NCLT Order Challenged in Madras HC, Not Maintainable

MANU/TN/1228/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

C.R.P. (PD) No. 525 of 2022 and C.M.P. No. 2785 of 2022
Decided On: 24.02.2022
Appellants: L & T Infra Investments Partners
Vs.
Respondent: Ebenezar Inbaraj and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M. Duraiswamy and T.V. Thamilselvi, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: P.S. Raman, Senior Counsel for Cibi Vishnu
For Respondents/Defendant: P.H. Arvind Pandian, Senior Counsel assisted by A.G.
Sathyanarayana
Case Note:
Insolvency - Order of NCLT - Maintainability of civil revision petition - Section
61 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Civil Revision Petition in
present case filed challenging order passed by National Company Law Tribunal
- Whether, inspite of provisions of Section 61 of IBC, Court can entertain Civil
Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution - Held, when appeal
remedy is provided under Act, aggrieved party should exhaust said remedy by
filing appeal before Appellate Forum - Writ Petition/Civil Revision Petition
filed by them under Articles 226/227 of Constitution is not maintainable -
When petitioner can raise all grounds available to them under law before
Appellate Forum, civil revision petition under Article 227 cannot be
entertained - Civil Revision Petition in present case filed challenging order
passed by National Company Law Tribunal is not maintainable - Petition
dismissed. [5]
ORDER
M. Duraiswamy, J.
1. Challenging the order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Division Bench-
II, Chennai, made in I.A.(IBC)/460/CHE/2021 in IBA/1099/2019, the petitioner has filed
the above Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. At the outset, Mr. P.H. Arvind Pandian, learned senior counsel appearing for the 1st
respondent raised objections with regard to the maintainability of the Civil Revision
Petition for the reason that as per Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016, the petitioner has got remedy only before the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal.
2.1. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel relied upon the following
judgments:
(i) MANU/SC/1661/2019 : (2020) 13 Supreme Court Cases 308 [Embassy
Property Developments Private Limited Vs. State of Karnataka and others]
18-03-2023 (Page 1 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"...
10. In the backdrop of the facts narrated and in the light of the rival
contentions extracted above, the first question that arises for
consideration is as to whether the High Court ought to interfere, under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, with an order [Vasudevan v. State
of Karnataka] passed by NCLT in a proceeding under the IBC, 2016,
despite the availability of a statutory alternative remedy of appeal to
NCLAT.
11. It is beyond any pale of doubt that the IBC, 2016 is a complete
code in itself. As observed by this Court in Innoventive Industries Ltd.
v. ICICI Bank [Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank,
MANU/SC/1063/2017 : (2018) 1 SCC 407 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 356 :
AIR 2017 SC 4084] it is an exhaustive code on the subject-matter of
insolvency in relation to corporate entities and others. It is also true
that the IBC, 2016 is a single Unified Umbrella Code, covering the
entire gamut of the law relating to insolvency resolution of corporate
persons and others in a time-bound manner. The Code provides a
three-tier mechanism, namely, (i) the NCLT, which is the adjudicating
authority, (ii) the NCLAT, which is the appellate authority, and (iii) this
Court as the final authority, for dealing with all issues that may arise in
relation to the reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate
persons. Insofar as insolvency resolution of corporate debtors and
personal guarantors are concerned, any order passed by the NCLT is
appealable to NCLAT under Section 61 of the IBC, 2016 and the orders
of the NCLAT are amenable to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 62. It is in this context that the action of the State of
Karnataka in bypassing the remedy of appeal to NCLAT and the act of
the High Court in entertaining the writ petition against the order
[Vasudevan v. State of Karnataka] of the NCLT are being questioned.
12. For finding an answer to the question on hand, the scope of the
jurisdiction and the nature of the powers exercised by -- (i) the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and (ii) the NCLT and
NCLAT under the provisions of the IBC, 2016 are to be seen.
Jurisdiction and the powers of the High Court under Article 226
13. What is recognised by Article 226(1) is the power of every High
Court to issue (i) directions, (ii) orders, or (iii) writs. They can be
issued to (i) any person, or (ii) authority including the Government.
They may be issued (i) for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III, and (ii) for any other purpose. But the exercise of
the power recognised by clause (1) of Article 226, is restricted by the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, determined either by its
geographical location or by the place where the cause of action, in
whole or in part, arose. While the nature of the power exercised by the
High Court is delineated in clause (1) of Article 226, the jurisdiction of
the High Court for the exercise of such power, is spelt out in both
clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226.

