Crim2 Reviewer
Crim2 Reviewer
Ca&To
Doctrine #1: Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time
the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and
the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal
Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately"
after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit
the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate
result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same
blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be
the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
Doctrine #2: 247 does not define an offense. Destierro in this case is not punishment.
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is
intended for his protection. As such, the act cannot be qualified nor be treated as neither
aggravating nor mitigating. Treachery is not present.
Doctrine # 3: When third persons are injured in the course of the assault at the wife
and/or her paramour, the offender is not free from liability. Even though the offender would
have been performing a legal act, if the injuries are caused by his carelessness, he is still
liable for imprudence or negligence, even if the accused uttered warning words: “an waray
labot kagawas.”
Doctrine #1: Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the
exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any
criminal liability. Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise his defense would be untenable.
Doctrine #2: The accused and the victim here were separated with the accused keeping
custody of their children. The Court ruled that Article 247 was applicable. It is not clear
whether the “separation” mentioned here was with a judicial order or just physical
separation. Just note that there was mention of custody of the children.
Doctrine: Elements must be attendant and proven with clear and convincing facts. The
physical evidence of Florencio’s body which when found by the policemen were still at the
crime scene outside the house of Tulo as opposed to the version of Rogelio wherein he
stabbed the deceased inside their house. Florencio was fully clothed in a shirt and a pair
of pants with buttons intact.
Q: Elements?
1. That a person was killed
2. That the accused killed him
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstance
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide
‣ Absorbed in treachery
4. Treachery - SOC
a. The attack was Sudden and unexpected
b. There was no Opportunity to defend, retaliate, repel, or escape
c. The mode of attack was Consciously adopted to ensure the commission of
the crime without risk to himself
Doctrine: (1) Conspiracy (2) Treachery (3) Evident Premeditation (4) Consideration of a
price, reward, or promise
(1) Yes. at the instigation of herein accused-appellant who promised and, in fact, paid
Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Brando/Boy Negro sums of money
enclosed in small envelopes (2) Yes. considering that the victims' hands were tied behind
their backs with nylon ropes and their mouths were gagged with their shirts before the
accused commenced taking turns in hacking them with bolos. (3) However, instead, of
desisting from his murderous inclinations, accused-appellant clung to his resolve when
Jack and Boy Negro/Brando returned with the two victims and ordered them killed. This is
absorbed by treachery, though. (4) Jack was hired by accused-appellant for a price of
5,000.00 to kill the two (2) victims and in fact received P200.00 contained in an airmail
envelope as down payment with the assurance that the balance would be paid after the
job.
Doctrine #2: The mere decapitation of the victim’s head constitutes outraging or scoffing
at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder.
Doctrine #1: Cruelty - There is cruelty when the culprit deliberately and inhumanly
augmented the suffering of the victim, or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. The
test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused
deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not
necessary for its commission and inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering or outraged
or scoffed at his/her person or corpse.
Doctrine #2: Abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against the appellants. It
must be stressed that this circumstance must be established by clear and categorical
evidence. There must exist proof that the attackers deliberately took advantage of their
superior strength, their apparent superiority in number vis-a-vis that of the victim,
notwithstanding.
Doctrine #1: As to the nature - Even if appellant, in detonating a hand grenade under the
hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., intended to kill Rosendo, but instead killed his son,
Resty, and seriously injured other family members, appellant is liable for all the
consequences of his unlawful act.
Doctrine #2: Considering that the offenses committed against the victims were caused by
a single act of detonating a hand grenade, the trial court found appellant guilty of the
complex crime of murder with multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Doctrine #1: The RTC reasoned that the stabbing injury sustained by Sicor was not on a
vital part of the body and she was able to leave the hospital two hours after receiving
medical treatment. The RTC properly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated
murder as it was not shown that there was intent to kill. After the wound on her buttocks
was treated, Sicor was released two hours after she was admitted to the hospital. Slight
physical injuries.
Doctrine #2: In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without
warning, stabbed him four times successively leaving the latter no chance at all to evade
the knife thrusts and defend himself from appellant’s onslaught. Thus, there is no denying
that appellant’s act of suddenly stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense
is a clear case of treachery.
NOTE:
‣ No frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence, only physical injuries through
reckless imprudence
‣ But homicide through negligence exists
‣ “el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado” still applies here.
‣ Use of unlicensed firearm aggravated homicide
‣ Reclusion perpetua if the victim is under 12 (RA 7610)
Doctrine: It bears stressing that in criminal cases such as this, the prosecution is not
required to show the guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
demanded, or that degree of proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. In
this case, we find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of
petitioner with moral certainty.
Doctrine #2: Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference
to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the
elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense.
Doctrine: The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must
not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. Here, however,
Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation.
He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial
court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now
seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling
in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when
they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege. In a
way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level
where the law would allow him to apply for probation. In a real sense, the Court’s finding
that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an
original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty.
Article 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray
Doctrine: In Art 251, an important element is that the group must not be organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, and that they were
quarrelling in a confused and tumultuous manner, which, seeing as there was conspiracy
and the act of one is the act of all. This does not apply in the case at bar.
Doctrine: Cannot be considered as under Art 251. The quarrel in the instant case is
between a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the
principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not a melee or
free-for-all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one
another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or
some of them. Moreover, there was treachery, because the victim was merely peeing
when he was suddenly attacked by several men, acting in concert, without the opportunity
to defend himself.
Doctrine: Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be
held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Q: What is infanticide?
‣ Killing of any child less than three days of age, whether the killer is the parent or
grandparent, any other relative of the child or a stranger
Doctrine: In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be
viable, that is, capable of independent existence. However, even if the child who was
expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to the
fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable. In the present case, the
unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.
Q: Elements?
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion
2. Abortion is intended
3. Caused by -
a. The pregnant woman herself
b. Other person with consent from her
c. Any of her parents, with her consent for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor
Q: Elements
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered abortion
2. Abortion is intended
3. Offender who must be a physician or midwife causes or assists in causing the
abortion
4. Said physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific knowledge or skill
261
1. Challenging another to a duel - punishes challengers
2. Inciting another to give or accept a challenge to a duel - punishes instigators
3. Scoffing or decrying another publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to
fight
Q: Elements of 262(1)
1. That there be castration - penis or ovarium
2. Mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately to deprive the offended party of
some essential organ for reproduction
Q: What is 262(2)?
‣ This is called “mayhem” or other intentional mutilation.
Doctrine: According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime
of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in
any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his
physical self."
The Spanish text, which should govern, uses the word "castrare," inadequately translated
into English as "castrate." The word "capar," which is synonymous with "castrar," is
defined in the Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the organs of generation or
conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish any person who shall
intentionally deprived another of any organ necessary for reproduction.
