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INDEX BOOKS GROUPS 22/02/2015
Beyond the
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Punitive Society
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22/02/2015 INDEX BOOKS GROUPS

Beyond the
Punitive Society
INDEX OPERANT CONDITIONING:

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS
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edited by Harvey Wheeler
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
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□a
W. H. FREEMAN AND COM PANY
San Francisco

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
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Wheeler, John Harvey.
Beyond the punitive society.
Papers presented at a symposium organized by J. H.

Wheeler and sponsored by the Center for the Study o f
Democratic institutions, held in Santa Barbara, Calif.
1. Operant conditioning—Congresses. 2. Human
behavior—Congresses. 3. Behaviorism (Psychology)—
Congresses. 4. Skinner, Burrhus Frederic, 1904-
I. Center for the Study o f Democratic Institutions.
II. Title.
BF319.5.06W47 301.15 73-1269
ISBN 0-7167-0785-3
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Copyright © 1973 by The Fund for the Republic, Inc.
N o part o f this book may be reproduced by any

mechanical, photographic, or electronic process,
or in the form o f a phonographic recording,
nor may it be stored in a retrieval system, transmitted,
or otherwise copied for public or private use,
without written permission from the publisher.
Printed in the United States o f America
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Preface
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O perant conditioning is one of the most im portant contributions to psy
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chology and the social sciences in the past fifty years. Although it had
always been surrounded by controversy, the storm of controversy that
erupted following the publication of Beyond Freedom and D ignity forced a
consideration of its merits, limitations, and social implications upon
thinking persons th ro u g h o u t the world. The purpose of this book is to
present an overview of operant conditioning, a critical evaluation of
Skinner’s ideas together with responses to his critics. The chapters of this
book were commissioned by the Center for a symposium in Santa
Barbara at which Skinner was present. A final purpose is to prepare for
a technological assessment of operant conditioning. We are familiar with
assessments of technologies deriving from the physical sciences; in the
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future, we shall have to make such assessments for social technologies
as well. With operant conditioning serving as a model, this book explores
some of the approaches that may be useful in doing so.
February, 1973 H a n e y Wheeler

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Contents
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1 Introduction: A Nonpunitive W orld? 1
HARVEY WHEELER
2 The Skinnerian Revolution 22
JOHN R. PLATT
3 Behavioral Technology and Institutional Transformation 57
DENNIS C. PIRAGES
4 Controlled Environments for Social Change 71
VITALI ROZYNKO, KENNETH SWIFT, JOSEPHINE SWIFT,
a n d LARNEY J. BOGGS
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O perant Behaviorism: F ad, Fact-ory, and Fantasy?
KA-RL H. PRIBRAM
G reat Expectations
ARNOLD TOYNBEE
113
Behaviorism's Enlightened Despotism

CHAIM PERELMAN
121
Some Aversive Responses to a Would-be Reinforcer

MAX BLACK
101
125
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Can Any Behavior Be Conditioned?
ROBERT ROSEN
135
How Good Is Current Behavioral Theory? 149

JOHN WILKINSON
11 A System-Theoretic View of Behavior Modification 160
L. A. ZADEH
12 Questions 170
FRED WARNER NEAL

viii CONTENTS
13 Skinner and Human Differences 177

ARTHUR R. JENSEN
14 Skinner’s New Broom 199
ALEXANDER COMFORT
15 Beyond B. F. Skinner 212
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER
16 Skinner and “ Freedom and Dignity” 217
NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
17 Is H e Really a Grand Inquisitor? 230
MICHAEL NOVAK
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18 A Quiver of Queries 247
JOSEPH SCHWAB
19 Answers for My Critics 256
B. F. SKINNER
References 267
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Beyond the
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1
Introduction:
A Nonpunitive World?
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Harvey W h e e le r
H arvey Wheeler, ci senior fe llo w at the Center fo r the Study o f
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Democratic Institutions, is coauthor (with the late Eugene Burdick) o f
Fail-Safe and author o f Democracy in a Revolutionary Era and
The Politics of Revolution. Wheeler com m issioned the chapters and
organized the Center conference upon which this book is based.
H is introduction provides a background discussion o f operant
conditioning and the related issues that fo r m the substance o f this book.
B. F. Skinner’s Book Beyond Freedom and D ignity discusses some of the

social and philosophical implications of behavior modification through
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operant conditioning. O f course, behavior modification did not start
with m odern behavioral psychology. One of the functions of politics has
always been to modify behavior. Plato stated this as his leading goal in
writing The Republic. O ur educational practices are devoted to behavior
modification. Each time we draft a new law we have in mind the modifi
cation of behavior to conform with the provisions of the law. The aim
o f modifying behavior is not new, but recently the techniques for m o d i
fying certain types o f behavior have developed a high degree of sophisti
cation. The most familiar include such examples as the behavioral drugs,
tranquilizers, and energizers. Moreover, we are told that the w orld’s

2 HARVEY WHEELER
leading nations are engaging in large, secret research projects in be

havioral drugs: drugs that can be sprayed over large population centers
to render their inhabitants docile or disoriented and easy for an invading
army to manipulate.
M any fear th a t such drugs may be used for other purposes: to quell
a riot or to calm angry com m uters caught in traffic ja m s and subway
failures. If they can be used for this, they can also be used for more
general, dictatorial purposes. A modern Hitler, for example, might use
behavioral drugs rather than concentration camps.
Electronics combined with brain research provides another technique
of behavior control. Electrodes implanted in the brain can stimulate
pleasure centers so effectively that the subject a bandons all other needs
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and functions in favor o f pressing the pleasure b utton over and over
again. Already, these stimuli can be activated by remote, wireless
control. Perhaps some day it will no longer be necessary to actually
implant electrodes in the brain in order to achieve similar results.
Molecular biologists seem to be on the verge of understanding the
way in which the D N A - R N A replication process works. W hen they do,
genetic engineering may become a reality. M any good things can be
done: genetic surgery can correct congenital defects in the newly born.
But these are all partial and discrete applications. Skinner goes beyond
this. He believes his psychological principles can provide the foundation
for a new social system. The mere suggestion is enough to frighten us
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with specters of Brave New W orld and 1984. Yet our own world, the
one Skinner and his followers want to supplant, is in good measure the
result o f the work of an eighteenth-century behavioral psychologist,
Jeremy Bentham. In his time, Bentham was attacked and derided and
his social prescriptions were feared, much as is the case with Skinner
today. The parallel between Skinner and Bentham is of special interest
because, despite the similarities in their work, it is precisely Bentham
whom Skinner wishes to dethrone. Or rather, it is the laws and institu
tions th at resulted from Bentham ’s theories that Skinner wishes to
supplant with new ones based on his own theories.
Jeremy Bentham and his utilitarian followers were behaviorists and
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their political philosophy was based upon Bentham ’s pleasure-pain
psychology: man, he said, seeks pleasure and avoids pain. Although
the Benthamites were empiricists, this was not an empirical proposition.
It was a postulate rather than a scientifically verified proposition. But
the pleasure-pain hypothesis accorded well enough with common-sense
observations to seem generally acceptable. Once the proposition was
accepted, it was possible to derive from it a complete system of political
theory. This is what the early “ liberals” —Bentham, James, John Stuart
Mills, and their followers—did. The completed edifice was known as

Introduction: A Nonpunitive World? 3
liberalism, a philosophy as well as a prescription for the construction

of a practicable political system. Jeremy Bentham was one of the most
influential men who ever lived. Within fifty years of his death, nearly
every theoretical proposition he had ever a nnounced had become
written into the laws of the “ liberal” democracies.
B entham ’s Theory o f Legislation was especially useful. The pleasure-
pain principle, he reasoned, could be used for the control of social
behavior in a way th at would be effective and, at the same time, maxi
mize the a m o u n t of liberty in society. (H e also defined liberty in a
common-sense way: the absence of restraint.) The formula was simple.
To maximize liberty m eant to minimize restraints. The problem of
government was to prevent restraining behavior, both by individuals
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and by political authorities. One prevented unw anted behavior by
punishing it. In theory, one could calculate the a m o u n t of pleasure the
restrainer derived from his restraining behavior and then write a law
prohibiting that behavior, affixing a punishm ent in such a way that the
punishment just overweighed the pleasure. The undesired behavior
would no longer bring pleasure to its perpetrator and, hence, would be
suppressed. The punishm ent would, a la G ilbert and Sullivan, fit the
crime. If the system worked, crime would be banished and liberty
would flourish.
The system did not work, at least not according to plan. But Bentham
ism, if not liberty, did flourish. Criminal law th ro u g h o u t the western
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world followed the principles of Benthamite pleasure-pain psychology.
Punitive laws and punitive modes of tho ug ht dom inated legislatures and
courts. The catalogue of crimes was subjected to an intensive b o o k
keeping analysis. Each was weighted with its ap pro priate punishment
according to the pleasure-pain calculus: so m uch money to be taken
from som ebody who comm itted an unwanted civil act; so much freedom
to be forfeited in prison for the commission of crimes. N orval Morris
claims th a t general reliance on im prisonm ent for crimes was, like
Benthamism, an innovation o f the eighteenth-century. It rested upon
the alleged correlation between time and crime. Prior to the m id
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eighteenth century, criminals were often simply executed. The c o n te m p o
rary social institution we know as the prison was the direct result o f the
liberal, behaviorist pleasure-pain principles that became dom inant in
western thinking after Bentham.
Today, the validity of the prison as an institution is being questioned.
T ho ugh doubtless it was an im provement over what went before, now
it, in its turn, seems to have become obsolete. Punishments, despite the
claims for B entham ’s pleasure-pain calculus, no longer deter crimes.
Prisoners do not expiate their crimes and they are not rehabilitated.
T hrow n together with other criminals, they learn chiefly how to be more

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intrepid, if not more skillful, criminals. We attack the prison system,

yet we have no idea of how to cope with undesired behavior except
through punishment and imprisonment, which maintains the tie between
time and crime that is our legacy from Jeremy Bentham and the eight
eenth-century liberals.
We cannot imagine how a nonpunishing world would work, even
though it is clear th a t the punishing world we have does not work. T hat
is, m ost of us cannot imagine what a nonpunishing world would be like.
A minority am ong us can, however. Its members are adherents of a new
behaviorism with a new non-Benthamite psychology, one th at claims
to rest upon solid scientific foundations rather than merely superficial
common-sense postulates. This is the psychology of operant condition
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ing, invented (discovered) by B. F. Skinner. Its adherents are multiplying
throu gho ut the world just as the adherents of pleasure-pain psychology
did earlier. The new ideas seem strange and threatening. They draw
cherished beliefs into question. They promise a new world of tranquility
and creativity, but only if we first give up tenets of freedom and dignity
that have been at the core of our liberal heritage.
The Benthamites, who started the process th a t led to the enshrinement
of these beliefs, met with fear and hostility when they began. They won,
even without having hard scientific evidence on their side. If, as is
conceivable, Skinner were to receive a Nobel Prize for his work on
operant conditioning, the fright and apprehensiveness provoked in many
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of us by his theories will magnify and, at the same time, the corps of
dedicated operant conditioners will expand.
Clearly, we must all inform ourselves a b o u t operant conditioning.
Indeed, we must do more. We must analyze and assess it. It is a science
with distinct technological implications, just as physics is. Today, as
we look at the recent advances in the physical and biological sciences,
we have growing concerns ab ou t where they may lead us. We speak of
the need for “ technological assessment” of their novel implications.
N o bo dy yet knows how to make such technological assessments ac
curately. We know even less about making accurate technological
assessments for a behavioral science such as operant conditioning. Yet
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it is imperative th at we try. In fact, Skinner himself, in one sense, has
come to the same conclusion. Beyond Freedom and D ignity might be
called a technological assessment of the social implications of putting
operant conditioning into practice th ro ug ho ut society. If we want to
assess the implications of this new technology, the best place to start
is with Skinner’s book. This is what we have tried to do in this collection
of essays. This collection is by no means a definite assessment; it merely
inaugurates a process that should be continued and expanded. Much
more needs to be d o n e —by universities, research institutes, and citizens
groups.

W hat, then, is operant conditioning? Perhaps the best way to find

out is to read two early b ooks by Skinner, Contingencies o f Reinforcem ent
and Science and Hum an Behavior. Even then, however, m any doubts and
questions will remain unanswered. A lthough the scientific d e m o n stra
tions on which o perant conditioning rests are very simple, its new way
of thinking and of expressing things is devilishly complex. Indeed, it
may not be far off the m ark to say that operant conditioning presents
us with a Copernican revolution in our ways of thinking. Just as C o p e r
nicus told us th a t the app aren t reality of a physical world in which the
sun revolves a rou nd the earth is illusory, so Skinner tells us th at the
a pp aren t reality o f a behavioral world in which organisms respond to
stimuli is alm ost as illusory. Skinner is to Pavlov, then, as Copernicus
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was to Ptolemy. But this may be a gross overstatement. M any dis
tinguished people, am o ng them N o a m Chomsky, think it is. This is one
of the questions readers o f this book will want to judge for themselves
when they have finished.
Let us look back again at the earlier behaviorists, the Benthamites.
Their critics immediately pointed out defects in the pleasure-pain
hypothesis: what was pleasure for one person was pain to a n o th e r;
each m an to his own taste. W hat to do, for example, ab ou t the m as
ochist? M oreover, degrees of intensity o f pleasure and pain vary am ong
individuals. Finally, how does one add up pleasures and pains? Can the
pleasures of a few persons outweigh one person ’s pain? N o w we see
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th a t Bentham ism ’s foundation was not scientifically valid and the cal
culus was impossible to apply. The main reason for restating this is to
emphasize a point m ade earlier: our present society operates on certain
assum ptions a bo ut the alleged efficacy o f punishment, and these assum p
tions have proved to be false. They are false whether or not Skinner
and the operant conditioners are right. However, the operant condi
tioners m ake a further point. Punishm ent can work. It works differently
from the way the Benthamites thou gh t it would, but it does work.
Punishm ent effectively suppresses undesired behavior, even though it
may, in the process, also suppress other highly desirable behavior.
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Indeed, suppression (punishment) is the prim ary way all previous
social systems have controlled unw anted behavior. U p to a point in
social development, prior to the time social interrelationships became
extremely complex, the benefits of suppression may have outweighed
its defects; th at is, the generalized system of suppression did not produce
intolerable side effects. T h a t point, say the avant-garde operant con di
tioners, has long since passed by. Just as prisons teach criminals how
to be criminals, not how to be good citizens, so punishm ent teaches
persons how to punish; how to punish themselves by haranguing th e m
selves with guilt feelings, as well as how to punish others retributively.
W hen interrelations are complex, each punishm ent may have a multiplier

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effect. The result is a society characterized by punishing; repressive

behavior produces a suppressive society. Such a society is dysfunctional;
no species can survive in such an environment. The hum an being,
marvelously subtle and resourceful creature that he is, has been able to
accom m odate m uch more suppression than can other living things, but
even he can take only so much.
Innovative operant conditioners believe th a t punishment control sys
tems are technologies and that they produce “ pollution” just as do other
technologies. A utomobiles produce noxious gasses, but as long as the
density of population is low and there are but few automobiles, the
pollution dissipates and the benefits from the technology outweigh the
evils. When concentrations of people and automobiles increase, the
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situation changes. The evils from the polluting side effects outweigh the
benefits of the technology. It is the same with punishment systems,
according to operant conditioners. In simple societies in which personal
contacts are few and not densely intertwined, the evil effects of punish
ment techniques are dissipated; but under complex conditions, they
produce a noxious form of social pollution. They produce Vietnam-type
wars; rootless, disillusioned youth; anomic, suicidal adults; disaffected
ethnic minorities; cynical, manipulative leaders; presidential assassins;
and M anson families. Fortunately, so the argum ent runs, behavior can
be controlled in a better way, in a way th a t produces expressive rather
than suppressed individuals, a way that is rewarding and reinforcing
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rather than punishing. Nearly everything th a t can be done by punish
ment can be done better and with fewer bad side effects through re
inforcements. Moreover, everybody will be happier. H o w do operant
conditioners know this?
The answer is that they do not yet know it. This is another reason
operant conditioning must be subjected to an intensive technological
assessment. The claim is th at hum an societies can be improved if we
follow lessons that were learned in the laboratory from experiments
involving primarily (but not exclusively) pigeons and rats. M any suc
cessful hum an applications have already been m a d e —for example,
operant-conditioning teaching programs. If such programs are designed
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by talented technicians, they are more effective for m ost students than
are traditional methods. M oreover, the results are duplicable. The p ro
grammer need not be present in person, he need only draw up the
original program. Once that is done, the program can be used anywhere
with anybody.
Certain intractable situations, such as the care of institutionalized
autistic children and “ back w ard” psychotics, can be improved beyond
anything previously possible. M any organizational and administrative
problems become solvable. Certain behavioral diseases or disorders,

such as alcoholism and drug addiction, seem to respond better to

operant conditioning than to traditional treatments. A prison can be
transformed into a relatively tolerable environm ent with a considerable
reduction in disciplinary problems. Such successes are increasing, but
they have so far applied only in marginal situations; the case is far from
being dem onstrated. Should the evidence become much more persuasive
in the near future, we can expect the movement, which is already expand
ing rapidly, to take on an exponential growth rate. This was what h a p
pened with Benthamism, and it had absolutely no laboratory or experi
mental verification behind it. If, for example, the behavior-modification
program with which Vitali Rozynko and his colleagues are associated
(see page 71) turns out to produce dram atic results in dealing with alco
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holics, psychiatric wards all over the country will introduce similar
operant-conditioning programs. In his essay “ Skinner's New B roo m "
(page 190), Alex C om fort predicts that, if operant conditioning proves
successful in mental hospitals, it will spread inexorably thro u g h o u t the
rest of society.
Suppose this happens: Will we be ready for it? Will the proper tech
nicians be available? Will the punitive teacher, recognizing the trend,
go home one night as his accustomed self an d emerge the next morning
as a self-proclaimed operant conditioner? These and m any other possi
bilities lie ahead if the movement takes hold. We may be confronted with
problems due not only to operant conditioning's inherent flaws but also
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to its over-hasty and inept adoption. This is what has happened in the
past to m any technologies: the com puter, thalidomide, the automobile.
A major public com m itm ent to the technological assessment of operant
conditioning should be m ounted immediately, not only to determine its
validity, but also, in the event it is found valid, to establish conditions
and standards under which it may be introduced more widely throu gho ut
society.
Suppose we now enter, ever so tentatively, the world of operant

conditioning. W h at does it look like? W hat is different? At first, nothing
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is different, and the reason is th at the world has always been an operant-
conditioning world. If it had not been, operant conditioning could not
have been discovered in the first place: The world always was and always
will be (so the doctrine holds) an operant-conditioning world; but
o perant conditioning’s special contribution, the reduction of punish
m ent in the environment, was not possible before the mainsprings of
behavior were discovered. The world was a N ew tonian world before
N ew ton, an Einsteinian world before Einstein, and so on. I use these
illustrious names as illustrations, not as comparisons. A better example
has to do with the behavioral faculty known as language. All hum an

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beings th ro u g h o u t all time have possessed language. In every natural

language there is an implicit gram mar, even tho ug h few societies using
language have ever discovered gramm ar. In gram m ar there is an im
plicit logic and in logic there is an implicit mathematics. The world, we
now say, is a mathematical world. It always was a mathematical world,
even before there was mathematics. M athem atics was implicit in hum an
behavior once the first H om o sapiens began to use the first rudimentary
language. O perant conditioning is to behavior in general as m a th e
matics is to natural language. It was always implicit in behavior, it
simply to o k a long tim e—far too long, many th in k —to be made explicit.
H ow was it made explicit?
This part of the story goes back to the fam ous Pavlov, the man who
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described stimulus and response and trained a dog to salivate at the
ringing of a dinner bell, as if the bell were actual food. This stim ulus-
response chain was consistent with certain experiments on autonomic
nervous systems: prick the muscle of a frog and his leg will contract:
stimulus produces response. All behavior, so the behaviorists o f the
early twentieth century believed, was stimulus-response behavior. This
is what John B. W atson m eant by behaviorism. Freud derived the
“ dynam ic” aspect of psychoanalytic theory from the Pavlovian reflex
a rc .1 It was a picture consistent with nineteenth-century mechanics:
energy was fed into one end of the system and work was produced at
the other. Skinner was well along into his own research before he
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realized something else was going on. The im portant discovery came
a b ou t as the result of an argument with two European psychologists.
They had responded to one of his published articles by claiming to have
earlier discovered and published very similar findings. In defending his
own work, Skinner was led to ponder Edward T h o rn d ik e ’s thesis about
the educational process. W hy he was led to Thorndike is not clear.
One must not discount the possibility th a t a predisposition toward
pragmatism was at work. The crucial role of consequences in both
pragmatism and operant conditioning seems more than accidental.
Thorndike had emphasized the potent role of consequences: learning is
enhanced if the student is rewarded for achievements. Looking back over
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his own laboratory findings, Skinner perceived th at he had not been
observing a stimulus and then a response pattern but, rather, behavior
that was shaped in an orderly pattern by its subsequent reinforcement.
This innocent-appearing modification led to the elaboration of the entire
KDtto Fenichel (1945) states this as follows: “The basic pattern which is useful for the
understanding o f mental phenomena is the reflex arc. Stimuli from the outside world,
or from the body, initiate a state of tension that seeks for motor or secretory discharge,
bringing about relaxation. However, between stumulus and discharge, forces are at
work opposing the discharge tendency. The study o f these inhibiting forces, their origin
and their effect on the discharge tendency, is the immediate subject of psychology.”

operant-conditioning system. Stimulus-response leads us to concentrate

on prior conditions; operant conditioning leads us to concentrate on
what happens after behavior occurs. Stimulus and response reactions
are not disproved, specifically not the reflex actions of the autonom ic
nervous system. However, the environmental contingencies within which
behavior takes place become crucial. Behavior operates on and within
these contingencies and is conditioned for the future according to the
results experienced. Behavior is reinforced when the consequences in
crease the probability it will recur when similar circumstances arise in
the future.2 N ow probability is used here in a special sense. Usually, it
refers to a measure of frequency distributions. In operant conditioning,
probability is quite a different notion, reminiscent of its use in Percy
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Bridgman’s operationalism. Different types of reinforcement schedules
produce differently shaped curves of behavior. However, whatever in
creases probabilities is a positive reinforcer. The subject “ reveals” what
his positive reinforcers are by the way they shape his behavior. Fo od and
sex are com m on positive reinforcers, not because we are told they are
“ liked,” not because they are said to give “ pleasure,” and not because
they are called “ good.” It is the other way a round. We report th a t we
“ like” them and we call them “ go o d ” because they positively reinforce
behavior associated with them. We know this not from expressed
opinions but from shaped behavior: when a positive reinforcer is added
to the environment, it increases behavior rates.
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Behavior in a subject can also be affected by removing certain things
from his environment, or by removing him from the environment c o n
taining them. We escape from the consequences of a fire either by fleeing
it or by putting it out. The consequence, relief from heat, shapes our
subsequent behavior. The beneficial result of ou r negative action rein
forces the escape behavior just as food does with positive behavior. The
reinforcement is produced by a negative act, rather than a positive one,
and it is the negative act that is reinforced. Behavior, assuming we
put out the fire, was increased (reinforced) by taking something out of
the environment. The thing that was taken away was a negative reinforcer,
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because the action consisted of eliminating from, rather than adding to,
the environment. Reinforce/??e»/ is produced both by positive and by
negative reinforcers.
2Pavlov’s a priori formula was in accord with classical mechanics: stimulus produces
response. Skinner defines behavior a posteriori: responses are shaped by consequences.
This is biological rather than mechanical. It is reminiscent o f the concept of tropism and
of C. H. W addington’s (1967) notion o f the “chreods,” the necessary pathways of organ
isms. It is interesting to speculate on what changes might be produced in psychoanalytic
theory if the principles of operant conditioning were to be substituted for those derived
from Pavlov. The result might well bear a close resemblance to Eric Berne’s transactional
analysis.

