March 25, 2023

Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr.

District Attorney
New York County
One Hogan Place
New York, NY 10013

Dear Mr. Bragg:

Our Committees are conducting oversight of your reported effort to indict a former
President of the United States and current declared candidate for that office. On March 20, 2023,
we wrote to you requesting that you voluntarily cooperate with our oversight by providing
relevant documents and testimony.1 We received a reply letter sent on your behalf dated March
23, 2023, which set forth several purported reasons for why you could not cooperate with our
investigation.2

Notably, your reply letter did not dispute the central allegations at issue—that you, under
political pressure from left-wing activists and former prosecutors in your office, are reportedly
planning to use an alleged federal campaign finance violation, previously declined by federal
prosecutors, as a vehicle to extend the statute of limitations on an otherwise misdemeanor
offense and indict for the first time in history a former President of the United States. Moreover,
you are apparently attempting to upgrade a misdemeanor charge to a felony using an untested
legal theory at the same time when you are simultaneously downgrading felony charges to
misdemeanors in a majority of other cases in your jurisdiction.3

Contrary to the central argument set forth in your letter, this matter does not simply
involve local or state interests. Rather, the potential criminal indictment of a former President of
the United States by an elected local prosecutor of the opposing political party (and who will
face the prospect of re-election) implicates substantial federal interests, particularly in a
jurisdiction where trial-level judges also are popularly elected. If state or local prosecutors are
able to engage in politically motivated prosecutions of Presidents of the United States (former or
current) for personal acts, this could have a profound impact on how Presidents choose to

1
Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, et al., to Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., Manhattan District
Attorney (Mar. 20, 2023).
2
Letter from Leslie B. Dubeck, Gen. Counsel, N.Y. Co. District Att’y Off., to Rep. Jim Jordan, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, et al. (Mar. 23, 2023) [hereinafter “Letter from Dubeck”].
3
See, e.g., Melissa Klein, NYC Convictions Plummet, Downgraded Charges Surge under Manhattan DA Bragg,
N.Y. Post (Nov. 26, 2022).
Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr.
March 25, 2023
Page 2

exercise their powers while in office. For example, a President could choose to avoid taking
action he believes to be in the national interest because it would negatively impact New York
City for fear that he would be subject to a retaliatory prosecution in New York City.

Likewise, because the federal government has a compelling interest in protecting the
physical safety of former or current Presidents, any decision to prosecute a former or current
President raises difficult questions concerning how to vindicate that interest in the context of a
state or local criminal justice system. For these reasons and others, we believe that we now must
consider whether Congress should take legislative action to protect former and/or current
Presidents from politically motivated prosecutions by state and local officials, and if so, how
those protections should be structured. Critically, due to your own actions, you are now in
possession of information critical to this inquiry.

I. The Arguments in Defense of Your Unprecedented Prosecutorial Conduct Are

Conclusory and Unconvincing.

The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has a “broad and indispensable” power
to conduct oversight, which “encompasses inquiries into the administration of existing laws,
studies of proposed laws, and surveys in our social, economic or political system for the purpose
of enabling Congress to remedy them.”4 In Wilkinson v. United States, the Supreme Court
articulated a three-prong test to determine the legal sufficiency of a congressional subpoena: “(1)
the Committee’s investigation of the broad subject matter area must be authorized by Congress;
(2) the investigation must be pursuant to ‘a valid legislative purpose’; and (3) the specific
inquiries involved must be pertinent to the broad subject matter areas which have been
authorized by Congress.”5

A. The Committees Are Authorized to Conduct Such an Inquiry.

Contrary to your assertion otherwise, the Committees’ inquiry plainly satisfies this three-
prong test. First, the Committee on the Judiciary is charged by the House of Representatives with
upholding fundamental American civil liberties and with promoting fairness and consistency in
our nation’s criminal justice system. In fact, Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives
authorizes the Committee on the Judiciary to conduct oversight of criminal justice matters to
inform potential legislation.6 In the Committees’ view, the circumstances of any prosecutorial
decision to indict a former President of the United States on a novel and untested legal theory
based on facts known for years and conduct previously uncharged by federal prosecutors, shortly
after your former high-ranking employee has publicly criticized you for not making such an
indictment, require an examination of the facts and potential consequences of this unprecedented
decision. The Committee on the Judiciary has an interest in the fair and evenhanded application
of justice at both the state and federal level.

