Ethical Issues in Animal Cloning: Scholarlycommons
Ethical Issues in Animal Cloning: Scholarlycommons
ScholarlyCommons
Center for Bioethics Papers Center for Bioethics
6-1-2005
Recommended Citation
Fiester, A. (2005). Ethical Issues in Animal Cloning. Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/35
Reprinted with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press. The article originally appeared in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Volume 48, Issue 2,
June 2005, pages 328-343.
Publisher URL: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives_in_biology_and_medicine/toc/pbm48.3.html
Disciplines
Bioethics and Medical Ethics
Comments
Reprinted with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press. The article originally appeared in Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine, Volume 48, Issue 2, June 2005, pages 328-343.
Publisher URL: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives_in_biology_and_medicine/toc/pbm48.3.html
Ethical Issues in
Animal Cloning
Autumn Fiester
University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics, Suite 321, 3401 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA
19104.
E-mail: [email protected].
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03/Fiester/Final/328–43 6/17/05 10:49 AM Page 329
Autumn Fiester
the cloning of animals with genes that make their milk or meat healthier for con-
sumers, or the cloning of animals that are disease-resistant or reduce the envi-
ronmental burden. Scientists are working on cloning goats with less fatty milk,
chickens with no feathers to reduce the environmental costs of poultry farming,
and pigs whose manure has less phosphorus and helps reduce environmental pol-
lution (Thomas 2003). At Texas A&M University, scientists have cloned cows
resistant to brucellosis (Phillips 2002).
Animal cloning may also soon play a role in American sports. Now that deer
have been successfully cloned, researchers at Texas A&M are attempting to clone
bucks with larger antlers, which will be attractive to hunters (AgBiotechNet
2003). Once perfected, cloning techniques could conceivably be used to clone
animals used in any competitive sport, like race horsing.
Most animal cloning projects, though not all, are aimed solely at human ends,
such as the treatment of diseases, better food production, or entertainment. But
some animal cloning projects are motivated by regard or concern for animals as
ends in themselves. For example, many current projects are aimed at cloning
endangered or even extinct species. A gaur—a type of wild ox on the verge of
extinction—was cloned in 2001 but died in infancy, apparently from dysentery
unrelated to the cloning process (BBC 2004). There are projects in progress to
clone the extinct thylacine, Asian cheetah, and wooly mammoth (AgBiotechNet
2001). One of the most famous cloning projects, the Missyplicity Project, was
created to clone a beloved dog who had died; a dog was found to be too diffi-
cult to clone, but this project eventually resulted in “CC” the calico cat (Texas
A&M University 2002). Other cloning projects seek to create disease-resistant
animals, which could lead to healthier animal lives and greater animal welfare.
ing the safety of the livestock used in food production. In both the areas of agri-
cultural cloning and cloning for conservation, cloned animals may have a seri-
ous impact on the environment, either by breeding with non-clones or due to
some unforeseen expression of a gene that has ramifications for the larger ecosys-
tem. Each of these negative consequences will be discussed in turn.
Animal cloning might also be criticized on deontological grounds (Regan
1983). Here there are ethical concerns about “playing God,” the intrinsic value
of the animals, and the objectification and commodification of animals. In the
area of pet cloning, there is the potential for false promises: grieving pet owners
may be misled into believing that cloning will resurrect their beloved pet, and
they may commit to storing their pet’s DNA without understanding the true
costs of cloning when the technique becomes commercially available. All of
these are ethically salient issues, some addressing the moral permissibility of the
science itself and others addressing issues that arise from the way in which the
science is conducted or commercialized.1
Consequence-Based Arguments Against Animal Cloning
Perhaps the most compelling argument against animal cloning is the very real
suffering endured by animals involved in this science. There are four areas of
concern with regard to the pain and suffering animals experience due to animal
cloning: the suffering animals undergo during cloning procedures; the obstetri-
cal complications that occur in the surrogate animal; the health of cloned ani-
mals; and the suffering animals will be forced to endure if cloned to exhibit, for
research purposes, or for certain diseases and pathologies.
