TikTok, ByteDance, and Their Ties To The Chinese Communist Party

Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media
Submission 34
TikTok, ByteDance,
and their ties to the
Chinese Communist Party
Submission to the Senate Select Committee

on Foreign Interference through Social Media
14 March 2023
Rachel Lee
Prudence Luttrell
Matthew Johnson
John Garnaut
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Contents
About this Submission ............................................................................................... 3

Executive Summary .................................................................................................. 7
1. Why TikTok Matters .............................................................................................. 9
2. TikTok and Xi’s External Propaganda Plan ........................................................... 16
3. The ByteDance Origin Story ................................................................................ 25
4. The Party-State Transforms ByteDance ............................................................... 32
5. Tracing Communist Party Control Through ByteDance and TikTok ....................... 37
6. ByteDance Serves Party Propaganda .................................................................. 51
7. ByteDance in China’s Military-Industrial-Surveillance Complex.............................. 61
8. Analysing the App: Content Quality and Access to Sensitive User Data ................ 67
9. Taking Stock of the Evidence............................................................................... 77
Appendix 1: Static Analysis Methodology ................................................................. 84
Appendix 2: Device Data Accessible to TikTok App.................................................. 85
Appendix 3: ‘android.permission’ Strings in TikTok Code .......................................... 86
References ............................................................................................................. 88
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About this Submission

This submission is addressed to:
Committee Secretary
Department of the Senate
PO Box 6100
Canberra ACT 2600
The authors of this report* express thanks to the Australian Senate Select Committee on
Foreign Interference through Social Media for the opportunity to make this submission.
Our submission is motivated by concerns that TikTok (and potentially other platforms
subject to authoritarian political leverage) pose risks not only to the data privacy of individual
users, but to social cohesion, democratic functioning, and the national security interests of
democratic nations including Australia and its partners and allies.
The analysis in this report is anchored in open-source material, as can be examined in the
hundreds of endnotes. Many of our references point to Chinese-language sources that
have been overlooked by the public debate to date. Some of our most important sources
have been excavated from digital archives after being taken offline by TikTok’s parent
company, ByteDance, or authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Our research confirms beyond any plausible doubt that TikTok is owned by ByteDance,
ByteDance is a PRC company, and ByteDance is subject to all the influence, guidance and
de facto control to which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, the Party) now subjects all
PRC technology companies. We show how the CCP and PRC state agencies (together, the
Party-state) have extended their ties into ByteDance to the point that the company can no
longer be accurately described as a private enterprise.
These findings draw on previously unexamined sources and contradict many of TikTok’s
public statements. The most significant findings, in our view, relate to how TikTok’s
capabilities may be integrated with what China’s leader Xi Jinping describes as the Party’s
“external discourse mechanisms”.
TikTok has recently generated attention among politicians and policymakers for its potential
use as a data access and surveillance tool, leading to multiple national and state
governments banning the app’s use on government-issued devices. 1 Mostly missing,
however, has been discussion of how TikTok provides Beijing with the latent capability to
*
Rachel Lee is a pseudonym as requested by the author and agreed by the Committee.
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“weaponise” the platform by suppressing, amplifying and otherwise calibrating narratives

in ways that micro-target political constituencies abroad.
TikTok undoubtably possesses the requisite capabilities, and a close examination of

Chinese-language sources reveals the Chinese leadership’s intent. Our research shows
how ByteDance’s 10-year development journey tracks with Xi Jinping’s efforts to
“meticulously build an external discourse mechanism [and] utilise the role of emerging
media”, as Xi told a “Study Session” of China’s top leaders in December 2013.2
In 2017, ByteDance launched TikTok and acquired the U.S. company Musical.ly. At the
same time, Beijing launched a six-year regulatory campaign to build Party control systems
inside ByteDance and accelerated the integration of senior corporate leaders into its “public
opinion guidance” regime. Over this same period, Beijing has blocked the TikTok app inside
China while enabling it to flourish outside China – to the point that it is now one of the most
sophisticated and powerful social media platforms in the world.
In May 2021, Xi returned to another Politburo “Study Session” and instructed his colleagues
to use the “external discourse mechanisms” that they had built in order to “target different
regions, different countries, and different groups of audiences” with “precise
communication methods” in order to “make friends, unite and win the majority, and
constantly expand our circle of friends who know China and are China-friendly.”3
Xi did not name TikTok in the official meeting readout, published by Xinhua. Subsequently,
however, the People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) elaborated on Xi’s message in an article
(republished by Xinhua) that called for China to “allow short video platforms to become
‘megaphones’ for telling Chinese stories well and spreading Chinese voices well”.4 The
article mentioned TikTok specifically as the representative example of short video platforms.
In Washington, in the pre-TikTok era, Russian intelligence actors "interfered in the 2016
presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion", according to the Mueller report.5
They did this by waging "a social media campaign that favoured presidential candidate
Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton", while seeking to
"provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States".6
Mueller found no evidence that Russia caused the election of Trump or that Trump had
colluded with Russia. Nevertheless, Russia’s interference fed perceptions that bitterly
divided Americans and wounded the faith of many that the election had been free and fair.
In Canberra, the spectacle of Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election provided
impetus to an Australian Government investigation into authoritarian interference in the
Australian political system. According to media reports, the classified inter-agency report
delivered in 2017 found that “the CCP's operations are aimed at all levels of government
and designed to gain access and influence over policy making.”7
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According to the then-Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, this analytical work “galvanised”
the Australian Government to deliver a comprehensive counter foreign interference
strategy, with bipartisan support. 8 It also generated conversations in other Five Eyes
nations, catalysed Australia’s strategic recalibration with respect to China,9 and contributed
to decisions such as blocking Huawei from 5G networks (2018), elevating the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue to leadership level (2021), and forging the three-nation AUKUS
agreement to jointly develop emerging technologies and deliver nuclear-powered
submarines to Australia (2021 and 2023).
In Ottawa, intelligence agencies reportedly found in 2017 that the CCP was interfering at
“all levels of government”.10 In contrast with Australia, however, Canada’s political leaders
did not act, and the problem of CCP interference continued to grow.11
Last week, while battling allegations of turning a blind eye,12 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
announced two probes into foreign interference and a special rapporteur who will have “a
wide mandate to make expert recommendations on protecting and enhancing Canadians’
faith in our democracy”.13 Whatever is revealed, the damage already caused to Canadian
democracy is real.
In the absence of policy action, TikTok could be the next challenge to democracies’
resilience against authoritarian interference. As ever, the challenge is to deal with the
potential for foreign interference before ‘elite capture’ becomes ‘state capture’.
It is possible that TikTok has already become so entrenched in some jurisdictions that
politicians fear that banning TikTok might amount to political self-sabotage. As U.S.
Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo told Bloomberg earlier this month: “The politician
in me thinks you’re gonna literally lose every voter under 35, forever.”14
If the risks remain unaddressed, the integrity of future elections could be vulnerable to
allegations from both analysts and opportunists that elections have been “rigged” by a
condominium of politicians and China’s super-app TikTok. Much of it might be overstated,
but – in the absence of effective policy action – there will be enough truth to make the
allegations stick, leaving the credibility of democratic processes in doubt.
Our purpose in submitting this report is not to prescribe legislative or administrative actions,
but to contribute constructively to public conversations and regulatory deliberations by
identifying relevant empirical source material and filling analytical gaps.
In recent years, Australia has been a pioneer among democratic countries in building a
bipartisan foundation for analysing and building resilience against authoritarian foreign
interference. We submit this work to the Australian Senate because we believe Australia
could play a similarly constructive role again.
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Disclaimer
Our report relies on a wide range of online and other publicly available sources on TikTok,
ByteDance, their relationship to China’s Party-state, and risks they may pose to data
privacy, national security, and the integrity of democratic systems globally.
To our knowledge, many of the most significant Chinese-language sources cited in this
report have been overlooked in the public debate surrounding these companies. We
consider our analysis to be sound and factual, and present it in the good faith belief that it
is, but we are not in a position to independently verify the accuracy of the information
contained in any public records.
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1. Why TikTok Matters
This section sets out national security risks posed by TikTok to democratic nations,
and the essential context for understanding those risks.
a. TikTok Is a News Platform: TikTok’s claim that it is only an entertainment

platform is untenable. Last year a third of adult users got their news from it,
while one in six U.S. teens say they are on the platform “almost constantly”.
b. Opacity and Obfuscation: TikTok is one of the world’s most important media
platforms and yet remarkably little is known about it – thanks in part to parent
company ByteDance’s efforts to airbrush basic information about the
company’s founder, corporate structure, partners, and activities.
c. Narrative Control: Concerns about Beijing using TikTok for data harvesting
and surveillance are well-founded. In our view, however, bigger risks involve
TikTok’s unique potential for shaping global narratives and curating a CCP-
friendly political landscape.
1.1. The Rise of TikTok, the App that “Gazes Back”
It is news to no one that TikTok – as an app and a business – has exploded since its
inception. The scale of the platform’s deep insights into users’ tastes and preferences has
revolutionised the way societies (and young people in particular) access information. It has
ushered in what could be described as the latest epochal shift in broadcast media. As
TikTok proclaimed, “relevance is the new reach”.15
With this shift, social media is moving away from reliance on the user to actively decide
what kind of content they want to see (by curating their own feed), toward personalised
content recommendations through algorithms that respond to cues such as watch time,
with only passive participation required of the user.
It is these algorithms, and the artificial intelligence that powers them, that led one tech
blogger in 2020 to write, “When you gaze into TikTok, TikTok gazes into you.”16 Paired with
the short video format that delivers both instant gratification for the viewer and exponential
volumes of data about user interests to the app, the algorithm can deliver content
recommendations with uncanny accuracy. It is no wonder then that other companies have
sought to learn from and compete with the TikTok model (see Meta’s Instagram Reels and
Alphabet’s YouTube Shorts).
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Comprehensive statistics for the Australian user base are hard to come by, but there is
ample data on TikTok consumers both globally and in the U.S.
"The latest [global] data suggest that TikTok has been adding an average of
more than 650,000 new users every day over the past 3 months, which
equates to almost 8 new users every second."18
TikTok has become the crucial medium for political actors to reach younger demographics,
especially Gen Z. “There’s no way that we can be a youth organisation trying to reach young
people and not be on TikTok,” said Cristina Tzintzún Ramirez, president of U.S. progressive
political action committee NextGen America.19
Politicians, of course, face the same dilemma. U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo
recently told Bloomberg of her own concerns:
Passing a law to ban a single company [TikTok] is not the way to deal with this
issue. The politician in me thinks you’re gonna literally lose every voter under
35, forever. However much I hate TikTok – and I do, because I see the
addiction in the bad s*** that it serves kids – you know, this is America.20
TikTok has revolutionised the attention economy. And yet TikTok describes itself only as an
“entertainment platform” on a mission to “inspire creativity and bring joy”.21 According to
TikTok’s VP and Head of Public Policy for the Americas, Michael Beckerman:
We are not the go-to place for politics. . . .The primary thing that people are
coming and using TikTok for is entertainment and joyful and fun content.22
But the claim that TikTok is about entertainment rather than politics is untenable in light of
the facts. (See figure on previous page.) Increasing volumes of social media users are
getting their news from the platform and using it as a search engine to navigate key issues.
The numbers tell a story of an unimaginably successful algorithm, and an app that has
gained unmatched sway over society and politics seemingly overnight.
To understand how this was possible, we must delve into the creation stories of TikTok, its
China analogue and precursor, Douyin, and their USD 400 billion parent company,
ByteDance, which is the most valuable startup in the world.23 Understanding ByteDance,
Douyin and TikTok requires understanding China’s ruling Communist Party and its guiding
ideology, organisational structures, and legal and extra-legal mechanisms for influencing,
coercing and controlling China’s nominally privately-owned technology companies.
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1.2. Opacity and Obfuscation
Answering basic questions about how the app works, how it is controlled, and who controls
it is not straightforward. ByteDance’s company website contains just the bare bones, shorn
of details about the company’s founder, corporate structure, partners, and sizeable
investment into AI.
Media reporting has emphasised the opacity of TikTok’s algorithm in producing virality, even
to some of TikTok’s own employees. Chris Stokel-Walker, author of TikTok Boom, said:
One person at TikTok in charge of trying to track what goes viral and why told
me in my book that ‘There’s no recipe for it, there’s no magic formula.’ The
employee even admitted that ‘It’s a question I don’t think even the algo team
have the answer to. It’s just so sophisticated.’24
Leaked internal advice from TikTok on public relations talking points encapsulates the
company’s evasive self-presentation. The document instructs TikTok spokespersons to
“downplay the parent company ByteDance, downplay the China association, downplay
AI”. 25 The memo directs spokespersons to say, “There’s a lot of misinformation about
TikTok right now. The reality is that the TikTok app isn’t even available in China.”26
This opacity and obfuscation is now compounded by what appears to be a concerted

campaign to airbrush what little material was available online. Excavating four years of
archived snapshots of ByteDance’s company website reveals layers of disappearing
information. 27 Pages that once recounted Communist Party activities inside ByteDance
have been deleted from the website of Beijing Internet Association (an industry association
charged with guiding the Party-building work of internet companies in Beijing).28
1.3. Demystifying the TikTok-Douyin-ByteDance Relationship
While TikTok is a household name across much of the world, its China analogue, Douyin,
is not. Our research points to a functional fusion of TikTok and Douyin under the control of
a single corporate entity – ByteDance, a conglomerate registered in the Cayman Islands
but headquartered in Beijing until November 2020.
Douyin's tagline exhorts users to “record a good life”. Its earlier establishment in China
offers a roadmap for TikTok’s global development (see Section 3). In Sections 4 and 5, we
set out how TikTok and Douyin share personnel and technological resources and have
parallel management structures, all of which link back to ByteDance. TikTok admits in its
latest Privacy Policy for Australia: “We also share [user] information with […] other
companies in the same [corporate] group as TikTok.” 29
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In Sections 5 and 6, we show how the CCP exerts control over ByteDance (and TikTok)
through a ‘golden share’ arrangement, export restrictions and cybersecurity review
mechanisms. These sections outline key collaborations between ByteDance and Party-
state propaganda and security organs, and the presence of Party members in key executive
positions at ByteDance. We examine sources that show ByteDance striving to serve Party
interests through censorship, public opinion-shaping and surveillance.
1.4. The Propaganda-Security Nexus
It is well-known that the Party’s security apparatus absorbs and repurposes technology and
data for surveillance, social control and repression. The logic of Beijing’s interlocking data
security laws applied to ubiquitous surveillance means that all customer data held by China-
controlled companies will be accessible to the Party’s security services.
Clearly the potential for Beijing to exploit TikTok for global surveillance is vast. In our view,
however, the most significant risk posed by TikTok is its unprecedented potential for
censoring and proactively shaping public opinion overseas – in the United States, Australia,
and other countries around the world.
1.5. How the Chinese Communist Party Could Wield TikTok
Intelligence agencies in jurisdictions including the U.S., 30 U.K., 31 Australia, 32 European

Union,33 Canada,34 New Zealand,35 the Netherlands,36 Estonia,37 and the Czech Republic38
have signaled clear concerns regarding China’s data cultivation, influence, and political
interference activities. The U.S. National Intelligence Council, a formal panel of intelligence
officers and independent scholars, assesses that:
Beijing will be able to exploit Chinese companies' expansion of

telecommunications infrastructures and digital services, these enterprises'
growing presence in the daily lives of populations worldwide, and Beijing's
rising and global economic and political influence. Beijing has demonstrated
its willingness to enlist the aid of Chinese commercial enterprises to help
surveil and censor regime enemies abroad.39
In Section 2, we set out evidence of Beijing’s capabilities and intent relating to influence,
interference and intelligence activities. This includes not only data harvesting and
surveillance activities, but also the deployment of targeted propaganda designed to shape
global discourses and influence overseas policymaking on issues related to China, with
short video platforms identified as a key arena for exploitation.
In Sections 6 and 7, we show how the Party’s global propaganda and surveillance activities
inform our risk assessment of TikTok.
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2. TikTok and Xi’s External Propaganda Plan
This section details the deep drivers of the Party’s efforts to control the media
environment and the online “propaganda and ideology battlefield”.
a. Propaganda Goes Digital: Xi Jinping has intensified the Party’s long-running

efforts to adapt the Party’s propaganda and ideological systems to the digital
age, deploying media companies as instruments of an “external discourse
mechanism” to shape global information and ideas.
b. Military-Surveillance Complex: China’s intelligence agencies are bringing data

storage and processing capabilities under their control. The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) – the armed wing of the Communist Party – studies the
use of AI/ML to manage public opinion on social networks.
c. Political Interference: TikTok – an app that now pervades the waking lives of
many Australian and American teenagers – has latent potential to sway
elections, corrode people’s faith in democracy, and undermine the will of open
societies to compete against China’s authoritarian model globally.
Party writings and speeches by Xi Jinping stress the importance of “cultural security” for
China’s national unity and the survival of its socialist political system – which it defines as a
single-party dictatorship.49 Cultural security is an element of political security – Xi calls it a
“guarantee” – and refers to ideological power (including propaganda, media, opinion,
education, and law) and control over information networks.50
The Party assumes that all external flows of information, thought, and values represent
potential risk to China's socialist system, and that conflict with Western democracy requires
submitting more of the world's data systems to Party norms of “internet governance” and
“data security”. Propaganda, ideological-political “thought work”, and “international public
opinion struggle” are the civilian tools of waging this conflict in peacetime.
Moreover, China’s military and security apparatuses seek global advantage in key
technologies to support the Party’s ability to confront the West and wage ‘grey zone warfare’
(or ‘political warfare’), including through information manipulation. The technologies given
emphasis include those that enable mass surveillance and information operations.
We have observed the Party using social media tools to wage this “peacetime conflict”.
Based on our evaluation of the Party-state’s access to and control over ByteDance and
TikTok, we assess as high the risk that the Party will seek to leverage the company’s
innovative algorithms and access to key data to develop its own big data harvesting and
analysis capabilities for targeted propaganda and political interference.
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2.1. Leveraging New Media to Target Global Audiences
The Party has paid close attention to new media’s influence on public opinion since the
internet first started gaining traction in China in the mid-to-late 1990s. By September 2004,
during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China, the Party passed its Decision on ‘Enhancing the Party’s Governance Capability’,
which formally designated the internet as a domain for Party control and influence:
Attach great importance to the influence of new types of media channels, such
as the internet, on public opinion. . . .Strengthen the construction of internet
propaganda teams and form a strong online positive public opinion.51
During his decade in power, Xi has intensified the Party’s long-running efforts to refine its
propaganda and ideological systems and adapt them to the digital age.52 He has frequently
instructed the Party to utilise “new media” – a term that encompasses short video platforms
– to “strengthen the promotion of the Chinese Communist Party” and “strive to create an
image of China that is credible, lovable and respectable”.53
In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China introduced its Decision on ‘Some Major Issues Concerning
Comprehensively Deepening Reform’.54 It stipulated:
We will straighten out the mechanism for both domestic and overseas
propaganda, and support key media groups to develop both at home and
abroad. We will foster external-facing cultural enterprises and support cultural
enterprises to go abroad and expand markets there.55
In order to effectively carry out this international propaganda effort, Xi has called for the
creation of “flagship” propaganda outlets for transmitting Party messages and enhancing
“international discourse power”.56
In December 2013, at a Politburo Collective Study Session, Xi told cadres:
We should meticulously build an external discourse mechanism, utilise the role

of emerging media, enhance the creativity, appeal, and credibility of our
external discourse, tell the China story well, spread Chinese voices, and
explain Chinese characteristics effectively.57
Then, in 2016, at a Symposium on the Party's News and Public Opinion Work, Xi reiterated:
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We should strengthen the development of international communication

capacity, enhance our international discourse power, focus on telling the
China story well, and … strive to build flagship external propaganda media
outlets with strong international influence.58
In December 2020, Xi convened a Politburo Collective Study Session to deliberate on plans

to strengthen and enlarge China’s national security system.59 Yuan Peng, head of the China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a Ministry of State Security think
tank, also attended the session.60 While the content of Yuan’s lecture was not revealed, in
a subsequent publication he argued that the Party should leverage a ‘post-truth’ information
environment in its struggle for ideological security:
What is truth and what is a lie is already unimportant, what is important is who
controls discourse power, this is nothing other than the twisted nature of the
‘post-truth era’. In the face of this strange phenomenon without precedent in
the past century, it is only by maintaining resolve, ‘not fearing the floating
clouds’, and refusing impulsivity, that we will ultimately be able to emerge
victorious from amidst this strategic game.61
(In February 2023, Hong Kong newspaper Ming Bao reported on Yuan Peng’s emergence
as vice minister of the Ministry of State Security, under what is apparently his real name,
Yuan Yikun.62)
In May 2021, at another Politburo Study Session, Xi referred specifically to his ambitions for
promoting pro-China policymaking abroad through the deployment of targeted propaganda
for overseas audiences:
We should build an external discourse mechanism and improve the art of

communication. We should adopt precise communication methods that target
different regions, different countries, and different groups of audiences,
promote the globalised, regionalised, and differentiated expression of Chinese
stories and Chinese voices, and enhance the affinity and effectiveness of
international communication. We should [strive to] make friends, unite and win
the majority, and constantly expand our circle of friends who know China and
are China-friendly.63
Xi’s language of making friends, winning the majority and expanding China’s circle of friends
is rooted in the Party’s history of “united front” work.64
In August 2021, the People’s Daily published an article that elaborated on Xi’s comments
and identified short video platforms as a key arena for deploying propaganda to enhance
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China’s “international discourse power” overseas.65 An excerpt from the article, which was
republished by Xinhua, reads:
As one of the windows of China’s foreign exchanges, short video platforms

