Ramirez or by the latter’s companion. The CA
concluded that res ipsa loquitur could not apply in this case because We cannot agree with the CA when it said that how the incident
the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of establishing happened could not be established, neither from the photographs
proof of negligence. offered in evidence in favor of petitioner, nor from the
Certification11 that quoted an excerpt from the records on the Police
Blotter of the Calauan Municipal Police Station. The CA, likewise,
Hence, this petition, with petitioner positing that the doctrine of res discounted the probative value of the Police Blotter because, although
ipsa loquitur is applicable given the circumstances of the case. prepared in the regular performance of official duty, it was not
conclusive proof of the truth of its entries, since police blotters are
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means "the thing or usually incomplete and inaccurate; and sometimes based on partial
the transaction speaks for itself." It is a maxim for the rule that the suggestion, inaccurate reporting and hearsay.12
fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of It is worth noting, however, that photographs are in the nature of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a physical evidence13 -- a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the ranking high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 14 When duly
thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful
management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the representations of the subject as of the time in question, they are, in
ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had the discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids in
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable arriving at an understanding of the evidence, the situation or
evidence -- in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical condition of objects or premises, or the circumstances of an
explanation by defendant -- that the accident arose from or was accident.15
caused by the defendant’s want of care. This rule is grounded on the
superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of
such experience or common knowledge that negligence may be The photographs16 proffered by petitioner indeed depicted the relative
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the positions of her jitney and of the JAM passenger bus immediately
rule is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common after the accident took place. An examination of the photographs
knowledge.8 would readily show that the highway where the accident occurred
was marked by two yellow continuous parallel lines at the center,
separating the right lane from the left. Based on evidence, the JAM
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does passenger bus was moving along the highway towards Manila, and
not constitute an independent or separate ground for liability. Instead, the jitney was going along the same route, until it was about to turn
it is considered as merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere left to the barangay road towards the Poblacion. After the incident,
procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and the photographs would show that both vehicles were found on the
relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of opposite lane of the highway. The front right portion of the bus was
 61

shown to have collided with or hit the left portion of the jitney with driven by Dimayuga, that caused the jitney to turn turtle at the road
such an impact, causing the latter to turn turtle with extensive shoulder causing damages on the jitney, the cargoes and injuries to
damage, injuring its driver and his companion, and completely the jitney driver and his companion. It was allegedly improper for the
destroying its cargo.17 bus to overtake as the road bears a double yellow line at the middle
which prohibits overtaking.
Although the person who took the pictures was not able to testify
because he predeceased the trial, Senior Police Officer II Daniel On the other hand, the bus driver who is the lone witness/evidence
Escares (Escares) was recalled to the witness stand to authenticate the for the defendant testified he was driving at the Maharlika Highway
said pictures. He testified that the pictures were faithful at 40 km/hr when the jitney "overtook" from the right and that there
representations of the circumstances immediately after the was no way for him to evade the latter so it was dragged to the side
accident.18 Escares also made an appropriately labeled sketch 19 of the [TSN, May 18, 2006, p. 13]. In its memorandum, defendants
situation after the collision, and testified as to the physical postulate that it was the jitney driver who was negligent as it
circumstances thereof, including the width of the road and the road overtook the bus from the right which is not proper. Plaintiff
shoulder, especially the double yellow lines at the center of the allegedly could not claim damages for its failure to prove the bus
highway.20 driver’s negligence, and it was the jitney’s own negligence that is the
proximate cause of his injury.
As regards police blotters, it should be remembered that although
they are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and No direct evidence was presented with respect to the exact road
considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts position of the bus and the jitney at the time of the collision such that
stated therein. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the same can only be inferred from the pictures of the colliding
the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie vehicles taken immediately after the incident [Exhibits "E"].
evidence of the facts therein stated, and their probative value may be
either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. 21 In this At this juncture, it was established from exhibits "E-5" and "E-6" that
case, the Certification,22 whose entries were adopted from the police the jitney’s left side portion was directly hit by the front-right portion
blotter of the Calauan Municipal Police Station, the sketch 23 prepared of the bus. This is consistent with the plaintiff’s theory that the jitney
by Escares, and the photographs, taken together would prove that the was then negotiating the left portion of the road when it was hit by
jitney and the bus were going along the same way; that the jitney was the oncoming bus causing the jitney to have a 90-degree turn around.
about to negotiate the intersection going to the left towards the feeder The bus and the jitney were almost perpendicular to each other when
road in the direction of the Poblacion; and that the bus hit the left- the collision took place, with the bus directly hitting the jitney head
turning jitney causing the smaller vehicle to turn turtle. on.

Indeed, no two motor vehicles traversing the same lane of a highway The statement of the bus driver that the jitney "overtook" from the
with double yellow center lines will collide as a matter of course, right only presumes that at the point of collision, the bus was at the
both ending up on the opposite lane, unless someone is negligent. left lane of the road overtaking the vehicle/s at the right. This
Dimayuga was driving the JAM passenger bus which, from the scenario, in fact, was affirmed by the police report of the incident
evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with [Exhibit "B"]. It is not quite logical that the jitney, in allegedly
petitioner’s jitney. Driving the bus gave Dimayuga exclusive overtaking the bus from the right came from the right shoulder of the
management and control over it. Despite the claim of JAM to the road, a rough road merely 5 meters in width [Exhibit "F"] and even
contrary, no contributory negligence could be attributed to Ramirez diminished by two (2) meters because of the encroachment at the
relative to the incident on the basis of the available evidence. sides [TSN, 11-6-02]. No evidence was shown that the jitney came
Inevitably, the requisites being present, the doctrine of res ipsa from the right shoulder. The jitney then loaded with eggs for
loquitur applies. delivery, was about to negotiate the left lane towards the
feeder/barangay road intersection, and it would be illogical in such a
We, thus, quote with concurrence the findings of the RTC— situation that the jitney driver would take the right shoulder. The
foregoing suggest the fact that the bus overtook the passing vehicles
As both parties are asserting claim for the damages each has at the right lane and in the course thereof, the jitney in front that was
respectively sustained from the subject collision, the negligence of about to negotiate the left lane, was hit. 24
either driver of the bus or of the jitney must be shown, and the burden
to prove the negligence, by preponderance of evidence, lies upon Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the JAM passenger
both who are alleging the other’s negligence. Preponderance of bus was overtaking the vehicles running along the right lane of the
evidence is "evidence as a whole which is superior to that of the highway from the left lane, the available evidence readily points to
defendant {or the other}" [Pacific Banking Employees Organization such fact. There were two continuous yellow lines at the center of the
vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495]. highway, which meant that no vehicle in the said area should
overtake another on either side of the road. The "double yellow
To prove negligence of the bus driver, plaintiff relies heavily upon center lines" regulation, which this Court takes judicial notice of as
the testimony of PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES, who identified the an internationally recognized pavement regulation, was precisely
police report of the incident [Exhibit "B"] as well as the sketch of the intended to avoid accidents along highways, such as what happened
site [Exhibit "I"] and the pictures taken as reflective of the scene of in this case. This prohibition finds support in Republic Act (R.A.)
the incident [Exhibits "E" with sub-markings], invoking [in plaintiff’s No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), Section
memorandum] the application of the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitor." 41(e).25 Furthermore, it is observed that the area of collision was an
intersection. Section 41(c)26 of R.A. No. 4136, likewise, prohibits
overtaking or passing any other vehicle proceeding in the same
From the said exhibits, the plaintiff postulates that her jitney then direction at any intersection of highways, among others. Thus, by
being driven by Alexander Ramirez, as well as the bus driven by overtaking on the left lane, Dimayuga was not only violating the
defendant Dimayuga were heading the same direction towards "double yellow center lines" regulation, but also the prohibition on
Manila, but when the jitney was about to negotiate the left side road overtaking at highway intersections. Consequently, negligence can be
intersection towards the feeder/Barangay road of Brgy. Bangyas, attributed only to him, which negligence was the proximate cause of
Calauan, Laguna, it was bumped by the oncoming/overtaking bus
 62

the injury sustained by petitioner. This prima facie finding of temperate damages. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
negligence was not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by damages may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered
Dimayuga. Therefore, a finding that he is liable for damages to but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. 31 We, however,
petitioner is warranted.1avvphi1 sustain the trial court’s award of ₱1,327.00 as regards the medical
expenses incurred by petitioner, the same being duly supported by
The liability of Dimayuga is solidary with JAM, pursuant to Article receipts.32
2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which provides— The award of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit are sustained, the same being in
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, order and authorized by law. Although the basis for the award of
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage attorney’s fees was not indicated in the trial court’s Decision, we
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual deem it justified as petitioner was compelled to litigate before the
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed courts and incur expenses in order to vindicate her rights under the
by the provisions of this Chapter. premises.33

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89046 is
whom one is responsible. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 20,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna in
Civil Case No. SC-3838 is REINSTATED with the
xxxx MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages is reduced to
₱1,327.00, and, in lieu of actual damages with respect to the damage
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees or loss sustained with respect to the passenger jitney and the cargo of
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, eggs, the amount of ₱250,000.00 is awarded by way of temperate
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. damages.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. ******************************************

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to G.R. No. L-21749             September 29, 1967
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
section (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
employees.27 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its vs.
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption, by LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
employee.28 H. San Luis and L.V. Simbulan for defendant-appellant.

In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not
present any other evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, in
its favor. Inevitably, the presumption of its negligence as Dimayuga’s
employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the damages
sustained by petitioner.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

As regards the award for actual damages, we, however, concur with
respondent that the award of ₱400,000.00 for the damage to the The present case comes by direct appeal from a decision of the Court
jitney is not warranted, considering that the evidence submitted to of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 44572) adjudging the
support this claim was merely an estimate made by A. Plantilla defendant-appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, liable in
Motors. The same reason holds true with respect to the amount of damages to the plaintiff-appellee Republic of the Philippines.
damages for the destroyed cargo of eggs, considering that the
document submitted by petitioner to support the claim of In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned by
₱142,210.00 was merely a Certification, 29 as the information found the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig
thereon was supplied by petitioner herself per the number of pieces of river by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero"1 also belonging to the
the different eggs and the corresponding price per piece. same corporation, when the barge rammed against one of the wooden
piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causing
To warrant an award of actual or compensatory damages for repair to the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was swollen and the current
damage sustained, the best evidence should be the receipts or other swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila and the
documentary proofs of the actual amount expended. 30 However, surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960.
considering that it was duly proven that the jitney was damaged and
had to be repaired, as it was repaired, and that the cargo of eggs was Sued by the Republic of the Philippines for actual and consequential
indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts expended or lost were not damage caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000 (Civil Case
proven, we deem it appropriate to award ₱250,000.00 by way of No. 44562, CFI of Manila), defendant Luzon Stevedoring
 63

Corporation disclaimed liability therefor, on the grounds that it had 2) Whether or not it was error for the Court to have
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its permitted the plaintiff-appellee to introduce additional
employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force evidence of damages after said party had rested its case.
majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan
bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation. As to the first question, considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an
immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with
After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges
holding the defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees like of appellant's, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the
and ordering it to pay to plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge
Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to P192,561.72, with legal supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint. or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in
the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper
Defendant appealed directly to this Court assigning the following care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises
errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit: by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule (Scott vs. London
Docks Co., 2 H & C 596; San Juan Light & Transit Co. vs. Requena,
224 U.S. 89, 56 L. Ed., 680; Whitwell vs. Wolf, 127 Minn. 529, 149
I — The lower court erred in not holding that the herein N.W. 299; Bryne vs. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 269 Mass.
defendant-appellant had exercised the diligence required of 130; 168 N.E. 540; Gribsby vs. Smith, 146 S.W. 2d 719).
it in the selection and supervision of its personnel to
prevent damage or injury to others.1awphîl.nèt
The appellant strongly stresses the precautions taken by it on the day
in question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow
II — The lower court erred in not holding that the ramming down river its barge L-1892; that it assigned to the task the more
of the Nagtahan bailey bridge by barge L-1892 was caused competent and experienced among its patrons, had the towlines,
by force majeure. engines and equipment double-checked and inspected; that it
instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes that it
III — The lower court erred in not holding that the had done all it was called to do, and that the accident, therefore,
Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction, if not a menace, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event.
to navigation in the Pasig river.
These very precautions, however, completely destroy the appellant's
IV — The lower court erred in not blaming the damage defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are
sustained by the Nagtahan bailey bridge to the improper identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) 2 by
placement of the dolphins. definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable,
"events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
V — The lower court erred in granting plaintiff's motion to inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore,
adduce further evidence in chief after it has rested its case. not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible
to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is
VI — The lower court erred in finding the plaintiff entitled not impossibility to foresee the same: "un hecho no constituye caso
to the amount of P192,561.72 for damages which is clearly fortuito por la sola circunstancia de que su existencia haga mas dificil
exorbitant and without any factual basis. o mas onerosa la accion diligente del presento ofensor" (Peirano
Facio, Responsibilidad Extra-contractual, p. 465; Mazeaud Trait de
However, it must be recalled that the established rule in this la Responsibilite Civil, Vol. 2, sec. 1569). The very measures adopted
jurisdiction is that when a party appeals directly to the Supreme by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only
Court, and submits his case there for decision, he is deemed to have foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.
waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial
Court. The only questions that may be raised are those of law Otherwise stated, the appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation,
(Savellano vs. Diaz, L-17441, July 31, 1963; Aballe vs. Santiago, L- knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and
16307, April 30, 1963; G.S.I.S. vs. Cloribel, L-22236, June 22, its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving
1965). A converso, a party who resorts to the Court of Appeals, and obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not shed
submits his case for decision there, is barred from contending later responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to
that his claim was beyond the jurisdiction of the aforesaid Court. The be insufficient. Hence, the lower Court committed no error in holding
reason is that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable it negligent in not suspending operations and in holding it liable for
practice of appellants' submitting their cases for decision to either the damages caused.
court in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of
attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable (Tyson
Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros) et al., L-10096, Res. It avails the appellant naught to argue that the dolphins, like the
on Motion to Reconsider, March 23, 1966). Consequently, we are bridge, were improperly located. Even if true, these circumstances
limited in this appeal to the issues of law raised in the appellant's would merely emphasize the need of even higher degree of care on
brief. appellant's part in the situation involved in the present case. The
appellant, whose barges and tugs travel up and down the river
everyday, could not safely ignore the danger posed by these allegedly
Taking the aforesaid rules into account, it can be seen that the only improper constructions that had been erected, and in place, for years.
reviewable issues in this appeal are reduced to two:
On the second point: appellant charges the lower court with having
1) Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the abused its discretion in the admission of plaintiff's additional
supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused evidence after the latter had rested its case. There is an insinuation
by fortuitous event or force majeure, and that the delay was deliberate to enable the manipulation of evidence
to prejudice defendant-appellant.
 64

We find no merit in the contention. Whether or not further evidence xxx xxx xxx
will be allowed after a party offering the evidence has rested his case,
lies within the sound discretion of the trial Judge, and this discretion Negligence of Charterers and/or Repairers,
will not be reviewed except in clear case of abuse. 3 provided such Charterers and/or Repairers are not
an Assured hereunder.
In the present case, no abuse of that discretion is shown. What was
allowed to be introduced, after plaintiff had rested its evidence in xxx xxx xxx
chief, were vouchers and papers to support an item of P1,558.00
allegedly spent for the reinforcement of the panel of the bailey
bridge, and which item already appeared in Exhibit GG. Appellant, in provided such loss or damage has not resulted
fact, has no reason to charge the trial court of being unfair, because it from want of due diligence by the Assured, the
was also able to secure, upon written motion, a similar order dated Owners or Managers of the Vessel, of any of
November 24, 1962, allowing reception of additional evidence for the them Masters, Officers, Crew or Pilots are not to
said defendant-appellant.4 be considered Owners within the meaning of this
Clause should they hold shares in the Vessel. 2
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the lower Court
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed. Costs against the Petitioner CSEW was also insured by Prudential for third party
defendant-appellant. liability under a Shiprepairer's Legal Liability Insurance Policy. The
policy was for P10 million only, under the limited liability clause, to
wit:

****************************************** 7. Limit of Liability

The limit of liability under this insurance, in

G.R. No. 132607 May 5, 1999
respect of any one accident or series of accidents,
arising out of one occurrence, shall be [P10
CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS, million], including liability for costs and expense
INC., petitioner, which are either:
vs.
WILLIAM LINES, INC. and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE and
(a) incurred with the written consent of the
ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents. underwriters hereon, or

 
(b) awarded against the Assured.3

PURISIMA, J.: On February 5, 1991, William Lines, Inc. brought its vessel, M/V
Manila City, to the Cebu Shipyard in Lapulapu City for annual dry-
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the docking and repair.
Revised Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeal1 which affirmed the decision of the trial court of origin
On February 6, 1991, an arrival conference was held between
finding the petitioner herein, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, representatives of William Lines, Inc. and CSEW to discuss the work
Inc. (CSEW) negligent and liable for damages to the private
to be undertaken on the M/V Manila City.
respondent, William Lines, Inc., and to the insurer, Prudential
Guarantee Assurance Company, Inc.
The contracts, denominated as Work Orders, were signed thereafter,
with the following stipulations:
The antecedent facts that matter are as follows:

10. The Contractor shall replace at its own work

Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. (CSEW) is a domestic
and at its own cost any work or material which
corporation engaged in the business of dry-docking and repairing of can be shown to be defective and which is
marine vessels while the private respondent, Prudential Guarantee
communicated in writing within one (1) month of
and Assurance, Inc. (Prudential), also a domestic corporation is in the redelivery of the vessel or if the vessel was not in
non-life insurance business.
the Contractor's Possession, the withdrawal of the
Contractor's workmen, or at its option to pay a
William Lines, Inc. (plaintiff below) is in the shipping business. It the sum equal to the cost of such replacement at its
owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which own works. These conditions shall apply to any
caught fire and sank on February 16, 1991. At the time of the such replacements.
unfortunate occurrence sued upon, subject vessel was insured with
Prudential for P45,000,000.00 pesos for hull and machinery. The 11. Save as provided in Clause 10, the Contractor
Hull Policy included an "Additional Perils (INCHMAREE)" Clause
shall not be under any liability to the Customer
covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, either in contract or for delict or quasi-delict or
among others, ship repairmen. The Policy provided as follows:
otherwise except for negligence and such liability
shall itself be subject to the following overriding
Subject to the conditions of this Policy, this limitations and exceptions, namely:
insurance also covers loss of or damage to Vessel
directly caused by the following: (a) The total liability of the
Contractor to the Customer
 65

(over and above the liability representing loss of income of M/V MANILA
to replace under Clause 10) CITY, with interest at the legal rate until full
or of any sub-contractor shall payment is made.
be limited in respect of any
defect or event (and a series 3. To pay unto plaintiff, William Lines, Inc. the
of accidents arising out of the amount of Eleven Million (P11 million) as
same defect or event shall payment, in addition to what it received from the
constitute one defect or insurance company to fully cover the injury or
event) to the sum of Pesos loss, in order to replace the M/V MANILA
Philippine Currency One CITY, with interest at the legal rate until full
Million only. payment is made;

(b) In no circumstance 4. To pay unto plaintiff, William Lines, Inc. the

whatsoever shall the liability sum of Nine Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand
of the Contractor or any Sub- Thirty-nine (P927,039.00) Pesos for the loss of
Contractor include any sum fuel and lub (sic) oil on board the vessel when
in respect of loss of profit or she was completely gutted by fire at defendant,
loss of use of the vessel or Cebu Shipyard's quay, with interest at the legal
damages consequential on rate until full payment is made;
such loss of use
5. To pay unto plaintiff, William Lines, Inc. the
xxx xxx xxx sum of Three Million Fifty-four Thousand Six
Hundred Seventy-seven Pesos and Ninety-five
20. The insurance on the vessel should be centavos (P3,054.677.95) as payment for the
maintained by the customer and/or owner of the spare parts and materials used in the M/V
vessel during the period the contract is in effect. 4 MANILA CITY during dry-docking with interest
at the legal rate until full payment is made;
While the M/V Manila City was undergoing dry-docking and repairs
within the premises of CSEW, the master, officers and crew of M/V 6. To pay unto plaintiff William Lines, Inc., the
Manila City stayed in the vessel using their cabins as living quarters. sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000 00)
Other employees hired by William Lines to do repairs and Pesos in moral damages;
maintenance work on the vessel were also present during the dry-
docking. 7. To pay unto plaintiff, William Lines, Inc. the
amount of Ten Million (P10,000.000.00) Pesos in
On February 16, 1991, after subject vessel was transferred to the attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of this suit.
docking quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to its eventual total
loss. CSEW (defendant below) appealed the aforesaid decision to the
Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, CSEW and
On February 21, 1991, William Lines, Inc. filed a complaint for William Lines presented a "Joint Motion for Partial Dismissal" with
damages against CSEW, alleging that the fire which broke out in prejudice, on the basis of the amicable settlement inked between
M/V Manila City was caused by CSEW's negligence and lack of care. Cebu Shipyard and William Lines only.

On July 15, 1991 was filed an Amended Complaint impleading On July 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals ordered the partial dismissal
Prudential as co-plaintiff, after the latter had paid William Lines, Inc. of the case insofar as CSEW and William Lines were concerned.
the value of the hull and machinery insurance on the M/V Manila
City. As a result of such payment Prudential was subrogated to the On September 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed
claim of P45 million, representing the value of the said insurance it decision of the trial court, ruling thus:
paid.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court
On June 10, 1994, the trial court a quo came out with a judgment ordering the defendant, Cebu Shipyard and
against CSEW, disposing as follows: Engineering Works, Inc. to pay the plaintiff
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in subrogee, the sum of P45 Million, with interest at
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, the legal rate until full payment is made, as
ordering the latter. contained in the decision of Civil Case No. CEB-
9935 is hereby AFFIRMED.
1. To pay unto plaintiff Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance Inc., the subrogee, the amount of With the denial of its motion for reconsideration by the Court of
Forty-five Million (P45 million) Pesos, with Appeal's Resolution dated February 13, 1998, CSEW found its way
interest at the legal rate until full payment is to this court via the present petition, contending that:
made.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
2. To pay unto plaintiff, William Lines, Inc., the REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
amount of Fifty-six Million Seven Hundred CSEW HAD "MANAGEMENT AND
Fifteen Thousand (P56,715,000.00) Pesos SUPERVISORY CONTROL" OF THE M/V
 66

MANILA CITY AT THE TIME THE FIRE fire as the crew cabins on either side of the
BROKE OUT. passageway were locked. He immediately sought
out the proprietor of JNB, Mr. Buenavista, and
II THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED the Safety officer CSEW, Mr. Aves, who
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING THE sounded the fire alarm. CSEW's fire brigade
DOCTRINE OF RES immediately responded as well as the other fire
IPSA LOQUITUR AGAINST CSEW. fighting units in Metro Cebu. However, there
were no WLI representative, officer or crew to
guide the firemen inside the vessel.
III THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
HOLDING CSEW NEGLIGENT AND
THEREBY LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF THE Despite the combined efforts of the firemen of
M/V MANILA CITY IS BASED FINDINGS OF the Lapulapu City Fire Department, Mandaue
FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. Fire Cordova Fire Department, Emergency
Rescue Unit Foundation, and fire brigade of
CSEW, the fire was not controlled until 2:00
IV THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED a.m., of the following day, February 17, 1991.
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING CSEW'S
EXPERT EVIDENCE AS INADMISSIBLE OR
OF NO PROBATIVE VALUE. On the early morning of February 17, 1991, gusty
winds rekindled the flames on the vessel and fire
again broke out. Then the huge amounts of water
V THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A pumped into the vessel, coupled with the strong
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT current, caused the vessel to tilt until it capsized
PRUDENTIAL HAS THE RIGHT OF and sank.
SUBROGATION AGAINST ITS OWN
INSURED.
When M/V Manila City capsized, steel and angle
bars were noticed to have been newly welded
VI ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT along the port side of the hull of the vessel, at the
PRUDENTIAL HAS THE RIGHT OF level of the crew cabins. William Lines did not
SUBROGATION AND THAT CSEW WAS previously apply for a permit to do hotworks on
NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF the said portion of the ship as it should have done
ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE pursuant to its work order with CSEW.5
SHIPREPAIR CONTRACTS. THE
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS LIMITING
CSEW'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE TO Respondent Prudential, on the other hand, theorized that the fire
A MAXIMUM OF P 1 MILLION IS NOT broke out in the following manner:
VALID, CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE
RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT. At around eleven o'clock in the morning of
February 16, 1991, the Chief Mate of M/V
Petitioner's version of the events that led to the fire runs as follows: Manila City was inspecting the various works
being done by CSEW on the vessel, when he saw
that some workers of CSEW were cropping out
On February 13, 1991, the CSEW completed the steel plates Tank Top No. 12 using acetylene,
drydocking of M/V Manila City at its grave dock. oxygen and welding torch. He also observed that
It was then transferred to the docking quay of the rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-
CSEW where the remaining repair to be done conditioning unit was already burning, prompting
was the replating of the top of Water Ballast him to scold the workers.
Tank No. 12 (Tank Top No. 12) which was
subcontracted by CSEW to JNB General
Services. Tank Top No. 12 was at the rear section At 2:45 in the afternoon of the same day,
of the vessel, on level with the flooring of the witnesses saw smoke coming from Tank No. 12.
crew cabins located on the vessel's second deck. The vessel's reeferman reported such occurence
to the Chief Mate who immediately assembled
the crew members to put out the fire. When it
At around seven o'clock in the morning of was too hot for them to stay on board and seeing
February 16, 1991, the JNB workers trimmed and that the fire cannot be controlled, the vessel's
cleaned the tank framing which involved minor crew were forced to withdraw from CSEW's
hotworks (welding/cutting works). The said work docking quay.
was completed at about 10:00 a.m. The JNB
workers then proceeded to rig the steel plates,
after which they had their lunch break. The In the morning of February 17, 1991, M/V
rigging was resumed at 1:00 p.m. Manila City sank. As the vessel was insured with
Prudential Guarantee, William Lines filed a claim
for constructive loss, and after a thorough
While in the process of rigging the second steel investigation of the surrounding circumstances of
plate, the JNB workers noticed smoke coming the tragedy, Prudential Guaranteed found the said
from the passageway along the crew cabins. insurance claim to be meritorious and issued a
When one of the workers, Mr. Casas, proceeded check in favor of William Lines in the amount of
to the passageway to ascertain the origin of the P 45 million pesos representing the total value of
smoke, he noticed that smoke was gathering on M/V Manila City's hull and machinery
the ceiling of the passageway but did not see any insurance.6
 67

The petition is unmeritorious. The facts and evidence on record reveal the concurrence of said
conditions in the case under scrutiny. First, the fire that occurred and
Petitioner CSEW faults the Court of Appeals for adjudging it consumed M/V Manila City would not have happened in the ordinary
negligent and liable for damages for the respondents, William Lines, course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised.
Inc., and Prudential for the loss of M/V Manila City. It is petitioner's In other words, some negligence must have occurred. Second, the
submission that the finding of negligence by the Court of Appeals is agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and the
not supported by the evidence on record, and contrary to what the Court of Appeals and as shown by the records, is the herein
Court of Appeals found, petitioner did not have management and petitioner, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc., which had
control over M/V Manila City. Although it was brought to the control over subject vessel when it was docketed for annual repairs.
premises of CSEW for annual repair, William Lines, Inc. retained So also, as found by the regional trial court, "other responsible
control over the vessel as the ship captain remained in command and causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff, and third persons, are
the ship's crew were still present. While it imposed certain rules and sufficiently eliminated by the evidence. 11
regulations on William Lines, it was in the exercise of due diligence
and not an indication of CSEW's exclusive control over subject What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence
vessel. Thus, CSEW maintains that it did not have exclusive control to prove that the workers and/or employees of CSEW were remiss in
over the M/V Manila City and the trial court and the Court of their duty of exercising due diligence in the care of subject vessel.
Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW was
really negligent. Thus, even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa
Time and again, this Court had occasion to reiterate the well- loquitur, in light of the direct evidence on record, the ineluctable
established rule that factual findings by the Court of Appeals are conclusion is that the petitioner, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering
conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. They Works, Inc., was negligent and consequently liable for damages to
are entitled to great weight and respect, even finality, especially the respondent, William Lines, Inc.
when, as in this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual
findings arrived at by the trial court. 7 When supported by sufficient Neither is there tenability in the contention of petitioner that the
evidence, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals affirming those of Court of Appeals erroneously ruled on the inadmissibility of the
the trial court, are not to be disturbed on appeal. The rationale behind expert testimonies it (petitioner) introduced on the probable cause
this doctrine is that review of the findings of fact of the Court of and origin of the fire. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals
Appeals is not a function that the Supreme Court normally erred in disregarding the testimonies of the fire experts, Messrs.
undertakes.8 David Grey and Gregory Michael Southeard, who testified on the
probable origin of the fire in M/V Manila City. Petitioner avers that
Here, the Court of Appeals and the Cebu Regional Trial Court of since the said fire experts were one in their opinion that the fire did
origin are agreed that the fire which caused the total loss of subject not originate in the area of Tank Top No. 12 where the JNB workers
M/V Manila City was due to the negligence of the employees and were doing hotworks but on the crew accommodation cabins on the
workers of CSEW. Both courts found that the M/V Manila City was portside No. 2 deck, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should
under the custody and control of petitioner CSEW, when the ill-fated have given weight to such finding based on the testimonies of fire
vessel caught fire. The decisions of both the lower court and the experts; petitioner argues.
Court of Appeals set forth clearly the evidence sustaining their
finding of actionable negligence on the part of CSEW. This factual But courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses.
finding is conclusive on the parties. The court discerns no basis for Although they may have probative value, reception in evidence of
disturbing such finding firmly anchored on enough evidence. As held expert testimonies is within the discretion of the court. Section 49,
in the case of Roblett Industrial Construction Corporation vs. Court Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
of Appeals, "in the absence of any showing that the trial court failed
to appreciate facts and circumstances of weight and substance that Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The
would have altered its conclusion, no compelling reason exists for the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
Court to impinge upon matters more appropriately within its knowledge, skill, experience or training which he
province.9 is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of The word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of an
law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. expert witness as evidence is a prerogative of the courts. It
The finding of negligence by the Court of Appeals is a question is never mandatory for judges to give substantial weight to
which this Court cannot look into as it would entail going into factual expert testimonies. If from the facts and evidence on
matters on which the finding of negligence was based. Such an record, a conclusion is readily ascertainable, there is no
approach cannot be allowed by this Court in the absence of clear need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence. In
showing that the case falls under any of the exceptions 10 to the well- the case under consideration, the testimonies of the fire
established principle. experts were not the only available evidence on the
probable cause and origin of the fire. There were witnesses
The finding by the trial court and the Court of Appeals that M/V who were actually on board the vessel when the fire
Manila City caught fire and sank by reason of the negligence of the occurred. Between the testimonies of the fire experts who
workers of CSEW, when the said vessel was under the exclusive merely based their findings and opinions on interviews and
custody and control of CSEW is accordingly upheld. Under the the testimonies of those present during the fire, the latter
circumstances of the case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. are of more probative value. Verily, the trial court and the
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the Court of Appeals did not err in giving more weight to said
following conditions must concur (1) the accident was of a kind testimonies.
which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2)
that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under On the issue of subrogation, petitioner contends that Prudential is not
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. entitled to be subrogated to the rights of William Lines, Inc.,
theorizing that (1) the fire which gutted M/V Manila City was an
 68

excluded risk and (2) it is a co-assured under the Marine Hull that when the terms of a contract are clear its stipulations
Insurance Policy. control. 14 Thus, when the insurance policy involved named only
William Lines, Inc. as the assured thereunder, the claim of CSEW
It is petitioner's submission that the loss of M/V Manila City or that it is a co-assured is unfounded.
damage thereto is expressly excluded from the coverage of the
insurance because the same resulted from "want of due diligence by Then too, in the Additional Perils Clause of the same Marine
the Assured, Owners or Managers" which is not included in the risks Insurance Policy, it is provided that:
insured against. Again, this theory of petitioner is bereft of any
factual or legal basis. It proceeds from a wrong premise that the fire Subject to the conditions of this Policy, this
which gutted subject vessel was caused by the negligence of the insurance also covers loss of or damage to vessel
employees of William Lines, Inc. To repeat, the issue of who directly caused by the following:
between the parties was negligent has already been resolved against
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. Upon proof of payment
by Prudential to William Lines, Inc. the former was subrogated to the xxx xxx xxx
right of the latter to indemnification from CSEW. As aptly ruled by
the Court of Appeals, the law on the manner is succinct and clear, to Negligence of Charterers and/or
wit: Repairers, provided such Charterers and/or
Repairers are not an Assured
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been hereunder 15 (emphasis supplied).
insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising As correctly pointed out by respondent Prudential, if CSEW were
out of the wrong or breach of contract deemed a co-assured under the policy, it would nullify any claim of
complained of the insurance company shall be William Lines, Inc. from Prudential for any loss or damage caused by
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the the negligence of CSEW. Certainly, no shipowner would agree to
wrongdoer or the person who has violated the make a shiprepairer a co-assured under such insurance policy;
contract. If the amount paid by the insurance otherwise, any claim for loss or damage under the policy would be
company does not fully cover the injury or loss invalidated. Such result could not have been intended by William
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover Lines, Inc.
the deficiency from the person causing the loss or
injury. 12 Finally, CSEW argues that even assuming that it was negligent and
therefore liable to William Lines Inc., by stipulation in the Contract
Thus, when Prudential, after due verification of the merit and validity or Work Order its liability is limited to One Million (P1,000,000.00)
of the insurance claim of William Lines, Inc., paid the latter the total Pesos only, and Prudential a mere subrogee of William Lines, Inc.,
amount covered by its insurance policy, it was subrogated to the right should only be entitled to collect the sum stipulated in the said
of the latter to recover the insured loss from the liable party, CSEW. contract.

Petitioner theorizes further that there can be no right of subrogation Although in this jurisdiction, contracts of adhesion have been
as it is deemed a co-assured under the subject insurance policy. To consistently upheld as valid per se; as binding as an ordinary
buttress its stance that it is a co-assured, petitioner placed reliance on contract, the Court recognizes instances when reliance on such
Clause 20 of the Work Order which states: contracts cannot be favored especially where the facts and
circumstances warrant that subject stipulations be
20 The insurance on the vessel should be disregarded. 16 Thus, in ruling on the validity and applicability of the
maintained by the customer and/or owner of the stipulation limiting the liability of CSEW for negligence to One
vessel during the period the contract is in Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos only, the facts and circumstances vis-
effect. 13 a-vis the nature of the provision sought to be enforced should be
considered, bearing in mind the principles of equity and fair play.
According to petitioner, under the aforecited clause,
William Lines, Inc., agreed to assume the risk of loss of the It is worthy to note that M/V Manila City was insured with Prudential
vessel while under dry-dock or repair and to such extent, it for Forty Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos. To determine the
is benefited and effectively constituted as a co-assured validity and sustainability of the claim of William Lines, Inc., for a
under the policy. total loss, Prudential conducted its own inquiry. Upon thorough
investigation by its hull surveyor, M/V Manila City was found to be
beyond economical salvage and repair. 17 The evaluation of the
This theory of petitioner is devoid of sustainable merit. Clause 20 of average adjuster also reported a constructive total loss. 18 The said
the Work Order in question is clear in the sense that it requires claim of William Lines, Inc., was then found to be valid and
William Lines to maintain insurance on the vessel during the period compensable such that Prudential paid the latter the total value of its
of dry-docking or repair. Concededly, such a stipulation works to the insurance claim. Furthermore, it was ascertained that the replacement
benefit of CSEW as the ship repairer. However, the fact that CSEW cost of the vessel (the price of a vessel similar to M/V Manila City),
benefits from the said stipulation does not automatically make it as a amounts to Fifty Million (P 50,000,000.00) Pesos.19
co-assured of William Lines. The intention of the parties to make
each other a co-assured under an insurance policy is to be gleaned
principally from the insurance contract or policy itself and not from Considering the aforestated circumstances, let alone the fact that
any other contract or agreement because the insurance policy negligence on the part of petitioner has been sufficiently proven, it
denominates the assured and the beneficiaries of the insurance. The would indeed be unfair and inequitable to limit the liability of
hull and machinery insurance procured by William Lines, Inc. from petitioner to One Million Pesos only. As aptly held by the trial court,
Prudential named only "William Lines, Inc." as the assured. There "it is rather unconscionable if not overstrained." To allow CSEW to
was no manifestation of any intention of William Lines, Inc. to limit its liability to One Million Pesos notwithstanding the fact that
constitute CSEW as a co-assured under subject policy. It is axiomatic the total loss suffered by the assured and paid for by Prudential
 69

amounted to Forty Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos would P30,000.00 — for the death of plaintiff's
sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is husband, the late
ordinarily required because, then, it would not be difficult for Julio Famoso
petitioner to escape liability by the simple expedient of paying an
amount very much lower than the actual damage or loss suffered by P30,000.00 — for actual, exemplary and moral
William Lines, Inc. damages

WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED and P10,000.00 — loss of earnings for twenty (20)
the decision, dated September 3, 1997, and Resolution, dated years
February 13, 1998, of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
P3,000.00 — funeral expenses
SO ORDERED.
—————

P73,000.00 — Total Damages

******************************************
Less: P18,250.00 — 25% for the deceased's
contributory
G.R. No. 83491 August 27, 1990 negligence

MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC. and GUILLERMO

Less: P41,367.60 — pension plaintiff and her
ARANETA, petitioners, minor children would
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HERMINIA
FAMOSO, respondents. —————
be receiving for five (5) years from the SSS
Jalandoni, Herrera, Del Castillo & Associates for petitioners.
Pl3,382.40
Napoleon Corral for private respondent.
Plus: P3,000.00 — Attorney's fees and cost of
this suit

—————
CRUZ, J.:

Pl6,382.40 — Total amount payable to the

To say the least, the Court views with regret the adamant refusal of plaintiff.
petitioner Ma-ao Sugar Central to recompense the private respondent
for the death of Julio Famoso, their main source of support, who was
killed in line of duty while in its employ. It is not only a matter of law —————
but also of compassion on which we are called upon to rule today.
We shall state at the outset that on both counts the petition must fail. SO ORDERED.

On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So
caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and
petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his therefore not liable at all.
companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side,
caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared
In its own decision, the Court of Appeals 2 sustained the rulings of
dead on the spot. 1
the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the
deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private
The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the respondent. Thus, the respondent court declared:
petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for
MODIFIED by ordering the defendant-appellant
the decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension of
to pay the plaintiff-appellee the following
P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would be receiving
amounts:
from the SSS for the next five years. The dispositive portion of the
decision read:
P30,000.00, for the death of Julio Famoso
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts
and circumstances present in this case, the Court P30,000.00, for actual, exemplary and moral
order, as it does hereby order the defendant Ma- damages
ao Sugar Central thru its Manager Mr. Guillermo
Y. Araneta to pay plaintiff the following amount: P10,000.00, for loss of earnings for twenty (20)
years
 70

P3,000.00, for funeral expenses Where the thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the defendant, and
P3,000.00, for attorney's fees the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords
———— reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident
P76,000.00 Total Amount arose from want of care.

