Case|1

People vs. Jaime Jose, et.al., G.R. No. L-28232, Feb. 6, 1971

FACTS: Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was
removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal
sitting beside her. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The
other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. They
started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her
dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it
from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her
brassiere, fell on the floor.
Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room.

The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. Like Jose, Aquino
succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino
called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to
revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the
complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in
forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock
for the second time, the three other men went into the room again poured water on the
complainant's face and slapped her several times. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left
the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and
Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on
different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the kind of rape committed is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

RULING: Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion

perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No.
4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:

ART. 335. When and how rape committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on

the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
 Case|2

People vs. Leo Echegaray, et.al., G.R. No. 117472, June 25, 1996

FACTS: Leo Echegaray was convicted for raping his ten-year old daughter; committed
during which time RA No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) was already in effect. In appealing
the conviction, it raised its constitutionality as being severe and excessive, cruel and in
violation of the constitution. He also argues that death is an excessive and cruel
punishment for a crime of rape because there is no taking of life in rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty for heinous crimes violates the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

RULING: No. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It
implies there something inhuman, barbarous, something more than the extinguishment
of life. It is degrading if it involves public humiliation. Death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably
execrable acts that deeply dehumanized a person, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of
their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals.

RA 7659 defined heinous crimes – those that are grievous, odious, and hateful by
reason of inherent viciousness, atrocity and perversity, repugnant and outrageous to
common standards of norms and decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society. They also include crimes which are despicable because life is callously taken,
or the victim is treated as an animal or dehumanized.
 Case|3

The United States vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910

FACTS: The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No.
27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto,
deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a
detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August,
19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house
except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch
was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the
room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the
habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing
against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door,
opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of
any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908 at about 10:00PM, Ah Chong, the defendant, was
suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of his room. He called out
twice saying, “Who’s there?” in which he received no answer in which he shouted to the
person, “If you enter the room, I will kill you.” At that moment he was suddenly struck by
the edge of a chair and the defendant thought that it was the person behind that door
trying to inflict him. Thus, he took a common knife that is kept under his pillow and
struck the person from behind the door who turned out to only be his roommate,
Pascual Gualberto.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong cannot be held criminally liable by reason of a

mistake as to the facts.

RULING: Yes. A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar
convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the
information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time,
he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing
no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as
he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the
means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
 Case|4

People vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, G.R. Nos. 64368-69, April 2, 2009

FACTS: On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No.
26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other
accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No.
26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No.
26565 reads:

That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having
been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten
wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the
Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND
use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at
birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was
allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act
No. 142.

RULING: In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the
totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis-à-
vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estrada’s use of an alias when
he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; we simply
determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense
charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his
guilt must be based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding
of criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in
this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now in this review and
accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

 Case|5

People of the Phils. vs. Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 176864, December 14,
2010

FACTS: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, and
Jennifer, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them
discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially
to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it
had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers,
who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as
the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory
after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.

ISSUE: Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut
Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

RULING: At this juncture, given the evidence on record, it is crucial to heed the Court’s
caveat that when an accused puts up the defense of alibi, "the courts should not at once
have a mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on
record, it may be sufficient to acquit him."

While alibi is, indeed, a weak defense because the accused can easily fabricate his
story to escape criminal liability,in the present case, Webb’s alibi could not have been
fabricated with ease. His travel and immigration documents showing his departure from
the Philippines and arrival in the U.S.A., not to mention the testimonial and documentary
evidence on his activities while in the U.S.A. between March 9, 1991 and October 26,
1992, deserve full credit. If half the world away could not even be considered to be "so
far removed from the crime scene"44 as to evince the physical impossibility of actual
presence, then the defense of alibi can only be appreciated when an accused lands in a
different planet.
 Case|6

People of the Phils. vs. Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 176864, December 14,
2010

FACTS: On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found
in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla. Petitioner was
correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 18662
thru the following Information:

That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle,
SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions,
one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and
possess the same.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted his application for bail.
During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for
petitioner after he refused, upon advice of counsel, to make any plea. Petitioner waived
in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule.