NOTE:
‣ Can be committed by reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence
‣ There must not be intent to kill. If there was it would be attempted or frustrated murder.
‣ The victim should not have been killed. If yes, then it is homicide.
Q: Elements? - SKANK
1. That the offender inflicted Serious physical injury
2. Done by Knowingly administering to him any injurious substance or beverage or by
taking Advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity
‣ If not known, not liable under this article
‣ Applicable to witchcraft, magnetism, etc.
3. No intent to Kill
‣ If present, frustrated murder
NOTE:
‣ Can be committed by reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence
‣ There must not be intent to kill. If there was it would be attempted or frustrated murder.
‣ The victim should not have been killed. If yes, then it is homicide.
Q: Elements?
1. That the offended party is incapcitated for labor for 10 days or more or needs
medical attendance for the same period of time
‣ can be (1) inability to work or (2) necessity for medical attendance
‣ covers even cases which has no incapacity but the medical attendance
administered was more than 10 days
‣ the phrase “shall require” means actual medical attendance
2. Physical injuries must be those described in the preceding articles
NOTE:
‣ Can be committed by reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence
‣ There must not be intent to kill. If there was it would be attempted or frustrated murder.
‣ The victim should not have been killed. If yes, then it is homicide.
Doctrine: We likewise take exception to the view of the trial court denominating the
assault upon Lilian Trabel as serious physical injuries for the reason that the medical
certificate estimated the healing period of one (1) month for her wounds. Article 13 of the
Civil Code explicitly provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood
that they are of thirty (30) days. Applied in the present case, the one (1) month healing
period provided in Lilians medical certificate should thus be interpreted as referring to
thirty (30) days of incapacity. The liability therefore of the accused for the wounding of
Lilian Trabel should fall under Art. 265 of The Revised Penal Code for less serious
physical injuries, and not under par. (4), Art. 263, of the aforesaid law.
Q: Kinds?
1. Incapcitated the offended party for labor or required medical attendance for a
period of one to nine days
2. Physical injuries which did not require medical attention or did not prevent the
offended party from going to work
3. Ill-treatment of another by deed without injury
NOTE:
‣ Can be committed by reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence
‣ There must not be intent to kill. If there was it would be attempted or frustrated murder.
‣ The victim should not have been killed. If yes, then it is homicide.
Doctrine #1: This is because the fight involved two distinct phases. The first phase
commenced when Li, without sufficient provocation, assaulted Arugay with the baseball
bat. Li’s participation in this phase, albeit as a solitary actor, was indubitably established.
Sangalang’s participation, much less his physical presence during this phase, was not
established at all. In the second phase, Sangalang was the main actor in the stabbing. Li
was incapacitated by then. Clearly, the existence of conspiracy should be ruled out.
Doctrine #2: What Li did however, was hit Arugay on the right arm with a baseball bat.
When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the
required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries.
Doctrine #2: When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury,
and without causing dishonor, the offense is Maltreatment under Article 266,98 par. 3.
Q: Elements?
‣ Paragraph 1 MWA - FUG12
1. That the offender is a Man
2. Who had carnal knowledge of a Woman
3. Act Accomplished under any of the following circumstances
a. Using Force or intimidation
b. Woman deprived of reason or Unconscious
c. Fraudulent machination or Grave abuse of authority
d. Woman is under 12 years of age
Presence -
1. Full view of the:
a. Spouse
b. Parent
c. Children
d. Relatives within the third degree
2. By two other persons
Age
1. Under eighteen and committed by: GRASPS
a. Guardian
b. Relatives within the third degree
c. Ascendant
d. Legitimate Step-parent
e. Parent
2. Child is below Seven
AFP-PNP
1. Victim is under custody of the:
Police
Military
Other law enforcement
Penal institution
2. Committed by taking advantage of his position:
AFP
PNP para-military units
Other law enforcement members
Penal institution members
Doctrine #1: The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a
female. Carnal knowledge isdefined simply as "theact of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman," which explains why the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the
peniscapable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.
Doctrine #2: There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched
the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. Hence, the conclusion that
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the
mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Doctrine #3: As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated
stage is a physical impossibility. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the
moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be
done by him.
Doctrine #4: The raison d’etrefor the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of
cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never
ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. The
act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary,
however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words
of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
Doctrine #5: If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and
rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should
produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can
be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female.
Doctrine #6: It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and
acts of lasciviousness is the offender’sintent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with
the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.
Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is
coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the
showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external
genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is committed
Doctrine #1: Statutory Rape (266-A) only applies where the victim of rape is a person less
than 12 years old. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (b) as
she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding her mental age. The crime is
simple rape.
Note that this decision was released 21 days after People v Baay which has a
conflicting ruling.
Doctrine #2: A child's (12 below) consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern good from evil and immaturity.
Doctrine #3: Moreover, this includes sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental
retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old. Thus, a person with a chronological age
of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of making decisions and giving consent
as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered
incapable of giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached
the level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on
matters involving sexuality. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12)
years of age" under Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with
either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual
disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established.
Doctrine #4: This is different from rape of a female “deprived of reason" (insane) or
"demented” (has dementia) under 1(b) and (d). In the former, there are abnormalities in
consent and ability to make decisions. In the latter, there is a loss of these functions.
“Deprived of reason” means that he or she has mental abnormalities that affect his or her
reasoning and perception of reality and, therefore, his or her capacity to resist, make
decisions, and give consent.
Doctrine: Notably, knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during
the commission of the crime of rape is a special qualifying circumstance, which makes it
punishable by death. Such qualifying circumstance, however, must be sufficiently alleged
in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. It
must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can
be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. In this case the mild mental retardation
of the victim was not manifest as she is able to function appropriately regarding her
communication and self-care.
Doctrine: The second paragraph of Art. 226-A: “when the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious.” Physical force, threat or intimidation is not
necessary, because an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and
voluntarily give her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse.
Doctrine: Marital rape is no different from ordinary rape cases. Consent is absent when:
1. it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority
2. the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or
3. that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented
The first part applies in this case. The point when consent must be given is at that time
when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case,
that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
The law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for
different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the
law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert
from what the law sets forth.
Doctrine #2: As an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may
be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of
such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.
Doctrine #3: The absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical
certificate do not negate rape.
Doctrine #1: Rape by sexual assault may be made to a male, applying Art. 266-B(2): “(...)
by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person”. Rape under the second
paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object rape,"69 "gender-free
rape,"70 or "homosexual rape."