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Behavior can be suppressed as well as reinforced. This is done by

adding something aversive to the environm ent when escape is impossible.
This is what is commonly called punishment. In operant terms, it is an
aversive stimulus. We detect its presence by observing th at the behavior
associated with it is suppressed. Skinner once believed aversion to be a
less effective behavior modifier than reinforcement, but this has since
proved to be false: the stability of the curves associated with the sup
pression of behavior th rou gh aversion and those for eliciting behavior
through reinforcement turn out to be roughly similar. However, one
may elicit desired behavior both ways: it is possible to specifically
reinforce the desired behavior or to aversively suppress everything but
the desired behavior. O f the two methods, however, reinforcement wins
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hands down. It is more efficient because it is more precise. It is more
effective because it has fewer side effects. It does not, as aversion does,
needlessly suppress extra behavior in order to achieve the desired result.
When stated abstractly, this conclusion seems obvious. Yet a great deal
of hum an behavior is shaped the inefficient and ineffective way. A
common example is the parent who wishes his child to come when called
and punishes the child for doing anything other than that. A very high
proportion of social interaction follows this pattern, even though most
people who engage in it know better. A more difficult situation obtains
when we attem pt to discourage automobile drivers from speeding: We
prohibit speeding by law, and whoever is caught violating the law is
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arrested. If they learn anything from being arrested, speeders learn to
avoid getting caught (one of the ways to do this being to refrain from
speeding). Despite its inherent ambiguity, aversion does work, and this
fact raises a serious question for operant conditioning. When simple
avoidance is what we wish to teach, reinforcement is very inefficient and
aversion can be effective. In theory, it would be possible to reinforce
drivers in such a way that they would always drive at the legal speed;
traffic police would then be unnecessary. However, the effort would be
enormously expensive and the process would be extremely arduous, two
consequences with quite aversive effects.
This leads to the notion of deferred consequences. Candy may be
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immediately reinforcing but ultimately aversive, in that dental caries
and excess weight may result from eating it. A law may be immediately
aversive but ultimately reinforcing in similar fashion. We need m ethods
for presenting future consequences as part of the present environment.
When we wish to produce simple avoidance, or restraint, aversion may
be the preferred device, especially when considered in the light of
deferred consequences. During the early days of liberalism, from the
eighteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, governments were
suppose to do very little, and that little was to be directed primarily

at preventing persons and groups from interfering with the liberty of

individuals. This was the day of negative government. T h at government
was thought best that governed least; anarchy plus the street constable
was the stated ideal. So long as these conditions existed, aversive c o n
trols may have been ultimately reinforcing. They had one further a d va n
tage: People do not like aversive controls and try to avoid them. Aversive
controls may even produce revolutionaries and, if so, they may be self-
correcting. But this happens only if aversion has no t become so wide
spread as to produce a suppressed population. In such cases, the people
become lethargic and m ore withdrawn, rather than restive and rebel
lious. Such behavior is characteristic o f slaves and of the subjects of
totalitarian regimes. Terror, the control device of totalitarian regimes,
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is the constant distribution of aversion th ro u g h o u t the environment,
keeping the people in a perm anent state of apprehension and suppression.
Tow ard the middle of the twentieth century, the so-called liberal
democracies began to develop into what we call the positive state. The
state did more things, and it also required individuals to do more things.
It introduced the controlled economy as well as a wide range of controls
over general behavior. However, it tended to do this through its ac
customed ‘'liberal” mode of control, namely, aversive and punitive
measures: the positive state was accomplished th rou gh the expansion of
punitive and suppressive regulations. The tables were turned on the past.
N ow aversion was used to create immediate satisfactions—for example,
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more j o b s —but at a fearsome deferred social cost thro ugh the increase
in persons exhibiting suppressed behavior. Such, at least, is the argum ent
of the operant conditioners.
The antidote? Dismantle the aversive control system; aband on the
control theories of the early liberals. Substitute instead operant-condi
tioning devices to control behavior th rou gh (negative as well as positive)
reinforcers. Society’s work will get done and everybody will be happier.
Some punitive laws will remain, but most tasks will be accomplished
through positive reinforcement schedules. A few lawyers will still be
required to frame old-fashioned punitive legislation, but most policies
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will be accomplished thro ug h the aid of skilled operant conditioners
program m ing reinforcement schedules.
W hat is wrong with this? N othing, obviously, if that is the only dif
ference. However, the critics of operant conditioning believe there would
be plenty of others. People, they believe, would be too happy and too
smug and too comfortable. M oreover, they would not be aware of their
controls. It is easy to see how a punishm ent controls behavior, but a
reinforcer works insidiously. In fact, operant conditioning itself proves
that we would all have a very difficult time altering behavior that had
been shaped th rough reinforcements. A dictator, if he were really clever,

12 HARVEY WHEELER
would rule throug h operant conditioning and maintain his authority by

keeping everybody happy all the time. In one light this may seem like a
diabolically clever scheme, but would m ankind suffer notably at the
hands of rulers who ran society in the way a ju st G od would run paradise?
The more persuasive reason for caution and skepticism is th at we
cannot estimate the deferred consequences. This is what a proper
technological-assessment project might tell us. However, the task would
be formidable. Operant conditioning is quite easy to understand, so long
as we consider the behavior of one individual at a time; when interactions
are visualized, it becomes much more difficult. Science and Human Be
havior contains a chapter entitled “ Social Behavior,” but it is very thin,
indeed. Moreover, though Skinner does not say so to the reader, he
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discusses nothing more complex than two-person behavior. Two-person
behavior is indeed complicated, and it presents difficult problems for
operant conditioning. The same behavior (for example, person A getting
rid of person B) may be negatively reinforcing to one and aversive
to the other. A dding a third person, or an “ /?th” person, enormously
complicates the situation, so th at it virtually defies analysis. Imagine a
simple task to be accomplished by five persons in such a way that each
is positively reinforced and nothing aversive occurs. Undoubtedly, game
theory could be redefined according to operant-conditioning principles
and then such problems could be worked out on computers. However,
this would require a logic, or an axiology, of operant conditioning
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and so far none has been produced. L. A. Z a d e h ’s essay, “ A System-
Theoretic View of Behavior Modification” (page 160), is a promising
start, but much more is required before theoretical analysis will be
possible. My own appendix to this chapter consists of a series of p ro p o
sitions th at are intended to express the implicit logic of operant condi
tioning. O perant conditioning is an empirical science, not a theoretical
one, and this is one of its major deficiencies. If it could be given a utho ri
tative theoretical expression, m any of the disputes between Skinner and
his opponents might be resolvable. A t least, bystanders would be in a
better position to judge between them.
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Beyond Freedom and D ignity purports to present us with the philos
ophy of operant conditioning. It does no such thing. Instead, it tells us
Fred Skinner’s personal credo, with operant arguments attached, pos
sibly in the hope of reinforcing the reader. With the general reader, it
was partly successful. At least not all younger readers were put off by
his attack on established notions of freedom and dignity, and they were
often attracted by the prospect of a nonpunishing world. W ith the
critics, however, the opposite occurred. Repelled by Skinner’s own be
liefs, they took his word for it that these were implicit in operant condi

Introduction: A Nonpunitice World? 13
tioning. H aving disposed of his beliefs to their own satisfaction, they

then assumed they had thereby disposed of operant conditioning, which,
of course, they had by no means done. Operant conditioning, with its
successes as well as its limitations, stands today exactly as it did before
the publication of Beyond Freedom and D ignity, except that considerably
more people are now misinformed ab o u t it. The reason for this traces
to Skinner’s own philosophy.
Skinner did not begin his professional career as a psychologist. In
fact, he to o k no psychology courses at all as an undergraduate. U pon
graduation from H am ilton College, he worked at being a novelist before
deciding to take graduate work at H arvard.
H e began as a Baconian pragmatist and an admirer of Bertrand
INDEX
Russell. Russell led him into John B. W a ts o n ’s pop ular book on be
haviorism. Only after this did he turn to more technical works and
decide to do graduate study in psychology. Empiricism, positivism,
behaviorism —these were Skinner’s philosophic antecedents, and the
precedence of philosophy over science is im portant. The precedence has
persisted. Chafing under the attacks on Beyond Freedom and D ignity,
Skinner now plans a new book, not on operant conditioning, but on the
philosophy of behaviorism.
Skinner believes that, if one accepts the validity of his scientific
accomplishments, one must also assent to his more general behaviorist
philosophy. He tends to dispose of his critics, not by meeting their
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arguments head on, but by com plaining th at they could not have said
the things they did if first they had either satisfied themselves a b out the
tru th of the science and the efficacy of the technology or, for the sake of
the argum ent, had assumed their validity. The book does not discuss
either the science or the technology, but it does give references permitting
the skeptical reader to satisfy himself a b ou t their claims.
First off, it must be determined whether or not this perspective is a
defensible one. I think it is not, and I think that, if the following p ro p o
sitions can be agreed upon both by Skinner and by his critics, m uch of
the basis for their differences will disappear.
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It is true, as Skinner suggests, that three topics are at issue; it is not
true that they relate to each other in the binding way he suggests. The
three topics are: the philosophy of behaviorism, the science relating to
contingencies of reinforcement, and the technology of operant co nd i
tioning. The last two are intimately connected. The first has no necessary
connection with the others at all.
As a confirmed empiricist, Skinner believes in what humanists call
scientism, namely the view th a t the methods of the physical sciences can
be applied to the study of hu m an and social problems. He also believes
in reductionism. As a physiological psychologist, he deals with indi

14 HARVEY WHEELER
vidual organisms; that is all he sees. When he looks at society, he does

not see structural forces, such as capitalism, or spiritual forces, such as
the Protestant Ethic; he sees individual behavior. Skinner believes that
all social problems can be reduced to individual problems. Scientism,
reductionism, and behaviorism provide the basis for Skinner’s ideo
logical attack on freedom and dignity. O f these, behaviorism has oc
casioned the most discussion.
One can be a philosophical behaviorist without being either a con-
tingencies-of-reinforcement scientist or an operant-conditioning tech
nologist, and vice versa: One could be a Platonist, a K antian, a Hegelian,
a Husserlite—even a Chom skyite—and still accept the findings of
operant conditioning just as one might accept the findings o f any other
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empirical science. This is not a proposition Skinner can easily assent to
because, in his own case, the science and the technology came after and,
hence, positively reinforced the philosophy. A special problem occurs
over Skinner’s arguments (in the absence o f empirical demonstrations)
concerning verbal behavior, but that is a separate issue. M ost of Skin
ner’s critics are really critics of the philosophy of behaviorism rather
th an of operant conditioning. Behaviorism as a philosophy possesses
several difficulties. Skinner’s critics point these out with some acerbity,
seldom bothering to take his science on its own terms or to discuss its
political and philosophical implications.
The general theory o f behaviorism th at Skinner holds goes beyond
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what we are warranted in assuming by virtue of the scientifically valid
propositions that derive from the theory of positive reinforcement. It
also goes beyond what can be dem onstrated by the technique of operant
conditioning. Hence, we must make a distinction between the general
theory of behaviorism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the special
theory of positive reinforcement with its associated technology. In short,
we are not warranted by the evidence in concluding that all behavior,
including verbal behavior, is explicable within the terms of operant con
ditioning. If some behavior is not satisfactorily explained in this way,
the universal claims extrapolated from the system cannot be accepted.
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Hence, we have the option, within the terms of operant conditioning, of
giving it qualified acceptance. Suppose we do this: what then are the
larger implications?
One implication is that we must ad op t the same stance tow ard the
theory of positive reinforcement that we do toward any other scientific
proposition. T hat is, we value it because it can explain certain things
about what is going on; it answers a set of “ w hat” questions. It does not,
however, answer any “ why” questions. Specifically, it does not tell us
why people respond in some situations more effectively to positive

reinforcements than they do to punitive (aversive) measures. As Skinner

has said, “ One might be tempted to conclude that people do so because
that is the way the brain is wired.” But this would be no explanation;
it would be going beyond the evidence, and it would not increase our
understanding even if there were some evidence suggesting that it was
indeed true. Skinner has stated that, in any case, this is the sort of thing
that is investigated by neurophysiologists rather than by behavioral
psychologists.
If “ why” questions can be disposed of we avoid immediately some of
the difficulties occasioned by a hasty reading of B eyond Freedom and
D ig n ity; for in some parts, the book does seem to be addressing itself
to “ why” questions—to the discussion o f overall purposes and their
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presence or absence—rather than merely to “ w h a t” questions. Specifi
cally, we cannot say, within the terms o f operant conditioning, “ why”
men invented liberty, dignity, responsibility, or any other of the classical
moral and political virtues. At most, we can offer a behavior analysis
of their functions. We cannot say which, if any, of these have survival
value, because we cannot judge this without reliance upon criteria o u t
side the scope of behavioral analysis. An example Skinner cites illustrates
the point. Men evolved as organisms highly reinforced by sweets. We
are not justified in suggesting exactly why this occurred merely from
observing th at it did occur. It may have been found that it was a useful
survival trait at one time. In any case, it appears now to be a trait that
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reduces survival potentials. But this is something th a t could not have
been known in the past when it appeared to possess survival potentials.
The same difficulty arises over any other characteristic th at may now be
reinforcing, or of any other behavior that we may now decide to rein
force. In other words, in considering any significant behavior we may
wish to adopt, the question whether or not it possesses survival value
must be decided on criteria separate from the behavior of the organism.
All of this must not be taken to imply that Skinner's own conception
of operant conditioning, either as an empirical science or as an applied
technology, is the only (or even the preferred) one. Many im portant
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qualifications, divergences, and improvements have been made by those
who have followed later. Karl Pribram, in C h ap ter 5, argues that
Skinner’s view of operant conditioning is not so m uch wrong as it is
obsolete. This is reinforced by the work of William T. Powers, who has
used the analogy of the closed feedback loop to explain behavior in a
fashion that purports to resurrect purpose and, hence, “ freedom .”
These, as well as the other qualifications found th ro u g h o u t the book,
merely serve to reinforce the argum ent in favor of a rigorous technologi
cal assessment of operant conditioning.

16 HARVEY WHEELER
Suppose we ad o p t this qualified view o f the application of operant-

conditioning techniques. W h a t difference will it make? First off, it
induces one im portant change in our world view. We accept the fact
that behavior is, and always has been, strongly affected by environ
mental factors composed of both aversive and reinforcing elements and
that, for certain types of performance, the most powerful conditioners
are the positive reinforcers. H u m an s now live, and always have lived,
in a world of positive reinforcement: th at is the fact, and it is a fact
with sound scientific underpinning. Therefore, there can be no question
of deciding whether or not to believe in operant conditioning, or whether
or not to introduce it, much as we may decide whether or not to in tro
duce the com puter or the SST.
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Having recognized that operant conditioning is, in fact, one of the
ways behavior is shaped, we then have the option of leaving things in
the operant condition presently existing or taking advantage of this new
awareness and adopting more widespread applications of operant-
conditioning practices, substituting positive reinforcers for aversive
stimuli in a number of cases.
W h at would be the effect o f the latter choice? One of the first things
we would have to decide would be the relative effectiveness of reinforcing
and aversive controls in specific cases. Recall the example of traffic
regulations. We could, conceivably, eliminate all policemen and all
traffic signs and positively condition people to get to places correctly
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and at proper rates of speed. It is not likely we would decide to do so,
because it appears that the costs in time, money, and other desirables
would be prohibitive. T hat is, we would end up with a system that would
be ultimately more punitive than is the more efficient, though c h ar
acteristically aversive, mode of control we now apply. Hence, even
within the assumptions of positive reinforcement, there may be overall
characteristics of a set of positive reinforcements that, taken as a whole,
are indirectly more aversive than would be alternative techniques for
achieving the same goal through overtly aversive means. This does not
mean that some qualified or partial applications would not be desirable,
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but it does mean that the choice for or against the practice would always
be one in which the possible deferred aversive effects of positive rein
forcers would have to be measured against the possibly amplified de
ferred reinforcements of immediate aversive means. Again, this is a case
somewhat akin to that of the effects of sugar as a positive reinforcer.
Moreover, our choice must depend upon our ultimate goals, and these
cannot be derived from within behavioral assumptions. Fo r example,
today we simply do not know what the correct ecological policies for
safeguarding the environment should be. Soon, through the application
of something like the Forrester-M eado w s model, we may be able to

Introduction: A Nonpunitiae World? 17
calculate ecological effects more accurately and, thus, avoid what

Forrester calls counterintuitive policies. But until something like this is
possible, we have no way of knowing what ecological behavior ought
now to be reinforced; on the other hand, we do know that much of
what we actually ad opt is ultimately aversive, in the counterintuitive
sense. Thus, we need much more sophisticated goal-setting devices before
we can accurately calculate the marginal reinforcement potentials of
alternative policies.
Suppose this problem is solved and we begin to adopt positive
reinforcement techniques for a large range of social and political policies,
how different would the new society be from the one we now have? Sev
eral suggestions can be made:
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1) Punitive institutions will tend to give way to educational institutions
(educational in the sense that persons can be ta u gh t how to avoid de
ferred aversive effects th rou gh operant conditioning).
2) The overall punitive, or legalistic, environment will be reduced and
somewhat supplanted by positive-reinforcement practices, with a result
ing decrease in repressive measures.
3) M anagem ent of people and direction of organizations will tend to
become debureaucratized, for it will be possible to condition behavioral
patterns in people rather than objectify them in organizational struc
tures.
4) Organizations will themselves become smaller due to the reduction
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of formalistic superstructures.
5) Organizations will operate more along self-management lines,
rather than authoritarian lines, which will result in an approxim ation of
goals traditionally associated with anarchism.
6) The increase in technically qualified people in the field of operant
conditioning may be similar to the previous increase in experts in
accounting, economics, and other social technologies. It is difficult to
visualize the role such experts would play. It is certain that professional
standards must be established, and some safeguards against im proper
practices will be required. It is even possible that a central governmental
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agency for the survey of the possible applications of operant conditioning
may be required, much as a central agency for economic forecasting is
now required.
7) A separate issue arises because of the possibility th at operant
conditioning may work best through focusing initially upon verbal
behavior. This is not established at present, but it may turn out that,
when the problem is to change overall normal behavior in some signifi
cant way, the device will be through verbal behavior. (See the essay
“ Controlled E nvironments for Social C hange,” by Vitali R ozynko et
al., on page 71.) In this event, something similar to the group mind-