======== The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176
of the Civil Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the
In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree.
petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the
diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to
the deductions made by the trial court. prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every hour."
Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out
prescribed forms reporting derailments-which reports have not been
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments is-not the kind of
locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates.
Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2"
thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of
keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his
special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails assigned station when the train was derailed. That might have been a
aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident. violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to
his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to suppose
that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the rather than at the back and that he had been killed because he chose
purpose inter alia of preventing derailments, was the responsibility of to ride in the caboose.
the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged.
According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the
control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission
the milling district were frequent and there were even times when amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured
such derailments were reported every hour. 3 The petitioner should which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate
therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents cause of the
instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its injury." 5 It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed
negligence. to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought
about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending
danger to health and body." 6 There is no showing that the caboose
The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he
derailments is of course not acceptable. And neither are we impressed recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending
by the claim that the brakemen and the conductors were required to danger.
report any defect in the condition of the railways and to fill out
prescribed forms for the purpose. For what is important is that the
petitioner should act on these reports and not merely receive and file The last point raised by the petitioner is easily resolved. Citing the
them. The fact that it is not easy to detect if the fish plates are missing case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 7 it argues that the
is no excuse either. Indeed, it should stress all the more the need for respondent court erred in disauthorizing the deduction from the total
the responsible employees of the petitioner to make periodic checks damages awarded the private respondent of the amount of
and actually go down to the railroad tracks and see if the fish plates P41,367.60, representing the pension to be received by the private
were in place. respondent from the Social Security System for a period of five years.
The argument is that such deduction was quite proper because of Art.
173 of the Labor Code, as amended. This article provides that any
It is argued that the locomotive that was derailed was on its way back amount received by the heirs of a deceased employee from the
and that it had passed the same rails earlier without accident. The Employees Compensation Commission, whose funds are
suggestion is that the rails were properly aligned then, but that does administered by the SSS, shall be exclusive of all other amounts that
not necessarily mean they were still aligned afterwards. It is possible may otherwise be claimed under the Civil Code and other pertinent
that the fish plates were loosened and detached during its first trip laws.
and the rails were as a result already mis-aligned during the return
trip. But the Court feels that even this was unlikely, for, as earlier
noted, the fish plates were supposed to have been bolted to the rails The amount to be paid by the SSS represents the usual pension
and could be removed only with special tools. The fact that the fish received by the heirs of a deceased employee who was a member of
plates were not found later at the scene of the mishap may show they the SSS at the time of his death and had regularly contributed his
were never there at all to begin with or had been removed long premiums as required by the System. The pension is the benefit
before. derivable from such contributions. It does not represent the death
benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an
employee who dies as a result of a work-connected injury. Indeed,
At any rate, the absence of the fish plates – whatever the cause or the certification from the SSS 8 submitted by the petitioner is simply
reason – is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the to the effect that:
petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently
in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 4 thus:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
 71

This is to certify that Mrs. Herminia Vda. de employee in the course of or during the
Famoso is a recipient of a monthly pension from employment. It must be realized that, under the
the Social Security System arising from the death Workmen's Compensation Act (or the Civil
of her late husband, Julio Famoso, an SSS Code, in a proper case), the employer is required
member with SSS No. 07-018173-1. to compensate the employee for the sickness or
injury arising in the course of the employment
This certification is issued to Ma-ao Sugar because the industry is supposed to be
Central for whatever legal purpose it may serve responsible therefore; whereas, under the Social
best. Security Act, payment is being made because the
hazard specifically covered by the membership,
and for which the employee had put up his own
Issued this 8th day of April 1983 in Bacolod City, money, had taken place. As this Court had said:
Philippines.
. . . To deny payment of
GODOFREDO S. SISON social security benefits
because the death or injury or
Regional Manager confinement is compensable
under the Workmen's
By: (SGD.) COSME Q. BERMEO, JR. Compensation Act would be
to deprive the employees
members of the System of the
Chief, Benefits Branch statutory benefits bought and
paid for by them, since they
It does not indicate that the pension is to be taken from the funds of contributed their money to
the ECC. The certification would have said so if the pension the general common fund out
represented the death benefits accruing to the heirs under the of which benefits are paid. In
Workmen's Compensation Act. other words, the benefits
provided for in the
Workmen's Compensation
This conclusion is supported by the express provision of Art. 173 as
Act accrues to the employees
amended, which categorically states that:
concerned due to the hazards
involved in their employment
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability. — Unless and is made a burden on the
otherwise provided, the liability of the State employment itself However,
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive social security benefits are
and in place of all other liabilities of the paid to the System's
employer to the employee, his dependents or members, by reason of their
anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on membership therein for
behalf of the employee or his dependents. The which they contribute their
payment of compensation under this Title shall money to a general common
not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in fund . . . .
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred
It may be added that whereas
sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
social security benefits are
Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended,
intended to provide insurance
Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
or protection against the
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight
hazards or risks for which
hundred sixty-four, as amended and other laws
they are established, e.g.,
whose benefits are administered by the System or
disability, sickness, old age
by other agencies of the government. (Emphasis
or death, irrespective of
supplied).
whether they arose from or in
the course of the employment
Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended, is the Social Security Law. or not, the compensation
receivable under the
As observed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Valencia v. Manila Workmen's Compensation
Yacht Club, 9 which is still controlling: law is in the nature of
indemnity for the injury or
damage suffered by the
. . . By their nature and purpose, the sickness or
employee or his dependents
disability benefits to which a member of the
on account of the
System may be entitled under the Social Security
employment. (Rural Transit
law (Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended by Rep.
Employees Asso. vs.
Acts Nos. 1792 and 2658) are not the same as the
Bachrach Trans. Co., 21
compensation that may be claimed against the
SCRA 1263 [19671])
employer under the Workmen's Compensation
Act or the Civil Code, so that payment to the
member employee of social security benefits And according to Justice Jesus G. Barrera in Benguet Consolidated,
would not wipe out or extinguish the employer's Inc. v. Social Security System:" 10
liability for the injury or illness contracted by his
 72

The philosophy underlying the Workmen's In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon,
Compensation Act is to make the payment of the an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the
benefits provided for therein as a responsibility of unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for
the industry, on the ground that it is industry cholecystectomy. 2
which should bear the resulting death or injury to
employees engaged in the said industry. On the Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision 3 of the Court of Appeals,
other hand, social security sickness benefits are dated 29 May 1995, which overturned the decision 4 of the Regional
not paid as a burden on the industry, but are paid Trial Court, dated 30 January 1992, finding private respondents liable
to the members of the System as a matter of right, for damages arising from negligence in the performance of their
whenever the hazards provided for in the law professional duties towards petitioner Erlinda Ramos resulting in her
occurs. To deny payment of social security comatose condition.
benefits because the death or injury or
confinement is compensable under the
Workmen's Compensation Act would be to The antecedent facts as summarized by the trial court are reproduced
deprive the employees-members of the System of hereunder:
the statutory benefits bought and paid for by
them, since they contribute their money to the Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon
general common fund out of which benefits are of June 17, 1985, a 47-year old (Exh. "A") robust
paid. In other words, the benefits provided for in woman (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 10). Except
the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the for occasional complaints of discomfort due to
employees concerned, due to the hazards pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone
involved in their employment and is made a in her gall bladder (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 4-
burden on the employment itself However, social 5), she was as normal as any other woman.
security benefits are paid to the System's Married to Rogelio E. Ramos, an executive of
members, by reason of their membership therein Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
for which they contributed their money to a she has three children whose names are Rommel
general common fund. Ramos, Roy Roderick Ramos and Ron Raymond
Ramos (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 5-6).
Famoso's widow and nine minor children have since his death sought
to recover the just recompense they need for their support. Instead of Because the discomforts somehow interfered
lending a sympathetic hand, the petitioner has sought to frustrate their with her normal ways, she sought professional
efforts and has even come to this Court to seek our assistance in advice. She was advised to undergo an operation
defeating their claim. That relief-and we are happy to say this must for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder
be withheld. (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 5). She underwent a
series of examinations which included blood and
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. The urine tests (Exhs. "A" and "C") which indicated
petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. she was fit for surgery.

SO ORDERED. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, Dr.

Buenviaje (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 7), she and
her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr.
Orlino Hozaka (should be Hosaka; see TSN,
February 20, 1990, p. 3), one of the defendants in
****************************************** this case, on June 10, 1985. They agreed that
their date at the operating table at the DLSMC
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999 (another defendant), would be on June 17, 1985
at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided that she should
undergo a "cholecystectomy" operation after
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own examining the documents (findings from the
behalf and as natural guardians of the minors, ROMMEL Capitol Medical Center, FEU Hospital and
RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON RAYMOND DLSMC) presented to him. Rogelio E. Ramos,
RAMOS, petitioners, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good
vs. anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured
COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist.
DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which
GUTIERREZ, respondents. was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and
which was to be paid after the operation (TSN,
  October 19, 1989, pp. 14-15, 22-23, 31-33; TSN,
February 27, 1990, p. 13; and TSN, November 9,
KAPUNAN, J.: 1989, pp. 3-4, 10, 17).

The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial A day before the scheduled date of operation, she
consideration to the health and welfare of their patients. If a doctor was admitted at one of the rooms of the DLSMC,
fails to live up to this precept, he is made accountable for his acts. A located along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City
mistake, through gross negligence or incompetence or plain human (TSN, October 19,1989, p. 11).
error, may spell the difference between life and death. In this sense,
the doctor plays God on his patient's fate. 1 At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while
still in her room, she was prepared for the
 73

operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali
Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the College yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan"
of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was (id., p. 17). Because of the remarks of Dra.
also there for moral support. She reiterated her Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr.
previous request for Herminda to be with her Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed
even during the operation. After praying, she was bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left
given injections. Her hands were held by hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka
Herminda as they went down from her room to approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue
the operating room (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon,
9-11). Her husband, Rogelio, was also with her another anesthesiologist (id., p. 19). After Dr.
(TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 18). At the operating Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw
room, Herminda saw about two or three nurses this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient.
and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, The patient's nailbed became bluish and the
who was to administer anesthesia. Although not a patient was placed in a trendelenburg position —
member of the hospital staff, Herminda a position where the head of the patient is placed
introduced herself as Dean of the College of in a position lower than her feet which is an
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was indication that there is a decrease of blood supply
to provide moral support to the patient, to them. to the patient's brain (Id., pp. 19-20). Immediately
Herminda was allowed to stay inside the thereafter, she went out of the operating room,
operating room. and she told Rogelio E. Ramos "that something
wrong was . . . happening" (Ibid.). Dr. Calderon
At around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Gutierrez reached a was then able to intubate the patient (TSN, July
nearby phone to look for Dr. Hosaka who was not 25, 1991, p. 9).
yet in (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 11-12). Dr.
Gutierrez thereafter informed Herminda Cruz Meanwhile, Rogelio, who was outside the
about the prospect of a delay in the arrival of Dr. operating room, saw a respiratory machine being
Hosaka. Herminda then went back to the patient rushed towards the door of the operating room.
who asked, "Mindy, wala pa ba ang Doctor"? The He also saw several doctors rushing towards the
former replied, "Huwag kang mag-alaala, operating room. When informed by Herminda
darating na iyon" (Ibid.). Cruz that something wrong was happening, he
told her (Herminda) to be back with the patient
Thereafter, Herminda went out of the operating inside the operating room (TSN, October 19,
room and informed the patient's husband, 1989, pp. 25-28).
Rogelio, that the doctor was not yet around (id.,
p. 13). When she returned to the operating room, Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and
the patient told her, "Mindy, inip na inip na ako, saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg
ikuha mo ako ng ibang Doctor." So, she went out position (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 20). At
again and told Rogelio about what the patient almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the
said (id., p. 15). Thereafter, she returned to the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
operating room.
About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ramos
At around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E. Ramos was was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka. The latter
"already dying [and] waiting for the arrival of the informed the former that something went wrong
doctor" even as he did his best to find somebody during the intubation. Reacting to what was told
who will allow him to pull out his wife from the to him, Rogelio reminded the doctor that the
operating room (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 19- condition of his wife would not have happened,
20). He also thought of the feeling of his wife, had he (Dr. Hosaka) looked for a good
who was inside the operating room waiting for anesthesiologist (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 31).
the doctor to arrive (ibid.). At almost 12:00 noon,
he met Dr. Garcia who remarked that he (Dr. Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by
Garcia) was also tired of waiting for Dr. Hosaka the hospital to explain what happened to the
to arrive (id., p. 21). While talking to Dr. Garcia patient. The doctors explained that the patient had
at around 12:10 P.M., he came to know that Dr. bronchospasm (TSN, November 15, 1990, pp.
Hosaka arrived as a nurse remarked, "Nandiyan 26-27).
na si Dr. Hosaka, dumating na raw." Upon
hearing those words, he went down to the lobby
and waited for the operation to be completed (id., Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month.
pp. 16, 29-30). About four months thereafter or on November 15,
1985, the patient was released from the hospital.
At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was
inside the operating room with the patient, heard During the whole period of her confinement, she
somebody say that "Dr. Hosaka is already here." incurred hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25
She then saw people inside the operating room which is the subject of a promissory note and
"moving, doing this and that, [and] preparing the affidavit of undertaking executed by Rogelio E.
patient for the operation" (TSN, January 13, Ramos in favor of DLSMC. Since that fateful
1988, p. 16). As she held the hand of Erlinda afternoon of June 17, 1985, she has been in a
Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the comatose condition. She cannot do anything. She
hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. cannot move any part of her body. She cannot see
 74

or hear. She is living on mechanical means. She and for arriving for the scheduled operation
suffered brain damage as a result of the absence almost three (3) hours late.
of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes
(TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 21-22). After being On the part of DLSMC (the hospital), this Court
discharged from the hospital, she has been finds that it is liable for the acts of negligence of
staying in their residence, still needing constant the doctors in their "practice of medicine" in the
medical attention, with her husband Rogelio operating room. Moreover, the hospital is liable
incurring a monthly expense ranging from for failing through its responsible officials, to
P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 (TSN, October 19, cancel the scheduled operation after Dr. Hosaka
1989, pp. 32-34). She was also diagnosed to be inexcusably failed to arrive on time.
suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal
damage" (Exh. "G"; see also TSN, December 21,
1989, In having held thus, this Court rejects the defense
p. 6). 5 raised by defendants that they have acted with
due care and prudence in rendering medical
services to plaintiff-patient. For if the patient was
Thus, on 8 January 1986, petitioners filed a civil case 6 for damages properly intubated as claimed by them, the
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private patient would not have become comatose. And,
respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of the fact that another anesthesiologist was called
Erlinda Ramos. to try to intubate the patient after her (the
patient's) nailbed turned bluish, belie their claim.
During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to the possible Furthermore, the defendants should have
cause of Erlinda's injury. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean rescheduled the operation to a later date. This,
Herminda Cruz and Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the sustained they should have done, if defendants acted with
by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the due care and prudence as the patient's case was
faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the an elective, not an emergency case.
anesthesia phase. On the other hand, private respondents primarily
relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora, a x x x           x x x          x x x
pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was
Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium
(Pentothal). WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing,
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants. Accordingly, the latter are
After considering the evidence from both sides, the Regional Trial ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the former
Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, to wit: the following sums of money, to wit:

After evaluating the evidence as shown in the 1) the sum of P8,000.00 as

finding of facts set forth earlier, and applying the actual monthly expenses for
aforecited provisions of law and jurisprudence to the plaintiff Erlinda Ramos
the case at bar, this Court finds and so holds that reckoned from November 15,
defendants are liable to plaintiffs for damages. 1985 or in the total sum of
The defendants were guilty of, at the very least, P632,000.00 as of April 15,
negligence in the performance of their duty to 1992, subject to its being
plaintiff-patient Erlinda Ramos. updated;

On the part of Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, this Court 2) the sum of P100,000.00 as
finds that she omitted to exercise reasonable care reasonable attorney's fees;
in not only intubating the patient, but also in not
repeating the administration of atropine (TSN,
August 20, 1991, pp. 5-10), without due regard to 3) the sum of P800,000.00 by
the fact that the patient was inside the operating way of moral damages and
room for almost three (3) hours. For after she the further sum of
committed a mistake in intubating [the] patient, P200,000,00 by way of
the patient's nailbed became bluish and the exemplary damages; and,
patient, thereafter, was placed in trendelenburg
position, because of the decrease of blood supply 4) the costs of the suit.
to the patient's brain. The evidence further shows
that the hapless patient suffered brain damage SO ORDERED. 7
because of the absence of oxygen in her
(patient's) brain for approximately four to five
minutes which, in turn, caused the patient to Private respondents seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of
become comatose. Appeals. The appellate court rendered a Decision, dated 29 May
1995, reversing the findings of the trial court. The decretal portion of
the decision of the appellate court reads:
On the part of Dr. Orlino Hosaka, this Court finds
that he is liable for the acts of Dr. Perfecta
Gutierrez whom he had chosen to administer WHEREFORE, for the foregoing premises the
anesthesia on the patient as part of his obligation appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, and the
to provide the patient a good anesthesiologist', complaint below against the appellants is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. The counterclaim of
 75

appellant De Los Santos Medical Center is I

GRANTED but only insofar as appellees are
hereby ordered to pay the unpaid hospital bills IN PUTTING MUCH RELIANCE ON THE
amounting to P93,542.25, plus legal interest for TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS DRA.
justice must be tempered with mercy. GUTIERREZ, DRA. CALDERON AND DR.
JAMORA;
SO ORDERED. 8
II
The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by
petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as "Atty. IN FINDING THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF
Rogelio Ramos." No copy of the decision, however, was sent nor THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT CAUSE THE
received by the Coronel Law Office, then counsel on record of UNFORTUNATE COMATOSE CONDITION
petitioners. Rogelio referred the decision of the appellate court to a OF PETITIONER ERLINDA RAMOS;
new lawyer, Atty. Ligsay, only on 20 June 1995, or four (4) days
before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a motion
for reconsideration. On the same day, Atty. Ligsay, filed with the III
appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES
July 1995. However, the appellate court denied the motion for IPSA LOQUITUR. 11
extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. 9 Meanwhile,
petitioners engaged the services of another counsel, Atty. Sillano, to Before we discuss the merits of the case, we shall first dispose of the
replace Atty. Ligsay. Atty. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion procedural issue on the timeliness of the petition in relation to the
to admit the motion for reconsideration contending that the period to motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners with the Court of
file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision had not yet Appeals. In their
commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Comment, 12 private respondents contend that the petition should not
Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. be given due course since the motion for reconsideration of the
Despite this explanation, the appellate court still denied the motion to petitioners on the decision of the Court of Appeals was validly
admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution, dismissed by the appellate court for having been filed beyond the
dated 29 March 1996, primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day reglementary period. We do not agree.
(15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already
expired, to wit:
A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the
delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact
We said in our Resolution on July 25, 1995, that that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel
the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration cannot on record of petitioners, the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of
be extended; precisely, the Motion for Extension the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and received by
(Rollo, p. 12) was denied. It is, on the other hand, petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly
admitted in the latter Motion that addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos. Based on the other
plaintiffs/appellees received a copy of the communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos, the appellate
decision as early as June 9, 1995. Computation court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Thus, no
wise, the period to file a Motion for copy of the decision of the counsel on record. Petitioner, not being a
Reconsideration expired on June 24. The Motion lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for
for Reconsideration, in turn, was received by the reconsideration, referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June
Court of Appeals already on July 4, necessarily, 1995.
the 15-day period already passed. For that alone,
the latter should be denied.
It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all
notices should be sent to the party's lawyer at his given address. With
Even assuming admissibility of the Motion for a few exceptions, notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on
the Reconsideration, but after considering the record is no notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the
Comment/Opposition, the former, for lack of decision of the appellate court was not sent to the counsel on record
merit, is hereby DENIED. of petitioner, there can be no sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the
delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken
SO ORDERED. 10 against petitioner. Moreover, since the Court of Appeals already
issued a second Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, which superseded
A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. Sillano on 11 the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the motion
April 1996. The next day, or on 12 April 1996, Atty. Sillano filed for reconsideration of petitioner, we believed that the receipt of the
before this Court a motion for extension of time to file the present former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 45. The Court granted the motion filing of the present petition. Based on this, the petition before us was
for extension of time and gave petitioners additional thirty (30) days submitted on time.
after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period counted from the
receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to After resolving the foregoing procedural issue, we shall now look
submit the petition. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. The petition into the merits of the case. For a more logical presentation of the
was filed on 9 May 1996, well within the extended period given by discussion we shall first consider the issue on the applicability of the
the Court. doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the instant case. Thereafter, the first
two assigned errors shall be tackled in relation to the res ipsa
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the loquitur doctrine.
following grounds:
 76

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a
the transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken harm. 25 The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to
a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of
facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with law, permit a given inference. 26
an explanation. 13 Where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or
does not happen if those who have its management or control use that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
caused by the defendant's want of care. 14 provides the proof of negligence. 27 The reason is that the general rule
on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that
postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be
very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. 28 Ordinarily, only
of negligence on the part of the person who controls the physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to
instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with
by the defendant who is charged with negligence. 15 It is grounded in a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the
the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances,
such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be
from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. 16 Hence, res ipsa given by non-expert witnesses. 29 Hence, in cases where the res ipsa
loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
knowledge. negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid
of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. 30 Where
substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
independent or separate ground of liability. 17 Instead, it is considered would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,
as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. 18 It is an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application
regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural of convenience of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which
since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and
burden of producing specific proof of negligence. 19 In other words, why it occurred. 31 When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with custody and management of the defendant without need to produce
the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort
invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
forward with the proof. 20 Still, before resort to the doctrine may be for injury suffered by him.
allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the
1. The accident is of a kind following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the
which ordinarily does not patient after an operation, 32 injuries sustained on a healthy part of the
occur in the absence of body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, 33 removal of
someone's negligence; the wrong part of the body when another part was
intended, 34 knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw was under
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, 35 and loss of an eye while
2. It is caused by an the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or
instrumentality within the following an operation for appendicitis, 36 among others.
exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has
been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases
3. The possibility of of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to
contributing conduct which the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed
would make the plaintiff negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
responsible is eliminated. 21 perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
instrumentality" which caused the damage. 22 Such element of control matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences
must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving followed if due care had been
injury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and exercised. 37 A distinction must be made between the failure to secure
must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not
in a particular incident. 23 ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the
usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be
Medical malpractice 24 cases do not escape the application of this conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves
 77

the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. 38 The physician of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a
or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body.
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the
did not produce the desired result. 39 Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the
result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. 40 The real operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated.
question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which
any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In
performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of
customary professional activity in such operations, which, if someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is
as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. 41 If not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such
there was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the
loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could. 42 endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private
respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence
bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered
Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation her unconscious.
presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the
A case strikingly similar to the one before us is Voss brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and
vs. Bridwell, 43 where the Kansas Supreme Court in applying the res under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold
ipsa loquitur stated: that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res
ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the
Court would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
The plaintiff herein submitted himself for a observation, if negligence attended the management and care of the
mastoid operation and delivered his person over patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and the hospital in
to the care, custody and control of his physician this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the
who had complete and exclusive control over desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the
him, but the operation was never performed. At diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever
the time of submission he was neurologically performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a
sound and physically fit in mind and body, but he case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
suffered irreparable damage and injury rendering loquitur.
him decerebrate and totally incapacitated. The
injury was one which does not ordinarily occur in
the process of a mastoid operation or in the Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the
absence of negligence in the administration of an present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any
anesthetic, and in the use and employment of an and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia,
endoctracheal tube. Ordinarily a person being put or to any and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its
under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa
consequence of administering such anesthesia in loquitur coverage.
the absence of negligence. Upon these facts and
under these circumstances a layman would be Having in mind the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and
able to say, as a matter of common knowledge the presumption of negligence allowed therein, the Court now comes
and observation, that the consequences of to the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
professional treatment were not as such as would private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during
ordinarily have followed if due care had been the anesthesia phase of the operation and, if in the affirmative,
exercised. whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda's
comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we shall also determine if the
Here the plaintiff could not have been guilty of Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of the witnesses
contributory negligence because he was under the for the private respondents.
influence of anesthetics and unconscious, and the
circumstances are such that the true explanation In sustaining the position of private respondents, the Court of
of event is more accessible to the defendants than Appeals relied on the testimonies of Dra. Gutierrez, Dra. Calderon
to the plaintiff for they had the exclusive control and Dr. Jamora. In giving weight to the testimony of Dra. Gutierrez,
of the instrumentalities of anesthesia. the Court of Appeals rationalized that she was candid enough to
admit that she experienced some difficulty in the endotracheal
Upon all the facts, conditions and circumstances intubation 45 of the patient and thus, cannot be said to be covering her
alleged in Count II it is held that a cause of action negligence with falsehood. The appellate court likewise opined that
is stated under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 44 private respondents were able to show that the brain damage
sustained by Erlinda was not caused by the alleged faulty intubation
but was due to the allergic reaction of the patient to the drug
Indeed, the principles enunciated in the aforequoted case apply with Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal), a short-acting barbiturate, as testified
equal force here. In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for on by their expert witness, Dr. Jamora. On the other hand, the
cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be appellate court rejected the testimony of Dean Herminda Cruz
performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her offered in favor of petitioners that the cause of the brain injury was
person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents traceable to the wrongful insertion of the tube since the latter, being a
who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time nurse, was allegedly not knowledgeable in the process of intubation.
 78

In so holding, the appellate court returned a verdict in favor of ATTY. PAJARES:

respondents physicians and hospital and absolved them of any
liability towards Erlinda and her family. Q: From whom did you hear
those words "lumalaki ang
We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals. We hold that tiyan"?
private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence A: From Dra. Perfecta
was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Gutierrez.

In the instant case, the records are helpful in furnishing not only the x x x           x x x          x x x
logical scientific evidence of the pathogenesis of the injury but also
in providing the Court the legal nexus upon which liability is based.
As will be shown hereinafter, private respondents' own testimonies Q: After hearing the phrase
which are reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes are replete "lumalaki ang tiyan," what
of signposts indicative of their negligence in the care and did you notice on the person
management of Erlinda. of the patient?

With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the care of A: I notice (sic) some bluish
Erlinda during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, discoloration on the nailbeds
respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. This of the left hand where I was
fact was attested to by Prof. Herminda Cruz, Dean of the Capitol at.
Medical Center School of Nursing and petitioner's sister-in-law, who
was in the operating room right beside the patient when the tragic Q: Where was Dr. Orlino
event occurred. Witness Cruz testified to this effect: Ho[s]aka then at that
particular time?
ATTY. PAJARES:
A: I saw him approaching the
Q: In particular, what did patient during that time.
Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez do, if
any on the patient? Q: When he approached the
patient, what did he do, if
A: In particular, I could see any?
that she was intubating the
patient. A: He made an order to call
on the anesthesiologist in the
Q: Do you know what person of Dr. Calderon.
happened to that intubation
process administered by Dra. Q: Did Dr. Calderon, upon
Gutierrez? being called, arrive inside the
operating room?
ATTY. ALCERA:
A: Yes sir.
She will be incompetent Your
Honor. Q: What did [s]he do, if any?

COURT: A: [S]he tried to intubate the

patient.
Witness may answer if she
knows. Q: What happened to the
patient?
A: As have said, I was with
the patient, I was beside the A: When Dr. Calderon try
stretcher holding the left hand (sic) to intubate the patient,
of the patient and all of a after a while the patient's
sudden heard some remarks nailbed became bluish and I
coming from Dra. Perfecta saw the patient was placed in
Gutierrez herself. She was trendelenburg position.
saying "Ang hirap ma-
intubate nito, mali yata ang x x x           x x x          x x x
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki
ang tiyan.
Q: Do you know the reason
why the patient was placed in
x x x           x x x          x x x that trendelenburg position?
 79

A: As far as I know, when a able to demonstrate through her testimony what truly transpired on
patient is in that position, that fateful day.
there is a decrease of blood
supply to the brain. 46 Most of all, her testimony was affirmed by no less than respondent
Dra. Gutierrez who admitted that she experienced difficulty in
x x x           x x x          x x x inserting the tube into Erlinda's trachea, to wit:

The appellate court, however, disbelieved Dean Cruz's testimony in ATTY. LIGSAY:
the trial court by declaring that:
Q: In this particular case,
A perusal of the standard nursing curriculum in Doctora, while you were
our country will show that intubation is not intubating at your first
taught as part of nursing procedures and attempt (sic), you did not
techniques. Indeed, we take judicial notice of the immediately see the trachea?
fact that nurses do not, and cannot, intubate. Even
on the assumption that she is fully capable of DRA. GUTIERREZ:
determining whether or not a patient is properly
intubated, witness Herminda Cruz, admittedly,
did not peep into the throat of the patient. (TSN, A: Yes sir.
July 25, 1991, p. 13). More importantly, there is
no evidence that she ever auscultated the patient Q: Did you pull away the
or that she conducted any type of examination to tube immediately?
check if the endotracheal tube was in its proper
place, and to determine the condition of the heart, A: You do not pull the . . .
lungs, and other organs. Thus, witness Cruz's
categorical statements that appellant Dra.
Gutierrez failed to intubate the appellee Erlinda Q: Did you or did you not?
Ramos and that it was Dra. Calderon who
succeeded in doing so clearly suffer from lack of A: I did not pull the tube.
sufficient factual bases. 47
Q: When you said "mahirap
In other words, what the Court of Appeals is trying to impress is that yata ito," what were you
being a nurse, and considered a layman in the process of intubation, referring to?
witness Cruz is not competent to testify on whether or not the
intubation was a success.
A: "Mahirap yata itong i-
intubate," that was the
We do not agree with the above reasoning of the appellate court. patient.
Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well
testify upon matters on which she is capable of observing such as, the
Q: So, you found some
statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external
difficulty in inserting the
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any
tube?
one. 48 This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses is not required. It is
the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary for the proof A: Yes, because of (sic) my
of negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary first attempt, I did not see
person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill right away. 51
or want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony
unnecessary. 49 We take judicial notice of the fact that anesthesia Curiously in the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez made the
procedures have become so common, that even an ordinary person haphazard defense that she encountered hardship in the insertion of
can tell if it was administered properly. As such, it would not be too the tube in the trachea of Erlinda because it was positioned more
difficult to tell if the tube was properly inserted. This kind of anteriorly (slightly deviated from the normal anatomy of a
observation, we believe, does not require a medical degree to be person) 52 making it harder to locate and, since Erlinda is obese and
acceptable. has a short neck and protruding teeth, it made intubation even more
difficult.
At any rate, without doubt, petitioner's witness, an experienced
clinical nurse whose long experience and scholarship led to her The argument does not convince us. If this was indeed observed,
appointment as Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School at private respondents adduced no evidence demonstrating that they
Nursing, was fully capable of determining whether or not the proceeded to make a thorough assessment of Erlinda's airway, prior
intubation was a success. She had extensive clinical experience to the induction of anesthesia, even if this would mean postponing the
starting as a staff nurse in Chicago, Illinois; staff nurse and clinical procedure. From their testimonies, it appears that the observation was
instructor in a teaching hospital, the FEU-NRMF; Dean of the made only as an afterthought, as a means of defense.
Laguna College of Nursing in San Pablo City; and then Dean of the
Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing. 50 Reviewing witness
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration
Cruz' statements, we find that the same were delivered in a
of anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of
straightforward manner, with the kind of detail, clarity, consistency
anesthetic accidents. Pre-operative evaluation and preparation for
and spontaneity which would have been difficult to fabricate. With
anesthesia begins when the anesthesiologist reviews the patient's
her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied that she was
 80

medical records and visits with the patient, traditionally, the day However, the exact opposite is true. In an emergency procedure,
before elective surgery. 53 It includes taking the patient's medical there is hardly enough time available for the fastidious demands of
history, review of current drug therapy, physical examination and pre-operative procedure so that an anesthesiologist is able to see the
interpretation of laboratory data. 54 The physical examination patient only a few minutes before surgery, if at all. Elective
performed by the anesthesiologist is directed primarily toward the procedures, on the other hand, are operative procedures that can wait
central nervous system, cardiovascular system, lungs and upper for days, weeks or even months. Hence, in these cases, the
airway. 55 A thorough analysis of the patient's airway normally anesthesiologist possesses the luxury of time to be at the patient's
involves investigating the following: cervical spine mobility, beside to do a proper interview and clinical evaluation. There is
temporomandibular mobility, prominent central incisors, diseased or ample time to explain the method of anesthesia, the drugs to be used,
artificial teeth, ability to visualize uvula and the thyromental and their possible hazards for purposes of informed consent. Usually,
distance. 56 Thus, physical characteristics of the patient's upper airway the pre-operative assessment is conducted at least one day before the
that could make tracheal intubation difficult should be intended surgery, when the patient is relaxed and cooperative.
studied. 57 Where the need arises, as when initial assessment indicates
possible problems (such as the alleged short neck and protruding Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra.
teeth of Erlinda) a thorough examination of the patient's airway Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation
would go a long way towards decreasing patient morbidity and of Erlinda's case prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia.
mortality. However, she never saw the patient at the bedside. She herself
admitted that she had seen petitioner only in the operating room, and
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. She negligently failed
Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June to take advantage of this important opportunity. As such, her attempt
1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-operative to exculpate herself must fail.
evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up Having established that respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to perform
and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informed of the pre-operative evaluation of the patient which, in turn, resulted to a
possible difficulties she would face during the administration of wrongful intubation, we now determine if the faulty intubation is
anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her truly the proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition.
patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and
professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral
vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician's anoxia which led to Erlinda's coma was due to
centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical bronchospasm 59 mediated by her allergic response to the drug,
procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence. Thiopental Sodium, introduced into her system. Towards this end,
they presented Dr. Jamora, a Fellow of the Philippine College of
Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of
Respondent Dra. Gutierrez, however, attempts to gloss over this Internal Medicine, who advanced private respondents' theory that the
omission by playing around with the trial court's ignorance of clinical oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy, 60 was due to
procedure, hoping that she could get away with it. Respondent Dra. an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. We
Gutierrez tried to muddle the difference between an elective surgery find the theory of private respondents unacceptable.
and an emergency surgery just so her failure to perform the required
pre-operative evaluation would escape unnoticed. In her testimony
she asserted: First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field
of anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Since
Dr. Jamora is a pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of
ATTY. LIGSAY: properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and
procedure and their complications. Dr. Jamora is likewise not an
Q: Would you agree, Doctor, allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion
that it is good medical on allergic-mediated processes. Moreover, he is not a pharmacologist
practice to see the patient a and, as such, could not have been capable, as an expert would, of
day before so you can explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the
introduce yourself to supposed culprit, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
establish good doctor-patient
relationship and gain the trust The inappropriateness and absurdity of accepting Dr. Jamora's
and confidence of the testimony as an expert witness in the anesthetic practice of Pentothal
patient? administration is further supported by his own admission that he
formulated his opinions on the drug not from the practical experience
DRA. GUTIERREZ: gained by a specialist or expert in the administration and use of
Sodium Pentothal on patients, but only from reading certain
A: As I said in my previous references, to wit:
statement, it depends on the
operative procedure of the ATTY. LIGSAY:
anesthesiologist and in my
case, with elective cases and Q: In your line of expertise
normal cardio-pulmonary on pulmonology, did you
clearance like that, I usually have any occasion to use
don't do it except on pentothal as a method of
emergency and on cases that management?
have an abnormalities
(sic). 58
DR. JAMORA:
 81

A: We do it in conjunction expert witness based on the above standard since he lacks the
with the anesthesiologist necessary knowledge, skill, and training in the field of
when they have to intubate anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting testimony from a
our patient. specialist in the wrong field, private respondents' intentionally
avoided providing testimony by competent and independent experts
Q: But not in particular when in the proper areas.
you practice pulmonology?
Moreover, private respondents' theory, that Thiopental Sodium may
A: No. have produced Erlinda's coma by triggering an allergic mediated
response, has no support in evidence. No evidence of stridor, skin
reactions, or wheezing — some of the more common accompanying
Q: In other words, your signs of an allergic reaction — appears on record. No laboratory data
knowledge about pentothal is were ever presented to the court.
based only on what you have
read from books and not by
your own personal In any case, private respondents themselves admit that Thiopental
application of the medicine induced, allergic-mediated bronchospasm happens only very rarely.
pentothal? If courts were to accept private respondents' hypothesis without
supporting medical proof, and against the weight of available
evidence, then every anesthetic accident would be an act of God.
A: Based on my personal Evidently, the Thiopental-allergy theory vigorously asserted by
experience also on pentothal. private respondents was a mere afterthought. Such an explanation
was advanced in order to advanced in order to absolve them of any
Q: How many times have you and all responsibility for the patient's condition.
used pentothal?
In view of the evidence at hand, we are inclined to believe petitioners'
A: They used it on me. I went stand that it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause
into bronchospasm during my of Erlinda's comatose condition.
appendectomy.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and
Q: And because they have continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
used it on you and on account produces injury, and without which the result would not have
of your own personal occurred. 64 An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a
experience you feel that you failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that
can testify on pentothal here the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or
with medical authority? actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
A: No. That is why I used act or omission. 65 It is the dominant, moving or producing cause.
references to support my
claims. 61 Applying the above definition in relation to the evidence at hand,
faulty intubation is undeniably the proximate cause which triggered
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm the chain of events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and, ultimately,
properly falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine- her comatosed condition.
allergy, and clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic
encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. While admittedly, Private respondents themselves admitted in their testimony that the
many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary diseases are within the first intubation was a failure. This fact was likewise observed by
expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic witness Cruz when she heard respondent Dra. Gutierrez remarked,
drug-induced, allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is "Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and lumalaki ang tiyan." Thereafter, witness Cruz noticed abdominal
pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the distention on the body of Erlinda. The development of abdominal
pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the distention, together with respiratory embarrassment indicates that the
drug with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred endotracheal tube entered the esophagus instead of the respiratory
in giving weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the tree. In other words, instead of the intended endotracheal intubation
administration of Thiopental Sodium. what actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During
intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the
The provision in the rules of evidence 62 regarding expert witnesses gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs
states: through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause
some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which
carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The been observed during the first intubation suggests that the length of
opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special time utilized in inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he tube was withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly significant.
is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda
showed signs of cyanosis. 66 As stated in the testimony of Dr. Hosaka,
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired the lack of oxygen became apparent only after he noticed that the
special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to nailbeds of Erlinda were already blue. 67 However, private
testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or respondents contend that a second intubation was executed on
by practical experience. 63 Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an Erlinda and this one was successfully done. We do not think so. No
 82

evidence exists on record, beyond private respondents' bare claims, up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. 75 This
which supports the contention that the second intubation was is particularly true with respondent hospital.
successful. Assuming that the endotracheal tube finally found its way
into the proper orifice of the trachea, the same gave no guarantee of After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending
oxygen delivery, the hallmark of a successful intubation. In fact, consultant, he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological
cyanosis was again observed immediately after the second intubation. conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents,
Proceeding from this event (cyanosis), it could not be claimed, as moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and
private respondents insist, that the second intubation was responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in
accomplished. Even granting that the tube was successfully inserted the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the
during the second attempt, it was obviously too late. As aptly hospital. In addition to these, the physician's performance as a
explained by the trial court, Erlinda already suffered brain damage as specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the
a result of the inadequate oxygenation of her brain for about four to basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from
five minutes. 68 patients, nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his
duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum
The above conclusion is not without basis. Scientific studies point out standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee, is
that intubation problems are responsible for one-third (1/3) of deaths normally politely terminated.
and serious injuries associated with anesthesia. 69 Nevertheless,
ninety-eight percent (98%) or the vast majority of difficult In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control
intubations may be anticipated by performing a thorough evaluation over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While
of the patient's airway prior to the operation. 70 As stated beforehand, "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to observe the proper pre-operative respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
protocol which could have prevented this unfortunate incident. Had patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
appropriate diligence and reasonable care been used in the pre- terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
operative evaluation, respondent physician could have been much employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment
more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the
perceived anatomic variations in the patient's neck and oral area, control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the
defects which would have been easily overcome by a prior foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in
knowledge of those variations together with a change in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in
technique. 71 In other words, an experienced anesthesiologist, effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
adequately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation, would physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to whether
have had little difficulty going around the short neck and protruding or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors
teeth. 72 Having failed to observe common medical standards in pre- for petitioner's condition. 76
operative management and intubation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez'
negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
We now determine the responsibility of respondent Dr. Orlino which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but
Hosaka as the head of the surgical team. As the so-called "captain of also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a
the ship," 73 it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those relationship of patria potestas. 77 Such responsibility ceases when the
under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the
Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. 78 In other
authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in not determining if words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs,
his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents
evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they
verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had damage.
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time
as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for
the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of
confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce
This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce
resulted in Erlinda's condition. evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised
over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a
similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its
We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do
incident. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with
specialist staff with attending and visiting "consultants," 74 who are its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
allegedly not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning
responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. However,
the difficulty is only more apparent than real. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in
accepting and relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the
private respondents. Indeed, as shown by the above discussions,
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring private respondents were unable to rebut the presumption of
and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the negligence. Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents
hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 79 of the Civil
or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, Code.
their educational qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation
by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most
cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by We now come to the amount of damages due petitioners. The trial
members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set court awarded a total of P632,000.00 pesos (should be P616,000.00)
 83

in compensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking
updated" covering the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15 April adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded —
1992, based on monthly expenses for the care of the patient estimated temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate
at P8,000.00. damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into
account the cost of proper care.
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial
court at the time of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based
the actual costs of home-based care for a comatose individual. The nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that
calculated amount was not even arrived at by looking at the actual condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for
cost of proper hospice care for the patient. What it reflected were the compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the
actual expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the
forced to bring home the patient to avoid mounting hospital bills. interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would
allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a
And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be
transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home
for the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly
minimum standards of care. In the instant case for instance, Erlinda inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in
has to be constantly turned from side to side to prevent bedsores and temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. 81
hypostatic pneumonia. Feeding is done by nasogastric tube. Food
preparation should be normally made by a dietitian to provide her In Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 82 this Court was confronted with
with the correct daily caloric requirements and vitamin supplements. a situation where the injury suffered by the plaintiff would have led
Furthermore, she has to be seen on a regular basis by a physical to expenses which were difficult to estimate because while they
therapist to avoid muscle atrophy, and by a pulmonary therapist to would have been a direct result of the injury (amputation), and were
prevent the accumulation of secretions which can lead to respiratory certain to be incurred by the plaintiff, they were likely to arise only in
complications. the future. We awarded P1,000,000.00 in moral damages in that case.

Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages Describing the nature of the injury, the Court therein stated:
recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the
correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes
family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of
bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the Civil Code on actual or her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just
compensatory damages present us with some difficulties. above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will
forever be deprived of the full ambulatory
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by functions of her left extremity, even with the use
the plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. The of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well
Civil Code provides: beyond the period of hospitalization (which was
paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo
Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate shrinkage of the stump from the process of
compensation only for such pecuniary loss healing.
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic
compensatory damages. replacements and months of physical and
occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that the lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to be
at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act replaced and readjusted to changes in the size of
of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. her lower limb effected by the biological changes
However, these provisions neglect to take into account those of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming
situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be she reaches menopause, for example, the
continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to
injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate
decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones
of all post-menopausal women. In other words,
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if the damage done to her would not only be
they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, permanent and lasting, it would also be
should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and permanently changing and adjusting to the
proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary physiologic changes which her body would
loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the normally undergo through the years. The
case, be made with certainty. 80 In other words, temperate damages replacements, changes, and adjustments will
can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory require corresponding adjustive physical and
damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it
because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises has been documented, are painful.
when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The
reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
x x x           x x x          x x x
As it would not be equitable — and certainly not in the best interests
of the administration of justice — for the victim in such cases to A prosthetic devise, however technologically
advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of
 84

functional restoration of the motor functions of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00
the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously
lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as
psychological injury, mental and physical pain temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and
are inestimable. 83 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.

The injury suffered by Erlinda as a consequence of private SO ORDERED.

respondents' negligence is certainly much more serious than the
amputation in the Valenzuela case.

Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident ******************************************
occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years
now. The burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by her
husband and children, who, in the intervening years have been G.R. No. 124378             March 8, 2005
deprived of the love of a wife and a mother.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the vs.
care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division),
temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if HADJI ABDUL CARIM ABDULLAH, CARIS ABDULLAH,
petitioner's condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. HADJI ALI LANGCO1 and DIAMAEL
PANGCATAN, Respondents.

We recognized, in Valenzuela that a discussion of the victim's actual

injury would not even scratch the surface of the resulting moral DECISION
damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the
amount of emotional and moral pain, psychological damage and CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
injury suffered by the victim or those actually affected by the victim's
condition. 84 The husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, In this petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal of the
will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's Decision2 dated 21 December 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have G.R. CV No. 44639, which affirmed with modification the
fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, Decision3 dated 29 July 1991 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a 12th Judicial Region, Branch 9, Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 115-
comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged with the 87, for damages. The Resolution 4 dated 27 March 1996 that denied
moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is likewise assailed.
injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the
foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages
would be appropriate. The factual milieu, as gleaned from the records, follows:

Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature and controlled corporation created under Commonwealth Act No.
of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at 120, as amended.5 It is tasked to undertake the development of
P100,000.00 are likewise proper. hydroelectric generations of power and the production of electricity
from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the
transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. 6 Concomitant to
Our courts face unique difficulty in adjudicating medical negligence its mandate, petitioner has, among other things, the power to
cases because physicians are not insurers of life and, they rarely set construct, operate and maintain power plants, auxiliary plants, dams,
out to intentionally cause injury or death to their patients. However, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations, and
intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence substations, and other works for the purpose of developing hydraulic
exists and is proven, the same automatically gives the injured a right power from any river, creek, lake, spring, and waterfalls in the
to reparation for the damage caused. Philippines, and supplying such power to the inhabitants.7

Established medical procedures and practices, though in constant flux On 15 November 1973, the Office of the President of the Philippines
are devised for the purpose of preventing complications. A issued Memorandum Order No. 398 - "Prescribing Measures to
physician's experience with his patients would sometimes tempt him Preserve the Lake Lanao Watershed, To Enforce the Reservation of
to deviate from established community practices, and he may end a Areas Around the Lake Below Seven Hundred And Two Meters
distinguished career using unorthodox methods without incident. Elevation, and for Other Purposes." Said decree instructed the NPC
However, when failure to follow established procedure results in the to build the Agus Regulation Dam at the mouth of Agus River in
evil precisely sought to be averted by observance of the procedure Lanao del Sur, at a normal maximum water level of Lake Lanao
and a nexus is made between the deviation and the injury or damage, at 702 meters elevation.8 Pursuant thereto, petitioner built and
the physician would necessarily be called to account for it. In the case operated the said dam in 1978.
at bar, the failure to observe pre-operative assessment protocol which
would have influenced the intubation in a salutary way was fatal to
private respondents' case. Private respondents Hadji Abdul Carim Abdullah and Caris Abdullah
were owners of fishponds in Barangay Bacong, Municipality of
Marantao, Lanao del Sur, while private respondents Hadji Ali Langco
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court and Diamael Pangcatan had their fishponds built in Poona-Marantao,
appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of also in the same province. All of these fishponds were sited along the
petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: Lake Lanao shore. Private respondents have spent substantial
1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of amounts to construct, maintain, and stock their respective fishponds
 85

with fish fingerlings, and make plantings along the adjoining of P260,000.00 in actual or compensatory damages; and the
foreshore areas between 1984 and 1986.9 further sum of P20,000.00 in litigation expenses and the
costs.15
In October and November of 1986, all the improvements were
washed away when the water level of the lake escalated and the Unflinched, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in
subject lakeshore area was flooded. Private respondents blamed the a Decision dated 21 December 1995, affirmed the decision of the
inundation on the Agus Regulation Dam built and operated by the court a quo with modification on the award of damages, to wit:
NPC in 1978. They theorized that NPC failed to increase the outflow
of water even as the water level of the lake rose due to the heavy WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations,
rains.10 judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Hadji
Abdul Carim Abdullah, Caris Abdullah, Hadji Langco and
Thus, in December of 1986, the private respondents, except for Caris Diamael Pangcatan and against defendant National Power
Abdullah, wrote separate letters to the NPC’s Vice-President, a Corporation directing said defendant National Power
certain "R.B. Santos," who was based in Ditucalan, Iligan City. They Corporation to pay unto plaintiff Hadji Abdul Carim
sought assistance and compensation for the damage suffered by each Abdullah the sum of P350,000.00; unto plaintiff Caris
of them.11 The private respondents’ pleas were shorn off by NPC on Abdullah the sum of P150,000.00; unto plaintiff Hadji Ali
the ground that it was mandated under Memorandum Order No. 398 Langco’s heirs and Diamael Pangcatan the sum
dated 15 November 1973 to build the dam and maintain the normal of P210,000.00 as and for temperate or moderate damages;
maximum lake level of 702 meters, and that since its operation in as well as P20,000.00 as and for litigation expenses and
1978, the water level never rose beyond 702 meters. Furthermore, costs.
NPC retorted that visible monuments and benchmarks indicating the
702-meter elevation had been established around the lake from 1974 Costs against appellant.16
to 1983, which should have served as a warning to the private
respondents not to introduce any improvements below the 702-meter
level as this was outlawed.12 The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner interposes this appeal, contending that the Court of Appeals
seriously erred when it:
Left with no other recourse, the private respondents filed a complaint
for damages before the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 9, on 24
February 1987, docketed as Civil Case No. 115-87. They alleged that I. …disregarded the mandate of Presidential Memorandum
the negligence and inexperience of NPC’s employees assigned to Order No. 398.
operate the Agus Regulation Dam were the proximate causes of the
damage caused to their properties and livelihood. They prayed for II. …concluded that petitioner was negligent in applying
damages corresponding to the cost of their lost fishes plus the value Presidential Memorandum Order No. 398, despite the clear
of their destroyed fishpond and the expenses and the fishes thereof. absence of evidence of such alleged negligence.
They, too, asked for reimbursement of necessary expenses as may be
proved in the trial, moral and exemplary damages, and the costs. 13 III. …concluded that the adverse result of an ocular
inspection conducted by the trial court at a much later date
NPC denied the private respondents’ allegations, and tossed back the and during the trial could be used, as it did, as proof of the
disputations that: (a) the water level of Lake Lanao never went alleged flooding in October/November 1986.
beyond 702 meters, (b) NPC employees were never remiss in the
performance of their duties, and (c) the private respondents’ alleged IV. …concluded and so held that petitioner allegedly failed
fishponds were either located below the 702-meter level, or must to prove that private respondents’ fishponds were situated
have been introduced when the water level was abnormally low and below the 702-meter elevation of the lake.
as such, were within the prohibited area as defined in Memorandum
Order No. 398. In fine, the NPC posited that the private respondents
had no cause of action against it.14 V. …awarded temperate and moderate damages in lieu of
actual and compensatory damages, at unreasonable
amounts at that, despite the clear absence OF LEGAL AND
The trial court created a committee composed of representatives of FACTUAL BASES FOR SUCH AWARD.17
both parties to conduct an ocular inspection of the dam and its
surrounding areas. On 29 July 1991, the trial court rendered a
Decision in favor of the private respondents. Thus, the trial court Despite the manifold spin-off subjects raised, the pertinent issue
disposed: worthy of exploration at the core is whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s verdict that petitioner was
legally answerable for the damages endured by the private
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing consideration, respondents.
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Hadji
Abdul Carim Abdullah, Caris Abdullah, Hadji Langco and
Diamael Pangcatan and against defendant National Power From the above-mentioned assignment of errors, petitioner palpably
Corporation directing said defendant National Power disputes the findings of facts and the appreciation of evidence made
Corporation to pay unto Plaintiff Hadji Abdul Carim by the trial court and later affirmed by respondent court. It is
Abdullah the sum of P410,000.00 in actual or apodictic that in a petition for review, only questions of law may be
compensatory damages; to pay unto plaintiff Caris raised18 for the reason that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
Abdullah the sum of P208,000.00 in actual or and generally does not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon
compensatory damages; to pay unto plaintiff Hadji Ali by the Court of Appeals.19 Corollarily, the factual findings of the
Langco or his substitutes Said Langco; Jalila Langco; Raga Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court bind this Court
Langco; Namolawan Langco; Alikan Langco; Dibolawan when such findings are supported by substantial evidence. In the case
Langco; Binolawan Langco; Ismael Langco; Bokari at hand, no reversible error could be attributed to the Court of
Langco; and Diamael Pangcatan the total sum Appeals in espousing conclusions of facts similar to the trial court on
 86

petitioner’s liability for the damages suffered by private When the lake level rises, specially during rainy days, it is
respondents.20 indispensable to wide open the dam to allow more water to
flow to the Agus River to prevent overflowing of the
Here are the reasons why: lakeshore and the land around it. But the NPC cannot allow
the water to flow freely into its outlet – the Agus River,
because it will adversely affect its hydroelectric power
Memorandum Order No. 398, also known as the law plants. It has to hold back the water by its dam in order to
"Prescribing Measures to Preserve the Lake Lanao maintain the volume of water required to generate the
Watershed, To Enforce the Reservation of Areas Around power supply. As a consequence of holding back the water,
the Lake Below Seven Hundred And Two Meters the lands around the lake are inundated. This is even
Elevation, and for Other Purposes," clothes the NPC with admitted by defendant’s witness Mama Manongguiring.
the power to build the Agus Regulation Dam and to operate Consequently, in October, November and December of
it for the purpose of generating energy. Twin to such power 1986 when the lake level increased, farmlands in the Basak
are the duties: (1) to maintain the normal maximum lake area around Lake Lanao and fishponds were inundated as
elevation at 702 meters, and (2) to build benchmarks to a result of such holding back of water by defendant
warn the inhabitants in the area that cultivation of land NPC.22 (Emphasis supplied)
below said elevation is forbidden. The wordings of the
said presidential order cannot be any clearer on this point.
Thus – Petitioner adduced in evidence its company records to bear out its
claim that the water level of the lake was, at no point in time, higher
than 702 meters. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, however,
4. The National Power Corporation shall render did not lend credence to this piece of evidence. Both courts below
financial assistance to forest protection, tree held that the data contained in petitioner’s records collapse in the face
farming, reforestation and other conservation of the actual state of the affected areas. During the ocular inspection
measures in coordination with private timber conducted by the lower court where representatives of both parties
concessionaires and the Bureau of Forest were present, it was established that in the subject areas, the
Development. With the assistance and benchmarks as pointed out by the NPC representative, could not be
cooperation of provincial and municipal officials, seen nor reached because they were totally covered with
as well as the Provincial Commander of the water.23 This fact, by itself, constitutes an unyielding proof that the
Philippine Constabulary, NPC shall place in water level did rise above the benchmarks and inundated the
every town around the lake, at the normal properties in the area.
maximum lake elevation of seven hundred and
two meters, benchmarks warning that
cultivation of land below said elevation is In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could
prohibited. (Emphasis supplied) have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam,
it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of
want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the
By the bulk of evidence, NPC ostensibly reneged on both duties. dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of
702 meters. An application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
With respect to its job to maintain the normal maximum level of the thing speaks for itself, comes to fore. 24 Where the thing which causes
lake at 702 meters, the Court of Appeals, echoing the trial court, injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the
observed with alacrity that when the water level rises due to the rainy accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
season, the NPC ought to release more water to the Agus River to those who have the management use proper care, it affords
avoid flooding and prevent the water from going over the maximum reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
level. And yet, petitioner failed to do so, resulting in the inundation defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 25
of the nearby estates.21 The facts, as unraveled by the trial court from
the evidence on record, established that before the construction of the NPC further attempts to dodge its burden by turning the tables
Agus Regulation Dam across the Agus River just beyond the Marawi against private respondents. Petitioner would entice this Court to
City Bridge, no report of damages to landowners around the lake was believe that private respondents brought the catastrophe upon
ever heard. After its construction and when it started functioning in themselves by constructing their fishponds below the 702-meter level
1978, reports and complaints of damages sustained by landowners in defiance of Memorandum Order No. 398. Yet, petitioner failed to
around the lake due to overflooding became widespread. The factual demonstrate that the subject fishponds were situated at an area below
findings of the trial court rightly support its conclusions on this the 702-meter level yardstick. Allegation is one thing; proof is
respect - another. Save for its bare claim, NPC was unable to indicate the
position of the fishponds vis-à-vis its benchmarks. But, how can it do
…Lake Lanao has only one outlet, the Agus River which in so when it cannot show its own benchmarks as they were submerged
effect is the natural regulator. When the Lake level is high, in water?
more water leaves the lakes towards the Agus River. Under
such a natural course, overflooding is remote because This brings us to the second duty of NPC under Memorandum Order
excess in water level of the lake, there is a corresponding No. 398 - to build and maintain benchmarks to warn the inhabitants
increase in the volume of water drain down towards the in the area that cultivation of land below the 702-meter elevation is
Agus River and vice versa. forbidden.

In order to achieve its goal of generating hydroelectric Notably, despite the clear mandate of Memorandum Order No. 398,
power, defendant NPC constructed the Intake Regulation petitioner’s own witness, Principal Hydrologist Mama
Dam, the purpose of which being to control and regulate Manongguiring, testified that although the dam was built in 1978,
the amount of water discharged into the Agus River. With the benchmarks were installed only in July and August of 1984
this dam, defendant NPC is able to either increase or and that apparently, many had already worn-out, to be replaced
decrease the volume of water discharged into the Agus only in October of 1986.26 As adroitly observed by the Court of
River depending on the amount of power to be generated.
 87

Appeals, it was only after many years from the time it was built that market prices. We find no reason to deflect from the award of
NPC installed said benchmarks. At that time, many farms and houses temperate or moderate damages by the Court of Appeals in reduced
were already swamped and many fishponds, including those of the amounts, but are reasonable under the circumstances conformably
private respondents, damaged. 27 with Articles 2224 and 2225 of the New Civil Code.32

Consequently, even assuming that the fishponds were erected below WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
the 702-meter level, NPC must, nonetheless, bear the brunt for such 21 December 1995 and the Resolution dated 27 March 1996 of the
damages inasmuch as it has the duty to erect and maintain the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44639 are hereby AFFIRMED.
benchmarks precisely to warn the owners of the neighboring Costs against petitioner.
properties not to build fishponds below these marks. Such
benchmarks, likewise, serve the evidentiary purpose of extricating SO ORDERED.
NPC from liability in cases of overflooding in the neighboring estates
because all NPC would have to do is point out that such constructions
are below the 702-meter allowable elevation. Without such points of
reference, the inhabitants in said areas are clueless whether or not
their improvements are within the prohibited area. Conversely, ******************************************
without such benchmarks, NPC has no way of telling if the
fishponds, subject matter of the present controversy, are indeed G.R. No. 157906             November 2, 2006
below the prescribed maximum level of elevation.
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner,
NPC staunchly asserts that the damages, if any, were due to a vs.
fortuitous event. Again, we cannot agree with petitioner. We defer SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA
instead to the findings and opinions expressed by the Court of CARDAÑA, Respondents.
Appeals that NPC cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the
rise of water was due to heavy rains that were acts of God. The rainy
season is an expected occurrence and the NPC cannot stop doing its DECISION
duty when the rains fall. In fact, it is during these critical times that
the NPC needs to be vigilant to make sure that the lake level does not QUISUMBING, J.:
exceed the maximum level. 28 Indeed, negligence or imprudence is
human factor which makes the whole occurrence humanized, as it Before us is a petition for review assailing the Decision 1 dated
were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. 29 October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No.
54412, declaring petitioner liable for negligence that resulted in the
NPC further enthuses that the principle of damnum absque injuria, or death of Jasmin Cardaña, a school child aged 12, enrolled in Grade 6,
damage without injury, applies in the present case. of San Roque Elementary School, where petitioner is the principal.
Likewise assailed is the Resolution2 dated March 20, 2003 denying
Again, we disagree. This principle means that although there was reconsideration.
physical damage, there was no legal injury, as there was no violation
of a legal right. The negligence of NPC as a result of its inability to The facts are as follows:
maintain the level of water in its dams has been satisfactorily and
extensively established. On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the
perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that "whoever by act or of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her,
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there Rosalita Cardaña - filed a case for damages before the Regional Trial
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
quasi-delict." In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages, which are the natural and probable The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios,
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.30 even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principal’s
office. The Cardañas averred that petitioner’s gross negligence and
In the case at bar, both the appellate court and the trial court lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
uniformly found that it was such negligence on the part of NPC
which directly caused the damage to the fishponds of private Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had
respondents. The degree of damages suffered by the latter remains only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree
unrebutted and there exists adequate documentary evidence that the was dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses
private respondents did have fishponds in their respective locations who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other
and that these were inundated and damaged when the water level teachers during a meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned
escalated in October 1986.31 Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.

However, as observed by the Court of Appeals, while the private In a Decision3 dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the
respondents claim reimbursement for actual or compensatory complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the
damages, they failed to present independent evidence to prove with a part of the petitioner.
reasonable degree of certainty the actual amount of loss. The private
respondents could only testify as to the amounts they had spent to
build and stock their respective fishponds and as to the amount of
earnings they would have made had the fish been sold at current
 88

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent
The appellate court found the appellee (herein petitioner) liable for or not is a question of fact which is generally not proper in a petition
Jasmin’s death, as follows: for review, and when this determination is supported by substantial
evidence, it becomes conclusive and binding on this
Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Court.8 However, there is an exception, that is, when the findings of
Appellee Joaquinita Capili is hereby declared liable for negligence the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of the lower
resulting to the death of Jasmin D. Cardaña. She is hereby ordered to court.9 In our view, the exception finds application in the present
indemnify appellants, parents of Jasmin, the following amounts: case.

1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaña P50,000.00; The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had
no knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that
Lerios merely informed her that he was going to buy the tree for
2. For burial expenses 15,010.00; firewood. It ruled that petitioner exercised the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances require and that there was an
3. For moral damages 50,000.00; absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of
care more than that required by the attendant circumstances. 10 The
4. For attorney’s fees and litigation 10,000.00. Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner should have
expenses known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting and that no
matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree
removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaña. The appellate
SO ORDERED.4 court ruled that the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that should have
been removed soon after petitioner had chanced upon it. 11
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now
comes before us submitting the following issues for our resolution: A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly
done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates
I a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of
nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIS-
in the actor’s position, in the same or similar circumstances, would
À-VIS THE SET OF FACTS STATED IN THE
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not
CHALLENGED DECISION, ERRED IN FINDING THE
to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. 12
PETITIONER NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF THE
CIVIL CODE AND IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall
TO PAY DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS; AND and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the
school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of
the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its
II
premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose
falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS discharge of the responsibility of her position.
ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.5
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
On the other hand, respondents posit the following issue: suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant
or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
Twelfth Division, in CA G.R. CV. No. 54412 promulgated on the damages incurred.13
October 18, 2002 … should be affirmed and respected, thus remain
undisturbed.6 The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a
result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows
Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is negligent and liable for that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and
the death of Jasmin Cardaña. calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was
tree since she had assigned her next-in-rank, Palaña, to see to its of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
disposal; that despite her physical inspection of the school grounds, happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident
she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
did any of her 15 teachers inform her that the tree was already exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
rotten;7 and that moral damages should not be granted against her negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
since there was no fraud nor bad faith on her part. due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.14
On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the
tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a
and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the
same situation. dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’ daughter
was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.
 89

In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court record shows that more than a month had lapsed from the time
held: petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaña on December 15,
1992, to the time the incident occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly,
…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree
to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence had been removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for negligence.
specific proof of negligence.
Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise: damages are awarded if the following elements exist in the case: (1)
an injury clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission by the
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the
rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 18 However, the person
defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights,
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to mental anguish, and serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of
raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the other party. Invariably, such action must be shown to have been
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive. 19 Under the
negligence. circumstances, we have to concede that petitioner was not motivated
by bad faith or ill motive vis-à-vis respondents’ daughter’s death. The
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused award of moral damages is therefore not proper.
the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the
in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had Court of Appeals of ₱50,000 as indemnity for the death of
its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient Jasmin,20 and ₱15,010 as reimbursement of her burial expenses.21
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or
was caused by the defendant’s want of care. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
October 18, 2002 and the Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED with
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that MODIFICATION such that the award of moral damages is hereby
petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents established the deleted.
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out
a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to
explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome Costs against petitioner.
by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the SO ORDERED.
inference.16

Was petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed to have the tree

removed immediately sufficient to exculpate her? ******************************************

As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the G.R. No. 194320               February 1, 2012
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within
the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state
of the tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why she failed to MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner,
be vigilant. vs.
RODELIO ALBERTO and ENRICO ALBERTO
REYES, Respondents.
Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and
rotting tree because Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not
inform her of its condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform her DECISION
that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she
could not see the immediate danger posed by the tree by its mere VELASCO, JR., J.:
sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted ground
inspections. She further argues that, even if she should have been The Case
aware of the danger, she exercised her duty by assigning the
disposition of the tree to another teacher.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
seeking to reverse and set aside the July 28, 2010 Decision 1 of the
We find petitioner’s explanation wanting. As school principal, Court of Appeals (CA) and its October 29, 2010 Resolution 2 denying
petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the school’s the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Malayan Insurance
premises.1âwphi1 The fact that she failed to see the immediate Co., Inc. (Malayan Insurance). The July 28, 2010 CA Decision
danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated February 2, 2009 of the
the responsibility demanded by her position. Regional Trial Court, Branch 51 in Manila.

Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to The Facts
another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee. 17 The
 90

At around 5 o’clock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an 1. The amount of P700,000.00 with legal interest from the
accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati time of the filing of the complaint;
City, involving four (4) vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by
Aladdin Transit with plate number NYS 381; (2) an Isuzu Tanker 2. Attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 and;
with plate number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate
number PDL 297; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number
TLM 732.4 3. Cost of suit.

Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, SO ORDERED.9

Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga (SPO1 Dungga), the
Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Dissatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as
Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. All three CA-G.R. CV No. 93112. In its Decision dated July 28, 2010, the CA
(3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court and ruled in
when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion favor of respondents, disposing:
of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus.
Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby
and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the GRANTED and the assailed Decision dated 2 February 2009
rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker.5 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint dated 18 October 1999
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994, Malayan Insurance
issued Car Insurance Policy No. PV-025-00220 in favor of First SO ORDERED.10
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured), insuring the
aforementioned Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability, own
damage and theft, among others. Having insured the vehicle against The CA held that the evidence on record has failed to establish not
such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated only negligence on the part of respondents, but also compliance with
October 18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the assured the other requisites and the consequent right of Malayan Insurance to
amounting to PhP 700,000.6 subrogation.11 It noted that the police report, which has been made
part of the records of the trial court, was not properly identified by
the police officer who conducted the on-the-spot investigation of the
Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of subject collision. It, thus, held that an appellate court, as a reviewing
the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the latter, body, cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an
Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents unverified and unidentified document, much less accord it
Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the evidentiary value.12
registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo
Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured.
When respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance Subsequently, Malayan Insurance filed its Motion for
was constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence Reconsideration, arguing that a police report is a prima facie
against respondents.7 evidence of the facts stated in it. And inasmuch as they never
questioned the presentation of the report in evidence, respondents are
deemed to have waived their right to question its authenticity and due
In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable execution.13
for the vehicular accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless
driving of the Nissan Bus driver. They alleged that the speeding bus,
coming from the service road of EDSA, maneuvered its way towards In its Resolution dated October 29, 2010, the CA denied the motion
the middle lane without due regard to Reyes’ right of way. When the for reconsideration. Hence, Malayan Insurance filed the instant
Nissan Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but petition.
the braking action could not cope with the inertia and failed to gain
sufficient traction. As a consequence, the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the The Issues
rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of
the vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on the other hand,
In its Memorandum14 dated June 27, 2011, Malayan Insurance raises
sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing damage to the latter in the
the following issues for Our consideration:
amount of PhP 20,000. Respondents also controverted the results of
the Police Report, asserting that it was based solely on the biased
narration of the Nissan Bus driver.8 I

After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued. WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN REFUSING
Malayan Insurance presented the testimony of its lone witness, a ADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLICE REPORT SINCE
motor car claim adjuster, who attested that he processed the insurance THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHO PREPARED THE
claim of the assured and verified the documents submitted to him. SAME DID NOT ACTUALLY TESTIFY IN COURT
Respondents, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence. THEREON.

In its Decision dated February 2, 2009, the trial court, in Civil Case II
No. 99-95885, ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and declared
respondents liable for damages. The dispositive portion reads: WHETHER THE SUBROGATION OF MALAYAN
INSURANCE IS IMPAIRED AND/OR DEFICIENT.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
against defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the following: On the other hand, respondents submit the following issues in its
Memorandum15 dated July 7, 2011:
 91

I of entries in official records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a
public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
WHETHER THE CA IS CORRECT IN DISMISSING so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of
THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE OF MALAYAN his or her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
INSURANCE TO OVERCOME THE BURDEN OF specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated,
NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENTS. which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person
personally or through official information.
II
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who
WHETHER THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites
BY MALAYAN INSURANCE ARE SUFFICIENT TO could be adequately proved.24
CLAIM FOR THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot
III investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the performance of
his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had
WHETHER THE SUBROGATION OF MALAYAN sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report.
INSURANCE HAS PASSED COMPLIANCE AND Thus, the third requisite is lacking.
REQUISITES AS PROVIDED UNDER PERTINENT
LAWS. Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police report’s
presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their
Essentially, the issues boil down to the following: (1) the right to do so.25 As a result, the police report is still admissible in
admissibility of the police report; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence evidence.
to support a claim for gross negligence; and (3) the validity of
subrogation in the instant case. Sufficiency of Evidence

Our Ruling Malayan Insurance contends that since Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo
Cargo truck, bumped the rear of the Mitsubishi Galant, he is
The petition has merit. presumed to be negligent unless proved otherwise. It further contends
that respondents failed to present any evidence to overturn the
Admissibility of the Police Report presumption of negligence. 26 Contrarily, respondents claim that since
Malayan Insurance did not present any witness who shall affirm any
negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of after the incident, there is no evidence which would show negligence
the police investigator who prepared the police report, said report is on the part of respondents.27
still admissible in evidence, especially since respondents failed to
make a timely objection to its presentation in evidence. 16 Respondents
counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the We agree with Malayan Insurance. Even if We consider the
investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the inadmissibility of the police report in evidence, still, respondents
evidence on record.17 cannot evade liability by virtue of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The
D.M. Consunji, Inc. case is quite elucidating:

Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to

those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the
knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness’ own application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine
perception.18 Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
which he or she merely learned from others either because said elevator was a result of the person having charge of the
witness was told or read or heard those matters. 19 Such testimony is instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes
what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule. 20 that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.

As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, 21 "Hearsay is not limited

to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements."
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give
Court, among which are entries in official records. 22 Section 44, Rule rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
130 provides: defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on
a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
therein stated. negligence.

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, 23 this Court reiterated the requisites x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused
for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
 92

defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s
in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the
its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or negligence arises. x x x.
was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or
necessary evidence is absent or not available. inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the husband."
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury
either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or
therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima
establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the
bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the
over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the established.28
matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police report, none
proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which of the parties disputes the fact that the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear
the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the
show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of vehicle in front of it. Respondents, however, point to the reckless
defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, driving of the Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the
some courts add to the three prerequisites for the application of the collision, which allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence on
res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa record. And assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true, it is
loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no astonishing that respondents never even bothered to file a cross-claim
knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or against the owner or driver of the Nissan Bus.
that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge
or opportunity for explanation of the accident. What is at once evident from the instant case, however, is the
presence of all the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in loquitur. To reiterate, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity which
the case at bar: applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. As
explained in D.M. Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
floor of a building to the basement while he was working with injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege negligence in
appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the accident in order to establish negligence.
situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur
therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of the res ipsa
employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to loquitur rule are the following: (1) the accident was of a kind which
know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused contribution on the part of the person injured.29
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Also,
x. the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver,
Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally
basement while performing work in a construction site unless unfounded. Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to the
someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for
the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby
construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of
likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and respondents.
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also
 93

It is worth mentioning that just like any other disputable dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of contract. It
presumptions or inferences, the presumption of negligence may be accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the
rebutted or overcome by other evidence to the contrary. It is insurance claim. The doctrine of subrogation has its roots in equity. It
unfortunate, however, that respondents failed to present any evidence is designed to promote and to accomplish justice; and is the mode
before the trial court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains. that equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one
Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for Malayan who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, ought to pay. 33
Insurance’s adverted failure to prove negligence on the part of
respondents. Considering the above ruling, it is only but proper that Malayan
Insurance be subrogated to the rights of the assured.
Validity of Subrogation
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The CA’s July 28,
Malayan Insurance contends that there was a valid subrogation in the 2010 Decision and October 29, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
instant case, as evidenced by the claim check voucher 30 and the 93112 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt31 presented by it before the February 2, 2009 issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 99-95885
trial court. Respondents, however, claim that the documents is hereby REINSTATED.
presented by Malayan Insurance do not indicate certain important
details that would show proper subrogation. No pronouncement as to cost.

As noted by Malayan Insurance, respondents had all the opportunity, SO ORDERED.

but failed to object to the presentation of its evidence. Thus, and as
We have mentioned earlier, respondents are deemed to have waived
their right to make an objection. As this Court held in Asian
Construction and Development Corporation v. COMFAC
Corporation: ******************************************

The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it G.R. No. 173870               April 25, 2012
admissible, and the court cannot, on its own, disregard such
evidence. We note that ASIAKONSTRUCT’s counsel of record OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., Petitioner,
before the trial court, Atty. Bernard Dy, who actively participated in vs.
the initial stages of the case stopped attending the hearings when GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and representing the children,
COMFAC was about to end its presentation. Thus, namely: MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B.
ASIAKONSTRUCT could not object to COMFAC’s offer of MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B.
evidence nor present evidence in its defense; ASIAKONSTRUCT MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and
was deemed by the trial court to have waived its chance to do so. CRISTINA B. MONSALUD, Respondents.

Note also that when a party desires the court to reject the DECISION
evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection
and it cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time
on appeal. Because of a party’s failure to timely object, the DEL CASTILLO, J.:
evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case. Thereafter, all
the parties are considered bound by any outcome arising from In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 the registered owner of a
the offer of evidence properly presented.32 (Emphasis supplied.) motor vehicle challenges the Decision 2 dated July 11, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 which held him
Bearing in mind that the claim check voucher and the Release of liable for damages to the heirs of the victims who were run over by
Claim and Subrogation Receipt presented by Malayan Insurance are the said vehicle.
already part of the evidence on record, and since it is not disputed
that the insurance company, indeed, paid PhP 700,000 to the assured, Factual Antecedents
then there is a valid subrogation in the case at bar. As explained in
Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety At dawn on New Year’s Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud
Corporation: (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their
daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a
Subrogation is the substitution of one person by another with Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga
reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run
succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK-600
including its remedies or securities. The principle covers a situation that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was
wherein an insurer has paid a loss under an insurance policy is registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.)
entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the insured against and used as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga
a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy. It del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
contemplates full substitution such that it places the party subrogated
in the shoes of the creditor, and he may use all means that the creditor Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-10347 3 for
could employ to enforce payment.1âwphi1 Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed
against Allan before the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga
We have held that payment by the insurer to the insured operates as del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13, 1997, said court
an equitable assignment to the insurer of all the remedies that the declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 4
insured may have against the third party whose negligence or
wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not
 94

During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilia’s father, Geronimo Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor children 5 of the
Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219, 6 an independent civil In its Decision22 dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the
action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency of evidence.
impleaded therein were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary
Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen (Spouses capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of
del Carmen) and the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence on the part of
Geronimo prayed for the reimbursement of funeral and burial a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused an injury is
expenses, as well as the award of attorney’s fees, moral and shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary course of
exemplary damages resulting from the death of the three victims, and things, the accident would not have happened had there been an
loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a public exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the
school teacher at the time of her death. 7 registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the same
through his driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was usually
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims’ deaths. parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that the
Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds have no cause of action against jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition
them because he and his wife do not own the jeep and that they were key, they should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent the
never the employers of Allan.8 For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a vehicle from being used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The
victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends 9 stole his jeep RTC thus concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due care and
while it was parked beside his driver’s rented house to take it for a foresight constitute negligence making the registered owner of the
joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the same.
can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The
vehicle’s engine shall then run but without any headlights on. 10 And The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
implying that this was the manner by which the vehicle was illegally
taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the
statements11 of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and
(Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of against the defendants Allan Maglasang and Oscar del Carmen, Jr.
the accident, declared before the investigating officer that during said ordering –
time, the vehicle’s headlights were off. Because of this allegation,
Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case 1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs,
against Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93- and in case of insolvency, for defendant OSCAR DEL
10380.12 The case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of CARMEN, JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:
evidence.13
a. ₱73,112.00 for their funeral and burial
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was expenses;
the latter’s brother, Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was
employed as the driver. 14 In any event, Allan’s employment as b. ₱1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of
conductor was already severed before the mishap occurred on the late Emilia Monsalud;
January 1, 1993 since he served as such conductor only from the first
week of December until December 14, 1992. 15 In support of this,
Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and c. ₱250,000.00 moral damages for the death of
Cresencio "Junior" Baobao (Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of the late Leonardo Monsalud, Sr.;
Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to Sominot
on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He d. ₱250,000.00 moral damages for the death of
also believed that Crecencio started to work as such at around the late Glenda Monsalud;
December 15 or 16, 1992.16 Cresencio, for his part, testified that he
worked as Oscar Jr.’s conductor from December 15, 1992 to January
e. ₱40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
1, 1993 and that Rodrigo was his driver. 17 He stated that upon
learning that the jeep figured in an accident, he never bothered to
verify the news. Instead, he went to Midsalip to work there as a f. ₱20,000.00 attorney’s fees; and
conductor for his brother’s vehicle, thereby terminating his
employment with Oscar Jr.18 g. The cost of this proceedings.

Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a day’s trip, 2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses
the jeep would be parked beside Rodrigo’s rented house 19 for the next OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR. and NORMA DEL
early-morning operation. CARMEN.

Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.’s SO ORDERED.23
employee subsequent to December 14, 1992. To prove this, he
presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and Jose
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration 24 contending that the provision
Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare to Allan
on vicarious liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
every time he would board the jeep in going to Molave and that the
Code25 requires the existence of employer-employee relationship and
last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December 23, 1992. He
that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment
also claimed that immediately before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and
when the tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan
Allan used to park the jeep at the yard of his house. 20 Jose likewise
was his employee, he was hired not as a driver but as a conductor.
attested that Allan was still the jeep conductor during the said period
Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he
as he had ridden the jeep many times in mid-December of 1992. 21
drove the jeep.
 95

Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without parked just beside Rodrigo’s house where Allan also lived; the jeep
its headlights on at the time of the accident indubitably shows that the could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the
same was stolen. He further alleged that the jeep could not have been said parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the
taken by only one person. As Rodrigo declared in Criminal Case No. unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the
93-10380 (carnapping case), based on his experience, the jeep cannot ignition key.
be pushed by only one person but by at least five people in order for
it to start. This was due to the vehicle’s mass and the deep canal The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
which separates the parking area from the curved road that was
obstructed by a house.26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
GRANTED. The assailed Order dated 21 June 2000 of the Regional
Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its Order 27 dated Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, in Civil Case
June 21, 2000 granted the Motion for Reconsideration and absolved No. 96-20,219 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered.
Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It cited Article 103 of the Revised Penal OSCAR DEL CARMEN, Jr. and ALLAN MAGLASANG are held
Code which provides that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable for primarily liable, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellants:
the criminal acts of his employee, the latter should have committed
the same in the discharge of his duties. The court agreed with Oscar
Jr. that this condition is wanting in Allan’s case as he was not acting 1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud,
in the discharge of his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep. Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud in the
amount of Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) each or for
the total amount of One hundred fifty thousand pesos
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable (₱150,000.00);
since the property owner cannot be made responsible for the damages
caused by his property by reason of the criminal acts of another. It
then adjudged that only Allan should bear the consequences of his 2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five
criminal acts. Thus: Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) each for the death of Emilia
Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud
(collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR Seventy-five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00);

RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL 3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
CARMEN JR. is hereby absolved from all civil liability arising from (₱50,000.00) each for the death of the Monsaluds or for a
the felonious acts of convicted accused ALLAN MAGLASANG. total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱150,000.00);
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos
Geronimo appealed. (₱40,000.00).

Ruling of the Court of Appeals No pronouncement as to costs.

In its July 11, 2006 Decision,29 the CA granted the appeal. SO ORDERED. 32

In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of Issues
whether there was an employer-employee relationship between Oscar
Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident. It ruled in the affirmative As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition for
and gave more credence to the testimonies of Geronimo’s witnesses Review on Certiorari alleging that the CA erred in:
than to those of Oscar Jr.’s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio. The
CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness presented by Geronimo,
Faustino never resided in Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge 1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations,
of the place. His testimony was also unreliable considering that he surmises and conjectures; misapprehension of facts which
only rode the subject jeep twice30 during the last two weeks of are in conflict with the findings of the trial court;
December 1992. As regards Cresencio’s testimony, the appellate
court found it puzzling why he appeared to have acted uninterested 2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord
upon learning that the jeep was the subject of an accident when it was with law and with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
his bread and butter. Said court likewise considered questionable Court;
Oscar Jr.’s asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor
when Cresencio testified that he replaced a certain Sumagang Jr. 31
3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial
proceedings in the disposition of the appeal and [in going]
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the beyond the issues of the case.33
heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered owner of
a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death
Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTC’s ruling in
of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved
its June 21, 2000 Order which was in accord with Article 2180 of the
Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the
Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by an employee should have
carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was
been done ‘within the scope of his assigned tasks’ for an employer to
dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is
be held liable under culpa aquiliana. However, the CA never touched
deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject
upon this matter even if it was glaring that Allan’s driving the subject
vehicle. To support its conclusion, the CA cited the following
vehicle was not within the scope of his previous employment as
circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were both employees
conductor. Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was stolen and
assigned to the said jeep; after a day’s work, said vehicle would be
 96

stresses that the liability of a registered owner of a vehicle as to third with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rizada and Joven
persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, should not apply Orot.35
to him. He asserts that although Allan and his companions were not
found to have committed the crime of carnapping beyond reasonable There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and
doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly taken Benjamin were fetched by Allan who was driving the jeep, this would
by them from a well secured area. This is considering that the vehicle mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to Rodrigo’s
was running without its headlights on at the time of the accident, a testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be pushed by
proof that it was started without the ignition key. at least five people so that it could start without the ignition key.

Our Ruling On direct examination, 36 Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo, his
driver who had informed him about the accident on January 1, 1993
Petitioner’s own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him after the incident, viz:
stolen by Allan and his alleged cohorts. Negligence is presumed
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you
about the accident, what did he carry with him if any and
Oscar Jr.’s core defense to release him from responsibility for the turned over to you?
death of the Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that
the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was indeed A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of
carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and his Registration) Sir.
five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the
parking area and the weight of the jeep.
Q: How about the key of the vehicle?
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was
already dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence. But even A: It was not turned over, Sir.37
in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA, the
evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence required was Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same
likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.’s claim that his jeep was pushed by a group, the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as
unlawfully taken. he was entrusted with the jeep’s possession. Thus, at the time
Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable
Two of Allan’s co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and to expect that the driver should have also returned the key to the
Benjamin, declared before the police that when Allan invited them to operator together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of
ride with him, he was already driving the jeep: Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was
allegedly handed over to the police for reasons unexplained and not
available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never presented
04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 o’clock on Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attest on cross-
December 31, 1992, where were you? examination that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or that the key
was handed over to him by Rodrigo:
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot,
Zamboanga del Sur. Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was
Rodrigo Maglasang who gave the key to Allan Maglasang.
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there Is that correct?
was an incident [that] happened?
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 affidavit to show that he turned it over to the police.
at dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang
arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of
with Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rezada and December 31, 1992, when it was driven by Allan
Joven Orot.34 Maglasang, you did not know that the key was voluntarily
given by Rodrigo Maglasang to Allan Maglasang?
xxxx
A: I was not there.
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening more or less on December 31, 1992, where were Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct?
you?
A: Yes Sir, I was not there.38
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot,
Zamboanga del Sur.
Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the carnapping
case, thus:
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if
there was an incident [that] happened?
Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang
and [his] x x x co-accused x x x [n]amely: Benjamin
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and
at dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang [Arniel] Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct?
arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together
 97

A: Yes Sir. relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of
negligence."41 It "recognizes that parties may establish prima facie
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to
December 31, 1992, your jeep was carnapped by Allan substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to
Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, is that present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending
correct? circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or
presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part." 42 The
A: Yes Sir. doctrine is based partly on "the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of
Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct? the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the
plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege
A: Yes, Sir. negligence in general terms."43

Q: And you could well remember that this representation is The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by
the counsel of the co-accused of Allan Maglasang, is that jurisprudence are as follows:
correct?
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
A: Yes Sir. unless someone is negligent;

Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
correct? the person in charge and

A: Yes Sir. 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.44
Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed,
is that correct
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just
walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over
A: Yes Sir. by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle
had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was
Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr.
that the jeep was carnapped, is that correct? entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct
him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeep’s use, including
who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run
A: Yes Sir.39
without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it
safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the
his claim that his jeep was stolen, this circumstance by itself will not victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
prove that it really was stolen. The reason why the headlights were
not on at the time of the accident was not sufficiently established
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a
during the trial. Besides, the fact that the headlights were not on
presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have
cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition key in starting
overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in
the jeep as there may be other possibilities such as electrical
preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to
problems, broken headlights, or that they were simply turned off.
do so.

Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to

What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CA’s
support the defense of unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to
conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan to use
Oscar Jr.’s claim that his jeep was stolen. The evidence on record
the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.’s failure to provide solid proof
brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers.
that he ensured that the parking area is well secured and that he had
expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he
Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for itself) CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by his brother
should not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing his Rodrigo since as already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo
vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well secured area not any specific and strict instructions on matters regarding its use.
remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given the absolute
discretion as to the vehicle’s operation, including the discretion to
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that caused allow his brother Allan to use it.
the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third
things, would not happen if those who had management or control persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation,
used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence – in the absence of a regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owner’s
sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant – that the vehicle in connection with his employment.
accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of
care."40 Res ipsa loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a
Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still
mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and
his
 98

employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no [G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep in his
private capacity and thus, an employer’s vicarious liability for the CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v.
employee’s fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE
to him. GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.

The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.
Savings Bank,45 the car of therein respondent bank caused the death
of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.
president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for
damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled
doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor vehicles, SYLLABUS
i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to
third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being 1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR
driven on the highways or streets.46 We have already ratiocinated that: CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES
COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. — The
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children
by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15
primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but
responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. 47 under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180,
the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use 48 or that the subject and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was
vehicle was stolen49 which are valid defenses available to a registered amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that
owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or
from his jeep’s use.1âwphi1 incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity,
upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed
All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded are in by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However,
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court concurs with the under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
findings of the CA and sustains the awards made. In addition, alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 50 an who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil
interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same
be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the RTC is rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the
rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on Civil Code, as so modified.
such amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA- DECISION
G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with further
MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on
the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the REGALADO, J.:
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent
(12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this Decision until One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is
the payment thereof. sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by
the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of
SO ORDERED. their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched.
While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their
families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition
should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended
****************************************** judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR- ART. 2180:
were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us
seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated
ON PARENTS AND GUARDIANS: on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following
decretal portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Art. 221 FAMILY CODE:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s
complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby
 99

rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court
plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside
and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000; who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit
for resolution the following issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00; library

3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs. 1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court
in accordance with established decisional laws; and
However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed."
1 2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that vicarious liability. 3
respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong
who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police
which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions
commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act.
and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the
died in the same event on the same date. absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of
entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of
and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie whether it was suicide or not.
Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly
found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of
second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance
with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of
prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor,
him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours
at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not
from January 7 to 13, 1978. categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched
at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was residue on Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private hastily buried.cralawnad
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem
streets of the same city. More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy
on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral
contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table
from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed,
documents and evidence of physical facts. but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted
that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on
submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the the head which he examined because the deceased was inside the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that
commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the
distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot
contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have himself. 6
displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the
have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the
any witness and thereby avoid hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which
identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct
examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s "Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, there would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from
the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as these guns because they are what we call clean?
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of
sufficient merit." 2 Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is
smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule out the
 100

possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct? the testimonies of defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James
Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house
smokeless powder. adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a
"shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that shots therefrom.
you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the
trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where
that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim she was staying faces the gas station; that it is the second apartment;
himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs
the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas station.
your oath? 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the
rooftop of the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and
trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop.
manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7 13

As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top
at the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone
Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house
prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiong’s
Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of house; and he further gave the following answers to these
entrance located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
x       x       x
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your
house?
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with
contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind
and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly A It is about 8 feet.
forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues,
making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the brain
tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT Q And where were you looking from?
wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left,
2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph A From upstairs in my living room.

x       x       x ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)

Q From Your living room window, is that correct?

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the
gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot
wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14
tissue, are absent." 10
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was that the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and
made of record, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions
of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand,
the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without
the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for
indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo
Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches? climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house,
he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and
drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s direct
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length. and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he
whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library man at the gate of the Gotiong house.

I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated
extending his right arm almost straight towards his head." 11 pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann.
It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged
 101

"John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that ‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
overwhelming evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial — obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.’
the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie
Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas ‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of
for a reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red their minor children who acted with discernment is determined under
the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
on record either. for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may
stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.’ (3
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety SCRA 361-362).
deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these
petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is ". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees,
always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said
have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when
the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said
serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong;
diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his
away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU
keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
x       x       x
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent
and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction
and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their "Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court
duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein
son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as preponderantly shown by
at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the
was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son
safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have
children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but
such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the
plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19
handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding
upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners
in possession of that firearm. should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears
from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination
petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion, therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the
part of petitioners and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of
petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for
who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of
of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-
the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an extended quotation
reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents
Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor
children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live hereunder.chanrobles law library
in their company.’
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being
having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look
deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which
natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings
in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants- that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their
appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor
prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:chanrob1es virtual diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the
1aw library other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct
and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial
 102

defense. both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability
should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted
minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not
code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where
the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however,
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable
not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether the liability of
that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
of a good father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw
library In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double
homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and
committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a
subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore,
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on
the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil
Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons
x       x       x who are liable for a quasi-delict.

However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but
liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time,
or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the
no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21 parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical
injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily
under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for liable for damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the
crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not
primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano,
on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of
family. intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article
2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages,
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond since the son, "although married, was living with his father and
for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is
both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was only held
respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of subsidiarily liable.
insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of
minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for
causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the
answerable with his own property in an action against him where a compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an
guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph engaged in industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories
for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes.
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his 30
authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be
insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil decision in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that
law."cralaw virtua1aw library Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A
careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed
children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not
aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after
number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the
Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in
Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its
Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their
minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with "Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these the basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent
situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under
 103

Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the
negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals,
reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
minor’s criminal responsibility is of no moment."cralaw virtua1aw
library Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three
parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an
under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair.
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and,
father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the
with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the
age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10,
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the
years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of
twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code
which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of
death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as
offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an
by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles act of his minor child which causes damage to another under the
2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified. specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil
Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong
was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages damage to another, there being fault or
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said existing contractual relation between the parties,
petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
familias to prevent such damages. provisions of this Chapter.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
with costs against petitioners. 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for
SO ORDERED. whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity

****************************************** are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
xxx xxx xxx
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father
ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, The responsibility treated of in this Article shall
vs. cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant. that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the
fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being
Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendant-appellant.
no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or
omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the
latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different
cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother
MAKALINTAL, J.: under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious,
 104

although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al.
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the
father of a family to prevent damage." son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the coupled with mistake."
exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove
it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate
company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated 1. The present action is not only against but a
measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual
case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence
the damage could have been prevented. 2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which
is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of 3. The complaint had no cause of action against
due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which as guardian of the other defendant through
caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his emancipation by marriage.
duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her
to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the (P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank
not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any grounds that the following order was issued:
trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her
parents. Considering the motion for reconsideration filed
by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy contained, the Court finds the same to be
for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated meritorious and well-founded.
to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction
enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good
conscience. WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on
December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p.

****************************************** 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano,

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
vs.
THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
I
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY
AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES
OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
BARREDO, J.:
II
 105

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR noted that it was the employer and not the
JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73
RES-ADJUDICTA; Phil.). 1

III It will be noticed that the defendant in the above

case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, case because his negligence causing the death of
ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
INSTANT CASE; and negligence being a proper subject matter either of
a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
IV separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana,
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER recognized, even with regard to a negligent act
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION for which the wrongdoer could have been
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.) prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and
for which, after such a conviction, he could have
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs- been sued for this civil liability arising from his
appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that It is most significant that in the case just cited,
his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because could have been criminally prosecuted for
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the reckless or simple negligence and not only
court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint punished but also made civilly liable because of
against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court
account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to awarded damages in an independent civil action
dismiss above-referred to. for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive
issues presented for Our resolution are: The legal provisions, authors, and cases already
invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, doctrines that have been little understood, in the
was not reversed? past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate
their foundations.

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365
the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, punishes not only reckless but also simple
living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902
legally married? to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a Code, the legal institution of culpa
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and aquiliana would have very little scope and
civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was application in actual life. Death or injury to
firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. persons and damage to property- through any
607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly degree of negligence - even the slightest - would
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in have to be Idemnified only through the principle
relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the state of affairs, what sphere would remain
works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath
that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds: about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor
are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
the same act machinist. come under both the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the meaning of the law to smother and render almost
action of the agent killeth unjustified and lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the such full-grown development as culpa
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
to be also a proper subject of a civil action under made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be Spanish Civil Code.
 106

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
doubt is required, while in a civil case, development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
the defendant pay in damages. There are Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is
not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby
such cases, the defendant can and should be made making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to
be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply
"Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.) says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by
the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision,
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Article 2177 of the new code provides:
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the under the preceding article is entirely separate
character and efficacy of the action for culpa and distinct from the civil liability arising from
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice negligence under the Penal Code. But the
to seek damages only by virtue of the civil plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting same act or omission of the defendant.
that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
useless and nugatory the more expeditious and negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence
But we believe it is high time we pointed out to and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
the harms done by such practice and to restore decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
the principle of responsibility for fault or sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
may no longer be diverted into that of a crime quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
make for the better safeguarding or private rights
because it realtor, an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only
independent civil action, not depending on the acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about
issues, limitations and results of a criminal construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
Phil.) establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil
action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
"which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
 107

a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a

declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, ******************************************
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 4 ON EMPLOYERS/OWNERS MANAGERS

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal G.R. No. 190696               August 3, 2010
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE
ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners,
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's vs.
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
upheld. RESOLUTION

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon BRION, J.:

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners,
it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) and Rolito Calang, to
by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus challenge our Resolution of February 17, 2010. Our assailed
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall Resolution denied the petition for review on certiorari for failure to
terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the show any reversible error sufficient to warrant the exercise of this
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
Antecedent Facts
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving
Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by Philtranco along Daang
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
when its rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming
those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case from the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Cresencio
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
Pinohermoso, the jeep’s driver, lost control of the vehicle, and
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
along the highway’s shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, before finally stopping at about 25 meters from the point of impact.
although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
Two of the jeep’s passengers, Armando Nablo and an unidentified
from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, woman, were instantly killed, while the other passengers sustained
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
serious physical injuries.
father, a situation which is not unusual.

The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their imprudence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31,
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
Calbayog City. The RTC, in its decision dated May 21, 2001, found
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear
resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by to property, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance
thirty days of arresto menor, as minimum, to four years and two
of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it months of prision correccional, as maximum. The RTC ordered
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to
Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay ₱50,000.00 as
judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And
death indemnity to the heirs of Armando; ₱50,000.00 as death
surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated,
indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and ₱90,083.93 as actual
the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty
damages to the private complainants.
to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable
for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child without The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals
their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 25522. The CA, in its decision
dated November 20, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The
CA ruled that petitioner Calang failed to exercise due care and
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty.
precaution in driving the Philtranco bus. According to the CA,
Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
various eyewitnesses testified that the bus was traveling fast and
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a pushcart that was
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
on the side of the road. In addition, he failed to slacken his speed,
subsidiary to that of his son.
despite admitting that he had already seen the jeep coming from the
opposite direction when it was still half a kilometer away. The CA
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial further ruled that Calang demonstrated a reckless attitude when he
court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Costs against appellees.
 108

drove the bus, despite knowing that it was suffering from loose In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,
compression, hence, not roadworthy. and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
The CA added that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
severally liable with petitioner Calang, for failing to prove that it had regulations shall have been committed by them or their
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the employees.1avvphil
accident.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or
certiorari. In our Resolution dated February 17, 2010, we denied the for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
assailed decision to warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
appellate jurisdiction. shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper
or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of
and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
The Motion for Reconsideration robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper’s employees.
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that
there was no basis to hold Philtranco jointly and severally liable with The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to
Calang because the former was not a party in the criminal case (for Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
multiple homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage
to property thru reckless imprudence) before the RTC.
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged
The petitioners likewise maintain that the courts below overlooked in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants,
several relevant facts, supported by documentary exhibits, which, if pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
considered, would have shown that Calang was not negligent, such as duties.
the affidavit and testimony of witness Celestina Cabriga; the
testimony of witness Rodrigo Bocaycay; the traffic accident sketch
and report; and the jeepney’s registration receipt. The petitioners also The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability –
insist that the jeep’s driver had the last clear chance to avoid the Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed written into the judgments in
collision. cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of
its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
subsidiary liability of the employer. 3 Nonetheless, before the
We partly grant the motion. employers’ subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence must
exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the
Liability of Calang convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry;
(3) the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of
We see no reason to overturn the lower courts’ finding on Calang’s their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been
culpability. The finding of negligence on his part by the trial court, satisfied due to insolvency. The determination of these conditions
affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact that we cannot pass upon may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s
without going into factual matters touching on the finding of liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for
negligence. In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors proceedings for the execution of the judgment.4
of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are
devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the present motion. The Court
is based on a misapprehension of facts. of Appeals decision that affirmed in toto the RTC decision, finding
Rolito Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
Liability of Philtranco resulting in multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
Philtranco’s liability should only be subsidiary. No costs.
We, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both erred in holding
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang. We emphasize
that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, SO ORDERED.
Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of
action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA
erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang,
based on quasi-delict under Articles 21761 and 21802 of the Civil ******************************************
Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the
vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee
G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998
has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability
arising from delict.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of
COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and
the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
FORTUNE INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments, as
follows:
 109

BELLOSILLO, J.: was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen

swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at
For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi- the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely
delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by
insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did
vehicle? not have any participation therein.

This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-
1987, two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising delict provides:
northward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City,
figured in a traffic accident. The car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the demandable not only for one's own acts or
highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, with Plate No. omissions, but also for those of persons for
PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), whom one is responsible.
and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left
of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, The father and, in case of his death or
the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not damages caused by the minor children who
possess a Philippine driver's license. 1 live in their company.

As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of Guardians are liable for damages caused by
its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By the minors or incapacitated persons who are
way of subrogation,2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR under their authority and live in their
as well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation company.
(FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
The owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise responsible for
Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he damages caused by their employees in the
was no longer staying at his given address; in fact, upon motion service of the branches in which the latter are
of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint. employed or on the occasion of their functions.

On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for failure of Employers shall be liable for the damages
petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation.3 caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the assigned tasks, even though the former are not
ruling of the trial court although based on another ground, i.e., engaged in any business or industry.
only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently
proved but not that of respondent FILCAR. 4 In other words, The State is responsible in like manner when it
petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money acts through a special agent; but not when the
based on quasi-delict. damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in
In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the which case what is provided in article 2176
strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation shall be applicable.
v. Vda. de Caldo5 that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable
for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
leased to another. arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in apprentices, so long as they remain in their
upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The pertinent custody.
provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or The responsibility treated of in this article
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between prove that they observed all the diligence of a
the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . " good father of a family to prevent damage.

To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a
concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons
negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to
damage incurred by the plaintiff.6 prevent them from causing damage.7 Yet, as correctly observed
by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under
the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-
defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl- car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen.
Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer
should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be
 110

responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not

being an employer of the latter. Statement of the Case

We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is Court, assailing the May 12, 2000 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the 2 (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55474. The decretal portion of the
vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the Decision reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision, dated May 5,
absence of master-driver relationship between respondent 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14, in Civil Case
FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of No. 95-73522, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; award of attorney’s fees is DELETED." 3
logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither
prosper. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 95-73522, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 14) had earlier disposed in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is
rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case, "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by plaintiffs and against the defendant Equitable Leasing Corporation
petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and ordering said defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the
damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the collision
it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to A. TO MYRNA TAMAYO
another; and, that the driver was not its employee but of the
lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the true 1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Reniel Tamayo;
nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more than a
disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the 2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this
finding and affirmed the declaration of joint and several liability 3. P56,000.00 for the damage to the store and its contents, and funeral
of the corporation with its driver. expenses.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of B. TO FELIX OLEDAN

respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 January 1995 sustaining
the dismissal of petitioner's complaint by the trial court is 1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Felmarie Oledan;
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
SO ORDERED.
3. P30,000.00 for medical expenses, and funeral expenses.

C. TO MARISSA ENANO

****************************************** 1. P7,000.00 as actual damages

[G.R. No. 143360. September 5, 2002.] D. TO LUCITA SUYOM

EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. 1. The sum of P5,000.00 for the medical treatment of her two sons.
LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA ENANO, MYRNA TAMAYO and
FELIX OLEDAN, Respondents. The sum of P120,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees." 4

DECISION The Facts

PANGANIBAN, J.: On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed
into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo located at Pier 18, Vitas,
Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed. Pinned to
death under the engine of the tractor were Respondent Myrna
In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor
Tamayo’s son, Reniel Tamayo, and Respondent Felix Oledan’s
vehicle is solidarily liable for the injuries and damages caused by the
daughter, Felmarie Oledan. Injured were Respondent Oledan himself,
negligence of the driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may have
Respondent Marissa Enano, and two sons of Respondent Lucita
already been the subject of an unregistered Deed of Sale in favor of
Suyom.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
another person. Unless registered with the Land Transportation
Office, the sale — while valid and binding between the parties —
Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence
does not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents
resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries in
involving the said transport equipment. Thus, in the present
Criminal Case No. 296094-SA, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
case, Petitioner, which is the registered owner, is liable for the acts of
Branch 12. 5
the driver employed by its former lessee who has become the owner
of that vehicle by virtue of an unregistered Deed of Sale.chanrob1es
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, respondents
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
were furnished a copy of Official Receipt No. 62204139 6 and
 111

Certificate of Registration No. 08262797, 7 showing that the The Petition has no merit.
registered owner of the tractor was "Equitable Leasing
Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim." On April 15, 1995, respondents First Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation ("Ecatine") and
Equitable Leasing Corporation ("Equitable") a Complaint 8 for Liability for Wrongful Acts
damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73522 in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 14. Petitioner contends that it should not be held liable for the damages
sustained by respondents and that arose from the negligence of the
The trial court, upon motion of plaintiffs’ counsel, issued an Order driver of the Fuso Road Tractor, which it had already sold to Ecatine
dropping Raul Tutor, Ecatine and Edwin Lim from the Complaint, at the time of the accident. Not having employed Raul Tutor, the
because they could not be located and served with summonses. 9 On driver of the vehicle, it could not have controlled or supervised him.
the other hand, in its Answer with Counterclaim, 10 petitioner alleged 18
that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former
was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the We are not persuaded. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may
incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of sue the negligent party under (1) Article 100 19 of the Revised Penal
Equitable, but of Ecatine. Code, for civil liability ex delicto; or (2) under Article 2176 20 of the
Civil Code, for civil liability ex quasi delicto. 21chanrob1es virtua1
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision ordering 1aw 1ibrary
petitioner to pay actual and moral damages and attorney’s fees to
respondents. It held that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner Furthermore, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
and Ecatine had not been registered with the Land Transportation employers may be held subsidiarily liable for felonies committed by
Office, (LTO), the legal owner was still Equitable. 11 Thus, their employees in the discharge of the latter’s duties. 22 This
petitioner was liable to respondents. 12 liability attaches when the employees who are convicted of crimes
committed in the performance of their work are found to be insolvent
Ruling of the Court of Appeals and are thus unable to satisfy the civil liability adjudged. 23

On the other hand, under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 24

Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner was still to be legally of the Civil Code, an action predicated on quasi delict may be
deemed the owner/operator of the tractor, even if that vehicle had instituted against the employer for an employee’s act or omission.
been the subject of a Deed of Sale in favor of Ecatine on December 9, The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and
1992. The reason cited by the CA was that the Certificate of primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection
Registration on file with the LTO still remained in petitioner’s name. and supervision of the employee. 25 The enforcement of the
13 In order that a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle can bind judgment against the employer for an action based on Article 2176
third persons, it must be duly recorded in the LTO. 14 does not require the employee to be insolvent, since the liability of
the former is solidary — the latter being statutorily considered a joint
The CA likewise upheld respondents’ claim for moral damages tortfeasor. 26 To sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following
against petitioner because the appellate court considered Tutor, the requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff, (b)
driver of the tractor, to be an agent of the registered owner/operator. fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and
15 effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff. 27
Hence, this Petition. 16chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be
Issues availed of, subject to the caveat 28 that the offended party cannot
"recover damages twice for the same act or omission" or under both
causes. 29 Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the independent of each other, the failure to recover in one will not
Court’s consideration:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library necessarily preclude recovery in the other. 30chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
I
In the instant case, respondents — having failed to recover anything
in the criminal case — elected to file a separate civil action for
damages, based on quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
"Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred
31 The evidence is clear that the deaths and the injuries suffered by
when they decided and held that petitioner [was] liable for damages
respondents and their kins were due to the fault of the driver of the
suffered by private respondents in an action based on quasi delict for
Fuso tractor.
the negligent acts of a driver who [was] not the employee of the
petitioner.
Dated June 4, 1991, the Lease Agreement 32 between petitioner and
Edwin Lim stipulated that "it is the intention of the parties to enter
II into a FINANCE LEASE AGREEMENT." 33 Under such scheme,
ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered in the name of
petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin
"Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred Lim. 34 Further, in the "Lease Schedule," 35 the monthly rental for
when they awarded moral damages to private respondents despite the tractor was stipulated, and the term of the Lease was scheduled to
their failure to prove that the injuries they suffered were brought by expire on December 4, 1992. After a few months, Lim completed the
petitioner’s wrongful act." 17 payments to cover the full price of the tractor. 36 Thus, on December
9, 1992, a Deed of Sale 37 over the tractor was executed by petitioner
This Court’s Ruling in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed
was not registered with the LTO.cralaw : red
 112

We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained petitioner in failing to register the sale. The non-registration is the
of, because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the fault of petitioner, which should thus face the legal consequences
accident on July 17, 1994. 38 The Court has consistently ruled that, thereof.
regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is
the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are Second Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for
the consequences of its operation 39 In contemplation of law, the Moral Damages
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. 40 The Petitioner further claims that it is not liable for moral damages,
same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle because respondents failed to establish or show the causal connection
does not use it for public service 41 or relation between the factual basis of their claim and their wrongful
act or omission, if any. 49
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could
not escape primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
from the negligence of the driver. 42 compensate 50 and alleviate in some way the physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
The finance-lease agreement between Equitable on the one hand and wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
Lim or Ecatine on the other has already been superseded by the sale. unjustly caused a person. 51 Although incapable of pecuniary
In any event, it does not bind third persons. The rationale for this rule computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow
has been aptly explained in Erezo v. Jepte, 43 which we quote proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. 52
hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph This is so because moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to
". . . .The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. 53chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is 1ibrary
caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor
can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances Viewed as an action for quasi delict, the present case falls squarely
are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused within the purview of Article 2219 (2), 54 which provides for the
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. 55 Having
identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of established the liability of petitioner as the registered owner of the
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient vehicle, 56 respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the
or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is factual basis for the award 57 and its causal connection to the acts of
primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons Raul Tutor, who is deemed as petitioner’s employee. 58 Indeed, the
responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways." damages and injuries suffered by respondents were the proximate
44chanrobles virtuallawlibrary result of petitioner’s tortious act or omission. 59

Further, petitioner’s insistence on FGU Insurance Corp. v. Court of Further, no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral
Appeals 45 is misplaced. First, in FGU Insurance, the registered damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the
vehicle owner, which was engaged in a rent-a-car business, rented out discretion of the court. 60 The evidence gives no ground for doubt
the car. In this case, the registered owner of the truck, which is that such discretion was properly and judiciously exercised by the
engaged in the business of financing motor vehicle acquisitions, has trial court. 61 The award is in fact consistent with the rule that moral
actually sold the truck to Ecatine, which in turn employed Tutor. damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate
Second, in FGU Insurance, the registered owner of the vehicle was the moral suffering undergone by that party by reason of the
not held responsible for the negligent acts of the person who rented defendant’s culpable action. 62chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
one of its cars, because Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not
applicable. We held that no vinculum juris as employer and employee WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
existed between the owner and the driver. 46 In this case, the AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
registered owner of the tractor is considered under the law to be the
employer of the driver, while the actual operator is deemed to be its SO ORDERED.
agent. 47 Thus, Equitable, the registered owner of the tractor, is —
for purposes of the law on quasi delict — the employer of Raul Tutor,
the driver of the tractor. Ecatine, Tutor’s actual employer, is deemed ******************************************
as merely an agent of Equitable. 48

True, the LTO Certificate of Registration, dated "5/31/91," qualifies G.R. No. 141538             March 23, 2004
the name of the registered owner as "EQUITABLE LEASING
CORPORATION/Leased to Edwin Lim." But the lease agreement HERMANA R. CEREZO, petitioner,
between Equitable and Lim has been overtaken by the Deed of Sale vs.
on December 9, 1992, between petitioner and Ecatine. While this DAVID TUAZON, respondent.
Deed does not affect respondents in this quasi delict suit, it definitely
binds petitioner because, unlike them, it is a party to it.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We must stress that the failure of Equitable and/or Ecatine to register

the sale with the LTO should not prejudice respondents, who have the DECISION
legal right to rely on the legal principle that the registered vehicle
owner is liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the
driver. Petitioner cannot hide behind its allegation that Tutor was the
employee of Ecatine. This will effectively prevent respondents from
recovering their losses on the basis of the inaction or fault of
 113

CARPIO, J.: issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper

service in accordance with the Rules of Court. 7
The Case
On 30 August 1994, the trial court issued an order resolving Tuazon’s
This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul the1  motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses’ urgent ex-parte
Resolution2 dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA- motion. The order reads:
G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20 January 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied At the hearing on August 30, 1994, the plaintiff [Tuazon]
the petition for annulment of the Decision3 dated 30 May 1995 testified that he is presently jobless; that at the time of the
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 filing of this case, his son who is working in Malaysia helps
("trial court"), in Civil Case No. 7415. The trial court ordered him and sends him once in a while P300.00 a month, and
petitioner Hermana R. Cerezo ("Mrs. Cerezo") to pay respondent that he does not have any real property. Attached to the
David Tuazon ("Tuazon") actual damages, loss of earnings, moral Motion to Litigate as Pauper are his Affidavit that he is
damages, and costs of suit. unemployed; a Certification by the Barangay Captain of his
poblacion that his income is not enough for his family’s
Antecedent Facts subsistence; and a Certification by the Office of the
Municipal Assessor that he has no landholding in the
Municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga.
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger
bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle bearing plate
number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the
Mabalacat, Pampanga. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon plaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this
filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the case as a pauper under existing rules.
bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus
driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda"). The complaint alleged that: On the other hand, the Court denies the prayer in the
Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion requiring new
7. At the time of the incident, plaintiff [Tuazon] was in his summons to be served to the defendants. The Court is of
proper lane when the second-named defendant [Foronda], the opinion that any infirmity in the service of the summons
being then the driver and person in charge of the Country to the defendant before plaintiff was allowed to prosecute
Bus with plate number NYA 241, did then and there his complaint in this case as a pauper has been cured by this
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said Order.
motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and imprudent
manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, If within 15 days from receipt of this Order, the defendants
there being a "Slow Down" sign near the scene of the do not question on appeal this Order of this Court, the
incident, and without taking the necessary precaution to Court shall proceed to resolve the Motion for Bill of
prevent loss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness Particulars.8
and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle
and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him On 27 September 1994, the Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte
unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb and motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion for
middle finger on the left hand being cut[.]4 reconsideration.