Recent data on the success rates of cloning procedures and the health and sur-
vival statistics of animal clones present a fairly grim picture.There is a large body
of literature citing high rates of miscarriage, stillbirth, early death, genetic abnor-
malities, and chronic diseases among cloned animals. These problems occur
against a backdrop of what in cloning science has been called “efficiency,” the
term used to talk about the percentage of live offspring from the number of
transferred embryos.The efficiency of animal cloning has typically been about 1
to 2%, so for every 100 embryos that are implanted in surrogate animals, about
98 of the embryos fail to produce a live animal offspring (Coleman 1999;
Paterson 2003). Even when efficiency rates are at their best, the overwhelming
majority of attempts fail. One study explicitly touting a “highly efficient”
method for cloning pigs claims efficiency rates of only 5 to 12% (Walker 2002).
This is still a failure rate of between 88 and 95%. These numbers have serious
1Some may object to the inclusion of certain issues under the rubric of “ethical” (as opposed to
legal or religious). I argue that it is in our best interest to cast as broad a net as possible when try-
ing to flesh out the ethical issues of a new area, and that hairsplitting about which normative
domain the issue really belongs to can lead us to overlook issues that ought to be decisive in help-
ing us navigate this moral terrain.
Autumn Fiester
consequences for both the donor and surrogate being impregnated: surgery must
be used to remove the donor animal’s eggs and then another surgical technique
used to implant the embryos into the surrogate. In the least “efficient” processes,
for every one or two live cloned offspring, 100 eggs must be harvested and 100
embryos implanted. For unknown reasons, cloned fetuses often exhibit a high
birthweight, frequently necessitating a C-section delivery, again causing pain and
suffering to the surrogate animal.
Of the live clones born, many experience compromised health status or early
death. In one study of cloned pigs, researchers reported a 50% mortality rate for
the live offspring, with five out of 10 dying between three and 130 days of age
from ailments including chronic diarrhea, congestive heart failure, and decreased
growth rate (Carter 2002). In some studies, cloned mice experienced early death
due to liver failure and lung problems (Ogonuki 2002). In others, they had a
high tendency to develop morbid obesity (Tamashiro 2002).
These adverse effects on the animals involved in cloning procedures have
prompted national animal welfare organizations to take a strong stance against
animal cloning.The U.S. Humane Society (HSUS), for example, has requested a
ban on products coming from cloned animals or their offspring. Michael Apple-
by, the HSUS vice president for farm animals, argues that the animal welfare
problems that already exist in factory farming will be exacerbated with the new
biotechnology, for example, disease vulnerability. He argues:“Already animals are
suffering from maladies at a rate unheard of before we applied biotechnology to
the barnyard. It would be disastrously premature to put this technology into
commercial practice” (HSUS 2002).
Proponents of animal cloning argue that efficiency rates are constantly im-
proving, and other studies show much better health outcomes for the cloned
animals. One study on the health of cloned cattle reported normal growth rates
of the cloned offspring and concluded that the surviving clones in this study
were healthy two years after birth (Pace 2002). A closer look at the findings,
however, shows that there were only 106 live births for 2,170 implanted em-
bryos, and of the 106 live offspring born, 24 of the calves died soon after birth;
11 of these 24 had severe physiological abnormalities, including digestive abnor-
malities, skeletal problems, deformities in the urinary track, or respiratory failure.
A meta-review of the health status of clones reported that 77% of cloned ani-
mals showed no developmental abnormalities throughout the period of follow-
up, though the percentage of healthy clones ranged across studies from 20 to
100% (Cibelli 2002). Given the current stage of development of cloning science,
even the highest efficiency rates and best health outcomes entail a significant cost
in animal welfare.
That said, proponents of animal cloning make two compelling arguments:
first, any criticism of the pain and suffering involved in animal cloning must be
made against a backdrop of standard practices involving animals, such as research,
companion animal breeding, or agriculture, which also involve a great deal of suf-
fering; and second, the net good of animal cloning science must be weighed
against the pain and suffering of animals if the analysis is to be truly “consequen-
tialist” in approach. On the first point—that animal pain and suffering due to
cloning may be indistinguishable from animal pain and suffering in other tradi-
tional areas of animal use—proponents argue that cloners and cloning science
should not be held to a higher standard of preserving animal welfare than is the
current practice in the various areas of animal use. On this argument, proponents
appeal to the fact that currently animals are eaten, hunted, experimented on, and
confined.Whatever the standards are for humane treatment of animals in the dif-
ferent arenas in which they figure in modern life—agricultural, research, sport,
etc.—those must be the same standards, and no higher, that govern the realm of
animal cloning. Mark Greene (2002) calls this the “Accepted Practice Standard.”