14. Traditionally, the jurisdiction under Article 226 was considered as
limited to ensuring that the judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or
administrative bodies do not exercise their powers in excess of their
statutory limits. But in view of the use of the expression "any person"
in Article 226(1), courts recognised that the jurisdiction of the High
Court extended even over private individuals, provided the nature of
the duties performed by such private individuals, are public in nature.
Therefore, the remedies provided under Article 226 are public law
remedies, which stand in contrast to the remedies available in private
law. As observed by this Court in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa
[Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, MANU/SC/0307/1993 : (1993) 2
SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527] public law proceedings serve a different
purpose than private law proceedings.
15. One of the well-recognised exceptions to the self-imposed restraint
of the High Courts, in cases where a statutory alternative remedy of
appeal is available, is the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
statutory/quasi-judicial authority, against whose order a judicial review
is sought. Traditionally, English courts maintained a distinction
between cases where a statutory/quasi-judicial authority exercised a
jurisdiction not vested in it in law and cases where there was a
wrongful exercise of the available jurisdiction. An "error of jurisdiction"
was always distinguished from "in excess of jurisdiction", until the
advent of the decision rendered by the House of Lords, by a majority of
3 : 2 in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission
[Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission,
MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)].
After acknowledging that a confusion had been created by the
observations made in R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p Armah [R.
v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p Armah, 1968 AC 192 : (1966) 3
WLR 828 (HL)] to the effect that if a Tribunal has jurisdiction to go
right, it has jurisdiction to go wrong, it was held in Anisminic
MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)]
that the real question was not whether an authority made a wrong
decision but whether they enquired into and decided a matter which
they had no right to consider.
1 6 . Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission,
MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)],
hailed as a breakthrough and a legal landmark (see Racal
Communications Ltd., In re [Racal Communications Ltd., In re,
MANU/UKHL/0016/1980 : 1981 AC 374 : (1980) 3 WLR 181 (HL)])
abolished the old distinction between errors of law that went to
jurisdiction and errors of law that did not. Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v.
Foreign Compensation Commission, MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2
AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)] was hailed in O'Reilly v. Mackman
[O'Reilly v. Mackman, MANU/UKHL/0054/1982 : (1983) 2 AC 237 :
(1982) 3 WLR 1096 (HL)] to have liberated English public law from the
fetters that the courts had theretofore imposed upon themselves so far
as determinations of inferior courts and statutory tribunals were
concerned, by drawing esoteric distinctions between errors of law
committed by such tribunals that went to their jurisdiction, and errors

of law committed by them within their jurisdiction.
1 7 . But Racal, In re [Racal Communications Ltd., In re,
MANU/UKHL/0016/1980 : 1981 AC 374 : (1980) 3 WLR 181 (HL)]
made a distinction between courts of law on the one hand and
administrative tribunal/administrative authority on the other and held
that insofar as (inferior) courts of law are concerned, the subtle
distinction between errors of law that went to jurisdiction and errors of
law that did not, would still survive, if the decisions of such courts are
declared by the statute to be final and conclusive. Thus one distinction
was gone with Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
Commission, MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2
WLR 163 (HL)], but another was born with Racal, In re [Racal
Communications Ltd., In re, MANU/UKHL/0016/1980 : 1981 AC 374 :
(1980) 3 WLR 181 (HL)]. This could be seen from the after-effects of
Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission,
MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)].
[Anisminic, MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR
163 (HL) had its own quota of problems. Prof. Wade, as pointed out in
R. v. Lord President of the Privy Council, ex p Page, 1993 AC 682 :
(1992) 3 WLR 1112 (HL), seems to have opined that the true effect of
Anisminic was still in doubt. People like Sir John Laws, quoted by Prof.
Paul Craig, and which was extracted in the decision in R. (Privacy
International) v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal,
MANU/UKSC/0022/2019 : 2019 UKSC 22 : (2019) 2 WLR 1219, seems
to have opined that once the distinction between jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional errors was discarded, there was no longer any need
for the ultra vires principle and that ultra vires is, in truth, a fig leaf
which has enabled the courts to intervene in decisions without an
assertion of judicial power which too nakedly confronts the established
authority of the Executive or other public bodies. According to Sir John
Laws, Anisminic, MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2
WLR 163 (HL) has produced the historical irony that with all its
emphasis on nullity, it nevertheless erected the legal milestone which
pointed towards a public law jurisprudence in which the concept of
voidness and the ultra vires doctrine have become redundant. In R.
(Privacy International), MANU/UKSC/0022/2019 : 2019 UKSC 22 :
(2019) 2 WLR 1219 the UK Supreme Court also quoted the editors of
De Smith's Judicial Review to the effect: "84.... 'The distinction
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error is ultimately based
upon foundations of sand. Much of the superstructure has already
crumbled. What remains is likely quickly to fall away as the courts
rightly insist that all administrative action should be simply, lawful,
whether or not jurisdictionally lawful.'" (WLR p. 1251, para 84)]
18. Interestingly just four days before the House of Lords delivered the
judgment in Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
WLR 163 (HL)] (on 17-12-1968), an identical view was taken by a
three-member Bench of this Court (delivered on 13-12-1968) in Official
Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee [Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath
Chatterjee, MANU/SC/0240/1968 : (1969) 3 SCR 92 : AIR 1969 SC
823] approving the view taken by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High