On 1 October 1993, Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. On 14 November 1994, the trial court issued an order directing the
Subsequently, the trial court issued summons against Atty. Cerezo Cerezo spouses to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of
and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses") at the Makati address stated the order. The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer. On 27 January
in the complaint. However, the summons was returned unserved on 1995, Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default.
10 November 1993 as the Cerezo spouses no longer held office nor On 6 February 1995, the trial court issued an order declaring the
resided in Makati. On 18 April 1994, the trial court issued alias Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his
summons against the Cerezo spouses at their address in Barangay evidence. 9
Sta. Maria, Camiling, Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the
complaint were finally served on 20 April 1994 at the office of Atty.
Cerezo, who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. Atty. On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazon’s testimonial and
Cerezo reacted angrily on learning of the service of summons upon documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The
his person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly told Sheriff William Canlas: trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because
"Punyeta, ano ang gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong hindi ka there was no service of summons on him. The trial court did not hold
makalabas ng buhay dito? Teritoryo ko ito. Wala ka sa teritoryo Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s
mo."5 business benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the
Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the
damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs.
The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
proceedings before the trial court. The Cerezo spouses filed a dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
comment with motion for bill of particulars dated 29 April 1994 and
a reply to opposition to comment with motion dated 13 June
1994.6 On 1 August 1994, the trial court issued an order directing the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
Cerezo spouses to file a comment to the opposition to the bill of defendant Hermana Cerezo to pay the plaintiff:
particulars. Atty. Elpidio B. Valera ("Atty. Valera") of Valera and
Valera Law Offices appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. On 29 a) For Actual Damages
August 1994, Atty. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying for
the resolution of Tuazon’s motion to litigate as a pauper and for the 1) Expenses for operation and medical Treatment
 114

2) Cost of repair of the tricycle they also failed to prove that they had a good and substantial defense.
The trial court noted that the Cerezo spouses failed to appeal because
b) For loss of earnings they relied on an expected settlement of the case.
c) For moral damages
d) And to pay the cost of the suit. The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65. The petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48132. 14 The petition questioned
The docket fees and other expenses in the filing of this suit whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering
shall be lien on whatever judgment may be rendered in there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo
favor of the plaintiff. spouses claimed was an indispensable party. In a resolution 15 dated 21
January 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
SO ORDERED.10 for certiorari and affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition
for relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals declared that the
Cerezo spouses’ failure to file an answer was due to their own
Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on 25 June 1995. On 10
negligence, considering that they continued to participate in the
July 1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial court a petition for relief
proceedings without filing an answer. There was also nothing in the
from judgment on the grounds of "fraud, mistake or excusable
records to show that the Cerezo spouses actually offered a reasonable
negligence." Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and
settlement to Tuazon. The Court of Appeals also denied Cerezo
Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the
spouses’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
court. Atty. Valera added that he received no notice before or during
the 8 May 1995 elections, "when he was a senatorial candidate for the
KBL Party, and very busy, using his office and residence as Party The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court a petition for review
National Headquarters." Atty. Valera claimed that he was able to read on certiorari under Rule 45. Atty. Cerezo himself signed the petition,
the decision of the trial court only after Mrs. Cerezo sent him a docketed as G.R. No. 137593. On 13 April 1999, this Court rendered
copy.11 a resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure
to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition to the Court
of Appeals and to the adverse parties. Even if the petition complied
Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove
with this requirement, the Court would still have denied the petition
the participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case. Tuazon presented
as the Cerezo spouses failed to show that the Court of Appeals
the following exhibits:
committed a reversible error. The Court’s resolution was entered in
the Book of Entries and Judgments when it became final and
Exhibit 1 - Sheriff’s return and summons; executory on 28 June 1999.16
Exhibit 1-A - Alias summons dated April 20, 1994;
Exhibit 2 - Comment with Motion; Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals on
6 July 1999 a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 with
Exhibit 3 - Minutes of the hearing held on August 1, 1994;
prayer for restraining order. Atty. Valera and Atty. Dionisio S. Daga
Exhibit 3-A - Signature of defendant’s counsel; ("Atty. Daga") represented Mrs. Cerezo in the petition, docketed as
Exhibit 4 - CA-G.R. SP No. 53572.17 The petition prayed for the annulment of
Minutes of the hearing held on August 30, 1994;
Exhibit 4-A - Signature of the defendant’s counsel; the 30 May 1995 decision of the trial court and for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining execution of the trial court’s
Exhibit 5 - Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion; decision pending resolution of the petition.
Exhibit 6 - Order dated November 14, 1994;
Exhibit 6-A - Postal certification dated January 13, 1995; The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment
Exhibit 7 - Order dated February [illegible]; in a resolution dated 21 October 1999. The resolution reads in part:
Exhibit 7-A - Court’s return slip addressed to Atty. Elpidio Valera;
Exhibit 7-B - Court’s return slip addressed to Spouses Juan and HermanaIn this case, records show that the petitioner previously
Cerezo;
filed with the lower court a Petition for Relief from
Exhibit 8 - Decision dated May [30], 1995 Judgment on the ground that they were wrongfully declared
Exhibit 8-A - Court’s return slip addressed to defendant Hermana Cerezo;
in default while waiting for an amicable settlement of the
Exhibit 8-B - complaint
Court’s return slip addressed to defendant’s counsel, Atty. for damages. The court a quo correctly ruled that
Elpidio Valera;
such petition is without merit. The defendant spouses admit
Exhibit 9 - Order dated September 21, 1995;
that during the initial hearing they appeared before the
Exhibit 9-A - Second Page of Exhibit 9; court and even mentioned the need for an amicable
Exhibit 9-B - Third page of Exhibit 9; settlement. Thus, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over
Exhibit 9-C - Fourth page of Exhibit 9; the defendant spouses.
Exhibit 9-D - Court’s return slip addressed to Atty. Elpidio Valera;
Therefore, petitioner having availed of a petition for relief,
and the remedy of an annulment of judgment is no longer
Exhibit 9-E - Court’s return slip addressed to plaintiff’s counsel, Atty.available.
Norman Dick
The de Guzman.
proper action for the petitioner is to appeal
the order of the lower court denying the petition for relief.
On 4 March 1998, the trial court issued an order13 denying the petition
for relief from judgment. The trial court stated that having received Wherefore, the instant petition could not be given due
the decision on 25 June 1995, the Cerezo spouses should have filed a course and should accordingly be dismissed.
notice of appeal instead of resorting to a petition for relief from
judgment. The trial court refused to grant relief from judgment SO ORDERED.18
because the Cerezo spouses could have availed of the remedy of
appeal. Moreover, the Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence by conclusive evidence,
 115

On 20 January 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the Cerezo The Issues
spouses’ motion for reconsideration.19 The Court of Appeals stated:
On 7 February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo, this time with Atty. Daga alone
A distinction should be made between a court’s jurisdiction representing her, filed the present petition for review
over a person and its jurisdiction over the subject matter of on certiorari before this Court. Mrs. Cerezo claims that:
a case. The former is acquired by the proper service of
summons or by the parties’ voluntary appearance; while the 1. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment,
latter is conferred by law. the Court of Appeals assumes that the issues raised in the
petition for annulment is based on extrinsic fraud related to
Resolving the matter of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the denied petition for relief notwithstanding that the
Section 19(1) of B[atas] P[ambansa] 129 provides that grounds relied upon involves questions of lack of
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus it was 2. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of
proper for the lower court to decide the instant case for Appeals disregarded the allegation that the lower court[’s]
damages. findings of negligence against defendant-driver Danilo
Foronda [whom] the lower court did not summon is null
Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case which and void for want of due process and consequently, such
is absolute and conferred by law; any defects [sic] in the findings of negligence which is [sic] null and void cannot
acquisition of jurisdiction over a person (i.e., improper become the basis of the lower court to adjudge petitioner-
filing of civil complaint or improper service of summons) employer liable for civil damages.
may be waived by the voluntary appearance of parties.
3. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of
The lower court admits the fact that no summons was Appeals ignored the allegation that defendant-driver Danilo
served on defendant Foronda. Thus, jurisdiction over the A. Foronda whose negligence is the main issue is an
person of defendant Foronda was not acquired, for which indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but
reason he was not held liable in this case. However, it has [whom] the lower court did not summon.
been proven that jurisdiction over the other defendants was
validly acquired by the court a quo. 4. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of
Appeals ruled that assuming arguendo that private
The defendant spouses admit to having appeared in the respondent failed to reserve his right to institute a separate
initial hearings and in the hearing for plaintiff’s motion to action for damages in the criminal action, the petitioner
litigate as a pauper. They even mentioned conferences cannot now raise such issue and question the lower court’s
where attempts were made to reach an amicable settlement jurisdiction because petitioner [has] waived such right by
with plaintiff. However, the possibility of amicable voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages
settlement is not a good and substantial defense which will notwithstanding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be
warrant the granting of said petition. waived.21

xxx The Court’s Ruling

Assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to The petition has no merit. As the issues are interrelated, we shall
reserve his right to institute a separate action for damages discuss them jointly.
in the criminal action, the petitioner cannot now raise such
issue and question the lower court’s jurisdiction because Remedies Available to a Party Declared in Default
petitioner and her husband have waived such right by
voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages.
Therefore, the findings and the decision of the lower court An examination of the records of the entire proceedings shows that
may bind them. three lawyers filed and signed pleadings on behalf of Mrs. Cerezo,
namely, Atty. Daga, Atty. Valera, and Atty. Cerezo. Despite their
number, Mrs. Cerezo’s counsels failed to avail of the proper
Records show that the petitioner previously filed with the remedies. It is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious manipulation
lower court a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the of legal technicalities that they have managed to delay the disposition
ground that they were wrongfully declared in default while of the present case, to the detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon.
waiting for an amicable settlement of the complaint for
damages. The court a quo correctly ruled that such petition
is without merit, jurisdiction having been acquired by the Mrs. Cerezo claims she did not receive any copy of the order
voluntary appearance of defendant spouses. declaring the Cerezo spouses in default. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that she
only came to know of the default order on 25 June 1995, when she
received a copy of the decision. On 10 July 1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed
Once again, it bears stressing that having availed of a before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment under Rule
petition for relief, the remedy of annulment of judgment is 38, alleging "fraud, mistake, or excusable negligence" as grounds. On
no longer available. 4 March 1998, the trial court denied Mrs. Cerezo’s petition for relief
from judgment. The trial court stated that Mrs. Cerezo could have
Based on the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration availed of appeal as a remedy and that she failed to prove that the
could not be given due course and is hereby DENIED. judgment was entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. Mrs. Cerezo then filed before the Court of Appeals a
SO ORDERED.20 petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 assailing the denial
of the petition for relief from judgment. On 21 January 1999, the
 116

Court of Appeals dismissed Mrs. Cerezo’s petition. On 24 February former trial, as far as the same is material and competent to establish
1999, the appellate court denied Mrs. Cerezo’s motion for the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking the same. 27
reconsideration. On 11 March 1999, Mrs. Cerezo filed before this
Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, questioning Mrs. Cerezo also had the alternative of filing under Rule 65 28 a
the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. We denied the petition for certiorari assailing the order of default within 60 days
petition and our resolution became final and executory on 28 June from notice of the judgment. An order of default is interlocutory, and
1999. an aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65.29 In a petition for certiorari, the appellate court may declare
On 6 July 1999, a mere eight days after our resolution became final void both the order of default and the judgment of default.
and executory, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial court under Rule Clearly, Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of these remedies
47. Meanwhile, on 25 August 1999, the trial court issued over the within the reglementary periods provided under the Rules of Court.
objection of Mrs. Cerezo an order of execution of the judgment in However, Mrs. Cerezo opted to file a petition for relief from
Civil Case No. 7415. On 21 October 1999, the Court of Appeals judgment, which is available only in exceptional cases. A petition
dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. On 20 January for relief from judgment should be filed within the reglementary
2000, the Court of Appeals denied Mrs. Cerezo’s motion for period of 60 days from knowledge of judgment and six months from
reconsideration. On 7 February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo filed the present entry of judgment, pursuant to
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
dismissal of her petition for annulment of judgment.
Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 30 Tuason v. Court of
Appeals31 explained the nature of a petition for relief from judgment:
Lina v. Court of Appeals22 enumerates the remedies available to a
party declared in default:
When a party has another remedy available to him, which
may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
thereof and before judgment, file a motion under oath to prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal,
to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will
negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]); effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which has
defendant discovered the default, but before the same has been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new
trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; Evidently, there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence that prevented Mrs. Cerezo from filing an appeal, a
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the motion for new trial or a petition for certiorari. It was error for her to
judgment has become final and executory, he may file avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of
Rule 38; and After our resolution denying Mrs. Cerezo’s petition for relief became
final and executory, Mrs. Cerezo, in her last ditch attempt to evade
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against liability, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of
him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no the judgment of the trial court. Annulment is available only on the
petition to set aside the order of default has been presented grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on
by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added) extrinsic fraud, a party must file the petition within four years from
its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or
Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a estoppel bars the petition. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if such
judgment by default is also available if the trial court improperly fraud was used as a ground, or could have been used as a ground, in a
declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment. 32
a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such
declaration.23 Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction, not extrinsic fraud, was
her ground for filing the petition for annulment of judgment.
Mrs. Cerezo admitted that she received a copy of the trial court’s However, a party may avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment
decision on 25 June 1995. Based on this admission, Mrs. Cerezo had under Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
at least three remedies at her disposal: an appeal, a motion for new petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are
trial, or a petition for certiorari. no longer available through no fault of the party. 33 Mrs. Cerezo could
have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her own fault she
erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief, which was
Mrs. Cerezo could have appealed under Rule 41 24 from the default denied with finality. Thus, Mrs. Cerezo may no longer avail of the
judgment within 15 days from notice of the judgment. She could have remedy of annulment.
availed of the power of the Court of Appeals to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence, and perform all acts necessary to resolve
factual issues raised in cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction. 25 In any event, the trial court clearly acquired jurisdiction over Mrs.
Cerezo’s person. Mrs. Cerezo actively participated in the proceedings
before the trial court, submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial
Mrs. Cerezo also had the option to file under Rule 37 26 a motion for court. The defense of lack of jurisdiction fails in light of her active
new trial within the period for taking an appeal. If the trial court participation in the trial court proceedings. Estoppel or laches may
grants a new trial, the original judgment is vacated, and the action also bar lack of jurisdiction as a ground for nullity especially if raised
will stand for trial de novo. The recorded evidence taken in the
 117

for the first time on appeal by a party who participated in the The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
proceedings before the trial court, as what happened in this case. 34 delict is solidary.40 Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of
debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation.
For these reasons, the present petition should be dismissed for utter Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full.
lack of merit. The extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual
restricted to the grounds specified in the rules. The reason for the representation.41 Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either
restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary
losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision party because complete relief is available from either. 42 Therefore,
that has long become final and executory. There would be no end to jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may
litigation if parties who have unsuccessfully availed of any of the collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault could still bring
an action for annulment of judgment. 35 Nevertheless, we shall discuss Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary
the issues raised in the present petition to clear any doubt about the and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely
correctness of the decision of the trial court. subsidiary.43 The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with
"subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the
Mrs. Cerezo’s Liability and the Trial Court’s Acquisition of obligation rather than to the character and limits of the
Jurisdiction obligation.44 Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the
negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the
employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of
annulment is lack of jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault
court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a
jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs. Cerezo points out that there was no subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal negligence, the
service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil
his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and
action. Such contention betrays a faulty foundation. Mrs. Cerezo’s supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s liability is
contention proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not of solely subsidiary is wrong.45
civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-
delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
The action can be brought directly against the person
responsible (for another), without including the author of
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the
delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the
An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment
based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
action.36 There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice employer) is in itself a principal action. 46
of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the
procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action. 37
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. In over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the
his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, "without exercising merits.
due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her
employees and buses," hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became
disabled because of Foronda’s "recklessness, gross negligence and In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary
imprudence," aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack of due care and liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee
diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the
particularly Foronda."38 employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved
party must initiate a criminal action where the employee’s delict and
corresponding primary liability are established. 47 If the present action
The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda
the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in part: is necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-
delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope The Cerezo spouses’ contention that summons be served anew on
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not them is untenable in light of their participation in the trial court
engaged in any business or industry. proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses’ contention would make
a fetish of a technicality. 48 Moreover, any irregularity in the service of
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable summons that might have vitiated the trial court’s jurisdiction over
party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is the persons of the Cerezo spouses was deemed waived when the
affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no Cerezo spouses filed a petition for relief from judgment. 49
final resolution of the case is possible. 39 However, Mrs. Cerezo’s
liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent to
solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in
party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s contention,
Mrs. Cerezo. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. It is not
even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil
action because he opted to file a civil action for damages against Mrs.
 118

Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97, in
negligence. The words of Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Civil Case No. Q-92-14114 and the Resolution of the Court of
Garcia still hold true today as much as it did in 1942: Appeals dated August 9, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
x x x [T]o hold that there is only one way to make
defendant’s liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver On November 24, 1992, Atty. Rodrigo Libunao filed a complaint for
and exhaust his (the latter’s) property first, would be damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against the
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious Mercury Drug Corporation; its President, Mariano Que; Store
and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is Manager, Vilma Santos; and Security Guard Remigio Sido. The case
such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-14114 and raffled to Branch
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct 97. The respondent prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
responsibility of the defendant under article [2180] of the rendered in his favor, thus:
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate
remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be
by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it rendered:
being a matter of common knowledge that professional
drivers of taxis and other similar public conveyances do not
have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, 1. Ordering defendants to, jointly and severally, pay
then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go plaintiff P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, and P500,000.00
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless in exemplary damages;
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored
to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. 50 2. Ordering defendants to, jointly and severally, reimburse
plaintiff for his acceptance fee expense in the amount
Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is due on the amount of damages of P50,000.00 and appearance fee expense at the rate
adjudged by the trial court. 51 The 6% per annum interest shall of P1,000.00 per appearance of undersigned counsel, and
commence from 30 May 1995, the date of the decision of the trial bear the cost of his attorney's fee in the amount
court. Upon finality of this decision, interest at 12% per annum, in of P200,000.00.
lieu of 6% per annum, is due on the amount of damages adjudged by
the trial court until full payment. 3. Ordering defendants to, jointly and severally, bear the
cost of the suit.3
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for review. The
Resolution dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA- In its Answer to the complaint, the defendant corporation mainly
G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20 January 2000 alleged that it was not Sido's employer, and that the latter's direct
denying the motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED with employer was the security agency, the Black Shield Security Services
the MODIFICATION that the amount due shall earn legal interest at Corporation (BSSC); hence, Mercury Drug Corporation could not be
6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial held liable for the damages under Article 2180 of the New Civil
court’s decision. Upon finality of this decision, the amount due shall Code.
earn interest at 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per annum, until full
payment. The Case for the Plaintiff

SO ORDERED. At about 8:00 p.m. on May 25, 1992, Atty. Rodrigo B. Libunao, a
corporate lawyer of Caltex Philippines, and his friend, Jesus Bustos
Atencio, the Secretary of the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations, had dinner at the Robinson's Galleria along Ortigas
****************************************** Avenue, Pasig City. Afterwards, they proceeded to the self-service
section of the Mercury Drug Store where Libunao purchased some
items, including antibiotics. Libunao paid for his purchases and was
G.R. No. 144458             July 14, 2004 issued a tape receipt[4] by the cashier, who then placed the items
inside the plastic bag. Libunao placed the receipt inside his pocket.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, As Libunao and Atencio were exiting from the drugstore, they were
vs. accosted by Sido, the security guard posted at the door. Sido was
ATTY. RODRIGO B. LIBUNAO, respondent. about 5 feet 5 inches tall, twenty pounds heavier than Libunao, and
was armed with a service gun. Sido held Libunao's upper right arm
and demanded the latter to show the receipt for his purchases, saying,
"'Yong resibo niyan." Libunao searched for the receipt in his pocket,
but it took him some time to get hold of it because Sido was still
holding his right arm. Sido then remarked, "Wala yatang resibo yan!"
DECISION Libunao was able to get hold of the receipt after about ten seconds
and showed it to Sido, close to the latter's face. Sido inspected the
receipt, and Libunao asked, "Satisfied ka na?" However, Sido angrily
reacted and hurled invectives at Libunao: "Putang-ina mo!" Libunao
retorted, "Putang-ina mo!" Sido lunged at him and again said:
"Putang-ina mo!" Atencio tried to pacify the two, but Sido was able
CALLEJO, SR., J.: to hit Libunao on the face twice, on the nose, the chin and on the
mouth. Sido then pointed his revolver at Libunao and said: "Putang-
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court ina mo, pag hindi kayo lumabas dito papuputukin'ko to sa iyo!" A
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59754 which modified the male person held Sido back. Afraid for his life, Libunao fled from the
 119

scene with Atencio and went to the Office of the Security justice. Sido was later brought to the security office of the building
Detachment of the Robinson's Galleria. Libunao reported the incident and then taken to the police station.
to the chief of security and asked him to arrest Sido. The chief of
security accompanied Libunao back to the Mercury Drug Store and Santos also testified that she accompanied Sido to the security office
approached the store manager, Vilma Santos. When informed of the and to the police station. Libunao told her that she should not have
incident and of Sido's need to surrender, she said: "Ako ang manager accompanied Sido because he was not an employee of the Mercury
dito, hindi ninyo puedeng arestuhin ang security guard kasi on duty Drug Corporation. She apologized to Libunao on behalf of Sido and
pa siya. Magsi-alis nga kayo dito mga buwisit kayo!" In the told him that she had not expected the altercation between the two of
meantime, a crowd started to gather when they noticed the them. She testified that one of her duties as the store manager was to
commotion. Eventually, Santos relented and surrendered Sido. While prevent injuries to their customers, more so those caused by any of its
the chief of security, Libunao, Atencio and Sido were leaving, the employees. She also testified that one of Sido's duties as their
sales ladies of the store surrounded Sido and tried to protect him. The security guard was to open and close the store.
chief of security brought Sido to the police station where a criminal
complaint was filed against him by Libunao. Santos also arrived at
the police station. On April 18, 1997, the court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, the decretal portion of which
reads:
Libunao was so traumatized by the incident, which was exacerbated
as Sido went to his house twice to apologize. Libunao had to consult
a psychiatrist, Dr. Patalinghod of the Philippine General Hospital WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration,
(PGH). After several sessions, Dr. Patalinghod found him to be judgment is hereby rendered by this Court in favor of the
suffering from post-traumatic depression syndrome. Plaintiff and against the Defendants Remigio Sido,
Mercury Drug Corporation, and Vilma Santos, and said
defendants are hereby ordered, as follows:
The Case for the Defendants
To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, by way of moral
Sido testified that he was employed as a security guard by the Black damages, the amount of P300,000.00, by way of exemplary
Shield Security Corporation and was assigned at the Mercury Drug damages, the amount of P200,000.00 to discourage
Store in Robinson's Galleria. At about 8:30 p.m. on May 25, 1992, he disrespect of the public by such acts as were committed by
saw Libunao and his companion exiting from the store. Libunao was defendants, plus attorney's fees of P50,000.00 and costs of
holding a plastic bag, and Sido noticed that no receipt was stapled suit.
thereto. He asked Libunao for the receipt, but the latter handed the
bag to him. Sido searched for the receipt in the bag, but failed to find
any. He then asked the two men to go back to the cashier to get a SO ORDERED.5
receipt. However, Libunao was able to bring out the receipt from his
pocket and angrily shoved it close to Sido's face. Sido explained to The court granted the motion for reconsideration filed by Store
them that he was just doing his duty. Libunao and his companion Manager Santos, and ordered the dismissal of the complaint against
were about to leave, but Libunao said, "Baka hindi mo ako kilala, her. It, however, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
security guard ka lang! Ano ba talaga ang problema mo?" Sido tried defendant Corporation. Hence, the defendant Corporation appealed
to explain, and in the process, a violent argument ensued. A sales the decision to the Court of Appeals contending that:
attendant of the store pacified them. The two men left, with a warning
from Libunao, "Be ready because I will come back." After about 15 I. EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY SHOW (sic)
minutes, Libunao returned with a security guard from the Enriquez THAT PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS AGAINST
Agency and a man in civilian clothes, who turned out to be a DEFENDANT MERCURY DRUG IN HIS COMPLAINT
policeman. The same policeman asked Sido to go with him to the HAS (sic) BEEN DISPROVED BY PLAINTIFF'S OWN
police station. He refused because he was still on duty. When Santos ADMISSION AND BY UNCONTROVERTED
saw the incident, she told Sido to go inside the store. But after talking EVIDENCE.
to the policeman, Santos relented and told Sido to go with them to the
building security office. When confronted by the security officer,
Sido denied boxing Libunao and poking a gun at him. He was later II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
brought to the police station and placed in jail. Libunao approached DEFENDANT MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION
him and said: "You see now how powerful I am?" Sido also testified JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
that a policeman later asked from him P2,000.00 so that he could get DEFENDANT SIDO FOR MORAL DAMAGES.
out of jail. He was able to give only P1,500.00 which was his salary
for that day. He was released from jail the next day at 4:00 p.m. III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN HOLDING MERCURY DRUG JOINTLY
Santos testified that she was the Store Manager of the Mercury Drug AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DEFENDANT SIDO
Store at the Robinson's Galleria. At about 8:30 p.m. on May 25, TO PAY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE EXEMPLARY
1992, she was at the retail section of the store when her attention was DAMAGES. 6
called by one of the pharmacy assistants, Geminiano de Leon, about
an on-going altercation between two men and the store security guard On June 9, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming
near the exit of the self-service section, which was about 15 meters with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
away from where she was. When she rushed to the scene, Libunao
and his companion were no longer there. However, Libunao returned
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged
with two policemen from Quezon City who were in civilian clothes,
decision of the trial court dated April 15, 1997 is
and informed her that they were going to arrest Sido. She told the
AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
policemen that they were about to close the store and asked them if
attorney's fees is DELETED, and the moral and exemplary
they could wait for about ten to fifteen minutes so that Sido could
damages awarded are reduced from P300,000.00
help them close up. The policemen agreed, but Libunao objected and
said that her refusal to surrender Sido amounted to obstruction of
 120

to P150,000.00 and from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, certification.10 As the petitioner's in-house counsel, she is the officer
respectively. who is in the best position to verify the truthfulness and the
correctness of the allegations of the petition, and to determine if a
SO ORDERED.7 similar petition has been filed and is pending with other courts.
In Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain,11 we held that the
certification executed by an in-house counsel is sufficient compliance
The appellate court ruled that Sido was an employee of the Mercury with the Rules:
Drug Corporation, and that there was no sufficient evidence to prove
that he was an employee of BSSC. As such, it held that Mercury
Drug Corporation was, jointly and severally, liable with Sido for the In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty.
latter's delictual and harmful acts. Cañete was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC at the
Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not
merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and
The Present Petition officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal pleadings
and to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal cases. As regional
Mercury Drug filed the instant petition for review, asserting as legal counsel for the Mindanao Area, he was the officer
follows: who was in the best position to verify the truthfulness and
the correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE expropriation in Davao City. As internal legal counsel, he
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE was also in the best position to know and to certify if an
JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT action for expropriation had already been filed and
RODRIGO LIBUNAO THAT REMIGIO SIDO IS NOT pending with the courts.12
AN EMPLOYEE OF PETITIONER-DEFENDANT
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION AND IN RULING On the second issue, we rule that the remedy of the petitioner under
CONTRARY TO SAID STIPULATION OF FACT OR Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is proper. While only questions of law
JUDICIAL ADMISSION. may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, review may nevertheless be granted under certain exceptions,
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE namely: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING A speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS NOT manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is a grave
QUESTIONED NOR CONTROVERTED AND IN abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
RULING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
RECORD. conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issue of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of
3. THE Court of appeals committed a grave abuse of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when
discretion in holding petitioner liable for the acts of the the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
security guard under article 2181 (sic) of the new civil evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the
code.8 petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; (j) when the finding of fact of the Court
The petitioner contends that based on the evidence on record, Sido of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
was not one of its employees, but an employee of BSSC. As such, the contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of
Court of Appeals misapplied the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
New Civil Code, and should have ruled in accordance with the ruling the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
of this Court in Soliman, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.9 different conclusion.13

In his Comment on the petition, the respondent sought the denial of We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
the petition on the following grounds: (a) the petition raises factual and found that there was a misapprehension of certain facts; that
issues; (b) the petitioner failed to submit the appropriate certification findings contrary to the admissions of the parties and the evidence on
against forum shopping; and, (c) the Court of Appeals did not commit record were made; and that the said courts overlooked certain
any reversible error in holding the petitioner liable for damages for relevant facts which were not disputed by the parties, and, if properly
the tortious and delictual acts of Sido, over whose acts the petitioner considered, would necessarily have altered the decision arrived at by
had direct control and supervision as employer. both courts.

The core issues for resolution are (a) whether the certification against Based on the evidence on record, the petitioner was not Sido's
forum shopping embedded in the petition is sufficient compliance employer; hence, the trial and appellate courts erred in applying
with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; (b) whether the remedy Article 2180 of the New Civil Code14 against the petitioner and
of the petitioner is proper; and, (c) whether the petitioner is liable for holding it liable for Sido's harmful acts.
damages to the respondent for the tortious and delictual acts of Sido.
First. The respondent was burdened to prove that the petitioner was
On the first issue, the respondent avers that the the employer of Sido but failed to discharge this burden.
verification/certification against forum shopping executed by the
petitioner's in-house counsel and counsel of record, Atty. Joy Ann Second. During the hearing in the trial court on August 17, 1994, the
Marie C. Nolasco, is insufficient. We reject the contention of the respondent's counsel of record, Atty. Caesar J. Poblador, admitted
respondent. The assailed verification and certification states that Atty. that Sido was not employed by the petitioner:
Joy Ann Marie C. Nolasco is the legal officer and/or in-house counsel
of petitioner, as well as its counsel of record in the above-entitled
case, and is duly authorized to sign the said verification and ATTY. GENER, JR.:
 121

Your Honor, since the cause of action of plaintiff Q   -       What was your employment?
is based on alleged negligence of the company,
we will prove deliligence (sic) of the company; A   -       As a Security Guard, Sir.
and the part (sic) of Remigio Sido that
she (sic) was not an employee of the company so
that she (sic) was not liable of the complaint. Q   -       And who was your employer?

COURT: A   -       Blackshield Security Agency, Sir.19

Could the parties stipulate that he was not an ...

employee of said company?
Q   -       And who assigned you there at that particular spot,
ATTY. POBLADOR: Mercury Drugstore or Blackshield Security Agency?

We admit that she (sic) is not an employee of the A   -       Blackshield Security Agency, Sir.
company, Your Honor.
Q   -       I mean, the area that you are suppose (sic) to
COURT: stand, who instructed you that?

There is no need to present her; they are A   -       The Blackshield Security Agency, Sir.20
admitting? Now, what are you going to prove?15
Fifth. The petitioner adduced in evidence its contract with the BSSC,
It must be stressed that the stipulations of facts of the parties in the which contained the following provisions:
course of the proceedings are conclusive upon them unless there is a
showing that the parties committed a palpable mistake or that no such 1. THE AGENCY shall provide the CLIENT with the
admission was made by them.16 necessary number of armed, uniformed and qualified
security guards properly licensed by the Chief of Philippine
Third. Santos testified that Sido was not an employee of the Constabulary; who shall provide security services to the
petitioner, but of BSSC. CLIENT at its establishment at – SEE ATTACHED
ANNEX A.
Q       And referring to defendant Remigio Sido, who is his
employer? These security guards during the life of the Agreement
shall be assigned in accordance with arrangements to be
made between the CLIENT and the AGENCY.
A       Black Shield Agency, Sir.17
...
She also testified that the respondent even chided her in
accompanying Sido to the police station, since the latter was not an
employee of the petitioner. 6. The AGENCY assumes full responsibility for any claim
or cause of action which may accrue in favor of any
security guard by reason of employment with the
Q       What happened at the Station No. 8? AGENCY, it being understood that security guards are
employees of the AGENCY and not of the CLIENT.21
A       They talked with our security guard then Mr.
Libunao told me, "Why did you go with them; you should The records show that the respondent did not object to the admission
not go with them because that is an agency; they are not of the contract which was offered in evidence to prove that Sido was
your employees." the employee of BSSC,22 and not of the petitioner.

Q       And what did you say, if any, to Mr. Libunao? On the third and last issue, it is thus evident that the respondent had
no cause of action against the petitioner for damages for Sido's illegal
A       I apologized in (sic) behalf of our security guard; I and harmful acts. The respondent should have sued Sido and the
told them that I did not expect these things will happen. 18 BSSC for damages, conformably to Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code.
Indeed, the respondent does not deny the testimony of Santos.
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,23 we held that where the security agency
Fourth. Sido testified that he was employed by BSSC as a security recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security
guard, which assigned him to the Mercury Drug Store at Robinson's guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such
Galleria. agency, and not the client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the
security guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family cannot be demanded from the said client:
Q   -       On May 25, 1992, do you remember what was
your work or employment, if any?
... [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security
agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its
A   -       Yes, Sir. watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of
such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful
 122

acts committed by the security guards attaches to the by Ong, Genetron’s Isuzu Elf truck with plate no. PMP-106 hit and
employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of bumped the front portion of a private jeepney with plate no. DAF-922
such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a along Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the
security agency has no hand in selecting who among the morning.3
pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the
agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the
guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be collision.4 Macalinao incurred the most serious injuries
demanded from the client whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards.24
among the passengers of the truck. He was initially brought to the
Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment but in view of the
Indeed, the petitioner had assigned Sido to help the management severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine
open and close the door of the drug store; inspect the bags of Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved
customers as they enter the store; and, check the receipts issued by to the Capitol Medical Center by his parents, petitioners herein, for
the cashier to said customers for their purchases. However, such medical reasons and later to the Philippine General Hospital for
circumstances do not automatically make the security guard the financial considerations.5
employee of the petitioner, and, as such, liable for the guard's tortious
acts. The fact that a client company may give instructions or
directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, Macalinao’s body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck
render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards down as a result of the accident and per doctor’s advice, his foot was
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. 25 amputated. He also suffered from bed sores and infection. His
immedicable condition, coupled with the doctor’s recommendation,
led his family to bring him home where he died on 7 November
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is 1992.6
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated June 9, 2000 and the
Resolution dated August 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59754 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages
complaint filed by the respondent against petitioner Mercury Drug against both Ong and Sebastian before the Regional Trial Court
Corporation in Civil Case No. Q-92-14114 is DISMISSED. The (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81. 7 After his death, Macalinao was
counterclaims of the latter are also DISMISSED. No costs. substituted by his parents in the action. 8 A criminal case for reckless
imprudence
SO ORDERED.
resulting to serious physical injuries 9 had also been instituted earlier
against Ong but for reasons which do not appear in the records of this
case, trial thereon did not ensue.10

******************************************
After trial in the civil action, the RTC held that based on the
evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck in a reckless and imprudent
G.R. No. 146635 December 14, 2005 manner thereby causing the same to hit the private jeepney. It
observed that while respondents claimed that Ong was driving
MARCELO MACALINAO, Substituted by ESPERANZA cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no evidence was
MACALINAO and ANTONIO MACALINAO, Petitioners, presented to substantiate the claim.11 It declared Ong negligent and at
vs. the same time, it held that Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of
EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG and GENOVEVO a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong.
SEBASTIAN, Respondents. Consequently, the trial court pronounced the two of them jointly
liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil
indemnity for Macalinao’s death. The trial court subsequently
DECISION increased the monetary award12 upon petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration thereof.
Tinga, J.:
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing It held that the evidence presented by petitioners was woefully scant
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May to support a verdict of negligence against Ong. And since
2000 and 7 September 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. respondents’ liability hinged squarely on proof of Ong’s negligence,
52963. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court neither of them could be held liable for damages to petitioners. 13
and dismissed the complaint for damages filed by Marcelo Macalinao
(Macalinao) against Eddie Medecielo Ong (Ong) and Genovevo Aggrieved at the ruling, petitioners elevated the case to this Court.
Sebastian (Sebastian) for insufficiency of evidence. They herein contend that contrary to the conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals, the evidence conclusively establish fault or
The antecedent facts follow. negligence on the part of Ong and justify the award of damages in
their favor.
Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver,
respectively, at the Genetron International Marketing (Genetron), a The petition is meritorious.
single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian. On 25 April
1992, Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to The issue of negligence is factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the
deliver a heavy piece of machinery–a reactor/motor for mixing award of damages.14 In the case at bar, the crux of the controversy is
chemicals, to Sebastian’s manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support a finding of
While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven negligence against Ong. Given the contradictory conclusions of the
 123

trial court and the appellate court on this issue, this Court is impelled counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we
to ascertain for itself which court made the correct determination. ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. 19

While as a rule factual findings of the Court of Appeals are deemed Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth
conclusive in cases brought to us on appeal, we have also consistently which ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 20
pronounced that we may review its findings of fact in the following
instances, among others: In this case, while there is a dearth of testimonial evidence to
enlighten us about what actually happened, photographs 21 depicting
(i) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident
misapprehension of facts; (ii) when the factual findings are took place do exist. It is well established that photographs, when duly
conflicting; (iii) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if representations of the subject as of the time in question, are, in the
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (iv) discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids in arriving
where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to at an understanding of the evidence, the situation or condition of
those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of objects or premises or the circumstances of an accident. 22
specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court According to American courts, photographs are admissible in
of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are evidence in motor vehicle accident cases when they appear to have
contradicted by the evidence on record.15 been accurately taken and are proved to be a faithful and clear
representation of the subject, which cannot itself be produced, and are
Said exceptions obtain in this case thus, a departure from the of such nature as to throw light upon a disputed point. 23 Before a
application of the general rule is warranted. photograph may be admitted in evidence, however, its accuracy or
correctness must be proved, and it must be authenticated or
In reversing the trial court and absolving respondents from liability, verified24 first. In the case at bar, the photographer testified in open
the appellate court made the following pronouncement: court and properly identified the pictures as the ones he took at the
scene of the accident.25
The evidence presented is woefully scant. The pictures of the
collision afford no basis for concluding that it was the fault of the An examination of said photographs clearly shows that the road
defendant driver, or that he was driving recklessly. The police report where the mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center
contains no findings as to the road conditions, estimates of the separating the right from the left lane. Based on the motorist’s right
relative speed of the vehicles, or their exact position at the time of the of way rule, the Isuzu truck which was headed towards Norzagaray,
accident. And even so, entries in the police blotter should not be Bulacan26 should have been occupying the left lane while the private
given significance or probative value as they do not constitute jeepney which was traversing the road to the town proper of Sta.
conclusive proof of the truth thereof. Nor were eyewitnesses Maria, Bulacan27 should have been in the right lane. Exhibits "L" and
presented, not even affidavits or statements to give any indication as "L-4" among the photographs, however, reveal that in the aftermath
to what actually happened. The police investigator’s findings are of the collision, the Isuzu truck usurped the opposite lane to such an
sketchy at best, with only the phrase "Isuzu lost control" as his extent that only its right rear wheel remained in the left lane, a few
opinion, with no explanation how he reached it. Civil cases require inches from the demarcation line. Its two front wheels and left rear
evidence of a lesser degree than criminal cases, but one sentence by wheel were planted squarely on the private jeepney’s lane and the
one who did not even witness an event, is not conclusive proof. Isuzu truck had rotated such that its front no longer pointed towards
Norzagaray but partially faced the town proper of Sta. Maria instead.
...
While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault
in automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles gives rise to
There was only the fact of the collision before the trial court. The the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the private
attendant circumstances were not established, and no fault could be jeepney rather than the other way around. The smashed front of the
determined using the evidence, both testimonial and documentary Isuzu truck is pressed against the private jeepney’s left front portion
presented.16 near the driver’s side. The private jeepney is positioned diagonally in
the right lane; its front at the rightmost corner of the road while its
Contrary to the above conclusion of the appellate court, the evidence rear remained a few feet from the demarcation line. Based on the
on record coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently angle at which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to
establishes Ong’s negligence. the right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. This
would support the statement of the police investigator that the Isuzu
We focus first on the evidence presented before the trial court. truck lost control28 and hit the left front portion of the private
jeepney.29 It would also explain why the driver of the private jeepney
died immediately after being brought to the hospital, 30 since in such a
The photographs of the accident which the appellate court cavalierly scenario, the brunt of the collision logically bore down on him.
brushed aside as insignificant deserve substantial cogitation. In Jose
v. Court of Appeals,17 we upheld the trial court’s reliance on
photographs of the accident as opposed to a party’s obviously biased Moreover, the unequal size and weight of the two vehicles would
testimony. In so doing, we stated: make it improbable for the relatively lighter private jeepney to have
stricken the heavier truck with such force as to push the latter to the
former’s side of the road. Had that been the case, the two vehicles
In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to would have ended up crushed together at the center of the road or at
lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, the Isuzu truck’s lane instead of rolling to a stop at the private
relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In jeepney’s lane.
People v. Vasquez,18 where the physical evidence on record ran
 124

Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of negligence In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the
against Ong is the police report of the incident denoted as Entry No. accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son as
04-229 of the Sta. Maria Police Station. The report states that the plaintiff, have no actual knowledge
Isuzu truck was the one which hit the left front portion of the private
jeepney.31 This piece of evidence was disregarded by the Court of about the event since they were not present at the crucial moment.
Appeals on the ground that entries in police blotters should not be The driver of the private jeepney who could have shed light on the
given significance or probative value as they do not constitute circumstances is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge
conclusive proof of the truth thereof. about the cause of the mishap are the two truck helpers who survived,
both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastian’s
While true in most instances, it must still be remembered that previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as well. In the
although police blotters are of little probative value, they are circumstances, evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all
nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to petitioners.
evidence to refute the facts stated therein. 32 Entries in police records The witnesses left are unlikely to divulge to petitioners what they
made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially knew about the cause of the accident if the same militates against the
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein interest of their employer. This justifies the invocation of the
stated,33 and their probative value may be either substantiated or doctrine.
nullified by other competent evidence.34
Under local jurisprudence, the following are the requisites for the
In this case, the police blotter was identified and formally offered as application of res ipsa loquitur:
evidence and the person who made the entries thereon was likewise
presented in court. On the other hand, aside from a blanket allegation (1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
that the driver of the other vehicle was the one at fault, respondents absence of someone’s negligence;
did not present any evidence to back up their charge and show that
the conclusion of the police investigator was false. Given the paucity
of details in the report, the investigator’s observation could have been (2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
easily refuted and overturned by respondents through the simple the defendant or defendants; and
expedient of supplying the missing facts and showing to the
satisfaction of the (3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated.42
court that the Isuzu truck was blameless in the incident. Ong was
driving the truck while the two other truck helpers also survived the We are convinced that all the above requisites are present in the case
accident. Any or all of them could have given their testimony to shed at bar.
light on what actually transpired, yet not one of them was presented
to substantiate the claim that Ong was not negligent. No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a
matter of course unless someone is negligent, thus, the first requisite
Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, for the application of the doctrine is present. Ong was driving the
the statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and Isuzu truck which, from the evidence adduced, appears to have
not the other way around is deemed established. The prima precipitated the collision with the private jeepney. Driving the Isuzu
facie nature of the police report ensures that if it remains unexplained truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it, a fact
or uncontradicted, it will be sufficient to establish the facts posited which shows that the second requisite is also present. No contributory
therein.35 negligence could be attributed to Macalinao relative to the happening
of the accident since he was merely a passenger in the Isuzu truck.
While not constituting direct proof of Ong’s negligence, the Respondents’ allegation that Macalinao was guilty of contributory
foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa negligence for failing to take the necessary precautions to ensure his
loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the safety while onboard the truck43 is too specious for belief particularly
transaction speaks for itself."36 as respondents did not even present any evidence to prove such
allegation. The last requisite is, therefore, likewise present.
Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima
facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to There exists a fourth requisite under American jurisprudence, that is,
substitute for specific proof of negligence.37 It permits the plaintiff to that the defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that
present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending the injury was caused by his or her want of due care. 44 In this case,
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or while respondents claimed that Ong drove cautiously and prudently
presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the during the time in question, no evidence was proffered to substantiate
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part. 38 the same. In fact, Ong did not bother to testify to explain his
actuations and to show that he exercised due care when the accident
happened, so even this requisite is fulfilled.
The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available. 39 This is based in
part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the Ong’s negligence arises. In consonance with the effect of the
plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege doctrine, the burden of proving due care at the time in question shifts
negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening to respondents. Unfortunately, as previously discussed, aside from
of the accident in order to establish negligence. 40 The inference which blanket allegations that Ong exercised prudence and due care while
the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence driving on the day of the accident, respondents proffered no other
of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically proof. As a consequence, the prima facie finding of negligence
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. 41 against Ong, remaining unexplained and/or uncontradicted, is
 125

deemed established. This in turn warrants a finding that Ong is liable In an obvious ploy to relieve himself from liability should the
for damages to petitioners. appellate court’s decision be reversed, Sebastian averred that
Macalinao is not entitled to damages. He anchored his claim on the
Such liability of Ong is solidary with Sebastian pursuant to Art. 2176 novel argument that the provisions of Art. 2180 apply only when the
in relation to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code which provide: injured party is a third person but it has no application to an
employee like Macalinao.52 He likewise postulated that recovery from
the Social Security System, State Insurance Fund, Employee’s
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, Compensation Commission, and the Philippine Medical Care Act, the
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage government agencies with which petitioners filed a claim in view of
done . . . . Macalinao’s injury and subsequent death, preclude pursuing alternate
recourse or recovering from other sources until the former claims
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not have been rejected.53
only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. Sebastian is grasping at straws. Art. 2180 makes no distinction
whatsoever whether the claimant is an employee or a third person
... relative to the employer. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. 54
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks Moreover, petitioner’s claim against Sebastian is not based upon the
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. fact of Macalinao’s previous employment with him but on the
solidary liability of the latter for the negligent act of one of his
... employees. Such is not precluded by prior claims with the
government agencies enumerated. One is based on compulsory
coverage of government benefits while the other is based on a cause
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the of action provided by law.
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Additionally, respondents postulated that since it was Macalinao who
sustained physical injuries and died, he was the one who suffered
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to pain, not petitioners so moral damages are not recoverable in this
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the case.55
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of
its employees.45 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by delict are not proscribed from recovering moral damages in
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence meritorious cases. To hold otherwise would give rise to the ridiculous
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his scenario where a defendant may be compelled to pay moral damages
employee.46 in a quasi-delict causing physical injuries but will be relieved from
doing so should those same injuries cause the victim’s death.