Animal cloning science ought not to be condemned for causing animals pain and
suffering if that same level of pain and suffering is morally permissible in areas
outside biotechnology research. By extension of this argument, we ought not to
selectively condemn cloning researchers for cloning animals destined to live their
whole lives in cages if we accept that other research or agricultural animals fare
no better. Of course, the assumption in the proponents’ argument is that those
practices are morally acceptable: if those traditional practices are morally accept-
able, and animal cloning represents no significant increase in suffering over the
benchmark set by them, then animal cloning would indeed be morally accept-
able, at least with regard to the moral criterion of pain and suffering. But if the
pain and suffering involved in traditional breeding, factory farming, or medical
and pharmaceutical research is morally unacceptable, then animal cloning is as
morally suspect as those practices (though, arguably, no worse than those prac-
tices).This is not a question that can be settled here because we no longer have
societal consensus about the moral legitimacy of those other practices. Factory
farming, for example, has come under a great deal of criticism in recent years
with many mainstream groups calling for significant reform. What can be said
with certainty is that a critique of animal cloning on these grounds has much
larger implications for animal use and treatment, and the argument cannot be
confined to animal biotechnology, such as cloning or transgenesis.
On the proponents’ second rejoinder—that a consequentialist analysis must
involve a balancing of means and ends—it is already clear that the potential ben-
efits of animal cloning to human medicine, food production, pharmaceutical ap-
plications, and even to animal species themselves are enormous. Given our cur-
rent ambivalence (or confusion) about the moral status of animals, it seems
reasonable to argue that if the cost to research animals is small enough and the
gain for human beings or animals is large enough, then animal cloning may well
be worth pursuing, at least until a consensus forms about the proper treatment
of animals in research.As cloning efficiency rates rise and health status improves,
the minimal suffering of a limited number of cattle or sheep may be outweighed
by the treatment benefits to human beings (and animals) that may be derived
Autumn Fiester
2 Our inconsistency in the treatment of animals across different domains is striking, even within the
same animal species or breeds. For example, one beagle might end up as a companion animal with
owners who believe it to be eminently reasonable to afford him a kidney transplant if the need arises
(at the price of approximately $14,000); another beagle may end up as a research animal in a cornea
lab, where he will have surgical procedures done to his eyes and then will be euthanized.The radi-
cally different life trajectories of these two animals depends completely on random chance, despite
the fact that the two beagles are indistinguishable in capacities, needs, characteristics, etc. In other
words, the grounds on which we normally determine moral status are alike in both cases, but these
“like” cases are treated as anything but “like.” It is this type of example that justifies my claim that
we are confused and inconsistent about the moral status of animals, whatever it turns out to be.
the $3.7 million Missyplicity Project, is a terrible waste of financial and intellec-
tual resources that could much better serve animal welfare interests if redirected
to better causes. But champions of pet cloning, including cloning scientists and
investors, are quick to point out there will only ever be a small number of pets
cloned even after the technology is perfected and widely available. On this argu-
ment, the number of animals who would be spared euthanasia in shelters if pet
owners chose pet adoption instead of cloning would not have any measurable
effect on the tragic numbers of animals euthanized.
In response, objectors could argue that this argument misses the mark: the crit-
icism assumes that only one animal life is at stake either way, one cloned or one
non-cloned. But the opponent to pet cloning is making a utilitarian argument
about distributive justice: the $20,000 (or $50,000) that one will have to spend to
create one clone could save the lives of literally thousands of non-clones. The pet
cloning issue also speaks to the moral status of animals. If animals have an intrin-
sic worth that merits this kind of expenditure, then it is criminal that we would
allow so many of the same creatures to die; resources simply need to be redistrib-
uted in a way that makes better ethical sense. Of course, proponents of pet cloning
will point out that the money in question can’t in fact be redistributed like this:
pet owners who are willing to shell out $20,000 to clone their own beloved pet
are not going to use that money to fund animal shelters should they decide not to
go ahead with the cloning. But this anti-cloning argument has another serious
flaw: if the argument is truly about redistribution of scarce resources, then why
limit the attack to those who would spend $20,000 to clone a pet? There are hun-
dreds of ways people could spend $20,000 on luxury items that could be used
instead to save the lives of animals in shelters—or donated to other noble causes.
As a society, we embrace the idea that (post taxes) individuals may spend their
money on whatever they choose, so this anti-cloning argument is a nonstarter.
Two other consequence-based arguments can be made against animal cloning
in general: it may have negative consequences for the environment, and it may
have negative consequences for human beings. Concerns about the environment
involve two different categories of animal cloning, cloning for conservation pur-
poses (the cloning of endangered or extinct species) and the cloning of livestock.