Court in Hriday Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra Barna Sarma [Hriday Nath
Roy v. Ram Chandra Barna Sarma, MANU/WB/0054/1920 : ILR (1921)
48 Cal 138]. It was held therein that : (Sachindra Nath Chatterjee case
[Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, MANU/SC/0240/1968 :
(1969) 3 SCR 92 : AIR 1969 SC 823], AIR p. 828, para 15)
"15. ...before a court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide
a particular matter it must not only have jurisdiction to try the
suit brought, but must also have the authority to pass the
orders sought for".
(emphasis supplied)
This Court also pointed out that it is not sufficient that it has some
jurisdiction in relation to the subject-matter of the suit, but its
jurisdiction must include (1) the power to hear and decide the
questions at issue, and (2) the power to grant the relief asked for. This
decision in Official Trustee [Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath
Chatterjee, MANU/SC/0240/1968 : (1969) 3 SCR 92 : AIR 1969 SC
823] was followed in a recent decision in IFFCO Ltd. v. Bhadra Products
[IFFCO Ltd. v. Bhadra Products, MANU/SC/0026/2018 : (2018) 2 SCC
534 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 208], quite independent of Anisminic
and its followers.
1 9 . Though the decision in Official Trustee [Official Trustee v.
Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, MANU/SC/0240/1968 : (1969) 3 SCR 92 :
AIR 1969 SC 823] preceded Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign
Compensation Commission, MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147
: (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)] and can proudly be claimed as the Indian
precursor to an English legal landmark, several subsequent decisions of
this Court considered Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign
: (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)] alone to have provided the breakthrough. In
Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v.
Union of India, MANU/SC/1203/1997 : (1997) 5 SCC 536],
Paripoornan, J. provided the list of Indian cases which cited Anisminic
with approval. They are:
(1) Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros. [Union of India
v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros., MANU/SC/0220/1971 : (1971) 1
SCC 486],
(2) A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
MANU/SC/0002/1988 : (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri)
372],
(3) R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad & Fatehchand Nursing Das v.
Settlement Commission [R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad &
Fatehchand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission,
MANU/SC/0429/1989 : (1989) 1 SCC 628 : 1989 SCC (Tax)

124],
(4) Associated Engg. Co. v. State of A.P. [Associated Engg. Co.
v. State of A.P., MANU/SC/0054/1992 : (1991) 4 SCC 93], and
(5) Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD [Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD,
MANU/SC/0522/1993 : (1993) 3 SCC 161].
2 0 . But in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur,
MANU/SC/0245/1972 : (1972) 2 SCC 427], K.K. Mathew, J., made
certain interesting observations about Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v.
Foreign Compensation Commission, MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2
AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)]. The learned Judge observed that the
effect of the dicta in Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
WLR 163 (HL)] is to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error
and error of law within jurisdiction almost to a vanishing point and that
it came perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction if the
decision is right in law, but none if it is wrong. Anisminic [Anisminic
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 :
(1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)], according to him virtually
left a court or tribunal with no margin of legal error.
21. Again in Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju [Hari Prasad
Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju, MANU/SC/0015/1973 : (1974) 3 SCC
415] K.K. Mathew, J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, pointed out
that though the dividing line between lack of jurisdiction or power and
the erroneous exercise of it has become thin with Anisminic [Anisminic
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 :
(1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)], the distinction had not
been wiped out completely.
22. But it is relevant to note that Official Trustee [Official Trustee v.
Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, MANU/SC/0240/1968 : (1969) 3 SCR92 :
AIR 1969 SC 823]/Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
WLR 163 (HL)] and what followed both, were mostly in the context of
the power of the superior court to interfere with the decisions of
subordinate courts/tribunals or administrative authorities. Most of these
decisions were not in the context of the exercise of jurisdiction despite
the availability of alternative remedy. That there exists such a
distinction between (i) cases where the jurisdiction of a superior court
is questioned on the basis of ouster clauses and (ii) cases where the
exercise of jurisdiction by a superior court is questioned on the ground
of availability of alternative remedy, was recognised even in Anisminic
MANU/UKHL/0001/1968 : (1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)],
when Lord Reid referred to the decision in Smith v. East Elloe Rural
District Council [Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council,
MANU/UKHL/0002/1956 : 1956 AC 736 : (1956) 2 WLR 888 (HL)] as
posing some difficulty. As a result, the Court of Appeal held in R. v.
Secy. of State for the Environment, ex p Ostler [R. v. Secy. of State for
the Environment, ex p Ostler, MANU/UKWA/0005/1976 : 1977 QB 122 :