In an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, Sebastian claimed

that he exercised due care in selecting Ong as a driver. Before he In the case of Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon,56 we held that in
hired Ong, he allegedly required him to produce police and NBI quasi-delicts:
clearances and he took into account the recommendations of Ong’s
previous employer and friends. 47 Sebastian also stressed that he . . . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the
instructed Ong to drive slowly and carefully and to take necessary limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must
precautions.48 He likewise admonished Ong to be careful after the be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the pain
latter had some minor accidents in the parking area. 49 experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the
intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with
However, Sebastian’s statements are not sufficient to prove that he the wealth or means of the offender.57 (Emphasis Supplied.)
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of
Ong. His testimony is self-serving and devoid of corroboration as he The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00
did not bother to support the same with document evidence. but since prevailing jurisprudence has fixed the same at
Moreover, Sebastian could not even remember whether the ₱50,000.00,58 there is a need to increase the award to reflect the
recommendation from Ong’s previous employer was made verbally recent rulings.
or in writing.50
Lastly, respondents claim that exemplary damages is not warranted in
On the other hand, due diligence in supervision requires the this case. Under the law, exemplary damages may be granted in
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 59 Gross
and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
rules.51 Admonitions to drive carefully without the corresponding is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
guidelines and monitoring of the employee do not satisfy the due conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
diligence required by law either. be affected.60

In short, Sebastian’s claims fall short of what is required by law to Ong’s gross negligence in driving the Isuzu truck precipitated the
overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and accident. This is lucidly portrayed in the photographs on record and it
supervision of his employee. The trial court therefore correctly held justifies the award of exemplary damages in petitioners’ favor.
him solidarily liable with Ong to petitioners. However, the trial court’s award of ₱10,000.00 is insufficient, thus
 126

the Court deems it proper to increase the award to ₱25,000.00 under during his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 to September
the circumstances. 1987.3

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and
Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2000, as well as its Resolution dated registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it was
7 September 2000, are hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 dated 12 April 1996 Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of
as amended by the Order dated 23 May 1996 is hereby the procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety deposit
REINSTATED with the modifications that the award for moral boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use
damages is increased to ₱50,000.00 to conform with prevailing of two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the
jurisprudence and other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel.
When a registered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he
the award for exemplary damages is increased to ₱25,000.00. Costs alone could personally request the management who then would
against respondents. assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in
opening the safety deposit box with the two keys.4
SO ORDERED.
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box:
Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00) which he placed in two
envelopes, one envelope containing Ten Thousand US Dollars
(US$10,000.00) and the other envelope Five Thousand US Dollars
****************************************** (US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00)
which he also placed in another envelope; two (2) other envelopes
G.R. No. 126780             February 17, 2005 containing letters and credit cards; two (2) bankbooks; and a
checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit box. 5
YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and
ANICIA PAYAM, petitioners, On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong,
vs. McLoughlin opened his safety deposit box with his key and with the
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE key of the management and took therefrom the envelope containing
McLOUGHLIN, respondents. Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the envelope containing
Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports
and his credit cards.6 McLoughlin left the other items in the box as he
DECISION did not check out of his room at the Tropicana during his short visit
to Hongkong. When he arrived in Hongkong, he opened the envelope
TINGA, J.: which contained Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00) and
discovered upon counting that only Three Thousand US Dollars
The primary question of interest before this Court is the only legal (US$3,000.00) were enclosed therein.7 Since he had no idea whether
issue in the case: It is whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss somebody else had tampered with his safety deposit box, he thought
of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these that it was just a result of bad accounting since he did not spend
guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its anything from that envelope.8
employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of
the Civil Code which voids such waivers. After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana on 18
December 1987 and left for Australia. When he arrived in Australia,
Before this Court is a Rule 45 petition for review of he discovered that the envelope with Ten Thousand US Dollars
the Decision1 dated 19 October 1995 of the Court of Appeals which (US$10,000.00) was short of Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000).
affirmed the Decision2 dated 16 December 1991 of the Regional Trial He also noticed that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and
Court (RTC), Branch 13, of Manila, finding YHT Realty stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was
Corporation, Brunhilda Mata-Tan (Tan), Erlinda Lainez (Lainez) and likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet. 9
Anicia Payam (Payam) jointly and solidarily liable for damages in an
action filed by Maurice McLoughlin (McLoughlin) for the loss of his When McLoughlin came back to the Philippines on 4 April 1988, he
American and Australian dollars deposited in the safety deposit box asked Lainez if some money and/or jewelry which he had lost were
of Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel, owned and operated by found and returned to her or to the management. However, Lainez
YHT Realty Corporation. told him that no one in the hotel found such things and none were
turned over to the management. He again registered at Tropicana and
The factual backdrop of the case follow. rented a safety deposit box. He placed therein one (1) envelope
containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), another
envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman- (AUS$10,000.00) and other envelopes containing his traveling
philanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the papers/documents. On 16 April 1988, McLoughlin requested Lainez
Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Tan. Tan befriended and Payam to open his safety deposit box. He noticed that in the
McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important envelope containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00),
people, accompanying him in visiting impoverished street children Two Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00) were missing and in the
and assisting him in buying gifts for the children and in distributing envelope previously containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars
the same to charitable institutions for poor children. Tan convinced (AUS$10,000.00), Four Thousand Five Hundred Australian Dollars
McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where (AUS$4,500.00) were missing.10
Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez served as
manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the
keys for the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confronted
McLoughlin's booking at the Tropicana where he started staying Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit
 127

box with the key assigned to him. 11 McLoughlin went up to his room receiving the notice of the hearing on 24 November 1989. Thus, the
where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had case at the Fiscal's Office was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
stolen McLoughlin's key and was able to open the safety deposit box Mcloughlin requested the reinstatement of the criminal charge for
with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. 12 Lopez also told theft. In the meantime, McLoughlin and his lawyers wrote letters of
McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the demand to those having responsibility to pay the damage. Then he
latter was asleep.13 left again for Australia.

McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the Upon his return on 22 October 1990, he registered at the Echelon
incident. Lopez got in touch with Tan and arranged for a meeting Towers at Malate, Manila. Meetings were held between McLoughlin
with the police and McLoughlin. When the police did not arrive, and his lawyer which resulted to the filing of a complaint for
Lopez and Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at Tropicana and damages on 3 December 1990 against YHT Realty Corporation,
thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note dated 21 Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan (defendants) for the loss of
April 1988. The promissory note reads as follows: McLoughlin's money which was discovered on 16 April 1988. After
filing the complaint, McLoughlin left again for Australia to attend to
I promise to pay Mr. Maurice McLoughlin the amount of an urgent business matter. Tan and Lopez, however, were not served
AUS$4,000.00 and US$2,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine with summons, and trial proceeded with only Lainez, Payam and
currency on or before May 5, 1988.14 YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.

Lopez requested Tan to sign the promissory note which the latter did After defendants had filed their Pre-Trial Brief admitting that they
and Lopez also signed as a witness. Despite the execution of had previously allowed and assisted Tan to open the safety deposit
promissory note by Tan, McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel box, McLoughlin filed an Amended/Supplemental Complaint20 dated
who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. However, 10 June 1991 which included another incident of loss of money and
Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions jewelry in the safety deposit box rented by McLoughlin in the same
for renting the safety deposit box entitled "Undertaking For the Use hotel which took place prior to 16 April 1988. 21 The trial court
Of Safety Deposit Box,"15 specifically paragraphs (2) and (4) thereof, admitted the Amended/Supplemental Complaint.
to wit:
During the trial of the case, McLoughlin had been in and out of the
2. To release and hold free and blameless TROPICANA country to attend to urgent business in Australia, and while staying in
APARTMENT HOTEL from any liability arising from any loss in the Philippines to attend the hearing, he incurred expenses for hotel
the contents and/or use of the said deposit box for any cause bills, airfare and other transportation expenses, long distance calls to
whatsoever, including but not limited to the presentation or use Australia, Meralco power expenses, and expenses for food and
thereof by any other person should the key be lost; maintenance, among others.22

... After trial, the RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of

McLoughlin, the dispositive portion of which reads:
4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE in favor of
TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL upon giving up the use of the WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby
box.16 rendered by this Court in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants,
to wit:
On 17 May 1988, McLoughlin went back to Australia and he
consulted his lawyers as to the validity of the abovementioned 1. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
stipulations. They opined that the stipulations are void for being plaintiff the sum of US$11,400.00 or its equivalent in
violative of universal hotel practices and customs. His lawyers Philippine Currency of ₱342,000.00, more or less, and the
prepared a letter dated 30 May 1988 which was signed by sum of AUS$4,500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine
McLoughlin and sent to President Corazon Aquino. 17 The Office of Currency of ₱99,000.00, or a total of ₱441,000.00, more or
the President referred the letter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) less, with 12% interest from April 16 1988 until said
which forwarded the same to the Western Police District (WPD). 18 amount has been paid to plaintiff (Item 1, Exhibit CC);

After receiving a copy of the indorsement in Australia, McLoughlin 2. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay
came to the Philippines and registered again as a hotel guest of plaintiff the sum of ₱3,674,238.00 as actual and
Tropicana. McLoughlin went to Malacaňang to follow up on his consequential damages arising from the loss of his
letter but he was instructed to go to the DOJ. The DOJ directed him Australian and American dollars and jewelries complained
to proceed to the WPD for documentation. But McLoughlin went against and in prosecuting his claim and rights
back to Australia as he had an urgent business matter to attend to. administratively and judicially (Items II, III, IV, V, VI, VII,
VIII, and IX, Exh. "CC");
For several times, McLoughlin left for Australia to attend to his
business and came back to the Philippines to follow up on his letter to 3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
the President but he failed to obtain any concrete assistance. 19 plaintiff the sum of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages (Item
X, Exh. "CC");
McLoughlin left again for Australia and upon his return to the
Philippines on 25 August 1989 to pursue his claims against 4. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
petitioners, the WPD conducted an investigation which resulted in the plaintiff the sum of ₱350,000.00 as exemplary damages
preparation of an affidavit which was forwarded to the Manila City (Item XI, Exh. "CC");
Fiscal's Office. Said affidavit became the basis of preliminary
investigation. However, McLoughlin left again for Australia without
 128

5. And ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay 1) ₱153,200.00 representing the peso equivalent of
litigation expenses in the sum of ₱200,000.00 (Item XII, US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00;
Exh. "CC");
2) ₱308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air
6. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay fares from Sidney [sic] to Manila and back for a total of
plaintiff the sum of ₱200,000.00 as attorney's fees, and a eleven (11) trips;
fee of ₱3,000.00 for every appearance; and
3) One-half of ₱336,207.05 or ₱168,103.52 representing
7. Plus costs of suit. payment to Tropicana Apartment Hotel;

SO ORDERED.23 4) One-half of ₱152,683.57 or ₱76,341.785 representing

payment to Echelon Tower;
The trial court found that McLoughlin's allegations as to the fact of
loss and as to the amount of money he lost were sufficiently shown 5) One-half of ₱179,863.20 or ₱89,931.60 for the taxi xxx
by his direct and straightforward manner of testifying in court and transportation from the residence to Sidney [sic] Airport
found him to be credible and worthy of belief as it was established and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven
that McLoughlin's money, kept in Tropicana's safety deposit box, was (11) trips;
taken by Tan without McLoughlin's consent. The taking was effected
through the use of the master key which was in the possession of the 6) One-half of ₱7,801.94 or ₱3,900.97 representing
management. Payam and Lainez allowed Tan to use the master key Meralco power expenses;
without authority from McLoughlin. The trial court added that if
McLoughlin had not lost his dollars, he would not have gone through
the trouble and personal inconvenience of seeking aid and assistance 7) One-half of ₱356,400.00 or ₱178,000.00 representing
from the Office of the President, DOJ, police authorities and the City expenses for food and maintenance;
Fiscal's Office in his desire to recover his losses from the hotel
management and Tan.24 8) ₱50,000.00 for moral damages;

As regards the loss of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000.00) 9) ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
and jewelry worth approximately One Thousand Two Hundred US
Dollars (US$1,200.00) which allegedly occurred during his stay at
10) ₱200,000 representing attorney's fees.
Tropicana previous to 4 April 1988, no claim was made by
McLoughlin for such losses in his complaint dated 21 November
1990 because he was not sure how they were lost and who the With costs.
responsible persons were. But considering the admission of the
defendants in their pre-trial brief that on three previous occasions SO ORDERED.29
they allowed Tan to open the box, the trial court opined that it was
logical and reasonable to presume that his personal assets consisting
Unperturbed, YHT Realty Corporation, Lainez and Payam went to
of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000.00) and jewelry were
this Court in this appeal by certiorari.
taken by Tan from the safety deposit box without McLoughlin's
consent through the cooperation of Payam and Lainez. 25
Petitioners submit for resolution by this Court the following issues:
(a) whether the appellate court's conclusion on the alleged prior
The trial court also found that defendants acted with gross negligence
existence and subsequent loss of the subject money and jewelry is
in the performance and exercise of their duties and obligations as
supported by the evidence on record; (b) whether the finding of gross
innkeepers and were therefore liable to answer for the losses incurred
negligence on the part of petitioners in the performance of their
by McLoughlin.26
duties as innkeepers is supported by the evidence on record; (c)
whether the "Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box"
Moreover, the trial court ruled that paragraphs (2) and (4) of the admittedly executed by private respondent is null and void; and (d)
"Undertaking For The Use Of Safety Deposit Box" are not valid for whether the damages awarded to private respondent, as well as the
being contrary to the express mandate of Article 2003 of the New amounts thereof, are proper under the circumstances. 30
Civil Code and against public policy. 27 Thus, there being fraud or
wanton conduct on the part of defendants, they should be responsible
The petition is devoid of merit.
for all damages which may be attributed to the non-performance of
their contractual obligations.28
It is worthy of note that the thrust of Rule 45 is the resolution only of
questions of law and any peripheral factual question addressed to this
The Court of Appeals affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower
Court is beyond the bounds of this mode of review.
court except as to the amount of damages awarded. The decretal text
of the appellate court's decision reads:
Petitioners point out that the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove the fact of prior existence of the dollars and the jewelry which
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby
had been lost while deposited in the safety deposit boxes of
AFFIRMED but modified as follows:
Tropicana, the basis of the trial court and the appellate court being
the sole testimony of McLoughlin as to the contents thereof.
The appellants are directed jointly and severally to pay the Likewise, petitioners dispute the finding of gross negligence on their
plaintiff/appellee the following amounts: part as not supported by the evidence on record.
 129

We are not persuaded.l^vvphi1.net We adhere to the findings of the petitioners exercised due diligence in taking care of McLoughlin's
trial court as affirmed by the appellate court that the fact of loss was safety deposit box, they should have confronted him as to his
established by the credible testimony in open court by McLoughlin. relationship with Tan considering that the latter had been observed
Such findings are factual and therefore beyond the ambit of the opening McLoughlin's safety deposit box a number of times at the
present petition.1awphi1.nét early hours of the morning. Tan's acts should have prompted the
management to investigate her relationship with McLoughlin. Then,
The trial court had the occasion to observe the demeanor of petitioners would have exercised due diligence required of them.
McLoughlin while testifying which reflected the veracity of the facts Failure to do so warrants the conclusion that the management had
testified to by him. On this score, we give full credence to the been remiss in complying with the obligations imposed upon hotel-
appreciation of testimonial evidence by the trial court especially if keepers under the law.
what is at issue is the credibility of the witness. The oft-repeated
principle is that where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the
established rule is that great respect is accorded to the evaluation of performance of their obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable
the credibility of witnesses by the trial court. 31 The trial court is in the for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of paying damages,
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that
testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
under grilling examination.32 service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an
We are also not impressed by petitioners' argument that the finding of employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer was
gross negligence by the lower court as affirmed by the appellate court negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the
is not supported by evidence. The evidence reveals that two keys are victim to prove the negligence of such employer. 35 Thus, given the
required to open the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. One key is fact that the loss of McLoughlin's money was consummated through
assigned to the guest while the other remains in the possession of the the negligence of Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan to open the
management. If the guest desires to open his safety deposit box, he safety deposit box without the guest's consent, both the assisting
must request the management for the other key to open the same. In employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator
other words, the guest alone cannot open the safety deposit box of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article
without the assistance of the management or its employees. With 2193.36
more reason that access to the safety deposit box should be denied if
the one requesting for the opening of the safety deposit box is a The issue of whether the "Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit
stranger. Thus, in case of loss of any item deposited in the safety Box" executed by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal
deposit box, it is inevitable to conclude that the management had at question appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both the
least a hand in the consummation of the taking, unless the reason for trial court and the appellate court found the same to be null and void.
the loss is force majeure. We find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Article 2003
is controlling, thus:
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were employees
of Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the management when Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility
the loss took place. In fact, they even admitted that they assisted Tan by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles
on three separate occasions in opening McLoughlin's safety deposit brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and
box.33 This only proves that Tropicana had prior knowledge that a the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in
person aside from the registered guest had access to the safety deposit Articles 1998 to 200137 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.
box. Yet the management failed to notify McLoughlin of the incident
and waited for him to discover the taking before it disclosed the Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an
matter to him. Therefore, Tropicana should be held responsible for expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as
the damage suffered by McLoughlin by reason of the negligence of that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common
its employees. carrier's business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the
public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel
The management should have guarded against the occurrence of this guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty
incident considering that Payam admitted in open court that she constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow
assisted Tan three times in opening the safety deposit box of such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
McLoughlin at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the latter was stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in
still asleep.34 In light of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their
undeniable that without the acquiescence of the employees of signature.
Tropicana to the opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of
McLoughlin's money could and should have been avoided. In an early case, 38 the Court of Appeals through its then Presiding
Justice (later Associate Justice of the Court) Jose P. Bengzon, ruled
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, that to hold hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for the effects of their
made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was guests, it is not necessary that they be actually delivered to the
always with him most of the time. The evidence on record, however, innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such effects are
is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the within the hotel or inn. 39 With greater reason should the liability of
management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing items are taken without
McLoughlin will not exculpate the petitioners from liability in the the guest's knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box
absence of any showing that he made the management believe that provided by the hotel itself, as in this case.
Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have access to the safety
deposit box. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "undertaking" manifestly contravene
to warrant such conclusion considering that what is involved in the Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for they allow Tropicana to be
instant case is the very safety of McLoughlin's deposit. If only released from liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use
 130

of the safety deposit box for any cause whatsoever.40 Evidently, the from Sydney to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) trips; 49 one-
undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any half of ₱336,207.05 or ₱168,103.52 representing payment to
loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not Tropicana;50 one-half of ₱152,683.57 or ₱76,341.785 representing
negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New payment to Echelon Tower;51 one-half of ₱179,863.20 or ₱89,931.60
Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall for the taxi or transportation expenses from McLoughlin's residence
extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests to Sydney Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the
even if caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or eleven (11) trips;52 one-half of ₱7,801.94 or ₱3,900.97 representing
inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from any force Meralco power expenses;53 one-half of ₱356,400.00 or ₱178,000.00
majeure.41 It is the loss through force majeure that may spare the representing expenses for food and maintenance.54
hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
the act of the thief or robber was done with the use of arms or The amount of ₱50,000.00 for moral damages is reasonable.
through an irresistible force to qualify the same as force majeure.42 Although trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of
moral damages, the appellate court may modify or change the amount
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article 2002 43 which awarded when it is palpably and scandalously
exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of excessive.l^vvphi1.net Moral damages are not intended to enrich a
his guest, his family, or visitors. Even a cursory reading of the complainant at the expense of a defendant.l^vvphi1.net They are
provision would lead us to reject petitioners' contention. The awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion
justification they raise would render nugatory the public interest or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
sought to be protected by the provision. What if the negligence of the undergone, by reason of defendants' culpable action. 55
employer or its employees facilitated the consummation of a crime
committed by the registered guest's relatives or visitor? Should the The awards of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱200,000.00
law exculpate the hotel from liability since the loss was due to the act representing attorney's fees are likewise sustained.
of the visitor of the registered guest of the hotel? Hence, this
provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of
concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the
occurrence of the loss. A depositary is not responsible for the loss of Court of Appeals dated 19 October 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.
goods by theft, unless his actionable negligence contributes to the Petitioners are directed, jointly and severally, to pay private
loss.44 respondent the following amounts:

In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the safety deposit box (1) US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso
was shared not only by the guest himself but also by the management equivalent at the time of payment;
since two keys are necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without
the assistance of hotel employees, the loss would not have occurred. (2) ₱308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air
Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurrent negligence in allowing Tan, fares from Sydney to Manila and back for a total of eleven
who was not the registered guest, to open the safety deposit box of (11) trips;
McLoughlin, even assuming that the latter was also guilty of
negligence in allowing another person to use his key. To rule
(3) One-half of ₱336,207.05 or ₱168,103.52 representing
otherwise would result in undermining the safety of the safety deposit
payment to Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel;
boxes in hotels for the management will be given imprimatur to allow
any person, under the pretense of being a family member or a visitor
of the guest, to have access to the safety deposit box without fear of (4) One-half of ₱152,683.57 or ₱76,341.785 representing
any liability that will attach thereafter in case such person turns out to payment to Echelon Tower;
be a complete stranger. This will allow the hotel to evade
responsibility for any liability incurred by its employees in (5) One-half of ₱179,863.20 or ₱89,931.60 for the taxi or
conspiracy with the guest's relatives and visitors. transportation expense from McLoughlin's residence to
Sydney Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila,
Petitioners contend that McLoughlin's case was mounted on the for the eleven (11) trips;
theory of contract, but the trial court and the appellate court upheld
the grant of the claims of the latter on the basis of tort. 45 There is (6) One-half of ₱7,801.94 or ₱3,900.97 representing
nothing anomalous in how the lower courts decided the controversy Meralco power expenses;
for this Court has pronounced a jurisprudential rule that tort liability
can exist even if there are already contractual relations. The act that
(7) One-half of ₱356,400.00 or ₱178,200.00 representing
breaks the contract may also be tort.46
expenses for food and maintenance;

As to damages awarded to McLoughlin, we see no reason to modify

(8) ₱50,000.00 for moral damages;
the amounts awarded by the appellate court for the same were based
on facts and law. It is within the province of lower courts to settle
factual issues such as the proper amount of damages awarded and (9) ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
such finding is binding upon this Court especially if sufficiently
proven by evidence and not unconscionable or excessive. Thus, the (10) ₱200,000 representing attorney's fees.
appellate court correctly awarded McLoughlin Two Thousand US
Dollars (US$2,000.00) and Four Thousand Five Hundred Australian
dollars (AUS$4,500.00) or their peso equivalent at the time of With costs.
payment,47 being the amounts duly proven by evidence. 48 The alleged
loss that took place prior to 16 April 1988 was not considered since SO ORDERED.
the amounts alleged to have been taken were not sufficiently
established by evidence. The appellate court also correctly awarded
the sum of ₱308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares
 131

****************************************** (23) In a parallel move, and a companion activity to their

unlawful obstruction of plaintiff Universal's premises,
Capocyan, et al., likewise picketed , obstructed and
G.R. No. 155990             September 12, 2007
otherwise barricaded the premises of plaintiff Marman,
whose depot adjoined that of plaintiff Universal; x x x
UNIVERSAL AQUARIUS, INC. and CONCHITA
TAN, petitioners,
(26) As a consequence of the companion blockade on
vs.
plaintiff Marman's premises, its business operations were
Q.C. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
paralyzed;
CORPORATION, respondent *.

(27) Plaintiff Universal's and plaintiff Marman's operations

DECISION
continue to be at a standstill, causing damages in the form
of unearned sales x x x
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
(31) Defendant Resources represented itself to be able to
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 provide temporary workers who are competent to assist in
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated August 23, 2002 plaintiff Universal's plant operations; it held itself out as a
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65570 and the CA manpower firm with a pool of what can generally be
Resolution2 dated October 22, 2002 which denied petitioners' Motion described as law-abiding workers, as that is essential in its
for Reconsideration. business of job-contracting;

The facts: (32) Defendant Resources instead sent a band of scoundrels

who allowed themselves to be misdirected and misguided
Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture by Capocyan, an attorney (?), and "national president" of
and distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila. It operates a Obrero Pilipino (?)
chemical plant in Antipolo City. Conchita Tan (Tan), as a proprietor
under the name and style of Marman Trading (Marman), is engaged x x x5
in the trading, delivery and distribution of chemical products in
Metro Manila, with a depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's
On January 3, 2001, Universal forged an Agreement (To End Labor
chemical plant.
Dispute) with Obrero Pilipino.6 Thus, the strike which affected the
business operations of Universal and Marman ended. Universal and
Q.C. Human Resources Management Corporation (Resources) is Tan then filed a Notice of Dismissal as against the strikers. 7
engaged in supplying manpower to various establishments. It
supplied Universal with about seventy-four (74) temporary workers
On January 8, 2001, Resources filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
to assist Universal in the operation of its chemical plant in Antipolo
grounds that the complaint stated no cause of action against it; that,
City.
assuming the existence of such cause of action, the same was lost
upon dismissal of the case against the individual defendants; and lack
On December 13, 2000, Rodolfo Capocyan (Capocyan), claiming to of jurisdiction.8
be the general counsel/national president of the labor organization
called Obrero Pilipino (Universal Aquarius Chapter), hereinafter
In an Order dated February 2, 2001, the RTC denied the Motion to
referred to as Obrero Filipino, sent a Notice of Strike to Universal.
Dismiss.9 Resources filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10 but it was
denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 11, 2001.11
On the same date, Resources informed the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment that the officers and members
On July 11, 2001, Resources filed a petition for certiorari and
of Obrero Pilipino are its employees and not employees of Universal.
prohibition with the CA.12 On August 23, 2002, the CA rendered a
Decision which set aside the Orders dated February 2, 2001 and May
Five days later, or on December 19, 2000, Capocyon and 36 other 11, 2001 of the RTC and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
union officers and members3 of Obrero Pilipino, picketed, barricaded action.13 The CA held that:
and obstructed the entry and exit of Universal's Antipolo City
chemical plant and intercepted Universal's delivery trucks thereby
It was very clear from the allegations in the complaint that
disrupting its business operations. Marman's depot, which adjoined
the claims of plaintiffs (private respondents in this case)
Universal's plant, suffered a similar fate.
stemmed from the strike, which resulted in the disruption of
their business operations. From the four corners of the
On December 27, 2000, Universal and Tan filed a Complaint against complaint, it was apparent that the right of the plaintiffs to
the strikers and Resources before the Regional Trial Court, Branch operate their business was violated when the defendants,
74, Antipolo City (RTC) for breach of contract and damages suffered Rodolfo Capocyan and company, staged the strike in the
due to the disruption of their respective business operations, docketed premises of Universal Aquarius and Marman, thereby
as Civil Case No. 00-6029.4 The Complaint alleges, in part: disrupting the plant's operations. Q.C. Human Resources
Management Corporation (the petitioner in this case) was
(17) On December 19, 2000, at about 2:00 o'clock in the made defendant in the complaint only because it was the
morning, in gross violation of all applicable laws, rules and employer of the strikers. However, subsequent events
regulations, defendants Capocyan, et al., willfully, erased the cause of action of plaintiffs, that is, when
unlawfully and feloniously picketed, barricaded and Universal Aquarius agreed to end the dispute by giving
otherwise obstructed entry and exit to and from the main financial assistance to the striking workers and the
gate of plaintiff Universal's plant; x x x dismissal of the case against them. With this turn of events,
the trial court had no more issue to resolve, and the
 132

dismissal of the complaint against the strikers necessarily material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint
warranted the dismissal of the complaint against Q.C. furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it
Human Resources Management Corporation because should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may
plaintiffs had no more cause of action against it. 14 be presented by the defendants.23

Universal and Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration 15 but it was Verily, it is beside the point whether or not the allegations in the
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated October 22, 2002. 16 complaint are true, for with a motion to dismiss complaint based on
lack of cause of action, the movant only hypothetically admits the
The present petition is anchored on the following grounds: truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that is, assuming arguendo
that the facts alleged are true, those allegations are insufficient for the
court to render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with
The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in the prayer of the complaint.24
dismissing Civil Case No. 00-6829 for lack of cause of
action.
The complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done
The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding at the trial on the merits of the case. 25 To sustain a motion to dismiss
that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively
motion to dismiss filed by respondent Resources.17 stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. 26

Universal and Tan aver that the complaint stated a cause of action Anent Universal's claim for breach for contract and damages, the
against Resources that would warrant cognizance by the RTC; the Court is convinced that the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of
allegations of the complaint clearly point out that Universal is suing action against Resources. The Complaint alleged that Universal had a
Resources for the latter's failure to supply the former with temporary contract of employment of temporary workers with Resources; and
workers who will help in its business. that Resources violated said contract by supplying it with unfit,
maladjusted individuals who staged a strike and disrupted its business
On the other hand, Resources contends that the complaint stated no operations. Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the
cause of action against it since there is nothing in the allegations exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction, 27 could have
thereof that it participated in the acts committed by its employees. rendered judgment over the dispute.

The petition is partly impressed with merit. However, with regard to Tan's claim for damages, the Court finds
that she has no cause of action against Resources. A thorough reading
Section 1(g) Rule 1618 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes it of the allegations of the Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for
clear that failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in damages clearly springs from the strike effected by the employees of
the complaint warrants the dismissal thereof. Section 2, Rule 2 of the Resources. It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee
omission by which a party violates the right of another. It is the delict relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. 28 The question then
or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in is whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the employee is
violation of the primary right of the plaintiff. 19 Its essential elements engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or, independently,
are as follows: in that of his own. An employer incurs no liability when an
employee’s conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of
employment.29 Unquestionably, when Resources' employees staged a
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range of their
under whatever law it arises or is created; employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages
caused by the strike staged by its employees.
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated August 23, 2002 and Resolution dated October 22,
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65570
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar only as the dismissal of
of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the complaint in Civil Case No. 00-6029 for lack of cause of action of
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages Universal Aquarius, Inc. against Q.C. Human Resources
or other appropriate relief.20 Management Corporation is concerned. The complaint against the
latter is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 74,
Antipolo City is DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings on the
It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of
cause of action of Universal Aquarius, Inc. against Q.C. Human
action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in
Resources Management Corporation.
court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. 21

The dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 00-6029 for lack of
In Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v.
cause of action of Conchita Tan against Q.C. Human Resources
Catalan,22 this Court held:
Management Corporation is AFFIRMED.

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is

SO ORDERED.
whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court
render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
 133

****************************************** The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident,
as testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of
TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who "has no
motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of any party"
and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971 denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .

Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila
PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants, Police Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death:
vs. shock due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight
owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that these
known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" internal injuries of the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist
(M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees. delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 3 It held that "(T)he act,
therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. . fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and
caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code." 4
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. . defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:

... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of

Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which reads:
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Art. 2180. ... .
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. . Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, damages caused by their
Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the pupils and students and
Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on apprentices, so long as they
May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the death remain in their custody.
on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student,
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said
Institute. . In the opinion of the Court, this article of the
Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since
this contemplates the situation where the control
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant or influence of the teachers and heads of school
Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise establishments over the conduct and actions by
to his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
institute;1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the
defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the
deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES
student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical ART 2180. NEW CIVIL
Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it CODE CONSTRUED: —
was duly incorporated." The clause "so long as they
remain in their custody"
contained in Article 2180 of
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus the new civil code
narrated by the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and contemplated a situation
the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the where the pupil lives and
afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, boards with the teacher, such
together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the that the control or influence
laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes on the pupil supersedes those
were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working of the parents. In those
on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at circumstances the control or
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like influence over the conduct
a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on and actions of the pupil as
the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the well as the responsibilities for
face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc their sort would pass from the
retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him father and mother to the
and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block teachers. (Ciriaco L.
which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and Mercado, Petitioner vs. the
fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so Court of Appeals, Manuel
he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained Quisumbing, Jr., et al.,
consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the respondents, G.R. No. L-
testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident." 14862, May 30, 1960).5
 134

There is no evidence that the accused Daffon The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the
lived and boarded with his teacher or the other earlier case of Exconde vs. Capuno,8 where the only issue involved as
defendant officials of the school. These expressly stated in the decision, was whether the therein defendant-
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible father could be civilly liable for damages resulting from a death
for the tort of the defendant Daffon. caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and
negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved adversely
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows: against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that
"It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts
and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or
1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only
pay the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00 for the death of educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .
Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral
damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning 2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials
power, considering that the deceased was only and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of
between sixteen and seventeen years, and in good schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their
health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises.
attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action. . Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not
involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic
incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved is a
2. Absolving the other defendants. . non-academic school,9 the Manila Technical Institute being
admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for
lack of merit. The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head
and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for
factual findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review, the damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son
trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No
of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the
defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly
son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant.
meritorious. . While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly
defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and
ground that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been
expressly hold "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so,
trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody," are not plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly manifested and made
applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered
accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows] 6 lived and boarded owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a
with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school. These corporation and is not owned by any individual person."10
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon." 3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils
dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals,7 that "(I)t would seem that and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." 11 This is
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil
the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of Code.12 In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the
the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their
mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper
the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they
pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to
homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum had been take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody
made in rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his minor from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully
[which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible, rather or through negligence on their fellow students. .
than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged
against him for the physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. 4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his
[A cut on the right cheek with a piece of razor which costs only dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of
P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure, since the negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that
wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after all set aside the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the
by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases provided in exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child
Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
established, petitioner's son being only nine years old and not having parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while
been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the injuries under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed
on his classmate. . to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority
 135

and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." 1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton
The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as
of its school head and teachers under the same cited article. 14 heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death
of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants- expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss
school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal of this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C.
fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing defendants'
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated counterclaims. .
above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective and Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. .
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at Dizon, J., took no part. .
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta
in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. . clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that
the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in- should be limited to pupils who are minors (below the age of
charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally majority) is not in accord with the plain text of the law. Article 2180
liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: .
having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador
Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants demandable not only for one's own acts or
but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their one is responsible. .
students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other
parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of the mother, are responsible for the damages
Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the caused by the minor children who live in their
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light company. .
of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants
failed to prove such exemption from liability. .
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as their authority and live in their company. .
indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to
P12,000.00 as set by the Court in People vs. Pantoja,15 and observed
in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court, The owners and managers of an establishment or
in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
Philippine peso, had expressed its "considered opinion that the caused by their employees in the service of the
amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a branches in which the latter are employed or on
crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court thereby the occasion of their functions. .
adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which by their employees and household helpers acting
amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said though the former are not engaged in any
codal article. . business or industry. .