18 HARVEY WHEELER
changing practices pioneered in China may appear. This will obviously

raise numerous issues, one of them relating to liberty.
8) The atm osphere of liberty is not likely to alter as sharply as is
described in Beyond Freedom and D ignity, but the emphasis is likely to
change. The role of negative liberty—liberty conceived as freedom
from restraint—is certainly not going to disappear, for one of the effects
of introducing positive reinforcement is to diminish restraints and,
hence, to expand liberty. It is likely, however, that the positive idea of
liberty—liberty interpreted as the freedom to do, or the ability to achieve,
what one w ants—is likely to take precedence over the more traditional
idea of negative liberty that has been associated with the tradition of
western liberalism. In this restricted sense, the society will, to some
INDEX
extent, have moved beyond liberty, if not dignity.
9) A special jurisprudential problem concerns the relation between
law and planning. Plans are goals and they are also laws. But they are
not laws in the traditional liberal sense because one cannot punish
people for failure to achieve goals. To do so leads to distortions and
falsifications of the sort familiar from the Russian experience in a t
tempting to enforce compliance with planning goals. At the present
time, there is no adequate jurisprudence applicable to the legal problems
of a planned society. Operant conditioning may point toward the solu
tion of this problem : a form of law in which achievement o f goals is
prescribed but failure to achieve them is not punished.
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Freedom and dignity, as we know them, are largely the invention of
modern western industrial man. True, these notions have been utilized
by other civilizations, but not in the meanings Skinner gives them. The
problem is to evaluate the costs and benefits attributable to them. It is
a formidable task, but given the m om entous consequences that might
follow their abandonm ent, it is something that must be attempted before
we can decide whether or not to eliminate them. Fo r example, to what
extent does an environment containing freedom and dignity achieve the
ends we want more efficiently than might otherwise be possible? This
raises a host of questions. There is the question of individualism and
how its ravages of our national resources can be curbed. It raises ques
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tions relating to the findings of K u rt Lewin and his dem onstrations that
environments providing freedom and dignity are more productive than
those that do not. But beyond this, it raises the question of the overall
effects of the social environment. A society providing freedom and
dignity am ounts to a moral society. It teaches its members that they are
auto no m ou s moral agents who must choose between good and evil and
act accordingly. Even if they choose to do evil or to violate the law,
they are accorded the dignity of an a u to no m ou s person (and punished
accordingly). To the extent that they have no choice—that is, to the

Introduction: A Nonpunitice World? 19
extent that they behave compulsively, when “ out o f their m inds” (from
drugs or insanity) or under duress—they are absolved from responsi
bility. In such cases, they are accorded treatm ent (often hospitalization)
rather than punishment. The first result of dispensing with freedom and
dignity is the elimination of the assumption th a t men are responsible
for their acts. Hence, the moral society will be supplanted by the “ hos
pital society” or, as it has also been called, the “ therapeutic society.”
This is not as fanciful as it might first ap pear; it is one way of describing
contem porary China. China is one of the societies that never experienced
such western values as freedom and dignity. This is not to say that
freedom and dignity were unknow n to traditional China, but only th at
the peculiarly western versions o f them were never assimilated by the
Chinese. M oreover, when China began industrialization, it adopted
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procedures much like those described in Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
It often applied reinforcement rather than aversive m ethods to induce
its people to accept the new behavioral environment. It then arranged
its reward system so as to positively reinforce actions that were in
conformity with the values of the new environment. Deviation was not
so much punished as it was treated. Recalcitrant individuals were given
group think tre a tm e n ts—called brain-washing—in which they were
rewarded for expressing approved sentiments. China provides an ex
ample th a t can be useful in preparing a model for the technological
assessment of operant conditioning.
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We may raise a somewhat more subtle issue. Even assuming th a t the
above difficulties can be resolved, what abou t the positive role that
such notions as freedom and dignity may have played? Skinner argues
they are bad because they stand in the way of full-fledged adoption of
operant-conditioning principles in hum an affairs. H e argues further that
they are wrong because a behaviorist point of view reveals them to be
myths. Suppose we agree that such concepts, formerly deemed en
nobling, are, in fact, myths. M ay it not be true, even from a behaviorist
point of view, that such ennobling myths are necessary positive rein
forcers for a hum ane and decent society? If so, the role of behaviorism
would be to induce a firm belief in the intrinsic validity of verbal be
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havior that it claims is no more valid than an archaic code of chivalry.
This, in fact, is close to the conclusion of an earlier behavior modifier.
Plato concluded th at people in general could not be induced to engage
in the normative behavior they ought to observe unless they could be
m ade to believe in certain myths capable of inducing such behavior. This
led Plato to his theory of the noble lie: a rule of behavior that is just, but
whose justice is not suspectible to being perceived by the average person.
M any of Skinner’s critics have suggested that he is, in effect, a negative
Plato, and that what he has presented us with is an ignoble lie.

20 HARVEY WHEELER
My own conclusion is th at this is an erroneous interpretation. I have

many doubts about the political and social conclusions he draws from
his work. The fact remains, however, th at Skinner’s work has resulted
in the creation of a rapidly m aturing technology of behavior modifica
tion. It is effective, and because it is effective it will be used. The political
problem facing us is the same one th at faces us when any powerful
technology is developed: how to control it so that we can enjoy its
benefits rather than suffer from its abuses. After the debate over the
merits of the arguments in Beyond Freedom and Dignity has subsided,
this problem will rem ain; a problem th a t would be posed to us by
Skinner’s scientific contributions even if he had never written Walden I I
or Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
INDEX A p p en d ix : A T e n ta tiv e Logic o f O p e r a n t C o n d itio n in g
1) We begin with an organism responding in an eventful environment.

The events of the environment include events taking place inside the
nervous system.
2) There may be much in the environment to which the organism is
neutral; no response occurs. Although we cannot say that an organism
is not behaving, we can say that, inasmuch as it responds selectively with
regard to the events in its environment, it may be neutral to many if not
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most of them. Specific events, or categories of events, may move in and
out of neutral status.
3) Organisms exhibit tropisms and enantiotropism s; they develop t o
ward (positive) and away from (negative) various things in their environ
ment.
4) These are, to use C. H. W a d ding to n’s term, chreods (necessary
pathways). There are positive and negative chreods.
5) The various chreods exhibited by an organism make up its reper
toires.
6) Alterations in the environment alter the repertoires.
7) An organism acquires highly articulated repertoires when they
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increase in quantity, or frequency, or both.
8) The record o f the interaction between an organism and those events
to which it is not neutral is its response rate.
9) The interaction may result either in suppression or in reinforcement
of the response.
10) Suppression reduces response rates; reinforcement augments re
sponse rates.
11) Both can be assigned operationalist probabilities denoting the
likelihood with which they will tend to occur under similar conditions
in the future.

12) Positive suppression is a decrease in the probability of the same

response occurring in the future and is achieved with direct aversive
stimuli.
13) A negative suppression is a decrease in the probability of a re
sponse occurring in the future and is achieved with reinforcement of
behavior preclusive of that response.
14) A positive reinforcer is something added to the environment that
increases the probability a given response will recur in the future.
15) A negative reinforcer is something elim inated from the environ
ment that increases the probability a given response will recur in the
future.
16) All reinforcement achieves negative suppression of responses
INDEX
contradictory to the one being reinforced.
17) Suppression and reinforcement are known th rou gh the responses
of the individual organism ; although most members of a species respond
similarly, what is suppressive for one may be reinforcing for another.
18) This is true both relatively and reflexively.
19) Relatively, the same event may suppress a response in one o rgan
ism but reinforce that response in another.
20) Reflexively, when an event incorporates the behavior of two or
more organisms, the reinforcement experienced by one may induce
suppression in another.
21) A relationship creates a corporate behavioral event.
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22) C orporate events consist of reflexive responses.
23) C o rpo rate events can be classified according to the reflexive effects
of an event on the responses of each member.
24) Two extreme possibilities exist: the positive reinforcement of all
members, and the positive suppression of all members.
25) Positive reinforcement on the corporate level would be an event
in which all the reflexive responses of each m em ber are positively
reinforced.
26) It is possible to simulate an operant-conditioning model for cor
porate events in which positive reinforcement is optimized.
27) It would be possible to minimize the a m ou nt of punishm ent in
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society by applying the model to the shaping of actual corporate be
havior.

The Skinnerian Revolution

John R. Platt
INDEX John R. Platt, research biophysicist and associate director o f the

M ental H ealth Research Institute at the University o f M ichigan, is the
author o / T h e Excitement of Science, The Step to M an, Perception
and Change: Projections for the Future, and other books.
The first h a lf o f “ The Skinnerian Revolution” is devoted to
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explicating what P latt calls Skinner's “revolutionary m anifesto.”
P latt manages to clarify aspects o f Skinner's approach that have
pu zzled m any readers o f Beyond Freedom and Dignity, and his
presentation is sufficiently comprehensive that those who have not yet
read Skinner will be able to understand the balance o f this book.
In the last h a lf o f his article, Platt reviews Skinner's methods fro m
a more existential viewpoint and comes to the conclusion that they
“offer us the brightest hopes o f any m ethods we now have fo r rapid
restructuring o f m any o f our obsolete and dangerous institutions, and
f o r building, not m erely a Skinnerian society, but any new society
f o r the world ahead."
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W h a t S k in n e r H a s D o n e
THE IM PACT O N PSY CH O LO G Y
B. F. Skinner’s new book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, is a revolutionary

manifesto. It proposes the design of a new society using our new methods
for improving the behavior and the interactions of hum an beings. It has

The Skinnerian Revolution 23
been roundly condem ned, as all his earlier books have been, by hum anist
critics who at other times call for improved hum an interactions. In fact,
from this point of view, Skinner may have had the worst press of any
great scientist since Darwin.
In order to understand the im po rtan t new philosophical ideas in
B eyond Freedom and Dignity, I think it is essential to u n d e rs ta n d —as
most of his critics have not u n d e rsto o d —Skinner’s basic discoveries
ab ou t behavior, what they imply ab ou t hum an relations, and how they
are already being applied to a m ultitude of problem s today.
The com parison with Darwin is not inappropriate. Both men started
from a small set of problems and forced a radical rethinking of every
thing else in the field. Both men displaced the old verbal explanations
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with an alm ost mechanical description of basic processes of life and
man. D a rw in's m echanism of the evolution of species is even closely
parallel to Skinner’s mechanism of the evolution of behavior in a single
individual. Darwin, like Skinner, was accused of unjustified e xtrapola
tion from birds and dogs to man, and of treating m an as a mere animal.
And in both cases, in spite of the scientific clarification and the technical
successes, there were loud protests from the defenders of hum anism
and morality.
There is no do ubt that Skinner's a p proach is leading to a radical
reprogram m ing of psychology. Until recently, psychology has seemed
to be standing still for lack of a general organizing principle. F re u d ’s
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form ulations have been greatly discredited by recent experiments;
Pearsonian m easurements and correlations usually do not show us how to
do anything; personality “ traits” and even intelligence tests are under
fire; the theories of “ drives” could not even explain such compulsive be
havior as gambling; the great learning theorists did not show us how
to teach faster; the “ classical conditioning” m ethods of the early be-
haviorists have been of little use in schools or child training, or even
anim al training; and the schools of loving responsiveness, group therapy,
and “ peak experiences” have been warm and inspiring but not very
scientific.
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Into this sea of ineffectiveness, Skinner has brought, over the last
thirty-five years, a technique and theory of “ op erant conditioning” and
behavior modification th at has transform ed every behavioral problem
and approach. His m ethod can speed up animal learning by 10 to 100
times (Skinner, 1959; Pryor, 1969), can be used to improve behavior in
psychiatric wards (Ayllon and Azrin, 1968), cure problems such as bed
wetting and stuttering th at have resisted psychiatric treatm ent (Ulrich
et al., 1966; Krassner and U llm ann, 1965), cure disruptive or delinquent
behavior (T harp and Wetzel, 1969), and can double the learning rate in
schools from kindergarten th rou gh college (Skinner, 1968a; Whaley and *
M alott, 1971). It can be used for self-control of unw anted habits (Ulrich

24 JOHN R. PLATT
et al., 1966; Stuart and Davis, 1970; Whaley and Malott, 1971), and
even for yoga-like voluntary control of heartbeat, blood pressure, and
other autonom ic functions that had been supposed to be beyond con
scious control (D iCara and Miller, 1968; Miller, 1969).
It is evidently im portant for u s—and for everyone—to understand
just how such a powerful m ethod works and what it implies abo ut
biology and hum an nature. Only then can we assess the real or imagined
dangers feared by Skinner’s opponents. In the end, I think we can show
that a considerable reconciliation is possible between Skinner's a p
proaches and those of his critics, when we see how their different c o n
tributions fit together into a total view o f man and of m a n ’s self-deter
mination of his society and his future.
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TH E PR IN C IP L E OF C O N T IN G E N T REINFORCEM ENT
The basis of Skinner’s methods o f learning and behavior modification is

his principle of contingent reinforcement, or “ operant conditioning,”
which he first stated more than thirty years ago (Skinner, 1938). He
showed that a three-term form ulation is necessary to describe how an
animal or hum an being is induced to change its behavior (Skinner,
1969). (This is why the usual one-term or two-term learning theories—
such as learning-by-experience, learning-by-doing, trial-and-error, and
stimulus-and-response, or, in com puter language, in p u t- o u tp u t—are so
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ineffective.) Koestler confused Skinner’s m ethod with stimulus-and-
response [p. 166].1
The three necessary terms are stim ulus-behavior-reinforcem ent, and
their relation can be symbolized by
B
S R,
thought of as repeated:
B B B
S R .. . S R. ..S R ___
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The lower line in each three-term unit represents the environm ent’s
actions on the organism, and the upper line represents the organism ’s
actions on the environment. S is the preliminary stimulus or situation,
B is some behavior the organism may then show or “ emit,” and R is
then any change or “ reinforcement” from the environment that is
immediate and contingent on a particular B. (A particular behavior B
T houghout this paper, page numbers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s
Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

emitted by the organism is called an “ op eran t,” and when this is induced
to be emitted regularly under a given S and R, the process is called
“ operant conditioning.” )
Any R that is followed by an increase in the probability of B is called
a positive reinforcer, or R +. Any R that is followed by a decrease is
called a negative or aversive reinforcer, or R~. Some critics object to
this as being a circular definition of reinforcem ent—as, for example, in
the phrase “ the enhancem ent of behavior by positive reinfo rcem ent"—
but the problem is no more difficult than that of the useful Darwinian
phrase “ the survival of the fittest.” In fact, reinforcers, unlike “ fitness,”
can be fairly reliably predicted or extended to other situations and other
species.
The R+ and R~ differ from ordinary “ rew ards” and “ punishm ents”
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in being more precisely defined. O rdinary “ rew ards” (food, for example)
may become aversive (too m uch food), whereas “ punishm ent” to a
response-starved child may be positively reinforcing. Skinner also de
fines an R °, called “ time o u t” (removal of S ), which plays a useful role
in shaping behavior.
Skinner showed the im portance of the immediacy and contingency
of R in inducing a changed B. An immediate R —within one second or
less—singles out the B that is being reinforced from all the other Bs
of minutes or hours earlier. And for fast and accurate learning, R must
come only after B has been emitted.
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However, R does not have to follow a given B every time. In fact, the
fastest method of changing behavior is to give R+ every time after some
initial B is emitted, and then withhold it until B fluctuates a little in the
desired direction. An R + then reinforces this new B, and can be again
repeated and again withheld, so proceeding on a “ reinforcement sched
ule” step by step to reach the final desired behavior. In the later stages
of learning, an intense and repeated B can be maintained by “ stretching
the ra tio ” and giving R + random ly and more and more rarely, as a
slot-machine. This is the basic explanation of gambling, on the one hand,
and of certain types of patience and perseverance on the other. By
stretching the ratio a little at a time, pigeons have been induced to keep
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pecking for more than 10,000 times for a grain of corn, though wasting
away steadily—like the gambler (Skinner, 1959).
In shaping behavior, the size of the reinforcer is m uch less im portant
than its immediacy and contingency. An animal will work harder for a
sequence of small bites of food than for a big dinner that would be
satiating, and a gambler can be hooked by repeated small payoffs. And
an animal or child will work at one task just to get to do another task that
he likes better [this is known as the Premack principle (see Premack,
1959, 1962)]. Or animals will work when the reinforcer is nothing but

26 JOH N R. PLATT
a sharpening up or clarification of the stimulus situation (Skinner,

1959)—just as hum ans will work to get a better m ap or a clarification
of their problems.
The role of “ secondary reinforcers” is extremely im portant and useful.
A positive reinforcer, R +, can be replaced most of the time by some
secondary reinforcer, R s {+), that has been associated with it. Thus, a
baby obtaining the primary reinforcer o f milk also comes to be rein
forced by secondary m aternal responses and by adult voices and smiles,
so that these come to serve as generalized social reinforcers th roughout
our lives. H arlow and H arlow (1962) have shown that baby monkeys,
like children, who are given food but deprived of these other responses
become antisocial and psychotic adults. A nd we all know that material
secondary reinforcers, such as money or school-tokens th a t can be
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exchanged for prim ary reinforcers, are of the greatest importance for
our own learning and efforts and social behavior.
Putting this all together, we find th a t any simple initial behavior
B, such as a body movement, or an eyeblink, or a secretion or an in
testinal contraction, can be increased or decreased in probability or
intensity by the correct reinforcement schedule of Rs. Or it can be
“ shaped,” step by step, into new forms, or c om pounded with other Bs
into a complex chain of behaviors. (A chain, Bi — B-2 — . . . — B n,
is built up by working backwards from the last element so that each
learned B is used as the reinforcer for the previous B). A larger repertoire
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of behaviors can thus be built up.
By having a reinforcement schedule th at depends on S, any of these
behaviors can then be “ brought under the control of” some new S
situation, or can come to be emitted with finer and finer discriminations
between different Ss. We learn to respond to the green light, with R +,
and ignore the red light, with R~. [In fact, the Terrace technique permits
these discriminations to be transferred to another set of discriminations
without errors! (See Skinner, 1968; Terrace, 1963a, 1963b.)]
These Bs can then be maintained indefinitely in full strength by a weak
and intermittent R+ or by a secondary reinforcer, R s {+). Or a B may
finally be “ extinguished” and no longer emitted if it ceases to be followed
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by any 7?+, or if the reinforcer continues to be given but is no longer
contingent on B. In short, Skinner’s central discovery is:
Immediate reinforcement contingencies—the schedule of Rs as related to

S and B —are what shape successive behavior in all learning animals.
To change behavior, first change the reinforcing contingencies.

This is very far removed from Pavlov’s 1910 discovery of the “ condi
tioned reflex” and “ classical conditioning,” although this work of more

than sixty years ago is still confused with Skinner’s work by his critics—
most recently in 1971 in the pages of Science! (See Holden, 1971; Semb
and Nevin, 1971.) Pavlov rang a bell as he presented food to a dog, and
then found that the dog would salivate to the bell alone. In this type of
experiment, the experimenter does both things beforehand, not waiting
for the anim al’s “ o p e ran t” behavior; and the animal does nothing but
“ associate” them, so the method is useless for shaping new behavior.
(The role of the third term, the R+ of food, in maintaining the bell-
induced salivation, remained to be recognized.)
In 1921, the other leading early behaviorist, J. B. Watson, actually
used intense bangs to make a baby fear small animals (Ulrich et al.,
1966), much as described by Huxley in Brave N ew World. (Again,
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Skinner’s critics confuse his work with W a tso n ’s pairing, and confuse
the m ethods in his behavioral utopia, Walden Two (1948), with the
stereotyped behavior methods in Brace New W orld.) But W atson inter
preted his shock treatm ent again as “ association” or stimulus-response,
neglecting the preshock behavior B, which he thus could not enlarge.
T oday, by contrast, an animal can be taught by reinforcement m ethods
— not in days but in a few m inutes—to control autonom ic behaviors
like salivation or the blushing of one ear (D iC ara and Miller, 1968;
Miller, 1969), or even the pulses of individual brain cells (Fetz and
Finocchio, 1971). Pigeons can be taught to dance a figure eight for the
first time in just thirty minutes (Skinner, 1959). Pryor (1969) induced a
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porpoise to emit not a particular behavior but continual novelties of
behavior. A nd G a rd n e r and G a rd n e r (1969) have taught a young
chimpanzee to “ ta lk ” in deaf-and-dum b sign language with a vocabulary
of m ore than 100 words.
These Skinnerian results go as far beyond Pavlov as the atomic
bom b goes beyond dynamite.
C Y BE R N ETIC A N D E V O LU T IO N A R Y PA R ALLELS
In spite of the time it to ok to straighten out the effects of reinforcement,

the principle is not alien to other ways of form ulating the organism -
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environm ent relationship. Thus, the parallel between reinforcement and
the way we learn from the natural environment is obvious. An animal
or baby is rewarded by food after it reaches for food, and so learns to
reach more and more accurately. The reinforcement principle is also
somewhat parallel to the older “ transaction th e ory” of interpersonal
relationship, where A maintains his behavior because of response by B,
and vice-versa.
There is an even closer parallel to W iener’s theory of cybernetics,
which describes the behavior of a goal-directed organism, or an a u to m

28 JOHN R. PLATT
aton, such as an automatic gun-director. Such a goal-directed system

can “ tra c k ” a target and hit it accurately because there is an ongoing
feedback-loop process, which consists of detecting the distance from the
target (S), moving tow ard it (B), and then detecting the error or success
( R ), which serves, in turn, as the stimulus (S ) for the next move (B),
and so on.
Von Holst, and Held and his co-workers (Held and Hein, 1963;
Held, 1965), have shown in a different way th a t this kind o f feedback
loop relation holds between an animal or hum an and the environment.
The organism’s own motions lead to “ reafferent stimulation” from the
environment, and this is a necessary condition for all visual perception
or adaptation. A kitten, for example, can only learn to see if, in the weeks
after birth, its visual stimulation, S' (afferent), can be followed by its
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own self-motions, B, which change in a natural way the new visual
stimulation, R (reafferent).
These parallels with modern feedback theory make the three-term
form ulation of the completed reinforcement loop, S - B - R , appear to
be a necessary natural formulation for describing the goal-directed
behavior of any learning organism. In Beyond Freedom and D ignity,
Skinner has now gone on to develop the larger parallel between the
reinforcement principle and the Darwinian mechanism of natural selec
tion. New behaviors in the individual are like variations or mutations
in the species, which are not directed in advance but are selected after
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wards by the environment, in the one case by reinforcement and in the
other case by survival. As he says, “ the environment does not push or
pull, it selects” [p. 16]. So over the lifetime of an individual organism,
num erous types of complex behavioral responses are built up and
evolved by the long sequence of natural and social reinforcement c o n
tingencies from b irth —just as, in the course of organic evolution,
numerous species of animals have been evolved by the long sequence
of evolutionary survival contingencies.
This is the reason why Skinner’s theory and experiments, like D a r
win’s, are generalizable from pigeons to hum an beings, in spite of the
enorm ous genetic and neurophysiological differences between such
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organisms. Learning by reinforcement may go back 500 million years
or more, so it is primitive, even though not quite so primitive as the
survival mechanism. Undoubtedly, some day we will discover far more
sophisticated principles of higher brain response and capability to put
on top of this. But at this stage it is only clear that we all need positive
reinforcement, like lower animals, for shaping our behavior and happi
ness, just as surely as we need food. It is only surprising that the dem on
stration has taken so long and has been so resisted.