(1976) 3 WLR 288 (CA)] that the availability of a statutory right to
challenge within a specified time-limit, among other points, provided a
sufficient basis for distinguishing Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign
: (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)]. This was taken note of by the UK Supreme
Court in Regina (Privacy International) [R. (Privacy International) v.
Investigatory Powers Tribunal, MANU/UKSC/0022/2019 : 2019 UKSC
22 : (2019) 2 WLR 1219]. Therefore the question whether the error
committed by an administrative authority/tribunal or a court of law
went to jurisdiction or whether it was within jurisdiction may still be
relevant to test whether a statutory alternative remedy should be
allowed to be bypassed or not.
23. In several cases, both in England and India, the ancient rule stated
by Willes, J., in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford
[Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford,
MANU/enrp/1697/1859 : (1859) 6 CBNS 336 : MANU/enrp/1697/1859
: 141 ER 486] to the effect that where a liability not existing at
Common Law is created by a statute, which also gives a special and
particular remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by the statute
must be followed, has been quoted with approval. For instance, United
Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati
Tondon, MANU/SC/0541/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC
(Civ) 260] held that the availability of a remedy of appeal under the
DRT Act, 1993 and SARFAESI Act, 2002 should deter the High Courts
from exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226. Similarly, the
availability of remedy of appeal under Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 as against an award of the Accidents Claims Tribunal
was held in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [Sadhana
Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., MANU/SC/0080/2003 : (2003) 3
SCC 524 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 762] as sufficient for the High Court to
refuse to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. The same principle was
applied in (1) Nivedita Sharma v. COAI [Nivedita Sharma v. COAI,
MANU/SC/1538/2011 : (2011) 14 SCC 337 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947],
and (2) Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory [Cicily Kallarackal v.
Vehicle Factory, MANU/SC/0672/2012 : (2012) 8 SCC 524 : (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 540] in relation to the awards passed by the special fora
constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
2 4 . Therefore insofar as the question of exercise of the power
conferred by Article 226, despite the availability of a statutory
alternative remedy, is concerned, Anisminic [Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign
: (1969) 2 WLR 163 (HL)] cannot be relied upon. The distinction
between the lack of jurisdiction and the wrongful exercise of the
available jurisdiction, should certainly be taken into account by High
Courts, when Article 226 is sought to be invoked bypassing a statutory
alternative remedy provided by a special statute."
(ii) In an unreported judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court
dated 09.09.2020 made in W.A. No. 1083 of 2020 [Sulochana Gupta Vs. RBG
Enterprises Private Limited] it has been held as follows:

"...
48. Issues raised for consideration in this appeal are:-
1 . On the facts and circumstances of the case, when an order
of the NCLT is challenged, writ petition has to be filed under
Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India.
2 . Whether a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is maintainable, when an alternate remedy
is available.
3. Whether a writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of
the Constitution, when a party pursues multiple remedies.
4. Whether a writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of
the Constitution, in a dispute between private parties.
5 . Whether a relief available under Article 226 of the
Constitution, when the respondents/writ petitioners are guilty
of suppression of crucial material.
6 . Whether NCLT should be made a party, in a petition filed
under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution, as the case may
be.
7 . Whether the judgment in W.P.(C) No. 14341/2020 dated
22.07.2020 can be treated as a binding precedent, so as to
enable the respondents to file a writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
8 . Whether the appellants have been given adequate
opportunity to file a counter affidavit before the writ court.
9. Whether the writ appeal has become infructuous.
49. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the
materials available on record.
5 0 . Though rival contentions have been made on the merits of the
disputes, in the company petition, we are not inclined to delve into the
same, and deem it fit to address issues stated above.
51. Admittedly, challenging the interim order of the NCLT, Kochi in I.A.
No. 83/2020 in C.P. No. 114/KOB/2019 dated 09.07.2020, writ petition
has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the
reliefs, stated above.
...
116. Material on record discloses that the dispute between the first
respondent company and its shareholders, under challenge, is purely a
civil dispute. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
is available against a State or authority or instrumentality of the State,
falling within the ambit of the definition "State" under Article 12 of the