Both concerns are motivated by the effect of clones on the ecosystem.The ques-
tion here is whether there will be an adverse effect or an unanticipated impact
on the environment from the interaction of clones with the environment. This
question may be even more pressing with regard to the re-creation of extinct
species than with regard to endangered ones. History has shown that tampering
with ecosystems has often wreaked havoc on the animal and plant life living in
those systems.3 While animal cloning projects may not pose any more of a threat
3 Although there are exceptions in which alternations in the ecosystem can be argued to have pro-
duced a net good (Crosby 2003), given the many untoward consequences of so-called biological
exchange, these exceptions should not temper our concern.
Autumn Fiester
4 The South Korean scientists were attempting to clone human embryos for the purpose of thera-
peutic cloning—in other words, to harvest stem cells, not to produce a human fetus (Amos 2004).
cultural products but the moral permissibility of producing animal clones in the
first place, however that moral critique is explained.5
In summary, the consequentialist arguments against animal cloning raise im-
portant concerns, but they do not constitute a justification for a blanket rejec-
tion of animal cloning. In the case of adverse effects to human beings and the
environment, the solution appears to be tighter regulation of the industry as op-
posed to a banning of animal cloning. In the case of adverse effects to animals,
consequentialist arguments show that projects are morally permissible if the costs
in animal suffering are small and the benefits (to human beings and animals) are
large. To assess the moral permissibility of animal cloning on consequentialist
grounds, then, the moral permissibility of each cloning projects needs to be
decided on a case-by-case basis, and clearly some types of animal cloning will
not pass this cost-benefit analysis.
Principle-Based Arguments Against Animal Cloning
Apart from the ethical issues that arise because of the potential consequences
of animal cloning, there is a significant set of ethical concerns about cloning that
are based on deontological considerations. Critiques of animal cloning using this
approach claim that cloning science violates an important moral prohibition or
duty. This is the type of argument some have called an “intrinsic” objection, in
which the activity is objectionable in and of itself, irrespective of the conse-
quences (Comstock 2001).
The most well-known of these deontological arguments, and quite possibly
the prime source of the public’s condemnation, is the “playing God” problem:
ought we to be creating life in this matter? Is it our place to do this? On this
view, cloning is a hubristic attempt by human beings to be divine. Cloning and
many types of genetic engineering cross an important line between facilitating
the creation of life (as in assisted reproduction) and engineering life (see Rifkin
1983). In the first case, human beings are the builders using a God-given blue-
print; in the second, they are the architects.While many individuals making this
type of argument come from a religious tradition, thus anchoring their argu-
ments in theology, not all of them do.There is also a secular version of this moral
concern that argues that we dehumanize ourselves and devalue the natural world
5 Itseems unlikely that a consequentialist critique lies behind the overwhelming moral condemna-
tion of animal cloning by the American people. With the exception of the adverse consequences
to animals, the other consequences of animal cloning are purely hypothetical and have received lit-
tle mention in public discourse. The untoward consequences to animals are unlikely to be the
source of this moral critique, because twice as many Americans condemn animal cloning as con-
demn the use of animals in medical research (Saad 2004); at this point there is no reason to believe
that the consequences of cloning are worse than the consequences of using animals for medical
research. The public’s critique of animal cloning is more likely to be deontological in approach, as
discussed below.
Autumn Fiester
of an evangelical Protestant, argues that God wants human beings to pursue sci-
ence and endorses scientific endeavors like biotechnology. Cloning isn’t playing
God—it’s doing what God has given human beings the mental gifts to do. Ani-
mal cloning researcher Randall Prather makes a similar argument in an essay on
animal biotechnology, written for a conservative Christian publication:
If arguments like these enter the public discourse, they may well defuse this type
of deontological objection to animal cloning.
A second deontological argument is that cloning negates the intrinsic value
of animals through both objectification and commodification. In this view,
cloning treats animals as mere things, rather than living, breathing, sentient sub-
jects. While cloning opponents admit that animals are already considered prop-
erty and products, they argue that cloning takes this objectification to new lev-
els. Life for animals in agriculture, research, and the pharmaceutical industry is
already bad enough, it’s argued; cloning will desensitize us further from the suf-
fering of these entities, placing them even more firmly in the “thing” category.
