CHINA-LAC REPORT

MARCH 2023

AT A CROSSROADS:
CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
TO LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN, 2022
Margaret Myers and Rebecca Ray*

China’s major development finance institutions (DFIs), Though still lending at low rates to LAC governments,
China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export-Import China’s DFIs would appear to be engaging the region
Bank (Eximbank), have historically accounted for the with renewed interest. In 2022, CDB and Eximbank
bulk of China’s overall lending to the Latin American and issued $813 million in new loans to the region, focusing
Caribbean (LAC) region. Based on data from the Chinese on Brazil and parts of the Caribbean. In Brazil, CDB
Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean Database, which issued a $500 million term loan to the Banco do Brasil,
is jointly produced by the Inter-American Dialogue and which the latter will reportedly use to finance social
the Boston University Global Development Policy Center projects.3 In the Caribbean, Eximbank issued a $121
and tracks Chinese DFI finance to LAC governments and million concessional loan to Barbados for the Scotland
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), these two banks issued District Road Rehabilitation Project4 and another $192
$136 billion to the region between 2005 and 2022, with million concessional loan to Guyana for Phase II of the
most of that directed toward Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, East Coast Road Project, which is part of the Irfaan Ali
and Venezuela.**

As noted in our previous reports on this topic,1 the LAC

region saw a precipitous decline in loans from CDB and
Eximbank between 2015 and 2020, when lending ceased Though still lending at low rates
altogether, amid pandemic-related challenges, and as
China reconsidered development bank functions and areas to LAC governments, China’s DFIs
of focus.2 Between 2019 and 2022, the LAC region received
a total of just over $2.9 billion in loans from both CDB and
would appear to be engaging
Eximbank (see Figure 1), as compared to peak DFI lending
in 2010, when CDB alone issued over $35 billion to the
the region with renewed interest.
region.

*
Margaret Myers is a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and directs the Asia and Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue. Dr. Rebecca Ray is
a senior academic researcher at the Boston University Global Development Policy Center.

A detailed description of our methodology is available at https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/03/23/gdp-center-database-methodology-guidebook/. We add any

** 

new loans to the database annually, but also revise past year estimates when and if projects do not come to fruition or are for amounts of financing that are
different than earlier reported. Our list of Chinese loans to LAC from 2005-2021 is available in the online Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean
Database (https://www. thedialogue.org/map_list/).
 FIGURE 1. CDB AND EXIMBANK LOANS TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2005-2022
Source: Ray, Rebecca and Margaret Myers (2023) “Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean Database,” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue.

40 20
Number of Loan Commitments (Right Axis)

Total Amount Committed (Left Axis)

30 15

Number of Commitments
US$ Billions

20 10

10 5

0 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

government’s expansive infrastructure proposal, including

road projects and the construction of 48 bridges.5 Managing Debt
Though pursuing new lending opportunities in LAC, China’s
In addition to these new loans, CDB and Eximbank also
DFIs have also spent considerable time in recent years
expressed interest in supporting several more, sometimes-
renegotiating the terms of existing agreements with the
sizeable infrastructure projects in other parts of the region.
region. Having issued sovereign loans for upwards of two
There was talk of possible support for the approximately
decades, CDB and Eximbank’s share of official bilateral
$20 billion worth of projects outlined by Argentina and
debt stock grew from 18 percent in 2010 to 49 percent in
China ahead of the 2022 Beijing Olympics, for instance.
2021, with most of that destined for the Global South.9
This included the possibility of Chinese DFI support to
Amid Covid-related, inflationary, and other financial
further expand Argentina’s Cauchari Solar Park—a project
challenges throughout the Global South, China’s banks,
initially funded by Eximbank in 2017.6 Likewise, Bolivia
along with other international financial institutions, are now
is anticipating a $422 million loan from Eximbank in the
often finding it hard to ensure timely repayment.
coming months for the construction of two zinc refineries—
one in Oruro and the other in Potosí—to further industrialize
Venezuela, which has accounted for the largest share
Bolivia’s raw materials exports. Eximbank already financed
(44 percent) of China’s total development finance in the
the development of the El Mutún steel refinery in Bolivia’s
region since 2005, was among the first in the region to
Santa Cruz province, which is expected to begin operations
work with China to adjust the terms of certain loans.
in 2023 and to operate at full capacity by 2024.7
There, China sought to address the country’s repayment
problems by offering grace periods on principal payments
In addition, having recently signalled interest in cutting
and extending the life of at least one loan.10 China’s
ties with Taiwan, Honduras is reportedly negotiating a
DFIs ceased lending to Venezuela starting in 2016,
credit line with China for the development of the Patuca II
noting deteriorating economic conditions in the country
hydroelectric dam, which is part of the country’s plans to
(see Figure 2).
develop a 600 MW hydroelectric complex.8 The Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) had previously issued
Like other major lenders, China’s creditors were also
$287 million to Honduras for the Patuca III dam project,
affected by the fiscal and balance of payments crisis that
which after a series of delays came online in January 2021.
unfolded in Suriname in 2020. China accounts for the

2 At a Crossroads
 CHINA-LAC REPORT | MARCH 2023

FIGURE 2. CDB AND EXIMBANK LOANS TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2022
Source: Ray, Rebecca and Margaret Myers (2023) “Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean Database,” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue.