Constitution of India.
117. Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
can be for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other
purpose, as envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is
no pleadings or materials to substantiate that the appellants are
discharging public duties or public functions, and thus, amenable to
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
118. On a scrutiny of the decisions extracted above, it is clear that
insofar as challenge to the judicial acts of the Courts or the Tribunals,
in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Court exercises overall superintendence on such Tribunals
under Article 227. Orders by Courts or Tribunals, as the case may be,
can be challenged by way of filing a writ petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India, and the administrative orders passed by the
Courts, or the Tribunals, as the case may be, can be challenged under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Administrative orders passed by the
State, authority or instrumentality of the State, can be challenged by
way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as
they do not fall under the ambit of superintendence and control, in
exercise of Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
119. Difference between the exercise of powers under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India has been explained in the foregoing
paragraphs. Thus, in the case on hand, when none of the parties, State
or authority or instrumentality of the State, or any private body,
discharging public functions, have been arrayed as respondents, when
the writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, having regard to the roster followed in listing the cases, writ
court ought to have directed the respondents/writ petitioners to make
necessary amendments, to the provisions under which the writ petition
ought to have been filed, or in the alternative, directed that the writ
petition be placed before the concerned court, dealing with the
challenges made to the orders passed by Courts, or Tribunals, as the
case may be. Admittedly, the order impugned in the writ petition
(Exhibit-P1) is not an administrative order, passed by the National
Company Law Tribunal.
120. Writ court, without drawing a distinction between a writ petition
filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitutions of India, has
erroneously proceeded to entertain the writ petition under Article 226
against an interim order passed by the NCLT, Kochi Bench, in I.A. No.
83/2020 in C.P. No. 114/KOB/2019 dated 9.7.2020. In Maharashtra
Chess Association v. Union of India & Ors. the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has considered, as to what the High Court should consider before
entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, and held as under:
"22. This brings us to the question of whether Clause 21 itself
creates a legal bar on the Bombay High Court exercising its
writ jurisdiction. As discussed above, the writ jurisdiction of
the High Court is fundamentally discretionary. Even the

existence of an alternate adequate remedy is merely an
additional factor to be taken into consideration by the High
Court in deciding whether or not to exercise its writ
jurisdiction. This is in marked contradistinction to the
jurisdiction of a civil court which is governed by statute.
[Section 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred - The
Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have
jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of
which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred].
In exercising its discretion to entertain a particular case under
Article 226, a High Court may take into consideration various
factors including the nature of the injustice that is alleged by
the petitioner, whether or not an alternate remedy exists, or
whether the facts raise a question of constitutional
interpretation. These factors are not exhaustive and we do not
propose to enumerate what factors should or should not be
taken into consideration. It is sufficient for the present
purposes to say that the High Court must take a holistic view of
the facts as submitted in the writ petition and make a
determination on the facts and circumstances of each unique
case.
23. At this juncture, it is worth discussing the decision of this
Court in Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering
[MANU/SC/1043/1993 : (1994) 4 SCC 710]. In that case, the
contract between the parties contained a clause conferring
jurisdiction on the courts at Aligarh. When the High Court of
Calcutta exercised its writ jurisdiction over the matter, this
Court held:
"2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of
Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it
had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were
executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried
out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of
dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The
arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely
because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High
Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it
had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are
constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of jurisdiction
and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the
Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause
of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It
clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court
was thoroughly unsustainable."
24. The court examined the facts holistically, noting that the
contract was executed and to be performed in Aligarh, and the
arbitrator was to function at Aligarh. It did consider that the
contract conferred jurisdiction on the courts at Aligarh, but this
was one factor amongst several considered by the court in
determining that the High Court of Calcutta did not have

jurisdiction.
2 5 . In the present case, the Bombay High Court has relied
solely on Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws to hold
that its own writ jurisdiction is ousted. The Bombay High Court
has failed to examine the case holistically and make a
considered determination as to whether or not it should, in its
discretion, exercise its powers under Article 226. The scrutiny
to be applied to every writ petition under Article 226 by the
High Court is a crucial safeguard of the rule of law under the
Constitution in the relevant territorial jurisdiction. It is not
open to a High Court to abdicate this responsibility merely due
to the existence of a privately negotiated document ousting its
jurisdiction.
2 6 . It is certainly open to the High Court to take into
consideration the fact that the Appellant and the second
Respondent consented to resolve all their legal disputes before
the courts at Chennai. However, this can be a factor within the
broader factual matrix of the case. The High Court may decline
to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 invoking the principle
of forum non conveniens in an appropriate case. The High
Court must look at the case of the Appellant holistically and
make a determination as to whether it would be proper to
exercise its writ jurisdiction. We do not express an opinion as
to what factors should be considered by the High Court in the
present case, nor the corresponding gravity that should be
accorded to such factors. Such principles are well known to the
High Court and it is not for this Court to interfere in the
discretion of the High Court in determining when to engage its
writ jurisdiction unless exercised arbitrarily or erroneously. The
sole and absolute reliance by the Bombay High Court on Clause
21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws to determine that its
jurisdiction under Article 226 is ousted is however one such
instance.
2 7 . We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 25
September 2018. Writ Petition No. 7770 of 2017 is accordingly
restored to the file of the High Court for being considered
afresh. No costs."
...
126. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the issues raised for
consideration are answered in favour of the appellants. In the result,
this Writ Appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment in W.P.(C) No. 14341
of 2020 dated 22.07.2020 is set aside.
...
121. Applying the above said decision to the case on hand, we are of
the view that the writ court, while entertaining the writ petition, has not
considered or examined the facts holistically.

