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California Fourth District Court of Appeals Ruling On The Villages of Lakeview
California Fourth District Court of Appeals Ruling On The Villages of Lakeview
DIVISION TWO
v.
1
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Raquel A. Marquez,
The Law Office of Susan Nash and Susan Nash for Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Center for Biological Diversity, John P. Rose, Ross Middlemiss, and Jonathan
Evans for Appellants, Center for Biological Diversity, Sierra Club and San Bernardino
Audubon Society.
Peter Landreth for Respondents, County of Riverside and Real Party in Interest, Nuevo
Development Company.
This appeal arises out of two lawsuits filed under the California Environmental
Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; "CEQA") challenging a development
known as The Villages of Lakeview. Two groups of appellants, one with the Center for
Biological Diversity, Sierra Club, and the San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society (the
"Center" appellants), and one with Albert Paulek, Friends of the Northern San Jacinto
Valley, and Keep Nuevo Rural (the "Paulek" appellants), each argue that the latest
environmental impact report (EIR) prepared for the project violates CEQA.
2
We agree with two of the claims raised by the Center appellants: that one of the
mitigation measures in the EIR was inadequate and that the EIR failed to address the
environmental effects of supplying water to the project. Thus, in the case filed by the
Center appellants, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. In the
Paulek case, we reject the arguments raised and affirm the judgment. i
I. BACKGROUND
submitted an application for The Villages of Lakeview, denominated as Specific Plan No.
unincorporated area of Riverside County between the cities of Perris and San Jacinto,
of 11,350 dwelling units, 500,000 square feet of commercial uses, new K-8 schools, and
over 1,000 acres of parks and open space. In 2010, the County's Board of Supervisors
(together with Nuevo and the County, "respondents") adopted the specific plan and
certified the related EIR. The Board of Supervisors also approved related actions,
consolidated. In 2012, the trial court found that the 2010 EIR was deficient in a number
of areas and issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the County and the Board of
In 2016, the County released a revised draft EIR (DEIR) prepared by Nuevo's
consulting firm. The DEIR discussed an alternative, Alternative 7, which the DEIR noted
was created in response to the trial court's 2010 decision and which was described as
having "a smaller development footprint" than the original project.2 Among other
the 11,350 proposed for the original project. A new specific plan reflecting Alternative 7
The County released a final revised EIR (FEIR) in July 2017. Later that year, the
Board of Supervisors denied Specific Plan No. 342 as originally proposed by Nuevo,
tentatively approved Alternative 7 as Specific Plan No. 342 instead, and then later
adopted that specific plan and certified the FEIR. The Center appellants and the Paulek
appellants both sought writs of mandate. In 2020, the trial court denied both petitions.
2 The DEIR states that "Alternatives 1-6 ... were previously considered in the
EIR that was certified in 2010."
4
11. DISCUSSION
proposes to approve or to carry out a project that may have a significant effect on the
(1988) 47 Ca1.3d 376, 390 (Laurel Heights).) An EIR is "'an informational document"
whose purpose "'is to provide public agencies and the public in general with detailed
information about the effect which a proposed project is likely to have on the
environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be
"Under CEQA, the public is notified that a draft EIR is being prepared [citation],
and the draft EIR is evaluated in light of comments received. [Citations.] The lead
agency then prepares a final EIR incorporating comments on the draft EIR and the
[Citations.] The lead agency must certify that the final EIR has been completed in
compliance with CEQA and that the information in the final EIR was considered by the
agency before approving the project. [Citation.] Before approving the project, the
agency must also find either that the project's significant environmental effects identified
in the EIR have been avoided or mitigated, or that unmitigated effects are outweighed by
the project's benefits." (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Ca1.3d at p. 391, footnote omitted.)
"A court may not set aside an agency's approval of an EIR on the ground that an
opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable. [Citation.] A court's
5
task is not to weigh conflicting evidence and determine who has the better argument
when the dispute is whether adverse effects have been mitigated or could be better
mitigated." (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Ca1.3d at p. 393.) This is because a court has
"neither the resources nor scientific expertise to engage in such analysis." (Ibid.) Thus,
"a court's inquiry in an action to set aside an agency's decision under CEQA 'shall
extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. " (Id. at p. 392.)
evidence." (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Ca1.3d. at p. 392.) "`Judicial review of these two
types of error differs significantly: While we determine de novo whether the agency has
factual conclusions." (Sierra Club v. County ofFresno (2018) 6 Ca1.5th 502, 512
of law and fact" and is therefore "generally subject to independent review," although
A. Center Appellants
We begin with the Center appellants, who raise three challenges. They contend
that the discussion of mitigation measure MM Bio 11 was inadequate, that the EIR failed
to analyze the impacts of Alternative 7's water usage, and that the EIR failed to reflect
~
the Board of Supervisors' independent judgment. As we explain, we agree that MM Bio
11 was inadequate and that the EIR failed to analyze the impacts of Alternative 7's water
usage.
1. MMBio11
a. Additional Background
The DEIR included MM Bio 11, which was aimed at reducing the potential
impacts of the project on adjacent conservation areas—in its words, "[t]o reduce direct
and indirect impacts due to edge effects." It applied to both the proposed project and to
Services Organization," some portion of which would go to local agencies in their effort
7
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the California Department of Fish
and Wildlife (CDFW) jointly submitted comments on the DEIR. One of those comments
are available for the Environmental Stewardship Program that includes a community
education program, enforcement and [San Jacinto Wildlife Area4] management issues.