Doctrine #2: A victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal
orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed
Doctrine #3: Because of the age of the victim, it is child abuse. RA 7610 applies. This
refers to “children exploited in other sexual abuse”. A single act of sexual abuse to a child,
by law, is already reprehensible. Our society has expressed that this is conduct which
should be punishable. The purpose and text of the law already punish that single act as
child abuse.
Doctrine #4: The interpretation that rape is consummated by the slightest penetration of
the male organ can be applied when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to
the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault. The
gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is
not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity."
RA 7610. Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act
PIECE-U
Persuasion
Inducement
Enticement
Coercion
Employment
Use
...of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in these acts: LIMPS
Lascivious conduct
Incest
Molestation
Prostitution
Sexual intercourse
Q: Elements?
1. A person is:
a. Placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation
b. Subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury
2. These acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry
into an organization
Q: Punishable acts?
1. Participation - officers and members
2. Failure to prevent the hazing from occurring despite actual knowledge thereof -
parents of officers or members in their home, or adviser present during hazing
3. Actual planning of the hazing - officers, former officers, alumni of organization
4. Cooperation in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat
Q: Accomplices?
1. The school authorities
2. Owner of the place
Who have knowledge of the hqazing, but failed to take any action to prevent it
Doctrine #2: Prima facie evidence is not new. This presumption is related to conspiracy in
hazing. There is a common design to haze. For this, there is prima facie evidence of the
participation because of their presence in the venue. There is no need to prove intent to
kill if in violation of RA 8049, because the charge is hazing and not murder. It is enough to
be a principal thru mere presence in the scene.
Doctrine #1: Dismissal of the principals in the crime of hazing does not automatically
mean dismissal for the accomplices. In this case, nowhere is it mentioned in the order that
the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime has been
committed
Doctrine #2: The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements
are established:
1. A person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to
physical or psychological suffering or injury
2. These acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry
into an organization
Doctrine #3: In case of school authorities or faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act the may be charged as accomplices if:
1. Hazing as established by the above elements occurred
2. They consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual
knowledge thereof
Doctrine #4: If information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing, then there will be no conviction. Psychological and physical injuries
were present. However, there is no allegation that the acts were employed as a
prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization.
‣ The following:
1. Wife (current or former)
2. Woman whom
a. the person has or had a sexual and/or dating Relationship
b. The person has a Common child with
3. Child of the woman
a. Illegitimate/legitimate
b. Within/without the family abode
c. Of/not of the person
Doctrine: RA 9262 does not require that the act of violence be a consequence of such
relationship as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence
of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed.
The elements in this case are: RAD
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating Relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an Act or series of acts of
proscribed under RA 9262 against the woman;
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological Distress
to her
Doctrine: The elements for the violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262 are:
1. A romantic relationship either subsisting or of the past, between the accused and
the offended party.
2. Established filiation with the child
3. That the accused failed to provide the child support
4. With established intent to deprive the child of support
Doctrine #2: Their away-bati nature does not derail from the meaning of continuing
because fights are not deterrent to a relationship. Plus, the law clearly distinguishes a
sexual relationship from a dating relationship. It can therefore exist even without sexual
intercourse.
Doctrine #3: A single act of harassment which translates into violence would be enough
to be considered under Section 5(h). Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed
would license isolated ones.
Doctrine#1: The general requisites for sexual harassment under RA 7877 are:
1. that the EMPTIEST-ACO
a. Employer,
b. Manager,
c. Professor,
d. Teacher,
e. Instructor,
f. Employee,
g. Supervisor,
h. Trainer,
i. Agent of the employer,
j. Coach,
k. Other person has authority, influence, or moral-ascendancy over another
2. the authority, influence, or moral ascendancy exists in a work-related,
training-related, or education-related environment
3. the EMPTIEST-ACO makes a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor.
(2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor
laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
the employee.
Doctrine #3: In government administrative cases, CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 3
governs. This defines what acts constitute sexual harassment in government offices such
as NEDA, such as:
1. Physical
a. Malicious Touching;
b. Overt sexual advances;
c. Gestures with lewd insinuation.
2. Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid
remarks
3. Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or writing notes with sexual
underpinnings
4. Other forms analogous to the foregoing.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Notes:
‣ Intent of the offender should be to deprive the offended party of his liberty for some time
and for some purpose by detaining or locking up the victim.
‣ If this is committed by a parent against their child, the crime is Art. 271 (inducing a minor
to abandon his home)
‣ The “carrying away” can be done either forcibly or fraudulently.
‣ Actual demand for ransom is not needed, as long as the purpose is to extort ransom.
‣ Ransom is money, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity
Doctrine: A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom
cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity. In abducting and taking away the victim,
appellants did so neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority
vested in them. It is not in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity
People v. Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, 23 July 2014
Doctrine: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless
of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659. Since it is provided by a special law
then it is mala prohibita which implies that intent to kill on the part of the kidnappers are
immaterial. As to the crime, they are not separate anymore but is taken now as one.
Doctrine #1: When the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial.
Doctrine #2: As George was detained for less than a day, and there is no evidence that
the appellant and his cohorts intended to detain the victim for more than three days, only
slight illegal detention applies.
Doctrine #3: The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom are: IDE
1. Intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty
2. actual Deprivation of the victim of his liberty;
3. motive of the accused, which is Extortion of ransom from the victim or any other
person
Doctrine #1: What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather
the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians. The time of the actual kidnapping here is irrelevant, as the accused already
failed to deliver Willy when she was demanded to by his mother.
Doctrine #2: Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly analogous to cases of illegal
and arbitrary detention or arrest which justify the award of moral damages as provided for
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Q: Elements? LI
1. That the minor is Living in the home of his parents or guardian or the person
entrusted with his custody
2. That the offender Induces said minor to abandon such home.
Notes:
‣ A minor is a person under age but over seven years (note: age of majority is over 18
years old)
‣ What is essential in the crime is the inducement employed such that it has resulted to the
minor abandoning his/her home.
‣ There is no crime if the minor willingly leaves their house out of their own free will.
‣ A parent can be liable here
Elements: PSKD
1. That the offender purchases, sells, kidnaps, or detains a human being
2. That the purpose of the offender is to enslave such human being.
Notes:
‣ If the purpose be done for some immoral traffic like prostitution, this is qualifying.
‣ If the purpose is to enslave, then slavery. If it was to deprive her liberty then it would be
illegal detention.
‣ If the parent or the guardian gives the consent over the minor, even though the minor
does not, it is not involuntary servitude. However, in any case there must be compensation
for services rendered.
Elements: SAR
1. That the offender retains a minor in his Service
2. That it is Against the will of the minor
3. That it is under the pretext Reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by and
ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of said minor.