122. Giving due consideration to the decisions on jurisdiction, we are
of the view that there is an error in exercising the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India."
(iii)MANU/TN/7475/2020 : (2021) 225 Comp. Cas 442 (Mad) [Hero Exports Vs.
K. Vasudevan, Resolution Professional and others], wherein the Division Bench
of this Court held as follows:
"...
12. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment reported
in MANU/SC/1661/2019 : [2019] 17 Scale 37 : [2020] 9 Comp. Case-
OL 609 (SC) (Embassy Property Developments P. Ltd., Vs. State of
Karnataka).
13. This Court has carefully considered the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel for the petitioner and also perused the materials placed
before it.
14. It is relevant to extract Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016:
"11: Inherent Powers:- Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed
to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Tribunal
to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends
of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Tribunal."
15. The first respondent/IRP, in the e-mail communication dated April
12, 2019, had given reasons and the revision petitioner/applicant filed
two miscellaneous applications with the following prayer:
"In the light of the above and in the interest of justice and in
furtherance of the object of the Code, it is therefore, prayed that this
Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to set aside the order in
IND/811/2019 dated August 30, 2019 of the learned Assistant Registrar
of National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai and direct the Registry to
number the Miscellaneous Application and pass such further or other
orders as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case and thus render justice."
1 6 . The National Company Law Tribunal/Tribunal, in the impugned
order held that the said prayer virtually amounts to reversal/recall of
the resolution plan and the same cause could be taken as a ground for
filing an appeal under Section 32 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
and not by way of this application which is impermissible in law. As
regards exercise of inherent power, the Tribunal has observed that
assuming the power of recall is in-built in Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code and it can be exercised only in cases where the order is passed
without jurisdiction or fraudulently obtained and that is not the case
here and the Tribunal, further observed that in the absence of specific
conferment of review jurisdiction, it cannot exercise the power to
review.
17. In the decision of Embassy Property Developments P. Ltd. Vs. State
of Karnataka reported in MANU/SC/1661/2019 : [2019] 17 Scale 37 :

[2020] 9 Comp. Case-OL 609 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
has considered the interplay between Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
certain provisions of the Companies Act and Mines and Minerals
[Development and Regulation] Act and Mines and Mineral Concession
Rules and other related Rules as well as the power of the High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
18. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in paragraph No. 24 has observed that
(page 628 of 9 Comp. Case-OL) "the distinction between lack of
jurisdiction and wrongful exercise of available jurisdiction should
certainly be taken into account by High Courts, when Article 226 is
sought to be invoked bypassing a statutory alternative remedy provided
by a special statute.' In paragraph No. 30 of the said judgment, the
Hon'ble Apex Court of India had dealt with the jurisdiction and the
powers of National Company Law Tribunal. There cannot be any
difficulty in accepting the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in
the above cited decision for the reason that it is also a well settled
position of law.
19. The revision petitioner, under the guise of filing a revision, under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, wants this Court to issue a
positive direction to National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Bench, to
exercise its inherent power in a particular manner. In the considered
opinion of the Court, it cannot issue a positive direction to National
Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Bench, as to how it should exercise its
inherent power. The National Company Law Tribunal/Tribunal also
found that in real sense, the revision petitioner wants to recall of the
Resolution Plan and the said cause could be taken as a ground for filing
an appeal under Section 32 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
Thus, there is an effective alternate remedy provided to the revision
petitioner who also claimed to be an Operational Creditor.
20. If this Court starts entertaining revision petitions like this, there is
a likelihood of opening of flood gates where the alleged aggrieved
person, without resorting to the alternate remedy of appeal, would
often approach this Court and that is not the object of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code.
21. This Court, on an independent appraisal of the entire materials as
well as the contents of the impugned order passed by National
Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Bench, is of the considered view that
there is no error apparent or infirmity in the reasons assigned and finds
no merit in this Civil Revision Petition.
2 2 . At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner would
submit that the revision petition was filed on December 6, 2019 and it
was returned for production of the approval of the Resolution Plan and
vide endorsement dated January 22, 2020, the papers were represented
and the revision itself came to be numbered on February 5, 2020. The
learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the
proviso to Section 61[2] of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and
would submit that since the period of limitation is self contained one
and that the impugned order came to be passed as early as on