also have a large audience abroad. Various short video apps represented by
TikTok have emerged one after another, and many cultural short videos with
rich content and well-made are loved by foreign internet users. … In promoting
the transformation and upgrading of China's international communication and
building a strategic communication system with distinctive Chinese
characteristics, we should make good use of short video platforms that are
open, inclusive, interactive and their advanced technological advantages,
innovate communication methods, empower cultural communication, and
allow short video platforms to become "megaphones" for "telling the China
story well and spreading Chinese voices well."66
2.1.2. Propaganda and Power in Party Ideology
The sophistication, magnitude and force of Xi’s efforts to dominate the “propaganda and
ideology battlefield” are rooted in a classical tradition of Chinese statecraft in which wu
(weapons, violence) and wen (words, culture) go hand-in-hand. This classical Chinese
emphasis on discursive power has been strengthened, institutionalised and re-purposed by
Marxism-Leninism, an ideology that posits “systematic, all-around propaganda and
agitation” as the “chief and permanent task”.67
The Party’s obsession with controlling communication platforms stems from a belief that
what people talk about and how they choose their words shape the way they think and
ultimately act. Authors are seen as “weapons”68 and words described as “bullets”69 that
can shape perceptions, define choices, subvert governments and sharpen battle lines
between enemies and friends.70
Once Xi completed his leadership accession in 2013, he directed his General Office to
issue a communique on “The Current State of the Ideological Sphere”. This April 2013
directive, known as Document No. 9, directs cadres to prioritise an “intense struggle”
against seven key vectors of ideological threat.71 The first five vectors of ideological threat
that must be “struggled” against are foundational institutions for liberal democracies and
the rules-based system which gave rise to the global internet.
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China 175 out of 180 countries in its press freedom index.79 All of this is important because
China's media and internet controls do not stop at the physical border.
Ostensibly private companies play a key role in this vision. As media technology has
continued to evolve, Xi has articulated plans to develop more refined and targeted methods
of harnessing media for international propaganda in order to influence audiences to adopt
more pro-China, pro-Party stances. 80 Viewed through Xi’s paradigm of “international
discourse power”, new media companies – with their vast reach, data-harvesting abilities,
and optimisation for targeting discrete segments of foreign societies – represent among the
most important weapons in the Party’s media arsenal.
2.2. Codifying a Propaganda-Security Nexus
In parallel with externally facing media and national security policy, Xi and his leadership
team have engineered a new legal regime mandating that individuals and corporations
support the ideological security interests of the Party-state. The Party’s regulatory regime
has made it the legal responsibility of companies to advance socialist thought, tighten
control in cyberspace, and propagate the right information and values.81
The rapid development of the new media sector’s responsibilities now dovetails with more
specific policy prescriptions for the management of external propaganda, the collection of
user data, and security-focused innovation.
2.2.1. Beijing Dreams of Data Riches
In 2013, in the early months of his reign, Xi began to speak of data in the way Mao had
spoken of domestic oil production in the 1950s, when seeking to break reliance on the
Soviet Union. Xi told the state-run Chinese Academy of Sciences:
The vast ocean of data, just like the oil resources during industrialisation,
contains immense productive power and opportunities. Whoever controls big
data technologies will control the resources for development and have the
upper hand.82
Beginning in 2014, Xi Jinping created new institutions (such as the Central National Security
Commission and the Cyber Administration of China) to manage internal and external risk
across multiple overlapping domains.
The Party’s 13th Five-Year Plan, published in 2016, and its “big data industry development”
sub-plan, outlined national goals of applying big data across domains including:
government supervision and efficiency; social control; data integration and centralisation;
first-mover advantage in big data and emerging industries; cross-sector transfer, including
Military-Civil Fusion; and cyber defence and risk prevention.83
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2.2.2. Intelligence Agencies Building Big Data Capabilities
These priorities are the direct outgrowth of Xi’s leadership and the Party’s decision to
harness data for strategic purposes. They are also the inspiration for recent and ongoing
attempts by the Ministry of State Security (China’s lead external intelligence agency) and
the Ministry of Public Security (the lead internal security agency) to bring the entirety of
China’s data storage and processing capabilities under the control of the security services
– a move that heralds the agencies’ intrusion into the operations of both domestic
companies and foreign multinationals.
China’s laws mandate that individuals and entities cooperate with intelligence agencies:
• The National Security Law (2015) requires citizens and organisations to

report acts harming national security and to support national security
bodies, public security bodies, and military bodies in their work.84
• The National Intelligence Law (2017) compels PRC entities and individuals
to support China’s intelligence services by secretly turning over data
collected in China or overseas.85
• The National Cybersecurity Law (2017) compels companies and

individuals to make networks, data, and communications available to the
police and security services.86
• The Data Security Law (2021) asserts state powers to access and control
private data, including China’s “national” data processed overseas.87
• The Personal Information Protection Law (2021) requires companies

handling Chinese citizens’ personal data to minimise collection, disclose
uses of personal data, and obtain prior consent in certain cases (involving
the use of biometric data, for example), while forbidding the unapproved
transfer and storage of personal information overseas.88
2.2.3. “Seizing the Strategic Advantage”
The Party-state’s ability to target individuals for intelligence operations and develop world-
leading surveillance technologies has been fuelled by its access to huge amounts of data
and expertise in deciphering it efficiently. The data is collected both legitimately and through
breaches and spying operations, on both foreign and domestic targets.
Tech firms such as Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent are reportedly instrumental in assisting
China’s spy agencies to process “pilfered and otherwise obtained data”.89 U.S. National
Counterintelligence and Security Center ex-chief William Evanina has said that this data:
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. . .gives [China] vast opportunities to target people in foreign governments,

private industries, and other sectors around the world – in order to collect
additional information they want, such as research, technology, trade secrets,
or classified information.90
Beijing has recognised data harvesting as a critical capability in the Party-state’s race with
the West to seize the “strategic commanding heights” of emerging technologies. 91 The
evidence points strongly to Beijing’s interest in leveraging private sector data – including
foreign data and that of firms like ByteDance – to grow its stores and become the world’s
most data-rich power. The U.S. National Intelligence Council assessed in April 2020:
Beijing's commercial access to personal data of other countries' citizens,

along with AI-driven analytics, will enable it to automate the identification of
individuals and groups beyond China's borders to target with propaganda or
censorship. Such access and analytics also will enable Beijing to tailor its use
of a range of online and offline carrots and sticks to its targets outside China
– potentially on a large scale.92
2.2.4. Social Media and Information Warfare
Xi’s China has gained a reputation for leveraging technology for influence and intelligence
work, whether through AI for online censorship and “smart city”-style surveillance or
through mass hacks of foreign data. What is less immediately obvious is how the Party may
be thinking about leveraging AI to shape narratives online and carry out social media-based
psychological operations and political interference far from China’s shores.
The emergence of China’s contemporary political warfare strategy begins with the People’s
Liberation Army Political Work Regulations in 2003, which describe ‘public opinion warfare’,
‘psychological warfare’, and ‘legal warfare’ as elements of national defence and military
combat effectiveness.93 According to the most recent revision of the Regulations, issued in
2010, the purpose of peacetime political warfare (‘liaison work’) is to:
Carry out the work of disintegrating enemy militaries and liaising with friendly
militaries. Launch work related to Taiwan. Investigate and research conditions
[related to] foreign militaries and ethnic separatist forces. Launch
psychological warfare work.94
More recent sources confirm the PLA is reinvigorating its practice of political warfare. The
Science of Military Strategy, a primary PLA doctrinal publication, states that the boundaries
between peacetime and wartime have been permanently blurred, increasing the necessity
of deeper military-civilian integration. 95 The Strategy describes media, information,
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psychological deterrence and propaganda as elements of military activity, particularly in the

early stages of a confrontation, such as that over the sovereignty of Taiwan.96
Indeed, political warfare was one of the focuses of the significant military reforms
undertaken during Xi’s leadership. In his first term (2012-2017), Xi created a ‘Strategic
Support Force’, which incorporated five core functions: intelligence, technological
reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, network attack and defence (‘information
warfare’), and psychological warfare functions.97 The PLA General Political Department’s
311 Base, a specialised unit for psychological warfare operations, was placed under the
Strategic Support Force, a move that appears designed to streamline the integration of
cyber and psychological warfare.98
The PLA has spoken more explicitly about the opportunities posed by social media in recent
years. A 2019 paper in a Chinese military journal, National Defence Technology, argues
that AI can be leveraged to achieve “intelligentised online public opinion guidance”.99 Elsa
Kania, an expert on the Chinese military’s AI capabilities, predicts that:
The PLA will likely leverage big data analytics, machine learning, and
automation to support information warfare, including cyber warfare and
electronic warfare. Potentially, these techniques will also enable precision
psychological warfare that leverages big data to profile targets and customise
attacks to shape individuals’ emotions and behaviour.100
With this in mind, the concern is not just that an app with TikTok’s data harvesting and
targeted recommendation capabilities could be used as a platform for disseminating
propaganda, disinformation, and other messages designed to influence democratic
societies. Rather, it is that TikTok has the potential to sway elections, corrode people’s faith
in democracy, and undermine the will of open societies to compete against China’s
authoritarian model globally.
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In April 2018, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television
(SAPPRFT) shut down Implied Jokes (one of ByteDance’s community apps – Chinese name
Neihan Duanzi) for hosting off-colour humour. 150 A U.S.-based watchdog group, China
Digital Times, alleged that, on the night of SAPPRFT’s decision, a chat screenshot circulated
on WeChat, claiming there had been a transfer of benefits between Zhang Yiming and Lu
Wei, and that this transfer of benefits had propelled ByteDance to the top tier of tech
companies within four years.151
Two years later, in 2020, Chinese media outlet Caixin reported that Today’s Headlines’
suspected involvement in Lu Wei’s downfall had generated concern on the market.152
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decision-making and management of risks. Party structures are not designed to be visible
or accountable to international regulators, partners, investors, or consumers.
Party members in Chinese private companies are required to establish Party cells in all
organisations with three or more full Party members, according to the CCP Constitution.154
The CCP Constitution stipulates that Party members are required to privilege Party interests
and protect its secrets in all circumstances. All Party members take an oath to this effect.
In practice, this means the activities of Party cells, committees and individual members are
visible and accountable only to those in the Party organisation. An understanding of the
Party’s operations inside ByteDance can only be gleaned by analysis of fragmentary open-
source information, interpreted in the context of the Party's history, doctrine and practices.
4.2. State Media Scrutiny
ByteDance’s transformation into a Party-state-controlled entity was systematic and

protracted. The signs of misalignment with Party-state directives began in 2014, two years
after the founding of the company. Zhang Yiming was vocal about his vision for Today’s
Headlines as a tech company, not a media company. This attracted criticism from
competitors and some in the Party that Today’s Headlines was a “news porter” stealing
material from other producers and feeding users “vulgar content”.155
Company officials told critics the app was a search engine that recommended content from
other outlets. 156 But in June 2014, China’s National Copyright Administration (NCA)
launched an investigation into the platform.157 By September 2014, the NCA found Today’s
Headlines guilty of copyright infringement, though it acknowledged the platform had
removed infringing media and developed cooperation agreements with content
producers.158
Internet czar Lu Wei’s relationship with Zhang Yiming may have shielded the company for
some time from the heat. The New York Times reported:
[When] other internet companies complained that [Today’s Headlines] was

stealing their content, one of Mr. Lu’s top lieutenants told them that he was a
fan and that they should stop complaining and work with the company.159
In a landmark 2016 interview with Caijing, Zhang Yiming insisted that ByteDance was not a
media company and was therefore free from any obligation to “educate users”:
The difference between [Today’s Headlines] and the media is this: The media
must have values and it must educate people. . . .We will bear corporate social
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responsibility, but we do not want to educate users. . . I may have my opinions,

but I don’t want to impose my judgment on Today’s Headlines.160
Zhang Yiming did not want ByteDance to operate like a newspaper with an editor-in-chief
curating content. His approach was similar to the way Silicon Valley tech firms operate,
where digital platforms are treated differently under U.S. law than traditional publishers, and
are not liable for the content that human users or algorithms post and promote.
But his vision didn’t sit well with Communist Party leadership.
4.2.1. Party Crackdown Prompts Greater Alignment
The scrutiny ByteDance faced over copyright infringement and its hosting of “vulgar
content” was a prelude for a frontal encounter with the Party which left ByteDance a
permanently changed company.
Beginning around 2017, a series of actions from the Party elicited reactions from the
company to align itself more with the Party.161 In 2017 Party regulators scrutinised Today’s
Headlines for disseminating “vulgar” information. In 2018, the platform was criticised by
state media and suspended for three weeks.162
4.2.2. Pressure Leads to Zhang Yiming’s Resignation
In 2021, like the founder-CEOs of Alibaba and Pinduoduo, Zhang relinquished his seat.163
The graphics on the following two pages detail how, over time, the Party has forced
ByteDance into greater political alignment.
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presence in Singapore.170 In addition to native Singaporean TikTok CEO Shouzi

Chew, multiple ByteDance executives are now at least partially based there:
founder and former CEO Zhang Yiming, CEO Liang Rubo, CFO Julie Gao, and
TikTok’s global R&D head Zhu Wenjia.171
• Changes to company name: ByteDance renamed several subsidiaries from

“ByteDance” to “Douyin” in May 2022.172 TikTok CEO Shouzi Chew explained
in a 30 June 2022 letter to the U.S. Congress that “multiple corporate entities
share the 'ByteDance' name, [therefore] several China-based ByteDance
entities were renamed earlier this year to keep the names of businesses and
entities more consistent. Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd is now called
Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited.”173 Observers have read this as
another move to distance TikTok from its China operations.174
5.2. TikTok Belongs to ByteDance
Legal documents and archived versions of the companies’ websites offer some insight into
the corporate group’s opaque structure.
5.2.1. ByteDance is the Parent Company of TikTok and Douyin
According to a legal petition that TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd. filed on 10 November
2020, ByteDance Ltd. (Cayman), owns TikTok Ltd. (Cayman), which wholly owns TikTok
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company.175 TikTok LLC holds “all of the outstanding shares
of capital stock of TikTok Inc.”176 An archived version of ByteDance’s website that shows a
corporate structure last updated on 30 June 2020 confirms this chain of ownership.177
Douyin and other PRC operations are likely held through a Hong Kong subsidiary, Douyin
Group (Hong Kong) Ltd.178 In January 2023, Hong Kong Economic Journal reported that
Douyin Co. Ltd is an entity that ByteDance established in Mainland China under the variable
interest entity (VIE) structure for business operations.179
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Sources: Evidence submitted to court by TikTok, ByteDance’s website,

PRC (including Hong Kong) online corporate databases180
5.2.2. Headquartered in China
While the parent company that owns TikTok is incorporated in the Cayman Islands,
ByteDance declared in November 2020 that its headquarters were in China. ByteDance
referred to itself as a “Chinese-headquartered company” multiple times in its appeal against
the U.S. official Divestment Order and CFIUS action:
[TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd.] did not submit the Musical.ly transaction to
CFIUS for review in 2017 because ByteDance was a Chinese-headquartered
company and Musical.ly was also a Chinese-headquartered company. . . .It is
necessarily the case that whatever national security risks posed by the
Musical.ly app and its Chinese ownership at the time of the acquisition were
not enlarged or changed by the acquisition of the Musical.ly company by
another China-headquartered company, ByteDance.181
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5.2.3. ByteDance Co-Founder Liang Rubo Leads Both TikTok and Douyin
Liang Rubo is CEO and Chairperson of the global ByteDance corporate group. ByteDance
Ltd. (Cayman) currently lists Liang as one of its five directors on the Cayman Islands
company registry.182 Both TikTok CEO Shouzi Chew and Douyin Group CEO Kelly Zhang
report to Liang, at least nominally. On 2 November 2021, Liang announced the company’s
organisational restructuring (in a letter published on Sina). 183 Liang stated that the
individuals in charge of each of the six business units would report to him, including TikTok
CEO Shouzi Chew and Douyin Group CEO Kelly Zhang.184
Sources: Cayman Islands Registry, Shouzi Chew letter to U.S. senators, Liang Rubo letter to the company185
Liang Rubo is a visible link between the Cayman company’s board and ByteDance’s China
operations. He occupies various management positions in the company’s China-based
subsidiaries, despite claims that the Cayman board is divorced from China operations.186
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Sources: PRC media187

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5.3. Zhang Yiming’s Retreat from ByteDance Appears Complete
On 19 January 2023, according to PRC corporate databases, Zhang Yiming transferred his
99% stake in Douyin Co. Ltd. to Xiamen Xingchen Qidian Technology Co. Ltd. (which was
established just a month before). 188 Soon after the transfer, Xiamen Xingchen Qidian
Technology Co. Ltd. pledged its equity in Douyin Co. Ltd. to Douyin Vision Co. Ltd., a wholly
foreign-owned entity of Douyin Group (Hong Kong) Ltd.189 (This transfer of shares has re-
ignited rumours of an impending IPO.190)
5.4. TikTok’s Management Structure
Our reconstruction of the company’s management structure indicates that TikTok

leadership report up to their department leads in ByteDance (in addition to or instead of
reporting to local TikTok managers), sometimes through ‘dotted’ reporting lines.191 Through
department-specific reporting lines, it appears that ByteDance may be able to exercise
significant and granular control over TikTok operations.
A ByteDance insider reportedly told China tech outlet LatePost last year that TikTok is not
developed enough to be a self-contained business unit.192 Therefore, per the source, TikTok
draws on personnel, experience, and methods of ByteDance’s Douyin app, software, and
commercial model to achieve “technology accumulation and business breakthroughs”.193
Whistleblower accounts from former and current TikTok employees attest to the closeness
of the two companies. These accounts portray the ByteDance office in Beijing making
decisions both large and small about TikTok’s content moderation, product development,
engineering, commercialisation, strategy and human resources. 194 Forbes reported in
September 2022 that senior TikTok executives had left the company because of the degree
of ByteDance control.195
5.5. Shared Resources
In our assessment, it is not possible for TikTok to operate independently of ByteDance in

Beijing for reasons including the sharing of technical and human resources across the global
corporate groups. This has profound implications not just for TikTok’s current relations with
ByteDance, but for any future possibility of isolating TikTok operations – and foreign users’
personal data – from ByteDance.
5.5.1. Personnel
The application of China’s regulations to TikTok operations within its borders is

unambiguous: ByteDance employees who are citizens must disclose information from
TikTok relevant to national security and intelligence work.
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Under Article 77 of the National Security Law, citizens and organisations have a duty to
report acts harming national security, and to support national security, public security, and
relevant military bodies.196 Under Article 7 of the National Intelligence Law, citizens and
organisations must support, assist, and coordinate with national intelligence work.197 In our
assessment, these laws codify what was previously extra-legal common practice.
Our research corroborates media reporting that ByteDance continues to depend on

employees in China to work on TikTok and to recruit employees from China for roles at
TikTok.198
In November 2022, for example, TikTok posted a job ad for a “Data Scientist” based in
Shanghai. A week later, an ad with the same description posted by ByteDance for a “Data
Scientist – International Short Videos – Shanghai” showed that the hiring team belonged to
“Talent Acquisition @ TikTok”.
Cross-posting of job ads for TikTok/ByteDance roles.199
We found similar examples, not just for data scientists and analysts, but also for account
directors (commercialisation), R&D engineers, and algorithm engineers.200 Both TikTok and
ByteDance regularly cross-post job advertisements with the same position IDs.201
5.5.2. Management and Employees See TikTok and ByteDance as Interchangeable
A simple search on LinkedIn shows at least 4400 people who list “ByteDance” and “TikTok”
in a single profile. 202 A significant number of profiles list ByteDance and TikTok
interchangeably, including prominent TikTok leaders such as Blake Chandlee, “President,
Global Business Solutions at ByteDance/TikTok”.203
This echoes reporting by Forbes that TikTok employees had ByteDance listed on their pay
checks and tax returns, and by CNBC as well as Forbes reporter Emily Baker-White that
TikTok email aliases are simultaneously ByteDance email aliases.204 It points to the fungibility
of ByteDance and TikTok as employer.
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5.5.3. Shared Cloud Infrastructure Team
The cloud infrastructures for both TikTok and other ByteDance products appear to be
administered by the same team. A role titled “Tech Lead (Database Administrator), Cloud
Infrastructure” manages database services within ByteDance, providing “online storage
service support for all types of products in ByteDance (TikTok, Douyin, [Today’s Headlines],
etc)”.205 This role may be akin to a China-based “Master Admin” that BuzzFeed reporting
refers to, who reportedly has access to U.S. user data.206
The ties that bind TikTok to ByteDance, coupled with the presence of robust Party control,
raise the likelihood of Communist Party influence over TikTok.
5.6. The Party-State’s Stake in Beijing Douyin
Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited, renamed from Beijing ByteDance Technology
Co., Ltd. was established in March 2012 at the company’s founding.207 The Party-state
formally registered a 1% stake in Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited in April 2021.208
The largest beneficial owners of this 1% stake are the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC, which oversees state enterprises), China Media
Group, and the Cyberspace Administration of China.209
The company’s own statements imply that the government stake was required by
regulators. Responding to direct questioning in a letter to U.S. senators about whether the
Chinese government owns a stake in TikTok, CEO Shouzi Chew clarified:
Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited is a separately held subsidiary of