A G A IN ST P U N ISH M E N T
The reinforcement experiments have led to conclusions and applications

that go far beyond animal training. One dram atic dem onstration is the
severe behavioral consequences associated with punishm ent or aversive
reinforcement, R~. Skinner discusses the consequences of punishment
and the alternatives to punishm ent more systematically in Beyoncl
Freedom and D ignity than in any previous books. It is true th at punish
ment can stop unw anted behavior almost immediately. This, of course,
reinforces the parent or punisher, leading him to do it again and again!
But the experiments show th a t punishment is ineffective unless applied
immediately every time (quite opposite to the situation with R + rein
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forcers), and the punished behavior always comes back, along with
such additional behavior as attempts to escape, or to evade punishment,
or to retaliate. Skinner says that this is why windows are broken in
schools and not in drugstores.
There are also general behavioral effects. The punished animal or
child cowers and loses his confidence and creativity, or else he becomes
defiant; and the punished child acquires long-lasting anxiety and guilt
feelings. It might be supposed that “ not being punished” for being
“ go o d ” would be equivalent to being “ rew arded,” but the behavioral
effects are very different. (Changing from R ~ to N ot-/?- may be equiv
alent to changing from no reward to R + in mathematics or economics,
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but it is not the same in behavior. This profound discovery has not
been appreciated by m any critics. The notation and usage here, in which
R ~ is applied to punishment, is a change from strict Skinnerian usage,
but is designed to bring out this difference. The present notation has
been found useful in applying reinforcement to microeconomic bargain
ing and to two-person game theory.)
The most effective fast way to stop unw anted behavior without these
severe additional effects is by R°, or “ time o u t.” The machine simply
stops working for the pigeon, who starts pecking madly in every direc
tion to turn it back on so he can work for his c o rn ; or the child is put
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in a bare ro om for exactly five minutes. The effect is to encourage
return to the creative environm ent and exploration for positive reward,
rather than to discourage it, as R~ does.
But the best long-run way to eliminate unw anted behavior is by
completely eliminating the R + reinforcements that m aintain it, so that
it becomes extinguished, and working at the same time to displace it
by providing R + reinforcements for wanted behavior that is incom p at
ible with it. This is not immediately reinforcing for the parent or teacher,
because it may take two weeks’ more patience before the correction is

30 JOHN R. PLATT
seen, but it is more rewarding in the long run because it preserves the
learning relation and does not generate the other behaviors of escape,
defiance, or cowering. The displaced behavior can then be brought back
in full strength later in other contexts in which it may be positively use
ful. So the energy of a disruptive child in class may be displaced during
that time by positively reinforced study behavior, but it may be brought
back later as a valuable asset to the tennis team.
The result is th at the Skinnerian school, from the beginning, has come
out strongly against punishment as a m ethod of teaching either animals
or hu m an beings. (Some of his opponents do not seem to know this.)
Yet, throu gho ut hum an history, large parts of family life, education,
law, and religion have been based on punishment methods of control.
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They produced dam aged and constrained hum an beings, as all our
literature testifies. The London schools have only now abolished caning,
although the more vicious punishments o f parents, schools, and jails
have been greatly reduced by the enlightenment and more permissive
child-rearing practices of the last 50 years.
Yet, as Skinner emphasizes in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, permis
siveness is still not the same as positive shaping of learning and crea
tivity, and it also has left us with serious behavioral deficits, delinquency,
and feelings of anomie and alienation. He is right to emphasize that it
is of the greatest importance to examine how a society might be designed
to achieve its ends through positive reinforcements in all our interac
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tions, and to see what it might do to us as individuals and to our col
lective life. All the experimental and educational results support this
claim, that, if positive-reinforcement m ethods began to be used by
parents and teachers (not to speak of law and the courts), and if they
were applied to a whole generation, we might see a transform ation in
our constructive creativity and in the pleasure of life.
COM PLEX BEHAVIORS A N D A TTITUD ES
A com m on objection to the application of the Skinnerian m ethods to

m an is that “ hum an beings are not pigeons,” and th a t inducing a de
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prived pigeon in a box to peck a key has little relevance to the learning
of complex hum an behavior. To this, Skinner replies that the reinforce
ment principle is im portan t in teaching any behavior we can specify.
We have seen what complex chains of animal behavior can be taught,
even to such relatively free animals as porpoises or chimpanzees in
home-labs. For hum an beings, the reinforcement principle can be used
not only for teaching lessons and classroom material to children, but
also for teaching good study habits, general problem-solving skills, and
such less tangible behaviors as patience, perseverance, self-control,
courage, cooperation, and ethical behaviors.

Thus, in “ contingency-contracting” classrooms, larger problem solv

ing is taught by “ self-contracting,” in which the student begins to design
and use his own self-reinforcers for improved study habits and explora
tory problem-solving steps (H om m e et al., 1970). “ To teach a student to
study is to teach him the techniques of self-management” (Skinner,
1968a, p. 129). Patience and perseverance can be taught by “ stretching
the ratio,” as we have seen. Skinner (1968a) suggests that the persever
ance of scientists, or their lack of it, is generated in this way by their
early reinforcement contingencies. He describes, fictionally in Walden
Two and prescriptively in The Techology o f Teaching, how such virtues
and more general ethical behavior might be taught.
The reinforcement m ethod is also a powerful method in self-control,
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in the reduction of unwanted habits, and in the development of wanted
ones. T ho usand s if not millions of adults have cut out sm oking or over
eating by using reinforcement methods, which are now taught in m any
behavioral psychology courses (Stuart and Davis, 1970; Whaley and
Malott, 1971). The procedure is the same as that described earlier for
eliminating unwanted behavior in children or o th e rs—to measure your
own behavior and find what R +s are reinforcing the unw anted habit,
then to reduce or eliminate these R+s, while simultaneously displacing the
habit by providing R + reinforcements for wanted behavior which is
incompatible with it. T o change behavior, first change the reinforcers.
This m ethod is very different in its success from such m ethods as
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promises or New Y ear resolutions, which depend on good intentions,
or guilt, or self-chastisement and, consequently, have no ongoing rein
forcement support and are forgotten in a few days. The R~ m ethod of
physical or spiritual flagellation, so familiar in religion, leaves one part
of a person fighting the other, so to speak, with self-resentment, escape,
guilt, and neurosis, if not psychosis. The R + m ethod, by contrast,
leaves a person more confident of self-management, with m ore sense of
ease and assurance, and more whole and creative than before. The two
are as different as night and day.
We will come back later to Skinner’s “ two-self a p p ro a c h ” to self
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control in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, and to the problems of self
control and mutual reinforcement for a group.
The effect of changed behavior in changing attitudes is another
startling result of the Skinnerian experiments. In the past, most psycholo
gists assumed, like everyone else, that we must som ehow acquire new
attitudes in order to develop new behavior so that we might then get
our new rewards. Skinner has shown that this must be turned around.
He says, in essence, that “ changed attitudes fo llo w or accom pany
changed behavior. Changed behavior fo llo w s changed reinforcement
contingencies.”

32 JOHN R. PLATT
Q uoting William James, he says that we do not run from the bear
because we are afraid, but rather th at the fear, set off by the higher
adrenalin in our blood and faster heartbeat, is part of our running
response. The fear follows or goes with the running behavior. Likewise,
in a psychiatric ward that is being managed by the reinforcers of a
“ T oken E conom y,” when the reinforcement tokens are given to the
patients for sweeping and helping to m ake beds, they speak of the
feeling of being appreciated and of the good spirit in the ward. But
when the same num ber of tokens, still exchangeable for the same
reinforcements of desserts or privileges, continue to be paid without
being contingent on the work, the behavior stops and the feelings of
alienation return (Ayllon and Azrin, 1968).
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One of the more ironical passages in Beyond Freedom and Dignity is
the description of the unhap py young m an just out of college, whose
attitudes are first described in the conventional psychological and pop u
lar language, and are then described in terms of the behavior, or lack
of it, that is producing them. “ He . . . feels insecure . . . (his behavior is
weak and inappropriate); . . . he feels guilty or ashamed (he has previously
been punished fo r idleness or fa ilure, which now evokes emotional re
sponses)', . . . he becomes . . . neurotic (he engages in a variety o f ineffec
tive modes o f escape); . . and so on.
As Skinner says, this analysis of attitudinal problems in behavioral
terms transforms the problems so that, at last, they can be solved. “ It
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helps in two ways: it defines what is to be done and suggests ways of
doing it” [pp. 146-147].
N E W EFFECTIVENESS IN T EA C H IN G
Reinforcement methods are now being tested in m any areas of social

importance, including the management o f psychiatric wards (Ayllon
and Azrin, 1968), rehabilitation (Cohen, G oldiam ond, et al., 1968),
industrial m anagement, and urban design. But two areas of application
are particularly significant for the larger society: teaching, and be
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havioral modification in the natural environment.
The role of reinforcers in teaching is especially im portant. As Skinner
emphasizes, teaching is a special situation in which we wish students to
learn complex skills or discriminations much faster than they can
usually learn them in the natural environment (Skinner, 1968a). C en tu
ries of hum an achievements are to be mastered in a few years. So we set
up training centers, schools, and classrooms for teaching; and we must
start off with a compression or simulation of the real-world task, and
with such “ unnatural reinforcers” as jo b bonuses, grades, or adult
approval, which do not grow naturally out of the task.

T o speed up the learning process under these conditions, Skinner

invented the “ teaching machine” and the more general method of
“ program m ed instruction,” which can be used either directly by teachers
or in books (Skinner, 1968). Both of these m ethods transform a lesson
into a sequence of small learning steps and immediate reinforcement
contingencies planned in advance. This produces much more rapid
learning and more retention than the usual m ethods of lecturing,
teaching from a text, or giving repetitious exercises. It completely
changes motivation, improving classroom behavior and permitting the
management of larger classes (Whaley and M alott, 1971).
H o m m e et al., in their book How to Use Contingency Contracting in
the Classroom (1970), give a rather lyrical description of these effects of
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program m ed instruction. They say:
T h e parents and teach ers n ow using th ese rules in their m anagem en t o f

child m otiv a tio n find that children are eager to perform under these c o n d i
tion s. T h ese children do n ot sh ow the tim id or aggressive traits o f children
perform ing under duress and coercion . N o r d o th ey exhibit the dem and in g
and “ sp o ile d ” characteristics o f th o se w h o are used to receiving unearned
benefits. There is a kind o f jo y in their activities; th ey seem to have a feeling
o f delight in their w illing and c o n sc io u s a ccom p lish m en t and their w ell
deserved rewards. O bservin g and participating in th is kind o f learning is,
in turn, the greatest rew ard teachers or parents can experien ce.
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Anyone who has seen Token Economy classrooms will agree.
Buckley and Walker, in their book M odifying Classroom Behavior
(1970), explain how these effects are produced. They say: “ Programmed
instruction is successful because it incorporates (a) immediate feedback,
(b) small steps, (c) active responding, and (d) self-pacing.”
O f course, after a student has begun to master the problems in the
classroom, he needs to be “ w eaned” away from the classroom re
inforcers to self-reinforcers or the natural reinforcers of the larger
world. A way of starting this transfer is by the “ self-contracting” m en
tioned earlier, which helps to teach the student self-management and
auto no m y in later activities. He finally learns the reward of seeing for
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himself that, for example, the arithmetic answer checks, or that he can
fly the plane by himself.
C R EA TIN G N E W REINFORCEM ENT PA TTER N S IN SOCIAL N ETW O R K S
T h arp and Wetzel describe other applications of great social significance

in their book Behavior M odification in the N atural Environment (1969).
They worked to solve the behavior problems of m any children in a large
school system and the surrounding community. They used a sequence

34 JOH N R. PLATT
of steps, starting with themselves as “ outside consultants,” first o b

serving and measuring the problem behavior, and then identifying
“ m ediators” in the school or com m unity who could also observe it and
who had available some positive reinforcers for any improved behaviors.
M ediators might be teachers or adult friends of the child involved. A
contract might then be made with the child, so th at he would get favorite
reinforcers for improved behavior—more TV, or 15 minutes play with
his father, or a horseback ride on the weekend. Thus a disruptive child
who began to make progressive small steps o f improvement in classroom
behavior would get immediate notations plus a note to take home two
or three times a week so he would get his home reward.
In m any cases, under this program, classroom and hom ew ork be
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havior improved, and truancy and stealing stopped. F o r some three-
fourths of the problem children, the disturbing behaviors were turned
a round in 2 to 6 weeks. (In some of the unsuccessful cases, the parents
were moralistic and “ did not approve of giving rewards to children for
good behavior,” or the children were caught in a “ double bind ” between
parents or police and com m unity expectations.)
The T harp-W etzel study goes beyond the applications mentioned
earlier, in that the new behaviors are not simply being maintained by
the outside consultant's reinforcements. Instead, they come to be locked
into new reinforcement patterns in the “ natural environm ent” with o n
going new reinforcement transactions between the child, the teachers
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or mediators, and the pleased parents or truant officers. The consultant
can then go away, leaving behind a permanently improved and self-
m aintaining reinforcement pattern. In the new “ family psychiatry,”
which regards the family as part of a patient’s problem, there is a similar
attem pt to change to a new self-maintaining pattern of relationships in
the family group.
But these approaches are quite opposite to the usual individualist
attempts to treat mental illness or delinquency either on the analyst’s
couch or in the detention home or jail. In th a t approach, a person’s
behavior and attitudes might change temporarily, but he usually reverts
back to his old patterns as soon as he is restored to his original environ
ways.
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ment, where the same people will renew the reinforcement of his old
A N O N G O IN G L A W OF M U T U A L BEH AVIOR
All this shows what the reinforcement principle is and how it can be
applied. But it is also im portant to understand what it is not.
It is not a m ethod of m anipulation th at is simply turned on or off by
a wicked dictator or a good fairy. We are all manipulating each other
right now, by means of positive or negative reinforcement, and always

have been. Skinner regards the principle of operant conditioning as a

law of nature, like the law o f gravity, by which nature and other people
have been pulling and shaping each of us, badly or well, from the
m om ent of birth. It is, therefore, a law that every new design must take
into account, if we want m ore satisfying and less unstable social struc
tures, just as we m ust take into account the principles of gravity and
centers of gravity in designing a table that will no t fall down.
Yes, this can be used for wicked ends, like any new understanding of
physical principles. But it is also the key to the better implem entation of
our good ends. And it could be argued that much of the wickedness in
society today is due to the types of punitive reinforcements we are now
ignorantly using against each other, with the consequences—just as the
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principle says—of aversion and revenge. We will come back to this
question.
The reinforcement principle is also not a one-way principle by which
men can control animals, or elites can control slaves, w ithout any
recourse. It is true th a t m uch of the literature involves asymmetric
teaching relations, but the whole point of the reinforcement principle is
th at our behaviors form a feedback loop, and th a t either punishments or
rewards always bring corresponding counterresponses. A teacher’s be
havior is, in fact, easily modified and im pro ved —or made w orse—by a
class that understands reinforcement principles, as has often been
demonstrated. In Beyond Freedom and D ignity, Skinner stresses that
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what we are always obeying is a reciprocal rule of control and co un ter
control: N o animal, or hum an being can shape the behavior of another
by response or reinforcement without the other shaping its behavior in
return by the response it gives, ju st as no physical body can pull on
an other one by gravity without itself being pulled by the other in return.
It might be supposed that this is not very effective countercontrol,
but when combined with Skinner’s emphasis on positive reinforcement,
this could be seen as a m odern formulation of the principle of Jesus:
Love your enemies, and do good to those who despitefully use you.
It is the fastest and surest way of changing or converting the behavior
of enemies or masters, far more effective th an hostility, which only
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reinforces their old behavior. In this formulation, all social interactions
become chains and networks of m utual transactions that go on and on
thro ugh ou t life as we shape each other. We have always known this in a
general way, but now we see the detailed mechanisms of the transactions,
and see how they can be improved.
A G A IN ST IN T E R PR ETA TIO N
The reinforcement m ethod is not a m ethod of electric shocks, brain

surgery, implanted electrodes, or m anipulation of behavior by drugs.

36 JOHN R. PLATT
Such experiments performed by other behaviorists and physiological

psychologists sometimes make use of reward-reinforcement and are often
mixed up with Skinner’s methods by his critics, but they have nothing
to do with his principles of behavior shaping or his proposals for methods
of improvement in society.
The reinforcement principle does not involve any knowledge of the
internal structure or states of the brain, or even of the genetics of the
organism. These factors will, of course, limit or guide the responses of
different organisms or what they can be taught to do, and Skinner
discusses certain underlying evolutionary responses. But reinforcement
is a general feedback principle of organism -environm ent relationships,
to which an understanding of these internal mechanisms is largely
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irrelevant.
This has led to the accusation that Skinner’s model is a “ black-box”
model, in which all the im p ortant inside relations are ignored and in
which there is no “ explanatory theory.” Skinner’s reply is that his c o n
cern is with behavior, or with observing accurately what the black box
does, and that this is the proper province of psychology, while the other
problems can be left to neurophysiology or genetics.
As for an “ explanatory th eory ” of the “ internal” type that would
satisfy his critics, Skinner’s reply is like th at of N ew ton when he was
refusing to “ explain” gravity; he said, “ I do not make hypotheses.”
Skinner’s Contingencies o f R einforcem ents: A Theoretical Analysis gives
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a New tonian-operational type of theory, with replies to his critics on these
points. W h a t kind of correspondence may finally be found between neu-
rophysiological flow patterns and the behavioral responses of higher
organisms is for the future to decide, but it is irrelevant to the application
of reinforcement principles in teaching and social interactions. [And the
recent findings on the plasticity of internal connections, with single-cell
connections and responses themselves being modified by reinforcement
principles (Fetz and Finocchio, 1971), suggests that any correspondence
may also be plastic.]
Skinner has a more radical critique of the com m on psychological
language o f “ traits,” “ drives,” and “ mental states,” which are commonly
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thought of as “ internal” to the “ m in d ” (though in quite a different
class from the observable neurophysiology of the brain.) He has always
attacked these as “ mentalistic” concepts that are left over from medieval
“ explanatory causes,” such as the “ dormitive faculty” that was supposed
to explain why we sleep. At best, he would say, they are “ mediating”
terms that are ill-defined and unnecessary in a complete description of
behavior.
He says, for example, that to speak of a “ state” or “ drive” such as
“ hunger” adds nothing to the behavioral observation that an animal
eats or does not eat, or that a boy overeats when he has been reinforced

by his m other for doing so. N o r can such a language suggest what to do
to change this behavior, as the reinforcement principle does. Even if
there are chemical levels in the brain that are correlated with “ hunger,”
this is still fairly irrelevant if the eating behavior is, in fact, changed
operationally by a change in reinforcement patterns.
The same is true of “ aggression,” “ industry,” “ laziness,” and “ atten
tion,” and such terms as “ personality,” “ ideas,” “ attitudes,” “ feelings,”
“ tho ughts,” and “ purposes.” (He insists that “ aggression” is not an
inescapable “ tra it” stored in us by evolution, but a pattern of behaviors
that is brought forth by, and can be suppressed by, reinforcement.) All
this is reemphasized in the last chapter of Beyond Freedom and Dignity,
where he renews and clarifies his attack on a num ber of such terms and
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usages th a t he believes are blocking our clear understanding of what
man is and how he acts.
This radical attack on the conventional wisdom extends to the physi
ologists who “ regard themselves as looking for the ‘physiological
correlates’ of mental events” [p. 195]. It also extends to psychoanalysts
who search for explanations of behavior in terms of “ causes” in child
hood history, and who try to get their patients to “ work th ro u g h ” old
hostilities. Skinner would say that any current inappropriate behaviors
and the neurotic attitudes that go with them are more easily changed by
changing the current reinforcing contingencies than by any attem pts to
“ uncover” and “ correct” the original “ causes.” The successes of be
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havioral therapy today are certainly showing th a t this is often true
(Stuart, 1970). .
Needless to say, professors o f these other schools of psychology and
psychiatry are fighting back against such a “ black-box” and “ non-
hum anistic” ignoring of the “ im po rtant aspects” of the “ m ind.” But
Skinner’s critique is in the pragmatic and operational tradition o f James,
Pearson, Mach, Bridgman, and Carnap. And where these other form ula
tions are often verbal and helpless, the Skinnerian formulation suggests
constructive ways to change behavior, ways that have been shown to
work experimentally.
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Which is operationally more accurate? Which is the more useful
psychology?
The ranking of achievements in this field is always a matter of vigorous
dispute, but I think we may come to see the importance of Skinner’s
reinforcement principle and his critique in psychology as being co m
parable to the theoretical and operational importance of the work of
Newton, Bohr, or Fermi in physics, or Darwin in evolution, or W atson
and Crick in molecular biology. In fact, considering its already visible
effects on education and behavior, and its incipient effects on medicine,
the law, and all our social structures, it may be the most im portant
discovery of this century.