4
See, e.g., Trump v. Mazars LLP, No. 19-715 at 11 (U.S. slip op. July 9, 2020) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
5
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1961); see Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 305
(D.D.C. 1976).
6
Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, R. X(l)(5) (2023).
Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr.
March 25, 2023
Page 3

B. The Inquiry Is on a Matter on Which Legislation Could be Had.

Second, the Committees’ inquiry has an obvious legitimate legislative purpose and is “a
subject on which legislation could be had.”7 To begin with, as discussed above, Congress has a
specific and manifestly important interest in preventing politically motivated prosecutions of
current and former Presidents by elected state and local prosecutors, particularly those tried
before elected state and local trial-level judges. Therefore, the Committee on the Judiciary, as a
part of its broad authority to develop criminal justice legislation, must now consider whether to
draft legislation that would, if enacted, insulate current and former presidents from such
improper state and local prosecutions. These legislative reforms may include, for example,
broadening the existing statutory right of removal of certain criminal cases from state court to
federal court. Because your impending indictment of a former President is an issue of first
impression, the Committees require information from your office to inform our oversight.

Moreover, as discussed above, your prosecutorial decision to indict a former President

may cause a potential confrontation between federal and local law-enforcement authorities.
Federal law requires the United States Secret Service to protect a former President.8 Therefore,
your unprecedented prosecutorial decision raises the potential for conflict between the federal
law-enforcement officials required to protect the former President and local law-enforcement
officials required to enforce your indictment and exercise control of him throughout his presence
in the local criminal justice system. Such a novel and potentially fraught collision of federal and
local law-enforcement officials with the safety of a former President at stake is certainly a matter
of interest for the Committees. The Committees’ oversight is necessary to inform potential
legislation that would address or remedy any potential conflicts between federal and local
authorities.

In addition, the federal campaign finance charges you are reportedly attempting to use to
upgrade a misdemeanor charge to a felony have previously been considered—and rejected—by
federal prosecutors.9 In light of this fact, to bring uniformity to the law and prevent future
attempts by state or local prosecutors to pursue politically motivated prosecutions related to
campaign finance regulations applicable to federal elections, Congress may elect to consider
legislation that broadens the preemption provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act. This
reform could have the effect of better delineating the prosecutorial authorities of federal and
local officials in this area and blocking the selective or politicized enforcement by state and local
prosecutors of campaign finance restrictions pertaining to federal elections.

Furthermore, your reported decision to indict a former President requires congressional

scrutiny about how federal public safety funds appropriated by Congress are implemented by

7
See, e.g., Mazars, No. 19-715 at 12 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
8
18 U.S.C. § 3056.
9
Jonathan Turley, “America’s Got Trump”: Get Ready for a Truly Made-for -TV Prosecution, Res Ipsa Loquitur –
The Thing Itself Speaks (Mar. 20, 2023) (“Although it may be politically popular, the case is legally pathetic. Bragg
is struggling to twist state laws to effectively prosecute a federal case long ago rejected by the Justice Department
. . . .”).
Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr.
March 25, 2023
Page 4

local law-enforcement agencies and how limited resources are prioritized. Under your
leadership, the New York County District Attorney’s Office has adopted and defended your
progressive criminal justice policies, which includes “downgrad[ing] 52 percent of felony cases
to misdemeanors.”10 Even with downgrading more than half of your felony cases to
misdemeanors, your office’s conviction rate when prosecuting serious felony charges was
reported to be just 51 percent.11 Your conviction rate for misdemeanors also dropped sharply—
from 53 percent to 28 percent.12 Your policies have allowed career “criminals [to] run[ ] the
streets” of Manhattan13—creating such a danger that a judge in your district has taken notice.14

To the extent that you are receiving federal funds and are choosing to prioritize apparent
political prosecutions over commonsense public safety measures, the Committee on the Judiciary
certainly may consider legislation to tie federal funds to improved public safety metrics. In fact,
last year, a Judiciary Subcommittee heard testimony from the mother of an army veteran
murdered in your district,15 who criticized your office’s handling of her son’s murder by offering
plea deals to the defendants despite the fact that “the murder and their roles were caught on video
. . . .”16 Her testimony crystallized the need for legislation to prevent dangerous criminals from
running free. Additionally, if our oversight determines that improper partisan or political
considerations are motivating your prosecutorial decisions, the Committee on the Judiciary may
consider legislation to place conditions on federal funding for state and local law-enforcement
jurisdictions to ensure that funds are not used to engage in discrimination on the basis of partisan
affiliation or political beliefs.

Lastly, because the circumstances of this matter stem, in part, from Special Counsel
Mueller’s investigation,17 Congress may consider legislative reforms to the authorities of special
counsels and better delineate their relationships with other prosecuting entities.