ByteDance Ltd. Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited does not have any
direct or indirect ownership interest in or control over any TikTok entity. The
Chinese state-owned enterprise’s acquisition of 1% of Beijing Douyin
Information Service Limited was necessary for the purpose of obtaining a news
license in China for several China-based content applications, such as Douyin
and [Today’s Headlines].210
The Party-state’s acquisition of “golden shares” in private tech companies gives it direct and
open insider access to corporate decision-making, and influence through board seats and
veto rights. This institutionalisation of Party alignment can limit or eliminate the need for
subsequent state intervention.
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Source: PRC online corporate databases211
In the case of ByteDance, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) – China’s internet
regulator and the external ‘nameplate’ and office of the CCP Central Cybersecurity and
Informatisation Commission – appointed an official, Wu Shugang, to the board of Beijing
Douyin Information Service Limited at the time of the ‘golden share’ acquisition.212
A Financial Times review of the company charter provides details about Wu’s powers within
the company: Wu reportedly gets a say over business strategy and investment plans, M&A,
profit allocation, and a vote on the group’s top three executives and remuneration
packages.213 Wu can control the content on ByteDance’s media platforms in China, such
as Douyin and Today’s Headlines, through his right to appoint the group’s editor-in-chief
and the chair of a “content safety committee”.214
Wu gained notoriety a decade ago from his June 2012 Weibo post:
I only have one wish – that one day I can cut off the dog head of traitors [i.e.
liberal voices in China]. Let the Chinese traitors preaching so-called ‘human
rights and freedom’ go to hell!!215
Later, Wu became Party secretary of the Communist Youth League for organs directly under
the Ministry of Education.216
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The notorious 2012 Weibo post of cyber regulator and now Douyin board member Wu Shugang.217
Before joining ByteDance, Wu Shugang worked in the Local Guidance Office of the CAC’s
Online Commentary Work Bureau. He visited internet companies to give lectures to Party
members about instructions from Xi Jinping and events such as the 19th Party Congress,
particularly in relation to online public opinion and discourse power on the main “battlefield”
of the internet.218
Wu Shugang, who helps ensure Party alignment within ByteDance through his ‘golden share’ board seat.
5.7. Communist Party Organisation Members within ByteDance
In a 2022 hearing, U.S. Senator Josh Hawley questioned TikTok COO Vanessa Pappas
about whether employees were affiliated with the CCP. Pappas responded that she
“wouldn’t be able to tell [Hawley] the political affiliation of any individual”, but that among
TikTok’s “U.S. and Singapore leadership, there are no CCP members. . . .Everyone who
makes a strategic decision at this platform is not a member of the CCP.”219
According to a Party newspaper, Study Times, ByteDance established its first Party branch
in October 2014, followed by a Party committee in April 2017 with branches within Review
and Operations, Public Affairs, and Technical Support.220
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The Epoch Times reported that it obtained a list of ByteDance Party members.221 Out of 138
Party committee members at the Beijing headquarters, most were born in the 1990s and
many held management or technical positions.222 We were not able to verify this list, but we
note that the report has informed U.S. and Australian government approaches to
questioning TikTok.223
The CAC has been pushing internet companies such as Alibaba and ByteDance to build up
Party organisations.
The Cyberspace Administration of Beijing Municipality (Beijing CAC) mobilised ByteDance

to establish a “public opinion research and evaluation small group” as well as an “internet
content security committee”, with Party members serving as content “gatekeepers” and
overseeing editing, auditing, technology, products, marketing, commercialisation, and other
operational areas across the company. 224
Beijing CAC also prescribed integrating the Party organisation with company management
by creating a “triple-hatted position incorporating the roles of Party Secretary, Editor-in-
Chief, and Vice President.”225
5.7.1. Red Leadership
TikTok executives refer to ByteDance Ltd.’s incorporation outside of China and the
international composition of the board as evidence of their parent company’s independence
from the CCP. This argument obscures the fact that key executives of parent company
ByteDance – which we argue exerts continued influence on TikTok despite structural
corporate boundaries – have close ties to the Party.
5.7.2. Party Secrecy Requirements
The Party’s systems for concealing its own control mechanisms begins with its rules and
systems for governing itself. New Party members are required to pledge that they will
“protect Party secrets”.226 The Party Constitution requires Party members to prioritise “the
interests of the Party . . . before all else” (Article 16).227
These obligations of secrecy and primacy could conflict with legal obligations to disclose
information to investors and regulators in rule-of-law jurisdictions.
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5.7.3. Founder Zhang Yiming
ByteDance founder and former CEO Zhang Yiming told a reporter from The Atlantic in 2020
that he “isn’t a Party member”.229 However, our research has identified his links to several
Fujian Province united front bodies.230 The purpose of the united front system is to increase
Party influence outside the Party.
Zhang Yiming was present when the Central United Front Department began a new
campaign engaging media professionals.231 He attended the first ever training for new media
professionals in 2015 that focused on how to conduct united front work online. While
reflecting on the course, Zhang Yiming shared that the training course allowed him to
“develop stronger self-confidence in rejuvenating the country through science and
technology and strengthening the country through the internet.”232
5.7.4. Chief-Editor-and-Party-Secretary Zhang Fuping
Zhang Fuping joined ByteDance as Deputy Chief Editor of Today’s Headlines in 2016 and
rose to Chief Editor the following year.233 Following the content crackdown on the company
in March 2018, he started making public appearances not just as ByteDance Chief Editor
but also as Party Secretary.234 He was appointed a board member of the Beijing Douyin
Information Service Co. Ltd. in April 2021 alongside the CAC’s Wu Shugang.235
Zhang Fuping is not listed as the company’s Party Secretary on either the Chinese or English
versions of ByteDance’s website. Nor does the company identify him as the business’s top-
ranked official for political matters.
5.7.5. Board Member Neil Shen of Sequoia Capital
Notable also is Neil Shen, Global Steward of Sequoia Capital and Founder and Managing
Partner of Sequoia Capital China, who serves on the board of ByteDance.236 Shen was a
member of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC), a peak united front forum chaired by a member of the Politburo
Standing Committee that brings together Party officials and Chinese elites.237 He was the
CPPCC’s only representative from the venture capital sector.238
Shen is vice president of the Venture Capital Funds Committee of the Asset Management
Association of China, which appears to exercise industry leadership in the venture capital
field, and director of the Yabuli China Entrepreneurs Forum, which comes under the
guidance of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce.239
Notably, Shen was absent from the line-up of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC
revealed in January 2023 (and he left the board of Chinese e-commerce giant Pinduoduo
in late 2022).240 This may raise questions about his standing with the Party as it appears to
shift its favour from tech firms toward state-owned enterprises.
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Sequoia Capital China previously hired Wang Xisha, daughter of former Politburo Standing
Committee member Wang Yang, as an investment partner.241
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ByteDance Party Secretary and Chief Editor Zhang Fuping (right)

with People’s Armed Police Political Work Department Director Yan Xiaodong.247
ByteDance is not merely a passive host for public security accounts on its Today’s Headlines
and Douyin platforms. The company offers expert guidance and big data analysis to assist
the MPS in its dissemination of propaganda.
In April 2019, the MPS Information and Propaganda Bureau signed a strategic cooperation
framework agreement with ByteDance, as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute first
reported. 248 According to a social media account run by the Public Security Bureau of
Yangshan County, Guangdong:
[T]he strategic cooperation agreement aims to maximise [Today’s Headlines’]

and Douyin’s specialised technology and platform advantages in big data
analysis, accuracy of push notifications, and creative strategy. The
cooperation agreement would . . . elevate public security propaganda in its
capacity to influence, guide, and gain public trust . . . creating positive public
opinion as an environment for the development and progress of public security
work in the new era.249
ByteDance’s collaboration with the MPS extends to Xinjiang, where it plays a role in
disseminating Party propaganda. According to a report by the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, Xinjiang local authorities received guidance to use Douyin to broadcast a sanitised
depiction of state poverty alleviation policies in Hotan, a region of Xinjiang with roughly a
dozen suspected detention centres for Uyghur Muslims and other minorities.250 This points
to ByteDance’s involvement in the Party-state’s efforts to whitewash the internment of
Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
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The United Nations has found that the CCP’s repression of non-Chinese ethnic groups may
amount to “crimes against humanity” – the most serious allegation the body is able to make,
absent an International Criminal Court investigation.251
6.2. ByteDance Ties to the Propaganda System
ByteDance and key company executives are members of media associations established to
ensure compliance with Party norms. Institutional ties include:
• Kelly Zhang, CEO of Douyin Group, is vice president of the China Netcasting
Services Association, of which Beijing ByteDance Network Technology is a
member. 252 Nie Chenxi, former deputy chief of the Central Propaganda
Department and a member of the 19th CCP Central Committee, is president of
the association. 253 The CCP Central Committee's Propaganda Department
controls the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA), which
supervises the China Netcasting Services Association. 254 As the largest
professional association in the industry, China Netcasting Services Association
publishes mandatory standards for online short video platforms.255
• Party Secretary and Chief Editor Zhang Fuping serves as executive vice
president at the Beijing Communication Industry Association, of which Beijing
Douyin Information Service is a member.256 The association “uses Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as an
operational guide”.257
• ByteDance is a member of the People’s Daily Smart Media Research

Institute.258 One key purpose of the institute is to explore how to use AI in media
operations, including “using mainstream values to control the algorithm, so as
to comprehensively improve capacity to guide public opinion”.259
• Beijing Douyin Information Service is an executive corporate member of the

Internet Society of China (ISC).260 One of ISC’s goals is to “participate in the
formulation of global Internet policies, norms and standards, improve the global
internet governance system, and maintain cyberspace order”.261
Outside of institutional ties, a notable number of employees have worked for Party
propaganda outfits before joining TikTok and ByteDance. In August 2022, Forbes reported
that its analysis of public LinkedIn profiles showed “300 current employees at TikTok and its
parent company ByteDance previously worked for Chinese state media”.262 ByteDance and
TikTok did not challenge the report’s findings.
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We independently verified that 10 senior leaders (directors, VPs and managers) at

ByteDance and its subsidiaries in China have come from traditional state media, particularly
the Beijing Times. Senior leaders with a history in traditional state media include Zhang
Lidong, current Chairperson of Douyin Group; Zhang Fuping, Party Secretary, Vice
President, and Chief Editor of Douyin; and ByteDance managers in Marketing, PR, Content
Moderation, Operations, and Overseas Markets. We identified another three TikTok
managers with prior experience in China’s state media.
6.3. Party Instruction and Supervision
Beijing’s cyber authorities mobilise and monitor internet companies such as ByteDance in
times of crisis, such as during Covid-19 and the protests against the government’s Zero
Covid restrictions. Examples:
• In February 2020, as the Party mobilised against Covid-19, the CAC placed
ByteDance (among other internet companies) under “special supervision” to
ensure support for “a good internet environment for winning the battle of Covid
prevention and control”.263
• ByteDance was responsive to Party calls from the Wuhan Internet Industry
Party Committee – and from Xi Jinping himself – to crack down on Covid-19
misinformation, anti-government sentiment, foreign reporting and other
“harmful information”, as defined by the Party. 264 By late February 2020,
ByteDance had set up channels on Douyin, Today’s Headlines and its other
apps for “broadcasting positive energy” and information about the
government’s epidemic control efforts.265
• More recently, on 1 December 2022, after anti-lockdown protests across

major cities in China, the CAC instructed tech companies such as ByteDance
to “expand censorship of protests”, pay attention to content about anti-
government protests, and restrict information about how to use VPNs to
circumvent state internet controls. 266 At an internal meeting, the CAC
instructed ByteDance to increase staffing of censorship teams, according to
insiders who spoke to the Wall Street Journal.267
6.4. Party-State Control of ByteDance Intellectual Property
The Party-state has emphasised the importance of algorithms and their injection with
“mainstream values” for the purposes of propaganda work.
In March 2019, Xi Jinping published an article in Qiushi on “Accelerating the development

of media integration and constructing an omni-media broadcast pattern”. He emphasised
the importance of “exploring the use of AI in news acquisition, production, distribution,
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reception, and feedback, [while] using mainstream values to guide and harness ‘algorithms’,
and comprehensively improving public opinion-shaping capabilities”.268
By the end of the year, Xi’s words had been enshrined in official guidelines. The instructions
came from the CAC and directed internet companies using personalised recommendation
algorithms to promote propaganda and refrain from republishing illegal or harmful
content.269
Since March 2022, ByteDance has been subject to Article 6 of the CAC’s Internet
Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions, which reads:
Algorithmic recommendation service providers shall uphold the mainstream

value orientation, optimise the algorithmic recommendation service
mechanism, actively disseminate positive energy, and promote the use of
algorithms for good.270
The Party-state has developed additional levers of control over ByteDance’s intellectual
property, such as export restrictions on recommendation algorithms and requirements for
algorithms to be submitted for review to cyber regulators.
6.4.1. Export Controls
On 28 August 2020, while discussions were underway with the U.S. government about
ByteDance’s potential forced sale of TikTok, China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of
Science and Technology added new items to their list of sensitive technologies requiring
export controls.271 This list included AI interactive interface technology and data analysis-
based personalised information push-service technology, both of which TikTok uses.272
Two days later, on 30 August 2020, state media Xinhua published an article titled “Planned
TikTok deal entails China's approval under revised catalogue”.273 Professor Cui Fan of the
University of International Business and Economics advised ByteDance to:
. . .carefully study the revised catalogue, seriously and carefully consider

whether it is necessary to suspend substantive negotiations on relevant
transactions, comply with statutory application and reporting procedures, and
then take further actions as appropriate”.274
ByteDance responded the same day that it had seen the Ministries’ announcement and
would strictly abide by the regulations.275
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On 13 September 2020, ByteDance reportedly informed the U.S. government that its
algorithm would not be for sale. A source who spoke to the South China Morning Post said,
“The car can be sold, but not the engine.”276
6.4.2. Transfer of Personalised Recommendation Algorithm to Cyber Regulators
In March 2022, the CAC, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), the
Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued
new regulations on recommendation algorithms.277 In August 2022, ByteDance submitted
its personalised recommendation algorithm to cyber regulators.278 The company professes
to use this same algorithm for Douyin, Today’s Headlines, Xigua Videos and other products
that recommend content.279
ByteDance likely uses a similar algorithm for TikTok. In 2017, Li Lei, then the head of
ByteDance’s AI Lab, said: “Many of the lessons we have learned can be shared for our
international products. . . .We have built the largest machine-learning platform for content.
That’s our weapon.”280
6.5. Censoring Content, Promoting Propaganda
Leaked TikTok documents from 2019 and 2020 established that content moderators were
instructed to suppress content about politically sensitive events, figures, and speech, while
limiting the viewership of posts from users deemed “ugly”, “fat”, “poor”, “LGBT” or
“disabled”.281 These leaked documents show the discretionary power of the platform in its
selective and opaque restrictions on content and users. Interviews with former or current
ByteDance staff, plus whistleblower accounts from former internet censors, have provided
glimpses of a content-moderation process combining machine and human review.282
The body of evidence about censorship on TikTok is credible and substantial. Without
disputing the veracity of these accounts, ByteDance and TikTok spokespeople have insisted
that offending content moderation guidelines have since been retired.283
The company has developed a formulaic response to public criticism of censorship on the
platform: Explain there was a technical or policy error (instead of an attempt at censorship),
apologise for the error, and declare that the error is now fixed.284 This applied to media
reporting about TikTok’s promotion of racist and anti-LGBTQ+ content, censorship of posts
about #BlackLivesMatter, and removal of teenager Feroza Aziz’s account from the platform
when she called attention to China’s treatment of Uyghurs in a makeup tutorial.285
ByteDance and TikTok assert that censorship is not a threat, but a close examination of
content moderation on Douyin (and other ByteDance platforms in China) suggests
otherwise. Content moderation is an existential issue for internet platforms in China, as we
have witnessed with Zhang Yiming’s formative experience with Fanfou, one of China’s early
Twitter equivalents. Li An, former ByteDance censor, explains:
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What Chinese user-generated content platforms most fear is failing to delete

politically-sensitive content that later puts the company under heavy
government scrutiny. It's a life-and-death matter. . . .Content moderation
policymakers, plus the army of about 20,000 content moderators, have helped
shield ByteDance from major political repercussions and achieve commercial
success.286
We have demonstrated how key individuals in ByteDance’s company structure ensure Party
alignment. In the sections that follow, we map the levers of control over the actual content
in Douyin and other ByteDance platforms in China – and their implications for TikTok.
6.5.1. Automated Content Filters
Beijing uses the term “rumour” to label ideas and discourse critical of the Party-state.287
ByteDance notes in its 2018 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) report the measures it
took to combat “rumours”:
• Created large datasets: “Created a ‘rumour database’ of more than 300,000

articles, to filter old rumours. Agreed to cooperate with the CAC’s Illegal and
Harmful Information Reporting Centre to work with authorities to share
information on rumour databases.”288
• Developed targeted content distribution: “Launched an accurate rumour-

dispelling function to accurately deliver rumour-dispelling articles to people
affected by rumours.”289
• Harnessed technology: “Collaborated with the University of Michigan to

establish an anti-rumour research alliance and develop anti-rumour
technology.”290
As recently as September 2022, the CAC led 12 internet platforms – including Douyin – in
the tagging of online rumours as part of a dedicated campaign. 291 In September 2020,
ByteDance attended a meeting with the National Anti-Pornography and Anti-Illegal
Publications Office on its shared database for harmful information on the internet.292
A 2019 company White Paper on the “Self-regulatory Mechanism of Live Video Streaming
Platforms” shows the breadth of ByteDance’s content-review models. 293 ByteDance
combines machine learning models (visual, audio, and textual models) with a risk model to
vet livestreams in real time. 294 It bans illegal and political content, inappropriate dressing,
pornographic and vulgar content, abusive and provocative content, and superstitious
content, among other categories of prohibited content.295 The rules further prohibit content
involving deepfakes, slime, and all-you-can-eat contests.296
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ByteDance’s content review process for livestreams includes a combination of machine and human review,
as depicted in this diagram from ByteDance’s 2019 White Paper (which has since been taken down).297
The use of technology in content moderation extends to facilitating the work of state
censors. Li An, former ByteDance censor, described the job as creating “technology to
make the low-level content moderators’ work more efficient”.298 Li said:
. . .[the team] received multiple requests from [moderators] to develop an

algorithm that could automatically detect when a Douyin user spoke Uyghur,
and then cut off the livestream session . . . because they didn’t understand the
language.299
The tech team decided not to pursue the solution because they “didn't have enough Uyghur
language data points in [their] system, and the most popular livestream rooms were already
closely monitored”.300
6.5.2. Calibrating Content Distribution
In 2018, ByteDance Party Secretary and Chief Editor Zhang Fuping held a special Party
class to study a National Work Conference on Cybersecurity and Informatisation. He
declared then that ByteDance should “transmit the correct political direction, public opinion
guidance and value orientation into every business and product line, use values to guide
algorithms, [and] create a Today’s Headlines that is more valuable to users and society”.301
ByteDance noted in its 2018 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) report that it identified
users who received “rumours”, then pushed articles to them that dispelled such rumours.302
This shows the control ByteDance retains over the targeting of content distribution and
propaganda.
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In November 2021, two employees at ByteDance subsidiaries were jailed by public security
organs for accepting bribes to push specific content to Douyin’s trending list.303 A Douyin
spokesperson responded that Douyin’s trending lists are generated by collating real-time
trending content and applying content review mechanisms. The feature allows content
editors to intervene in trending topics that violate laws and regulations, or public order and
customs, or that are overly sensational.304 These charges foreshadowed Forbes reporting
in January 2023 about TikTok’s “secret ‘heating’ button” that would help a video reach wider
viewership and achieve virality.305
We found a September 2022 ByteDance investor report on a Chinese file-hosting site and
assessed it to be authentic based on its visuals and substance.306 It reported that ByteDance
“adjusted its algorithm systems away from a purely commercial logic, strengthened the
social value orientation of platform content, and ultimately strengthened control over
content”. 307 According to the investor report, measures to control content included
“comprehensively analysing user behaviour and comment sentiment to crackdown on low-
quality content such as clickbait and rumours”; “using machine learning to create risk
identification and filtering models for pornography, vulgarity, and abuse, among others”; and
“training the 'positive energy model' to strengthen the recommendation of content with
mainstream values”.308
6.5.3. Content Moderator Guidelines
In our assessment, the public-facing user service agreement for Douyin shows close
alignment with norms promulgated by the China Netcasting Services Association (a state-
backed professional association) and the National Radio and Television Administration.
The Association forbids “content harming the socialist system with Chinese characteristics”,
“separatist content”, and “content damaging the image of revolutionary leaders and
heroes”. 309 Per the latest Douyin user service agreement, all “created, commented,
published and disseminated information” on the platform “must consciously abide by the
law, socialist system, national interests, legal rights of citizens, social public order, morality
and customs, and informational veracity”. 310 Users must agree not to create or share
content that “threatens national security”, “incites separatism”, “breaks national unity”,
“undermines the socialist system”, or “promotes evil cults and feudal superstitions”.311
The Association further stipulates that, as internet platforms launch their short video
services, they should build a content reviewer team of “high political quality and strong
professional capability”. 312 The team should undergo training by the National Radio and
Television Administration, and there should be a ratio of at least one content reviewer per
every thousand new short videos created each day.313
Today’s Headlines prioritised Party members when hiring 2000 content reviewers in January
2018.314 ByteDance noted in its 2018 CSR report that it ramped up the size of its content-
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auditing team, with a focus on Party membership.315 According to former censors, content
moderation teams at ByteDance must apply directives received from authorities to new and
existing content, often self- and over-censoring to avoid offending the Party.316
6.5.4. Peddling Party Propaganda Abroad
Reuters reported that ByteDance censored content it perceived as critical of the Chinese
government on its Indonesia news aggregator app, Baca Berita (BaBe), from 2018-2020.317
Beijing headquarters reportedly instructed local moderators to delete articles critical of CCP
authorities. 318 In July 2022, BuzzFeed reported claims from former employees that
ByteDance pushed “soft” pro-China messaging on its news app TopBuzz, the international
version of Today's Headlines.319 According to these employees, TopBuzz staff needed to
provide evidence to ByteDance that they had placed the content on the app.320
The company tried to do the same on TikTok, too: In June 2022, Bloomberg reported that
a Chinese government entity responsible for public relations attempted to open a stealth
account on TikTok targeting Western audiences with propaganda”.321
6.5.5. Implications for TikTok
ByteDance has demonstrated its capacity to develop automated content filters and calibrate
content distribution in service of Party propaganda, apply Party-aligned content norms, and
hire Party members as content moderators. Its capabilities to serve Party propaganda are
manifold, including a public-opinion early-warning system, AI that automatically generates
content, and “automatic targeting” that draws on signals outside its own app.322
ByteDance portrays TikTok and Douyin as distinct platforms with no relation to each other.
Yet, as mentioned in Section 6.5.2, content-related charges emerged against Douyin
employees more than a year before Forbes’s explosive reporting on TikTok’s “secret
‘heating’ button”.323 Douyin offers fertile grounds for understanding TikTok, especially due
to the current overlap in Douyin and TikTok personnel.
The lack of transparency around algorithm decisions creates additional vulnerabilities.

ByteDance retains oversight over TikTok’s algorithms and their development through TikTok
Global R&D Lead Zhu Wenjia’s reporting up to ByteDance VP Yang Zhenyuan. 324
In our view, ByteDance has demonstrated sufficient capability, intent, and precedent in
promoting Party propaganda on its Chinese platforms to generate material risk that they
could do the same on TikTok.
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Zhang Yiming acknowledged the symbiotic relationship he and his company enjoyed with
the Party-state. His award acceptance speech, entitled “Innovation and Responsibility of
Technology Enterprises”, described the special responsibilities companies like his were
required to shoulder as they became more successful.326 He said:
In the past, a company might be a node, but after becoming a platform, you
are the infrastructure of the society, and the impact on the economy and
society is bigger and you need to take on more responsibilities.327
At the time, Today’s Headlines had begun cooperation with the Gansu Province Cyberspace
Affairs Office to provide a sales platform to merchants in poor counties and assist in tracking
down lost people.328
Party-state support and guidance is ongoing. The current 14th Five-Year Plan for
Zhongguancun seeks to “promote capacity for innovation” by:
Encouraging high-tech enterprises to strengthen technological R&D […].