November 4, 2019, the petitioner may not be in a position to avail the
appeal remedy.
23. This Court has considered the said submission. From the perusal of
the papers, it is prima facie disclosed that the petitioner was diligently
prosecuting the proceedings by filing Civil Revision Petition and though
it was presented on December 6, 2019, it came to be numbered on
February 5, 2020 after compliance of certain returns. Therefore, it is for
the revision petition to convince the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal as to how the appeal petition is within the limitation period.
24. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition stands dismissed. No costs.
Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed."
3 . Mr. P.S. Raman, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that
inspite of the provisions of Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016,
this Court can entertain the Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution. The jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226/227 cannot be wholly
excluded and that the decisions of the Tribunal will be subject to the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Articles 226/227.
3.1. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel relied upon a judgment
reported in MANU/SC/0261/1997 : (1997) 3 Supreme Court Cases 261 [L. Chandra
Kumar Vs. Union Bank of India and others] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
follows:
"...
91. It has also been contended before us that even in dealing with cases which
are properly before the Tribunals, the manner in which justice is dispensed by
them leaves much to be desired. Moreover, the remedy provided in the parent
statutes, by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the
Constitution, is too costly and inaccessible for it to be real and effective.
Furthermore, the result of providing such a remedy is that the docket of the
Supreme Court is crowded with decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on
relatively trivial grounds and it is forced to perform the role of a first appellate
court. We have already emphasised the necessity for ensuring that the High
Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of the
Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R.K. Jain case
[MANU/SC/0291/1993 : (1993) 4 SCC 119 : 1993 SCC (L & S) 1128 : (1993)
25 ATC 464], after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the
possibility of an appeal from the Tribunal on questions of law to a Division
Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be
pursued. It appears that no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the
suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having
regard to both the aforestated contentions, we hold that all decisions of
Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the
Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within
whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls."
3.2. Further, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that a Larger Bench
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in MANU/SC/0595/2007 : AIR
2007 Supreme Court 861 [I.R. Coelho (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu],

followed the ratio laid down in the judgment reported in MANU/SC/0261/1997 : (1997)
3 Supreme Court Cases 261, cited supra.
4 . On a careful consideration of the materials available on record, the submissions
made by the learned senior counsel on either side and also the judgments relied upon
by them, it is clear that as per Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016,
the petitioner has got remedy by way of an appeal before the National Company Law
Appellate Tribunal. However, without exhausting the appeal remedy available to them,
the petitioner has filed the Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.
4.1. In the judgment reported in MANU/SC/1279/2018 : (2019) 13 Supreme Court
Cases 497 [ICICI Bank Limited and others Vs. Umakanta Mohapatra and others], the
Apex Court held as follows:
"...
2 . Despite several judgments of this Court, including a judgment by Hon'ble
Navin Sinha, J., as recently as on 30-1-2018, in State Bank of Travancore v.
Mathew K.C. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., MANU/SC/0054/2018 :
(2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41], the High Courts continue to
entertain matters which arise under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI),
and keep granting interim orders in favour of persons who are non-performing
assets (NPAs).
3. The writ petition itself was not maintainable, as a result of which, in view of
our recent judgment, which has followed earlier judgments of this Court, held
as follows: (SCC p. 94, para 17)
"17. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for
reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem
Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. [Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v.
Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd., MANU/SC/0639/1997 : (1997)
6 SCC 450], observing: (SCC p. 463, para 32)
'32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of
judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to
judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts
including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and
then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the
settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be
permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the
subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in
passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of
granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties.
It is time that this tendency stops.'"
4. The writ petition, in this case, being not maintainable, obviously, all orders
passed must perish, including the impugned order [Umakanta Mohapatra v.
ICICI Bank, WP (C) No. 5890 of 2012, order dated 3-2-2014 (Ori); Sabita
Kumar Nayak v. ICICI Bank, WP (C) No. 18460 of 2013, order dated3-2-2014
(Ori); Dharmendra Panigrahi v. ICICI Bank Ltd.; Satyajit K. Jena v. ICICI Bank
Ltd.; Kalandi Ch. Behera v. ICICI Bank; Umasankar Misra v. ICICI Bank;
Asutosh Mishra v. RBI; Arabinda Mohanty v. ICICI Bank], which is set aside."

4.2. Similarly, in the judgment reported in MANU/SC/0054/2018 : (2018) 3 Supreme
Court Cases 85 [Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another], the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:
"...
1 0 . In Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon,
MANU/SC/0541/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] the High
Court had restrained [Satyawati Tondon v. State of U.P.] further proceedings
under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory
scheme under the SARFAESI Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrieved
under Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Section
18 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it
was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the
alternate statutory remedy available holding: (SCC pp. 123 & 128, paras 43 &
55)
"43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the
High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved
person and that this Rule applies with greater rigour in matters
involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and
the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while
dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for
recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that
the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for
recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not
only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also
envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the
grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the
High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of
the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under
the relevant statute.
***
5 5 . It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated
pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the
availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI
Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which
have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial
institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the
High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater
caution, care and circumspection."
1 1 . In Union Bank of India v. Panchanan Subudhi [Union Bank of India v.
Panchanan Subudhi, MANU/SC/1229/2009 : (2010) 15 SCC 552 : (2013) 2 SCC
(Civ) 221], further proceedings under Section 13(4) were stayed in the writ
jurisdiction subject to deposit of Rs 10,00,000 leading this Court to observe as
follows: (SCC pp. 553-54, para 7)
"7. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court was clearly
erroneous. When the respondent failed to abide by the terms of one-
time settlement, there was no justification for the High Court to