Notes:
‣ Indebtedness of the minor s not a legal justification to hold a person and deprive him of
his freedom to live.
Elements:
1. That the offender Compels a debtor to work for him, either as:
a. Household servant
b. Farm worker
2. That it is Against the debtor’s will
3. That the purpose is to Require or enforce the payment of a debt
Notes:
‣ The enumeration of work is exclusive. If the person is compelled to work as a janitor, Art.
274 does not apply. It may be coercion instead.
Exploitation of Child Labor Services Rendered under
(Art. 273) Compulsion in Payment of
Debt (Art. 274)
Age Minor Any debtor
Compulsion Compelled to render services Compelled to work as a
for the debt of his parent or household servant or farm
guardian worker for his own debt to the
offender
Work Any Only as household servant or
farm worker
Doctrine #1: The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing
an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could
a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued?
Doctrine #2: Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
‣ If at all, petitioner's failure to render assistance to the victim would constitute
abandonment of one's victim punishable under Article 275.
Art. 276 – Abandoning a Minor
Elements:
1. Offender has the Custody of the child.
2. Child is under Seven (7) years of age.
3. He Abandons such child.
4. He has No intent to kill the child when the latter is abandoned.
Qualifying circumstances?
1. When the death of the minor resulted from said abandonment – PC, med to max
2. If the life of the minor was in danger because of the abandonment – PC, min to
med
Notes:
‣ “Abandon” means a conscious and deliberate act which deprives the minor of the care
and protection from danger to his person which he needs by reason of his tender age.
‣ Intent to kill cannot be presumed from the death of the child. The offender’s only purpose
in abandoning the minor is to avoid the obligation of taking care of him.
‣ If the offender is the parent of the minor, he or she shall lose his or her parental authority
over the minor.
Elements:
1. The offender has Charge of the rearing or Education of a minor.
2. He delivers said minor to a Public Institution or other Persons.
3. The one who entrusted such child to the offender, or the proper authorities, have
not Consented to such act.
Notes:
‣ “Rear” means o bring to maturity by educating, nourishing, etc.
‣ If, for example, he finds a child in the forest, and gives it to another person, he is not
liable since the accused is not charged with the “rearing or education” of the minor.
Elements:
1. The offender is a Parent.
2. He neglects his children by Not giving them education.
3. His Station in life requires such education and his financial condition permits it.
Notes:
‣ “Article 277 only penalizes deliberate refusal, even if able to. If the mother and children
refuse, without good reason, to live with the accused or if the accused physically cannot
work anymore, the accused is not liable.
Elements:
Art. 278 – Exploitation of Minors
1. By causing children under 16 years of age to perform any dangerous feat of:
a. Balancing
b. Physical strength
c. Contortion
2. By employing children under 16 years of age who are not the children or
descendants of the offender in exhibitions of:
a. acrobat,
b. gymnast,
c. rope walker,
d. diver,
e. wild animal tamer,
The offender being an acrobat, etc., or circus manager or person engaged in any of
said callings.
3. Employing any descendants under 12 years of age in dangerous exhibitions
enumerated on the next preceding paragraph, the offender being engaged in any
of the said callings.
4. Any ascendant, guardian, teacher, or persons entrusted in any capacity with the
care of a child under 16 years of age who shall deliver such child gratuitously to
either:
a. Any person following any of the callings enumerated in par. 2
b. Habitual vagrant
c. Beggar
5. Any who shall induce any child under 16 years of age to abandon the home of its
ascendants, person guardians, curators, or teachers to follow either
a. Any person following any of the callings enumerated in par. 2
b. Habitual vagrant
c. Beggar
Q: What are the other penalties in Art. 278(4)?
‣ When the delivery is made in consideration of any price, reward, or promise, the crime is
qualified and the penalty is higher.
‣ The guardian or curator is deprived of his authority.
‣ The parent may be deprived, temporarily or perpetually, at the discretion of the court, of
their parental authority.
Elements:
Art. 280(1) – Simple Trespass to Dwelling - PEA
Q: Exempting circumstances?
1. When the offender enters a dwelling of another for the purpose of Preventing some
serious harm for himself or any other occupant of the dwelling or any other person.
2. When the offender enters the dwelling to Render some service to humanity or to
justice.
3. When the place is entered to is a café, tavern, inn, and other Public houses while
the same are open
Notes:
‣ If the offender is a public person, the crime is Art. 128 (Violation of Domicile)
‣ A dwelling place is any building or structure exclusively devoted for rest and comfort.
‣ “Against the will of the owner or occupant?” means that there should be: (1) presumed,
or (2) express prohibition on the part of the owner or occupant.
‣ There should be prohibition prior to or at the time of entrance
‣ Even if there was permission, violence or intimidation qualifies the crime.
‣ If there is no overt act of the crime to be intended to be committed (ex. they desisted),
the crime is only trespass to dwelling.
‣ If the purpose is to kill, it would be homicide with the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling or unlawful entry.
‣ If the purpose is to trespass, and the intent to kill came after, it would be separate crimes
of trespass to dwelling and homicide.
Elements: CUMS
1. That the offender enters the Closed premises or the fenced estate of another.
2. That the entrance is made while either of them is Uninhabited
3. That the prohibition to enter be Manifest
4. That the trespasser has not Secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker
thereof
Notes:
‣ “Premises” signifies distinct and definite locality. Means a room, shop, building, or definite
area but in either case, locality is fixed. This may include a warehouse which is
uninhabited where prohibition is manifest.
Elements: TCDA
1. By Threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor, or property or
that of his family of any wrong amounting to a Crime and Demanding money or
imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and the offender Attained
his purpose. TCDA
2. By making such threat without the offender attaining his purpose. TCD
3. By threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property or that
of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, the threat not being subject to a
condition. TC
Notes:
‣ It is not necessary that the wrong threatened to be inflicted must amount to any of the
crimes against persons, against honor, or property only.
‣ The essence of this crime is intimidation as there is promise of some future harm or
injury either to the person, honor, property of the offended party or of his family.
‣ As soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened, the crime is
consummated.
‣ Grave threats can be committed if the offender made the threats in the absence of the
person threatened
‣ When made during the commission of a graver crime, or as a means to commit a
different objective, this is absorbed.
‣ When a person takes possession of a personal object belonging to another, but without
intent to gain, this Article applies.
Doctrine #1: There is no continuing crime of grave threats here, as petitioner was not
impelled by a single criminal impulse, as petitioner could not have planned this
beforehand. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three individuals,
albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.