If animals are simply objects that we can create, then how different are they from
disposable products like automobiles or telephones? When animals were first
being cloned in the mid- to late-1990s, the animals were given personal names,
emphasizing their subjecthood and uniqueness. More and more, cloned animals
are referred to by impersonal numbers and letters, rather than names Andrea
Bonnicksen writes:“The fact that Polly, Morag, Megan, and other creatures with
personal monikers are fading in the wake of the impersonally named [animals]
foretells a normalcy of genetic and cloning combinations in biotechnology”
(Bonnicksen 2001, p. 267). She cites as examples the cattle cloned in 1998 that
were designated “ACT3,” “ACT4,” and “ACT5,” not three years after the first
sheep were cloned (Cibelli et al. 1998). Of course, the proponents’ argument is
already made by the opponents: animals are now and have historically been con-
sidered objects, both legally and in practice, so cloning science simply reaffirms
the status quo, it does not change the status of animals. Livestock and research
animals are already referred to by numbers, not names. If this is acceptable prac-
tice in non-cloning breeding, then it constitutes no argument specific to the
cloning of animals.
By extension of the objectification argument, opponents to cloning argue that
cloning further commodifies animals. Even if they are already seen as products
for purchase, they are—at least sometimes—seen as ends in themselves as well.
Autumn Fiester
Cloning connotes “pure product” and implies that no attention need be paid to
them as subjects. Opponents ask where this ultra-commodification will take us
in terms of animal welfare. The distinction opponents may be trying to make
here is between being a “pure” means and a means while also at the same time
an end. For example, if traditional farmers argued that they “cared” about their
animals, then even if they sold them or had them butchered for food, they could
plausibly have been described as treating the animals as subjects or ends in them-
selves—while at the same time as a means for the farmer to sustain his life, phys-
ically or economically.This treatment of food animals as ends in themselves may
have waned with the rise of factory farming, but does cloning exacerbate this
trend? Does it delude us into believing that animals are no different from
machines? Parallel to the problems with the consequentialist arguments about
animal suffering, these deontological arguments attack many forms of contem-
porary use of animals and are not specific to animal cloning. But that does not
necessarily undermine their efficacy or seriousness. Society’s view of the moral
status and proper treatment of animals is in flux, and the deontological argu-
ments against animal cloning might be used to critique animal treatment more
broadly construed. The success of this argument rests with the public’s percep-
tion of the moral status of animals, and it may someday become the most com-
pelling anti-cloning argument. For now, cloning proponents must at least take
seriously this type of objection.
On a completely different type of deontological argument, specific types of
animal cloning are criticized on grounds of fraud or false promising. Pet cloning,
in particular, is vulnerable to this type of objection. Opponents argue that griev-
ing pet owners are deceived into believing that cloning is a way of resurrecting
a deceased and beloved pet.There is great potential for false promises here, since
cloning the animal would never replicate the exact pet due to the many envi-
ronmental factors that influence personality and even appearance (“CC,” the
cloned calico cat, does not look like the mother, for example). Owners who seek
to clone a deceased pet may have unrealistic expectations based on an assump-
tion of genetic determinism that may not be entirely disabused by the pet
cloning firms. Pet cloning websites vary in their treatment of this problem.The
Genetic Savings and Clone Website, for example, says: “Before gene banking
your pet, we urge you to answer one question as honestly as possible: do I want
to bank my pet’s DNA because I’m distraught and want the SAME pet back, or
because my pet had a special genetic endowment that ought to be preserved?
. . . If your honest answer is that you are grieving your pet’s loss and seeking an
identical replacement, then we respectfully discourage you from using our ser-
vices” (Genetic Savings and Clone 2004a). At rival Perpetuate’s Website, cus-
tomers are explicitly told that the cloned animal will be an identical twin, al-
though the site cryptically offers the following reason to clone the animal:“The
possibility of cloning a valued pet provides its owner with a degree of hope”
(Perpetuate 2003).
Conclusion
A review of the ethical issues in animal cloning shows that both consequence-
based and principle-based objections to cloning science constitute a serious cri-
tique that proponents of cloning need to consider.The public’s negative view of
animal cloning can be understood on either consequentialist or deontological
grounds, and to build societal consensus around animal cloning, these objections
need to receive more attention in the public discourse. Neglect of these issues
has had no ill effect on cloning science to date, but ignoring public sentiment
on animal cloning could have serious implications for the commercialization and
acceptance of cloning products from agriculture to the medical-pharmaceutical
industry.
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