COUNTRY AMOUNT RECIPIENT PURPOSE

Brazil $500 million Banco do Brasil Lending for social projects

Barbados $121 million Government of Barbados Scotland District Road Rehabilitation Project

Guyana $192 million Government of Guyana Phase II of the East Coast Road Project

largest share of bilateral debt to the Caribbean nation, with CDB and Ecuador’s Ministry of Finance, gave Ecuador a
Eximbank loans totaling 17 percent of GDP in 2022, so that 16-month grace period on an additional $474 million in
Chinese buy-in was essential to International Monetary Fund debt, with principal payments set to resume in March 2022.
(IMF) negotiations with Suriname on debt restructuring.11 In
2022, the IMF estimated the stock of external arrears at 10 This past year, as grace periods expired, the Guillermo
percent of GDP, with $61 million due to China, $7 million to Lasso government sought agreements with both CDB
India, and $22 million to Paris Club creditors. and Eximbank to restructure an additional $4.4 billion of
Ecuador’s debt. Chinese and Ecuadorian officials agreed to
In Ecuador, where CDB and Eximbank loans account for a series of measures, including maturities extensions and
about 13 percent of the country’s total external debt, interest rate adjustments, to reduce payments to CDB and
CDB agreed in 2020 to delay principal payments on one Eximbank by $745 million and $680 million, respectively,
loan for a period of one year, noting the pandemic’s toll over the next three years.12
on Ecuador’s financial well-being. The loan’s interest rate
remained at 7.16 percent and outstanding debt was divided Around the same time, Petroecuador also sought to revise
into eleven future payments of approximately $38 million the terms of its oil-based debt payments to China. The
each. Another agreement, reached in September 2020 by state oil firm and Chinese national oil company Petrochina

FIGURE 3. CDB AND EXIMBANK LOANS TO VENEZUELA, 2005-2022 (US$ BILLIONS)

Source: Ray, Rebecca and Margaret Myers (2023) “Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean Database,” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue.

25

21.4

20

15

10

10

5.5 5.5
5
4.5
4 4
5

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

At a Crossroads 3
 reached an agreement to amend the price formula for Guyana has yet to face major difficulties repaying its
Ecuadorian crude and further extend the delivery schedule debts to China, but as Chinese loans enter their repayment
for shipments. The new deal maintains the same oil sale periods, bilateral debt to China accounts for a sizeable
commitments to Petrochina, but over an extended period, share of Guyana’s total external debt. According to the
Ministry of Finance’s latest debt report, reflecting the
first quarter of 2022, China represents 17.3 percent of
all external public debt and 62.2 percent of all bilateral
There are indications that China’s debt.17 The Bank of Guyana reports that service payments
on Chinese debt accounted for 39.5 percent of all external
banks will be engaged in even more debt service during that time.18 Chinese public and publicly
guaranteed debt has also grown significantly in importance
negotiations on the terms of public in several other CARICOM nations, including Dominica and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (see Figure 4).
and publicly guaranteed debt in the
coming months and years.
A Question of Capacity
Despite the slight uptick in Chinese DFI activity in LAC, and
from 2022-2027. Ecuador hopes to sell more oil at market indications of more to come, future China-LAC financial
prices through this arrangement, including to China. deal-making is at something of a crossroads—with future
The amended deal will reportedly generate a $28 million activity contingent on both China’s ability to issue new
increase in revenue for Ecuador over the next five years. sovereign loans to the region, and also interest among LAC
nations in taking on additional Chinese debt, at a moment
There are indications that China’s banks will be engaged in when public debt to GDP ratios are at historic highs in
even more negotiations on the terms of public and publicly many countries. As China considers new approaches to
guaranteed debt in the coming months and years. Even overseas finance and investment, governments in the
in Costa Rica, where China’s DFIs have issued a relatively LAC region are increasingly weighing their sometimes-
limited $435 million in total loans since 2008, officials hefty debt obligations against a need for more capital to
there are looking to extend repayment of Eximbank’s stimulate economic growth. For some of the region’s more
2015 loan for $395 million to expand the country’s Route debt-burdened economies even low-interest Chinese loans
32 highway,13 citing delays in project delivery by China could be problematic.
Harbour Engineering Corporation. Completing the project
will reportedly require an additional $500 million allocation At this juncture, and despite new lending in 2022, there
by the Costa Rican state.14 are plenty of signs that Chinese DFI engagement with
LAC sovereigns and state-owned enterprises will remain
Negotiations were also underway in Argentina in 2022, as relatively subdued, especially on the part of CDB. Having
the country has sought to reactivate a lending agreement essentially ceased commodity-backed lending in LAC,
for the Condor Cliff and Barrancosa dams (also known CDB’s role is now more limited, focusing instead on
as Nestor Kirchner and Jorge Cepernic) in Santa Cruz pandemic support, some limited export credit, and intra-
province. Between 2014 and 2021, CDB had disbursed bank lending in recent years. According to data from its
only $1.4 billion of a promised $4.7 billion loan. The bank annual reports, CDB’s activities are also heavily focused
stopped issuing funds when the loan contract expired, within China at the moment, as the country looks to boost
following lengthy delays in project development during historically low GDP growth rates.19
the Mauricio Macri administration. As a result, Argentina’s
Treasury issued over $280 million to keep the project on Protracted negotiations between Chinese DFIs and
track.15 Negotiations with China resumed in 2022, led by Argentina on several proposed infrastructure projects
Marco Lavagna, a close associate of Argentine Minister would also suggest some sensitivity to the risks
of Economy Sergio Massa. By the end of 2022, China had associated with issuing even more loans to already
issued two new disbursements, of $212 million and $287 debt-burdened governments in LAC. Though working to
million.16 accumulate reserves, including through new currency