entertain the writ petition and that too by ignoring the fact that a
statutory alternative remedy was available to the respondent under
Section 17 of the Act."
12. The same view was reiterated in Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of
Maharashtra [Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra,
MANU/SC/0103/2011 : (2011) 2 SCC 782 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 570],
observing: (SCC p. 789, para 23)
"23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed
[Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra] the petition on
the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants
under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an
efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person.
(See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [Sadhana Lodh v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd., MANU/SC/0080/2003 : (2003) 3 SCC 524
: 2003 SCC (Cri) 762], Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai [Surya Dev
Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, MANU/SC/0559/2003 : (2003) 6 SCC 675] and
SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories[SBI v. Allied Chemical
Laboratories, MANU/SC/2624/2005 : (2006) 9 SCC 252].)"
13. In Ikbal [Sri Siddeshwara Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, MANU/SC/0856/2013 :
(2013) 10 SCC 83 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 638] it was observed that the action of
the bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act available to challenge by the
aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution
directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tondon
[United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, MANU/SC/0541/2010 : (2010) 8
SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] observing: (Ikbal case [Sri Siddeshwara
Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, MANU/SC/0856/2013 : (2013) 10 SCC 83 : (2013) 4
SCC (Civ) 638], SCC pp. 94-95, paras 27-28)
"27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is
well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate
remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under
Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot
be allowed to be circumvented.
28.... In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the
learned Single Judge [Ikbal v. Registrar of Coop. Societies] to allow the
borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him under
Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when
he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single
Judge was clearly in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The
Division Bench [Sri Siddeshwara Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal ] also erred
in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge."
14. A similar view was taken in Punjab National Bank v. Imperial Gift House
[Punjab National Bank v. Imperial Gift House, MANU/SC/1010/2009 : (2013) 14
SCC 622], observing: (SCC p. 622, paras 3-4)
"3. Upon receipt of notice, the respondents filed representation under

Section 13(3-A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any
further action could be taken under Section 13(4) of the Act by the
Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High Court.
4. In our view, the High Court [Imperial Gift House v. Punjab National
Bank] was not justified in entertaining the writ petition against the
notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act and quashing the
proceedings initiated by the Bank."
15. It is the solemn duty of the court to apply the correct law without waiting
for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well
settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the
case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the
relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex parte interim orders can have a
deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the
remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions
are granted from public money generated at the taxpayer's expense. Such loan
does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its
character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the
public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in
need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by
frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution
required, as expressed in Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati
Tondon, MANU/SC/0541/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260],
has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:
(SCC pp. 123-24, para 46)
"46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State
and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees,
etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and
disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal
obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the
dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted
by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial
health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove
detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court
should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion
to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to
show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in
Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad
[Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad,
MANU/SC/0399/1968 : AIR 1969 SC 556], Whirlpool Corpn. v.
Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks,
MANU/SC/0664/1998 : (1998) 8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia v.
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
MANU/SC/1199/2002 : (2003) 2 SCC 107] and some other judgments,
then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters
and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order."
5 . On a perusal of the recent judgments of the Apex Court, it is clear that when an
appeal remedy is provided under the Act, the aggrieved party should exhaust the said
remedy by filing an appeal before the Appellate Forum and the Writ Petition/Civil
Revision Petition filed by them under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is not

maintainable. When the petitioner can raise all the grounds available to them under law
before the Appellate Forum, the filing of the Civil Revision Petition under Article 227
cannot be entertained.
6 . In such view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the Civil Revision
Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the order passed by the
National Company Law Tribunal is not maintainable. Accordingly, the Civil Revision
Petition is dismissed as not maintainable. No costs. Consequently, the connected
miscellaneous petition is closed.
© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

NCLT Order Challenged in Madras HC, Not Maintainable

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

NCLT Order Challenged in Madras HC, Not Maintainable

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MANU/TN/1228/2022

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

18-03-2023 (Page 1 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 2 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 3 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 4 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 5 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 6 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 7 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 8 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 9 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 10 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 11 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 12 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 13 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 14 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 15 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 16 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 17 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 18 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

18-03-2023 (Page 19 of 19) www.manupatra.com NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

You might also like