Doctrine #2: Petitioner’s theory holds water only if the facts are altered – that is, he
threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time. Had
this been true, then petitioner’s liability would only be for one count of Grave Threats.
Doctrine #1: Accused’s act of threatening to shoot Julia while she was walking was not
285(1) of other light threats. It was, in fact, grave coercion. That the threat to commit a
wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave
threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.
Doctrine #2: In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is
always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not
amount to a crime and there is no condition.
Doctrine #1: There was no child abuse here. By making the statements (like saying that
she would release her dogs), petitioner merely intended that the children stop their unruly
behavior. There was no indication that petitioner had any specific intent to humiliate the
brothers. Art. 285(2) - Orally threatening another, in the heat of anger, with some harm
constituting a crime, without persisting in the idea involved in his threat applies here.
Doctrine #2: The brandishing of the bolo is in a separate case, but this is also under other
light threats. Art. 285(1) - Threatening another with a weapon, or drawing such such
weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
Elements:
1. That the offender makes a threat to commit a wrong.
2. That the wrong does not constitute a crime
3. That there is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed, even though
not unlawful
4. That the offender has attained his purpose or that he has not attained his purpose
Notes:
‣ Blackmailing is covered in this article
Notes:
‣ A person may be required to give bail not to molest another when he threatens another
under the circumstances mention in Art 282 and 283.
‣ Failure to do so will result to destierro.
‣ This is discretionary upon the Court.
Elements:
1. That a person:
a. Prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law,
b. He Compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong
2. The the prevention or compulsion be Effected by violence, threats or intimidation
3. That the person that restrained the will and liberty of another had No authority of
law or the right to do so. The restraint shall not be made under authority of law or
in the exercise of any lawful right.
Qualifying Circumstances:
‣ If committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage
‣ If committed to compel another to perform any religious act - punishes religious
intolerance
‣ If committed to prevent another to perform any religious act
Notes:
‣ Coercion must be made at the very moment that the latter is doing o is about to do
something he wants to do. If done after the deed was already done or not done, then the
crime is unjust vexation.
‣ Someone compelling another person from giving the former what is rightfully theirs can
be guilty of grave coercion. No man is authorized to take the law into his own hands
‣ The force or violence must be immediate, actual or imminent.
‣ Good faith is a defense here.
‣ Where there is no clear deprivation of liberty by the purpose of the offender, the crime is
merely coercion.
Doctrine #1: If there was intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or
intimidation, it is robbery. If there was intent, to compel another to do something against
his will and to seize property, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner
or the creditor, or for other reasons, it is grave coercion. In this case, their incidental
encounter made him angry which led to the snatching of her necklace. He swore at her
and kicked the tricycle, and made the driver leave, which shows an intent instead to
prevent Nelia from riding the tricycle and proceeding to her destination.
Elements:
Notes:
‣ A creditor is someone whom the debtor owes money or a thing (the one who can
demand the fulfillment of the obligation). If, instead, he was a co-owner, 287(1) does not
apply.
‣If “violence or a display of material force producing intimidation” is missing, and instead
the seizure was through deceit and misrepresentation, the crime is merely unjust vexation.
‣ The seizure must be made to deduct or replace the debt. If it was to merely seize
something to hold as security, for example, 287(1) does not apply.
‣ “Unjustly annoys or irritates” means anything that causes annoyance, irritation, torment,
distress or disturbance However, it should not constitute another crime.
‣ Grave and light coercion, missing the element of violence, or serious threats, and
intimidation, falls under 287(2).
Doctrine #1: The paramount question to be considered is whether the offender’s act
caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it was directed. Appellant’s acts of embracing, dragging and kissing AAA in front of
her friend annoyed AAA. The filing of the case against appellant proved that AAA was
disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of appellant.
Doctrine #1: Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the Information, for the crime
of unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation,
being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good
defense.
Doctrine #2: For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present
when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private
complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the
overt acts of the petitioners.
Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, 26 September 2006
Doctrine #1: Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the Information, for the crime
of unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation,
being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good
defense.
Doctrine #2: For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present
when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private
complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the
overt acts of the petitioners.
Doctrine #1: Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the Information, for the crime
of unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation,
being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good
defense.
Doctrine #2: For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present
when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private
complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the
overt acts of the petitioners.
Doctrine #1: In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce
the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced
the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is
not completed.
Doctrine #2: Since there was no overt or external act which would manifest the intent to
rape, the crime is merely unjust vexation. An Overt or external act is some physical activity
or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning
or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Doctrine #2: Chito really did do the acts as described by the prosecution, as there was
positive evidence.
Positive identification - proof of identity
Direct evidence - Witness identifies a suspect or accused as the offender to the very act of
the commission of the crime
(Part of) Circumstantial evidence - Witness positively identifies a suspect or accused as
the perpetrator of a crime (Ex. the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime.)
Threat Coercion
Elements: PPuSSI
1. Offender is a Private individual or Public officer acting in private capacity who is
NOT the:
a. Parent
b. Guardian
c. Person entrusted with the custody of minors with respect to the papers or
letters of the children or minors placed under their care of custody.
d. Spouse with respect to the papers or letters of either of them
2. He Seizes the papers or letters of another
3. The purpose is to discover the Secrets of such another person
4. That offender is Informed of the contents of the paper or letters seized
Notes:
‣ “Seize” means to place in the control of someone a thing or to give him possession
thereof, even if for a short time only.
‣ The purpose of the offender must be to discover the secrets. Good faith or accidentally
discovering secrets is a defense.
‣ “Informed of the contents” means that the offender, by discovering the secrets, actually
knows of the secrets. If he merely seizes it, but does not open and read the
correspondence, the crime is not consummated
‣ The crime is consummated when all the offender merely knows about the secrets.
Prejudice is not needed.
‣ The crime is qualified when the offender reveals the secrets to another.
Elements: PPuSSI
1. The offender is a Manager, Employee, or Servant
2. He Learns of the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity
3. He Reveals such secrets
Notes:
‣ The secrets must be learned by reason of the offender’s employment, even if it was told
to them personally.
‣ Damage is not necessary.
Elements: CEWL-RP
1. The offender is a person in Charge, Employee or Workman of a manufacturing or
industrial establishment
2. The manufacturing or industrial establishment has a secret of the industry which
the offender had Learned The offender Reveals such secrets
3. Prejudice is caused to the owner
Notes:
‣ “Secret of the industry” means that t he secrets must be those relating to the
manufacturing or industrial process that:
1. Was invented by or for a manufacturer
2. Is used only in one or a limited number of factories
‣ A generally-used process is not a “secret.”