38 JOHN R. PLATT
“ B eyond F r e e d o m a n d D ig n ity ”
s k i n n e r ’s s t y l e
W ith this understanding of the Skinnerian achievements, applications,

and professional controversies, it becomes possible to go on to examine
the m ajor new ideas put forward in Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
However, it is necessary first to say a word ab o u t Skinner’s prose style,
because I believe this is the key to some of the misunderstandings. W ith
his usual logical consistency, he has applied his radical critique to his
language and his m ethod o f writing. The result is somewhat like a p ro
gramm ed text, with each sentence intended to reinforce the previous one
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or to go one step beyond it. This produces a prose th at is bland and
straightforward, with a measured density of ideas, but reading it is like
skating on sm ooth ice over a very deep pond. Y ou are almost lulled
asleep, and then you suddenly find yourself very far from shore on the
edge of a hole you had no t noticed. This is the result o f reading too
fast, instead of stopping to digest and underline and bracket the im p or
tant ideas. In an effective text, as he says, “ something happens as each
sentence is re a d ” (Skinner, 1968a, p. 163). (I read this b o o k — The
Technology o f Teaching—three times, m aking notes, because of the in
tellectual density, before I thought I knew all that was in it. This has
happened to me with less than ten books in a lifetime of study.)
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Skinner tries to avoid any material that he does not want to be posi
tively reinforcing to the reader, such as the old psychological terms, or
the names of his opponents, or even the pronoun “ I.” The demolition
of current and popular psychological ideas is saved until the last ch a p
ter, after the reader has been prepared for it. A nd Skinner introduces
his own terms, such as “ emit,” “ reinforce,” and “ extinguish,” in what
seems to be a casual way, until you suddenly realize he is reinforcing
you with an exact technical usage. W hen this gets too legalistic in specify
ing behavior rather than calling names, a translation into the com m on
tongue is often needed. “ Contingencies involving positive and negative
reinforcements, often of the most extreme sort, are codified.” T h a t’s
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roughly, “ The Ten C o m m an dm en ts” [p. 116]. “ Those who are in a posi
tion to exert constructive countercontrol.” T h a t’s, roughly, “ checks and
balances” [p. 181]. And so on. It takes practice and perseverance.
But what has led m any critics astray is Skinner’s irony and wry
humor. He can be as sardonic as Veblen or G albraith. After building
up a point, he will contrast it with a dead-pan description o f some
op p o n e n t’s naive view, expecting the absurdity of this now to be a p
preciated. “ The problem is to induce people not to be good but to
behave well” [p. 67]. Think of a m o th e r’s ineffective “ Be go od !” in

quotes. Such bits can be hilarious if read aloud, but the low-emphasis
approach has led m any casual readers and critics to take these ironical
phrases for Skinner’s own views.
Thus, in criticizing the mentalistic way of talking abou t sudden solu
tions to problems, he says, “ The element of surprise makes it easy to
suppose that a solution has been triggered by some such prebehavioral
event as an idea” (Skinner, 1968a, p. 138). Put the words “ prebehavioral
event” and “ idea” in quotation marks, and the irony is clear, but read
casually, it seems to be Skinner’s own supposition. Similarly, in Beyond
Freedom and D ignity, there is a long paragraph describing “ reactionary
proposals” against people who do not work or are not law-abiding, with
the “ explanation” th at it is “ because law enforcement has grown lax;
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the problem can be solved . . . by increasing the police force, and by
passing stronger laws” [p. 119]. It is all exactly opposite to the improved
methods he is describing, and must be read tongue-in-cheek.
A little further on, Skinner criticizes the usual “ simplification in
utopian writing,” in which, he says, “ the control o f the population as a
whole must be delegated to specialists—to police, priests, owners,
teachers, therapists, and so o n.” He points out the conflicts this would
produce in these imagined utopias, which are one reason why “ the word
utopian means unw orkable” [p. 155]. But the N ew York Tim es reviewer
thought Skinner was recomm ending this kind o f control! And when
Skinner objected, in a letter to the editor, saying “ 1 deplore such a cul
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tu re ” (Sennet, 1971; Skinner and Sennet, 1971), the reviewer tried to
justify himself by replying “ The words . . . are his ow n” !! A nd then the
reviewer in the New York Review o f Books (Chomsky, 1971) repeated
the identical error five weeks after Skinner’s protest.
A final difficulty in reading Skinner is that he insists, as a m atter of
principle, on using blunt and forbidding lanaguage, such as “ reinforce
m e n t” and “ c o ntro l” and “ shaping behavior,” even when recommending
what might be called in softer terms, “ responsiveness,” “ influence,”
“ persuasion,” “ inducem ent,” “ political pressure,” or “ Christian love.”
Essentially, he says th a t we are already using adult social control and
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intention in teaching children, curing patients, or changing social laws
and institutions, and we damage our effectiveness when we kid ourselves.
We fear the language of control, but we fear control itself, even when
we want it. As Skinner (1968a, pp. 90, 260) put it,
W e fear effective teach in g, as w e fear all effective m eans o f changin g

hum an behavior. P ow er n o t on ly corrup ts, it frigh ten s; and a b so lu te pow er
frightens ab solu tely. . . . A b so lu te p ow er in e d u cation is n o t a seriou s issu e
to d a y b ecau se it seem s ou t o f reach. H ow ever, a te ch n o lo g y o f teach in g will
need to be m uch m ore p ow erfu l i f the race w ith catastrop h e is to be w on ,

40 JOHN R. PLATT
and it may then, like any powerful technology, need to be contained. . . .

The issue is important because the government of the future will probably
operate mainly through educational techniques.
He states it more strongly in Beyond Freedom and D ignity:
Good government is as much a matter of the control of human behavior

as bad, good incentive conditions as much as exploitation, good teaching
as much as punitive drill. Nothing is to be gained by using a softer word.
If we are content merely to “influence” people, we shall not get far. . . . To
refuse to exercise available control because in some sense all control is
wrong is to withhold possibly important forms of countercontrol. We have
seen some of the consequences. Punitive measures . . . are instead promoted.
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A preference for methods which make control inconspicuous or allow it to
be disguised has condemned [opposing leaders] to the use of weak measures.
This could be a lethal cultural mutation [pp. 180-181],
T h at conscious and deliberate control is necessary may be true, but

not since the Calvinists have we ventured to say it aloud.
A G A IN ST “ A U TO N O M O U S M A N ”
Beyond Freedom and D ignity is Skinner’s first attem pt to develop a full-

scale coherent philosophy. The “ freedom ” and “ dignity” of the title are
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ironic and again should be put in quotation marks. But the key word is
“ beyond,” for he goes past his critics and his debates with conventional
psychology and tries to relate his organism -environm ental behavioral
formulations to family and social practices, evolution and death, ethics
an d values and cultural survival, and the design of the future. F ro m the
point of view of its scope and its coherent restatement of the relation
between man and society—based, for the first time, on experiment
rather than on introspection or philosophy—it is a masterpiece. It will
have to be taken into account by all future social philosophers, and it
may be the capstone of his life’s work.
The “ freedom ” and “ dignity” of the title are not attacked, in this
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case, because they are mentalistic “ states,” but because they have been
key concepts in his o pponents’ attack on his work and his philosophy.
Skinner sees them as cardbo ard verbal concepts expressing a fuzzy-
minded and false view of man, a view th a t is blocking a clear u n de r
standing of the relations between man and society, a view th at must be
demolished if we are to understand how to make an improved society.
He sees “ freedom ” as having been a useful watchword against tyranny
and against elites who tried to control others by negative reinforcement
and punishment. To proclaim that men are not inherently slaves or

subjects was a justification of escape or retaliation, and a valuable aid

in countercontrol. But, of course, it was also used by the punishers
and the moralist elites to justify punishment: if a man was “ free,” then
his acts had no outside causes, and society could apply its controls
nowhere but to his own body.
Skinner says this is false, th at there is no such “ free” or “ a u to no m ou s
m a n ,” that the experiments show th at all o f m a n ’s behavior is shaped
deterministically by the reinforcements from his environm ent from the
time he is born. M odern social work and criminology come close to
this view, and regard most, if not all, of delinquency and crime as being
due to genetics, brain damage, sickness, or a po or environment, for
which the delinquent was not responsible.
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Conversely, Skinner sees “ dignity” as society’s way o f praising
“ a u ton om o us m a n ” for “ uncaused” acts of generosity, self-sacrifice,
courage, or defiance under pressure or punishment. But if we had had a
search for the roots of this behavior as careful as our search for the roots
of crime and delinquency, we might find the environmental shaping to
be just as determining in this case.
Skinner concludes th at “ freedom ” and “ dignity” are myths th at are
preventing us from seeing how continually and subtly we are being
shaped by our environment. They keep us using gross methods of praise
and punishment th at are ineffective in preventing each others’ delin
quencies and malfunctions and do not help us shape the good be
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haviors that we might achieve.
“ FREE W IL L ” OR DETERM INISM , OR B O T H ?
T o this, the hum anist critic may reply that no experiments on rats,
helpless children, or psychotics can prove that his behavior is c o m
pletely determined, because he feels and knows within himself that he
has “ free will.”
This seems a pathetic argum ent to the scientist, because we know how
often men delude themselves with such subjective feelings. Yet I believe
that there is more to the argum ent than has been allowed for in Skinner’s
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presentation, and th at a reconciliation on this point would do m uch to
remove the hum anist objection to his type of determinism.
M y reconciliation argum ent has two parallel lines of reasoning. The
first one is th at determinism is limited, for a system as complex as the
hum an brain and the hum an organism (Platt, 1966). I am taking deter
minism in the natural scientists’ operational sense of linear causality—
of being able to predict a sequence of future behaviors completely from
a knowledge of the present state and past states o f the organisms.
There are several reasons why any such deterministic statement is

42 JOHN R. PLATT
limited. First, because of statistical random ness, from cosmic rays,

somatic m utations, or thermal fluctuations in the nervous system. This,
of course, is “ noise” and not “ free will,” but it provides the very varia
tions in behavior on which Skinner’s mechanism of shaping, like D a r
win’s, depends, so it is a necessary limitation on any exact Skinnerian
determinism.
Second, even without statistical fluctuations, the “ initial state” of a
very complex organism, from which prediction starts, is unknow able by
any observer o f the same complexity. This is true for two reasons:
“ complexity-indeterminacy” and “ privacy-indeterminacy.” The physi
cist believes that the motions o f mechanical objects, like rolled dice,
are deterministic; but he takes the roll o f dice, as they bounce on a
thousand unprescribed irregularities of the table, as the symbol of in
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determinacy. Yes, an expert swindler may spin a die with considerable
control, but he sometimes misses; and, likewise, a hum an brain o f 1011
neurons and 1014 synapses—many orders of m agnitude more complex
than the possible rolls of any die—even thoug h it has im p ortant regu
larities of shaping and control, will not always be deterministically
predictable.
Privacy-indeterminacy simply means th a t your eye cannot see my
sunbeam and your ear cannot be at this point of resonance, so you
cannot know the private and ever-changing inputs of my initial state.
The jailer, absolute in deterministic behavioral control, may chain the
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prisoner to the wall, but he cannot see the c o ckroach —or the jailer—
from the point of view the prisoner has. These complex and private
operations determine each of our outcomes and behaviors in ways that
no experimenter or controller can entirely measure or predict. If anyone
still wishes to say th at we are behaving deterministically “ in principle,”
he can; but it is operationally an empty statement if the prediction is,
in principle, not possible itself because of incomplete information. And
these unpredictable com ponents of behavior could properly be called
“ self-determining” in the sense th at they are reliable brain operations
that are not being determined by anyone else.
Third, these private inputs and operations interacting with the envi
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ro n m e n t—with behavior th at is being reinforced and leading to new
behavior, as Skinner says—can lead to new insight-closure of new
organism -environm ent loops. I see that the m oon is in line with my
window; and Darwin, on his desert island, sees that all the finches
differ from the mainland species. I write a poem; and he makes notes
for publication. This is how the individual has always seen new truths,
and drawn the whole world after him. Sometimes the delinquent boy
can do it, too, or the addict, Malcolm X, in jail. It is not because we nave
“ freedom ” from the w orld—that kind of “ freedom” is an artifact of

the old self-world, m in d -b o d y dichotomy. Insight is environmentally

shaped; yet no one else has done it to me or seen it for me. It is an act
of creation between me and my environ m ent—and what else should my
“ free will” or “ a u to n o m y ” mean?
Recent studies suggest that these acts of insight or closure, or “ hier
archical ju m p s ” in complex systems, are not predictable from the
separate precursor steps, either from inside or outside the system
(Platt, 1970). They are like the evolution of wings, or like K u h n ’s
“ scientific revolutions,” which can only be understood afterwards, in
the light of the new laws or closures that the hierarchical restructuring
has revealed. (They are like “ a priori ideas,” which remain to be dis
covered, as the aerodynamics of wings and flying remained to be dis
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covered before there were wings that locked the com ponents together
into a self-maintaining system.) And yet they can be arrived at in many
different ways, as different men can reach the same insight. Fo r an
animal that is near flying, bird or bat or reptile, all ways lead to wings.
This evolutionary convergence stabilizes our continually discovered rela
tions to the environment, but it is more like teleology than determinism
in any traditional sense. It is a form of organism -environm ent self
determinism that Skinner does not have room for, except in his self
shaped society.
Finally, there are strong interactions between the organism and the
environment th at could be described as cybernetic. The effort of the
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organism is enormously amplified by intelligence and designed struc
tures, as in levering up a rock, driving a car, shooting a rifle. Skinner
says the organism does not control the environment (as a u to no m ou s
man) but, rathei, the environment controls the organism. Nevertheless,
both are true in the feedback loop th at has no beginning and no end.
These behaviors, with amplified consequences that frequently grow out
of private inputs, are the conspicuous trigger actions that men single
out as “ a u to n o m o u s” or, in com m on speech, due to “ free will.” It does
not change their singularity or privacy to know th a t they were shaped
and made more probable by a long chain of organism -environm ent
interactions. As Skinner says, “ no theory changes what it is a theory
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a b o u t” [p. 213], and this is true also of a deterministic theory as applied
to these conspicuous acts of self-initiative.
The second reconciliation argum ent is the other face o f this reasoning.
It is that determinism is, in fact, a necessary basis for the kind of “ free
will” we have been discussing. F o r if we mean by “ a u to n o m y ” and “ free
will” the privacy of our experiences and the individual insight-closure
o f the organism-with-environment based on such experiences, and the
cybernetic acts based on such insights, then a necessary requirement for
such closure and cybernetics is that there be reproducible and predictable

44 JOHN R. PLATT
relations between the organism and the e nvironm ent—th at is, that the
natural reinforcers of the environment act in a deterministic way as
they shape the behavior or are tested by it. Otherwise, both the environ
ment and the organism ’s behavior would be unreliable, and no one would
have said that a consistent “ self-determination” or “ free will” was
“ responsible” for behavior. Determinism does not belittle m an: it en
larges him and makes him dependable, responsive, and creative.
Fro m this same side of the fence, we can also see that insight-closure
to new self-maintaining relationships between organism and environ
ment can be regarded as “ self-determination.” W h at else would we
mean by “ ^//'-determ ination” ? It is an old idea of the “ self” that sees
it as bounded by a skin. A truer idea, with cybernetic feedback loops, is
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that self and environment form an indissoluble complex with no sharp
boundary. M y voice fills the ro o m ; the wave of my hand or the blink
of my eye changes all the holograms thro u g h o u t the space to the distant
hills. And if this environment reacts back on me and redetermines my
new behaviors, it is self-determination in this larger and truer sense.
I —which means I-and-the-environm ent—have done something and
learned something interactively and holistically. W ho else?
This self-cybernetics of closure, insight, and m anipulation is the
cybernetics of interacting man, the only kind of man there is. The
humanists and the environmental determinists are simply emphasizing
opposite sides of the same interacting subject.
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A nd yet not entirely. Skinnerian objective determinism, like the deter

minism of most scientists today, does not and cannot include the total
existential and subjective framework within which it has its validity.
This primary interaction of ourselves with the world, which precedes
all determinism, must also be put in if we are to have a total picture of
man, a picture complete enough for us to use in leading and persuading
and shaping a better society.
W hat Skinner omits is essentially that pron ou n “ I.” He writes, “ A
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person may respond . . . “ A person may act . . . , ” “ H u m a n beings
do all this . . . ,” throughout the book, without ever distinguishing
between his self-person and the other persons he is describing. He does
not distinguish between himself as “ I,” as observer, behaver, and
arguer, and the world of behavior observed. The closest he comes to
recognizing this distinction is in discussing his “ two-self m odel” of
“ self-knowledge” and “ self-control,” where he says that “ the controlling
se lf must be distinguished from the controlled self, even when they are
both inside the same skin . . .” [p. 206] (a rare use of italics). But he is

still speaking of these “ selves” as objectively observed in others, and

leaving out himself as observer.
It is not that there is a biological difference of “ a u to n o m y ” or “ free
will” between the observing man and the observed man. Rather, it is a
logical difference—or, more exactly, an ontological difference. In physics
or in biology, the observer or experim enter—who “ prepares the initial
state,” who drops the ball, and who draws or does not draw the deter
ministic conclusion—can never be logically equivalent, in the construc
tion of the experiment or the conclusions, to the experimented-on, even
if the experimented-on is an other m an like himself.
Each of us—as an experimenter on the outside world —starts with
some kind of primary totality within which are these objects pointed to,
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and deterministic experiments, and books, and other professors arguing.
This is “ the canvas upon which the picture is painted,” or the “ existen-
tial-I,” as discussed by M ach (1959), Schrodinger (1945). Bridgman
(1959), Bohm (1965), and other operationalist philosophers of science.
This total framework, this existential-I of being, action, and reaction,
precedes anything else that can be said abou t the world. And it is within
this subjective and almost solipsist sphere that each of us listens, and
decides whether the determinism is correct, and acts to m anipulate the
behavior of these other objects or people.
The objective world, the world of isolated and controlled experiments,
is the world of physics; the subjective world o f knowledge, values,
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decisions, and acts—the world of the purposes th a t these experiments
are, in fact, designed to serve—is the world of cybernetics, of our own
goal-seeking behavior. Determinism or indeterminism lies on that side
of the boundary, while the usual idea of “ free will” lies on this side of
the boundary. They belong to different universes, and no statement
a bo ut one has any bearing on the other. Is not this the way the world
almost necessarily appears, when seen from the manipulating organism
side of an o rganism -environm ent feedback loop of the kind Skinner
describes?
I think it is his failure to acknowledge this existential basis that each
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of us starts from that makes Skinner miss the point of the criticisms by
K rutch, Maslow, and C. S. Lewis. They claim his determinism “ reduces
the stature of m a n ,” attacks “ the ‘being’ of m a n ,” or abolishes man.
They say “ what is threatened is ‘man quo m a n ,’ . . . or ‘man as Thou
not It,’ or ‘man as a person not a thing.’ ” He sees this as their defense
of what he has scientifically abolished: “ au to n o m o u s man —the inner
man, the homunculus, the possessing dem on . . .” [p. 200].
But it is clear from their language that they are not protesting against
the loss of the hom unculus from the determinate behavior of “ a person”
in his experiments, but against the omission of the existential self of our

46 JOH N R. PLATT
subjective “ being,” which underlies all experiments. Skinner is not alone

in confusing these two categories, because none of his opponents have
made the distinction clear either.
W hen this misunderstanding is clarified, I think it is again possible
to bridge the gap between these opposed positions, accepting both the
existential basis of all our knowledge an d action and the fact of the
general determination of behavior by the environment.
[I myself would hold th a t the world we experience is simultaneously
(1) subjective or existential in its primary reality of a cybernetic, in
separable, self-environment totality; (2) a priori in certain self-maintain
ing loop invariances, or laws of nature, with which we come to achieve
closure; (3) unpredictable, with complex organisms continually reshaping
the future by unforeseeable amplified acts of creation and closure; yet
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(4) deterministic and causal (except for the fundamental indeterminacies
of physics) in every study of simple and essentially isolated objective
systems. I think that there is no contradiction, as commonly supposed
by objective scientists, as well as by humanists, between these char
acteristics, because they apply to different aspects of reality; and I think,
in fact, th at they are mutually necessary for a learning, cybernetic
organism.]
This larger view makes it possible to see, suddenly, th at we exist as
organisms m anipulating the environm ent; and that it is our existential
business to interact strongly and persuade each other of our own in
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sights into reality and our own desired goals, enlarging the loops of
collective behavior-and-consequences—instead of offering unpersuasive
explanations, as a pure determinist like Skinner must do, by saying that
it is “just our environment and culture that has determined us” to make
these persuasions and arguments.
Ethics to S h a p e a C u ltu re
C ONVERSION OF REINFORCERS FOR SE L F-C O N TR O L
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After we have gotten the free will and existentialist argum ents out of
the way, I think we can better appreciate Skinner’s effort, in Beyond
Freedom and Dignity, to put forward a behavioral-evolutionary basis
for ethics. It has two components. The first com ponent is a new theory
and practice of self-control and group control, by the conversion of
long-run large-scale reinforcers into immediate personal reinforcers.
The second com ponent is the consideration of the longest-run rein
forcer of all, the survival and maintenance of a culture, and how it can
be transformed into behavioral rules and practice.