RULING: The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance).
In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in
this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein
petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or
have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
 Case|7

Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Amin, G.R. No. 93335, Sept. 13, 1990

FACTS: Together with filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as
having committed rebellion complexed with murder with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon city, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The
second information reads:

"That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarinas Village, Makati,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there
unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay
the apprehension of said Ex.-Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or
concealing him in his house."

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable
cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of

respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile’s Omnibus motion on the basis of
a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable
for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court’s finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal
basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder
against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their
alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for
harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile’s arraignment to May
30, 1990.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD
No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

RULING: The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion
had been filed. The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator
Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot
complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it
prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of P.D 1829 in Makati. It should
be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under
PD 1829 can not prosper.
 Case|8

People vs. Romeo Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76 Nov. 16, 2001

FACTS: In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to
devote an even more painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on record
and a similarly conscientious evaluation of the arguments of the parties. The victim of
rape in this case is a minor below twelve (12) years of age. As narrated by her, the
details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and repulsive. The victim was peddled for
commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the
complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of
lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused is also a most unlikely
rapist. He is a member of Congress. Inspite of his having been charged and convicted
by the trial court for statutory rape, his constituents liked him so much that they
knowingly re-elected him to his congressional office, the duties of which he could not
perform.

Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his
office located near Robinson’s Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought there and
introduced by a talent manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Accused-appellant
promised to help Rosilyn become an actress. When he saw Rosilyn, accused-appellant
asked how old she was. Simplicio answered “She is going to be 11 on May 11."
Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows how to sing. Simplicio told Rosilyn to sing,
so she sang the song, "Tell Me You Love Me." Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn
has nice legs and then raised her skirt up to the mid-thighs. He asked if she was already
menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accused-appellant further inquired if Rosilyn
already had breasts. When nobody answered, accused-appellant cupped Rosilyn’s left
breast. Thereafter, accused-appellant assured them that he would help Rosilyn become
an actress as he was one of the producers of the TV programs, "Valiente" and "Eat
Bulaga."

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness.

RULING: In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of
age consummates the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or
lack of it. The law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment
and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that
carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years old even if she is engaged in prostitution
is still considered statutory rape. The application of force and intimidation or the
deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of struggle or
outcry of the victim or even her passive submission to the sexual act will not mitigate
nor absolve the accused from liability.

In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully
proved that Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the time she was sexually abused.
As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for that matter of consent or passive
submission to the sexual advances of accused-appellant, was of no moment. The fact
that accused-appellant had sexual congress with eleven year-old Rosilyn is sufficient to
hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Case|9
 C a s e | 10

People vs. Antonio Sanchez, et.al. G.R. No. 121039-45, January 25,
1999

FACTS: " . . a plot seemingly hatched in hell . . ."

This was how Judge Harriet O. Demetriou 1 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 70, in her 132-page Decision dated March 11, 1995 now before us on review,
emphatically described the "Allan Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay" that drew strong
condemnation from an outraged populace in the middle of 1993. After a protracted and
grueling 16-month trial, she found all those charged therewith, namely: Calauan Mayor
Antonio Sanchez (hereafter the Mayor), George Medialdea, Luis and Rogelio Corcolon,
Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit (appellants herein), guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced
each one of them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to this case impaired appellants' right to a fair
trial.

RULING: Appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge
due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case.
In Martelino, Et. Al. v. Alejandro, Et Al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding
of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.

In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias
against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial
and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the
trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable
of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to
prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
 C a s e | 11

People vs. Jason Ivler, CA-GR-CR-CR-HC No. 08092, Nov. 28, 2017 as
affirmed in GR No. 241783, Nov. 11, 2019

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner)
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with
two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for
his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause stops further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

RULING: YES. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be “twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense” protects him from being prosecuted for
the same offence with the prior verdict rendered by the court of competent jurisdiction.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same regardless of various
resulting acts.
 C a s e | 12

People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, Oct. 6, 1995

FACTS: Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and
Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND
CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of
JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991,
during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was
amended to MURDER.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car,
driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on
the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked:
“Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.” When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed
and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused:
“Why are you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a
gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked:
“Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside
Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone.
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a
trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step backward.