The funding source and amount of funding is not identified. Please provide additional
information, with a detailed budget, that identifies staffing levels, tasks, and roles and
responsibilities of all parties involved in this program. The funding mechanism should
adequacy of the funding mechanisms for the Environmental Stewardship Program (MM
Blo-11)."
will be a binding requirement on the project. The funding entity has been identified as a
public with additional information about how the project will limit its indirect impacts to
The northwest portion of the project boundary shares a border with the San
Jacinto Wildlife Area.
~ Although CDFW is not a party to the litigation, the Center appellants may
contend that an EIR is insufficient on a ground someone else raised so long as they have
also objected on the same or other grounds, as the Center appellants have done here.
(§ 21177; Maintain Our Desert Environment v. Town ofApple Valley (2004) 124
Ca1.App.4th 430, 439 [section 21177 "permits any person who objected to raise any
ground asserted as an objection by any other objecting party"].)
the [San Jacinto Wildlife Area]. Funding for the [Environmental Stewardship Program]
does not affect the EIR's analysis or conclusions." The FEIR revised MM Bio 11 only to
state that the types of information that the Environmental Stewardship Program would
CDFW continued to voice its concern about MM Bio 11 following the release of
the FEIR. In October 2017, a few months after the FEIR was released, CDFW submitted
a comment letter stating that there continued to be "no details on how much money will
be generated for the Environmental [Stewardship] Program fund or whether those funds
will be sufficient to address the increased management costs that will come with the
addition of close to 30,000 people" to the surrounding area. That "lack of detail," CDFW
staff warned, would "set[] the stage for future conflict" between CDFW, the San Jacinto
Wildlife Area staff, and the Lakeview Community Services Organization." (Underlining
omitted.) The CDFW stated that MM Bio 11 needed "more detail on how the fund is
established, how CDFW will participate in this process, and" that the mitigation measure
"should identify a minimum amount that will be provided to" surrounding agency staff.
CDFW noted that it did "not believe that sufficient detail ha[d] been provided to evaluate
whether [MM Bio 11] will offset increased management needs that will come with [the]
noted that at a September 2017 meeting, Nuevo had requested that CDFW provide
"detailed costs of operating budgets and expected increases in CDFW budgets" but that
r'7
CDFW's response remained pending. The County went on to state that, although it was
"not possible at this time, without knowing CDFW operation costs, to determine a
specific budget," the County would revise MM Bio 11 to state that "The Lakeview
[Community Services Organization's] budget directed towards the [San Jacinto Wildlife
Area] and Lakeview Mountains interface issues shall be a priority and the appropriate
the [San Jacinto Wildlife Area] and Lakeview Mountains will be developed in
consultation with the California Department of Fish and Wildlife [San Jacinto Wildlife
In December 2017, before the Board of Supervisors meeting to certify the FEIR,
CDFW staff sent the County an e-mail noting that "how much funding comes to the [San
Community Services Organization. The e-mail also "request[ed] that sufficient and
predictable annual funds [be] provided directly to CDFW to address future management
costs associated with the project." In response, the County noted that CDFW staff had
estimated (during an earlier meeting) that it would need "around $60,000," and reiterated
that Nuevo had "requested some clarification as to what would be covered under that
amount." It stated: "It seems reasonable for the applicant to ask for some level of annual
accounting for services that are yet to be quantified or even estimated or even determined
would have control over the funding: "The [Lakeview Community Services
10
Organization] is the mechanism the applicant has proposed to facilitate and fund
programs and services not covered elsewhere. As such, the discretion of distribution of
"[p]rior to issuance of building permit[s] for the 500th residential unit, the developer shall
initiate with California Fish & Wildlife staff for them to submit an initial budget of work
necessary to offset recognized impacts of the Specific Plan development on the San
Jacinto Wildlife Area to the [Lakeview Community Services Organization] and County
the California Fish & Wildlife on an annual basis. Quarterly meetings shall be held with
the [Lakeview Community Services Organization], California Fish & Wildlife, and
County staff to review the budget, work needed at the San Jacinto Wildlife Area, and
Fish & Wildlife." MM Bio 11 also now stated that "[t]o assist initial funding of the
Environmental Stewardship Program, the developer shall provide funding to the program
in the amount of $200 per unit for the first 500 units" and that "[s]uch proof of funding
shall be provided prior to building permit issuance for the first 500 units." In other
words, that the Environmental Stewardship Program would be initially funded with
$100,000.
11
b. Analysis
Ca1.App.3d 1011, 1027.) "For each significant effect, the EIR must identify specific
mitigation measures." (Ibid.) "For projects for which an EIR has been prepared, where
substantial evidence supports the approving agency's conclusion that mitigation measures
will be effective, courts will uphold such measures against attacks based on their alleged
inadequacy." (Ibid.)
removal, and other wildlife area management issues that agency staff have been tasked
with mitigating.