‣ If the offender did not reveal the secret, but used it for his own benefit, he is not liable
‣ If the secret was divulged after the offender leaves the establishment, he is still liable
What Any secret in Any mail matter Only letters and Any secret in A secret of the
any form papers any form industry of that
manufacturing
or industrial
establishment
in any form
Prejudice Damage not Not necessary Prejudice not Damage not Prejudice is
or Damage necessary necessary necessary necessary
Elements: PPuSSI
4. The offender is a Manager, Employee, or Servant
5. He Learns of the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity
6. He Reveals such secrets
Notes:
‣ The secrets must be learned by reason of the offender’s employment, even if it was told
to them personally.
‣ Damage is not necessary.
RA 9208 as amended by RA 10364 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act)
Doctrine #1: The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition
under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders."
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another["]; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
Doctrine #2: Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons
have been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders[";]
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person"[;]
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.
Doctrine #3: Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's
consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Doctrine #1: RA 9208, Sec. 4(e) makes the act of “maintaining or hiring a person to
engage in prostitution or pornography” a crime,
Doctrine #2: Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6
(a) and (d) of RA 9208, makes the act of “recruiting, etc. for the purpose of prostitution,
etc.” a crime.
Doctrine #2: Trafficking persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.
Doctrine #1: "Section 4 (k) (4): makes it a crime to “recruit, transport, harbor, obtain,
transfer, maintain, hire, offer, provide, adopt or receive a child for purposes of exploitation
or trading them, including but not limited to, the act of baring and/or selling a child for any
consideration or for barter for purposes of exploitation. Trafficking for purposes of
exploitation of children shall include:”
"(4) The use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal activities or work which, by its nature
or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm their health, safety or
morals; and
Doctrine #2: Even if Section 4 (k) (4) does not apply, nevertheless, Section 4 (a) (RA
9208), can be applied to the case at bar:
1. To recruit a person by any means
2. For the purpose of forced labor or involuntary servitude
‣ This means the extraction of work or services from any person by means of enticement,
violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Q: What are the requisites of robbery with serious physical injuries under pars.
3&4?
1. That any of the physical injuries defined in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 263 was inflicted
in the course of the robbery;
2. That any of them was inflicted upon any person not responsible for the commission of
the robbery.
Doctrine #1: Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence that in
taking the six roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of Baylon's house violence
against or intimidation of persons was employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code cannot be invoked. Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house (casa habitada), public
building or edifice devoted to worship. The coop was not inside Baylon's house. Nor was it
a dependency thereof within the meaning of article 301 of the Revised Penal Code.
Doctrine #2: One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299
and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or dependency, where the object
to be taken is found. If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with
force upon things.
Doctrine #3: The taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as
theft and not robbery. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal
the roosters. The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that
the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to
two crimes of theft.
Doctrine #4: Article 302 refers to houses or buildings which, while not actually
inhabited, are habitable. A person cannot be accommodated inside the cage or
compartment. It was not intended that a person should go inside that compartment. The
taking was effected by forcibly opening the cage and putting the hands inside it to get the
roosters.
Doctrine #1: While it may be true that the "homicide" preceded the taking of the victims'
valuables, the killing of the spouses was nonetheless perpetrated for the aim of eliminating
an obstacle, removing an opposition to the robbery and doing away with witnesses
Doctrine #3: Dwelling was present when the crime was perpetrated in the house where
the Hermida Spouses lived, and without any provocation from the victims Simon and
Corazon
Doctrine #1: All the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment were
present, i.e.,
(a) personal property belonging to another,
(b) unlawful taking,
(c) intent to gain, and
(d) violence or intimidation.
It is therefore immaterial that she failed to ask for the return of her personal things.
Doctrine #2: In this regard, this Court had declared in some cases that the additional
rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery would not increase the penalty.
There were also cases, however, where this Court ruled that the multiplicity of rapes
committed could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Additional rapes
committed should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a
resultant "anomalous situation" wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level
as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of gravity.
People v. Escote, 400 SCRA 603 (2003)
Doctrine #1: The elements of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons are:
PUTI-VH
1. There is Personal property
2. Belonging to another
3. There is Unlawful Taking of that property
4. The taking is with Intent to gain (animo lucrandi)
1. The taking is with Violence against or intimidation of any person
2. On the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of Homicide, which
is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
Doctrine #2: Although some authors (even Reyes) and some cases hold that treachery is
only for crimes against persons, the SC of Spain has consistently held that the
classification of robbery with homicide as a crime against property is irrelevant and
inconsequential in the application of treachery. When robbery is coupled with crimes
committed against persons, the crime is not only an assault on the property of the
victims but also of the victims themselves. As homicide is used in its generic
sense, treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. However, treachery cannot
be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar because the same was not
alleged in the Information.
Doctrine #1: On the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, (the crime of Homicide,
which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed), means that the homicide was
committed: DEPF
1. to prevent Discovery of the commission of the robbery; or,
2. to Eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
3. to Preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
4. to Facilitate the robbery or the Escape of the culprit;
Doctrine #2: As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter
crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery. Moreover, robbery
with homicide is a continuing offense. There are series of acts, borne from one criminal
resolution, which is to rob.
Doctrine #2: When theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime
appreciates into qualified theft punishable under Article 310 of the RPC. The elements of
Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as follows:PAWIW - G
1. Taking of Personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to Another;
3. That it be done Without the owner's consent;
4. That the said taking be done with Intent to gain;
5. That it be accomplished Without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; [and]
6. That it be done with Grave abuse of confidence.
Article 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and
by a band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley
‣ When the injury inflicted upon the offended party on the occasion of robbery can be
qualified only as:
1. In an Uninhabited place,
2. by a Band,
6. on a Street, Highway, Road, or Alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of
Firearms
Robbery by a band
‣ When at least four armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it is
deemed committed by a band.
‣ Proof of conspiracy is not necessary when four or more armed persons committed
robbery
‣ Any member of a band who was present at the commission of a robbery by the band,
shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band.
Doctrine #1:That another person, and not the victim, was the intended victim is not
incompatible with the existence of treachery. Treachery may be taken into account even
if the victim of the attack was not the person whom the accused intended to kill.
Doctrine #2: if the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but
robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the
homicide, the criminal act should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a
single complex crime. Robbery with homicide arises only when there is a direct relation,
an intimate connection, between the robbery and the killing, even if the killing is prior to,
concurrent with, or subsequent to the robbery.
In the instant case, it is apparent that the taking of the personal properties from the victim
was an afterthought. The personal properties were taken after accused-appellant has
already successfully carried out his primary criminal intent of killing.
Doctrine #3: Considering that the victim was already heavily wounded when his personal
properties were taken, there was no need to employ violence against or intimidation upon
his person. Thus, accused-appellant can only be held guilty of the separate offense of
theft under Article 308, penalized under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof.