4 At a Crossroads
 CHINA-LAC REPORT | MARCH 2023

FIGURE 4. PUBLICLY GUARANTEED DEBT TO CHINA IN THE CARIBBEAN (AVERAGE % OF TOTAL EXTERNAL
PUBLICLY GUARANTEED DEBT)
Source: Author analysis of World Bank (2022) and IMF (2022) data.20, 21

40% 38%

2007-2011
35%
2012-2016

30% 2017-2021

25%

20% 18%

15% 13%
12%
11%
10%
10%
7%
6% 6%
5%
5%
2% 2%
1% 1%
0% 0% N/A N/A
0%
Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica Suriname St. Vincent
and
the Grenadines

swaps with China,22 Argentina has stuggled to achieve the Latin American nation’s financial welfare, and of the
financial stability as severe drought weakens the country’s scandals that continue to plague the Coca-Codo Sinclair
economic outlook. Amid persistent challenges, Argentine Dam project, which was developed with Chinese finance.
officials intend to lower the target for international
reserves in the country’s $44 billion agreement with Lending prospects will also be shaped by China’s own
the IMF.23 economic limitations, as the country manages property
sector woes, its own mounting debt burden, and growing
Recent loan negotiations between China and Argentina international calls for debt restructuring. These and other
were further complicated by Argentina’s request for full factors will continue to shape the extent of Chinese DFI
financing from China for the Atucha III nuclear facility, activity, whether in support of the Belt and Road, or the
which would feature Chinese nuclear reactors. Though an newly minted and still-loosely defined Global Development
opportunity for China to showcase its nuclear capabilities Initiative. In all likelihood, Chinese loan commitments to
(China’s Hualong nuclear technology is only operational in LAC and other regions will continue to be much smaller
China and Pakistan at present), China is apparently holding on average than they were a decade ago. As the Boston
fast on its commitment to financing just 85 percent of the University Global Development Policy Center has noted,
total project cost.24 in 2016, DFI commitments to foreign governments and
state-owned enterprises were twice as large as those of
As noted above, Ecuador was successful in renegotiating the World Bank. In 2021, CDB and Eximbank promised less
the terms of some of its Chinese finance, buying itself than a tenth as much. The size of individual loans and lines
an estimated $1.4 billion worth of debt relief through of credit in LAC is also dramatically smaller on average
2025.25 But the Andean nation will still owe China sizable than in years past.
payments in the coming years. Moreover, while the 2022
agreement between Ecuador and China’s DFIs will afford
Ecuador some short-term breathing room, given the various
amortizations that were due to China between 2022-2025, Looking Ahead
these deals don’t open much fiscal space to accommodate
more public spending.26 Although a China-Ecuador bilateral There is little to indicate a resurrection of the multi-
free trade agreement is on the horizon, any new loans billion-dollar, oil-backed lending that once characterized
will likely hinge on both Ecuadorian and Chinese views of the bulk of China’s financial engagement with the region.