Through strategic cooperation with companies such as Xiaomi, ByteDance,
and Tencent, advance the establishment of an innovation platform with leading
innovative internet tech companies as the main body, in-depth cooperation
among industry, university, and research institutions, and with high-tech
industries that connect the upstream and downstream.329
ByteDance is pursuing technological advancement in areas the Party has prioritised. After
the Party’s crackdown on the tech sector in 2021, ByteDance set out a plan for achieving
“hard technological breakthroughs” in Extended Reality (XR), chips, life sciences, and
enterprise intelligence tech. The language of ByteDance’s 2021 CSR report aligns closely
with Party policy-speak.330 For example:
1. “Based on accumulated advantages, extend upstream of the technological

chain to AI chips, server CPU chips, and strive to achieve the greatest
degree of autonomy and controllability of the technological chain.”
2. “Continue to explore and apply the company’s accumulated AI tech to

more fields and fields with greater social value, such as smart devices,
medical care, and enterprise services.”
3. “Carry out basic research and explore the frontiers at the intersections of
AI+.”331
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7.2. Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence
ByteDance was a founding member of the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence,

established by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and the Beijing Municipal
People’s Government in 2018. 332 Peking University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, and AI giant Megvii are also members. The U.S. government placed
Megvii on its export-control Entity List for enabling repression in Xinjiang in 2019, then
blacklisted U.S. public investment into the firm in 2021.333
The Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence originated out of China’s 2017 Development
Plan for New-Generation Artificial Intelligence, which aimed to “build a first-mover
advantage in the development of AI in China”.334 The Plan stipulates that China will “promote
the formation of an all-element, multi-field, high-efficiency AI military-civilian fusion
pattern”.335 The Plan also includes instructions to:
. . .encourage prominent civilian scientific research forces to participate in

national defence for major scientific and technological innovation tasks in AI,
to promote AI technologies to become quickly embedded in the field of national
defence innovation.336
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7.3. Working with Defence Universities
Heeding guidance to serve national defence, ByteDance researchers have collaborated

with defence-linked universities powering China’s military. The Australian Strategic Policy
Institute has rated Chinese universities’ risk of ties to the People’s Liberation Army,337 which
we review below:
• Huazhong University of Science and Technology: Rated “very high risk” for
its large number of defence laboratories and close links to the defence
industry.338 A ByteDance researcher collaborated with scientists from this
university’s State Key Lab of Multi-spectral Image Information Processing
Technology, a major defence lab, on person re-identification.339
• People’s Public Security University of China: Rated “very high risk” for its
affiliation with the Ministry of Public Security. 340 ByteDance researchers
collaborated with this university on deepfakes.341
• Tsinghua University: Rated “very high risk” for its substantial involvement
in defence research and alleged involvement in cyberattacks. 342
ByteDance researchers collaborated with Tsinghua on quantum
computing and deep neural networks.343
• Peking University: Rated “high risk” for its involvement in defence

research. 344 ByteDance worked with Peking University researchers on
intelligent text generation.345
State organisations that funded ByteDance’s research would likely have access to their
findings. Funders include the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, the Ministry of Public
Security Technology Research Program, and the Natural Science Foundation of China.346
7.4. Surveillance Tech Partners
As detailed in Section 6.1, ByteDance whitewashes Ministry of Public Security work in

Xinjiang and broadcasts sanitised depictions of the region. In business operations and
research, ByteDance has cooperated with companies identified as part of the military-
industrial-surveillance complex enabling repression in Xinjiang:
• Lion Technology: On the U.S. Entity List since 2019 for ties to repression
in Xinjiang.347 ByteDance cooperates with Lion Tech in data centers.348
• SenseTime: On the U.S. Entity List since 2019 for alleged ties to repression
in Xinjiang.349 Sanctioned by Washington again in 2021 for ties to Beijing’s
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military-industrial complex. ByteDance used facial recognition technology

developed by SenseTime.350
• Dawning Information Industry, a.k.a. Sugon: A subsidiary of the Chinese

Academy of Sciences sanctioned for ties to Beijing’s military-industrial
complex and enabling repression in Xinjiang.351 ByteDance was a major
client of Sugon cloud services. Sugon also makes data centers for
ByteDance.352
• iFlytek: On the U.S. Entity List since 2019 for enabling repression in
Xinjiang. 353 ByteDance uses iFlytek for voice synthesis technology and
music on Douyin and for office collaboration products on Feishu.354
• Megvii: Sanctioned by Washington in 2019 and 2021, as noted above.355

ByteDance collaborated with Megvii on computer vision research.356
7.5. Serving the Ministry of Public Security
ByteDance’s flagship China products – Douyin and Today’s Headlines – serve as resources
for surveillance, particularly for China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS).
In 2015, the MPS announced a raft of internet measures, including cybersecurity bureaus
for major websites and major internet enterprises. The cybersecurity bureaus target
cybercrime, including the Party-defined offence of spreading rumours.357
In September 2018, ByteDance Party Secretary Zhang Fuping announced Douyin’s

integration with the MPS Network Security and Protection Bureau. The cybersecurity
bureaus, together with Douyin and Douyin users, would collaborate to clean up cyberspace
and promote the constructive environment of platform governance.358
Douyin’s official ceremony marking its cooperation with the Ministry of Public Security.359
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The strategic cooperation agreement between ByteDance and the MPS signed in April 2019
includes a clause for Douyin to cooperate with public security organs and jointly plan “offline
activities”.360 The agreement is vague on the meaning of cooperation and joint planning. But
ByteDance’s 2019 CSR report documented the company’s efforts in establishing an
“integrated linkage mechanism [linking] behaviour recognition, online confrontation, and
cooperation with public security agencies to crack down on behaviour offline”.361
There is evidence of arrests made as a result of ByteDance cooperation with the security
services. ByteDance claims that it has aided in solving police cases, some involving
hundreds of arrests, facilitated by an in-house official police cybersecurity team. 362
According to ByteDance’s 2022 Anti-Fraud Report, on which state media reported, between
January 2021 and March 2022, Douyin helped public security organs apprehend 140 fraud-
related criminal gangs, arrest 576 suspects, and solve more than 800 cases.363
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In September 2019, the Washington Post reported that searches for #hongkong on Twitter
and TikTok revealed starkly different results.368 On Twitter, the hashtag surfaced “the city’s
unavoidable protests, including pro-China agitprop, sympathetic memes and imagery from
the hundreds of thousands of pro-democracy marchers who have braved police
crackdowns”.369 By contrast, TikTok surfaced “playful selfies, food photos and singalongs,
with barely a hint of unrest in sight”.370
In November 2019, a Vice Germany journalist found that most of the videos he uploaded to
TikTok with the hashtag #Xinjiang disappeared from search results.371
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) followed up in August 2020 and found that
the top 100 videos listed under #Xinjiang were 15% pro-CCP (denying the persecution of
Uyghurs), 33% propaganda (“[depicting] Xinjiang in an exclusively idyllic way”), 12% critical
of the CCP, and 40% entertainment.372 ASPI noted that TikTok’s depiction of Xinjiang with
“smiling and dancing Uyghurs” is a more “politically convenient version for the CCP”.373 The
ASPI researchers wrote:
While it’s unlikely that ByteDance would manipulate TikTok’s algorithm as

blatantly as it does on its PRC-based equivalent, Douyin, there’s ample room
for it to covertly tweak users’ feeds, subtly nudging them towards content
favoured by governments and their ruling parties – including the CCP. . . . Even
if ByteDance successfully ringfences TikTok from its China operations,
censorship and information control can still be achieved via the app’s opaque
algorithm, which is developed by ByteDance’s China-based engineering
teams.374
TikTok also faces allegations of propagating election misinformation.
TikTok says it does not allow political advertising on its platform.375 However, in October
2022, an independent investigation by rights group Global Witness and New York
University’s Cybersecurity for Democracy (C4D) team found that TikTok failed to detect and
remove advertisements containing election misinformation ahead of the 2022 U.S.
midterms.376 TikTok approved 90% of the ads containing election misinformation that the
researchers sought to upload:
TikTok performed the worst out of all of the platforms tested in this experiment,
with only one ad in English and one ad in Spanish – both relating to covid
vaccinations being required for voting – being rejected. Ads containing the
wrong election day, encouraging people to vote twice, dissuading people from
voting, and undermining the electoral process were all approved. The account
we used to post the election disinformation ads was still live until we informed
TikTok.377
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8.1.2. Content Analysis
To test some of these claims, we designed and iterated over time a preliminary content
analysis experiment that sought to identify the levels of pro-CCP content and misinformation
present in top search results across TikTok, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube.
Given that TikTok functions uniquely (in that it generates recommended content without
ever requiring the user to search for a topic or follow a creator), we focused our analysis on
the content returned by each app’s search function, thereby ensuring our experiment could
be reliably repeated across platforms. This minimised the extent to which each app’s content
recommendation functions affected the content encountered. We also assessed that an
analysis of the top search results returned for each term would provide valuable insight into
the kinds of content users would likely encounter when seeking out information on certain
topics via each app’s search function.
The experiment tested two hypotheses:
1. TikTok hosts a higher proportion of content favourable to the CCP than

competing social media platforms; and
2. TikTok hosts a higher proportion of misinformation than other platforms.
Based on our expertise in identifying PRC propaganda talking points, as well as a review of
the existing literature on censorship, propaganda and misinformation on social media, we
developed a list of 25 search terms across the two target issues and analysed the top 20
search results returned for each term. In total we analysed 2000 search results across the
four platforms combined.
In the table below, we list the search terms examined, provide examples of the claims and
representations we encountered, and note how we coded content. In order to reduce bias,
we used fact-checking services such as Snopes and PolitiFact to assess the truthfulness of
particular claims and coded content as ‘disinformation’ only if it presented untruths as fact.
We emphasise that this analysis is limited and preliminary in nature. It investigates the quality
of content present in top search results for a limited set of terms, across a limited time
period. Presence of pro-CCP content is not evidence that the app promotes propaganda or
censors anti-CCP views. Similarly, presence of misinformation is not evidence that the app
promotes this kind of content. Any assessment of the extent of propaganda, censorship or
disinformation occurring on the platforms would require investigation into the origins of and
intentions behind content appearing in top search results (on the content creator side) and
evidence of the functions of TikTok’s recommendation algorithm and content moderation
processes (on the platform side).
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8.1.3. Control Variables
We conducted this content analysis over a 48-hour period (20-22 November 2022). We
performed the searches on newly created sock puppet accounts on an Apple device using
a VPN to spoof the device IP’s location, deleting accounts made for one app before making
those for the next. This was done to reduce the potential for targeted recommendations
generated by third-party user data sharing that may occur across apps.
8.1.3. Findings
Our experiment revealed that top search results on TikTok (and Twitter) featured higher
proportions of content favourable to the CCP, compared to Instagram and YouTube.
In the absence of direct evidence of policies, practices, and human or technical mechanisms
for managing content on the platform, we cannot determine the specific causes of the
elevated proportion of pro-CCP content and disinformation on TikTok vis-à-vis other apps.
That is, our experiment does not enable us to determine whether this result stems from
internal TikTok content moderation, algorithm manipulation, or a higher volume of pro-CCP
content creators active on the platform.
Our findings do support a conclusion that, when searching for information on contentious
topics related to China and, separately, to U.S. political issues, the average TikTok (and
Twitter) user is more likely to be exposed to content favourable to the CCP and
misinformation in search results than the average Instagram and YouTube user. These
findings have significant implications for Gen Z users who increasingly use TikTok as a
search engine to learn about political issues.378
We emphasise the limited and preliminary nature of this investigation, which focused on
results returned for a limited set of search terms within a limited time period.
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8.1.4. Possible Intervening Variables: Twitter Takeover
This content analysis was conducted after Elon Musk completed his takeover of Twitter but
prior to reports of substantial changes to content algorithms and moderation functions. In
December, Twitter reportedly dismissed a number of key executives and, by some estimates,
half of the workforce, including some of those working on content moderation.379
8.1.5. Suggestions for Future Analyses
These results capture only a snapshot of content on TikTok for a limited 48-hour period.
Follow-up experiments could repeat the experiment multiple times, or over a longer period,
examining a broader range of search terms, for more reliable results. This would allow
stronger conclusions about the app’s treatment of particular topics. For instance, in our
experiment, almost all top search results for the terms “PLA” and “China military” contained
favourable depictions of the CCP. However, we would require more robust evidence to draw
firm conclusions about the reasons for and implications of this.
8.2. Technical Analysis: Data Accessed by the App
A July 2022 investigation by cybersecurity firm Internet 2.0 alleges abuses of data privacy
and security by the TikTok app, including the claim that “Permissions and device information
collection are overly intrusive and not necessary for the application to function”.380
The report cites a number of examples of data TikTok collects which the authors argue
should be considered excessive, including information on other applications installed and
running, hourly location data, persistent calendar access, contacts, and unique device
identifiers such as the International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI).381
To independently verify some of these findings, we performed a limited technical analysis of

the TikTok app designed to be verifiable and repeatable by others. Our technical analysis
was conducted on the Android v25.1.3 app (the same version analysed by the Internet 2.0
investigation).382 In summary, we found that the app requests permission to access a vast
array of data, including sensitive data, and it also requests permission for data seemingly
unnecessary for the functioning of the app (based on its current features).
Based on our understanding of the app’s personalised recommendation algorithm, we

assess that TikTok may be able to build user profiles that reflect personal proclivities relating
to engagement with ‘compromising’ material. These user profiles could conceivably be used
to publicly discredit or blackmail individuals for the purposes of political interference or
transnational repression. Agents of the CCP regularly participate in campaigns of
harassment and repression via social media.383
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8.2.1. Static Analysis of the Android App
Our researchers performed a static analysis of the TikTok app (Android v25.1.3) in order to
independently verify some of the findings of the Internet 2.0 report.384 (For our methodology
for the purposes of replication, see Appendix 1.)
Our findings are based on an initial analysis of the decompiled code of the app. It is important
to note that a significant proportion of the code is obfuscated, so we were unable to
determine the functions of much of the code.
Moreover, static analysis is limited in its ability to inform definitive conclusions about whether
data is being sent outside of the device. The TikTok Android app is a large, well-protected
and complex program. Outside reference points would be required to determine whether
TikTok’s collection and handling of data varies significantly from that of other popular social
media applications. However, third-party security evaluation services rate TikTok poorly
compared with other social media platforms.
We used the security analysis tool Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) to run two separate
static analyses of the Android Package Kits (APKs) for TikTok (v25.1.3) and Instagram
(v261.0.0.21.111). The MobSF reports scored TikTok’s security risks as “critical” (21/100)
and gave the app an “F” grade with 5/428 trackers detected. Comparatively, Instagram
scored as “medium” risk (50/100) and received a “B” grade with 2/428 trackers detected.
MobSF flagged 48 “high severity findings” for TikTok and 5 for Instagram.
Risk ratings provided by Mobile Security Framework, based on an automated security evaluation.
75
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8.2.2. Data Access
Our limited investigation of this particular version of the TikTok Android app found that it
requests permission to collect a large number of datapoints about the user and their device.
We were unable to confirm whether the data is indeed collected, what it might be used for,
or where it is sent. However, the data the app requests permission to collect contains
numerous unique identifiers and would facilitate device “fingerprinting” – the practice of
profiling a machine based on its unique software and hardware configuration.385 (For a list
of device data the TikTok app is able to read, see Appendix 2.)
The app can perform checks for a user’s contacts, location and calendar information. (For
the full list of ‘android.permission’ strings and the number of times each is observed in the
decompiled code, see Appendix 3.) From this list, we can see that the app can collect users’
precise location, and collect location data even while the app is not in use.386
Given recent revelations regarding TikTok’s surveillance of American journalists using the
app to monitor their locations, these findings present individual privacy and security risks
that warrant further examination.387
76
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U.S. Federal Communications Commissioner Brendan Carr highlights how TikTok parent ByteDance’s
pre-Christmas admission of snooping backs up allegations that have long dogged the company.
Democrat Mark Warner, chair of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, said:
This new development reinforces serious concerns that the social media
platform has permitted TikTok engineers and executives in the People’s
Republic of China to repeatedly access private data of U.S. users despite
repeated claims to lawmakers and users that this data was protected.389
9.1.2. Intelligence Officials Sound the Alarm
Also toward the end of last year, key U.S. national security officials intensified their warnings
about TikTok. In November, FBI chief Chris Wray stated that the FBI has “a number of
concerns” regarding TikTok as a “national security threat”:
They include the possibility that the Chinese government could use it to control
data collection on millions of users or control the recommendation algorithm
which could be used for influence operations if they so chose, or to control
software on millions of devices which gives it the opportunity to potentially
technically compromise personal devices.390
79
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On 3 December, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines addressed TikTok at the

Reagan National Defense Forum:
It is extraordinary the degree to which China, in particular . . . are developing

just frameworks for collecting foreign data and pulling it in and their capacity
to then turn that around and use it to target audiences for information
campaigns or for other things, but also to have it for the future so that they can
use it for a variety of means that they’re interested in.391
On 16 December, CIA Director William Burns echoed such concerns:
I think it's a genuine concern, I think, for the U.S. government, in the sense
that, because the parent company of TikTok is a Chinese company, the
Chinese government is able to insist upon extracting the private data of a lot
of TikTok users in this country, and also to shape the content of what goes on
to TikTok as well to suit the interests of the Chinese leadership. . . .What I would
underscore, though, is that it's genuinely troubling to see what the Chinese
government could do to manipulate TikTok.392
9.2. “Project Texas” Doesn’t Measure Up
TikTok has gone to great efforts to allay Western policymakers’ data security concerns, and
convince governments against a ban, forced divestment or other major action. In the U.S.,
the company has proposed and begun to implement a number of measures relating to data
security, the most notable set of which is known as “Project Texas”.393 However, these
measures fail to address fundamental issues, as detailed below.
9.2.1. Oracle’s Role Doesn’t Address the Underlying Problem: While Oracle is responsible
for the provision and maintenance of the data storage architecture under “Project Texas”,
the cloud servers themselves are administered by TikTok and, according to an Oracle official,
TikTok maintains “full control of everything they’re doing”.394
Regardless of where data is stored, according to company spokesman Ken Glueck, Oracle
would have “absolutely no insight one way or the other” into whether entities or individuals
in China had access to TikTok data stored on the Oracle cloud, nor where it was being sent
from there.395 As TikTok’s Head of Data Defense said in leaked recordings:
It’s almost incorrect to call it Oracle Cloud, because they’re just giving us bare
metal, and then we're building our [virtual machines] on top of it.396
80
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9.2.2. Oracle’s Financial Conflict: As TikTok’s business partner, Oracle may not be in a
position to serve as independent auditor of TikTok’s algorithms as part of “Project Texas”.
Insiders told The Washington Post in late 2022 that “audits have not been started or closely
planned” and that Oracle merely serves as TikTok’s server provider “with no authority to
police operations”.397
9.2.3. ByteDance Policy Remains Clear on China Data Access: TikTok leadership have
claimed that the company would not agree to government requests for data if asked.398
However, TikTok’s privacy policy enshrines ByteDance access to U.S. (and European) user
data. 399 According to U.S. Senator Josh Hawley, when questioning TikTok executive
Vanessa Pappas:
You have hundreds of employees with access to U.S. user data that may very
well be members of the Chinese Communist Party. You have no way to assure
me that they have no access to our citizens’ data. And you won’t answer my
question in a straightforward way about whether a CCP member has ever
gained access or not. From my own point of view, that’s a huge security
problem.400
TikTok shared an update to its Europe privacy policy in November 2022 that confirmed
China-based employees have access to European user data:
Based on a demonstrated need to do their job, subject to a series of robust

security controls and approval protocols, and by way of methods that are
recognised under the GDPR, we allow certain employees within our corporate
group located in Brazil, Canada, China, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, and the United States remote access to TikTok
European user data.401
TikTok’s Pappas did not commit to stopping data flows to China.402 Instead, TikTok has said
that it will “[minimise] employee access to US user data and [minimise] data transfers across
regions”. 403 TikTok describes these ostensible data flow-minimisation measures on its
website:
We have policies and procedures that limit internal access to user data by our
employees, wherever they're based, based on need. Like many global
companies, TikTok has engineering teams around the world—including in
Mountain View, London, Dublin, Singapore, and China – and those teams
might need access to data for engineering functions that are specifically tied
to their roles. That access is subject to a series of robust controls, safeguards
81
Submission 34
like encryption for certain data, and authorisation approval protocols overseen
by our U.S.-based security team. To facilitate those approvals, we also have
an internal data classification system; the level of approval required for access
is based on the sensitivity of the data according to the classification system.404
These policies and procedures are internal, with oversight by a “US-based security team”.
TikTok’s U.S. privacy policy says, “We may share all of the information we collect with a
parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of our corporate group.”405
TikTok’s refusal to implement an effective quarantine of U.S. user data from China-based
staff, and from other entities in its global corporate group, means that this data will continue
to be vulnerable to potential requests for access coming from Beijing made possible by the
PRC’s National Intelligence Law (see Section 2.2.2 and Section 5.5.1).
9.3. Biden’s CFIUS Decision – and Beijing’s Potential Countermove
TikTok may claim it is not controlled by the Chinese government but, if we revisit a series of
key events in 2020, it is clear the Chinese government cares about controlling TikTok.
Amid the failure of “Project Texas” to address fundamental concerns, U.S. policymakers
continue to consider stronger measures that Beijing would, based on the evidence, likely
seek to thwart.
The most immediate policy landmark for TikTok globally was long expected to be the verdict
of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review, led by the
U.S. Treasury Department since 2019. Since late last year, CFIUS has reportedly been
considering two approaches:
First, CFIUS could allow ByteDance to maintain ownership of TikTok as long as it moves
TikTok’s U.S. operations (including its data) into a new subsidiary with a separate board
composed of U.S. national security veterans. This approach, avoiding a ban, has reportedly
been Treasury’s preference.406 (This would trigger criticism from Congress).
Alternatively, CFIUS could force ByteDance to sell TikTok’s U.S. operations altogether,
requiring it to relinquish ownership and control of this significant portion of the company,
along with its algorithms and its data. This is reported to be the preferred approach of the
Defense Department, the Justice Department and the Intelligence Community. (TikTok
critics in Congress have signalled that a forced sale could be satisfactory.407)
Beijing could balk at a forced sale. Back in 2020, as the Trump administration considered
forcing a sale to U.S. buyers such as Microsoft, Beijing rolled out a series of
countermeasures, including warnings and new export controls on algorithms (as outlined in
Section 6.4.1). Official organs referred to a would-be forced sale as “bullying”, “robbery”
and “contemporary piracy”:
82
Submission 34
• 24 August 2020: TikTok and ByteDance sued the Trump administration for banning
the app. 408 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said at a press
conference: "China supports relevant companies in taking up legal weapons to
protect their legitimate rights and interests, and will continue taking all necessary
measures to resolutely safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of PRC
companies.” 409 State outlet Xinhua published a commentary titled, “Say ‘no’ to
economic bullying using legal weapons”.410
• 28 August 2020: The PRC’s Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Science and
Technology announced new export controls pertaining to AI technologies relevant
to TikTok.411 (See Section 6.4.1.) Xinhua spelled out the implications of the export
controls for ByteDance’s algorithms. 412 ByteDance promised to strictly follow
Beijing’s rules.413
• 12 September 2020: Reuters reported that, according to sources, Chinese

authorities would rather see TikTok shut down than forcibly sold.414
• 20-26 September 2020: Global Times and China Daily published at least seven
editorials on TikTok.415 One announced: “China is prepared to prevent Chinese firm
TikTok and its advanced technologies from falling into US hands at all cost, even if
that means the vastly popular video sharing app risks being shut down in the
US. . . .The case goes way beyond just a mafia-style robbery of a lucrative Chinese
business and cutting-edge technologies, but a threat to its national security,
because the US could find loopholes in those technologies to launch cyber and other
attacks on China and other countries to preserve its hegemony.”416
A similar crop of commentaries from Chinese state media emerged in response to late-2022
news of the Biden CFIUS review possibly pointing toward forced divestment.417 There is no
reason to think Beijing would be any warmer to the notion of a forced sale today than in
2020, even though blocking a sale would probably require TikTok to withdraw from the U.S.
market at great commercial cost to ByteDance.
The attempts to regulate or restrict TikTok in 2020 revealed the CCP’s interest in retaining
control over the app. So long as that is the case, TikTok poses risks to democracies.
Australia has a duty to consider these risks. In our view, Australian policymakers are well-
placed to address this issue in a bipartisan way, as was the case when Australia developed
and delivered a counter foreign interference strategy in 2017-18.418
83
Submission 34
Appendix 1: Static Analysis Methodology