Q: What are the requisites for liability for the acts of the other members of the
band? MePAN
Q: Definition of a band?
‣ More than three armed malefactors who acted together in the commission of an offense
‣ The penalty is the same, whether the robbery is attempted or frustrated. But not with
consummated robbery.
‣ The term "homicide" also contemplates multiple homicides, murder, parricide, and
infanticide. However, the penalty for the above will be imposed, although the nomenclature
remains “homicide.”
‣ In this case, the offender shall be held guilty of robbery and punished by the penalties
respectively prescribed in this chapter.
Q: What if the violence used resulted in the death of the person to be defrauded?
‣ If successful, the crime is robbery with homicide and the penalty for that crime as
prescribed in paragraph 1 of Art. 294 shall be imposed.
Doctrine: The charge here was of Highway Robbery with Homicide. Court said that the
variance doctrine allows the conviction for attempted robbery with homicide. The
elements of Robbery with Homicide are: (1) There is an attempted or frustrated robbery.
(2) A homicide is committed. Both elements are among the elements of Highway
Robbery with Homicide and were duly proved in this case.
Subd. A: EMI
1) The offender Entered: RIP
1. An edifice devoted to Religious worship
2. An Inhabited house
3. A Public building
2) The entrance was effected by any of the following Means: PNP-BO(bo)
1. By using false keys, Picklocks, or similar tools;
2. By using any fictitious Name or pretending the exercise of Public authority.
3. By Breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;
4. Through an Opening not intended for entrance or egress;
3) Once inside, the offender took personal property belonging to another with Intent to
gain.
Subd. B: RI
1) The offender is inside an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to
religious worship, Regardless of the circumstances under which he entered it
2) The offender took personal property belonging to another with Intent to gain under any
of the following circumstances: BT
1. By Breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed
furniture or receptacle
2. By Taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open outside the
place of the robbery
Dependencies: cow-bsd
All interior CIGS-CoW-BCD
1. Courts,
2. Inclosed places:
3. Granaries,
4. Stables,
5. Corrals,
6. Warehouses,
7. Barns,
8. Coach-houses,
9. other Departments,
Doctrine: Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an
inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or
intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with
reclusion temporal. Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous decisions, if, aside
from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing any of
the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) of Art.
294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty — under paragraph (5) thereof — shall be
much lighter. This result and the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic
and reason.
We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the
person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but,
precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the
cases above cited — reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the
concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our
mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with
violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited
house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of both
provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition — as
provided in Art. 48 of said Code — of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its
maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period.
Doctrine #1: The conspiracy was only to commit robbery, not to rape Pacita. When the
act done is not pursuant to the conspiracy nor a necessary and logical consequence of the
intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable.
Doctrine #2: Although the Information alleges that the robbery was committed by four
armed men (more than three constitute a band), the same has not been indubitably
established. Article 296 (robbery committed by a band) does not apply.
Doctrine #1: In this case there is no sufficient evidence on record that Erlinda was indeed
the lawful occupant of the unit. The authority did indeed have no board resolution to
support it. Absent any showing that Erlinda was indeed an occupant, robbery could not
have been committed
Doctrine #2: Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling.
Art. 280(2) – Qualified Trespass to Dwelling - PEAVI
Doctrine: RTC convicted them of Robbery With Force Upon Things. The CA affirmed it,
adding that Art. 299, which is robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to worship, applied in this case.
If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a
dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate house, the robbery committed therein is
punished under Article 302. In this case, what was robbed was actually just a stall rented
by Valderosa from a private person.
‣ Penalty next lower in degree if there is force upon things (Arts. 299 or 302)
‣ These are “seedlings” or the immediate and natural product of the soil.
‣ Hulled rice (bigas) does not fall under this article, but unhulled rice (palay) does.
‣ If the quantity of the palay is not insignificant, and here is no showing that the same was
kept by the owner as "seedling" or taken for that purpose by the robbers, then the lowered
penalty under Art. 303 does not count.
Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools.
Notes:
‣ The purpose should be to rob. A band of dissidents does not fall under this Article.
‣ Evidence that the accused was a member of an armed band is not sufficient, where there
is no evidence showing that the band was organized for any of the purposes mentioned.
‣ There is no need to prove their purpose if the accused are members of a band where the
firearms possessed by one them are unlicensed.
‣ “Highway” includes:
1. Streets within the cities
2. Roads outside the cities
‣ This article does not apply when the brigands commit acts punishable by higher
penalties.
Q: Elements:
1. That there is a Band of brigands.
2. That the offender Knows the band to be of brigands.
3. That the offender does any of the following acts:
a. He in any manner Aids, abets or Protects such band of brigands;
b. He gives them Information of the Movements of the Police or other peace
officers of the Government;
c. He Acquires or Receives the property Taken by such brigands.
Q: Elements:
1. That there is a Band of brigands.
2. That the offender Knows the band to be of brigands.
3. That the offender does any of the following acts:
a. He in any manner Aids, abets or Protects such band of brigands;
b. He gives them Information of the Movements of the Police or other peace
officers of the Government;
c. He Acquires or Receives the property Taken by such brigands.
Q: Elements:
1. The robbery should take place along the Philippine Highway
2. The act of robbery should be Indiscriminate, and not merely an isolated case
3. The victim was not Predetermined, rather, it may be any Prospective victim.
‣ A “Philippine highway?” is any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or other parts
thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or
locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of
goods, articles, or property or both
Doctrine #1: As highway robbery is now governed by PD 532, it is no longer required that
there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers.
Doctrine #2: The robbery must be directed not only against specifice, intended or
preconceived victims but against any and all prospective victims. This differentiates this
case from that of a simple robbery with homicide.
Notes:
‣ “Taking” refers to where the culprits were able to take possession of the thing taken by
them. “Carrying away” of the thing is not required.
‣ Theft is consummated from the moment the offender had full possession of the thing,
even if he did not have an opportunity to dispose of the same.
‣ Taking must have the character of permanency
‣ Personal property are things capable of asportacion
‣ Joint owners cannot steal something they own in common
‣ The lack of violence or intimidation in order to effect the taking must exist until the taking
is already complete. After that, even if violence or intimidation is used, the crime is still
theft, and physical injuries will only be appreciated as a separate crime.
‣ Both the actual finder and the authority he gives it to gain physical and not legal
possession of the thing. If either of them misappropriate it, both are liable.
‣ Defendant who shot, killed and slaughtered the cattle of another, which had destroyed
defendant's plantation, and distributed the meat among himself and his neighbors, falls
under Art. 308(2).