MM Bio 11's goal was to reduce "edge effects," partly through community
education and partly through increased funding to local agencies. As CDFW emphasized
during the EIR approval process, its concern was that there was no guarantee that the
The County's first response made little sense. By stating that funding for the
conclusions," the County all but opined that the program, and hence the mitigation
12
measure as whole, was insignificant, unless the expectation was that the Environmental
Stewardship Program would achieve all of its directives for free. Under the County's
logic, MM Bio 11 would have been either unnecessary, because it would not have
mitigated any significant environmental impact, or unrealistic, if the goals were seen as
important but the funding was not. (See Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San
The County's later responses did not repeat this position, but they also validated
CDFW's concern about the lack of stable funding. Even though MM Bio 11 was
amended to state that the budget "shall be a priority," the County confirm
ed to CDFW
that "the discretion of distribution of funds" would "rest[] entirely with" the Lakeview
Community Services Organization." Thus, agencies tasked with management items that
were now deemed important would have to rely on an organization that was not obligated
remained unclear. The only information that the County provided about the
organization's structure was that it would be "a community services organization such as
13
The lack of detail surrounding the proposed Lakeview Community Services
Organization was perhaps best shown by the disagreement over just whose responsibility
it was to provide additional details. The joint letter from CDFW and the United States
Fish and Wildlife Services asked that the County "provide additional information, with a
detailed budget, that identifies staffing levels, tasks, and roles and responsibilities of all
parties involved in this program." The County neither provided such a budget nor
explained why it wasn't doing so (except by stating that the funding wasn't important),
but later on, the County chided CDFW for its lack of clarification for why it needed
approximately $60,000, stating that "[i]t seems reasonable for the applicant to ask for
some level of annual accounting for services that are yet to be quantified or even
undeveloped idea, the current implementation of which could not have reasonably been
expected to achieve its goals. The County provided no clarity as to how the Lakeview
were no details of how the organization would get money beyond its initial funding, and
by confirming that the organization would retain full discretion over the funds, the
County disclaimed any guidance or oversight of how much of any continued funding
should be allocated to one priority over another. MM Bio 11 obligated CDFW to submit
budgets, but when the County was asked that the Environmental Stewardship Program
itself produce a budget, the County waived off the request, saying essentially that the
14
funding (and hence the mitigation measure) was not important. "Mitigation measures
need not include precise quantitative performance standards, but they must be at least
partially effective ...." (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Ca1.5th at p. 523.) Here, no substantial
(2010) 184 Ca1.App.4th 70, 92 ["An EIR is inadequate if '[t]he success or failure of
mitigation efforts ... may largely depend upon management plans that have not yet been
formulated, and have not been subject to analysis and review within the EIR"]; Preserve
Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Ca1.App.4th 260, 281 [mitigation measure was
inadequate where "EIR does not state, nor is it readily apparent, why specifying
endangered species] within the preserve was impractical or infeasible at the time the EIR
was certified"]; Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County ofSan Diego (2020) 50
Ca1.App.5th 467, 520 [mitigation measure violates CEQA when it "sets a generalized
protocols]; see also California Oak Foundation v. City of Santa Clarita (2005) 133
Ca1.App.4th 1219, 1244 ["the EIR failed to present a reasoned analysis in response" to
comments "pointing out the uncertainty attending the [c]ity's reliance" on a water
15
entitlement," and "[w]ithout the ... entitlement, substantial evidence of sufficient water
parent corporation. There, an individual from the parent corporation stated that the
transfer fee upon the sale of a home in the community." "The transfer fee is 1/8 of 1% on
the initial transfer of the home from the builder to the first homebuyer," while
"[s]ubsequent transfers are assessed a fee of 1/4 of 1%." Based on those transfer fees, the
e-mail states that the Lakeview Community Services Organization "would generate
The problem, though, is that nothing in the FEIR or the mitigation monitoring and
reporting plan that the Board of Directors adopted requires this. For purposes of
"`irrelevant ... because the public and decision makers did not have the [information]
available at the time the project was reviewed and approved. " (Sierra Club, supra, 6
required to be considered in an EIR must be in that formal report; what any official might
have known from other writings or oral presentations cannot supply what is lacking in the
report"].) Unlike the County's e-mail stating that the Lakeview Community Services
Organization would have full discretion over its funds, which merely confirmed what the
text of MM Bio 11 already allowed, the e-mail describing transfer fees would have
16
imposed new, specific requirements onto the mitigation measure. It therefore needed to
have been in the EIR, and because it was not, we will not consider it here. 7
will act in good faith and enforce MM Bio 11. This is true so far as it goes. (See Bus
Riders Union v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Agency (2009) 179
Ca1.App.4th 101, 108 ["`[a]ll presumptions of law are in favor of the good faith of public
be, it will presumably not be a public agency, and there is little that the County can do
under MM Bio 11 as currently described if the organization construes its funding priority
CEQA requires that projects comply with sections 10910 through 10915 of the
Water Code. (§ 21151.9.) Those sections "require the city or county considering a
project to obtain, at the outset of the CEQA process, a water supply 'assessment' from
the applicable public water system," which "is then to be included in any CEQA
document the city or county prepares for the project." (Vineyard Area Citizens for
For the same reason, we will also not consider the County's contention, made in
passing and for the first time on appeal, that the funding CDFW requested would not be
an issue because of increased user fees the department might get under section 1765 of
the Fish and Game Code. We note, however, that in any event, stable funding for the
Environmental Stewardship Program (and the Lakeview Community Services
Organization) is not the same as stable funding for the CDFW and San Jacinto Wildlife
Area staff tasked with many of the measure's mitigation items.
17
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City ofRancho Cordova (2007) 40 Ca1.4th 412, 433
(Vineyard).)
The Center appellants do not take issue with the water supply assessment that was
prepared for the project here. Rather, they contend that, under CEQA, an EIR must
discuss more than supply projections when it comes to water; it must, to some degree,
agree.
An EIR must "include a detailed statement setting forth" "[a]ll significant effects
on the environment of the proposed project." (§ 21100, subd. (b); see also Guidelines,
§ 15126.2, subd. (a) ["An EIR shall identify and focus on the significant effects of the
proposed project on the environment"].) "Direct and indirect significant effects of the
project on the environment shall be clearly identified and described, giving due
subd. (a).) Direct effects are those "caused by the project and occur at the same time and
place," while indirect effects are those "caused by the project and are later in time or
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable." (Id., § 15358, subd.