To reconstruct our technical analysis and verify findings, follow the steps below:
Download the TikTok Android v25.1.3 (ARM64) Android Package Kit (APK) from
https://www.apkmirror.com/apk/tiktok-pte-ltd/tik-tok-including-musical-ly/tik-tok-including-
musical-ly-25-1-3-release/#downloads.
Decompiling the APK
a. Install Python at https://www.python.org/downloads/.
b. Install Androguard (a tool and Python library for interacting with Android files)
in Windows Command Prompt (CMD) (“pip install androguard”).
c. Ensure that the Python scripts directory

(C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Packages\PythonSoftwareFoundation.P
ython.3.8\LocalCache\local-packages\Python38\Scripts) is located within the
system environmental variables.
OR
a. Navigate to “entry_points.py” in the Androguard install directory

(Androguard/CLI) and run “python entry_points.py gui” in the CMD.
b. Select “File” > “Open” > “.APK file”.
c. Select “View” > “String”.
d. Filter by desired string variable.
e. Select the entry.
f. Select the method.
84
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Submission 34
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https://cert.europa.eu/files/data/TLP-CLEAR-JointPublication-23-01.pdf
34
‘National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023/2024’, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2022,
https://www.cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/ncta-2023-24-web.pdf
‘Statement by Minister Fortier announcing a ban on the use of TikTok on government mobile devices’, Treasury
Board of Canada Secretariat, 27-Feb-2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-
secretariat/news/2023/02/statement-by-minister-fortier-announcing-a-ban-on-the-use-of-tiktok-on-government-
mobile-devices.html
Robert Fife and Steven Chase, ‘CSIS documents reveal Chinese strategy to influence Canada’s 2021 election’,
The Globe and Mail, 17-Feb-2023, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-influence-2021-
federal-election-csis-documents/
35
‘New Zealand condemns malicious cyber activity by Chinese state-sponsored actors’, Government
Communications Security Bureau, 19-Jul-2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-condemns-
malicious-cyber-activity-chinese-state-sponsored-actors
36
‘Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2022’, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, 4-Jul-
2022, https://english.nctv.nl/documents/publications/2022/07/04/cyber-security-assessment-netherlands-2022
37
‘Kaitsepolitsei Aastaraamat 2021-2022, KAPO, 12-Apr-2022,
https://kapo.ee/sites/default/files/content_page_attachments/Aastaraamat_2021-22.pdf
‘International Security and Estonia 2022’, Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, 31-Jan-2022,
https://www.valisluureamet.ee/doc/raport/2022-en.pdf
38
‘WARNING’, National Cyber and Information Security Agency, 8-Mar-2023,
https://www.nukib.cz/download/publications_en/2023-03-08_Warning-TikTok-App.pdf
39
‘Cyber Operations Enabling Expansive Digital Authoritarianism’, 7-Apr-2020, National Intelligence Council,
http://web.archive.org/web/20230217033234/https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICM-
Declassified-Cyber-Operations-Enabling-Expansive-Digital-Authoritarianism-20200407--2022.pdf
40
See our technical analysis of the TikTok Android app in Section 8 for details of potential data collection overreach
and user data security concerns. See also:
‘Leaked Audio From 80 Internal TikTok Meetings Shows That US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed
From China’, BuzzFeed, 17-Jun-2022, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-tapes-us-
user-data-china-bytedance-access
‘Privacy Analysis of TikTok’s App and Website’, Rufposten, 5-Dec-2019,
https://rufposten.de/blog/2019/12/05/privacy-analysis-of-tiktoks-app-and-website/
41
‘EXCLUSIVE: TikTok Spied on Forbes Journalists’, Forbes, 22-Dec-2022,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-white/2022/12/22/tiktok-tracks-forbes-journalists-
bytedance/?sh=5aebf8af7da5
‘TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned to Use TikTok to Monitor The Physical Location Of Specific American
Citizens’, Forbes, 20-Oct-2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-white/2022/10/20/tiktok-bytedance-
surveillance-american-user-data/?sh=436b90e36c2d
From China’, BuzzFeed News, 18-Jun-2022, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-tapes-
us-user-data-china-bytedance-access
42
‘Data brokers and national security’, Lawfare, 29-Apr-2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/data-brokers-and-
national-security
‘China harvest masses of data on Western targets, documents show,’ The Washington Post, 31-Dec-2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-harvests-masses-of-data-on-western-targets-
documents-show/2021/12/31/3981ce9c-538e-11ec-8927-c396fa861a71_story.html
‘How China harnesses data fusion to make sense of surveillance data,’ Brookings, 23-Sep-2021,
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-china-harnesses-data-fusion-to-make-sense-of-surveillance-data/
‘Baby Biocode: China’s gene giant harvests data from millions of women,’ Reuters, 7-Jul-2021,
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/health-china-bgi-dna/
Lotus Ruan, ‘When the winner takes it all: Big data in China and the battle for privacy,’ ASPI Report No. 5/2018,
https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2018-
06/Winner%20takes%20it%20all_0.pdf?VersionId=r0DDh71qxQgqwHtX8z8tmScoz55JQVyc
90
Submission 34
Samantha Hoffman and Nathan Attrill, ‘Mapping China’s technology giants: Supply chains and the global data
collection ecosystem,’ ASPI Report No. 45/2021, https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2021-
06/Supply%20chains.pdf?VersionId=56J_tt8xYXYvsMuhriQt5dSsr92ADaZH
Emile Dirks and James Leibold, ‘Genomic surveillance: Inside China’s DNA dragnet,’ ASPI Report No. 34/2020,
https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2020-
06/Genomic%20surveillance_1.pdf?VersionId=QhPFyrNVaSjvblmFT24HRXSuHyRfhpml
‘Why TikTok is the latest security threat,’ Center for Internet Security,
https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/why-tiktok-is-the-latest-security-threat
43
‘Five Individuals Charged Variously with Stalking, Harassing and Spying on U.S. Residents on Behalf of the PRC
Secret Police’, US Department of Justice, 16-Mar-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221231145316/https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-individuals-charged-variously-
stalking-harassing-and-spying-us-residents-behalf-prc-0#:~:text=United%20States%20v.%20Qiming%20Lin
44
‘TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned To Use TikTok To Monitor The Physical Location Of Specific American
surveillance-american-user-data/?sh=746cf0266c2d
‘Why TikTok is the latest security threat’, Center for Internet Security,
https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/why-tiktok-is-the-latest-security-threat
45
‘Social Media and News Fact Sheet,’ Pew Research, 20-Sep-2022, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-
sheet/social-media-and-news-fact-sheet/
46
'TikTok's state-affiliated media policy’, TikTok, 18-Jan-2023,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230203101952/https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/tiktoks-state-affiliated-media-
policy
47
'大数据下的网络舆情应对’, Cyberspace Administration of China, 29-Dec-2016,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220520173515/http://www.cac.gov.cn/2016-12/29/c_1120214456.htm
'人工智能、大数据与对外传播的创新发展’, International Communications via People’s Daily, 18-Apr-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220523174958/http://media.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0418/c40628-31037065-
2.html
‘Evaluating the Utility of Global Data Collection by Chinese Firms for Targeted Propaganda’, Jamestown, 30-Oct-
2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20220929152445/https://jamestown.org/program/evaluating-the-utility-of-
global-data-collection-by-chinese-firms-for-targeted-propaganda/
48
Lili Turner and Nirit Hinkis, ‘Chinese state media’s global influencer operation’, Miburo, 31-1-2022,
https://miburo.substack.com/p/csm-influencer-ops-1
Nirit Hinkis and Lili Turner, ‘Chinese state media’s global influencer operation: Why it matters’, Miburo, 10-Feb-
2021, https://miburo.substack.com/p/chinese-state-medias-global-influencer
Fergus Ryan, Audrey Fritz and Daria Impiombato, ‘TikTok and WeChat: Curating and controlling global
information flows’, ASPI Policy Brief No. 37/2020, https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2020-
09/TikTok%20and%20WeChat.pdf?VersionId=7BNJWaoHImPVE.6KKcBP1JRD5fRnAVTZ
Fergus Ryan, Daniella Cave and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, ‘Mapping more of China’s technology giants: AI and
surveillance,’ ASPI Issues Paper No. 24/2019, https://archive.md/wip/wP051
Albert Zhang, Jacob Wallis and Zoe Meers, ‘Strange bedfellows on Xinjiang: The CCP, fringe media and US social
media platforms,’ ASPI, March 2021, http://web.archive.org/web/20221001172836/https://ad-aspi.s3.ap
southeast2.amazonaws.com/202103/Strange%20bedfellows.pdf?VersionId=mOh5mC5B_a08J6ntNwTC2q6Gdjt
Wz4di
Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Nathan Ruser, Albert Zhang and Daria Impiombato, ‘Borrowing mouths to speak on
Xinjiang,’ ASPI Policy Brief No. 55/2021, https://archive.md/yMRjM
Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato and Hsi-Ting Pai, ‘Frontier influencers: The new face of China’s propaganda,’
ASPI Policy Brief No. 65/2022, https://archive.md/MWUBv
Samantha Bradshaw, ‘Influence operations and disinformation on social media,’ Centre for International
Governance Innovation, 23-Nov-2020, https://archive.md/jMHuK
49
Matthew Johnson, ‘Safeguarding socialism: The origins, evolution, and expansion of China’s total national security
paradigm,’ Sinopsis, 11-Jun-2020, https://sinopsis.cz/en/johnson-safeguarding-socialism/
50
51
John Fitzgerald, ‘Beijing's Guoqing versus Australia's Way of Life’, Inside Story, 27-Sept-2015,
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52
53
‘习近平在中共中央政治局第三十次集体学习时强调: 加强和改进国际传播工作展示真实立体全面的中国’,
People’s Daily, 2-Jun-2021, http://archive.today/E8T2y
91
Submission 34
54
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https://archive.ph/hs5gH
55
‘中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定’, Xinhua Net via 中央政府门户网站, 15-Nov-2013,
https://archive.ph/hs5gH
56
‘习近平引领国际传播能力建设’, CCTV via People's Daily, 14-Jun-2022, http://archive.today/RYzkr
57
58
59
‘习近平在中央政治局第二十六次集体学习时强调坚持系统思维构建大安全格局为建设社会主义现代化国家提
供坚强保障’, Xinhua, 12-Dec-2020, https://archive.vn/gQpAO
60
‘Profile (English-language): “Yuan Peng”’, CICIR, https://archive.vn/wip/qYiDo
61
《国际战略与安全形势评估 2020/2021》卷首语, CICIR, 31-Dec-2020, https://archive.vn/Xsnkq
62
‘港媒：美国问题专家袁鹏改名袁亦鲲出任国安部副部长’, Lianhe Zaobao, 22-Feb-2023,
https://archive.md/CECOq
63
64
‘The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system',
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 9-Jun-2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you
65
‘让短视频平台展示好中国形象传播好中国声音’, Xinhua, 6-Aug -2021, http://archive.today/qk00A
66
‘让短视频平台展示好中国形象传播好中国声音’, Xinhua, 6-Aug-2021, http://archive.today/qk00A
67
Paul Saba, ‘On the Role of Agitation and Propaganda (Transcription)’, Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line,
originally published Dec-1978, https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-8/rcp-agit-prop.htm?
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70
‘Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society’, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Mar-1926,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230217043746/https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-
works/volume-1/mswv1_1.htm
71
‘Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation’, ChinaFile, 8-Nov-2013,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230217043230/https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation
72
Rogier Creemers, 'Xi Jinping’s 19 August speech revealed? (Translation)', China Copyright and Media, 12-Nov-
2013, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/11/12/xi-jinpings-19-august-speech-revealed-
translation/
73
‘网传习近平 8•19 讲话全文：言论方面要敢抓敢管敢于亮剑,’ 中国数字时代 China Digital Times, 4-Nov-2013,
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74
Lily Kuo, ‘Chinese journalists to be tested on loyalty to Xi Jinping’, The Guardian, 20-Sep-2019,
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75
Willy Lam, 'Beijing Harnesses Big Data & Al to Perfect the Police State', The Jamestown Foundation, 21-Jul-2017,
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76
Liat Clark, ‘China wants police installed in every internet company’, Wired, 05-Aug-2015,
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-cyber-security-police-in-internet-headquarters
Liza Lin and Josh Chin, ‘China’s Tech Giants Have a Second Job: Helping Beijing Spy on Its People’, The Wall
Street Journal, 30-Nov-2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-tech-giants-have-a-second-job-helping-the-
government-see-everything-1512056284
77
John Garnaut, ‘Hong Kong's outspoken media chiefs are facing growing intimidation, The Sydney Morning Herald,
30-May-2014, https://www.smh.com.au/world/hong-kongs-outspoken-media-chiefs-are-facing-growing-
intimidation-20140530-399ol.html
John Garnaut, ‘Australia’s China reset’, The Monthly, Aug-2018,
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79
‘Asia-Pacific Absolute and autocratic control of information’, Reporters Without Borders,
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80
学而时习, ‘习近平：讲好中国故事，传播好中国声音’, Qiushi, 2-Jun-2021, http://archive.today/lI79B
‘习近平在中共中央政治局第三十次集体学习时强调: 加强和改进国际传播工作展示真实立体全面的中国’,
People’s Daily, 2-Jun-2021, http://archive.today/E8T2y
81
‘中国人民共和国网络安全法’, Xinhua, 7-Nov-2016, https://archive.ph/IwrOs
82
‘科学大数据——国家大数据战略的基石’, China Development Gateway, 7-Sep-2017, https://archive.md/PkLNF
83
‘中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和 2035 年远景目标纲要’ (transmitted March 12, 2021),
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92
Submission 34
‘工业和信息化部关于印发大数据产业发展规划（2016－2020 年）的通知’, MIIT, December 18, 2016,