For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his
head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away.
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw
the incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to this case impaired appellants' right to a fair
trial.

RULING: We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial
trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the
case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials.
Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial
for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism."
 C a s e | 13

People vs. Marivic Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, Jan. 15, 2004

FACTS: Appellant, who was then eight months pregnant, and the victim quarreled. The
latter beat her, however, she was able to run to another room. Allegedly there was no
provocation on her part, and it was her husband who began the provocation. Frightened
that her husband would hurt her, appellant admitted having killed the victim, who was
then sleeping at the time, with the use of a gun. She was convicted of the crime of
parricide.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as
constituting self-defense.

RULING: No. We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not
warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense
-- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was
not completely justified under the circumstances.

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome.
We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion.
More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of
the essential characteristics of BWS.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the
death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle.
She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage.
However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other
words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
 C a s e | 14

People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 180501, Dec. 24, 2008

FACTS: It occurred in the early afternoon of April 25, 2000 after her parents had left for
work. She was then six (6) years old. At home with her on that day was the maid and
accused-appellant, who was reapplying as family driver. As she was playing with the
water hose in the garage, her dress got wet forcing her to repair to her room to change.
Accused-appellant followed. Once inside the room, accused-appellant tried to undress
her, tightly held her hands, and told her to lie in the bed. He thereupon pulled her
panties down. In reaction, she pulled it up but accused-appellant quickly pulled it down
again. It was at this moment when, according to AAA, accused-appellant touched her
vagina with his fingers and kissed her on the left cheek. All the while, he repeatedly
assured her of being her friend and that they were just playing the mother-and-father
roles.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.

RULING: No. The touching of a female’s sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent
to rape, not even an attempted one. By analogy, we hold that for a charge for rape by
sexual assault (with the use of one’s fingers as the assaulting object, as here) to
prosper, there should be evidence of at least the slightest penetration of the sexual
organ and not merely a brush or graze of its surface. This is in consonance with Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.

Rape through sexual assault, thus, requires that the assault be specifically done
through "insertion" into the genital or anal orifices of the victim, a circumstance absent in
this case, or at least not established by the required quantum of evidence.

The prosecution’s evidence introduced during the entire trial established the presence
of all the elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. The testimony of the victim
shows that accused-appellant committed lewd acts against her when he pulled down
her panties, kissed her on her left cheek, touched her private part and then squeezing
her arm causing her extreme pain.
 C a s e | 15

Ordinario vs. People, G.R. No. 155415, May 20, 2004

FACTS: Complainant Jayson Ramos and accused-appellant were student and teacher,
respectively, at Nicanor Garcia Elementary School during the time the alleged crime
was perpetrated. Jayson was then a fourth-grader and accused-appellant was his
teacher in Boy Scout.

On November 9, 1998, at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, accused-appellant

summoned Jayson to his office at the Boys Scout headquarters while the latter was
about to go home. Therein, accused-appellant ordered Jayson to strip off which the
latter complied unwary of the perverse intentions of accused-appellant. Bare to the skin,
accused-appellant approached Jayson and started kissing him all over his body
including his male organ. Thereafter, accused-appellant inserted his private part into the
mouth of Jayson but the latter could not hold on for long as he felt vomiting prompting
accused-appellant to remove his penis and ordered Jayson to dress up. Before they
parted ways, accused-appellant told Jayson `pag nagsumbong ka sa mga magulang
mo, may masamang mangyayari sa iyo.’ Interpreting the same to mean an immediate
bodily harm, Jayson kept mum on the incident for fear of accused appellant’s reprisal.
The following day, Jayson was absent from school as he got sick.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.

RULING: The definition of the crime of rape has been expanded with the enactment of
Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, to include
not only "rape by sexual intercourse" but now likewise "rape by sexual assault."