(a)(1)-(2).) Indirect effects also include "effects related to induced changes in the pattern
of land use, population density, or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and
18
"`When reviewing whether a discussion is sufficient to satisfy CEQA, a court
must be satisfied that the EIR [] includes sufficient detail to enable those who did not
participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues the
proposed project raises. " (Buena Vista Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Water Bank
Authority (2022) 76 Ca1.App.5th 576, 593, citing Sierra Club, supra, 6 Ca1.5th at p. 5 10.)
(MWD) "supplies imported water, primarily from the State Water Project[81 ... and from
the Colorado River," to multiple member agencies, one of which is the Eastern Municipal
Water District (EMWD). The EMWD gets approximately two-thirds of its water from
the MWD. The Villages of Lakeview project is expected to require 4,843 acre-feet, or
over 1.57 billion gallons, of water per year, which will be provided by EMWD.
Alternative 7 would slightly reduce that demand to 4,684 acre-feet per year.
In a comment letter on the DEIR, the Center for Biological Diversity stated that
"the DEIR does not adequately analyze the impacts of extracting water from other areas
in order to support the water needs" of the project. It continued: "Drawing more water
from the already-depleted Colorado River.... will have foreseeable impacts on water
quality and wildlife, including reduced instream flows. The DEIR does not appear to
~ The State Water Project is one of two "major exporter[s]" of "Bay-Delta water."
(In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Ca1.4th 1143, 1154.) "California's two largest rivers, the
Sacramento and the San Joaquin Rivers, meet to form a delta ... near the City of
Sacramento, and their combined waters, if not diverted, flow through the [d]elta, Suisun
Bay, and San Francisco Bay, to the Pacific Ocean. The flow of water through this region,
commonly known as the Bay-Delta, forms the largest estuary on the West Coast of the
United States." (Id. at p. 1151.)
19
analyze these foreseeable impacts." In response, the County stated: "Analyzing the
environmental impacts of more extraction from the Colorado River and State Water
To comply with CEQA, the EIR here needed to address, with "'sufficient detail to
enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider
extraction. (Buena Vista Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Water Bank Authority, supra, 76
Ca1.App.5th at p. 593; see Santiago County Water District v. County of Orange (1981)
118 Ca1.App.3d 818, 829 [EIR insufficient where there were no "facts from which to
evaluate the pros and cons of supplying the amount of water that the [project] will
Ca1.App.4th 182, 197 [EIR insufficient where there was "'no analysis of the potential
impacts of the eventual long-term supply' of water"].) As our Supreme Court has noted,
CEQA ... is not whether an EIR establishes a likely source of water, but whether it
project." (Vineyard, supra, 40 Ca1.4th at p. 434.) The EIR made no attempt to do so.
And because of the EIR's omission here, "some important ramifications of the proposed
project remained hidden from view at the time the project was being discussed and
approved," which "frustrates one of the core goals of CEQA." (Santiago County Water
20
Of course, "[i]t is the adequacy of the EIR with which we are concerned, not the
County Water District v. County of Orange, supra, 118 Ca1.App.3d at p. 83 1.) What this
means is that the County could have determined that the environmental effect the project
would have due to increased extraction from the State Water Project and the Colorado
River was not significant. If it was going to, however, it needed to at least briefly
describe why. (Guidelines, § 15128 ["An EIR shall contain a statement briefly indicating
the reasons that various possible significant effects of a project were determined not to be
significant and were therefore not discussed in detail in the EIR"].) Alternatively, the
County could have concluded that increased extraction would have had a significant
environmental impact that could not be mitigated, but that other, overriding
considerations merited project approval anyway. (§ 2 108 1, subd. (b).) However, a flat
response that the impact was "beyond the scope of the EIR," as the County provided,
In contending that the EIR was sufficient, respondents at times conflate the EIR's
discussion of whether there will be enough water with a discussion of the environmental
effects of providing that water. For instance, respondents contend that the EIR complied
with the framework our Supreme Court laid out in Vineyard. But whether or not the EIR
here complied with Vineyard's four-part test does not address the Center appellants'
point, as the Vineyard test resolved the "principal disputed issue [of] how firmly future
water supplies for a proposed project must be identified." (Vineyard, supra, 40 Ca1.4th at
21
p. 428.) That test9 was not primarily about when an EIR must discuss environmental
Even so, other parts of Vineyard did highlight the necessity of discussing the
environmental impacts resulting from a given water supply. Vineyard underscored that
"[t]he ultimate question under CEQA ... is not whether an EIR establishes a likely
source of water, but whether it adequately addresses the reasonably foreseeable impacts
of supplying water to the project." (Vineyard, supra, 40 Ca1.4th at p. 434.) Thus, "[i]f
the uncertainties inherent in long-term land use and water planning make it impossible to
confidently identify the future water sources, an EIR may satisfy CEQA if it
development if sufficient water is not available for later phases—and discloses the
- "First, CEQA's informational purposes are not satisfied by an EIR that simply
ignores or assumes a solution to the problem of supplying water to a proposed land use
project. ... Second, an adequate environmental impact analysis for a large project, to be
built and occupied over a number of years, cannot be limited to the water supply for the
first stage or the first few years. ... Third, the future water supplies identified and
analyzed must bear a likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and
unrealistic allocations ('paper water') are insufficient bases for decisionmaking under
CEQA. ... Finally, where, despite a full discussion, it is impossible to confidently
determine that anticipated future water sources will be available, CEQA requires some
discussion of possible replacement sources or alternatives to use of the anticipated water,
and of the environmental consequences of those contingencies." (Vineyard, supra, 40
Ca1.4th at pp. 430-432.)