T he achievement of self-control by reinforcement mechanisms is

surprisingly simple, as we have seen. First, measure the unw anted habit
or behavior and identify its immediate reinforcers, R +, then eliminate
or reduce them and displace the unwanted habit by introducing new
R+s for competing wanted behavior. Lifetime habits can often be re
versed in 2 to 4 weeks.
But what do we mean by “ unw anted,” if it is something we actually
continually do or try to do? Here Skinner offers the “ two-self theory,”
as we have seen, of the “ controlling self” and the “ controlled self,” as
he earlier offered a “ self-knower” and a “ self th a t is k n o w n ” [p. 199].
He says, “ The controlling self (the conscience or superego) is of social
origin, but the controlled self is more likely to be the product o f genetic
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susceptibilities to reinforcement (the id, or the Old A d a m )” [p. 199].
We see that the controlling self is acting somew hat like the “ con sultant”
in the T harp-W etzel formulation of behavior modification in co m m u n i
ties. It sees the large-scale or long-range values, and applies the new
theoretical knowledge to the design of new reinforcers th at will shape
our more autom atic behavior into new patterns that will achieve these
values. Or, more briefly, the thing to do is simply to “ convert” long-run
or large-scale advantages or reinforcements, R L+ or R L~, into congruent
short-run reinforcers, R s+ or R s~, that will tend to immediately en
courage or suppress behavior with long-run positive or negative pay-offs.
In these terms, it could be said th at happiness is having short-run
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reinforcers congruent with medium-run and long-run ones, and wisdom
is knowing how to achieve this. And ethical behavior results when
short-run personal reinforcers are congruent with long-run group rein
forcers. This makes it easy to “ be go od ,” or more exactly, to “ behave
well.” The achievement of the latter takes a design for the conversion of
m utual advantage into personal advantage. It can be done more easily
and effectively by design than by exhortation, as when we m ake an
organizational design to collect garbage, or to feed the poor, or to edu
cate all children—transform ing the long-run com m unity payoffs into
daily wages, instead of depending on personal neighborliness or charity
to do these jo bs as we once had to do.
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These reinforcement approaches do not create the internal conflicts
o f the old religious resolves with repeated violations and self-punish
ment. Rather, by m aking it easy for our immediate responses to be good,
we are able to pursue whatever long-run ends we pursue with wholeness
and energy. This means true self-control and autonom y.
This appears to be a real solution to the classical dilemma of St. Paul,
which has seemed, for so long, to be an inescapable statement of the
hum an condition. “ F o r the good that I would I do not: but the evil
which I would not, that I d o ” (R o m ans 7:19). He is speaking of longer-

48 JOH N R. PLATT
run good and evil, and short-run behaviors. Paul also explained this in
terms of what a scientist might call a “ two-self theory” : “ But I see a n
other law in my members, warring against the law o f my mind. . . . O
wretched m an that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this
death? . . . with the mind I myself serve the law of G o d ; but with the
flesh the law o f sin” (R om a ns 7:23-25). [Koestler (1968) similarly
attributed our troubles today to the higher brain and the lower brain
being hopelessly at war with each other, and supposed th a t to save the
hum an race some drug would be needed to harmonize them!)
I believe th at this is the first time th at the Pauline dilemma, which has
plagued all religions and all moralists, has been solved in a practical
way; so th at again Skinner’s m ethod of designing reinforcers for self
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control may be the most im portant contribution to ethical practice- in
2000 years.
E V O LU T IO N , BEH AV IO R , A N D SU R V IV A L
G rou ps also need to convert their long-run survival or reinforcers into

contingencies bearing immediately on each individual in the short run.
This conversion has largely been thro ugh the teaching of moral rules.
Skinner follows W addington (1967) in suggesting th at the moral codes
of a group are subject to survival pressure. Those that have come down
to us are a mixture of those that had survival value for the g ro u p
such as codes against lying, stealing, and killing within the g r o u p -
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together with others accidentally or superstitiously connected with them,
such as certain taboos, and food, dress, and sabbath customs. (Skinner
has shown that pigeons also preserve “ superstitious” behavior acci
dentally connected with their first instances of reinforcement.)
A m ong the codes with group survival value are those th at benefit the
group at the risk of the individual’s life, or after the individual is dead.
These include risking life for the group in battle or to save the young or
females—as certain animals d o —as well as building houses, planting
trees, and educating children. Skinner emphasizes th at the group must
find ways to instill not only these verbal values but this behavior by
offering present reinforcers of praise and reward for heroes, as well as
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respect for fathers and mothers and leaders who have built up the family
and the community.
He extends this reasoning to the problems of the present survival of
our own large-scale culture. The old warring modes and codes that
helped the earlier survival of the tribes an d nations will destroy us, if
they continue in this new world society in which we have all been pushed
together. They must be rapidly superseded by a world ethic and pattern
o f behavior in which men will risk their lives, if necessary, for the world
culture, and in which they know they will receive personal praise and
reward for such risks.

But what is almost more im portant is that we must shape the educa
tion of our children and the rewards for them so th a t they will not only
want to preserve the culture that has been achieved—or at least large
parts o f it—but so that their behavior will also be shaped tow ard ways
that will preserve it, and that will shape the behavior of their children,
in turn, toward preserving it. “ A culture is ultimately no stronger than
its capacity to transm it itself” (Skinner, 1968a, p. 110). Skinner is
obviously influenced by the ethics of his own religious upbringing,
wanting a world in which all men are brothers, but he is scrupulous not
to let this enter his formal scientific reasoning a bo ut the survival of a
culture.
The two earlier long-range “ goods” that societies have always c o n
verted into short-run reinforcers (even though badly) were “ the personal
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‘goods,’ which are reinforcing because of the hu m a n genetic endowment,
and the ‘goods of others,’ which are derived from personal reinforcers.”
He is saying th at to these, “ we must now add a third, the good of the
culture” [p. 134]. This is not for culture as culture (because Skinner sees
all cosmic or religious argum ents for m an's cultures as culturally in
duced), but only because of its long-run value for people. “ If there is
any purpose or design in the evolution of a culture, it has to do with
bringing people under the control of more and more of the consequences
of their behavior.”
This strict derivation of ethics from survival and, in fact, from global
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survival, is not outside the framework of scientific hum anism, but
Skinner has added, 1 think, two im portant points. First, that ethics is
ineffective unless it includes actual behavioral and valuing practices,
which can only come by conscious and deliberate shaping of the be
havioral education of the young, so that they, in turn, will shape their
young. A nd second, that ethics has meaning only within the framework
of its contributions to the longer-run or larger-scale survival of the
larger biological system. This gives us a behavioral foundation for per
sonal ethics that is congruent with our m odern ecological consciousness
of the need to preserve the complex global network of life—a congruence
th a t is absolutely necessary in any viable society of the future.
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This conversion-of-reinforcers theory of ethics means that there is
an im portant confluence between the “ g o o d ” and the “ profitable,” just
as in the case of personal wisdom in planning and behavior. T he only
power in the world that moves men to large efforts is the gap between
“ what is” and “ what might be” (Platt, 1971). That is to say, an antici
pated im provement or advantage is converted into personal reinforcers
for present action. This is why we work, save, build dams, and invest in
factories and education. All of economics may be found to be only a
narrow application of these behavioral principles.
Correspondingly, all of politics is but a theorem of the profitability

50 JOH N R . PLATT
and the power of utopias. U topias are dreams, but it is the hope for
improvem ent in these dreams th at makes men tear down governments
and rem ake societies. We invest our votes or our lives in th at long-run
and ethical payoff for ourselves and our children. Each such step is
another collective insight-closure into how we can m ore satisfyingly
survive in our environment, and, in this sense, it is historically inevitable.
The forces of history are with us. Seen in this way, there is energy and
profit enough for us to solve any social problem, if we anticipate what
great payoffs for all of us an improved society could achieve. It is enough
to pay off unions into autom ation, industries into environmental p ro
tection, adm inistrations into responsiveness, and perhaps governments
into peace. It is better than faith for moving m ountains.
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BETTER C O N T R O L, BETTER C O U N T E R C O N T R O L
We call this conversion from group or cultural reinforcers to personal

reinforcers by the special name of “ ethics,” rather than “ wisdom,”
because we have not been closely integrated with each other in the past,
and it has taken special effort and powerful verbal reinforcers that had
to be “ drilled in” or “ accepted on faith” in order to make our rather
clumsy conversion. But Skinner’s reinforcement-conversion methods
would enable this “ group self-control,” like “ personal self-control,” to
be easier and more effective, with less punishm ent and fewer attempts to
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escape or retaliate than we have with present aversive religious and legal
methods of control.
But is it ethical for a group to maintain its own self-control in this
way by easy m ethods rather th an clumsy and punishing ones? Is it
ethical to make ethics easy? Skinner forces us to face this issue. But
certainly, for m any distraught parents and teachers and officials today,
the answer would be a resounding “ Yes!”
Yet this immediately leads to a related question: W ho is going to pre
scribe and impose this more effective ethics on the rest of us? Skinner
quotes C. S. Lewis as protesting: “ . . . the power of m an to make himself
what he pleases . . . means . . . the power of some men to make other men
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w hat they please” [p. 206].
The answer is, as it has always been, th a t the controlling elites are
teachers, leaders, and officials whose m ethods and values are accepted
or adopted by the whole community. This is a question not of behavioral
methods but of social and political structure. H ow does a teacher
comm unicate new ideas? H ow does a leader get a following? H ow does
an official get his job, and how is misconduct curbed?
New behavioral methods will force us to rethink these questions, and
to redesign the mechanisms and politics of democracy, particularly our

traditional adversary methods. These were once designed —in the U.S.
Constitution, for example—as checks to protect us against tyranny, but
they also engender continuing polarization and hostility thro ugh ou t our
society. Ham ilton said th at “ am bition must be made to counteract
am bition ,” but strengthening it also counteracts goodwill and co n
structive efforts and attem pts to make a more peaceful world order.
With new methods, what we have called politics and government might
find earlier and more constructive ways o f controlling tyranny than by
confrontation.
In particular, Skinner has a cogent paragraph on the m any tyrannies
in our present system resulting from delegation of authority to people
who do not know what is happening. His behavioral cure is to redesign
the system in order “ to bring some im portant consequences to bear on
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the behavior o f the controller” [p. 171].
I think this is a pioneering concept, to translate the general problem
of “ controlling the controllers” into a behavioral problem of “ cou nter
c ontrol.” The symmetry o f the reinforcement m ethod, in which all those
involved are reinforcing each other for behavioral modification, means
that any new methods o f control are matched by correspondingly
powerful new methods of countercontrol. This is what the better inte
gration of a society m ean s—like the integration of an organism. If the
stom ach does not get enough blood from the heart, it dem ands more,
and gets it, or we become sick, and the heart may be forced to stop.
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So leaders or officials m anaging a society are endangering themselves,
as well as everyone else, if the countercontrol dem ands for equity,
rights, or variety are not satisfied and the society tears itself apart. A
society, like a man, is educated by events or it does not survive. Both
biological and cultural evolution “ m ake organisms more sensitive to the
consequences o f their action” [p. 143]. O ur new high-communication
society, with enorm ous powers of m utual destruction, can only survive
if it adopts sensitive signaling and feedback and positive reinforcement
practices, so as to detect and solve its problems long before they reach
the point o f malfunction and confrontation. It will have to become more
like a cheerful family than like any government today.
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D ELIBERATELY SH A P IN G THE FU T U R E
Finally, in Beyond Freedom and D ignity, these technical and ethical

com ponents are put together in a program of designing a culture for
the future of man. I think it is a new kind of blueprint of the future.
It differs from all past utopias and utopian colonies—except Walden
Tw o— '\x\ not being derived from the revelations of a prophet or from
generally uplifting rules of love and cooperation without much know l

52 JO H N R . PLATT
edge o f good long-run structures and behavioral practices. A nd it differs

from the many books th at depict our present disorders and what a
better world would be like—hoping all other men will agree with the
a u th o r ’s culturally shaped opinions ab out w hat is “ better” —which com
monly end with the pathetic conclusion th at “ som ebody” should create
a new politics or a new economics or new attitudes.
Instead, Skinner’s book gets down to the theoretical bedrock of the
ethical practices logically needed for a satisfying society, and the prac
tical mechanisms of constructing it, with scientifically tested knowledge
of hum an behavioral interactions. His improved behavioral methods
are not “ unw orkable” but are already being practiced daily in hundreds
of centers, with improvements in m otivation and satisfaction like those
described earlier.
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W hat Skinner calls for, at this time of crisis in the world’s history
when all the old partial and accidentally inherited systems are in dis
array, is to accept our cultural or existential responsibility for creating
the future and to begin to build according to this blueprint. He sees our
refusal to build, because of misgivings abo ut problems of control or
abo ut the fact that we might be really effective in shaping our children’s
ethics and attitudes and behavior, as the surest recipe for disaster. The
old behaviors that society has been reinforcing for centuries will destroy
us if they continue. “ The capacity to be reinforced by food now leads
to overeating and illness . . . sexual reinforcement now means over
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population,” and aggressive behaviors “ may now interfere with more
useful social relations” [p. 176]. The “ cultural designer” must “ ac
celerate the development of practices which bring the remote conse
quences of behavior into play” [p. 143].
To put the psychology of positive reinforcement into practice to
change our old behaviors and structures will take manifold efforts of
design, and diverse pilot experiments. Yet there is hope, too, of new
types of family living, neighborhood relations, town meetings, business
management, economic relations, and legal and political structures.
New mutual support and a new consciousness. It is, as Skinner says, a
new “ design of m a n .”
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But he insists, like a good evolutionist, that the only long-run survival
will be of a society planned for diversity and a constantly experimental
approach, to keep from falling into sterile and homogeneous repetitions
unable to deal with emerging problems. There may be as many viable
life-styles or cultures as there are different kinds of successful organisms.
He says that “ a standard pattern . . . would be bad design, but if we are
looking for variety, we should not fall back upon accident. . . . The
only hope is planned diversification, in which the im portance of variety
is recognized” [p. 162].

He also suggests that a society shaped for survival will have to manage
leisure, and to m ake far more effective use of it, in order to avoid being
consumed by gambling, destructive behavior, or spectatoritis. “ Leisure
itself does not necessarily lead to art, literature, or science. Special
cultural conditions are needed.” Skinner sees it as crucial to create such
cultural conditions to shape and “ control what a person does when he
does not need to do anything” [pp. 179-180]. Probably it will only be
our delight in hum an relations th at will finally be able to use up our
time, going far beyond the “ services” th at now make up over half of
our national economic activity. New meanings and new behaviors will
be needed for work, income, and unemployment. In an affluent society,
we might fruitfully shape ourselves into creating new experimental
communities, or into spending the days playing with children and teach
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ing them, as in the old, easy, Polynesian societies.
Skinner emphasizes that a new design of society will have to appeal
now to most o f us. “ A new culture must appeal to those who are to
move into it, and they are necessarily the products of an older culture.”
But he recognizes that the long-run design might not be one we have
been brought up to enjoy or “ to be reinforced for” —with no punish
ment or threat or compulsive labor and “ no need for m oral struggle.”
He says, rather, that “ the problem is to design a world which will be
liked . . . by those who live in it,” a world based on the real “ sources of
the things people call g o o d ” [pp. 163-164].
BOOKSHELL OR H E A V E N ?
Is all this just a benevolent Fascism, as Skinner’s critics have commonly

asserted? Is it a “ blueprint of hell,” as an oppo nent in Psychology Today
suggested in a rem ark th a t has now been quoted in m any other reviews?
I think the answer is clearly no. It is true that this is not laissez-faire
capitalism, and that it might lead to a very different type of economic
system. A nd it is not a Com m unist society of the Russian or Chinese
type, for these have few large-scale behavior-shaping mechanisms, other
than exhortation and censorship, and few effective checks and balances
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or countercontrols. And it is not a theocratic state, like some pseudo-
utopian societies today, with an ecclesiastical hierarchy and punishing
m oral controls. But it is surely at the opposite pole from the real Fascisms
of this century, with their goose-stepping and b loodbaths and need of
control by continuous expansion and war.
N o, this is a new concept of a society, although it was represented in
embryonic form in Walden Two. Parts of it have been suggested by other
reformers and Utopians (or antisuggested, if we include Brave New W orld
and the misunderstood passage quoted earlier). A m ong existing socie

54 JOHN R . PLATT
ties, it is perhaps most like a kibbutz, with its warm family relations and
emphasis on constructive work together for survival. But Skinner’s
emphasis on diversity and experimentation, and his positive behavioral
methods and teaching m ethods for achieving such goals as group h a r
m ony and effectiveness, are quite new.
A society for survival with immediate feedback channels of protest
and correction, a society th at ends the long reign of punishment and
retaliation, a society whose officials are subject to continuous counter
control to insure th at they work for the good of everybody, a society
that deliberately practices diversity and experimentation with different
life styles, a society in which such things are not just wishful dreams but
one that actually knows how to accomplish th e m —from where we
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stand today, such a society looks to me not like a blueprint of hell but
more like a blueprint of heaven. Read the H o m m e quotation again, and
see if this is not a society th a t most of us would pledge our lives to achieve
for our children and grandchildren!
W e must look at the realities, and not be like the religious zealots of
the past who thou gh t all reforms were from the devil if they were not
dressed in their own familiar theological language. It is by their fruits
that you shall know whether reforms are good.
OTHER T H IN G S TO BE D O N E
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There are m any other things to be done in spreading these new patterns
or m aking the needed large-scale transform ations based on them. Two
will be mentioned here. The first is the further study of m utual rein
forcement by adults with each other in families and small groups. M ost
of the reinforcement studies so far are on such asymmetrical relations
as psychologist-pigeon, therapist-patient, or teacher-child. W e need
studies on the reinforcement contingencies needed to maintain mutual
cooperation and m utual respect between lovers, siblings, or friends in
groups of various sizes. Adults will have gone beyond baby talk and
baby rewards and will need subtle, verbal, high-information discriminat
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ing responses. We may need to alternate “ shaping” and “ being shaped” ;
and an attitude of openness to being shaped may be the key to maturity
and effectiveness in working with others, as the responsiveness psy
chologists have emphasized. There are reasons for believing that small
mutual-support groups to practice and teach behavior-shaping tech
niques might be natural self-multiplying units for Skinnerian methods,
and a rapid and effective mechanism for constructive social change to
new ways o f behaving, new values, and countercontrol methods where
they are most needed today.