An act of sexual assault under the second paragraph of the article can be committed by
any person who, under the circumstances mentioned in the first paragraph of the law,
inserts his penis into the mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice, of another person. The law, unlike rape under the first paragraph
of Article 266-A of the Code, has not made any distinction on the sex of either the
offender or the victim. Neither must the courts make such distinction. Article 266-B of
the Code prescribes the penalty of prision mayor for the crime of rape by sexual assault.
The trial court, in all the twelve (12) indictments, has found the elements of rape by
sexual assault, under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A, to have all been established by the
prosecution and thereupon uniformly imposed the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
five (5) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, which the appellate court has affirmed. The impositions
accord with the law.
 C a s e | 16

People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, Oct. 19, 2011

FACTS: This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who,
although 29 years of age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-
year old.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was
invited by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would
give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped
inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the
sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her.

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister
brought AAA to the police station and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). AAA underwent a series of Psychological Test with result showed that she had a
mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child aged from
six to seven years.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.

RULING: Yes. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of

legal consent constitutes rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly
and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to
the act did not mean consent for she was incapable of giving any rational consent.

The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is

enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse
with an insane woman was considered rape.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental
retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or
intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual
congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the
victim.
 C a s e | 17

People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014

FACTS: XXX wife of herein Accused-appellant EDGAR JUMAWAN Married with 4

children Executed Complaint-Affidavit for rape (Dec 3) and for boxing her shoulder for
refusing to have sex with him (Dec 12) That conjugal intimacy did not really cause
marital problems until later into marriage when he started to be brutal in bed. One night,
KKK fixed the matrimonial bed but did not lie thereon but instead rested in a cot near
the bed, which angered him. When he threw the cot against the wall, KKK stood up and
transferred to the bed (where the rape happened) Accused denied the rape and alleged
that KKK merely fabricated it as revenge because he took over the control and
management of their business and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUES: Whether or not there can be marital rape.

RULING: Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W
and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A.
No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who
has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a
marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords
himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a
sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its
international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on
marital activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.

It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and
wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of
spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at
a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship.
 C a s e | 18

People vs. Armando Dionaldo, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013

FACTS:
 C a s e | 19

People vs. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, Jan. 28, 2003

FACTS: The above-named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in the house of
Modesto Delim and once inside conspiring with one another, grab, hold, hogtie, gag
with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and
Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto
Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and
killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the specific intent was murder.

RULING: The specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where
circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences
or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Thus, it is evident
on the face of information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the
house of Modesto was to kill him and the act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto
was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him.

In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the
malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized
precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the
malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of
killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary
intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing
him was merely incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the
Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping
under Article 268 thereof.
 C a s e | 20

People vs. Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, Aug. 31, 2011

FACTS: On October 3, 2001, at 6:30 in the evening, while AAA, a 17-year-old

househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the house of BBB situated in Tacloban City,
four persons, one of whom was armed with a handgun while the other three with knives,
suddenly barged inside the house through the open kitchen door. The four men
accosted her, warned her to keep quiet, and brought her to the living room. There, they
herded all the other members of the household whom they caught and bound their
hands and feet, and thereafter, placed masking tapes over their captives’ eyes. With her
eyes partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant inside the comfort
room and thereat, appellant and one of the robbers stripped off AAA's clothes and
removed her panty. AAA resisted and fought back but they slammed her head twice
against the concrete wall, causing her to lose consciousness. When she regained her
senses, appellant and the other robbers were already gone, and she found herself lying
on the side on the floor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands still tied
behind her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side. She suffered pain in
her knees, head, stomach, and her vagina, which was bleeding. Later on, AAA was
freed from the comfort room by the other occupants of the house, who were earlier
freed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of robbery with rape.

RULING: In this case, the prosecution established that appellant and his three co-
accused took the pieces of jewelry and valuables of the spouses BBB and CCC by
means of violence and intimidation. Appellant and his co-accused barged into the house
of the victims armed with a handgun and knives and tied the hands and feet of the
members of the household. The perpetrators then asked for the location of the pieces of
jewelry and valuables. BBB was also tied and was struck in the head with a gun causing
him to fall face down on the floor with blood oozing from his left eyebrow. He was able
to see the perpetrators going out of the house carrying bags and the jewelry box of his
wife. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an
internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Having established
that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by the appellant, intent
to gain was sufficiently proven. Thus, the first three elements of the crime were clearly
established.