10
Andrea Cavallier, REVEALED: Woke Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg has downgraded over HALF of felony cases to
misdemeanors as criminals are free to roam streets of the Big Apple, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 28, 2022); Georgett
Roberts and Melissa Klein, Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg surprised by ‘push back’ – defends policies, N.Y. Post (Jan.
8, 2022).
11
Numbers show the grim consequences of Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg’s pro-crime principles, N.Y. Post (Nov. 27,
2022).
12
Id.
13
Alyssa Guzman, Priorities, eh? Woke DA Alvin Bragg who’s set to indict Trump is one of America’s most
controversial prosecutors after charging self-defense shopkeeper with murder and sending soft-on-crime memo,
DAILY MAIL (Mar. 18, 2023); Cavallier, supra note 10.
14
Joe Marino and Bruce Golding, Ex-con would have faced ‘long time in jail’ if not for new Manhattan DA: judge,
N.Y. Post (Jan. 12, 2022) (A career criminal “accused of threatening a drug store worker with a knife was told in
court that he should “feel lucky” he got busted after new Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg took office . . . .
‘Based on your record, you would have faced a long period of time in jail if convicted,” [Manhattan Criminal Court
Judge Jay] Weiner said during the court proceeding . . . .”)
15
Reimagining Public Safety in the COVID-19 Era, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (Mar. 8, 2022) (testimony from Madeline Brame).
16
Jack Morphet and Gabrielle Fonrouge, Mother of slain Army vet Hason Correa rips Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg
for giving plea deals in case, N.Y. Post (June 10, 2022).
17
Ben Protess et al., How Michael Cohen turned against President Trump, N.Y. Times (Apr. 21, 2019).
Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr.
March 25, 2023
Page 5

C. The Requests Are Pertinent to the Committees’ Inquiry.

The Committees’ inquiry satisfies Wilkinson’s third prong of pertinence to the oversight.
Federal courts have interpreted this prong broadly, requiring “only that the specific inquiries be
reasonably related to the subject matter under investigation.”18 The information sought by the
Committees will allow us to assess the extent to which your reported effort to indict a former
President and current declared candidate for that office is politically motivated and whether
Congress should therefore draft legislative reforms to, among other things, protect former and
current Presidents from politically motivated prosecutions.

II. Your State Law-Based Defenses Are Insufficient.

Your conclusory claim that our constitutional oversight responsibilities will interfere with
law enforcement is misplaced and unconvincing. As a threshold matter, whether your office is, in
fact, fairly enforcing the law or abusing prosecutorial discretion to engage in a politically
motivated indictment of a former President is a serious matter that, as discussed above,
implicates significant federal interests. The Committees require information from the New York
County District Attorney’s Office to advance our oversight over the very matter that you claim is
a basis to obstruct our investigation.

In support of your broad claim that compliance with the Committees’ requests for
documents and a transcribed interview would interfere with law enforcement, you note two New
York State statutes that prohibit the disclosure of grand jury materials. The Committees’
information requests, however, relate to numerous areas of inquiry that in no way implicate
grand jury materials or seek information that would be confidential under New York law. For
example, the request for your office’s use of federal funds has no connection to any grand jury
proceedings. Similarly, the vast majority of the questions that the Committees intend to ask you
in an interview also would not implicate grand jury secrecy. Moreover, to the extent that
questions are asked that you believe you are not permitted to answer, you would retain the ability
to decline to answer or to assert an applicable privilege. Likewise, you remain free to decline to
produce certain responsive documents on the basis of appropriate privileges or statutes that
preclude production, provided you provide the Committees with a detailed privilege log that will
enable us to review and evaluate your claims. The laws cited in your letter do not establish a
basis for a complete refusal to cooperate. At best, they provide arguments that may be asserted
on either a question-by-question or a document-by-document basis.

Furthermore, your invocation of certain New York laws as precluding you from
complying with our oversight request is, at a minimum, overbroad. For example, New York’s
Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law § 87(2)) provides that agencies may decline
to make certain records available for public inspection; it neither requires them to do so nor
directly speaks to formal requests from congressional committees. Thus, that statutory provision
does not preclude you from providing us with records that were “compiled for law enforcement

18
MORTON ROSENBERG, WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING: A STUDY ON THE PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND
PRAGMATICS OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 18 (2017).
Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr.
March 25, 2023
Page 6

purposes.”19 Indeed, the statute in question states that even when an agency receives a request
from a member of the public, as opposed to congressional committees, a “denial of access shall
not be based solely on the category or type of such record and shall be valid only when there is a
particularized and specific justification for such denial.”20

III. The Inquiry Does Not Intrude on Federalism Powers Because Congress Is
Exercising Its Core Authority to Legislate.

Your letter raises unfounded and unpersuasive objections to our oversight based on
federalism—arguing, in part, that our “requests are an unlawful incursion into New York’s
sovereignty.”21 You go on to note that “the District Attorney is duty bound by his constitutional
oath to New York’s sovereign interest in the exercise of police powers reserved to the States
under the Tenth Amendment.”22 Contrary to your assertions, this inquiry does not infringe on
New York’s sovereignty.