8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court The State is responsible in like manner when it
should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest acts through a special agent; but not when the
on the total damages awarded, besides increasing the award of damage has been caused by the official to whom
attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the discretion the task done properly pertains, in which case
of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse what is provided in article 2176 shall be
in the exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial applicable. .
court.16 Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231,
Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long
warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest
as they remain in their custody.
and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in
this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such finding. .
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to
that they observe all the diligence of a good
provide as follows: .
father of a family to prevent damages.
 136

Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility the school authorities, which is the basis of the latter's correlative
prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article responsibility for his torts, committed while under such authority. Of
expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and of the course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as when the student is a
guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to minor; but that circumstance can only affect the decree of the
similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is only a
persons enumerated in the article, it would have expressly so stated. factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant
The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as
not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it is not prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180. .
without significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly
establishments are not grouped with parents and guardians but ranged Barredo, J., concurs.
with owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as
to whom no reason is discernible to imply that they should answer
only for minors. .  

Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho  

Moderno", Volume 5, page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting the
split among commentators on the point it issue, observes with  
considerable cogency that —
Separate Opinions
272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de
las cuales se funds en argumentos merecedores  
de seria ponderacion, no es facil tomar un
partido. Esto no obstante, debiendo manisfestar
nuestra opinion, nos acercamos a la de los que no MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
estiman necesaria la menor edad del discipulo o
del aprendiz; porque si el aforismo ubi voluit I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart
dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, no es siempre argumento from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court of
seguro para interpreter la ley, es infalible cuanto Appeals, 108 Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they remain in
se refiere a una misma disposicion relative a their custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed
varios casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo que haya as referring to a "situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
establecido important poco si, elevandones a los teacher, such that the (latter's) control, direction and influence on the
principios de razon, puede dudarse de la pupil supersedes those of the parents." I think it is highly unrealistic
oportunidad de semajante diferencia; porque la and conducive to unjust results, considering the size of the enrollment
voluntad cierta del legislador prevalece in iure in many of our educational institutions, academic and non-academic,
condito a cualquier otra consideracion. Por otra as well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive activism of the
parte, si bien se considera, no puede parecer students, to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the
extrano o absurdo el suponer que un discipulo y schools directly liable for torts committed by them. When even the
un aprendiz, aunque mayores de edad, acepten school authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and
voluntariamente la entera vigilancia de su attacked, and unable to impose the traditional disciplinary measures
preceptor mientras dura la educacion. Ni parece formerly recognized as available to them, such as suspension or
dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los outright expulsion of the offending students, it flies in the face of
preceptores deben, al par de los padres, responder logic and reality to consider such students, merely from the fact of
civilmente de los daños comitidos por sus enrollment and class attendance, as "in the custody" of the teachers or
discipulos, aun cuando estos esten faltos de school heads within the meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter
discernimiento. liable unless they can prove that they have exercised "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article
Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, 2180, if applied as appellants construe it, would be bad law. It would
No. 635 (Spanish version), say that — demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering
teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond
their power to control. Present conditions being what they are, I
635. Personas de quien responde. — Si bien la believe the restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid provision
responsibilidad del maestro es originalmente una enunciated in Mercado should be maintained. .
estension de la de los padres (1), el art. 1384 no
especifica que los alumnos y aprendices han de
ser menores de edad, por lo que la presuncion de With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor
culpa funcionara aun cuando sean mayores (2); constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here,
pero, la vigilancia no tendra que ser ejercida en the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved,
iguales terminos. Aun respecto a los menores since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident."
variara segun la edad, extremo que tendra que This statement is of course in accordance with Article 2180, which
ternese en ceunta a los fines de apreciar si el says that "the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
maestro ha podido impedir el acto nocivo o no. . mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company." Note that for parental responsibility to
arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as
I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their stated also in the opinion of the majority, "the rationale of (the)
authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their
upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that
supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. A they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over
himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the conduct of the child," then it stands to reason that (1) the clause
 137

"so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who
teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and (2) that
live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their
just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors, so should teachers and school
children who are no longer minors, so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in
heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. I find no justification, either in the law itself
the same age category. I find no justification, either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a substitute parent liable where the
or in justice and equity, to make a substitute parent liable where the real parent would be free from liability. .
real parent would be free from liability. .
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

 
******************************************
 
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
 
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
Separate Opinions AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA,
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart vs.
from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court of HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN
Appeals, 108 Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they remain in JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO
their custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO
as referring to a "situation where the pupil lives and boards with the DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and
teacher, such that the (latter's) control, direction and influence on the MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru
pupil supersedes those of the parents." I think it is highly unrealistic his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
and conducive to unjust results, considering the size of the enrollment
in many of our educational institutions, academic and non-academic,
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
as well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive activism of the
students, to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the
schools directly liable for torts committed by them. When even the Padilla Law Office for respondents.
school authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and
attacked, and unable to impose the traditional disciplinary measures
formerly recognized as available to them, such as suspension or
outright expulsion of the offending students, it flies in the face of
logic and reality to consider such students, merely from the fact of CRUZ, J.:
enrollment and class attendance, as "in the custody" of the teachers or
school heads within the meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking
liable unless they can prove that they have exercised "all the forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high
2180, if applied as appellants construe it, would be bad law. It would school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972.
demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
their power to control. Present conditions being what they are, I auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
believe the restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid provision classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,
enunciated in Mercado should be maintained. . ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only
seventeen years old. 1
With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor
constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here, Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's
since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident." parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the
This statement is of course in accordance with Article 2180, which Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the
says that "the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
who live in their company." Note that for parental responsibility to parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After
arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining
stated also in the opinion of the majority, "the rationale of (the) defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00,
liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of
pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco attorney's fees .3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely
the conduct of the child," then it stands to reason that (1) the clause absolved .4
"so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to
 138

In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule, he
court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools
San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of
academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and
not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the not "teachers."
semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of
the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration.
necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5 A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the
Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice
Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself
shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and had also not been sued that the school was not liable because it was
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree. not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody
requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the
then under the custody of the private respondents. The private parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members
respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was
no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended. In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old
student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer — who was
petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which already of age — was not boarding in the school, the head thereof
they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The
of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on Court declared through Justice Teehankee:
April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from
Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as
making a report to the principal or taking any further action . 6 As (the students) remain in their custody" — means
Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the protective and supervisory custody that the
the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the school and its heads and teachers exercise over
same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son the pupils and students for as long as they are at
would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. attendance in the school, including recess time.
The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was There is nothing in the law that requires that for
the same firearm that killed Alfredo. such liability to attach, the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the the school, as erroneously held by the lower
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in
both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
part of this article reads as follows: deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including
their pupils and students or apprentices so long as Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting
they remain in their custody. opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the
provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and
subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado
the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed by
Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco
reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar. parentis.

In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes'
Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante another case wherein it may properly be raised."
was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In
the separate civil action flied against them, his father was held
solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article This is the case.
2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old
boy. Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and
29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein have
party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers
trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and
 139

trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and
custody." the head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come
to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of
is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the
and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word school were non-academic.
"apprentices."
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part: his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable
where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule
of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
trades and not to academic ones. What substantial teacher?
difference is there between them insofar as
concerns the proper supervision and vice over The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically
their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools
watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
the detriment of third Persons, so long as they are artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly
in a position to exercise authority and instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head
Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil even boarded with him and so came under his constant control,
Code, the words "arts and trades" does not supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
qualify "teachers" but only "heads of school was not as involved with his students and exercised only
establishments." The phrase is only an updated administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly
version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then
artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Codes. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of
the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent
exercise of their authority, it would seem clear increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
that where the parent places the child under the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision
not the parent, should be the one answerable for must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original
the torts committed while under his custody, for mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the
the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
interfere with the discipline of the school nor amendment.
with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction. And if there The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of
is no authority, there can be no responsibility. the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the
students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as
the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over petitioners themselves?
the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of
the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that
Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does
the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by not mean that the student must be boarding with the school
any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of
head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that
 140

such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held
start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
and in the case of graduating students, the period before the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school although
semester has not yet begun or has already ended. the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats
the parent more favorably than the teacher.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline
of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice
before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be
under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing
the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and
requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be
submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present
such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover,
of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be
observance of its rules. held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the
teacher in its employ.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises
in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically
friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he enforce those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of
is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180. may be committed by its students.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would
must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage
the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed
other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility
in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the
present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the
immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's
result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, influence, besides being coterminous with the period of custody is
the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was usually enforced only because of the students' desire to pass the
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child than the
authority could be validly exercised over him. teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the
teacher for the tort committed by the child.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this
article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the
school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for
school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then there
of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability should all the more be justification to require from the school
by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable
diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority
the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort age and so is no longer under the former's control, there is then all the
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for
had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained the acts of the student.
of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article
2180, which also states that: Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the
following conclusions:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the Persons herein mentioned prove 1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
that they observed all the diligence of a good custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
father of a family to prevent damages. notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is
 141

important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously G.R. No. 82465             February 25, 1991
observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS.
brought him in the custody of the school authorities. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA,
BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS,
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as vs.
previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH
authority over the student body and not the direct control and DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes CADIZ, respondents.
or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.
the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.
gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not
necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,
the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no

showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon PARAS, J.:
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations
of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals,
the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he the dispositive portion of which reads:
was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And
while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of
the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby
the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused affirmed, with the following modifications: (1) Exemplary
by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby awarded
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual damages of
due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in P30,000.00, moral damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's
maintaining that discipline. fees in the amount of P15,000.00 awarded to plaintiffs in
the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis High School,
represented by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of Lacandula, and Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held jointly
boys who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted and severally liable with defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one de Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment
of the students and returned the same later to him without taking to plaintiffs of the abovementioned actual damages, moral
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, and for
this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them,
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and together with their respective counterclaims, is hereby
returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son. ordered dismissed.

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join
other private respondents for none of them has been found to have a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan
been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody. Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice,
did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food
to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the
in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on
Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium
of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were
deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning.
under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was
grief, under the law they have invoked. recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought
to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel
General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil
Case No. 8834, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena
City, against the St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses
Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its
****************************************** principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie
 142

Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to
which respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly
old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that the death of their son invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C
was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's
drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation. Respondents-spouses assigned the following errors committed by the
trial court:
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against
petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and 1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St.
Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents Francis High School and its administrator/principal
the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for its approved
damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The co-curricular activities but also for those which they
court a quo reasoned: unreasonably failed to exercise control and supervision like
the holding of picnic in the dangerous water of Talaan
Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
Court believes that the defendant teachers namely: Connie
Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly Jaro, Nida 2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis
Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the High School and principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly and
diligence required of them by law under the circumstances solidarily liable with their co-defendants-teachers Rosario
to guard against the harm they had foreseen. (pp. Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo
2930, Rollo) in a picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last March
20, 1982.
x x x           x x x          x x x
3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and actual and moral damages for the untimely and tragic death
Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of plaintiffs-appellants
incident had already occurred, such fact does not and against all the defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)
cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be
said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to The Court of Appeals ruled:
safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.
The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old),
were easily attracted to the sea without aforethought of the
dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a
allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely school-sponsored activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid
fell short of the standard required by law under the that the same was held under the supervision of the teachers
circumstances. While the defendants-teachers admitted that employed by the said school, particularly the teacher in
some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are deep, charge of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged, and
the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even those whom she invited to help her in supervising the class
actually go to the water to test the depth of the particular during the picnic. Considering that the court a quo found
area where the children would swim. And indeed the fears negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers who,
of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was as such, were charged with the supervision of the children
confirmed by the fact that three persons during the picnic during the picnic, the St. Francis High School and the
got drowned at the same time. Had the defendant teachers school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article
made an actual and physical observation of the water 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of
before they allowed the students to swim, they could have Article 2180 of the Civil Code. They cannot escape liability
found out that the area where the children were swimming on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an "extra-
was indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers curricular activity of the St. Francis High School." We find
who according to the female teachers were there to from the evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants,
supervise the children to ensure their safety were not even the school principal had knowledge of the picnic even from
at the area where the children were swimming. They were its planning stage and had even been invited to attend the
somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness they affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against
were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo) undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any
precautionary measures to be adopted during the picnic. At
the least, We must find that the school and the responsible
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. school officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin
Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the Illumin, had acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.
court a quo:
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find defendant school principal must be found jointly and
sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a school severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the
sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has been shown to damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of
hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna their son. It is the rule that in cases where the above-cited
responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together provisions find application, the negligence of the
with the other defendant teachers. It has been sufficiently employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a
shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or
the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand,
 143

manager of the establishment (in the present case, St. While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly
Francis High School and its principal); and while this Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site,
presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only the drowning incident had already occurred, such
by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or fact does not and cannot excuse them from their
manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming
of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard
employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in the students.
this case, the defendants-teachers). The record does not
disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the The evidence shows that these two defendants had
aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to the
School and its principal from liability under the above-cited picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the entrance
provisions. examination being conducted by the school which is part of
their duty as teachers thereof. Since they were not at the
As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs- picnic site during the occurrence in question, it cannot be
appellants, while We cannot but commiserate with the said that they had any participation in the negligence
plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the untimely attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to
death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their exercise diligence in the supervision of the children during
suffering as parents, especially the victim's mother who, the picnic and which failure resulted in the drowning of
according to appellants, suffered a nervous breakdown as a plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or
result of the tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed by the omission to the two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida
court a quo as actual damages and moral damages Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury caused to
(P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable the plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting
and are those which are sustained by the evidence and the from his drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be
law. absolved from any liability.

However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-
in the amount of P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is appellants, We agree with the court a quo that the
hereby, imposed in the present case by way of example of counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-
correction for the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of 60, Rollo)
the Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors
committed by the trial court: The issues presented by petitioners are:

1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the
Chavez, Luisito Vinas, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and defendants which will warrant the award of damages to the
Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and severally plaintiffs;
liable for damages such finding not being supported by
facts and evidence.
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the
New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar;
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the
defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)
C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral
damages is proper under the circumstances surrounding the
On this score, respondent Court ruled: case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)

The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the
plaintiffs, the parents of the victim Ferdinand Castillo, were petition and required the parties to submit their respective
not able to prove by their evidence that they did not give memoranda.
their son consent to join the picnic in question. However,
We agree with the trial court in its finding that whether or
not the victim's parents had given such permission to their The petition is impressed with merit.
son was immaterial to the determination of the existence of
liability on the part of the defendants for the damage If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their
incurred by the plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death own negligence or the negligence of people under them. In the instant
of their son. What is material to such a determination is case however, as will be shown hereunder, petitioners are neither
whether or not there was negligence on the part of guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those
defendants vis-a-vis the supervision of the victim's group under them.
during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the trial court,
an affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence.
established by the evidence, as already pointed out. Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.

However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of
of the defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.
are concerned. As to them, the trial court found:

Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores

 144

Q Now, when your son asked you for money to A I have interviewed several persons and the
buy food, did you not ask him where he will patient herself She even felt guilty about the
bring this? death of her son because she cooked adobo for
him so he could join the excursion where her son
A I asked him where he was going, he answered, died of drowning.
I am going to the picnic, and when I asked him
where, he did not answer, sir. Q Why were you able to say she was feeling
guilty because she was the one who personally
Q And after giving the money, you did not tell cooked the adobo for her son?
him anything more?
A It was during the interview that I had gathered
A No more, sir. it from the patient herself. She was very sorry had
she not allowed her son to join the excursion her
son would have not drowned. I don't know if she
Q And after that you just learned that your son actually permitted her son although she said she
join the picnic? cooked adobo so he could join. (Emphasis
Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984,
A Yes, sir. Dr. Lazaro — witness).

Q And you came to know of it after the news that Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article
your son was drowned in the picnic came to you, 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the
is that correct? death of respondent's son.

A Yes, sir. Article 2180, par. 4 states that:

Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
o'clock noon of March 20, 1982, you did not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
know that your son join the picnic? persons for whom one is responsible.

A No, sir, I did not know. x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Did you not look for your son during that time? Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
was not able, sir. engaged in any business or industry.

Q You did not ask your wife? Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held
liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee
A I did not, sir. was in the performance of his assigned tasks.

Q And neither did your wife tell you that your In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual
son join the picnic? performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not
within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly
A Later on after 12:00, sir. while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a
picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while
some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were
Q And during that time you were too busy that
having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the
you did not inquire whether your son have joined
school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is
that picnic?
not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-
curricular activity.
A Yes, sir.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the
Romulo Castillo) students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither
even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent for is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings
his son to join the same. Furthermore. of respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed
to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the
misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:
he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.

Q How did you conduct this mental and physical

Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers
examination?
to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses.
 145

Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the
Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good pressure of your body on the body of Ferdinand
father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all Castillo?
the students who joined the picnic.
A Yes, sir.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito
Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have Q Will you please describe how you applied a
knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even single act of back to back pressure?
respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants
(petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the
defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also A This has been done by placing the boy lay first
show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly downwards, then the face was a little bit facing
possible to save the child. right and doing it by massaging the back of the
child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30,
1984)
Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand
Castillo, you approached the boy and claim also
having applied first aid on him? ATTY. FLORES:

A Yes, sir. Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial

respiration to the child?
Q And while you were applying the so called first
aid, the children were covering you up or were A Myself, sir.
surrounding you?
Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?
A Yes, sir.
A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr.
Q You were rattled at that time, is it not? Luisito Vinas, was I applied back to back
pressure and took notice of the condition of the
child. We placed the feet in a higher position, that
A No, sir. of the head of the child, sir.

Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful Q After you have placed the boy in that particular
condition? position, where the feet were on a higher level
than that of the head, what did you do next?
A Yes, sir.
A The first thing that we did, particularly myself,
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer was that after putting the child in that position, I
responding to your application of first aid? applied the back to back pressure and started to
massage from the waistline up, but I noticed that
A Yes, sir. the boy was not responding, sir.

Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" Q For how long did you apply this back to back
in the process of your application of the first aid pressure on the boy?
on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
A No, sir, because we were attending to the
application of first aid that we were doing, sir. Q What about Mr. Vinas?

Q After you have applied back to back pressure A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds,
and which you claimed the boy did not respond, sir.
were you not disturb anyway?
Q After you noticed that the boy was not
A I was disturbed during that time, sir. responding, what did you do?

Q For how many minutes have you applied the A When we noticed that the boy was not
back to back pressure? responding, we changed the position of the boy
by placing the child facing upwards laying on the
A From 9 to 11 times, sir. sand then we applied the mouth to mouth
resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)
 146

With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and adopted by
awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not reference by the respondent Court, are:
fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.
... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, institution ... [However], it is also an institution of arts and trade. It
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched has so advertised itself, as its own evidence shows. Its brochure (Exh.
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social 2) shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of offer Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses...
if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful these courses divest BCF of the nature or character of being purely or
act or omission. exclusively an academic institution. 3

Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio
guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit,
assessed against them. which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. 4 The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), pursuant to Department
their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of Education and
were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence Culture, 5 is provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at
of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But the basement of its main building. 6
in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as
exemplary damages becomes baseless. its duly appointed armorer. 7 As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy
B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, 8 as
November 19, 1987, finding petitioners herein guilty of negligence well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of
and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent
respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee
herein are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing (officer) of the AFP. 9 Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student
their counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED. of the BCF. 10

SO ORDERED. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF,
Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of
Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the
armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. 11 As a result, Napoleon Castro
died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the
****************************************** crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. 12

G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988 Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages,
impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF),
FOUNDATION, petitioners, Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D.
vs. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing
and RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents. defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges
Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as
heirs of Napoleon Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon
Edilberto B. Tenefrancia for petitioners. Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity
of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as
Leonardo L. Cocjin Jr. for respondents. actual damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs; (2)
absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit. 13 On appeal by petitioners, the
respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial
Court. The modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of
PADILLA, J.: earning capacity of the deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by
way of temperate damages, and increasing the indemnity for the
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal death of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
of the
decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 7 Hence, this petition.
December 1984, in AC-G.R. No. CV 69876, in so far as it affirmed
the decision 2 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (hereinafter
referred to as the Trial Court), which held, among others, petitioners The central issue in this case is whether or not petitioners can be held
solidarily hable with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180
Code. of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B.
Abon.
 147

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for so far as it holds petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long his tortious act in the killing of Napoleon Castro. No costs.
as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that
so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter SO ORDERED.
"stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]
called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long
as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers ******************************************
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time." 15 G.R. No. 182353               June 29, 2010

In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was stin in the ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI,
protective and supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO, Petitioners,
Foundation when he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court vs.
ruled that: JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S.
MIRANDA, Respondent.
it is true that Abon was not attending any class or
school function at the time of the shooting DECISION
incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the
evening; but considering that Abon was
employed as an armorer and property custodian NACHURA, J.:
of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and therefore that hour in This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
the evening was just about dismissal time for him Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367,
or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke (RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-95-22889.
of and envisioned by the Palisoc case,
supra. 16 (Emphasis supplied) The facts, as found by the CA, follow:

In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St.
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is Joseph College’s [SJC’s] premises, the class to which [respondent
embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to [petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and
leave the school premises, or the area within which the school employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jayson’s] class is x x x
activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include Estefania Abdan.
dismissal. 18 Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without
school, as contemplated in the law. having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or
occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The
cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it
the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the compound
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit
held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from [Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his
his acts. group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically
burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery
Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the
B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. lower court, [Jayson’s] wound had not completely healed and still
Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well had to undergo another surgery.
guarded." 19 Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was
under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
the petitioners are sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows [Jayson’s] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home
that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with for which she spent ₱36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her
definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount
when he shot Napoleon Castro. of at least ₱40,000.00.

Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental
Code, a school which offers both academic and technical/vocational anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to
courses cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student [petitioners’] fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and
enrolled only in its academic program; however, considering that diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be
Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot held liable for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to
Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such [petitioners] for the payment of his medical expenses as well as other
other issue. 20 expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence,
 148

[Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages. 2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of ₱50,000.00 as mitigated
[Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for moral damages;
litigation expenses, including attorney’s fees.
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of ₱30,000.00 as reasonable
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, attorney’s fees;
and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the
school year 1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30 in the 4. To pay the costs of suit.
afternoon, the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was conducting a
science experiment under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo,
the class science teacher, about fusion of sulphur powder and iron SO ORDERED.4
fillings by combining these elements in a test tube and heating the
same. Before the science experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously
classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:
procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until
the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the
sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of understanding RTC of Quezon City, Branch 221 dated September 6, 2000 is hereby
the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against [petitioners].51avvphi1
waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the
written procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained by
the teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to this Court, adamant
and looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the that the CA grievously erred, thus:
test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson’s] eyes.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSON’S
thereafter transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center for treatment. At INJURY WAS HIS OWN ACT OF LOOKING AT THE HEATED
the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and TEST TUBE BEFORE THE COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN
apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look COMPLETE DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR
into the test tube until the compound had cooled off. TO THE EXPERIMENT.

After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT,
an eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected. IN LIGHT OF THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ST. MARY’S
In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in COLLEGE V. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, x x x JAYSON’S
[Jayson’s] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson’s] father, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING INTO THE TEST
requested SJC to advance the amount of ₱26,176.35 representing TUBE WAS IN FACT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS
[Jayson’s] hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and INJURY FOR WHICH THE PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE
pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request. HELD LIABLE.

On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE
medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science
experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].
school cannot accede to the demand because "the accident occurred
by reason of [Jayson’s] failure to comply with the written procedure
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
for the experiment and his teacher’s repeated warnings and
AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TO
instruction that no student must face, much less look into, the
[JAYSON].
opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled. 3

VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING

Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson’s father, on
THE PETITIONERS’ COUNTERCLAIM.6
Jayson’s behalf, sued petitioners for damages.

We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
courts that petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise
the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in prevent or avoid injuries to the students."
favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. This Court orders and
holds the [petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay [Jayson]
Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court,
the following amount:
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the
highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of ₱77,338.25 as actual parties.7 A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted
damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered to reimburse except for highly meritorious circumstances when: (1) the findings of
[petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount of ₱26,176.36 a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
representing the advances given to pay [Jayson’s] initial conjectures; (2) a lower court’s inference from its factual findings is
hospital expenses or in the alternative to deduct said manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
amount of ₱26,176.36 from the ₱77,338.25 actual damages discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate
herein awarded by way of legal compensation; court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain
 149

relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different [petitioners] were under her direct control and supervision. The
conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of negligent acts of the other individual [petitioners] were done within
fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on the scope of their assigned tasks.
which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are
contradicted by evidence on record. 8 None of the foregoing xxxx
exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision
obtains in this instance.
"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by
[petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in
was his own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by the supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening
Tabugo prior to the experiment and peeking into the test tube. process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been
Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Mary’s Academy v. a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous
Carpitanos9 which absolved St. Mary’s Academy from liability for experiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of
the untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned activity, the teachers and employees because it had full information on the
declaring that "the negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative
only a remote cause of the accident." steps to avert damage and injury to students. The fact that there has
never been any accident in the past during the conduct of science
We are not convinced. experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving
the status quo and do away with creative foresight to install safety
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the lower courts’ conclusions are measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install
borne out by the records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More
that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to
injury to Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The assailed
Decision of the CA quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus: "Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or
university itself, although an educational institution may be held
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of liable under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also
[Jayson] was the proximate cause of the latter’s injury. We find that been held that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or
the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and
[Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test tube when the immediate and not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior
chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden recourse against the negligent employee."10
and unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any
intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the
they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The findings of the RTC, which the CA affirmed.
court a quo correctly ruled that:
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo
"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for specifically instructed her students, including Jayson, at the start of
negligence because all of them are responsible for exercising the the experiment, not to look into the heated test tube before the
required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent compound had cooled off. Petitioners would allocate all liability and
or avoid injuries to the students. The individual [petitioners] are place all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student,
persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their students as herein respondent Jayson.
well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the
facts presented before this Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in We disagree.
their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected
of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the
classroom when the class undertook the science experiment although As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s
[Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the
evidence, however, was presented to establish that [petitioner] foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the
experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the
[Jayson] was brought to the school clinic for immediate treatment not school, its administrators and teachers.
by [petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody
else. The Court is inclined to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the
Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the accident Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the following
happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of the other students persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
(who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court to
corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court, however, Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
understands that these other students cannot testify for [Jayson] individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have
because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school and testifying special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
for [Jayson] would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge
because she exercised control and supervision over [petitioner]
Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
that nothing would go wrong and that the science experiment would whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students. institution.
[Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the
doctrine of command responsibility because the other individual
 150

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in
whom one is responsible. exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its
administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause
xxxx of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary’s,
"for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy] to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, have a causal connection to the accident." 12
so long as they remain in their custody.
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to
Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of disturb the lower courts’ identical rulings thereon:
care and caution is demonstrated by the following:
As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jayson’s] injury was the
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert explosion of the heated compound independent of any efficient
damage and injury to its students although it had full intervening cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo
information on the nature of dangerous science experiments in not making sure that the science experiment was correctly
conducted by the students during class; conducted was the proximate cause or reason why the heated
compound exploded and injured not only [Jayson] but his classmates
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to as well. However, [Jayson] is partly responsible for his own injury,
protect the students who conduct experiments in class; hence, he should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
likewise bear the consequences of his own negligence. [Petitioners],
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and therefore, should be held liable only for the damages actually caused
devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from by their negligence.13
expected risks and dangers; and
Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the courts’ award of actual and moral damages, and grant of attorney’s
whole time her class conducted the experiment, fees. The denial of petitioners’ counterclaim is also in order.
specifically, when the accident involving Jayson occurred.
In any event, the size of the class—fifty (50) students— WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor. of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and
liability by insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions SO ORDERED.
to her science class not to look directly into the heated compound.
Neither does our ruling in St. Mary’s preclude their liability in this
case.
******************************************
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Mary’s is not in point. In that case,
respondents thereat admitted the documentary exhibits establishing THE STATE:
that the cause of the accident was a mechanical defect and not the
recklessness of the minor, James Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We
held, thus: G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school FONTANILLA, petitioners,
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. x x x. vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He
was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,
drive the jeep at the time of the accident. vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of FONTANILLA, appellees.
the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.
The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.
intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.11

In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the
mishap which happened during the science experiment was PARAS, J.:
 151

In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the Petitioners allege:
affirmance of the decision dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and its 1. The award of moral damages is specifically
modification with respect to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral allowable. under paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. the New Civil Code which provides that the
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration and ascendants of the deceased may demand
seeks the reversal of the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
original appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals was certified the death of the deceased. Should moral damages
to this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed be granted, the award should be made to each of
with the aforecited number. And in the resolution of April 3, this case petitioners-spouses individually and in varying
was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963. amounts depending upon proof of mental and
depth of intensity of the same, which should not
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.
owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation
Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then 2. The decision of the trial court had made an
driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its impression that respondent National Irrigation
regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son Administration acted with gross negligence
of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City because of the accident and the subsequent
along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco failure of the National Irrigation Administration
Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San personnel including the driver to stop in order to
Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later give assistance to the, victims. Thus, by reason of
transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners
become entitled to exemplary damages under
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed
professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular 3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of
driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral attorney's fees, the amount of which (20%) had
examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by been sufficiently established in the hearing of
National Irrigation Administration authorities. May 23, 1979.

The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. 4. This petition has been filed only for the
SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against purpose of reviewing the findings of the lower
respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva court upon which the disallowance of moral
Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
the death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident. was based and not for the purpose of disturbing
the other findings of fact and conclusions of law.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980
which directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent
damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The National Irrigation Administration, contends thus:
dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:
1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in
. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the view of the appeal taken by respondent National
defendant National Irrigation Administration to Irrigation Administration to the Court of Appeals
pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for against the judgment sought to be reviewed. The
the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 focal issue raised in respondent's appeal to the
which the parents of the deceased had spent for Court of Appeals involves the question as to
the hospitalization and burial of the deceased whether or not the driver of the vehicle that
Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs. (Brief bumped the victims was negligent in his
for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, operation of said vehicle. It thus becomes
p. 132) necessary that before petitioners' claim for moral
and exemplary damages could be resolved, there
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, should first be a finding of negligence on the part
1980, its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which of respondent's employee-driver. In this regard,
respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court
Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision does not categorically contain such
decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 67237- R) where it finding.
filed its brief for appellant in support of its position.
2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals Motion For Leave to File Plaintiff-Appellee's
case, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court. Brief" dated December 28, 1981 by petitioners in
the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R.
No.61045) of the respondent National Irrigation
The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the Administration before the Court of Appeals, is an
award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is explicit admission of said petitioners that the
legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict herein petition, is not proper. Inconsistent
which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners. procedures are manifest because while petitioners
 152

question the findings of fact in the Court of the task done properly pertains, in which case
Appeals, they present only the questions of law what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
before this Court which posture confirms their
admission of the facts. The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is
whether or not negligence caused the vehicular liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.
accident involves a question of fact which
petitioners should have brought to the Court of
Appeals within the reglementary period. Hence, 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it
the decision of the trial court has become final as engages in private enterprises) where it becomes
to the petitioners and for this reason alone, the liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil
petition should be dismissed. Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986
Ed. ).
4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction,
sound discretion and in conformity with the law. In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the
damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to
moral and exemplary damages by reason of the Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has
shock and subsequent illness they suffered voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents.
because of the death of their son. Respondent The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially
National Irrigation Administration, however, commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be
avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's
because it is an agency of the State performing agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-
governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an
was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort.
agent who was performing a job or act foreign to Where the government commissions a private individual for a special
his usual duties. Hence, the liability for the governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the
tortious act should. not be borne by respondent meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984
government agency but by driver Garcia who Ed.)
should answer for the consequences of his act.
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the
6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental"
laxity of respondent National Irrigation in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the
Administration in exercising due diligence in the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private
selection and supervision of its employee, the corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the
matter of due diligence is not an issue in this case function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be
since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
regular driver of the vehicle.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the
The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of
to an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees can Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act provides:
very well be answered with the application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of
theNew Civil Code. Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body
corporate is hereby created which shall be known
Art. 2176 thus provides: as the National Irrigation Administration,
hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall
be organized immediately after the approval of
Whoever by act omission causes damage to this Act. It shall have its principal seat of
another, there being fault or negligence, is business in the City of Manila and shall have
obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or representatives in all provinces for the proper
negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual conduct of its business.
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary
functions. Thus-
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall
have the following powers and objectives:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the (a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry. (b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

The State is responsible in like manner when it (c) To collect from the users of each irrigation
acts through a special agent.; but not when the system constructed by it such fees as may be
damage has been caused by the official to whom
 153

necessary to finance the continuous operation of Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove
the system and reimburse within a certain period the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not
not less than twenty-five years cost of been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the
construction thereof; and wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer
would still be liable. (Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all
such business as are directly or indirectly Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-
necessary, incidental or conducive to the 26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver
attainment of the above objectives. should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be
using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical reasons and objects in the line to be traversed constitutes negligence.
personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a
corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay
becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of
the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial
assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages;
becomes answerable for damages. P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the
total award.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the
existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The SO ORDERED.
negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
******************************************
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent
NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has
G.R. No. 45985 May 18, 1990
been established that respondent is a government agency performing
proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an
ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible CHINA AIR LINES, LTD., petitioner,
for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to vs.
observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PAGSIBIGAN, PHILIPPINE
the driver. AIR LINES, INC. and ROBERTO ESPIRITU, respondents.