https://archive.ph/qa4Zx
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85
‘中华人民共和国国家情报法’, 中国人大网, 12-Jun-2018, https://archive.md/EvpjJ
86
‘中华人民共和国网络安全法’, CAC, 7-Nov-2016, https://archive.ph/IwrOs
87
‘中华人民共和国数据安全法’, 中国人大网, 10-Jun-2021, https://archive.md/lMQL0
88
‘中华人民共和国个人信息保护法’, 中国人大网, 20-Aug-2021, https://archive.md/2cifD
89
Zach Dorfman, ‘Tech giants are giving China a vital edge in espionage,’ Foreign Policy, 23-Dec-2020,
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90
Zach Dorfman, ‘Tech giants are giving China a vital edge in espionage,’ Foreign Policy, 23-Dec-2020,
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‘Cyber Operations Enabling Expansive Digital Authoritarianism’, National Intelligence Council, 7-Apr-2020,
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97
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陳津萍 and 張貽智, ‘軍改後中共「中央軍委政治工作部」組織與職能之研究’, 軍事社會科學專刊, Aug-2019: pp.
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Elsa B. Kania, ‘Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,’
Center for New American Security, Nov-2017, https://s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/hero/documents/Battlefield-Singularity-November-
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c.f. 刘全展, 李波, ‘大数据：信息化作战的制胜法宝’, PLA Daily, 15-Nov- 2015, in Elsa B. Kania, ‘Battlefield
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https://web.archive.org/web/20221117091553/https://m.zhongtouhuac.com/h-nd-2913.html
103
‘风暴中的张一鸣：“创富神兽”让身家充满变数’, 21st Century Business Herald, 6-Aug-2020,
https://archive.ph/bsuIN
104
‘“饭否”归来尚能饭否’, CYOL, 2-Dec-2010, https://archive.ph/n0pvW
‘作者介绍’, Chongzou, https://archive.ph/NnQYB
105
106
‘微博网站“饭否”关闭一年多后重新开放’, BBC, 30-Nov-2010,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221209070202/https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2010/11/101130_chi
na_fanfou_internet
93
Submission 34
107
‘南开校友、今日头条创始人张一鸣在 2016 级新生开学典礼上的讲话’, Nankai University, 19-Sep-
2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20221209053808/https://cs.nankai.edu.cn/info/1039/2356.htm
108
‘网络空间，年轻创业者在这里逐梦’, People’s Daily, 18-Apr-2013, https://archive.ph/IlPyf
109
‘这个龙岩 80 后要怒砸 10 亿抢占下一个风口’, Sina Fujian, https://archive.ph/tbnsq
110
111
‘微博网站“饭否”关闭一年多后重新开放’, BBC, 30-Nov-
2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20221209070202/https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2010/11/1011
30_china_fanfou_internet
112
‘解码酷讯创业帮：张一鸣这些 80 后老板们的“黄埔军校”’, Economic Observer Network, 3-Sep-
2016, https://archive.ph/lqxue
113
‘海纳亚洲王琼自述：为何投资今日头条？”’, Huxiu, 5-Apr-2016, https://archive.ph/x1SMJ
114
115
Yue Wang, ‘Billionaire Zhang Yiming Steps Down As ByteDance Chairman’, Forbes, 3-Nov-2021,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2021/11/03/billionaire-zhang-yiming-steps-down-as-bytedance-
chairman/?sh=57548d2e7016
116
‘36 氪独家 | 字节跳动搭建“直播大中台”，张一鸣想在广告之外寻觅第二台“赚钱机器”’, 36kr, 19-Mar-2019,
https://archive.ph/iL3OU
‘从字节跳动“拆中台”寻找巨头中台演进的草蛇灰线’, Jiemian, 11-Nov-2021, https://archive.ph/ftPv6
117
‘张一鸣首谈字节跳动创业 7 年：我们不是 APP 工厂，是一个浪漫的公司’, National Business Daily, 14-Mar-
2019, https://archive.ph/FMpPh
118
‘ByteDance CEO returns to the apartment where he first started the company’, YouTube (ByteDance channel),
30-Jul-2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TIYPXpfA7_Q
119
‘张一鸣的“上帝视角”’, Pingwest, 15-Jun-2015,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221118014848/https://www.pingwest.com/a/51495
120
‘字节跳动二号人物登场’, Jiemian via Sohu, 14-Mar-2020, https://archive.ph/yWrXs
‘张一鸣首谈字节跳动创业 7 年：我们不是 APP 工厂，是一个浪漫的公司’, National Business Daily, 14-Mar-
2019, https://archive.ph/FMpPh
121
’张一鸣退出字节跳动全球董事会，梁汝波与八名核心高管走向前台’, LatePost via WeChat, 2-Nov-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20211127192008/https:/mp.weixin.qq.com/s/TkpV2ux3ibqj372c39cApg
‘新加入视频功能的读图应用“图吧”，想借读图构建用户的兴趣图谱’, 36kr, 28-Jun-2013,
https://archive.ph/ckyUU
122
‘海纳亚洲王琼自述：为何投资今日头条？’, Huxiu, 6-Apr-2016, https://archive.ph/x1SMJ
Ryan Mac and Chang Che, ’TikTok’s C.E.O. Navigates the Limits of His Power’, New York Times , 16-Sep-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221114134158/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/technology/tiktok-ceo-shou-
zi-chew.html
Yunan Zhang and Juro Osawa, ’Tencent, Xiaomi Invested in TikTok’s Parent, ByteDance’, The Information, 20-
Aug-2020, https://www.theinformation.com/articles/tencent-xiaomi-invested-in-tiktoks-parent-
bytedance?rc=zcbseh
123
Murray Newlands, ’The Origin and Future Of America's Hottest New App: musical.ly’, Forbes, 10-Jun-2016,
https://archive.ph/zTHL4
124
‘Petition for review, TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd., Petitioners’, The United States Court Of Appeals For The
District Of Columbia Circuit, 10-Nov-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20210928143950/https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/tiktok-cadc-petition.pdf
125
‘今日头条收购 Mus cal.ly：海外野心与引信型公司宿命’, Jiemian, 13-Nov-2017, https://archive.ph/YZL3C
‘Mus cal.ly CEO 阳陆育：C 轮前投资方全部退出’, Yicai, 13-Nov-2017, https://archive.ph/Ma6QW
‘微视努力撕掉抄袭标签能否复制抖音增长轨迹？’, Sina Tech via WeChat, 23-May-2018,
https://archive.ph/ELz6k
126
‘机会面前，拼的是速度 | 21 读书’, 21st Century Business Herald via China Fund, 23-Oct-2021,
https://archive.ph/GSj2X
127
‘Can pop music connect teens in China with the world? Musical.ly co-founder Louis Yang wants to find out’, The
China Project, 13-Sep-2017, https://archive.ph/wQ9kU
94
Submission 34
128
John Herrman, ’Who’s Too Young for an App? Musical.ly Tests the Limits’, New York Times, 16-Sep-
2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20221102192402/https:/www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/business/media/a-
social-network-frequented-by-children-tests-the-limits-of-online-regulation.html
‘The most popular users on musical.ly’, DW, 19-Oct-2016, https://archive.ph/z4XFm
129
‘今日头条张一鸣：短视频是内容创业的下一个风口’, Sina, 20-Sep-
2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20221118040558/http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2016-09-20/doc-
ifxvyqvy6859414.shtml
130
Benita Zhang, ‘抖音内幕：时间熔炉的诞生’, Tencent News via Huxiu, 26-Oct-2020, https://archive.ph/pgGxT
131
‘大事记’, ByteDance, https://web.archive.org/web/20230308045944/https://www.bytedance.com/zh/
‘谁在管理 TikTok：没有中心的网状组织、字节的全球化构想’, LatePost via Laohu8, 7-Apr-2022,
https://archive.ph/yLV9W
‘TikTok 内幕：张一鸣的巨浪征途’, Jiemian via Sina, 25-Apr-2022, https://archive.ph/geqqt
132
‘【爆料】Mus cal.ly 为何卖给了头条而不是出价更高的快手’, iFeng, 10-Nov-2017,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230308174817/https://tech.ifeng.com/a/20171110/44755384_0.shtml
‘Musical.ly has lots of users, not much ad traction’, Digiday, 5-Sep-2017, https://archive.ph/giB5r
‘From Musers To Money: Inside Video App Musical.ly's Coming Of Age’, Forbes, 11-May-2017,
https://archive.ph/NxiD0
'大事记’, ByteDance, https://web.archive.org/web/20230308045944/https://www.bytedance.com/zh/
133
‘China's ByteDance buying lip-sync app Musical.ly for up to $1 billion’, Reuters, 10-Nov-2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-musical-ly-m-a-bytedance-idUSKBN1DA0BN
‘字节跳动收购的 musical.ly 正式并入 Tik Tok’, Sina Tech, 2-Aug-2018, https://archive.ph/Cmh5A
134
‘大事记’, ByteDance, https://web.archive.org/web/20230308045944/https://www.bytedance.com/zh/
135
Georgia Wells and Yang Jie, ‘TikTok’s Videos Are Goofy. Its Strategy to Dominate Social Media Is Serious.’ The
Wall Street Journal, 29-Jun-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220930033958/https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-videos-are-goofy-its-strategy-
to-dominate-social-media-is-serious-11561780861
136
‘沈南鹏：王兴、张一鸣给我的启发和感受’, China Businessman via FX361, 7-May-2021,
https://archive.ph/Th5E5
137
‘第二届中韩互联网圆桌会议’, Xinhua, 2013, https://archive.ph/hYgDO
138
‘首届世界互联网大会开幕业界大佬齐聚乌镇’, Yicai, 19-Nov-2014,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230101171859/https://www.yicai.com/news/4042409.html
139
‘鲁炜：世界互联网大会实现了 3 个 C to C’, Caixin, 19-Nov-2014, https://archive.ph/dg7jL
‘今日头条 CEO 张一鸣：机器解放媒体人’, Caixin, 19-Nov-2014, https://archive.ph/q8rw8
140
‘China-US Internet Industry Forum opens in Washington DC’, China Daily via gov.cn, 14-Dec-2014,
https://archive.ph/3lyph
141
‘互联网信息办公室主任鲁炜在美把库克贝索斯小扎见了个遍 #硅谷史上最美图片集不服来辩#’, Huxiu, 7-Dec-
2014, https://archive.ph/0sr65
‘Chinese Internet regulator welcomed at Facebook campus’, Reuters, 8-Dec-2014, https://archive.ph/6Ku2C
142
‘除了大合照，中美论坛上大佬们还聊了什么？’, China.org.cn, 24-Sep-2015, https://archive.ph/vOM6j
‘随习主席访美互联网科技公司除 BAT 还有哪些’, Sina Finance, 22-Sep-2015, https://archive.ph/fzghw
143
‘除了大合照，中美论坛上大佬们还聊了什么？’, China.org.cn, 24-Sep-2015, https://archive.ph/vOM6j
144
‘专访张一鸣：中国企业完全有能力在海外拓展’, Global Times, 30-Sep-2015, https://archive.ph/ruVnu
145
‘What's in a picture? The unspoken messages in Xi Jinping's group portrait with CEOs and senior executives
during his first state visit to the US’, SCMP, https://www.scmp.com/tech/leaders-founders/article/1861033/whats-
picture-unspoken-messages-xi-jinpings-group-
portrait?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=1861033
146
‘第二届世界互联网大会’, Huanqiu, https://archive.ph/nxPHP
147
‘第二届世界互联网大会’, Huanqiu, https://archive.ph/nxPHP
148
‘中共中央宣传部原副部长鲁炜涉嫌严重违纪接受组织审查’, CCDI via gov.cn, 22-Nov-2017,
https://archive.ph/dmnzt
149
‘中央宣传部原副部长、中央网信办原主任鲁炜，山东省政府原党组成员、副省长季缃绮严重违纪被开除党籍和
公职’, CCDI, 13-Dec-2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221124050712/https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiao/201802/t20180213_164223.html
‘中宣部原副部长鲁炜受贿 3200 万判 14 年罚金 300 万’, Xinhua via Sina, 26-Mar-2019, https://archive.ph/7L1ZS
‘China’s Former Top Internet Regulator Gets 14 Years for Corruption’, WSJ, 26-Mar-2019,
https://archive.ph/2NM91
95
Submission 34
150
‘“内涵段子”被永久关停’, Xinhua, 10-Apr-2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220625025726/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-04/10/c_129847557.htm
151
‘端传媒 | 两千万日活的手机应用为何被突然斩杀？’, China Digital Times, 21-Apr-2018, https://archive.md/tjF8b
152
‘争雄 BAT “头条帝国”何以崛起’, Caixin via Zhihu, 8-Feb-2020, https://archive.ph/CFRLk
153
‘Complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd.’, United States District Court,
Central District of California Western Division, 24-Aug-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220416021500/https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/7043165/TikTok-
Trump-Complaint.pdf
154
‘中国共产党章程’, 12371.cn [Organisation Department], 22-Oct-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221126151852/http://www.12371.cn/2022/10/26/ARTI1666788342244946.shtml
155
‘小丫专访张一鸣：我不是“新闻搬运工”’, CCTV, 27-Aug-2014,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221115070825/http:/jingji.cntv.cn/2014/08/27/ARTI1409120412396179.shtml
‘今日头条创始人回应低俗质疑：从不主动 push 低俗内容’, Caijing via Sina, 14-Dec-2016,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220708100249/http:/tech.sina.com.cn/i/2016-12-14/doc-ifxypipt1331463.shtml
156
‘国家版权局对“今日头条”立案调查’, People’s Daily, 24-Jun-2014, https://archive.ph/rR4mn
157
‘小丫专访张一鸣：我不是“新闻搬运工”’, CCTV, 27-Aug-2014,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221115070825/http:/jingji.cntv.cn/2014/08/27/ARTI1409120412396179.shtml
‘国家版权局对“今日头条”立案调查’, People’s Daily, 24-Jun-2014, https://archive.ph/rR4mn
158
‘国家版权局确认"今日头条"侵权:积极整改是好现象’, People’s Daily, 16-Sep-2014, https://archive.ph/1StWt
159
Li Yuan, ’China’s TikTok Blazes New Ground. That Could Doom It.’, New York Times, 5-Nov-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220930033958/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/tiktok-china-
bytedance.html
160
‘今日头条创始人回应低俗质疑：从不主动 push 低俗内容’, Caijing via Sina, 14-Dec-2016,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220708100249/http:/tech.sina.com.cn/i/2016-12-14/doc-ifxypipt1331463.shtml
161
‘北京网信办约谈今日头条、凤凰新闻手机客户端负责人两家企业将暂停部分频道内容更新’, People’s Daily, 29-
Dec-2017, https://archive.ph/awbil
162
‘互联网不良内容的监管升级微信微博今日头条纷纷自查’, Beijing News via China News, 12-Apr-2018,
https://archive.ph/7DUhu
‘未成年怀孕成“网红”？被央视点名的快手、火山小视频下架整改！ ’, National Business Daily, 6-Apr-2018,
https://archive.ph/iuwhD
‘4 款 APP 被下架今日头条暂停下载 3 周’, The Beijing News, 10-Apr-2018, https://archive.ph/73Ddc
163
’张一鸣宣布卸任字节跳动 CEO，联合创始人梁汝波将接任’, The Paper, 20-May-2021, https://archive.ph/fSp5h
‘字节跳动创始人张一鸣已卸任董事长退出董事会--消息人士（更新版）’, Reuters, 3-Nov-2021,
https://www.reuters.com/article/bytedance-reshuffling-1103-wedn-idCNKBS2HO06L
164
‘北京网信办约谈今日头条、凤凰新闻手机客户端负责人两家企业将暂停部分频道内容更新’, People’s Daily, 29-
Dec-2017, https://archive.ph/awbil
‘今日头条启动招聘 2000 名内容审核编辑：党员优先’, The Paper, 3-Jan-2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221116013004/https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1932733
‘今日头条公布算法原理称并非一切交给机器’, Leiphone, 12-Jan-2018,
http://web.archive.org/web/20221122152458/https://www.leiphone.com/category/industrynews/cEc03ORUAeiwy
tnC.html
‘互联网不良内容的监管升级微信微博今日头条纷纷自查’, Beijing News via China News, 12-Apr-2018,
https://archive.ph/7DUhu
‘未成年怀孕成“网红”？被央视点名的快手、火山小视频下架整改！ ’, National Business Daily, 6-Apr-2018,
https://archive.ph/iuwhD
‘国家广播电视总局严肃处理“今日头条” “快手”传播有违社会道德节目等问题’, State Administration of Press,
Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the PRC, 4-Apr-2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200124192251/http://www.sapprft.gov.cn/sapprft/contents/6582/363639.shtml
‘“内涵段子”被永久关停张一鸣发文致歉反思’, People’s Daily, 11-Apr-2018, https://archive.ph/utuBC
‘致歉和反思’, Zhang Yiming via Toutiao, 11-Apr-2018, https://archive.ph/wbVSM
165
‘全国“扫黄打非”办通报：“抖音”平台被行政处罚’, China News, 8-Jan-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220418033453/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2021/01-08/9381634.shtml
‘国家市场监督管理总局行政处罚决定书’, SAMR, 12-Mar-2021, https://archive.ph/7f0lo
‘市场监管总局、中央网信办、税务总局联合召开互联网平台企业行政指导会’, SAMR, 13-Apr-2021,
https://archive.ph/1VTwx
‘市场监管总局、中央网信办、税务总局联合召开互联网平台企业行政指导会’, SAMR, 13-Apr-2021,
https://archive.ph/1VTwx
96
Submission 34
‘互联网平台企业向社会公开《依法合规经营承诺》（第一批）’, SAMR, 14-Apr-2021,

https://web.archive.org/web/20220413082741/https://www.samr.gov.cn/xw/zj/202104/t20210413_327811.html
‘China Warns 34 Tech Firms to Curb Excess in Antitrust Review’, Bloomberg, 13-Apr-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220220232838/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-13/china-
orders-34-tech-firms-to-curb-excesses-in-antitrust-review
‘金融管理部门联合约谈部分从事金融业务的网络平台企业’, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 29-Apr-
2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210515205240/https://www.safe.gov.cn/safe/2021/0429/18865.html
‘China Reins In Tech Giants’ Finance Arms After Hobbling Ant’, Bloomberg, 29-Apr-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220407174002/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-29/china-
orders-tencent-ByteDance-to-rectify-financial-operations
‘ByteDance Shelved IPO Intentions After Chinese Regulators Warned About Data Security’, WSJ, 12-Jul-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221206013550/https://www.wsj.com/articles/bytedance-shelvedipo-intentions-
after-chinese-regulators-warned-about-data-security-11626078000
’A Letter From Yiming’, ByteDance, 19-May-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220909193935/https://www.bytedance.com/en/news/60a526af053cc102d640c0
61
‘张一鸣宣布卸任字节跳动 CEO，联合创始人梁汝波将接任’, The Paper, 20-May-2021, https://archive.ph/fSp5h
‘国家互联网信息办公室、公安部加强对语音社交软件和涉深度伪造技术的互联网新技术新应用安全评估', CAC
via Xinhua, 18-Mar-2021, https://archive.ph/C5VRZ
166
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, USCA CASE #20-1444
Vanessa Pappas, “Senate Hearing on Social Media and National Security”, C-SPAN, 14-Sep-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221109011249/https://www.c-span.org/video/?522807-1/senate-hearing-social-
media-national-security&playEvent=
Parliament of Australia ‘Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media – 25/09/2020’, Australian
Parliament House Hansard, 25-Sep-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221125030444/https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansar
d_Display?bid=committees%2Fcommsen%2F1a5e6393-fec4-4222-945b-859e3f8ebd17%2F&sid=0002
167
‘迪士尼前高管加入字节跳动，TT 原总裁朱俊向其汇报’, Beijing News via Sina, 19-May-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221210093341/https://k.sina.com.cn/article_1644114654_61ff32de02000zbnu.ht
ml
‘ByteDance Names Kevin Mayer Chief Operating Officer’, TikTok, 19-May-2020, https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-
us/bytedance-names-kevin-mayer-chief-operating-officer
168
‘TikTok Names CEO and COO’, TikTok, 30-Apr-2021, https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/tiktok-names-ceo-and-
coo
169
’Chinese companies set up in Singapore to hedge against geopolitical risk’, Financial Times, 30-Nov-2022,
https://www.ft.com/content/a0c11e3e-ab72-4b4b-a55c-557191e53938
170
‘Senate Hearing on Social Media and National Security’, C-Span, 14-Sep-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221109011249/https://www.c-span.org/video/?522807-1/senate-hearing-social-
media-national-security&playEvent=
171
‘Billionaire ByteDance Founder Zhang Yiming Now Living Far From Home’, The Information, 29-Sep-2022,
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/billionaire-bytedance-founder-zhang-yiming-now-living-far-from-
home?rc=zcbseh
‘知名律所合伙人高准担任字节跳动 CFO，或将操盘上市重任’, Yicai, 25-Apr-2022, https://archive.ph/PjSoB
172
‘“字节跳动”改名“抖音”了？官方回应来了！’, Nanfang Daily via Sohu, 9-May-2022, https://archive.ph/1VhUy
173
Letter from Shouzi Chew to U.S. Senators, Marsha Blackburn, U.S. Senator for Tennessee, 30-Jun-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220702045206/https://www.blackburn.senate.gov/services/files/A5027CD8-
73DE-4571-95B0-AA7064F707C1
174
'TikTok’s Owner ByteDance Quietly Changed Its China Unit’s Name After U.S. Political Fears’, The Information,
10-Aug-2022, https://www.theinformation.com/articles/tiktoks-owner-bytedance-quietly-changed-its-china-units-
name-after-u-s-political-fears?rc=zcbseh
175
‘Petition for review 2’, Courthouse News Service, 10-Nov-2020,
176
‘Petition for review 2’, Courthouse News Service, 10-Nov-2020,
97
Submission 34
177
‘Corporate Structure’, ByteDance,
https://web.archive.org/web/20210501000449/https://www.ByteDance.com/en/
178
Written evidence submitted by TikTok (FL0022), UK House of Commons, Oct-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221101032109/http://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/13247/pdf/
‘張一鳴退任抖音名義股東’, Hong Kong Economic Journal via Yahoo, 25-Jan-2023, https://archive.ph/RYLOh
‘字节跳动香港公司更名为抖音集团，概念股集体沸腾’, Yicai, 9-May-2022, https://archive.ph/NxFmn
179
180
Written evidence submitted by TikTok (FL0022), UK House of Commons,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221101032109/http://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/13247/pdf/
‘字节跳动香港公司更名为抖音集团，概念股集体沸腾’, Yicai, 9-May-2022, https://archive.ph/NxFmn
‘抖音视界有限公司’, Aiqicha Baidu, https://archive.ph/E8QkD
‘抖音有限公司’, Aiqicha Baidu, https://archive.ph/3xuZt
181
‘Petition for review, TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd., Petitioners’ 12, 26, The United States Court Of Appeals For
The District Of Columbia Circuit, 10-Nov-2020,
182
Cayman Islands General Registry, retrieved 4-Nov-2022, https://online.ciregistry.gov.ky/cos/faces/home?_adf.no-
new-window-redirect=true
183
‘字节跳动 CEO 梁汝波发内部信：头条、西瓜等业务并入抖音’, Sina, 2-Nov-2021, https://archive.ph/AW4Yd
184
185
Letter from Shouzi Chew to U.S. Senators, Marsha Blackburn, U.S. Senator for Tennessee, 30-Jun-2022,
73DE-4571-95B0-AA7064F707C1
Cayman Islands General Registry, retrieved 4-Nov-2022, https://online.ciregistry.gov.ky/cos/faces/home?_adf.no-
new-window-redirect=true
186
‘北京甲艺丙科技有限公司’, Aiqicha Baidu, https://archive.ph/dyzQV
‘或赴港上市？字节跳动成立抖音集团！三位董事公布：梁汝波领衔’, NBD, 8-May-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221129141240/https://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2022-05-08/2269021.html
‘梁汝波退出多家置业公司法定代表人’, jrj.com, 30-Mar-2022, https://archive.ph/p9sQG
‘北京微播视界科技有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221018151516/https://aiqicha.baidu.com/company_detail_81699330266992
‘梁汝波卸任杭州字节跳动科技公司职务’, QCC via OfWeek, 17-Oct-2022, https://archive.ph/koeAH
187
‘抖音换帅：张楠管国内、朱俊管国际，分头迎战快手与 Facebook’, LatePost via Tencent, 31-Oct-2019,
http://web.archive.org/web/20221210092254/https://new.qq.com/omn/20191031/20191031A0KPLQ00.html
188
‘抖音有限公司’, Tianyancha, https://archive.ph/egkYD
‘抖音有限公司’, Aiqicha Baidu, https://archive.ph/3xuZt
‘厦门星辰启点科技有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/L2WJI
‘上海字跳网络技术有限公司’, Tianyancha, https://archive.ph/HMjbW
‘字节跳动组织调整：集团 CFO、TikTok CEO 周受资将管理更多团队’, LatePost via Laohu, 16-Jun-2021,
https://archive.ph/5JKYN
‘字节跳动入股教育硬件品牌北京孔明科技’, Huanqiu via Sohu, 27-Oct-2020, https://archive.ph/uLDfr
189
‘抖音视界有限公司’, Tianyancha, https://archive.md/iOjpl
98
Submission 34
’張一鳴退任抖音名義股東’, Hong Kong Economic Journal via Yahoo, 25-Jan-2023, https://archive.ph/RYLOh