22
Vineyard noted that CEQA "does not require a city or county" "to reinvent the
water planning wheel" "each time a new land use development comes up for approval."
(Vineyard, supra, 40 Ca1.4th at p. 434.) However, this language from Vineyard does not
help respondents. Vineyard observed, in the same paragraph, that urban water suppliers
must periodically "prepare and periodically update an 'urban water management plan,"
and that "[w]hen an individual land use project requires CEQA evaluation, the urban
water management plan's information and analysis may be incorporated in the water
supply and demand assessment required by both the Water Code and CEQA `[i]f the
projected water demand associated with the proposed project was accounted for in the
most recently adopted urban water management plan. " (Ibid., citing Wat. Code,
§ 10910, subd. (c)(2).) However, that paragraph, and the Water Code provision linking
CEQA to the Water Code that the Court was focusing on, speaks only in terms of what
the water supply assessment requires. (See Wat. Code, § 10910, subd. (c)(2) ["If the
projected water demand associated with the proposed project was accounted for in the
most recently adopted urban water management plan, the public water system may
incorporate the requested information from the urban water management plan in
preparing the elements of the assessment required to comply with" other subdivisions].)
As noted, the Center appellants take no issue with the water supply assessment prepared
for the EIR here. They also have not raised any concerns about the sufficiency of the
urban water management plan that provided the basis for the water supply assessment's
23
may need to include a discussion of the availability of water and the environmental
Respondents also rely on Vineyard's rejection of the notion that the EIR at issue
needed to repeat a previously performed environmental impact analysis for new water
supplies. (Vineyard, supra, 40 Ca1.4th at p. 442 ["We do not hold or suggest that the
for new surface water supplies already performed in connection with the Water Forum
proposal."].) They do not, however, identify anything in the record showing that an
environmental impact analysis for the project's projected water supply has ever been
undertaken. As respondents state, the EMWD's most recent urban water management
plan accounts for the project's anticipated demand. However, "accounting for"
something is not necessarily the same as analyzing and disclosing the environmental
impacts of something. Urban water management plans are exempt from CEQA, and
hence are not obligated by CEQA to discuss the environmental impacts of increased
water supplies. (Wat. Code, § 10652; see also Waterman, Addressing California's
Uncertain Water Future by Coordinating Long-Term Land Use and Water Planning: Is
a Water Element in the General Plan the Next Step (2004) 31 Ecology L.Q. 117, 163
[urban water management plans "may be less realistic documents ... because the
environmental consequences of future projects can be left for others to consider, with less
opposition from the public"].) And although other water district projects may be subject
to CEQA and thus require an EIR, respondents have not shown us any EIR that
24
specifically covers the increased water extraction that would supply this project.
Respondents' oblique references in urban water management plans (from EMWD and
MWD) to other EIRs hardly satisfy the Center appellants' concern, which is that the
environmental impacts of this increase in extraction might have escaped public scrutiny
altogether.i° (See Guidelines, § 15150, subd. (c) ["Where an EIR ... uses incorporation
summarized"].) This case is unlike Vineyard, where after stating that the FEIR there did
performed," the Court stated that another EIR the final EIR heavily relied on "did discuss
the impacts of the planned additional diversions of American River water; indeed a
summary of [those] impacts and the proposed mitigation measures occupie[d] 85 pages of
that EIR." (Vineyard, supra, 40 Ca1.4th at p. 442, first italics added; see id. at p. 423.)
Respondents' reliance on other cases does not help it either. Respondents say this
case is analogous to Habitat & Watershed Caretakers v. City ofSanta Cruz (2013) 213
Ca1.App.4th 1277 (Habitat) because neither project involves drawing more water from
10
In contending at oral argument that the environmental impacts of providing
water to the project have already been discussed, the County cited to another EIR that is
part of the record. However, the citation was to the EIR in general, not to any discussion
of environmental impacts of increased water that it might contain. Furthermore, none of
the other citations that the County provided at oral argument discuss the environmental
impacts of supplying water to the project.
The County had opportunities to show us specifically where in the more than
190,000 page record the required discussion of water impacts would be located but has
not done so.
25
existing sources. (Id. at p. 1295.) The argument appears to boil down to the notion that
because the EIR in Habitat had a discussion of water supply that was upheld on appeal,
the County's discussion should also be held sufficient. But the Villages at Lakeview
would require drawing more water; it's just that EMWD says it can handle the increased
demand. As a result, Habitat is not analogous, as it does not shed much light on whether
EIR.11 Friends of the Eel River v. Sonoma County WaterAgency (2003) 108 Ca1.App.4th
859 is inapposite for the same reason; the court there held that the EIR did not need to
discuss diversions from the Eel River's effect on salmonid species in the river as a
significant environmental impact caused by the project because the project "neither
approve[d] nor ma[de] any change to Eel River diversions." (Id. at p. 875.) But here,
Although we agree with the Center appellants that the environmental effects of
supplying water to the project needed to have been accounted for in at least some form in
the EIR, we reject their other claims about the adequacy of the EIR's water supply
analysis. They contend, for example, that the EIR is internally inconsistent because
EMWD says it can supply the project's water needs even though the EIR's cumulative
26
impact analysis concludes that "impacts to water supply are significant and unavoidable."
evaluated in the EIR together with other projects causing related impacts." (Guidelines,
15130, subd. (a)(1).) The seeming discrepancy simply means that even though the
cumulative impact of multiple projects will have a significant effect on water supply, the
The Center appellants also contend that the EIR's cumulative impact analysis on
water supply failed to adequately address the severity and likelihood of those impacts.