As regard the last requirement. Although the victim AAA did not exactly witness the
actual rape because she was unconscious at that time, circumstantial evidence shows
that the victim was raped by the appellant and the other accused.
 C a s e | 21

People vs. Regala, G.R. No. 130508, April 5, 2000

FACTS: On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening at Barangay
Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother
(Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other
companions entered the former’s house.

Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by removing the
pieces of wood under the stove. Appellant went to the room of Nerissa and her
grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after the other.

Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his companions.
Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by appellant Armando Regala in bed while her
grandmother was on the floor. After the rape, appellant and his two companions
counted the money which they took from the "aparador."

Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of ring
valued at P6,000 and two wrist watches worth P5,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not additional rape committed in a crime of robbery be considered

as an aggravating circumstance.

RULING: It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or
homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of
aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as
opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding mitigating
circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for
analogous circumstances.

It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in. the case of multiple homicide on the
occasion of the robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation" where from the
standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same
level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A
penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender and no person should be brought
within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.

In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant

should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by
the trial court is proper.
 C a s e | 22

People vs. Palmy Tibayan, G.R. Nos. 209655-60, Jan. 14, 2015

FACTS: Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment

company registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on
September 21, 2001. Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI
and its subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling securities
to the public without a registration statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as "The Securities Regulation Code," and that TGICI submitted a
fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the
SEC revoked TGICI’s corporate registration for being fraudulently procured. The
foregoing led to the filing of multiple criminal cases for Syndicated Estafa against the
incorporators and directors of TGICI, namely, Jesus Tibayan, Ezekiel D. Martinez,
Liborio E. Elacio, Jimmy C. Catigan, Nelda B. Baran, and herein accused-appellants.
Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against all of them; however, only
accused appellants were arrested, while the others remained at large.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article
315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.

RULING: The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants. In this case, a

judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of inducing the public to
invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very high
monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%). Under
such lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI.
However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is
operating without any paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the
assured profits to its investors, they cannot comply with their guarantee and had to
simply abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-
appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in
a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
 C a s e | 23

Taguinod vs. People, G.R. No. 185833, Oct. 12, 2011

FACTS: This case started with a single incident on May 26, 2002 at the parking area of
the Rockwell Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda
CRV (CRV) from the 3rd basement parking, while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was
driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd basement parking. When they were
about to queue at the corner to pay the parking fees, the respective vehicles were
edging each other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake,
which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara
was pushed backward and naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was pushed
forward. This prompted the private complainant's wife and daughter, namely, Susan
and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the petitioner.
Petitioner appeared to be hostile, hence, the private complainant instructed his wife and
daughter to go back to the CRV. While they were returning to the car, petitioner
accelerated the Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The CRV, having been
overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane. Private complainant was able to pay the
parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was at the upward ramp
leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until
it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Malicious Mischief

RULING: The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is proof
enough to establish the existence of the element of "hate, revenge and other evil
motive." Here, the accused entertained hate, revenge and other evil motive because to
his mind, he was wronged by the complainant when the CRV overtook his Vitara while
proceeding toward the booth to pay their parking fee, as a consequence of which, their
side view mirrors collided. On the same occasion, the hood of his Vitara was also
pounded, and he was badmouthed by the complainant's wife and daughter when they
alighted from the CRV to confront him for the collision of the side view mirrors. These
circumstances motivated the accused to push upward the ramp complainant's CRV until
it reached the steel railing of the exit ramp. The pushing of the CRV by the Vitara is
corroborated by the Incident Report dated May 26, 2002 prepared by SO Robert
Cambre, Shift-In-Charge of the Power Plant Mall, as well as the Police Report.
 C a s e | 24

Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil 313

FACTS: On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love
with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of
a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on
March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the
complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel,
Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived
together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious
ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was
performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer
required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract
shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband
and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the
respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal
action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s grossly immoral conduct makes him
disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

RULING: Upon consideration of the records of G. R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this
Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made a mockery of marriage
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the
criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second
marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive
and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.

Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is
hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
 C a s e | 25

Raffy Tulfo vs. People, GR. No. 187113 & G.R. No. 187230, Jan. 11,
2021

FACTS: These consolidated criminal cases originated from 14 Informations for libel filed
against the writer, publisher, and managing editor of the Abante Tonite column, "Shoot
to Kill," which covered stories on the alleged anomalous dealings of Atty. Carlos "Ding"
So (Atty. So) of the Bureau of Customs. At issue are the Revised Penal Code provisions
on libel vis-ŕ-vis the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press and statements
involving public officers in the exercise of their official functions.

Abante Tonite columnist Raffy T. Tulfo (Tulfo) filed a partial Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 187113, assailing a portion of the Court of Appeals' Amended
Decision that affirmed his conviction for six of 14 counts of libel. Abante Tonite publisher
Allen A. Macasaet (Macasaet) and managing editor Nicolas V. Quijano (Quijano) also
filed a partial Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 187230, assailing the same
Decision.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of libel.

RULING: This Court finds that the articles are not libelous, petitioners should be
acquitted, and Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 finds no application.

Besides, the constitutionality of criminalizing libel is doubtful. In libel, the kinds of

speech actually deterred are more valuable than the State interest the law against libel
protects.206 The libel cases that have reached this Court in recent years generally
involve notable personalities for parties, highlighting a propensity for the powerful and
influential to use the advantages of criminal libel to silence their critics.

In any event, alternative legal remedies exist to address unwarranted attacks on a

private person's reputation and credibility, such as the Civil Code chapter on Human
Relations. Civil actions for defamation are more consistent with our democratic values
since they do not threaten the constitutional right to free speech, and avoid the
unnecessary chilling effect on criticisms toward public officials. The proper economic
burden on complainants of civil actions also reduces the possibility of using libel as a
tool to harass or silence critics and dissenters.

This Court is not unmindful of the far-reaching implications that our deliberation may
bring journalists and members of the press actively engaged in disseminating news. We
regard the vital role that the media plays in ensuring that the government and its officials
remain true to their oath in carrying out their mandates in a manner prescribed by law.

Nevertheless, the constitutionally protected freedoms enjoyed by the press cannot be

used as a shield to advance the malicious propagation of false information carried out
by unscrupulous entities to injure another's reputation.

The acquittal meted out to petitioners does not mean that journalists have unbridled
discretion in publishing news and information below the standards expected of them.
These standards are prominently provided under the Philippine Press Institute's (PPI)
Journalist's Code of Ethics and the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) Code of
Ethics.
 C a s e | 26

Erwin Tulfo vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 161032, Sept. 16, 2008

FACTS: On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4)
separate informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in
(RTC) Pasay City. These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan
Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city
editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily
tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles in
the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and
June 25, 1999.

ISSUE: Whether or not the articles are protected as qualified privileged communication.

RULING: Even with the need for a free press, the necessity that it be free does not
mean that it be totally unfettered. It is still acknowledged that the freedom can be
abused, and for the abuse of the freedom, there must be a corresponding sanction. It
falls on the press to wield such enormous power responsibly. It may be a cliché that the
pen is mightier than the sword, but in this particular case, the lesson to be learned is
that such a mighty weapon should not be wielded recklessly or thoughtlessly, but
always guided by conscience and careful thought.

A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of the most effective checks on
government power and abuses. Hence, it behooves government functionaries to
respect the value of openness and refrain from concealing from media corruption and
other anomalous practices occurring within their backyard. On the other hand, public
officials also deserve respect and protection against false innuendoes and unfounded
accusation of official wrongdoing from an abusive press. As it were, the law and
jurisprudence on libel heavily tilt in favor of press freedom. The common but most
unkind perception is that government institutions and their officers and employees are
fair game to official and personal attacks and even ridicule. And the practice on the
ground is just as disconcerting. Reports and accusation of official misconduct often
times merit front page or primetime treatment, while defenses set up, retraction issued,
or acquittal rendered get no more, if ever, perfunctory coverage. The unfairness needs
no belaboring. The balm of clear conscience is sometimes not enough.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY
SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code.