A nother area in which much more study is needed is that of “ non-

zero-sum games” and their relation to reinforcement principles and
behavior-modification techniques. These “ games” include many social
conflict-cooperation dilemmas, such as “ Prisoner’s D ilem m a” (Rapo-
port, 1966), and “ The Tragedy o f the C o m m o n s” (H ardin, 1968). These
are our present ways of labeling two-person game situations similar to
arms races, where escalating conflict continually reinforces arms makers
and governm ent officials on each side; or /7-person games, like interna
tional whaling, where catching the last whales is a tem porary national
advantage but a collective disaster. W ithout a superordinate controlling
authority, there is now no available mechanism for converting the long-
ru n collective advantages o f peace and trade, on the one hand, or of
restraint, on the other, into short-run reinforcements for different be
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havior by the individuals involved. The search for new reinforcement
methods and long-run-short-run conversions in such problems, possibly
including such new political pressures as the large-scale consciousness
of the ecology movement, might be of great practical value in these
larger-scale social-structural conflicts.
But there are hundreds of new types of studies that can be made and
that will be made in extending behavior-modification m ethods to other
aspects of our social life. The Skinnerian m ethods are loose in the world
and can no t be put back. They offer us the brightest hopes of any methods
we now have for rapid restructuring o f m any o f our obsolete and
dangerous social institutions, and for building not merely a Skinnerian
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society, but any new society for the world ahead. T od ay we stand at the
fulcrum of history, between the old societies and ethical values, which
developed by accident, and the new culture, which will have to be
created by intentional design if we are to survive at all. At this critical
m oment, we are fortunate to have a revolutionary manifesto like Beyond
Freedom and D ignity to shake up and clarify our thinking and to lay
the foundation o f necessary values and practical m ethods that will be
needed, as we finally take up the responsibility of designing and creating
a livable and long-run future for man. As Skinner says at the end:
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It is hard to im agin e a w orld in w h ich p e o p le live togeth er w ith ou t
quarreling, m aintain th em selves by produ cin g the fo o d , shelter, and cloth in g
they need, en joy th em selves and con trib u te to the en jo y m en t o f others in
art, m usic, literature, and gam es, co n su m e on ly a reason ab le part o f the
resources o f the w orld . . . and c o m e to k n ow th em selv es accu rately and,
therefore m anage th em selves effectively. Y et all th is is p ossib le . . . [p. 214].
It is not a dream. He has helped to make it a reality that is already

coming into existence at m any centers. These centers are seeds of the

JOHN R . PLATT
56
first culture th a t has ever offered people tested and effective ways of
shaping each other’s behavior so as to reach their full and diverse hum an
potentialities. F o r the solutions of our deep problems, it is, in the long
run, the only hope we have.
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3
Behavioral Technology
and Institutional Transformation
INDEX
D ennis C. Pirages
Dennis C. Pirages, a political scientist with a broad background in the

behavioral sciences, is currently a research associate in the
D epartm ent o f Biological Sciences at S tanford University. H is most
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recent book, Ark II, takes up m any o f the ideas im plicit in this
article in much greater detail.
The main theme that Pirages treats in this chapter is the growing
imbalance between industrial and social technology. Galloping
technology has shaped industrial m an's culture, and now this culture
seems to offer little guidance f o r fu tu r e survival o f the species. He
points out that there is now a great need fo r a social transformation in
which the old norms, values, and institutions are replaced with others
that are more ecologically sound.
In this respect, Pirages sees much that is im portant in Skinner's
message, particularly at what he calls this “critical point in human
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h is t o r y S k i n n e r calls attention to the subtle conditioning that
presently exists in our society, he fe e ls, and lays the groundwork f o r a
strategy to turn this conditioning around in starting the needed
social transformation.
Industrial society has become technologically overdeveloped while re

maining socially underdeveloped. The same society that uses applied
science to orbit M ars and put a m an on the m o on seems incapable of

58 DENNIS C. PI RAGES
maintaining a stable social order and prom oting a more satisfactory

life for all citizens. Industrial culture is held captive by a galloping tech
nology that molds values, institutions, and hum an behavior (Frank,
1966). “ Progress” is a one-dimensional progress, no longer defined in
terms of hum an needs but most often in terms of economic growth
and other material achievements (Marcuse, 1964).
The publication of B. F. Skinner’s manifesto Beyond Freedom and
D ignity once again calls attention to our failure to develop a technology
of behavior sufficient to cope with the results of achievements in the
physical sciences. While scientists have been able to split the atom and
decipher genetic codes, there have been no equivalent breaththroughs
in understanding hu m an behavior or the structure of society in which
we live. Technicians produce new types of nausea gas and remarkable
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weapons for riot control, but little has been done to prevent riots from
taking place. It is unfortunate th a t Skinner has left himself open to so
many attacks by overdrawing his case, because the social and political
message that is woven through the boo k highlights some very critical
contem porary problems.
Skinner’s timely argum ent focuses attention on the failure to develop
a behavioral technology at a very critical point in hum an history.
Never before have so m any interrelated problems threatened man with
extinction. Galloping technology has created a highly complex and
interdependent environment, and man is no longer certain whether he
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controls this environment or is being controlled by it. The planet is
overpopulated, the atmosphere is becoming increasingly polluted, the
division of labor is now unbelievably complex, social insulating space
is rapidly disappearing, and the level of social discontent seems constantly
to rise. Men of good will suggest solutions, but they are told th at intuitive
ways of solving these problems turn out to be counterintuitive in the
end (Forrester, 1971a).
Industrial man has learned too m uch abo ut his natural environment
while knowing too little about himself. He has dom inated and “ inherited
the ea rth ” because of successes in modifying and redesigning his eco
logical niche. The environment has been shaped to meet m a n ’s needs,
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but man has not yet altered his behavior to meet environmental im pera
tives. Success in m anipulating the physical world has enabled man to
avoid facing the unpleasantness of modifying ecologically destructuve
behavior.
But the ability to manipulate the physical environment at will is
increasingly circumscribed. Even with a “ green revolution,” food sup
plies c a n ’t keep pace with the increasing numbers of humans. Resources
for providing w arm th and shelter are in scarce supply. Population
growth more than absorbs increased productivity, and consumer goods

Behavioral Technology and Institutional Transformation 59
th a t have played an im portant role in insuring social peace over the

last century no longer guarantee stability in a society in which the
purchasing power remains concentrated in the hands o f a very few. It is
for these reasons th a t the social and political aspects of Skinner’s mes
sage are now so im portant.
T h e Social A n im a l
H om o sapiens differs from other species because it has developed very

complex cultures that serve as survival weapons. M a n alone is no m atch
for his well-endowed competitors. H e can no t run nearly as fast as some
animals, his sense o f smell is not well developed, and he lacks the sharp
INDEX
tusks and teeth necessary to do battle. But, th rou gh evolutionary
accident, m an has developed a much bigger brain than his competitors.
This, in turn, has enabled m an to com m unicate, cooperate, and pass
detailed knowledge from generation to generation. M an uses symbols
and abstractions to pass on knowledge and to condition behavior,
rather than the simple mimesis used by less sophisticated species.
Patterns of behavior passed from generation to generation become
institutionalized. Institutions represent parsim onious ways of passing
on shared norms, values, and behaviors. Religious institutions have
grown up surrounding m a n ’s relation to the unknow n, political institu
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tions have developed to handle collective decision-making, and social
institutions have grown out of patterns of social interaction. Although
man is a social animal,' cooperation has never been autom atic. Countless
wars attest to the fact. Over time, however, a core o f com m only held
values has evolved as a part of the cultures that have aided m a n ’s sur
vival. It is these institutionalized values that have m ade organized social
life possible.
But, in spite of m a n ’s superior brain size, much of his cultural evolu
tion has been as haphazard as genetic m utation. Values and institutions
have rarely been designed or modified to meet anticipated crises.1 Our
present industrial culture has grown as crazily as if man had no powers
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to rationally plan his future. M an has changed his behavior only in
response to changing conditions and rarely, if ever, in anticipation of
problems.
Skinner alludes to the survival value of a culture and points out that
“ to the extent th at it helps its members to get what they need and avoid
what is dangerous it helps them to survive and transm it the culture”
irThe only exceptions to this generalization would seem to be those institutions devoted
to war that must be innovative or perish. Much o f what is referred to as galloping
technology has been related to war research.

60 DENNIS C. P1RAGES
[p. 129].2 Fo r Skinner, a culture represents a set o f contingencies (rein

forcement mechanisms) by which hum ans orient their behavior. These
contingencies are em bedded in social institutions, values, norms, and
behavior. As cultures evolve, the behavior th at has been rewarding in
the past is repeated, and that th at has led to the extinction o f hum ans is,
quite naturally, ab an do ned along with the nonsurvival cultures that
produced it.
Skinner lightly passes over two very fundam ental points in his dis
cussion of cultural evolution. The first is th a t behavioral contingencies
are socially determined and d o n ’t exist in a vacuum, and the second is
that con tem p orary cultures can just as easily hinder species survival
as aid it.
We all engage in certain types of behavior because it is rewarded by
INDEX
people around us. The child learns values and norm s thro ugh socializa
tion processes, although, much to his parents’ chagrin, there j s no
one-to-one relation between what is taught and what is absorbed. Other
people are the im p ortant contingencies in our lives. H um ans strive for
approval from those whose opinions are valued. The approval of sig
nificant others can be one of the most im po rtan t reinforcers of social
behavior.3
Industrial society consists of an extremely complex web of social
relations, and much social behavior is “ m ediated” by unseen others.
A lthough Skinner can easily manipulate the contingencies governing
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animal behavior in his laboratory, assessing the structure of reinforce
ments in a real society is a forbidding task. The study of how contingen
cies are socially anchored has just barely begun, and the whole question
of organizing attem pts to modify hum an behavior remains in the realm
of science fiction. Although there are, undoubtedly, complex sets of
rules governing hum an behavior th at we may be able to understand at
some future date, there is a world of difference between pigeons pecking
triangles and hum ans refusing to sell their homes to others of a different
race. It is quite easy to make the pigeons peck the triangle on com m and,
but it is not so easy to modify the socially anchored behavior of humans.
In traditional societies, the social anchoring o f behavior does not
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conflict with the role that culture plays in survival. The social structure
is simple, and nearly all members of the culture are exposed to the same
range of critical problems. The structure of reinforcements automatically
aids survival, because those who stray from the com monly accepted
value core find life to be nasty, brutish, an d short. Conform ity is a virtue
th r o u g h o u t this paper, page numbers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s

Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Alfred A. K nopf, 1971).
3The social anchoring o f behavior and the “exchanges” that take place in everyday
life have been mapped out by Blau (1964).

in traditional society, because the life expectancy of the nonconform ist

is minimal. Only the living survive and modify behavioral contingencies,
and traditional cultures represent ideal survival mechanisms for u n
changing environm ents.4
There is now considerable d o u b t th a t the culture in which we live
has the survival value of its traditional counterpart. The mechanisms
by which “ survival” behavior is reinforced have apparently broken
down. As man has modified his ecological niche, elementary threats to
daily existence have diminished. Aside from the very poor, few need
worry a b o u t finding food or protection from the elements in m odern
society. Simple survival imperatives make up a diminishing part o f the
industrial culture. N ow th a t the wolf is no longer at the door, the relation
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between survival and the sanctioned structure o f rewards is no longer
close. An entire society now lives in a p parent nonconform ity with
environmental imperatives; but it is clear th a t we can get away with this
behavior for only a limited period o f time.
Industrial society is in constant flux. M an is now changing his physical
and social environment in ways th a t he does not completely understand.
Behavior th a t was survival-relevant in the past m ay have little survival
value today. Unless a culture continuously adap ts to the environment
in which it is embedded, there is little hope th a t it can long endure:
behavior anchored in an agricultural value can n o t persist as farmland
turns to desert; a hunting and gathering society can no t survive as game
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becomes scarce; and, most im portant, a society in which the structure
of social rewards is anchored in conspicuous consum ption can not long
survive in an environment of increasing scarcity.
T h e C h a n g in g E n v ir o n m e n t
T h ro u g h o u t most of h um an history, there has been little need to discuss

conscious program s of behavior modification or altering the institution
alized structure of rewards. Those who did not conform to environ
mental imperatives received sum m ary justice. But remaking the physical
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environm ent has given man a cushion th at permits more deviance in
social behavior. Those who are unwilling to have their lives guided by
ecological wisdom can now survive, thanks to the industrial revolution
and the spurt o f abundance that it has produced. The “ deviants” have
helped to create a new industrial culture of abundance, a culture that
is sowing the seeds o f its own destruction.
4The conformity that characterizes traditional societies has been best explicated by
Lerner (1958).

62 DENNIS C. PIRAGES
It is one of the ironies o f history th at the “ benefits” th at have altered

the social contingencies for industrial m an and have led him to so
readily embrace m odern technology now threaten to destroy the hum an
race (see H arm an, 1971). Greater abundance has seduced man away
from rational evaluation o f the ecosystem’s potential for continued
support of greater numbers o f people. N ew prosperity has led to a
global revolution of rising expectations, which places new dem ands on
an already overtaxed supply o f nonrenewable resources. Scientific dis
coveries have produced new drugs to prolong hum an life and, thus,
have contributed to planetary overcrowding. Laissez-faire cultural de
velopment has led to the immediate satisfaction of perceived needs,
with little attention to aversive long-term consequences.
The emergence of a highly interdependent industrial culture beset by
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an increasing num ber o f technological “ success” problems necessitates
more cooperation and planning for unseen contingencies. At the same
time that industrial society has become m uch more heterogeneous, we
all have become much more dependent upon others for our continued
survival. Sustaining trem endous num bers o f people at very high stand
ards of living requires new forms of cooperation not unlike those
instilled by simple conformity in traditional societies. Adequate social
insulating space no longer exists, and the types of behavior appropriate
in m odern society are quite different from the “ rugged individualism”
of an open frontier.
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In a very real sense, we all have a veto power over the lives of others
that grows every day. Extreme interdependence means that the failure
of any part of society to perform as expected results in problems for the
whole society. In G reat Britain, coal miners clearly dem onstrated their
im portance to the rest of society when, in 1972, they created havoc by
walking off their jobs to obtain higher wages. The lack of coal virtually
paralyzed the British economy. In the United States, dockworkers
demonstrated the same principle. By walking off their jobs, they caused
untold inconvenience, including loss of job s and income, for millions.
Strikes became acceptable behavior during the period of intense indus
trialization, when their effects were localized, but now they remain as a
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dysfunctional reminder that our institutions are still those of the frontier.
But even on an individual level we all have more impact on our
fellow citizens. D ram atic examples occasionally occur in our weapons
culture when a deranged individual arms himself and shoots others at
random . Such explicit displays of veto power are unusual, and more
m undane examples occur every day when careless drivers slaughter
innocent people on the freeways. W hether we like it or not, the crowded
and complex social environment gives us little choice about becoming
our brothers’ keeper. Because we are all pressed m uch closer together
in densely populated society, all of our actions affect others.

The collective decisions of millions of individuals to consume more

have not been without effect on the physical environment. The e a rth ’s
carrying capacity is not unlimited, and neither are the supplies o f n o n
renewable resources needed to sustain industrial societies. In striving to
meet the perceived needs of additional millions, the planet has become
increasingly polluted and resource supplies have become dangerously
depleted. N o a m ou nt of technological modification of the environment
promises to save m ankind .5 Industrial man must once again begin to
conform to environmental imperatives and modify his behavior in
accordance with age-old rules. There are limits, clearly, to the extent to
which man can transform his ecological niche th rou gh imperialistic
activities aimed at other species, and we have apparently reached those
limits.
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Just as galloping technology has unleashed four new horsemen of the
apocalypse—Progress, Production, Population, and Pollution —it has
begun to develop the rudim ents of behavioral expertise to cope with new
social problems. Behavior modification and social engineering are at
least discussed in polite society, although more often in a negative
than in a positive context. In Skinner's terms, we still prefer to remedy
m ounting problems by “ playing from our strong suit” and investing in
technological solutions, because they involve little tam pering with im
portant taboos against organized modification of institutions and be
havior [p. 3]. It is acceptable to perfect birth-control devices but not to
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frame social policies designed to insure their use. The former requires
only technological innovation, but the latter involves interference with
social values. Science develops the most expensive pollution-reducing
equipment in an effort to keep up with the increasing output of noxious
exhausts, but no one dares suggest that society should cut back on its
fantastically high rates of consum ption. The cult o f social laissez faire
(freedom and dignity?) encourages development of an increasingly
dangerous galloping industrial technology that is extremely im portant
in reducing our freedoms in less apparent ways while condemning
efforts to develop and use a technology of behavior.
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In s titu tio n a l T r a n s f o rm a tio n
The contingencies by which hum an behavior is molded are embedded

in social institutions. In order to modify collective behavior, the in
stitutions that shape that behavior must be correspondingly altered.
Any pattern of expected behavior that becomes “ institutionalized”
is, by definition, difficult to change. Men are basically conservative
•'There is an extensive literature on the environmental problems we face. Perhaps the

best reference is Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1972).

64 DENNIS C. PI RAGES
and resist sudden shifts in behavioral expectations. Organized groups

develop vested interests in the m aintenance of prescribed behavioral
patterns, even thou gh those patterns may become dysfunctional for
hum an survival.
Being social animals, men seek recognition from others in the form
of power, privilege, and prestige. Political institutions determine the
distribution of power and define the types of behavior th at lead to
being rewarded with greater supplies. Similarly, economic institutions
determine the types of behavior th at are rewarded with privilege. A l
though there is no necessary connection am o ng them, similar types of
behavior most often lead to accrual of power, privilege, and prestige.
Taken together, the institutionalized rationing of scarce social resources
could be called a social “ paradigm .” In this sense, the term represents
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the accepted way of parceling out social rewards, a set of commonly
understood social wisdoms, and an organized framework for socializing
the young and passing on relevant experience. This usage of the term
is analogous to th at explicated by K u hn in his study of scientific revolu
tions (K uhn, 1962).
The most pressing task for twentieth-century man and his government
is transform ing the now outm oded industrial paradigm and creating a
structure of rewards more in conformity with environmental im pera
tives. A behavioral “ Prometheus Project” is needed, if m ankind is to
escape the fate of other species that have overshot their niche and
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suffered the inevitable consequences.6 G ro w th in numbers and a revolu
tion of rising expectations have outstripped the planet’s ability to provide
adequate long-run support, and the gap between perceived needs and
realistic possibilities continues to widen. We would expect that, if man
is truly different from other species, he will recognize the problem
and develop a behavioral technology adequate to prevent the population
crash that will certainly result from continued reliance on an outmoded
institutional paradigm.
In Skinner’s language, the heart of the predicament is that the be
havior most rewarded in industrial society militates against m a n ’s
long-term survival chances. There is great difficulty in making the
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aversive long-run consequences of present behavior a meaningful con
tingency. In simpler terms, this means it is very difficult to discourage
tod ay ’s population from bequeathing current problems to unborn gener
ations. Industrial man is told to consume, although the interests of
future generations would encourage him to ration. Economies grow
GA Prometheus Project to exhaust man’s creative capacities has been suggested for the
physical sciences by Feinberg (1969), but so far no one has suggested such an under
taking in social life, where it is most needed.

when there is a need to stabilize exploitation of natural resources.

“ G ro w th ” and “ progress” are values th a t are firmly entrenched and
until a significant institutional transform ation or “ paradigm shift” occurs
there can be little change in hu m an behavior.
U nfortunately, little is know n ab o u t the transform ation process.
Existing institutions have developed slowly over time, and little rational
guidance has been employed in their formation. Laissez faire has been
the guiding rule. It has taken m ajor visible crises to alter institutions and
behavior in the past, and sometimes even catastrophic events have failed
to have any impact.
Environmental problems, unfortunately, do no t fall into the highly
visible category. They seem to have been growing slowly, an d their
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consequences remain rem ote in time and space for most people. It is
difficult to watch a mineral “ depleting itself,” and no one pays much
attention to statistics. Tiny increments in air pollution pass unnoticed,
and we adjust to them. Starvation remains a way of life for a sizable
portion of the w orld’s population, and poverty is tolerated in the
wealthiest country in the world. Yet, little remedial action is taken.
There have been no ecological “ Pearl H a rb o rs ” to alert us to impending
dangers, and the consequences of present behavior are glossed over by
all but a handful of “ prophets of d o o m .”
Even the obvious deterioration of the social environment stirs little
apparent critical evaluation. While the centers o f our major cities were
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burning, a few years ago, most went a b o u t their business as usual and
there was no enduring shift in social priorities. There have been new
developments in police science, as new equipment and riot-control
techniques have been developed to deal with the symptoms of social
discontent, but the causes of social catastrophes are still ignored. As a
result, greater quantities of social resources are spent in keeping order
thro ugh the use of force, while the roots of social problems are ignored.
Crime, violence, and other indicators of social dislocation represent
failures of our institutions and not, necessarily, new hum an weaknesses.
Increasing indications of deviant behavior mean that there is a gap
between what the structure of rewards offers people and what they have
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been taught to accept. F o r example, equality of op portunity is an
accepted value in our society, but when a very rigid hierarchy controls
the distribution of privilege, conventional paths to wealth may be closed
to all but a selected few. Deviant behavior becomes the only way in which
oppressed minorities may seek the opportunities supposedly open to all.
In this respect, deviant behavior is but an other indication that an
institutional transform ation is necessary. Expectations are being created
that cannot be met. In the long run, the use of aversive controls to
maintain order will ban kru pt society, as costs begin exceeding benefits.

T error and coercion are effective only for brief periods o f time, and an
active or well-ordered society need seldom resort to force.7 Police pro
tection, for example, cost each of us $36.50 in 1969. In constant dollars,
this was double the $18.61 that such protection cost in 1960 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, p. 148; 1971, p. 227). There is no reason th at this
trend w on’t continue, in the absence of a large-scale shift to a new social
paradigm more in keeping with hum an needs and environmental
possibilities.
It is unfair to contend that all these problems result from evil people.
H u m an nature is certainly no worse in industrial society than it has
been in the past, and it seems much more benevolent when we consider
past excesses of hum an violence. If there has been anything encouraging
ab ou t the environmental crisis, it has been the apparent willingn'ess of
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people to put in the required effort to solve problems th at have become
pressing. M ost people have attem pted to play some role in meeting
local problems, whether by operating a neighborhood recycling center
or attending city council meetings. Political activism is a sign of concern.
W h a t is most u nfortunate is th at leadership has been lacking. People
will work to solve problems brought to their attention, but contem
porary political leaders have done little to emphasize the extent of
the crisis we face. Perhaps this is from ignorance, but more likely it
is out of concern for their own careers. G row th and consumption
behavior is still sanctioned by social support from significant others,
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even though most knowledgeable people will adm it th at we can't sustain
our society on this level very m uch longer.
Theoretically speaking, the political, social, and economic institutions
in a mass democracy respond to the needs and dem ands of citizens.
In reality, there have always been big gaps between theory and practice.
Institutions can and do develop lives of their own and, at best, are
responsive to hum an needs only in the long run. At this point in history,
however, institutional lag is a very serious problem. C ontem porary
institutions inculcate patterns of behavior th at have been rewarding to
past generations. In times of rapid change and serious crises, however,
values th at only can change as they are passed from generation to
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generation rapidly become outmoded. T o d a y ’s citizen must change his
values several times within each lifetime (Lifton, 1968). Just as man
cannot physically evolve in anticipation of future environmental condi
tions—at least not until we better understand genetics—present institu
tions offer little promise in transforming behavior to help meet future
7The fact that coercion cannot work forever has been demonstrated repeatedly in
communist countries, most recently in the economic collapse in Czechoslovakia. For an
analysis of the role o f coercion in maintaining stability, see Pirages (1972).

problems. O ur old institutions have acted as excellent codifiers of past

experience, but anticipatory or planning institutions have been rare in
hum an history.
A lthough it is a sobering prospect to consider, it is possible th at mass
democracy cannot transform itself to meet environm ental imperatives
(see, for example, Ophuls, 1971). The fragile consensus that underlies
mass democracy is sustained by economic growth. A society with large
inequities in the distribution of wealth can only exist when there is hope
am on g the less fortunate that they, too, may profit from a growing
economy and become wealthy. N o revolution has ever taken place
while the lot of the masses was perceived to be improving, regardless
of existing inequities. But environm ental problems make it unreasonable
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to expect large-scale economic growth to continue, and advanced indus
trial societies have to consider that, at some point, steady-state resource
consum ption will become imperative (Daly, 1973). There is no exception
to the rule that accelerating depletion of finite quantities of resources
cannot continue forever, even though we seem to ignore this simple fact.
W h o C o n tr o ls a T ra n s f o r m a tio n ?
The real problem in our laissez-faire industrial culture is one o f control.