The Guidelines state that "[t]he discussion of cumulative impacts shall reflect the severity
of the impacts and their likelihood of occurrence, but the discussion need not provide as
great detail as is provided for the effects attributable to the project alone." (Guidelines,
15130, subd. (b).) The EIR's discussion on this point was sufficient. As the Center
appellants concede, the EIR noted that significant reductions on existing users may need
Finally, the Center appellants contend that the EIR needed to "apply its general
discussion of drought and cumulative water supply impacts to specific impacts on the"
be "applied to" specific impacts. Sierra Club, which the Center appellants rely on here,
held that the EIR was insufficient because it did not make "a reasonable effort to
discuss ... the connection between ... the general health effects associated with a
27
particular pollutant and the estimated amount of that pollutant the project will likely
produce," in part because the Guidelines state that an EIR should discuss "'relevant
specifics of.... health and safety problems caused by the physical changes" from a
proposed project. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Ca1.5th at pp. 521, 520, citing Guidelines,
§ 15126.2, subd. (a).) It does not stand for the broader proposition that general or
"The preparation and circulation of an EIR is more than a set of technical hurdles
for agencies and developers to overcome. The EIR's function is to ensure that
understanding of the environmental consequences and, equally important, that the public
is assured those consequences have been taken into account. [Citation.] For the EIR to
serve these goals it must present information in such a manner that the foreseeable
impacts of pursuing the project can actually be understood and weighed, and the public
decision to go forward is made." (Vineyard, supra, 40 Ca1.4th at pp. 449-450.) Here, the
EIR was deficient for the additional reason that it lacked a sufficient discussion about the
28
3. The County's Independent Judgment
The Center appellants' final contention is that the County violated the requirement
that an EIR reflect the lead agency's independent judgment by allowing the DEIR and
FEIR to be drafted by a consulting firm Nuevo hired, a firm that had no contractual
subdivision (a) states that "[a] draft environmental impact report [or] environmental
impact report ... shall be prepared directly by, or under contract to, a public agency."
Subdivision (b) states that "[t]his section does not prohibit, and shall not be construed as
agency responsible for preparing an environmental impact report[ or] draft environmental
impact report .... The information or other comments may be submitted in any format,
shall be considered by the public agency, and may be included, in whole or in part, in any
report or declaration." Subdivision (c) states in part that "[t]he lead agency shall do all of
the following: [¶] (1) Independently review and analyze any report or declaration
required by this division. [¶] (2) Circulate draft documents that reflect its independent
judgment. [¶] (3) As part of the ... certification of an environmental impact report, find
that the report ... reflects the independent judgment of the lead agency."
In Friends ofLa Vina v. County ofLos Angeles (1991) 232 Ca1.App.3d 1446 (La
Vina), disapproved on other grounds in Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court
(1995) 9 Ca1.4th 559, 570, fn. 2, 572, the Court of Appeal held that "an agency may
29
comply with CEQA by adopting EIR materials drafted by the applicant's consultant, so
long as the agency independently reviews, evaluates, and exercises judgment over that
documentation and the issues it raises and addresses." (La Vina, supra, at p. 1452.) Its
decision was based on an analysis of section 21082.1's text (La Vina at p. 1453 ["In the
same breath as it requires agency 'preparation' of the EIR, the statute specifically
authorizes the agency not only to consider outside comments and information but to
include them in the EIR"]), its legislative history (ibid. ["the history of the bill that
enacted section 2 1082. 1 reflects that after the 'preparation' language alone was proposed,
the Assembly deleted it, and then reinstated and approved it only with the addition of the
further language authorizing outside input"]), the Guidelines (La Vina at p. 1453. [noting
that section 15084, subdivision (d)(3) of the Guidelines allows the lead agency to
any other person"], prior caselaw (id. at pp. 1454-1455), the fact that the practice was
"common" and "routine[]" (id. at p. 1454), and its rejection of the view, espoused by the
trial court (and adopted by a dissenting justice), that "'general principles of conflict of
interest" was a proper basis for finding otherwise (id. at p. 1456; see id. at pp. 1458-1459
(dis. opn. of Gates, J.) [adopting trial court's statement of decision]). No appellate
opinion has disagreed with this portion of La Vina in the 30-plus years since it was
decided.
30
Moreover, at the time La Vina was decided, section 2 1082.1 did not expressly say
that its requirements applied to draft EIRs. (See La Vina, supra, 232 Ca1.App.3d at p.
1453, fn. 4 [restating former section 21082.1].) However, two months after La Vina, the
Legislature amended section 2 1082. 1 to clarify that it applied to draft EIRs as well.
(Stats. 1991, ch. 905, § 1.) Because "[t]he Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing
laws and judicial decisions construing the same statute in effect at the time legislation is
enacted, and to have enacted and amended statutes ""in the light of such decisions as
have a direct bearing upon them, " the effect of the amendment was to expand La Vina
and remove any doubt that it applied to both draft and final EIRs. (Viking Pools, Inc. v.
Maloney (1989) 48 Ca1.3d 602, 609.) Since then, section 21082.1 has been amended
three other times; none of those amendments were aimed at overruling La Vina. (Stats.