190
‘如何看待张一鸣退出抖音抖音有限公司股东？’, Zhihu, 22-Jan-2023, https://archive.ph/B9dbJ
191
TikTok 内幕：张一鸣的巨浪征途’, Jiemian via Sina, 25-Apr-2022, https://archive.ph/geqqt
192
‘抖音视界有限公司‘, Tianyancha, https://archive.md/iOjpl
‘如何看待张一鸣退出抖音抖音有限公司股东？’, Zhihu, 22-Jan-2023, https://archive.ph/B9dbJ
193
194
Sam Biddle, Paulo Victor Ribeiro, Tatiana Dias, ‘INVISIBLE CENSORSHIP: TikTok Told Moderators to Suppress
Posts by “Ugly” People and the Poor to Attract New Users’, The Intercept, 16-Mar-2020, https://archive.ph/1n45R
Salvador Rodriguez, ‘TikTok insiders say social media company is tightly controlled by Chinese parent
ByteDance’, CNBC, 25-Jn-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221104203859/https:/www.cnbc.com/2021/06/25/tiktok-insiders-say-chinese-
parent-bytedance-in-control.html
Sylvia Varnham O’Regan, ‘TikTok’s $4 Billion Advertising Machine Is Messy Behind the Scenes’, The Information,
11-Aug-2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221114090438/https://www.theinformation.com/articles/tiktoks-4-
billion-advertising-machine-is-messy-behind-the-scenes?rc=zcbseh
Emily Baker-White, ‘TikTok Is Bleeding U.S. Execs Because China Is Still Calling The Shots, Ex-Employees Say’,
Forbes, 21-Sep-2022, https://archive.ph/YQVm7
Emily Baker-White, ‘TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned To Use TikTok To Monitor The Physical Location Of
Specific American Citizens,’ Forbes, 20-Oct-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-white/2022/10/20/tiktok-bytedance-
surveillance-american-user-data/
Drew Harwell and Elizabeth Dwoskin, ’As Washington wavers on TikTok, Beijing exerts control’, The Washington
Post, 28-Oct-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221101005158/https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2022/byt
edance-tiktok-privacy-china/
Ryan Mac and Chang Che, ‘TikTok’s C.E.O. Navigates the Limits of His Power’, New York Times, 16-Sep-
2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221102210817/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/technology/tiktok-
ceo-shou-zi-chew.html
195
‘TikTok Is Bleeding U.S. Execs Because China Is Still Calling The Shots, Ex-Employees Say’, Forbes, 21-Sep-
2022, https://archive.ph/YQVm7
196
‘中华人民共和国国家安全法’, gov.cn, 1-Jul-2015,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221216184050/http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-07/01/content_2893902.htm
197
‘中华人民共和国国家情报法’, National People’s Congress of the PRC, 12-Jun-2018, https://archive.ph/EvpjJ
198
Raffaele Huang, ‘TikTok’s Efforts to Distance Itself From Chinese Parent Stumble Over Talent’, WSJ, 16-Dec-
2022, https://archive.ph/RVsCa
Juro Osawa, Amir Efrati and Shai Oster, ‘TikTok Still Has Key Software Developers in China Despite Effort to Move
Offshore’, The Information, 26-Aug-2021, https://www.theinformation.com/articles/tiktok-still-has-key-software-
developers-in-china-despite-effort-to-move-offshore?rc=zcbseh
Juro Osawa, Yunan Zhang and Amir Efrati, ‘Breaking Off TikTok Will Be Hard to Do’, The Information, 29-Jul-
2020, https://www.theinformation.com/articles/breaking-off-tiktok-will-be-hard-to-do?rc=zcbseh
Yingzhi Yang, Echo Wang and Alexandra Alper, ‘Exclusive: TikTok owner ByteDance moves to shift power out of
China – sources’, Reuters, 28-May-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221201022956/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bytedance-tiktok-
exclusive/exclusive-tiktok-owner-bytedance-moves-to-shift-power-out-of-china-sources-idUSKBN2341VJ
199
‘数据科学家-国际短视频-上海’, ByteDance via LinkedIn,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230227050201/https://cn.linkedin.com/jobs/view/%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E
7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6%E5%AE%B6-%E5%9B%BD%E9%99%85%E7%9F%AD%E8%A7%86%E9%A2%91-
%E4%B8%8A%E6%B5%B7-at-%E5%AD%97%E8%8A%82%E8%B7%B3%E5%8A%A8-3362902087
‘Data Scientist/数据科学家’, TikTok via LinkedIn,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230227050531/https://cn.linkedin.com/jobs/view/data-
scientist-%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6%E5%AE%B6-at-tiktok-3345866583
200
‘数据分析师-国际化短视频（用户体验方向）’, ByteDance, https://archive.ph/njPBh
‘出海大客户总监--北上广’, ByteDance,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221031203410/https://jobs.bytedance.com/experienced/position/7020292300300
863757/detail?recomId=0550f0ef-0f81-11ed-83ce-6c92bfa0d82e&sourceJobId=6777279603208620301
‘服务端核心研发工程师-抖音服务架构-基础工程方向’, ByteDance, https://archive.ph/OUicS
99
Submission 34
‘推荐算法高级工程师 - 电商’, ByteDance, https://archive.ph/oXTbj

201
‘Tech Lead (Streaming Computing), Cloud Infrastructure’, ByteDance,
100581/detail?use_ssr=1
‘Tech Lead(Streaming Computing), Cloud Infrastructure’, TikTok, https://perma.cc/9NTN-53ED
‘Backend Software Engineer - TikTok (Livestreaming) – Singapore’, ByteDance, https://archive.ph/oHFHK
‘Backend Software Engineer - TikTok (Livestreaming) – Singapore’, TikTok,
https://careers.tiktok.com/position/7094943341029280031/detail
‘Site Reliability Engineer, Recommendation Architecture’, ByteDance, https://archive.ph/Zvyan
‘Site Reliability Engineer, Recommendation Architecture’, TikTok,
https://careers.tiktok.com/position/7057825736279623950/detail
‘Software Engineer - Recommendation Architecture’, ByteDance, https://archive.ph/L5qOZ
202
We input “ByteDance” “TikTok” into the search field on LinkedIn, then selected Filter by People. The results
included former employees of ByteDance or TikTok.
203
‘Blake Chandlee’, LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/in/blakechandlee/
"ByteDance" "TikTok", LinkedIn,
https://www.linkedin.com/search/results/people/?keywords=%22ByteDance%22%20%22TikTok%22&origin=GL
OBAL_SEARCH_HEADER&sid=XJ~
204
Emily Baker-White, ‘TikTok Is Bleeding U.S. Execs Because China Is Still Calling The Shots, Ex-Employees Say’,
Forbes, 21-Sep-2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221114090501/https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-
white/2022/09/21/tiktok-bleeding-us-execs-china-control-bytedance/?sh=7332d8d89707
‘TikTok insiders say social media company is tightly controlled by Chinese parent ByteDance’, CNBC, 25-Jun-
2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20230210063010/https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/25/tiktok-insiders-say-
chinese-parent-bytedance-in-control.html
‘TikTok’s Spying Scandal and ChatGPT’s Challenge to Google’, New York Times, 6-Jan-2023,
https://archive.ph/1T57f
205
‘Tech Lead (DBA) , Cloud Infrastructure’, ByteDance, https://perma.cc/7W5G-VSVC
‘Tech Lead(DBA), Cloud Infrastructure’, TikTok, https://perma.cc/NNX8-YGLH
206
Emily Baker-White, ‘Leaked Audio From 80 Internal TikTok Meetings Shows That US User Data Has Been
Repeatedly Accessed From China’, BuzzFeed, 17-Jun-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221113152059/https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-
tapes-us-user-data-china-bytedance-access
207
‘北京抖音信息服务有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/EXVxv
208
209
‘网投中文(北京)科技有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/q6Bj8
‘中网投(北京)科技有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/H5UzA
‘中国互联网投资基金管理有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/EFcs9
‘北京市文化投资发展集团资产管理有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/I8zAh
‘央视频融媒体发展有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/KbeAY
‘公司简介’, China Internet Investment Fund, https://archive.ph/UxtPm
210
Shou Zi Chew, Letter from TikTok CEO to US Senators, United States Senate, 30-Jun-2022,
73DE-4571-95B0-AA7064F707C1
211
‘网投中文(北京)科技有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/q6Bj8
‘中网投(北京)科技有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/H5UzA
‘中国互联网投资基金管理有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/EFcs9
‘北京市文化投资发展集团资产管理有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/I8zAh
‘央视频融媒体发展有限公司’, Baidu Aiqicha, https://archive.ph/KbeAY
‘公司简介’, China Internet Investment Fund, https://archive.ph/UxtPm
212
Ryan McMorrow, Qianer Liu and Cheng Leng, 'China moves to take ‘golden shares’ in Alibaba and Tencent units’,
Financial Times, 12-Jan-2023, https://archive.md/PmxYE
213
214
100
Submission 34
215
'爱党书记狂言砍网友的头一张办公照把他出卖了’, Aboluowang, 17-Jul-2012, https://archive.md/yGthO
“某官员 @爱我中华_情满神州实名认证信息为...”, @zuola via Twitter, 29-Jun-2012, https://archive.md/zI8iv
216
‘人教社向河北省平山县小学生捐赠 2000 套《新编小学生字典》和 1000 套《中华传统美德格言》’, Chinese
Education Publishing & Media Group Ltd, 6-Jun-2012, https://archive.md/1zI0F
217
“某官员 @爱我中华_情满神州实名认证信息为...”, @zuola via Twitter, 29-Jun-2012, https://archive.md/zI8iv
218
‘守好网络舆论阵地助力美好淮南发展’, Huainan Vanguards Network, 24-May-2019, https://archive.ph/Lq0ja
‘全国网信系统十九大精神宣讲团吉林省报告会综述’, China Jilin via CAC, 20-Nov-2017,
https://archive.md/KS8Pz
'中央网信办党的十九大精神宣讲团走进中原网和郑州网信企业’, Zhengzhou Evening News via Toutiao, 8-Nov-
2017, https://archive.md/uMfj5
‘全国网信系统在豫首场宣讲报告会走进河南日报报业集团’, Henan Mobile News, 9-Nov-2017,
https://archive.md/SCYMp
219
'"Are There TikTok Employees... Who Are Members Of The Chinese Communist Party?" Hawley Grills Exec’,
Forbes Breaking News via YouTube, 15-Sep-2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=meWM8d4Uz7Q
220
‘不忘初心重温入党志愿书’, Study Times via People’s Daily, https://archive.ph/4AjRJ
221
‘【独家】党支部名单曝光抖音何去何从’, Epoch Times, 5-Aug-2020, https://archive.ph/RVz3Z
222
‘【独家】党支部名单曝光抖音何去何从’, Epoch Times, 5-Aug-2020, https://archive.ph/RVz3Z
223
‘New DOJ Filing: TikTok's Owner Is 'A Mouthpiece' Of Chinese Communist Party’, NPR, 26-Sep-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230114040919/https://www.npr.org/2020/09/26/917134452/new-doj-filing-
tiktoks-owner-is-a-mouthpiece-of-chinese-communist-party
‘TikTok Downplays Chinese Communist Party Links in Australia Hearing’, Bloomberg, 25-Sep-2020,
https://archive.ph/tVKAO
224
’以党建为统领推动网络空间清朗’, CAC, 16-Apr-2020, https://archive.ph/S1SLL
225
’以党建为统领推动网络空间清朗’, CAC, 16-Apr-2020, https://archive.ph/S1SLL
226
‘Constitution of the Communist Party of China’, Xinhua, 24-Oct-2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf
227
‘Constitution of the Communist Party of China’, Xinhua, 24-Oct-2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf
228
‘你是优秀健康记者吗？看看你是否符合这四个条件’, Health Times, 29-Dec-2015,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221105041818/http://www.jksb.com.cn/index.php?m=special&c=index&a=show&i
d=388
‘京华时报副总编辑张辅评：将群众路线进行到底’, People’s Daily via CCTV, 05-Sep-2011,
https://archive.ph/NA3Xo
‘重磅 | 中国书协第八届理事会主席团名单’，China Calligraphers Association, 4-Feb-2021,
https://archive.ph/vH6eq
‘表彰 | 2022 年元旦春节两节期间“送万福进万家下基层公益活动”先进单位及个人’, China Calligraphers
Association via WeChat, 8-Apr-2022, https://archive.ph/yWNA2
‘（全国）教育书画协会少年分会第二次全国会员代表大会在京召开’, CCTV via WeChat, 3-Jun-2021,
https://archive.ph/SQFdv
‘送温暖发布会’, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 27-Dec-2018, https://archive.ph/kyEMT
‘送万福、进万家书法公益活动走进首都消防部队’, NetEase, 2-Feb-2018, https://archive.ph/Z0OuJ
‘预祝上洋陈氏大宗祠 2 月 1 日庆典活动圆满举办’, Hakka Anecdotes via WeChat, 31-Jan-2018,
https://archive.ph/197RJ
‘市领导邓菊芳会见北京字节跳动科技有限公司副总裁陈志锋一行’, Longyan UFWD via WeChat, 9-Oct-2019,
https://archive.ph/hvjXM
‘集团领导到北京字节跳动科技有限公司洽谈合作’, Fujian Media Group, 16-Mar-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221116024217/http:/www.fjrtv.net/folder2841/ly/report/2019-03-16/1879371.html
‘中央统战部首度轮训新媒体从业人员，陈彤张一鸣邓飞等在列’, The Paper, 19-May-2015,
https://archive.ph/3csmt
‘政协第十一届福建省委员会增补委员名单’, Fujian Daily via Southeastern Network, 16-Jan-2017,
https://archive.ph/p17S9
‘政协第十二届福建省委员会委员名单’, Southeastern Network, 21-Jan-2018, https://archive.ph/xhd1O
‘今日头条将在福建龙岩建分公司？张一鸣说要支持家乡发展’, Global Times, 19-Dec-2017,
https://archive.ph/F1BYo
‘福建省海外联谊会第五届理事大会’, Sina Fujian, https://archive.ph/kZ8tN
‘福建省新的社会阶层人士联谊会在福州召开’, Central United Front Work Department via Unity Network, 11-Oct-
2017, https://archive.ph/ZOpIt
101
Submission 34
229
Michael Schuman, ‘Why America Is Afraid Of TikTok’, The Atlantic, 31-Jul-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221102130912/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/07/tiktok-
ban-china-america/614725/
230
‘政协第十一届福建省委员会增补委员名单’, Fujian Daily via Southeastern Network, 16-Jan-2017,
https://archive.ph/p17S9
‘政协第十二届福建省委员会委员名单’, Southeastern Network, 21-Jan-2018, https://archive.ph/xhd1O
‘今日头条将在福建龙岩建分公司？张一鸣说要支持家乡发展’, Global Times, 19-Dec-2017,
https://archive.ph/F1BYo
‘福建省海外联谊会第五届理事大会’, Sina Fujian, https://archive.ph/kZ8tN
‘福建省新的社会阶层人士联谊会在福州召开’, Central United Front Work Department via Unity Network, 11-Oct-
2017, https://archive.ph/ZOpIt
'新闻聚焦丨龙岩市首届文化旅游产业发展大会新闻发布会召开，龙岩长汀向世界发出邀请，欢迎您来做客……’,
Minxi Daily and Changting County Radio and Television Station via WeChat, 2-Apr-2019,
https://archive.md/gvQZv
'新加坡华源会代表受邀出席第五届世界闽商大会’, Hua Yuan Association via WeChat, 20-Jun-2016,
https://archive.md/42zRS
231
232
233
‘张辅评升任今日头条总编辑，夏勇去职’, Media Observer via Read01, 20-Feb-2017, https://archive.ph/P6JTq
‘《红色气质》：时长虽短“气质”不减’, China Press and Publishing via Xinhua, 14-Jul-2016,
https://archive.ph/zX4UQ
234
‘字节跳动党委：要把讲导向守责任放首位’, The Paper via Sina, 29-Apr-2018, https://archive.ph/EJNyo
235
236
‘The next chapter in our leadership’, Sequoia Capital via Twitter, 5-Apr-2022, https://archive.md/PVXV1
237
‘沈南鹏委员：协同推进减碳和东西部协调发展’, CPPCC, 8-Mar-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221125161521/http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2022/03/08/ARTI1646670339234
351.shtml
’Neil Shen’, Center for China & Globalization, https://archive.ph/394l5
Alex Joske, ‘The party speaks for you’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 09-Jun-2020,
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you
238
‘沈南鹏委员：协同推进减碳和东西部协调发展’, CPPCC, 8-Mar-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221125161521/http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2022/03/08/ARTI1646670339234
351.shtml
‘Neil Shen’, Center for China & Globalization, https://archive.ph/394l5
239
‘创业投资基金专业委员会’, AMAC, https://archive.ph/wYufz
‘Forum Introduction’, China Entrepreneurs Forum, https://archive.ph/IaNLW
240
'中国人民政治协商会议第十四届全国委员会委员名单’, CPPCC, 18-Jan-2023, https://archive.md/RTB56
Shai Oster and Juro Osawa, ‘Sequoia Capital China Chief Leaves Beijing’s Top Political Advisory Body’, The
Information, 20-Jan-2023, https://www.theinformation.com/articles/sequoia-china-chief-leaves-beijings-top-
political-advisory-body?rc=zcbseh
’Form 6-K Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13-a-16 or 15d-16 Under the Securities exchange
Act of 1934’, Pinduoduo Inc. via US SEC, 29-Nov-2022, https://archive.ph/vq6zj
241
Juro Osawa and Shai Oster, ‘Sequoia Capital’s China Arm Employed Daughter of Politburo Member’, The
Information, 9-Sep-2022, https://www.theinformation.com/articles/sequoia-capitals-china-arm-employed-
daughter-of-politburo-member?rc=zcbseh
242
‘Report claims TikTok parent company ByteDance is working with China's Communist Party to spread
propaganda on Xinjiang’, Business Insider, Nov-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20191129091747/https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-parent-company-
ByteDance-spreads-chinese-propaganda-report-2019-11
243
‘武警部队携手今日头条，强强联合打造政务新媒体’, Geek Park, 1-Dec-2017, https://archive.ph/FfQt6
‘中华人民共和国人民武装警察法’, Ministry of National Defence, 20-June-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220723031732/http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2020-
06/20/content_4867004.htm
244
‘中华人民共和国人民武装警察法’, Ministry of National Defence, 20-June-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220723031732/http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2020-
102
Submission 34
245
‘武警部队新媒体账号，集体入驻抖音啦！ ’, Affiliated Hospital of Logistics University of People's Armed Police
Force via Sohu, 11-Apr-2019, https://archive.ph/9MuIh
246
Jichang Lulu and Filip Jirouš, ‘Back to the Cheka: The Ministry of Public Security’s political protection work’,
Sinopsis, 21-Feb-2022, https://sinopsis.cz/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/mps1.pdf
247
248
‘Mapping more of China's tech giants: AI and surveillance’, ASPI, Nov-2019,
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-more-chinas-tech-giants
249
‘重磅！公安部与抖音正式合作’, Southern Network, 26-Apr-2019, https://archive.ph/TM7E5
250
Mapping more of China's tech giants: AI and surveillance 18-20, ASPI, Nov-2019,
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-more-chinas-tech-giants
‘北京局开展广播电视和网络视听对口援疆工作', National Radio and Television Administration, 4-Nov-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20191126030214/http:/www.nrta.gov.cn/art/2019/11/4/art_114_48597.html
251
‘OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of
China,’ United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, 31-Aug-2022,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Daria Impiombato and Nathan Ruser, ‘UN Uyghur report leaves no room for denial and no
excuse for inaction,’ The Strategist, 3-Sep-2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/un-uyghur-report-leaves-no-
room-for-denial-and-no-excuse-for-
inaction/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strate
gist+CID_863221cf1139c8446269d7362ce45936&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=UN%20Uyghur%
20report%20leaves%20no%20room%20for%20denial%20and%20no%20excuse%20for%20inaction
252
‘协会领导’, China Netcasting Services Association, https://archive.ph/jWnJK
‘中国网络视听节目服务协会第二届理事会常务理事名单’, China Netcasting Services Association, 17-Nov-2020,
https://archive.ph/RtNmF
‘副会长单位’, China Netcasting Services Association, 1-Dec-2021, https://archive.md/tHP6x
253
‘聂辰席’, China Netcasting Services Association, 27-Jun-2022, https://archive.ph/42ovG
254
‘协会章程', China Netcasting Services Association, http://archive.today/bBS6W
'总局领导’, NRTA, http://archive.today/Bbk2f
‘协会简介’, China Netcasting Services Association, https://archive.ph/tpDfh
‘中宣部接管新闻出版电影三大台合并’, Caixin, 21-Mar-2018, https://archive.ph/enCea
255
‘《网络短视频平台管理规范》《网络短视频内容审核标准细则》发布’, People’s Network, 10-Jan-2019,
https://archive.ph/UWgWc
‘网络短视频内容审核标准细则（2021）’, China Netcasting Services Association, 16-Dec-2021,
https://archive.ph/C6jpS
256
‘领导成员’, Beijing Communication Industry Association, https://archive.ph/vkXWt
257
‘协会章程’, Beijing Communication Industry Association, https://archive.md/zD5MS
258
‘今天，人民日报成立的这个研究院不一般！’, People’s Daily via WeChat, 19-Sep-2019, https://archive.ph/nXtBv
259
‘今天，人民日报成立的这个研究院不一般！’, People’s Daily via WeChat, 19-Sep-2019, https://archive.ph/nXtBv
260
‘会员单位’, Internet Society of China,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230309001535/https://home.isc.org.cn/member-unit/index?kw=&level=3&p=4
261
‘中国互联网协会章程’, ISC, 25-Apr-2022, https://perma.cc/U4E5-NWWH
262
Emily Baker-White, ‘LinkedIn Profiles Indicate 300 Current TikTok and ByteDance Employees Used To Work For
Chinese State Media’, Forbes, 11-Aug-2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-
white/2022/08/10/bytedance-tiktok-china-state-media-propaganda/?sh=425dc8f4322f
263
’国家网信办指导有关地方网信办依法查处违法违规网站平台及账号’, Xinhua, 5-Feb-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200806014435/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-
02/05/c_1125536088.htm
264
‘字节跳动公司打造武汉疫情防控网络传播服务矩阵’, Wuhan CAC via WeChat, 24-Feb-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221208164239/https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?src=11&timestamp=1670517314&ver
=4214&signature=5ircLSQ5LGxcsX05pEvOJfgWiSVnzPKpsI7D8KGbteZluPEwxs%2ASQvWimYS1bTSDAmQ1ZA
S%2AyHAVAm5vz8-aoIt6FOGsnTS3PVvHIC1H0-M2NyyuTZdXJZvml2J3B03t&new=1
265
‘字节跳动公司打造武汉疫情防控网络传播服务矩阵’, Wuhan CAC via WeChat, 24-Feb-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221208164239/https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?src=11&timestamp=1670517314&ver
=4214&signature=5ircLSQ5LGxcsX05pEvOJfgWiSVnzPKpsI7D8KGbteZluPEwxs%2ASQvWimYS1bTSDAmQ1ZA
S%2AyHAVAm5vz8-aoIt6FOGsnTS3PVvHIC1H0-M2NyyuTZdXJZvml2J3B03t&new=1
266
Liza Lin, 'China Clamps Down on Internet as It Seeks to Stamp Out Covid Protests', The Wall Street Journal, 1-
Dec-2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221201143725/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-clamps-down-on-
internet-as-it-seeks-to-stamp-out-covid-protests-11669905228
103
Submission 34
267
Liza Lin, 'China Clamps Down on Internet as It Seeks to Stamp Out Covid Protests', The Wall Street Journal, 1-
Dec-2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221201143725/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-clamps-down-on-
internet-as-it-seeks-to-stamp-out-covid-protests-11669905228
268
‘习近平谈媒体融合发展金句：用主流价值导向驾驭“算法”’, Qiushi, 16-Mar-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20190323110922/http://www.qstheory.cn/2019-03/16/c_1124242581.htm
‘加快推动媒体融合发展构建全媒体传播格局’, Qiushi, 15-Mar-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230309005056/http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-03/15/c_1124239254.htm
269
‘网络信息内容生态治理规定’, CAC, 20-Dec-2019,
270
‘互联网信息服务算法推荐管理规定’, CAC, 4-Jan-2022,
271
Zhou Xin and Tracy Qu, ‘TikTok’s algorithm not for sale, ByteDance tells US: source’, South China Morning Post,
13-Sep-2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20200913160256/https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-
economy/article/3101362/tiktoks-algorithm-not-sale-bytedance-tells-us-source
‘商务部科技部公告 2020 年第 38 号关于调整发布《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》的公告’, Ministry of
Commerce, 28-Aug-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221031213250/http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/xxfb/202008/2020080299664
1.shtml
‘《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》调整内容’, Ministry of Commerce,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220709223655/http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/fms/202008/20200828200911003.
pdf
272
Commerce , 28-Aug-2020,
1.shtml
‘《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》调整内容, Ministry of Commerce,
pdf
273
‘Planned TikTok deal entails China's approval under revised catalogue: expert’, Xinhua, 30-Aug-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221030175546/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/30/c_139329598.htm
274
275
字节跳动 via Today’s Headlines, 30-Aug-2020, https://archive.ph/XLz4u
276
Zhou Xin and Tracy Qu, ‘TikTok’s algorithm not for sale, ByteDance tells US: source’, South China Morning Post,
13-Sep-2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20200913160256/https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-
277
‘国家互联网信息办公室、中华人民共和国工业和信息化部、中华人民共和国公安部、国家市场监督管理总局令
第 9 号:互联网信息服务算法推荐管理规定’, Cyberspace Administration of China via Central People’s
Government of the People’s Republic of China, 31-Dec-2021, https://archive.ph/lAw2J
278
‘国家互联网信息办公室关于发布互联网信息服务算法备案信息的公告’, Cyberspace Administration of China, 12-
Aug-2022, https://archive.ph/G8XIx
279
‘抖音个性化推荐算法’, CAC,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221018203822/https://beian.cac.gov.cn/api/static/fileUpload/principalOrithm/addit
ional/user_9b84b02a-0c7f-4bd4-81f2-5cad879ad4ab_96ed08c8-0ed8-4ab5-b04d-46cccf4c00ab.pdf
280
Will Knight, ‘The Insanely Popular Chinese News App That You’ve Never Heard Of,’ MIT Technology Review, 26-
Jan-2017,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221122162904/https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/01/26/154363/the-
insanely-popular-chinese-news-app-that-youve-never-heard-of/
281
Alex Hern, ‘Revealed: How TikTok censors videos that do not please Beijing,’ The Guardian, 25-Sept-2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/25/revealed-how-tiktok-censors-videos-that-do-not-please-
beijing
Sam Biddle, Paulo Victor Ribeiro, Tatiana Dias, ‘Invisible censorship: TikTok told moderators to suppress posts by
“ugly” people and the poor to attract new users,’ The Intercept, 16-Mar-2020,
https://theintercept.com/2020/03/16/tiktok-app-moderators-users-discrimination/
Markus Reuter and Chris Kover, ‘Cheerfulness and censorship’, netzpolitik.org, 23-Nov-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230105104124/https://netzpolitik.org/2019/cheerfulness-and-censorship/
282
‘独家| 内部员工揭秘：TikTok 竟然这么审核内容’, Pingwest, 14-Jun-2020, https://archive.ph/RsUQX
‘The censor cannot hold: the pressure of controlling China's internet’, France24, 6-Oct-2022,
http://web.archive.org/web/20221108193721/https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221006-the-censor-
cannot-hold-the-pressure-of-controlling-china-s-internet
104
Submission 34
Shen Lu, ‘I helped build ByteDance's vast censorship machine’, Protocol, 18-Feb-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221216031945/https://www.protocol.com/china/i-built-bytedance-censorship-
machine
‘前新浪微博内容审核员专访：中共如何打造网络“真理部”’, VOA, 12-Aug-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221209214136/https://www.voachinese.com/a/internet-censorship-
20200812/5540475.html
283
Alex Hern, ‘Revealed: How TikTok censors videos that do not please Beijing,’ The Guardian, 25-Sept-2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/25/revealed-how-tiktok-censors-videos-that-do-not-please-
beijing
‘Oral evidence: Forced labour in UK value chains, HC 810’, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee,
UK House of Commons, 5-Nov-2020, https://archive.ph/i6vzE
Sam Biddle, Paulo Victor Ribeiro, Tatiana Dias, ‘INVISIBLE CENSORSHIP: TikTok Told Moderators to Suppress
Posts by “Ugly” People and the Poor to Attract New Users’, The Intercept, 16-Mar-2020, https://archive.ph/1n45R
284
Abby Ohlheiser, ’Welcome to TikTok’s endless cycle of censorship and mistakes’, MIT Technology Review, 13-Jul-
2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221119070904/https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/07/13/1028401/tiktok-
censorship-mistakes-glitches-apologies-endless-cycle/
285
Charlotte Colombo, ‘TikTok has apologized for a 'significant error' after a video that suggested racial bias in its
algorithm went viral’, Insider, 8-Jul-2021, https://archive.md/9jraE
Sam Shead, ‘TikTok apologizes after being accused of censoring #BlackLivesMatter posts’, CNBC, 2-Jun-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230106130612/https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/02/tiktok-blacklivesmatter-
censorship.html
Lily Kuo, ‘TikTok sorry for blocking teenager who disguised Xinjiang video as make-up tutorial’, The Guardian, 28-
Nov-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221224015107/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/nov/28/tiktok-
says-sorry-to-us-teenager-blocked-after-sharing-xinjiang-videos
Umberto Bacchi, ‘TikTok apologises for censoring LGBT+ content’, Reuters, 22-Sep-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230107051422/https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-tech-lgbt-idUSL5N2GJ459
Eric Han, ’An update on recent content and account questions’, TikTok, 28-Nov-2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221216024217/https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/an-update-on-recent-content-
and-account-questions
Vanessa Pappas, ’A message to our Black community’, TikTok, 2-Jun-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230107091339/https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/a-message-to-our-black-
community
Seth Melnick and Somar Musa, ’Hashtag view count display issue post-mortem’, TikTok, 17-Jun-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220925143948/https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/hashtag-view-count-display-
issue-post-mortem
286
machine
287
‘造谣“上海封城”，两人被上海警方立案侦查’, CCTV, 23-Mar-2022, https://archive.ph/MmKOz
288
‘2018 字节跳动企业社会责任报告’, ByteDance, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20220130223125/https://lf3-
static.bytednsdoc.com/obj/eden-cn/uj_shpjpmmv_ljuhklafi/ljhwZthlaukjlkulzlp/csr/csr-2018.pdf
289
290
291
‘中央网信办深入开展网络辟谣标签工作’, China News, 29-Sep-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221216004319/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2022/09-29/9863196.shtml
292
‘全国“扫黄打非”办公室召开网络有害信息和出版物特征值共享数据库系统例会’, National Anti-Pornography and
Anti-Illegal Publications Office, 30-Sep-2020, https://archive.ph/CQfrZ
293
‘平台直播白律白皮书’ Self-regulatory Mechanism of Live Video Streaming Platforms, ByteDance,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230109045701/http://www.dlong.com/eWebEditor/uploadfile/2019071008285385
76693.pdf
‘THREAD: This seems really alarming so I did a little digging and found that apparently ByteDance...’, @Izzy_Niu
via Twitter, 8-Jul-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20211103183638/https://twitter.com/Izzy_Niu/status/1280911594310991877
105
Submission 34
294
‘平台直播白律白皮书’ Self-regulatory Mechanism of Live Video Streaming Platforms’, ByteDance,
http://web.archive.org/web/20230309042939/http://www.invest-
data.com/eWebEditor/uploadfile/201907100828538576693.pdf
295
296
297
298
machine
299
machine
300
machine
301
‘字节跳动党委：要把讲导向守责任放首位’, The Paper via Sina, 29-Apr-2018, https://archive.ph/EJNyo
302
303
‘字节跳动两员工收钱将指定内容推上抖音热榜自首获刑’, Fanwubi, 30-Nov-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221114002717/https://www.fanwubi.org/Item/200523.aspx
304
‘抖音回应员工受贿被判刑：将严厉打击内部贪腐’, Fanwubi, 13-Dec-2021, https://archive.ph/WnOaw
305
Emily Baker-White, ‘TikTok’s Secret ‘Heating’ Button Can Make Anyone Go Viral’, Forbes, 20-Jan-2023,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230207023409/https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-
white/2023/01/20/tiktoks-secret-heating-button-can-make-anyone-go-viral/?sh=11952ae6bfd4
306
'字节跳动投资报告’, ByteDance via Vzkoo, Sep-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230309021933/https://www.vzkoo.com/document/20221019fdf26403c23542f51b
8cd8d8.html?keyword=%E5%AD%97%E8%8A%82%E8%B7%B3%E5%8A%A8
307
308
309
310
‘“抖音”用户服务协议’, Douyin, 06-Jul-2022, https://archive.ph/8zrEY
311
‘“抖音”用户服务协议’, Douyin, 06-Jul-2022, https://archive.ph/8zrEY
312
106
Submission 34
313
314
‘今日头条启动招聘 2000 名内容审核编辑：党员优先’, The Paper, 3-Jan-2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221116013004/https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1932733
315
‘2018 字节跳动企业社会责任报告’, ByteDance, https://web.archive.org/web/20220130223125/https://lf3-
316
machine
‘The censor cannot hold: the pressure of controlling China's internet’, France24, 6-Oct-2022,
http://web.archive.org/web/20221108193721/https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221006-the-censor-
cannot-hold-the-pressure-of-controlling-china-s-internet
‘前新浪微博内容审核员专访：中共如何打造网络“真理部”’, VOA, 12-Aug-2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221209214136/https://www.voachinese.com/a/internet-censorship-
20200812/5540475.html
317
'Exclusive: ByteDance censored anti-China content in Indonesia until mid-2020 - sources’, Reuters, 13-Aug-2020,
https://archive.ph/YXigt
318
'Exclusive: ByteDance censored anti-China content in Indonesia until mid-2020 - sources’, Reuters, 13-Aug-2020,
https://archive.ph/YXigt
319
‘TikTok Owner ByteDance Used A News App On Millions Of Phones To Push Pro-China Messages, Ex-Employees
Say’, BuzzFeed, 26-Jul-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221108220821/https:/www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-
bytedance-topbuzz-pro-china-content
320
‘TikTok Owner ByteDance Used A News App On Millions Of Phones To Push Pro-China Messages, Ex-Employees
Say’, BuzzFeed, 26-Jul-2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221108220821/https:/www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-
bytedance-topbuzz-pro-china-content
321
‘Chinese government asked TikTok for stealth propaganda account,’ Bloomberg, 29-Jul-2022,
https://archive.ph/hyF2j
322
'舆情负责人’, ByteDance,
910792/detail?recomId=a3f08a23-8062-11ed-84f1-fa163ef1500c&sourceJobId=6839512909916686599
'高级舆情分析师’, ByteDance, https://archive.ph/dg3Ko
'舆情分析专家’, ByteDance, https://archive.ph/sa2Ys
‘互联网信息摘要与机器写稿关键技术及应用’, Wu Wen Jun AI Science & Technology Award, 25-Jan-2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221220193738/http://award.wuwenjunkejijiang.cn/wj/news.aspx?pkid=11590&tid=
13535
'Xiaojun Wan’, GitHub, https://archive.ph/gvs2N
'Ad Targeting’, TikTok, https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article/ad-targeting?lang=en
'Purchase Intent Targeting’, TikTok, https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=10014017
323
‘字节跳动两员工收钱将指定内容推上抖音热榜自首获刑’, Fanwubi, 30-Nov-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221114002717/https://www.fanwubi.org/Item/200523.aspx
Emily Baker-White, ’TikTok’s Secret ‘Heating’ Button Can Make Anyone Go Viral’, Forbes, 20-Jan-2023,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230207023409/https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-
white/2023/01/20/tiktoks-secret-heating-button-can-make-anyone-go-viral/?sh=11952ae6bfd4
324
325
‘张一鸣荣获“中关村创新创业青年英豪” 称科技企业应承担更多责任’, Economic Daily, 7-Dec-2017,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221117171922/http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/kj/201712/07/t20171207_27160272.shtml
326
327
328
329
‘“十四五”时期中关村东城园发展规划’, Beijing Doncheng Government via NCSTI.gov, 11-Sep-2022,
https://archive.ph/cTQqq
107
Submission 34
330
‘北京字节跳动企业社会责任报告’, ByteDance, 10-Mar-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230216075729/http://p3-bd-official.byteimg.com/obj/bytedance-
cn/2021%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%AD%97%E8%8A%82%E8%B7%B3%E5%8A%A8%E4%BC%81%E
4%B8%9A%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E8%B4%A3%E4%BB%BB%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A.pdf
331
‘北京字节跳动企业社会责任报告’, ByteDance, 10-Mar-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20230216075729/http://p3-bd-official.byteimg.com/obj/bytedance-
cn/2021%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%AD%97%E8%8A%82%E8%B7%B3%E5%8A%A8%E4%BC%81%E
4%B8%9A%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E8%B4%A3%E4%BB%BB%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A.pdf
332
‘北京成立智源人工智能研究院’, People’s Network, 14-Nov-2018, https://archive.ph/RgMuO
‘Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List’, Industry and Security Bureau via Federal Register, 09-Oct-2019,
https://archive.ph/HhyU6\
‘Treasury Identifies Eight Chinese Tech Firms as Part of The Chinese Military-Industrial Complex’, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, 16-Dec-2021, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0538
333
https://archive.ph/HhyU6
334
‘新一代人工智能发展规划的通知’, gov.cn, 20-Jul-2017,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221105172041/http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-
335
336
337
China Defence Universities Tracker, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, last updated 05-2021,
https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/
338
‘Huazhong University of Science and Technology’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 18-Nov-2019,
https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/huazhong-university-of-science-and-technology/
339
‘Person Re-Identification With Hierarchical Discriminative Spatial Aggregation’, IEEE, vol. 17, 26-Jan-2022,
https://archive.ph/cI1p5
340
‘People's Public Security University of China’, ASPI, 21-Nov-2019,
https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/peoples-public-security-university-of-china/
341
‘An Overview of Deepfake: The Sword of Damocles in AI 265’, 2020 International Conference on Computer
Vision, Image and Deep Learning (CVIDL), 10-Jul-2020, https://archive.ph/VPnsN
‘面向中文文本分类的词级对抗样本生成方法’, 信息网络安全,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221028092147/https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbna
me=CJFDLAST2020&filename=XXAQ202009004&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=sJjxsAJahnrTSFLRDzmhdGKrLZ_mtsF
BsH-JG14_mFZodpZrOEw0iY-qPZZoPip8
342
‘Tsinghua University’, ASPI, 21-Nov-2019, https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/tsinghua-university/
343
‘清华大学、字节跳动 | Multimodal Entity Tagging with Multimodal Knowledge Base（基于多模态知识库的多模
态实体标注）’, BAAI.ac.cn, 4-Jan-2022, https://archive.ph/a35OS
‘Subspace Attack: Exploiting Promising Subspaces for Query-Efficient Black-box Attacks’, 33rd Conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019),
https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2019/file/2cad8fa47bbef282badbb8de5374b894-Paper.pdf
‘字节 AI Lab 推出业界首个系统性大分子体系的量子计算模拟方法，成果入选《Chemical Science》’, BAAI, 25-
Jul-2022, https://archive.ph/sOfco
344
‘Peking University’, ASPI, 20-Nov-2019, https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/peking-university/
345
‘北京大学-字节跳动数字人文开放实验室’, Research Center for Digital Humanities of PKU,
https://archive.ph/MQG3k
‘北大、字节跳动等联合 | Contextual Representation Learning beyond Masked Language Modeling（掩码语言建
模之上的语境表征学习）’, BAAI.ac.cn, 11-Apr-2022, https://archive.ph/5lOmF
‘Unified Perceptual Parsing for Scene Understanding’, 15th European Conference on Computer Vision,
https://web.archive.org/web/20211204180726/https://people.csail.mit.edu/bzhou/publication/eccv18-
segment.pdf
‘北大万小军 | 智能文本生成：进展与挑战’, China InfoCom Media Group, 16-Feb-2023, https://archive.ph/sjvod
346
‘Person Re-Identification With Hierarchical Discriminative Spatial Aggregation’, IEEE, vol. 17, 26-Jan-2022,
https://archive.ph/cI1p5
‘面向中文文本分类的词级对抗样本生成方法’, 信息网络安全,
108
Submission 34
https://web.archive.org/web/20221028092147/https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbna
me=CJFDLAST2020&filename=XXAQ202009004&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=sJjxsAJahnrTSFLRDzmhdGKrLZ_mtsF
BsH-JG14_mFZodpZrOEw0iY-qPZZoPip8
‘Subspace Attack: Exploiting Promising Subspaces for Query-Efficient Black-box Attacks’, 33rd Conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019),
https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2019/file/2cad8fa47bbef282badbb8de5374b894-Paper.pdf
347
348
‘立昂技术与字节跳动在数据中心业务方面有合作’, Shanghai Securities News, 20-May-2022,
https://archive.ph/8v0HX
349
Department of the Treasury, 16-Dec-2021, https://archive.ph/ljRn3
‘Can SenseTime become a Chinese AI champion?’, Financial Times, 29-Sep-2021, https://archive.ph/bBkcP
350
‘Face – Inspire your Beauty’, Amazon, https://archive.ph/JxjPE
‘FaceU – Inspire your Beauty’, Google Play,
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lemon.faceu.oversea&hl=en_GB&gl=US
351
‘U.S. Blacklists More Chinese Tech Companies Over National Security Concerns’, The New York Times, 21-Jun-
2019, https://archive.ph/jMQCu
352
‘2018 业务拆解’, Dawning Information Industry via Zhongtai Securities, 21-Apr-2019,
https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H3_AP201904221321136186_1.pdf
353
354
‘“看见词曲计划”上线，讯飞音乐联动抖音音乐，为优秀词曲助力’, Jiangxi TV via China Daily, 19-Nov-2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20221127041448/https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202111/19/WS61973540a3107be
4979f8ffe.html
‘抖音联手讯飞智声 AI 黑科技让明星念出你名字送专属祝福’, iFeng, 11-Feb-2018, https://archive.ph/amsVF
‘智能语音，让飞书更高效’, iFlytek, https://archive.ph/wVle8
355
356
‘Unified Perceptual Parsing for Scene Understanding’, 15th European Conference on Computer Vision,
https://web.archive.org/web/20211204180726/https://people.csail.mit.edu/bzhou/publication/eccv18-
segment.pdf
357
‘我国将强化互联网安全管理着力提升保护网民个人信息能力’, Economic Daily via gov.cn, 5-Aug-2015,
https://archive.ph/xPtuZ
358
‘字节跳动党委书记张辅评：抖音打造“警务亲民”新模式’, Guangming Online, 14-Sep-2018,
https://archive.ph/VRNBJ
359
360
361
‘画好网上网下同心圆，全国公安新媒体矩阵入驻今日头条、抖音’, China Daily, 25-Apr-2019,
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Submission 34
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113