It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a G.R. No. 46036 May 18, 1990
result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50
meters away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. and ROBERTO
thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the ESPIRITU, petitioners,
edge of the cemented portion of the road." (Emphasis supplied,) vs.
[page 26, Rollo] COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PAGSIBIGAN and CHINA AIR
LINES, LTD., respondents.
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in
contact with a person causes force and impact upon the vehicle that Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioner China Air Lines, Ltd.
anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the
impact was so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioners in G.R. No.
dents on the right side of the radiator guard, the hood, the fender and
46036.
a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation report (Exhibit
"E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo]
Syquia Law Offices for Jose Pagsibigan.
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the
Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an
urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters
away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver REGALADO, J.:
Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that
the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-
described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to These consolidated petitions seek the review of the decision of
reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 53023-R entitled "Jose E.
stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their Pagsibigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and
normal and initial reaction. Roberto Espiritu, Defendants-Appellants; China Air Lines, Ltd.,
Defendant-Appellee," 1 the dispositive portion of which declares:

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for

the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city WHEREFORE, except for a modification of the
limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to judgment in the sense that the award of
caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed P20,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff shall be in the
limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further concept of nominal damages instead of
aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even exemplary damages, and that defendant China
checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object Air Lines, Ltd. shall likewise be liable with its
it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of two co-defendants in a joint and solidary
both the driver and the supervisor in the group. capacity, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in all other respects, without costs. 2
 154

The challenged decision of respondent court contains a synthesis of Espiritu in the ticket was furnished and
the facts that spawned these cases and the judgment of the court a confirmed by the reservation office of defendant
quo which it affirmed with modifications, thus: China Air Lines. It further averred that CAL had
not informed PAL's Manila Hotel Branch of the
On June 4, 1968, plaintiff Jose E. Pagsibigan, revised schedule of its flight, nor provided it with
then Vice-President and General Manager of revised timetable; that when the travel agency
Rentokil (Phils.) Inc., a local firm dealing in sought to purchase the ticket for the plaintiff on
insecticides, pesticides and related services CAL CI Flight No. 812 for June 10, 1968,
appurtenant thereto, purchased a plane ticket for a Espiritu who was then the ticketing clerk on duty,
Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight from the checked with the reservation office of CAL on
Transaire Travel Agency. The said agency, the availability of space, the date and the time of
through its Cecille Baron, contacted the Manila said flight; that CAL's Dory Chan informed
Hotel branch of defendant Philippine Air Lines Espiritu that the departure time of Flight No. 812
which at that time was a sales and ticketing agent on June 10, 1968 was at 5:20 in the afternoon of
of defendant China Air lines. On June 6, 1968, said date. PAL asserted a cross-claim against
PAL, through its ticketing clerk defendant CAL for attorney's fees and for reimbursement of
Roberto Espiritu, cut and issued PAL Ticket No. whatever amount the court may adjudge PAL to
01 7991 for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila be liable to the plaintiff. Defendant Espiritu
flight. According to the plane ticket, the plaintiff adopted the defenses of his co-defendant PAL.
was booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812 to depart
from Manila for Taipei on June 10, 1968 at 17:20 Defendant China Air Lines, for its part, disclaims
hours (5:20 p.m.), Exhibit A. liability for the negligence and incompetence of
the employees of PAL. It avers that it had revised
On June 10, 1968, one hour before the scheduled its schedule since April 1, 1968, the same to be
time of the flight as stated in his ticket, the effective on April 20, 1968, and the said revised
plaintiff arrived at the airport to check in for CI schedule was adopted only after proper petition
Flight No. 812. Upon arriving at the airport, the with and approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board
plaintiff was informed that the plane he was of which all airlines, including defendant PAL,
supposed to take for Taipei had left at 10:20 in were notified; that both printed copies of the
the morning of that day. The PAL employees at international timetable and of the mimeographed
the airport made appropriate arrangements for the notices of the official schedule and flight
plaintiff to take PAL's flight to Taipei the departure schedules were distributed to all its
following day, June 11, 1968. The plaintiff took sales agents, including PAL, that after the
said flight and arrived in Taipei around noontime effectivity of the new time schedules, PAL's
of the said date. Manila Hotel office had been issuing and selling
tickets based on the revised time schedule; and
that, assuming that the plaintiff is entitled to
On July 8, 1968, the plaintiff, through counsel, recover damages, the liability is on PAL and not
made formal demand on defendant PAL, for on CAL. A cross-claim was likewise asserted by
moral damages in not less than P125,000.00 for CAL against its co-defendant PAL.
what the plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of
his failure to take the flight as stated in his plane
ticket. (Exhibit E) After a series of negotiations After due trial, the Court a quo rendered
among the plaintiff, PAL and CAL failed to reach judgment laying the blame for the erroneous
an amicable settlement, the plaintiff instituted entry in the ticket as to the time of departure to
this action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal defendant Roberto Espiritu, ticketing agent of
on September 22, 1969. In his complaint, plaintiff defendant PAL, and that no employee of CAL
prays for the recovery of P125,000.00 as moral contributed to such erroneous entry. It was
damages and P25,000.00 for and as attorney's further ruled that the plaintiff had no reason to
fees. The moral damages allegedly arose from the claim moral damages but may be entitled to
gross negligence of defendant Roberto Espiritu in recover exemplary damages. The dispositive
stating on the plane ticket that the time of portion of the decision makes the following
departure was 17:20 hours, instead of 10:20 hours adjudication:
which was the correct time of departure in the
revised summer schedule of CAL. Plaintiff WHEREFORE, premises
claims that by reason of his failure to take the considered, judgment is
plane, he suffered besmirched reputation, hereby rendered sentencing
embarrassment, mental anguish, wounded the defendants Philippine Air
feelings and sleepless nights, inasmuch as when Lines, Inc. and Roberto
he went to the airport, he was accompanied by his Espiritu, to pay to plaintiff
business associates, close friends and relatives. Jose Pagsibigan jointly and
He further averred that his trip to Taipei was for severally, by way of
the purpose of conferring with a certain Peng exemplary damages, the sum
Siong Lim, President of the Union Taiwan of Twenty Thousand Pesos
Chemical Corporation, scheduled at 9:00 a.m. on (P20,000.00) plus Two
June 11, 1968. Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
as reimbursement for
Defendant Philippine Air Lines alleged in its attorney's fees and the costs.
answer that the departure time indicated by
 155

The complaint is dismissed A similar principle is recognized in our Civil

with respect to the defendant Code in its Art. 2180 . . . . Unlike in the doctrine
China Air Lines, Ltd. The of respondeat superior, however, the Civil Code
cross-claim filed by permits the employer to escape this liability upon
defendant PAL and Espiritu proof of having observed all the diligence of a
against defendant CAL as good father of a family to prevent the
well as the cross-claim filed damage. We find the evidence of
by the defendant CAL against defendant CAL to be insufficient to overcome the
defendant PAL and Espiritu presumption of negligence on its part for the act
are also hereby dismissed. 3 done by defendant Roberto Espiritu. (Emphasis
supplied)
From said decision of the court below, all the parties, except China
Air Lines, Ltd. appealed to respondent court which, however, The liability for the damage sustained by the
sustained the ruling of the trial court denying Pagsibigan's claim for plaintiff should, therefore, be borne by all of the
moral damages. It concluded that Roberto Espiritu did not act with defendants in a joint and solidary capacity (Art.
malice or in bad faith in making a wrong entry of the time of 2194). The liability of an employer under Art.
departure on the ticket, and that the mistake committed by Espiritu 2180 is primary and direct. . . .
appears to be an honest one done in good faith.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent court also ruled out the claim for exemplary damages for
lack of legal basis. Nonetheless, as earlier noted, it awarded It appearing that defendant CAL, as employer or
Pagsibigan P20,000.00 as nominal damages, under Article 2221 of principal, did not contribute to the negligence
the Civil Code, for the vindication of a legal wrong committed committed by defendants PAL and Roberto
against him. As regards the liability of the parties, respondent court Espiritu, its liability to the plaintiff could be
held: passed on to said defendants. Defendant CAL,
however, did not take an appeal and did not,
There can be little question as to the liability of therefore, take exception to the dismissal of its
PAL and Espiritu for the damage caused to the cross-claim against defendants PAL and Espiritu.
plaintiff due to the erroneous entry in the plane This serves as an obstacle for a rendition of
ticket made by the latter. They seek to justify the judgment favorable to CAL on its said
erroneous statement as to the time of departure on counterclaim. 4
the ground that such was the time given by Dory
Chan to Espiritu when the latter called up for the In its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. L-45985,
reservation in favor of plaintiff. Aside from the petitioner China Air Lines, Ltd. (CAL) relied on the following
fact that Dory Chan had vigorously disclaimed grounds:
having given such information to Espiritu, We
are convinced that, as the trial court had found,
CAL had no share in the error committed by 1. A principal cannot be held liable, much less
Espiritu in indicating the time of departure of solidarily, for the negligence of the sub-agent,
Flight No. 812. PAL had shown through the where the former never participated in, ratified or
testimony of Carmen Ibazeta Gallaga, ticket authorized the latter's act or omission.
representative of PAL at the Manila Hotel Office,
that they received circulars and timetables of 2. Dismissal of the cross-claim of petitioner
airlines in the PAL main office. It further appears against the private respondents Philippine Air
that on two occasions, defendant PAL cut and Lines, Inc. and Roberto Espiritu will not prevent
issued tickets for CAL based on the new schedule the release of the petitioner from liability to the
even before June 10, 1968. As a matter of fact, private respondent Pagsibigan.
the other entries of time departures in the ticket
issued to the plaintiff are in accordance with the 3. The award of damages was unwarranted both
revised schedule, and that the only error therein legally and factually. 5
was with respect to the departure from Manila on
June 10, 1968.
On their part, petitioners Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL) and
Roberto Espiritu made the following submissions in G.R. No. L-
However, in proving that the fault lied with 46036, to wit:
Espiritu, defendant CAL derives no solace nor
gains an advantage. It may not claim exemption
from liability by reason thereof. Espiritu was an 1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
employee of PAL and whatever negligence was holding that respondent China Air Lines, Ltd.,
committed by him is attributable to PAL. It is an being the principal, is solely liable to respondent
admitted fact that PAL is an authorized agent of Pagsibigan.
CAL. In this relationship, the responsibility of
defendant PAL for the tortious act of its agent or 2. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in
representative is inescapable. . . . awarding respondent Pagsibigan the sum of
P20,000.00 as nominal damages. 6
xxx xxx xxx
In G.R. No. L-45985, respondent Pagsibigan contends, by way of
refutation, that CAL's liability is based on breach of contract of
 156

transportation which was the proximate result of the negligence 13. That as a direct result of culpable
and/or error committed by PAL and Espiritu; that even assuming that incompetence and negligence of defendant
CAL has no share in the negligence of PAL and Espiritu, the liability Roberto Espiritu as sales representative of
of CAL does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence defendant PAL, plaintiff was unable to attend to
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its previously scheduled business commitments in
employees. Traversing such contentions, CAL argues that it can not Taipei . . . resulting in direct and indirect
be made liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the prejudice to plaintiff that has yet to be fully
absence of employer-employee relationship between it and PAL. assessed; (Emphasis supplied) 7

On the other hand, in G.R. No. L-46036, respondent Pagsibigan xxx xxx xxx
claims that PAL is liable under Article 1909 of the said code which
holds an agent responsible not only for fraud but also for negligence Had the intention of respondent Pagsibigan been to maintain an
which shall be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according action based on breach of contract of carriage, he could have sued
to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation. PAL, CAL alone considering that PAL is not a real party to the contract.
however, maintains that for lack of privity with Pagsibigan, the suit Moreover, in cases of such nature, the aggrieved party does not have
for breach of contract should have been directed against CAL. to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All he
has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-
What surfaces as a procedural maneuver taken by respondent performance by the carrier. 8
Pagsibigan in the course of the proceedings in these cases has
confused the real issues in the controversy subject of both petitions The records disclose that the trial court delved much into the issues of
before us. who was at fault, and its decision is primarily anchored on its factual
findings regarding the civil liability arising from culpa aquiliana of
Respondent Pagsibigan has opted to seek redress by pursuing two the erring party, to this effect:
remedies at the same time, that is, to enforce the civil liability of
CAL for breach of contract and, likewise, to recover from PAL and Plaintiff said that the erroneous entry in his ticket
Espiritu for tort or culpa aquiliana. What he has overlooked is the which made it appear that his CAL flight of June
proscription against double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil 10, 1968 was to be at 5:20 in the afternoon was
Code which, while not preventing recourse to any appropriate due to the fault or negligence of PAL's Roberto
remedy, prevents double relief for a single wrong. Espiritu, a co-defendant herein, as well as the
employees of the defendant CAL. In making
To avoid inequitable effects under such confluence of remedies, the CAL co-responsible, plaintiff appears to rely on
true nature of the action instituted by respondent Pagsibigan must be the doctrine that the principal is responsible for
determined. A careful perusal of the complaint of respondent the act of an agent done within the scope of the
Pagsibigan will readily disclose that the allegations thereof clearly agency.
and unmistakably make out a case for a quasi-delict in this wise:
There is no proof extant that any of the
4. That at all pertinent times particularly in June employees of PAL had contributed to the
of 1968, defendant China Air Lines Ltd. has been erroneous entry in plaintiffs PAL ticket for Taipei
operating regular scheduled flights to and from which placed his time of departure to 5:20
Manila, and has offered accommodations thereon o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 1968. Only
through, among others, defendant PAL as its defendant Roberto Espiritu appears to be solely
authorized sales agent and/or ticketing agent, and exclusively responsible for such error and
such that China Airlines Ltd. is here impleaded as therefor the conclusion becomes inevitable that
being the principal of defendant PAL; CAL must be absolved from any blame because
defendant Roberto Espiritu who committed the
5. That at all pertinent times, particularly in June error is not an employee or agent of the defendant
of 1968, defendant Roberto Espiritu has been in CAL. 9
the employ of defendant PAL at its sales counter
at the PAL Manila Hotel branch office and is It, therefore, becomes evident that respondent Pagsibigan, having
here impleaded as defendant as being sensed that he can not hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict, decided on
the proximate malfeasor in this cause of action; appeal to instead make a sinistral detour, so to speak, by claiming that
his action against CAL is based on a breach of contract of carriage.
xxx xxx xxx
We can not permit respondent Pagsibigan to change his theory at this
12. That plaintiff missed the initial Manila-Taipei stage; it would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no
leg (CI Flight 812) on June 10, 1968, as set forth more opportunity to present further evidence, material to the new
in his ticket (Annex "A") solely and exclusively theory, which it could have done had it been aware earlier of the new
by reason of gross incompetence and inexcusable theory at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 10
negligence amounting to bad faith of defendant
PAL — acting, through its sales representative, There is indeed no basis whatsoever to hold CAL liable on a quasi-
the defendant Roberto Espiritu, of its Manila delict or culpa aquiliana. As hereinbefore stated, the court a
Hotel branch office — in the discharge of its quo absolved CAL of any liability for fault or negligence. This
duties as sales agent and/or ticketing agent for finding was shared by respondent court when it concluded that
defendant China Airlines Ltd. as principal. defendant CAL did not contribute to the negligence committed by
therein defendants-appellants PAL and Roberto Espiritu.
 157

Respondent Pagsibigan insists that CAL was barred from proving On the issue of damages, we agree, except as to the amount, that
that it observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its nominal damages may be awarded to respondent Pagsibigan to
employees. This argument is obviously misplaced. CAL is not the vindicate the legal wrong committed against him. It appearing that
employer of PAL or Espiritu. In Duavit vs. The Hon. Court of the wrong committed was immediately rectified when PAL promptly
Appeals, et al., 11 we have stressed the need of first establishing the booked him for the next morning's flight to Taipei where he arrived
existence of an employer-employee relationship before an employer before noon of June 11, 1968 and was able to attend his scheduled
may be vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. conference, and considering the concept and purpose of nominal
damages, the award of P20,000.00 must accordingly be reduced to an
With respect to PAL and Espiritu, they disclaim any liability on the amount equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained.
theory that the former is merely an agent of CAL and that the suit
should have been directed against CAL alone. There is no question WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
that the contractual relation between both airlines is one of agency. MODIFIED accordingly. China Air Lines, Ltd. is hereby absolved
Suffice it to say, however, that in an action premised on the from liability. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and Roberto Espiritu are
employee's negligence, whereby respondent Pagsibigan seeks declared jointly and severally liable to pay the sum of P10,000.00 by
recovery for the resulting damages from both PAL and Espiritu way of nominal damages, without prejudice to the right of Philippine
without qualification, what is sought to be imposed is the direct and Air Lines, Inc. to recover from Roberto Espiritu reimbursement of the
primary liability of PAL as an employer under said Article 2180. damages that it may pay respondent Jose Pagsibigan.

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there SO ORDERED.

instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the employer either in the selection of the employee or in the
supervision over him after such selection. The presumption, however,
may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it
******************************************
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee. 12
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
Hence, to escape solidary liability for the quasi-delict committed by
Espiritu, it is imperative that PAL must adduce sufficient proof that it PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
exercised such degree of care. PAL failed to overcome the CARBONEL, petitioners,
presumption. As found by respondent court, CAL had revised its vs.
schedule of flights since April 1, 1968; that after the Civil THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
Aeronautics Board had approved the revised schedule of flights, PAL LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
was duly informed thereof and, in fact, PAL's Manila Hotel branch
office had been issuing and selling tickets based on the revised time
schedule before June 10, 1968.
FELICIANO, J:
PAL's main defense is that it is only an agent. As a general
proposition, an agent who duly acts as such is not personally liable to
third persons. However, there are admitted exceptions, as in this case In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. —
where the agent is being sued for damages arising from a tort private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he
committed by his employee. lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails-
and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing
corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had
The respondent court found that the mistake committed by Espiritu taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen
was done in good faith. While there is no evidence that he acted with car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and
malice, we can not entirely condone his actuations. As an employee General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home,
of PAL, the nature of his functions requires him to observe for the and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. He headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
committed a clear neglect of duty. looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck,
owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Ergo, for his negligence, Espiritu is primarily liable to respondent Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of
Pagsibigan under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. For the failure of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing
PAL to rebut the legal presumption of negligence in the selection and in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
supervision of its employee, it is also primarily liable under Article facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not
2180 of the same code which explicitly provides that employers shall parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the
be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
the former are not engaged in any business or industry. anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had
earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U.
Under the aforesaid provision, all that is required is that the Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer
employee, by his negligence, committed a quasi-delict which caused Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
damage to another, and this suffices to hold the employer primarily following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision
and solidarity responsible for the tortious act of the employee. PAL, by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed
however, can demand from Espiritu reimbursement of the amount into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered
which it will have to pay the offended party's claim. 13 some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a
"nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
 158

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First such that, in the opinion of
Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate the appellate court, his loss of
cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had income "was not solely
parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. attributable to the accident in
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the question;" and
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of 3. The award of P100,000.00
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix as moral damages was held
also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection by the appellate court as
and supervision of the dump truck driver. excessive and unconscionable
and hence reduced
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against to P50,000.00.
Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered the latter:
The award of P10,000.00 as
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum exemplary damages
of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and the and P4,500.00 as attorney's
replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff; fees and costs remained
untouched.
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum
of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income for This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on
plaintiff brought about the accident in a petition for review.
controversy and which is the result of the
negligence of the defendants; Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit
findings of fact relating to the manner in which the dump truck was
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of which both courts
sum of P 10,000. as moral damages for the drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of Carbonel,
unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff the dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the proximate
from his lifetime career as a marketing man; cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that
mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and
anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was
reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and not the way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather the
the untold sorrows and frustration in life reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he
experienced by plaintiff and his family since the smashed into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its
accident in controversy up to the present time; questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in some
way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum Dionisio's negligence and made no further mention of it. We have
of P 10,000.00 as damages for the wanton examined the record both before the trial court and the Intermediate
disregard of defendants to settle amicably this Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the
case with the plaintiff before the filing of this record sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the
case in court for a smaller amount. appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact
relating to the alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his
car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was
sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for attorney's fees; parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition"
and and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied) injuries he sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as
between the parties in this case, without having to remand it back to
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. the trial court after eleven years, compels us to address directly the
That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial contention put forward by the petitioners and to examine for
court but modified the award of damages to the following extent: ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence
which must bear upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix
and Carbonel.
1. The award of P15,000.00
as compensatory damages
was reduced There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether
to P6,460.71, the latter being or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and
the only amount that the effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast
appellate court found the or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether
plaintiff to have proved as Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact
actually sustained by him; with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether
Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
2. The award of P150,000.00
as loss of expected income
was reduced As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no
to P100,000.00, basically curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after
because Dionisio had the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence here
voluntarily resigned his job consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken
 159

Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his
treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical headlights, or whether his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just
Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along moments before the accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court
with the contents of pockets together with Patrolman expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he
Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so.
curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his
his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be
certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a
Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We
of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to have believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than
authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. that offered by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his
This certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however, specify mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although
any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds
curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to before contact with the dump truck.
prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the
accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at
not have such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or the time of the accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimony
non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio
shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and
and whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights before brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious
the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the condition. 7 This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the
police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor
curfew without a valid curfew pass. before dinner with his boss that night. We do not believe that this
evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se
that night — both the trial court and the appellate court were an act of reckless imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence
completely silent. to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that
upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of We are also aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect
Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene of the accident almost different people differently.
immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based
being barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined
who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of
car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than
on the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near
at 30 kilometers per hour and had just crossed the intersection of the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and
General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking
accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took out onto the road lane.
place. 3
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of
was hearsay and did not fag within any of the recognized exceptions the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or
to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other
him through official information and had not been given by the words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on
objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other
Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of
exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of the res Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an
occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was
inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent
and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that
and not the result of reflective thought. 6 consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the
startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these
reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that
testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and
the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already
Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make this
testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have purported to quite clear:
describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch Dionisio was
travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck. Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to
distinguish between the active "cause" of the
 160

harm and the existing "conditions" upon which wind arising later wig spread it beyond the
that cause operated. If the defendant has created defendant's own property, and therefore to take
only a passive static condition which made the precautions to prevent that event. The person who
damage possible, the defendant is said not to be leaves the combustible or explosive material
liable. But so far as the fact of causation is exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents fire from some independent source. ... In all of
which have played an important part in these cases there is an intervening cause
producing the result it is quite impossible to combining with the defendant's conduct to
distinguish between active forces and passive produce the result and in each case the
situations, particularly since, as is invariably the defendant's negligence consists in failure to
case, the latter are the result of other active protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
forces which have gone before. The defendant
who spills gasoline about the premises creates a Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from
"condition," but the act may be culpable because liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial
of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the and important part of the risk, to which the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed
bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
the very risk which the defendant has created, the within the scope original risk, and hence of the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite
lapse of a considerable time during which the generally agreed that intervening causes which
"condition" remains static will not necessarily fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
affect liability; one who digs a trench in the defendant's responsibility.
highway may still be liable to another who fans
into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the Thus it has been held that a defendant will be
decisions; but the distinction is now almost required to anticipate the usual weather of the
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature
at all, it must refer to the type of case where the such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog
forces set in operation by the defendant have or even lightning; that one who leaves an
come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and obstruction on the road or a railroad track
some new force intervenes. But even in such should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run
cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" into it; ...
and "condition" which is important but the nature
of the risk and the character of the intervening The risk created by the defendant may include the
cause. 9 intervention of the foreseeable negligence of
others. ... [The standard of reasonable conduct
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff
being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and against 'that occasional negligence which is one
efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private of the ordinary incidents of human life, and
respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant
dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff
reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car,
held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in even though the car is negligently driven; and
point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to one who parks an automobile on the highway
the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. without lights at night is not relieved of
What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more responsibility when another negligently drives
than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had into it. --- 10
parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver
owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are
fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to Philippines).
quote once more from Professor and Keeton:
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the
intervening cause is one which in ordinary petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had
human experience is reasonably to be anticipated the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries,
or one which the defendant has reason to and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must
anticipate under the particular circumstances, bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the
the defendant may be negligence among other common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs.
reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has
the defendant may be negligent only for that found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical
reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the
to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of
 161

contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory
negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. 13 The respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs
common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant against the petitioners.
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to SO ORDERED.
do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the
common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction
where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it
has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15 ******************************************

Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be [G.R. No. L-26810. August 31, 1970.]
extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule
in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not ROSARIO SANTOS VDA. DE BONIFACIO, VIRGINIA
believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, BONIFACIO, ROSALINDA BONIFACIO, ROMEO
is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's BONIFACIO, ZENAIDA BONIFACIO, GENEROSO
— was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not BONIFACIO, ANDRES BONIFACIO, JOSE BONIFACIO,
simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the JOVITO BONIFACIO, JR., CORAZON BONIFACIO,
petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or ALBERTO CONCEPCION, AGUSTIN ANGELES and ELISA
"intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum ANGELES, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. B. L. T. BUS CO., INC., as
of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or Successors of LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY and
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into SERGIO DE LUNA, Defendants-Appellants.
account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the
negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity Leandro Sevilla & Ramon C. Aquino for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore Domingo E. de Lara & Associates, for Defendants-Appellants.
his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own
prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with
that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the
peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or DECISION
omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping
out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the
forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our REYES, J.B.L., J.:
law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
society and to allocate them among the members of society. To
accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very
Direct appeal to the Supreme Court (lodged prior to the enactment of
bonds of society.
Republic Act No. 5440) from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), in its Civil Case No. 8275, sentencing the
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of defendants-appellants, B. L. T. Bus Co., Inc., and its driver Sergio de
negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix 16 in supervising its Luna, to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, as
employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court damages arising from a vehicular accident, the total amount of
in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to P240,905.72, with interest from the filing of the complaint.
overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that
Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his Said Civil Case 8275 was filed pursuant to a reservation made by the
home whenever there was work to be done early the following plaintiffs to file a civil action separately from the criminal case
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part instituted against the B. L. T. B. bus driver Sergio de Luna in the
of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is Court of First Instance of Laguna, for homicide and multiple physical
parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence, in
showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. connection with the same vehicular accident. The Laguna Court had
convicted de Luna of the criminal charge, but the judgment, was
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the appealed and is pending in the Court of Appeals.
comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand
and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we Of the detailed findings of facts of the trial court, we affirm the
believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by following as either non-controverted or preponderantly established by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the the evidence:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award
of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees "Before February 27, 1964, Jovito Bonifacio, Sr., together with his
and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the wife (plaintiff Rosario Santos de Bonifacio) and neighbor Agustin
balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix Angeles, used to bathe in the Pansol hot springs at Los Baños,
who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of Laguna, twice a week. They made such trips in his 1962 Mercedes
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne Benz car with plaintiff Alberto Concepcion as his driver, a duly
exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to licensed driver since 1946.
reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for
disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent "About 4:00 o’clock in the morning of February 27, 1964, the four of
appellate court. them left Barrio Sumilang, Pasig, bound for the Pansol hot springs in
Los Baños, Laguna. Jovito, Sr. was seated beside his driver Alberto
 162

Concepcion; while Agustin Angeles was seated on the left side of the to be traversed constitutes negligence (7 Am. Jur. 2d 901).
rear seat with plaintiff Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio to his right. Furthermore, in intruding into the lane reserved for vehicles coming
Alberto Concepcion was driving the car on the right lane facing Los from the opposite direction, it was incumbent upon the bus driver to
Baños at the rate of 30 miles per hour because the concrete road was make sure that be could do so without danger.
slippery as it was then drizzling. After going down the overpass or
bridge and negotiating the curve after the said bridge at Barrio Confirmatory of the foregoing considerations is the fact that de Luna
Landayan, San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, Alberto Concepcion saw a himself admitted, in the statement, Exhibit "A," taken by the chief of
cargo truck parked on the left portion of the concrete highway police, and subscribed and sworn to before the Mayor of San Pedro,
without any parking lights. It was about 5:20 a.m., still dark and Laguna, at 8:00 o’clock in the same morning of the accident, and
raining. While he was about 15 meters from the said parked cargo while the facts were fresh in his mind, that when he (de Luna) noticed
truck, he saw for the first time the oncoming LTB passenger bus No. the parked cargo truck he slammed on his brakes and because of this,
136 bearing 1964 plate No. PUB-1276, about 200 meters away from the bus skidded to the left and hit the Mercedes Benz car (." . . ang
him and about 185 meters behind the parked cargo truck. Said bus ginawa ko po ay nagpreno ako ng aking sasakyang minamaneho at
was then driven at a very fast clip by the defendant Sergio de Luna. dahil po dito ay umislayd ang aking trak na papuntang kaliwa, subalit
Because he was on his right lane, Alberto Concepcion continued on siya po namang pagdaan ng isang awtong Mercedes Benz na aking
his way at the rate of 30 miles per hour. The parked truck was nabunggo . . .")
entirely on the left lane and about one (1) meter from the center, of
the concrete highway. His Mercedes Benz was passing alongside the The version at the trial of defendant-appellant Sergio de Luna, and
parked truck and about 70 cm. from the center of the road. Just as he his witnesses, is that when the former saw the parked cargo truck he
was about to pass beyond the parked truck, the oncoming LTB bus slowed down, swerved a little to the left, then completely stopped his
suddenly swerved to its left towards the right lane of the Mercedes vehicle; that right then, the Mercedes Benz car hit his bus, with such
Benz and collided with the Mercedes Benz. The place of collision force that the bus turned to the direction where it came from. Not
was about 10 meters from the parked truck. The impact caused the only is this version belied by de Luna’s original and spontaneous
Mercedes car to swerve to the right shoulder of the road facing Los statement to the San Pedro Police, but it was infirmed by physical
Baños, as Alberto slammed his brakes, and the Mercedes car stopped facts.
on the right shoulder, which is about two meters wide: while the LTB
bus made a complete U-turn and finally stopped on the left lane of It is incredible, and contrary to common experience and observation,
the concrete highway facing Los Baños or the direction where it that the bus, admittedly three (3) times bigger than the car, and
came from. It was filled with about 40 passengers then (see pictures loaded with about forty(40) passengers, could be turned around while
Exhs. H, I, J, K, L, M, and SS or 13 and 26, pp. 92-94, 391, 576, standing still by the impact of the much smaller car. Nor was his
rec.). The left front part of the Mercedes Benz was smashed (see swerving to the left justifiable if he were in control of his vehicle,
pictures Exhs. H and I, p. 92, rec.). The violent impact threw Jovito since he had a clear view of the left lane and the oncoming Mercedes
Bonifacio, Sr. out of the car onto the right shoulder of the road facing Benz from the driver’s seat of the bus. Evidence, to be believed, must
Los Baños, causing his instantaneous death (Exhs. J. K. L and M, pp, not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
93-94, rec.) while the other passengers, the driving [sic] Alberto credible in itself (People v. Baquiran, L-20153, 29 June 1967, 20
Concepcion, Mrs. Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio, and Agustin SCRA 451).
Angeles, lost consciousness and were seriously injured. They
recovered consciousness in the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital in There was no negligence on the part of the driver of the Mercedes
Pasay City to where they were brought that same morning of the car, Alberto Concepcion.
incident." (Decision, Rec. on App., pp. 116-119)
"A motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the
As is usual in cases of this kind, three main issues arise:chanrob1es highway, even after he sees an approaching motorist coming toward
virtual 1aw library him on the wrong side, is generally entitled to assume that the other
motorist will return to his proper lane of traffic, . . ." (8 Am. Jur. 2d
(1) Who of the drivers of the colliding vehicles was at fault? 319)

(2) Is the employer of the guilty driver responsible for the fault of the That the L.T.B. bus was damaged near the front right wheel and
latter? fender proves that the Mercedes was already very close to the place
of collision when it occurred, so that the car driver had no chance to
(3) Are the damages awarded reasonable? evade it. Nor did said driver, Concepcion, possess any means of
knowing that the bus intruding into his line of travel was skidding out
Taking up the questions seriatim, we find that the court below of control, and could not draw back to its proper lane.
correctly held that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the L.T.B. bus driver, de Luna, who failed to take the Appellants pretend that the Mercedes car was proceeding at reckless
necessary precautions demanded by the circumstances. He admitted speed, but this charge rests on nothing more substantial than an
that when the mishap occurred, it was still dark, and as it was raining, alleged statement by Mrs. Bonifacio at the hospital that her driver
requisite prudence required that de Luna should be more careful than was driving fast. The court below, in our opinion, correctly
usual, and slacken his pace, for the wet highway could be expected to discredited this evidence, for at the time it was supposedly made,
be slippery. Even assuming that the presence of the parked cargo Mrs. Bonifacio was still in a state of shock, with visitors barred by
truck did constitute an emergency, although it was in plain view, still, doctor’s orders; and, moreover, defense witness, ex-Cpl. Casantusan,
if de Luna had not been driving unreasonably fast, his bus would not did not even take down or report the pretended statement,
have skidded to the left and invaded the lane of the oncoming car notwithstanding its patent importance; there was no corroboration
when he applied his brakes. His having failed to see the parked cargo thereof, and it was contradicted by the car driver and by Mrs.
truck until he was only 50 meters from it also justifies the inference Bonifacio herself. The rule, too well-known to require citation of
that he was inattentive to his responsibility as a driver. That he did authorities, is that in the absence of clear error (and none is shown in
not know that anyone else was using the road is no defense to his the present instance) a trial court’s estimate on the credibility of
negligent operation of his vehicle, since he should be especially witnesses, whose demeanor it had unparalleled opportunity to
watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway; and observe, will not be disturbed on appeal.
his failure to keep a proper lookout for persons and objects in the line
 163

At any rate, so long as the Mercedes car remained in its proper lane, endeavor to explain the alteration afterwards.
its speed could not have been the proximate cause of the mishap.
(b) The record of driver de Luna shows that, on the average, he was
On the second issue posed, the rule under Article 2180 of the Civil at the wheel and on the road for eleven (11) hours and thirty-five (35)
Code of the Philippines makes an employer liable for damage caused minutes per day, from Paete to Manila and back, and Paete to San
by his employee in the discharge of his duties, unless the former Antonio and back, starting before dawn until the evening. He has
adequately proves having exercised due care in the selection and been in the Paete-Manila route for four (4) years (T.s.n., 22
supervision of the employee. November 1965, pages 38-39). He was paid by the hour, so that the
more time he drove, the greater compensation he received. That
Appellant company defends that it had observed all the diligence of a employer company thus abetted, obviously for the sake of greater
good father of a family to prevent damage, conformably to the last profit, the gruelling schedule, unmindful of the harmful consequence
paragraph of said Article 2180. It adduced evidence to show that in that excessive working time would register upon the driver’s health,
hiring driver de Luna, the latter was tested on his proficiency as a and, particularly, on his reflexes. The pay-off came when driver de
driver; that he passed the test given by the company’s board of Luna, because of his accumulated fatigue and inattentiveness failed to
examiners, composed of the office manager, the medical director, the notice seasonably the presence of the parked cargo truck upon his
chief of the legal department and the job superintendent, aside from lane of traffic, impelling him to brake suddenly in an effort to avoid
the orientation test given by experienced drivers along the different hitting it, The braking made the bus slide and encroach upon the
lines of the company; that the company issued service manuals to its other lane, resulting in its collision with the oncoming automobile.
employees, aside from memorandum circulars and duty orders to
govern the conduct of its drivers; that it assigns inspectors interlinked (c) Sergio de Luna had repeatedly violated company rules. Despite
with one another along the different lines of the company to see to it his numerous infractions, 31 in all since 1951, and including a
that the rules and regulations are complied with by all the drivers; collision with a carretela, the company took no more drastic action
that it metes out penalties, such as fines, to erring drivers; that it against him other than repeated warnings and imposing token fines,
maintains shops at different stations where several mechanics are which on the whole amounts to tolerance of the violations or laxity or
assigned to see to it that no truck leaves on the line without being negligence in the enforcement of the company rules.
thoroughly checked; that it keeps a summary of service records of its
drivers to help in determining their efficiency and fitness; that it (d) On its bus involved in the accident (No. 136), the appellant
conducts seminars on safe-driving and prevention of accidents; that it company was also negligent. The bus was last overhauled on 26
had received an award of appreciation in 1963 by the National Traffic January 1963 but was usually overhauled every six months; its
Safety Committee; that it used the best available brake lining on Bus overhauling therefore, was overdue by six months. In addition, as
No. 136 and that said bus was completely checked for road heretofore observed, its brake linings were last changed on 10
worthiness the day before the accident. January 1964, but were usually changed every 30 days; the changing
was therefore, overdue by one (1) month and seventeen (17) days at
Yet the evidence of appellant company also established facts that the time of the mishap, and must have contributed to the driver’s
demolished its very defense of "diligence of a good father of a inability to control the skidding that led to the collision.
family," for it plainly shows inexcusable laxity in the supervision of
its driver and in the maintenance of its vehicles. Salient among these In the face of these plain instances of lax supervision, the trial court
facts are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library has aptly remarked:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

(a) Defense witness Cuevas asserted that the brake lining of the bus "The mere issuance of numerous rules and regulations, without the
was changed on 10 January 1964, over a month prior to the accident, corresponding periodic checks as to whether such rules and
although brake linings last about 30 days only. The change in lining regulations are being complied with, is not sufficient to exempt the
was overdue but the appellant bus company tried to hide this fact. defendant bus firm from liability arising from the negligence of its
Said the trial court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph employees. Neither the establishment of maintenance and repair
shops, which do not regularly service its buses, would suffice to
". . . The job sheet for the change of brake lining appears dated Jan. demonstrate the diligence of the employer in the selection and
10, 1964, in ink. There was an attempt to change it by crossing out supervision of its employees and in servicing and maintaining the
"Jan." and super-imposing the word "Feb." in pencil (see page 598, buses in good running condition."cralaw virtua1aw library
rec.). There was an attempt to make "Feb. 10, 1964" as altered appear
as the correct date — instead of January 10, 1964 — by not arranging The minor errors charged against the appealed decision do not suffice
chronologically the various orders and/or job sheets for said bus No. to overrule the findings of negligence of both the driver and the
136 in said folder, Exh. 27, and by placing the said small job sheet as company, measured by the requirements of ordinary diligence.
page 11 of the said folder, Exhibit 27, which has for its first page an Appellants’ complaint in their brief, that the lower court applied the
order for bus No. 136 dated February 13, 1964 (p. 1 of Exhibit 27 or law requiring carriers to observe extraordinary diligence with respect
Exh. 25-B, p. 290, rec.)." (Rec. on Appeal, p. 132.) to passengers, and not ordinary diligence with respect to third parties
as in the present case, is without basis.
By resorting to these documentary alterations, the company indicated
its awareness that its case is weak or unfounded and from that may be On the question of damages, the trial court properly took into account
inferred that its case of appellant lacks truth and merit. 1 The claim that the late Jovito Bonifacio, Sr., was already a successful
on appeal that the alteration in the writing was innocent, or that the businessman when his life was cut short, at the age of 49, by the
company should have been given an opportunity to explain because it highway accident. He was treasurer of Bonifacio Bros., Inc., a firm
was caught unaware that the court below would take the incident owned by himself and his brother, and which is engaged in the
against them as it did, is untenable. The rule requires that a party, business of repairing motor vehicles. The assets of said firm in 1962
producing a writing as genuine but which as found altered after its were worth P1,059,754.53; it had 102 employees receiving a salary
execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, should of P1,800.00 or more, per annum; in 1963, its assets were worth
account for the alteration, and if "he do that, he may give the writing P995,885.78 (Exhibits "KK-2" & "KK-3"). In April, 1963, the
in evidence, but not otherwise." (Section 32, Rule 132, Revised Rules deceased founded J. Bonifacio Bros., Inc., which also engaged in the
of Court.) In other words, the company should have accounted for the same line of business, with principal office at 267 P. Casal, Manila,
alteration when it introduced the job sheet in evidence, and not and of which he was president at ,the time of his demise. The
 164

deceased had a net income of P33,738.62 and P24,000.00 in 1962 family group and each of the aforenamed plaintiffs P5,000.00, as
and 1963, respectively. 2 The lower court, therefore, fairly assessed exemplary damages. The quantum of moral and exemplary damages
that, had he lived to the age of 55, he would have earned a total net thus awarded is not unconscionable, as appellants aver, but are
income of P144,000.00. The six-year life expectancy allowed by the justified, considering all the circumstances of the case.
trial court is shorter than that shown by insurance mortality tables,
but the award was not appealed. Interest on the various damages at 6% per annum since the filing of
the suit was also awarded, despite the lack of prayer for interest in the
Bonifacio’s family incurred expenses of P13,764.05, as follows; plaintiffs’ complaint. The grant of interest is not necessarily error, for
coffin — P600.00; burial lot — P90.00; cost of publication of death under the Civil Code —
notices — P720.00; tomb — P4,850.00; food and gasoline during
vigil — P1,782.00; other expenses — P500.00; compensation to a "ART. 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the
private investigator to look into the record of defendant driver Sergio damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the
de Luna — P222.05; and damage to Mercedes Benz car, not covered court."cralaw virtua1aw library
by insurance — P5,000.00.
The findings and conclusions of negligence on the part of the
Defendants-appellants question the actual and litigation expenses defendants-appellants, and not on the part of the plaintiffs-appellees,
because they were paid by the firm J. Bonifacio Bros., Inc., arguing show the lack of merit of the last assignment of error about the denial
that said firm, not the plaintiffs, has the right to claim the damages by of appellants’ counterclaim for the fees of their own counsel.
virtue of subrogation, per Articles 1302 and 1303 of the Civil Code.
This is a defense that, even if true (which we need not rule upon) Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified
should have been invoked in the court below, and its interposition because the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees had been a classmate of
comes too late on appeal. Moreover, such a technical defense the trial judge. Admittedly, this is not a legal ground for
deserves scant consideration, because the firm is a family corporation disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial
and a subrogation of parties will neither diminish the expenses nor judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion
exculpate defendants-appellants from liability therefor. would result, for under the rule advocated, a judge would be barred
from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he
Plaintiff-appellee Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio regained could have many) appeared. Nor have the appellants successfully
consciousness at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. She suffered a shown here that bias distorted the judgment or conduct of the
lacerated wound in the frontal region of her head, contusion on the challenged trier of the case. That he should question defense
left side of her face, fracture of the distal portion of her left ulna and witnesses more closely than those of the plaintiffs is but natural, since
dislocation of the left femur. She was confined in the hospital from defendants’ evidence varies from proof already on record. A desire to
27 February 1964 to 15 March 1964. Her hospital bills and get at the truth is no proof of bias or prejudice.
compensation for special nurses amounted to P1,658.48. During her
confinement, she failed to receive her salary, amounting to P608.00. FINDING NO REVERSIBLE ERROR, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed. Costs against the appellants.
Driver Alberto Concepcion of the Mercedes Benz car, sustained
compound fractures; his right foot was in a plaster cast for six (6)
months and one (1) week; his left leg was under traction and hanging ******************************************
for two (2) weeks, his left hip-bone dislocated. He was confined in
the hospital for one (1) month and four (4) days. Up to the time the
lower court rendered its decision on 30 July 1966, Concepcion had to
go in crutches to the hospital, for treatment. His medical expenses
amounted to P1,777.21. As a driver of the deceased Jovito Bonifacio,
Sr., he was paid a weekly salary of P50.00, with free meals, which
remuneration may be estimated to be P4,000.00 yearly (T.s.n., 22
October 1964, page 10) . He was 40 years old at the time of the
accident and there is no indication as to when he would be able to
drive again. If he would be permanently incapacitated from driving
again, he may, in the future, be able to find a different calling or
gainful occupation. The award of P15,000.00, as compensatory
damages, is fair and reasonable.

Agustin Angeles suffered a broken right wrist, a crack in the top left
part of his head, sunken left eye, and a wound in the left cheek. He
regained consciousness at the hospital only after 11 days from the
time of the accident. He was confined for 18 days, and billed for
P1,097.98. Due to the accident, his memory and vision were
impaired; he now walks with a cane; his bowel movement and
urination are now abnormal and irregular; he cannot freely move his
right arm. He was 76 years old at the time of the accident, but despite
his age, he used to repair watches, with an suffrage monthly income
of P250.00. He cannot repair watches anymore. The lower court
granted him compensatory damages for P3,000.00.

For their shock, worry and anguish, the court below awarded moral
damages to the plaintiffs-members of the family of the deceased
Jovito Bonifacio, Sr. in the sum of P20,000.00; to Rosaria Santos
Vda. de Bonifacio, the sum of P10,000.00; to Alberto Concepcion
and Agustin Angeles, the sum of P5,000.00 each. It also granted the