2002, ch. 1052, § 1; Stats. 2016, ch. 476, § 1; Stats. 2021, ch. 97, § 2.) "The failure of
the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally
before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law
as it stands in the aspects not amended." (Estate ofMcDill (1975) 14 Ca1.3d 831, 837-
12
We grant respondents' request for judicial notice of legislative history
documents relating to the various amendments to section 21082.1. However, the
documents do not persuade us that the Legislature intended to restrict or overturn La
Vina.
31
Respondents contend that La Vina is not controlling here because it did not
address whether section 2 1082. 1 "requires any contractual relationship between the
preparer of the EIR and the lead agency, or whether CEQA requires the EIR preparers to
owe a legal duty to the lead agency." In their view, CEQA requires as much. However,
or legal duties, La Vina forecloses the argument that respondents want us to adopt. La
Vina explains that "the 'preparation' requirements of CEQA ... turn not on some
artificial litmus test of who wrote the words, but rather upon whether the agency
exposition that constitute the EIR." (La Vina, supra, 232 Ca1.App.3d at p. 1455; see also
id. at p. 1456 ["In short, in accordance with consistent practice and judicial application,
the independent review, analysis and judgment test, not the proposed physical
So long as the lead agency independently reviews the EIR—regardless of who prepares
it, what contracts the preparer has with the lead agency, or what duties it owes to the lead
an EIR have a contractual relationship with or owe a legal duty to the lead agency would
contravene section 21083.1, which states that "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that
courts, consistent with generally accepted rules of statutory interpretation, shall not
requirements beyond those explicitly stated in [CEQA or the Guidelines]." (See Berkeley
32
Hillside Preservation v. City ofBerkeley (2015) 60 Ca1.4th 1086, 1107 [the purpose of
section 2 10 83.1 "was to `limit judicial expansion of CEQA requirements' and to "'reduce
the uncertainty and litigation risks facing local governments and project applicants by
providing a`safe harbor' to local entities and developers who comply with the explicit
requirements of the law"].) We therefore find that the County and Board of Directors
B. PaulekAppellants
The Paulek appellants contend that the project description in the EIR was not
accurate, stable and finite and that it excluded discussion of certain endangered species in
its significant environmental impacts analysis. We disagree as to the first contention and
The requirement that a project description be "accurate, stable and finite" was first
stated in County oflnyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Ca1.App.3d 185, 193 (County of
Inyo). There, the Court of Appeal addressed the fluctuating descriptions of a City of Los
Angeles project extracting subsurface water in the Owens Valley. (Ibid.) The project
"expand[ed] and contract[ed] from place to place within the EIR," including in one
section of the EIR entitled "'Recommended Project." (Id. at p. 190.) There, what
supplement surface flow.... to supply the uses of water on City of Los Angeles lands"
33
description" of "`operat[ing] the Los Angeles Aqueduct System in an environmentally
sensitive manner to benefit the citizens of Los Angeles and the people of Inyo County."
(Id. at p. 190 & fns. 3-4.) Noting that "an accurate, stable and finite project description is
the sine qua non of an informative and legally sufficient EIR," the court held that the
agency did not proceed in a manner required by law. (Id. at pp. 199-200.)
A later case relied on County oflnyo to hold that an EIR violated CEQA. In
Ca1.App.5th 277 (Washoe Meadows), the court held that a draft EIR that "did not identify
a proposed project, but described five very different alternative projects" without
identifying a preferred one violated the requirement that a project description be accurate,
stable and finite. (Id. at pp. 281, 283.) "Rather than providing inconsistent descriptions
of the scope of the project at issue," the court noted, the draft EIR at issue in Washoe
Here, the EIR project descriptions in the EIR were accurate, stable and finite. The
DEIR described the project as "the development of 11,350 dwelling units, 500,000 square
immediately south of the Ramona Expressway, up to three new K-8 schools, 150 acres of
passive and active parks, and approximately 1,000 acres of open space/conservation that
is proposed for permanent protection and conservation." The FEIR repeats the same
project description verbatim. As there was an actual, proposed project, this case is unlike
Washoe Meadows. As we have not been pointed to anything in the record suggesting that
34
the scope of the project "expand[ed] and contract[ed] from place to place within the
EIR," County oflnyo does not apply either. (County oflnyo, supra, 71 Ca1.App.3d at p.
190.)
Moreover, the project descriptions remained accurate, stable and finite even with
the inclusion and discussion of Alternative 7 in the DEIR and FEIR. This is for the
simple reason that "project descriptions" and "alternatives" are distinct concepts under
CEQA. One of the Guidelines describes what the project description must contain, while
presumably why County oflnyo separated its discussion of the EIR's deficient project
description from its discussion of the EIR's discussion of alternatives, which the court
also found lacking. (County oflnyo, supra, 71 Ca1.App.3d at pp. 192-200 [project
their contentions have not been properly presented to this court due to a lack of citation to
legal authority or the factual record. At one point while arguing that the project
Alternative 7 "is not an Alternative as defined by CEQA," but they omit any discussion
(or citation to legal authority) of what a proper alternative must contain. At another point
in the same discussion, the Paulek appellants support a factual claim with a "passim"
35
citation, essentially asking this court to pore through the record—all 190,000 pages or so
"It is the appellant's responsibility to support claims of error with citation and
authority; this court is not obligated to perform that function on the appellant's behalf."
(Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Ca1.App.4th 647, 656; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(C) [briefs must "[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation
to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears"]; Harshad v.