TikTok, ByteDance, and Their Ties To The Chinese Communist Party

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TikTok, ByteDance, and Their Ties To The Chinese Communist Party

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Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media

Submission to the Senate Select Committee

About this Submission ............................................................................................... 3

About this Submission

“weaponise” the platform by suppressing, amplifying and otherwise calibrating narratives

TikTok undoubtably possesses the requisite capabilities, and a close examination of

1. Why TikTok Matters

a. TikTok Is a News Platform: TikTok’s claim that it is only an entertainment

1.1. The Rise of TikTok, the App that “Gazes Back”

1.2. Opacity and Obfuscation

This opacity and obfuscation is now compounded by what appears to be a concerted

1.3. Demystifying the TikTok-Douyin-ByteDance Relationship

1.4. The Propaganda-Security Nexus

1.5. How the Chinese Communist Party Could Wield TikTok

Intelligence agencies in jurisdictions including the U.S., 30 U.K., 31 Australia, 32 European

Beijing will be able to exploit Chinese companies' expansion of

2. TikTok and Xi’s External Propaganda Plan

a. Propaganda Goes Digital: Xi Jinping has intensified the Party’s long-running

b. Military-Surveillance Complex: China’s intelligence agencies are bringing data

2.1. Leveraging New Media to Target Global Audiences

In December 2013, at a Politburo Collective Study Session, Xi told cadres:

We should meticulously build an external discourse mechanism, utilise the role

We should strengthen the development of international communication

In December 2020, Xi convened a Politburo Collective Study Session to deliberate on plans

We should build an external discourse mechanism and improve the art of

As one of the windows of China’s foreign exchanges, short video platforms

2.1.2. Propaganda and Power in Party Ideology

2.2. Codifying a Propaganda-Security Nexus

2.2.1. Beijing Dreams of Data Riches

2.2.2. Intelligence Agencies Building Big Data Capabilities

• The National Security Law (2015) requires citizens and organisations to

• The National Cybersecurity Law (2017) compels companies and

• The Personal Information Protection Law (2021) requires companies

2.2.3. “Seizing the Strategic Advantage”

. . .gives [China] vast opportunities to target people in foreign governments,

Beijing's commercial access to personal data of other countries' citizens,

2.2.4. Social Media and Information Warfare

psychological deterrence and propaganda as elements of military activity, particularly in the

4.2. State Media Scrutiny

ByteDance’s transformation into a Party-state-controlled entity was systematic and

[When] other internet companies complained that [Today’s Headlines] was

responsibility, but we do not want to educate users. . . I may have my opinions,

4.2.1. Party Crackdown Prompts Greater Alignment

4.2.2. Pressure Leads to Zhang Yiming’s Resignation

presence in Singapore.170 In addition to native Singaporean TikTok CEO Shouzi

• Changes to company name: ByteDance renamed several subsidiaries from

5.2. TikTok Belongs to ByteDance

5.2.1. ByteDance is the Parent Company of TikTok and Douyin

Sources: Evidence submitted to court by TikTok, ByteDance’s website,

5.2.2. Headquartered in China

Sources: PRC media187

5.3. Zhang Yiming’s Retreat from ByteDance Appears Complete

5.4. TikTok’s Management Structure

Our reconstruction of the company’s management structure indicates that TikTok

5.5. Shared Resources

In our assessment, it is not possible for TikTok to operate independently of ByteDance in

The application of China’s regulations to TikTok operations within its borders is

Our research corroborates media reporting that ByteDance continues to depend on

Cross-posting of job ads for TikTok/ByteDance roles.199

5.5.2. Management and Employees See TikTok and ByteDance as Interchangeable

5.5.3. Shared Cloud Infrastructure Team

5.6. The Party-State’s Stake in Beijing Douyin

Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited is a separately held subsidiary of