‣ Fishing in Art. 308(3) is madenot in the fishpond or fishery of the enclosed estate. If the
fish is taken from fishpond or fishery, it is qualified theft.
Doctrine #1: The term “personal property” should be interpreted in the context of the Civil
Code’s definition of real and personal property. This is defined as "anything susceptible of
appropriation and is not real property." The appropriation of forces of nature which are
brought under control by science, like electricity, can become property. Following the ruling
in Strochecker v. Ramirez, business should also be classified as personal property.
Doctrine #2: To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word
"take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which
may be committed through the use of the offenders’ own hands, as well as any
mechanical device.
Doctrine #3: However, the international calls themselves are not property. It is the use of
these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of
theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.
Notes:
‣ If a stolen thing was taken somewhere else first, the culprit is liable for the whole value
‣ If it was not taken away, the culprit is only liable for the price of the missing part or parts.
‣ If there is judicial notice of the value of thing stolen, the court may fix the price which the
thing is worth at least
‣ If there is no judicial notice, the court should impose the minimum penalty
Doctrine #1: An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the
public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an
order quashing search warrants.
Doctrine #2: Where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal
case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for
reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done
thereafter. An appeal then may be properly taken therefrom.
Doctrine #3: Toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the
installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus,
petitioners may also be held liable for violation of P.D. 401.
Doctrine #2: The “violence” in Simple robbery means when less serious physical injuries
or slight physical injuries are inflicted upon the offended party on the occasion of a
robbery. In this case, Snyder did not sustain any kind of injury at all.
Doctrine #3: As to the applicability of the “force upon things”: Court said that besides, the
use of force is not an element of the crime of simple robbery in Art 294(5). For the
requisite of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained
less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery.
Doctrine #1: Difference between robbery and theft: “had the appellant then run away, he
would undoubtedly have been guilty of theft only, because the asportation was not effected
against the owner's will, but only without his consent; although, of course, there was some
sort of force used by the appellant in taking the money away from the owner.”
Doctrine #1: Money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business day for the
purpose of servicing withdrawals is only material possession. Juridical possession remains
with the bank. If the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony
committed is theft and not estafa.
Doctrine #2: Since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places
money in the teller's possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of
qualified theft would be committed
Doctrine #3: In the presumption availed of by the lower courts the property found in the
possession of the accused, which is the withdrawal slip, is not stolen property.
Furthermore, the presumption the lower court made was not that the petitioner stole
anything, but rather that the petitioner was the maker of the withdrawal slip.
Doctrine #1: Under Article 309, the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than
that imposed for theft.
Doctrine #2: Art. 74 proscribes the imposition of the death penalty resulting from the
graduation of the penalty. If the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the "penalty higher than
reclusion perpetua" is reclusion perpetua for forty years with the accessory penalties of
death under Art. 40. Otherwise, as he said "there could be no difference at all between
reclusion perpetua, when imposed as the penalty next higher in degree and when it is
imposed as the penalty fixed by law."
Doctrine #1: Accused’s intentional failure to properly and correctly account for the same
constitutes appropriation with intent to gain.
Doctrine #2: Through the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or
vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of
confidence between them which the appellant abused. In this case, appellant was a close
friend of Rebecca and her family. It was due to this personal relationship that appellant
was employed by Rebecca as a legal secretary and liaison officer. The position
necessarily entails trust and confidence because appellant makes representations on
behalf of Rebecca as regards third parties.
Cattle Rustling:
‣ It is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raise of any of the large cattle whether or not f the profit or gain, or whether
committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon
things.
Q: What is a large cattle?
‣ Horses, asses, mules, sheep, goats, and swine
‣ Include cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other domesticated member of the bovine
family
Notes:
‣ The killing of a cowie and taking away of its meat is simple theft
‣ But if the killing of the cowie was because of revenge, it is malicious mischief
‣ The crime is estafa, if offender borrowed the cows, as he had juridical possession of the
cowie when he sold it.
‣ It is qualified theft if the offender was taking care of the cowies and ate their meat
‣ In taking away multiple cows, there is only one count of qualified theft.
Doctrine #1: The crime is committed if the following elements concur: CAW - AWA
(1) a large Cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to Another; (3) the taking is done Without the
consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by Any means, methods or scheme; (5)
the taking is With or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is Accomplished with or
without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.
Doctrine #2: In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the
knowledge and permission of its owner. If he thought it was the cow he had
allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the settlement of his claim.
Doctrine: The non-presentation of the certificate of ownership does not matter. the
gravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is the "taking" or "killing" of large cattle or "taking"
its meat or hide without the consent of the owner. owner" includes the herdsman,
caretaker, employee or tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or
other persons in lawful possession of such large cattle.
Q: What is carnapping?
‣ The taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidaiton of persons, or by using force upon
things
Doctrine #2: RTC convicted Lobitania with the crime of aggravated carnapping with
murder. Anti-carnapping law is a special law. .particularly addresses the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent. . .But a
careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily
reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to
gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter’s
consent. The conviction was qualified carnapping (or carnapping in its aggravated
form).
Doctrine #1: Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and
Penalizing Carnapping", defines carnapping, thus:
Doctrine #2: Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of carnapping,
is an internal act and hence presumed from the unlawful taking of the vehicle.
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the vehicle without the consent of the
owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
Doctrine #3: That only the wheel was found in possession of the accused and was
intended to be appropriated by the latter is of no moment. The unlawful taking of the
tricycle from the owner was already completed. Besides, the accused may be held liable
for the unlawful taking of the whole vehicle even if only a part thereof is ultimately taken
and/or appropriated while the rest of it is abandoned.
Notes:
‣ The real property belongs to A and is taken by B, then that is usurpation
‣ The real property belongs to A but B has occupied it and A asserted his rights over the
property through violence and intimidation, then that is grave coercion on the part of A
‣ If the accused refuses to vacate the premises against a writ of execution, there is
contempt of Court under the Rules of Court punishable by a fine not exceeding P1K or
imprisonment not exceeding six months
‣ RA 947 punishes the entering or occupying through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth any public agricultural land including such public lands as granted to private
individuals
Doctrine #2: The issue of ownership over the land in question having been decided in
Civil Case No. 3561 in favor of the complainant in 1949, the same will not be disturbed.
Claim of owning the property is not a defense in this case.
Notes:
‣ “Alter”; definition is enough to constitute the material element. Destruction of stone
monument or taking it to another place or removing a fence is altering.
Notes:
‣ Even if the debtor disposes the property, unless it is shown that such disposal has
actually prejudiced the creditor, there is no conviction
‣ Concealment is not considered as absconding
‣ The offended party must be the creditor