At a Crossroads 5
 However, if 2022 is any indication, CDB and Eximbank will funds (see “What Role for China’s Policy Bank’s in LAC?”
remain committed to issuing smaller loans that are closely for details on China’s regional funds in LAC28), though
linked to China’s diplomatic or host country development these funds have been relatively inactive in recent years.
objectives, whether as concerns pandemic outreach,
transport infrastructure development, industrial upgrading, Given the region’s debt-related challenges, the extent to
or in other areas. which China will further restructure or else forgive certain
debt obligations in LAC will also be of considerable
Whatever materializes in the way of future CDB and interest looking ahead. In general, China’s banks have been
Eximbank sovereign loans is likely to remain focused relatively less accommodating in LAC than in Africa, where
on the Caribbean region to at least some degree. The China canceled at least $3.4 billion in debt between 2000
Caribbean has not only been a focus for the banks since and 2019. However, in Africa, China’s debt cancellations
they arrived in the region, but also a top recipient of the have been limited to interest-free loans, which are much
DFIs’ most recent loans to LAC, including two in 2022. less common in LAC.29
Trinidad and Tobago received the only DFI sovereign loan
issued in 2021, and the Caribbean attracted three of six In addition to the DFIs, there are of course several other
loans in 2019. Between CDB and Eximbank, the latter institutions that are similarly working to advance China’s
is more active in the Caribbean, with Caribbean nations commercial and diplomatic outreach in the region. These
accounting for 17 percent of the total value of Eximbank include China’s “big five” commercial banks (ICBC, Bank of
China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank,
and Bank of Communications), which are increasingly
active in Latin America and other regions, often taking part
in syndicated loans to Chinese or LAC companies. In 2022,
Future CDB and Eximbank sovereign
Bank of China was a member of a three-bank syndicate
loans are likely to remain focused that provided $1.25 million to Petrobras. Bank of China
also took part in a 2022 loan to Colombia’s Grupo Energía
on the Caribbean region to some Bogotá.30 Multilateral financial institutions such as the New
Development Bank, or BRICS Bank, would also appear to
degree. have expanded their lending activity of late. Brazil received
ten sovereign loans from the NDB in 2022.31 The Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) also provided $100
million to the Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais
to finance renewable energy projects in the Brazilian state.
finance to the region, and 65 percent of the bank’s total Ecuador received finance from the AIIB in 2022, too, but
loan commitments. China Eximbank’s concessional (two to address the liquidity constraints of private small and
percent interest) loans remain of considerable interest medium-sized enterprises amid the COVID-19 crisis.32
to Caribbean governments looking to finance critical
infrastructure development. Given their relative size, these
loans are also among the most impactful for China, as it
looks to demonstrate a growing commitment to advancing
development objectives across the Global South.
Conclusion
The uptick in CDB and Eximbank lending this year is
In addition to providing loans to LAC governments and indicative of continued Chinese interest in establishing
SOEs, China’s DFIs will also continue to provide direct strong diplomatic ties across the region, in this case by
finance to Chinese and Latin American companies, such supporting often high-profile infrastructure and social
as a recent $53 million CDB loan to Argentina Telecom.27 investments. However, overall DFI loan amounts remain
Though not tracked in the Chinese Loans to Latin America low, especially in comparison to lending to the region pre-
and the Caribbean Database, this remains an important 2016, before China’s ministries and regulatory institutions
part of China’s overall financial profile, and with important rethought these banks’ intended areas of focus. The shape
implications for China’s investment and commercial of future lending by the DFIs will continue to depend in very
prospects in the region. China Development Bank and large part on China’s own views of these institutions and
Eximbank are additionally responsible for providing the their role in supporting its foreign and economic policy.
bulk of finance for deals struck by some of China’s regional The newly established National Financial Regulatory

6 At a Crossroads
 CHINA-LAC REPORT | MARCH 2023

Commission, a super regulatory body crafted to manage considerations. But Chinese lending in its various forms,
China’s $60 trillion banking assets, is bound to shape whether from DFIs, commercial banks, private equity, or
developments among China’s many financial institutions other sources, continues to feature prominently in the
in still unclear ways, for instance. Much also depends China-LAC relationship, shaping China’s investments in the
on economic outlooks in both China and LAC, as both region, and still underpinning bilateral ties in a number of
aim to manage mounting debt and wide-ranging policy LAC countries.

ENDNOTES

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to-change-imf-net-reserve-target-for-third-time details/2020/approved/Ecuador-CONAFIPS-COVID-19-
Credit-Line-Project-Previously-Corporacion-Financiera-
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