To begin with, your argument hinges on your assertion that “Congress cannot have any
legitimate legislative task relating to the oversight of local prosecutors enforcing state law.” But
this claim is simply wrong; as discussed at length above, this matter involves substantial federal
interests. Moreover, the cases that you cite, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Cameron
v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), involve the question of when federal courts can enjoin
prosecutions of state law. And needless to say, our oversight requests do no such thing; they
would not block you from conducting any prosecution. Rather, we are simply seeking
information to carry out constitutional duties.

Finally, our oversight requests do not implicate what is commonly referred to as the anti-
commandeering principle.23 In establishing the anti-commandeering principle in New York v.
United States, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress cannot compel states to enact,
enforce, or administer federal policies.24 Unlike the matter before the Court in New York, our
requests here simply do not compel the state “to enact, enforce, or administer federal policies.”25
Rather, the Committees are merely seeking information pertaining to a matter that is directly
within the purview of our jurisdiction and is necessary to inform potential legislative reforms.

IV. The Inquiry Does Not Usurp Executive Powers

In your reply letter, you cited the Supreme Court of the United States in Watkins v.
United States as saying, “Congress [is not] a law enforcement or trial agency.”26 We agree. The
Committees do not seek to step into the shoes of the Executive Branch or usurp its powers.
19
Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e).
20
Id. at § 87(2).
21
Letter from Dubeck, supra note 2.
22
Id.
23
The Committee’s oversight does not involve the federal spending power. As such, the anti-coercion principle
cannot be reasonably implicated.
24
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
25
Id.
26
Letter from Dubeck, supra note 2 (citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)).
Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr.
March 25, 2023
Page 7

Rather, as explained, we are exercising the broad powers afforded Congress by the Constitution
to conduct oversight to inform potential legislative reforms. This power

encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing

laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes
surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the
purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends
probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste.27

Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress retains broad authority to conduct
oversight of ongoing civil and criminal investigations. In Sinclair v. United States, the Supreme
Court noted that the pendency of litigation does not stop Congress’s ability to investigate,
stating:

It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel

disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending
suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its
committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own
constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought
to be elicited may also be of use in such suits.28

The Court has further noted that “a congressional committee . . . engaged in legitimate legislative
investigation need not grind to a halt whenever responses to its inquiries might potentially be
harmful to a witness in some distinct proceeding . . . or when crime or wrongdoing is exposed.”29
Phrased another way, the Committees’ oversight will in no way “stop [your] prosecution or set
limits on the management of a particular case.”30 Accordingly, your refusal to cooperate with our
oversight inquires on this basis is therefore unavailing.

V. Your Offer to Provide Information About Your Office’s Use of Federal Funds Is
Insufficient

While we appreciate your offer to submit a letter detailing the District Attorney’s
Office’s use of federal funds, and we look forward to that submission, such a letter alone does
not satisfy our oversight requests or preclude the Committees from proceeding with them. For
example, as we have explained in detail, the Committee on the Judiciary is examining whether
legislative reforms are necessary to insulate former and current Presidents from politically
motivated prosecutions by state and local officials. And while your letter regarding your office’s
use of federal funds will not shed meaningful light on that question, we expect that your response
to our other information requests will do so.

27
Id.
28
279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929).
29
Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 617 (1962).
30
See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (1995).
Mr. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr.
March 25, 2023
Page 8

Accordingly, we reiterate the requests in our March 20 letter and ask that you comply in
full as soon as possible but no later than March 31, 2023. We trust the information in this letter
satisfies your request to “understand whether the Committee has any legitimate legislative
purpose . . . .”31 Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Jim Jordan Bryan Steil

Chairman Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary Committee on House Administration

James Comer
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Accountability

cc: The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member

Committee on the Judiciary

The Honorable Joseph Morelle, Ranking Member

Committee on House Administration

The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Accountability

31
Letter from Dubeck, supra note 2.