Nasir Corp. v. Global Sign Systems, Inc. (2017) 14 Ca1.App.5th 523, 527, fn. 2 ["We are
not required to scour the record in search of support for a party's factual statements and
may disregard such unsupported statements"].) Importantly, "[t]he larger and more
complex the record, the more important it is for the litigants to adhere to appellate rules."
(City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Ca1.App.4th 266, 287.) Accordingly, we
As to the issues which the Paulek appellants have adequately briefed, we find no
error. They contend, for instance, that requiring the public to go through over 19,000
pages of appendices in each of the EIRs makes the EIRs even more inadequate than the
EIR in Washoe Meadows. However, Washoe Meadows made clear that it was the failure
to identify a proposed project combined with five very different alternative projects that
made the EIR inadequate. (See, e.g., Washoe Meadows, supra, 17 Ca1.App.5th at pp. 281
["[t]he draft EIR in this case did not identify a proposed project, but described five very
different alternative projects"], 288 ["the DEIR did not describe a project at all"; "[a]
36
description of a broad range of possible projects, rather than a preferred or actual
project, presents the public with a moving target"], italics added.) Here, there is no
dispute that there was an actual project, so the rationale of Washoe Meadows does not
apply.
The Paulek appellants also contend that because there were 19,000 pages of
appendices in the EIR, it should have specified which appendices applied only to the
project and which applied to both the project and Alternative 7. They concede, however,
that the EIR stated which of the appendices specifically applied to only Alternative 7. In
light of this concession as well as the lack of any discussion of how the public would
have been misled or confused by the appendices, we find no prejudicial error based on
2. Endangered Species
The Paulek appellants contend that the EIRs failed to properly discuss certain
endangered species from their analyses of the project's significant impacts to biological
resources. The trial court found the Paulek parties barred by claim preclusion from
making the argument at all, and that in any event the argument failed on the merits. We
agree with the trial court that claim preclusion applies and therefore do not reach the
merits here.
suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.' [Citation.] Claim
preclusion arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the
37
same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. [Citations.] If claim
Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Ca1.4th 813, 824, italics removed.) "[C]laim
preclusion bars 'not only...issues that were actually litigated but also issues that could
have been litigated." Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake WaterAgency
(2009) 180 Ca1.App.4th 210, 226 (Castaic Lake).) However, claim preclusion does not
apply when "'there are changed conditions and new facts which were not in existence at
the time the action was filed upon which the prior judgment is based. " (Id. at p. 227.)
The DEIR and FEIR here are distinct from the 2010 EIR that the trial court found
deficient in 2012. The main difference was the inclusion of Alternative 7. However, as
the trial court noted, no new issues relating to endangered species are engendered by
Alternative 7. In arguing (in both their opening and reply briefs) that claim preclusion
does not apply, the Paulek appellants do not contend that their arguments about the EIR's
We therefore agree with the trial court that the requirement of the same cause of action is
met here. (See also Atwell v. City ofRohnert Park (2018) 27 Ca1.App.5th 692, 702
[holding, in CEQA action, that second petition was "not based on changed material facts
There is privity between the Paulek appellants and the petitioners in the earlier
action as well. There is no real dispute that the alleged harm is to the community, and,
importantly, the trial court noted that none of the Paulek appellants "alleged any harm
38
apart from that incurred by the community," a conclusion the Paulek appellants do not
contest on appeal. "Accordingly, when an alleged harm impacts the public rather than a
specific entity, the privity analysis must focus on the 'community of interest' rather than
the relationship between the parties." (Atwell, supra, 27 Ca1.App.5th at p. 703; see also
id. at p. 704 ["Despite their claims of personal harm, appellants do not allege any such
harm apart from that incurred by the community"].) We find that the privity requirement
Finally, there is no dispute that the third requirement for claim preclusion has been
satisfied.
The Paulek appellants' arguments that claim preclusion does not apply are
unpersuasive. First, they assert that the respondents' brief "failed to cite any reference to
the 2010 EIR which shows the 2010 EIR failed to comply" with the applicable
requirements, thereby failing to show that the issue could have been raised in 2010.
However, this flips the burden of persuasion on appeal. The trial court has determined
that the issue could have been raised in 2010, so it is the Paulek parties' appellate burden
(2021) 67 Ca1.App.5th 538, 546.) As discussed, they have made no attempt to show that
their arguments relate only to Alternative 7 and hence could not have been raised earlier.
Second, the Paulek appellants claim that the so-called "public interest" exception
to claim preclusion applies. Under the exception, ""`when the issue is a question of law
rather than of fact, the prior determination is not conclusive either if injustice would
39
result or if the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed." (Atwell,
supra, 27 Ca1.App.5th at p. 705.) The exception, however, is "extremely narrow" and "is
Dept. ofEducation (1992) 2 Ca1.4th 251, 259.) More importantly, the exception was not
raised in trial court, and """[g]enerally, issues raised for the first time on appeal which
were not litigated in the trial court are waived." (Premier Medical Managements
Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Ca1.App.4th 550, 564.)
We therefore find that claim preclusion bars the Paulek appellants' contention
111. DISPOSITION
Paragraphs C and E under the heading "Center Petitioners" in Exhibit A of the judgment
The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to (1) vacate its March 12,
2020 order denying the petition for writ of mandate as to the claims for the CEQA
violations identified in this opinion; (2) enter a modified order granting those claims; (3)
enter a modified judgment; and (4) issue a peremptory writ of mandate for corrective
action that is not inconsistent with this opinion. The modified judgment and the
peremptory writ of mandate shall direct the Board of Supervisors to set aside the
certification of the EIR. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
In case RIC1800517, the judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal.
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
SLOUGH
J.
41