We can really no longer pretend that we d o n ’t know how to modify
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hu m an behavior. Private interests working for private gain m ake full
use of the available psychological knowledge. T he airwaves are satu
rated with television commercials designed to instill a desire to consume.
H ardly an hour of television time passes w ithout at least one sultry
blonde using the oldest conditioning device in the world to sell m e n ’s
deodorants and after-shave lotions. Sex-sells, subliminal advertising,
erroneous logic, deceptive statistics, and outright p ropaganda are freely
used by private interests in their attempts to condition behavior.
It is ironic that our political leaders are so distrusted th a t the use of
such devices by public officials in prom oting the com m on interest is
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forbidden, although private interests are permitted, with few restrictions,
to use them for individual gain. For example, governmental altering of
the economic structure to encourage development of nonpolluting indus
tries is still often attacked as unw arranted interference with private
enterprise. On an individual level, government financing of television
commercials to prom ote racial integration still meets with intense o p p o
sition. The fact is that we have been unwilling to develop and use a
behavioral technology in the public interest because we have not yet
learned to trust each other. It goes against the grain of hundreds of years
of tradition to permit such developments. Because of an inability and

unwillingness to come to any agreement on the seriousness of the p ro b

lem we now face, we ignore the conditioning th a t takes place every day
and restrict government to ruling only by use o f the most aversive
controlling measures.
Skinner is very correct when he points out th a t there has never been
a society in which freedom and dignity have had real meaning, in the
generally accepted sense. Behavior has always been conditioned by
others and freedom has never been absolute. W h at constitutes dignity
has always been culturally determined. M ost behavior is predictable,
given the requisite information, and it would be fair to say that ninety
percent of the behavior of ninety percent of the population can now be
accurately predicted. The ability to predict, o f course, can soon be
followed by the ability to control.
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If one doubts that freedom and dignity are only relative terms, he
need only com pare the varying definitions o f freedom in the U nited
States, China, and the Soviet U nion. In the U nited States, freedom has
meant free enterprise, free economic opportunity, and the right of the
individual to defend property for his own use. In the Soviet Union,
freedom has meant freedom to serve the people while not criticizing
existing institutions. In China, freedom is apparently found in internaliz
ing the words of C hairm an Mao. The point is not that one type of free
dom is better than another, but simply that in each culture freedom and
dignity are defined differently by the institutional paradigm.
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To the student of “ dem ocratic” institutions, the consequences of these
realities and Skinner’s observations create a serious dilemma. It is clear
that democratic institutions have been very slow in responding to new
problems an d remolding contingencies. The task for present political
leaders is to restructure the social environm ent so that ecologically
sound behavior is rewarded and suicidal behavior discouraged. But this
requires a type of bold leadership that has been rare in our history.
Present leaders are attuned to the politics o f industrial society, the old
politics of muddling through. The required bold program s of behavior
modification and institutional transform ation raise too m uch opposition
am ong believers in Skinner’s “ cult of freedom and dignity.”
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It is uncomfortable, but it is perhaps necessary, to consider that
present democratic institutions may not survive in a less affluent future.
Times of crisis require resolute action, and democracies have not been
noted for encouraging massive transformations. It is not inconceivable
that mass democracy and other aspects o f our laissez-faire culture will
come under sustained attack as the impending crisis becomes clearer.
But there is no reason that a democracy cannot respond to challenge. The
real question is, Will it? There could be no more powerful instrument
to prom ote the needed paradigm shift than a determined, democratically

ruled society, but there is a very real question of whence the necessary
impetus will come.
A lthough people in our mass democracy are certainly not malevolent,
and although they remain available for any mobilization effort, a silent
majority is hardly ready to lead a wholesale transform ation of values
and institutions. The masses are basically inert, at least until some o b
vious problem appears in need of solution. In time of war, when there
is an obvious enemy against whom we struggle, people can be easily
mobilized. It is much more difficult to mobilize people in support of
the rights of future generations!
Given the current constraints placed on future growth possibilities by
environmental deterioration, democratically elected politicians can
hardly be expected to seize the initiative. Given a choice between candi
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dates promising greater economic growth, higher salaries, and general
prosperity and “ prophets of d o o m ” backing plans for limiting growth
and equalizing incomes, there is little d o ub t as to how people will vote.
Voters do not have sympathy with candidates who confront them with
ugly truths. Consequently, we can expect little bold leadership from
politicians who depend upon mass support.
W hat is really needed at present is some insulation of public officials
from citizen pressures. The immediacy of political campaigns precludes
any real efforts at long-term planning. There is no planning branch of
government charged with responsibility for the welfare of future genera
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tions.8 Politically, we live for the m oment, as if we secretly realize that
tom o rro w we might well die. Officials are elected by appealing to indi
vidual and group interests, and the com m on interest of the species is
neglected.
It would seem th a t a partial solution to the dilemma is the establish
ment of an insulated planning branch within the government. In this
manner, it would be possible to outline a program of behavior modifi
cation and institutional transform ation, which seems to be required.
This group o f “ controllers” would be charged with responsibility for
designing a structure of social contingencies th a t would make the aver-
sive long-term consequences of contem porary behavior meaningful at
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the present time. Perhaps this could be made more palatable by the
creation of a new profession th at might be called behavioral technology.
But first we must accept the fact that survival problems have social
solutions that can be solved by scientific inquiry ju st as readily as other
problems have been solved by physicists and chemists.
This should not be taken to mean that we need scrap our democratic
8A planning branch o f government has been proposed in the suggested constitution de
signed by Rexford Tugwell (1970) at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

70 DENNIS C. PIRAGES
institutions. The “ controllers” in the planning branch need not be little

philosopher kings. They would be charged with the development of
policy alternatives in light of the serious problems we face. The imple
mentation would be up to the elected representatives of the people. As
of now, we have no institutions devoted to long-term planning and
framing societal alternatives. Such a planning branch or group of
behavioral technologists would inject a new and authoritative voice into
the political debate. It is hoped that this would be the voice representing
the interests of those who will yet live on this planet.
S o m e C o nc lu sio ns
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The social message in Skinner’s book is timely, and it offers an introduc
tion to the m ajor problems confronting twentieth-century man. His work
touches a very sensitive nerve in our society. A fairly effective technology
of behavior is currently being developed, but we have an inordinate fear
of recognizing it and harnessing it for the com m on good. There still is
a great deal of distrust of behavior modification in general, and of the
application of these techniques to social problems in particular.
If our culture is to survive, it must be drastically remolded. The data
clearly indicate that m ankind is headed for a population disaster, and,
without effective rational action, the social and physical environments
will continue to deteriorate. This occurs in an atmosphere in which the
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greatest portion of the w orld’s population has been led to expect tre
mendous increases in standards of living. But social scientists know that
worsening conditions in the face of golden promises lead to violent and
tragic responses. M an not only responds to institutionalized contin
gencies, but he can understand them and create new ones. Skinner’s
behavioral technology offers the hope that man can avert impending
disaster by better understanding himself.
We have approached a trem endous watershed in hum an history that
may be equal to all previous “ revolutions” combined. The very survival
of the species is at stake. B. F. Skinner’s warnings and observations
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stand at the crest of this historic divide. He has made an admirable case
for developing a technology of behavior before it is too late. In the end,
man will get what he, by his efforts, deserves. If he uses his m aterial and
intellectual resources to overcome his own challenges to himself, a more
golden future awaits him. If he fails to use these resources, the result
will certainly be chaos and self-destruction.

4
Controlled Environments
for Social Change
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Vitali Rozynko, Kenneth Swift,
Josephine Swift, and Larney J. Boggs
Vitali R ozynko and his colleagues are associated with the Operant
Conditioning Behavior M odification Project at the Veterans
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Adm inistration Hospital, M enlo Park, California. Their project is
partially supported by a grant fr o m the N ational In stitute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism.
Their chapter takes us fr o m the general exposition o f operant
conditioning to a practical and applied discussion o f its techniques as
they are utilized in an innovative program f o r the treatm ent o f
emotional and behavioral disorders. In their project, Skinner's methods
are used in treating a group o f institutionalized alcoholics. Though this
project has not been in existence sufficiently long to develop longitudinal
statistical p ro o f o f the m ethod's efficacy, the authors are confident that
the results will be quite impressive when a f u l l analysis o f the data
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becomes available in 1973. They also emphasize an aspect o f
Skinner ism not touched on elsewhere in this book: the importance o f
verbal behavior in operant conditioning. They believe that abusive,
pejorative, or “ aversive" words can be as punishing as physical assaults.
M oreover, they believe that fo r certain general behavioral disorders—
as distinguished, fo r exam ple, fr o m discrete phobias— verbal behavior
provides the appropriate leverage fo r m aking the necessary
modifications. They always refer to those with whom they work (and
to their sta ff) as students and, in other ways, avoid verbal patterns that

72 V1TAL1 ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT, AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
might condition clients to think o f themselves in negative terms.

The authors dedicate this paper to B. F. Skinner and James G.
Holland, and would like to share credit with the rest o f their
colleagues— Garry Flint, Jay M atejcik, Larry D ell'Anno, Christine
Danforth, Phyllis Ratigan, M arjorie Fuller, Bruce Bailey, H azel
Tiles ton, Arvada Pacheco, James Word, John Greenhalgh, Barbara
M atejcik, John Sinclair, Jane R ozynko, Peter D eM artini, Stephanie
Balter, Clifford E. H am m er, and many others.
B. F. Skinner’s statements on a u ton om o us man and his attributes have

pervasive ramifications concerning the control o f individual and group
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behavior and, by implication, the kinds o f governmental control mech
anisms that might be implemented in the future. N o t unexpectedly,
these statements have been followed by considerable alarm and criticism.
The breadth and significance of Skinner’s ideas, as well as the genuine
concern of his opponents, call for national and international discussion
at the highest levels. O ur com ments are intended to further stimulate
such discussion.
D e te rm in ism versus F re e d o m
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Skinner’s basic statement is that the behavior of all living organisms
is ultimately controlled by the environment and the changes in it that
occur consequent to their behavior. The behavior of organisms changes
as a result of whether or not a given behavior is followed by positive
reinforcement (reward) or negative reinforcement (the termination of a
“ frightening” or an aversive stimulus), punishment, or no discernable
consequences. M ore specifically, the behavior of individuals is a function
of (1) their previous history of reinforcement and punishment, (2) the
stimulus situation impinging on them at a specific time, and (3) their
level of deprivation. The experimental evidence supporting these general
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statements is unassailable. Thus, Skinner states that hum an behavior
is lawful and determined, and that it can be predicted and controlled.
Finally, Skinner observes that present systems of behavioral control are
dangerously inadequate and, if not altered, may result in the extinction
of our species or, at the very least, the significant degradation of human
society. He suggests that we begin to discuss and, ultimately, to devise
more effective ways of controlling hum an behavior.
There is little controversy regarding Skinner’s observation that
society must begin to behave differently in order to survive. The evidence

Controlled Environments for Social Change 73
of social dysfunction at various levels of human interaction is presented

to us daily, and ranges from reports of individual acts of m urder to the
subtle evidence of “ duplicity in high places.” The necessity for societal
change is generally evident and is undeniable. Disagreement exists,
however, as to what is to be done, how it can be accomplished, and when.
The central controversy surrounding Skinner’s formulation of the
problem is his denial of “ free will.” His critics phrase their objections
in a number of ways (for example: the theory ignores the capacity of
m an to make existential decisions; it is mechanistic; it will create a
society in which individual expression is impossible; it will eliminate
disagreement and rebellion and stifle necessary social change). This
controversy is grounded in discussions concerning free will, which, in
many aspects, is a pseudoproblem and only serves to help us avoid the
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necessary and difficult task of learning better ways of controlling o u r
selves, in order to insure our survival and our future happiness.
Other objections to Skinner’s theoretical structure state that certain
behavior exhibited by hum an beings cannot be accounted for by his
theory; that it is overly simple and cannot explain the richness of hum an
experience.
There is no disagreement about the complexity of m a n ’s behavior,
but one need not posit free will to account for it. W. Grey W alter (1951)
has calculated that his elementary electronic organisms, “ Machina
Speculatrix,” which consist of only two elements or circuits, form a
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system that can generate a new behavior pattern every one-tenth of a
second for 280 years. He estimates th at the hum an brain may have
approximately one thousand perceptible functional elements, and states
that “ even if man had only ten, this num ber of elements could provide
enough variety for a lifetime of experience for all the men who ever
lived or will be born if m ankind survives a thousand million years.”
W hether or not all of hum an behavior can be predicted and controlled
on the basis of Skinner’s system is an empirical question. There is no
question that much of hum an behavior can be and, moreover, th at much
of it is already controlled. Skinner contends that hum an behavior is
lawful, predictable, and modifiable, if—and only if—certain specific
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operations are carried out. If freedom and free will are synonymous
with whimsy or are independent from any param eters in the environ
m e n t—past or present, internal or external —then Skinner’s system
negates freedom. On the other hand, if freedom means the existence of a
multitude of alternatives for behavior, which at any instant may occur
lawfully to result in a specific response, then there is no conflict.
The free-will issue stemming from Skinner’s formulation of human
behavior creates visible controversy only am ong very select groups of
people who are involved in this rather esoteric to pic—for example,

74 VITALI ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE S W IF t, AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
scientists, philosophers, and theologians. Individuals in the general

population do not, as a rule, discuss free will. Nevertheless, as Skinner
points out, their attitudes and thinking appear to be based on a free-will
model. However, the ramifications of Skinner’s position, when applied
to government, immediately stimulate the interest of a much broader
group. His tenet th a t society and government should begin “ self
consciously” (in response to the data ab o u t behavior already available)
to control individual and group behavior by systematically modifying
the environment stimulates fears of losing individual freedoms. M ost
objections to designing specific environments are based on the assumption
that we have freedom and will lose it if our environments are planned
or designed. It is clear th a t behavior does not occur in a vacuum, but
that our present behaviors are controlled by our present environments,
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ju st as our behaviors will be controlled by whatever environments we
are able to devise in the future. Certainly, we can agree that a p ro p o r
tionately greater num ber of people who live in ghettos than of those
who live in Beverly Hills will commit crimes. Similarly, a proportionately
greater num ber of Beverly Hills residents than of ghetto residents will
go to college. In fact, even now, we seem to recognize this state of affairs
by our social legislation, which seeks to provide different environments
for minority groups in order to modify their behavior.
A lte rn a tiv e C o n tr o l M e th o d s
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behavior associated with social change and discontent, but we also
share the fear of developing a society that will achieve communal tr a n
quillity at the expense of what we call our individual freedoms. Skinner’s
proposals stimulate the latter fear and raise the portent of society
depicted by Aldous Huxley (1932) and George Orwell (1949).
It is more likely, however, that an Orwellian society may develop
from our present system than from extrapolations of Skinner’s p ro
posals. People rebel against and resist repressive measures but, at the
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same time, advocate and support their use on others who behave in
ways that are aversive to them. People have learned that punishment is
very effective in immediately suppressing ongoing behavior; they have
not yet learned that punishment is not very effective in helping initiate
new behaviors—behaviors that may be m ore productive and helpful,
both to society and to the individual. In addition, most people see
government largely as a coercive force, rather than a potential source
of reward for things well done.
During a period of rapid economic and social change, a significant

num ber of the population will suffer, and will be more apt to support
repressive governmental measures as a response to their own fears. The
last five years have seen much more emphasis placed on law enforce
ment and strict interpretation of the laws than before, and it is likely that
repressive measures will become more prevalent in the near future.
The extent to which the present trend toward the use of repressive
measures will develop is partly a function of the rate of social change.
Because our rapid technological development forces an acceleration of
social adjustments, the trend toward repression may be difficult to stem
and may result in a technologically sophisticated totalitarian state.
A distinct additional possibility is that, with the rising population,
depletion of natural resources, and the increase o f pollution, repressive
measures may have to be used to guarantee survival of our species.
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These measures may take the form of forced sterilization, greatly re
stricted uses of energy, and limits on m ovem ent and living location.
Some of these measures have a high probability o f being put into action
suddenly with consequent additional social disruption.
Skinner’s proposals not only recom m end more sophisticated be
havioral control but also advocate a reduction of coercive measures.
The literature on operant technology shows that, for the most part,
punishment works temporarily and only while the punishing agent is
present. Extrapolated to a larger group, the more a society utilizes
repressive measures, the more energy has to be devoted to maintaining
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the control system; consequently, less energy is available for more p ro
ductive enterprises. The excessive use of punishm ent sometimes results
in behaviors that are more troublesome or dam aging than the original
behavior—for example, a child who has been subjected to excessive
punishm ent may become apathetic or depressed, or an adult may
behave in ways that people call “ insane,” “ crim inal,” or “ dull.” Even
more energy has to be devoted by society to taking care of the people
who respond aversively to aversive methods of control. The use of
positive reinforcement as a control mechanism, although not as im
mediately effective, is more expeditious and less costly in the long run.
The energy required to develop such a system is initially high, owing to
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research and developmental costs, but considerably less in the long run,
because it requires less supervision.
L a n g u a g e a n d B ehav io r C o n tro l
A lthough the ultimate causes of behavior can be said to lie in the external
environment, a vast am ou nt of behavior control is internalized and is a
function of learned covert and overt verbal systems (thinking and speak

76 VJTALI ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT, AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
ing). Verbal stimuli are rarely considered as stimuli to which the org an
ism responds. However, the verbal systems th at we possess and share
are directly related to our other social behaviors and determine our
concept of the world in which we live. A m an does much of what he
does as a function o f what he thinks (or would say) is real. People vote
for candidates, go to the theater, raise their children, or build airplanes
and sophisticated electronic app aratu s as functions of the overt or
covert statements a b o u t these things th a t others direct at them. These
statements are learned, sometimes paired with autonom ic responses
(emotions), and are an effect and consequence of the control exerted by
verbal com m unities—the family, the school, the media, religious groups,
and many other subgroups or institutions. People continue to behave
the way they do because of the consequences of their behavior in the
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past; similarly, people continue to talk and think the way they do be
cause of the past consequences of their behavior. As civilization has
developed, the prevalence of violent or repressive control of behavior
has diminished. However, coercion as a model for controlling behavior
has not been replaced. Instead, it is now mediated by our language;
and coercion, though expressed in terms less physically dam aging to the
individual, has significant short-term and long-term deleterious effects.
Skinner’s advocacy of a reduction of coercive measures, therefore, a p
plies to verbal behavior as well as to nonverbal behavior.
W hen individuals live in a com m unity th a t verbally punishes certain
behaviors, they learn to behave similarly—that is, they learn to punish
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others verbally when presented with examples of the socially disap
proved behaviors. Similarly, they will make punishing verbal statements
to themselves in a like circumstance or when presented with occasions
in which the probability of their behaving in a socially disapproved
manner is increased. If, on the other hand, individuals live in a society
that talks about and reinforces responses that are incompatible with
socially unproductive behavior, they are more apt to talk and behave
in a way that reinforces productive behavior. The type of control people
are subjected to in their environment and in their verbal com m unity
is the type of control they apply to themselves and to people around
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them. The behavioral ramifications and consequences of a society re
warding or maintaining punishment of unacceptable behavior, as
opposed to a society reinforcing positive and acceptable behavior, are
pervasive and manifest.
W hat we say is “ w rong” with society, or our own behavior or that of
some other person, is also a function o f the verbal system we have
learned in our community, and what we say to others and ourselves will
determine where we will look for solutions. In our present society,
what we say is a significant part of the problem. Our main control
device has been some form of punishment, and much of it is verbal.

Punishm ent as a m eans of control is taught in our communities, and it

has become an integral part of our ethical system. The backup system
for punitive control includes agencies th a t are sanctioned to generate
the sort of aversive stimuli th at could term inate life or greatly restrict
the environment of, and the behaviors available to, an individual. When
solving a problem th at is aversive to society or to a person, we have, as
a function o f our traditional m ethods and verbal systems, dealt directly
with the person or group th at we have held responsible instead of with
the environment th at controls their behavior. We have various penal
institutions and mental hospitals designed to punish and somehow
change the people who create social problems. All of our systems are,
for the most part, trying to stop or restrain “ offenders” from emitting
behaviors that we have found aversive. They are no more successful in
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accomplishing their goal than is an individual who chastizes himself for
drinking or smoking too m uch: such a person continues to drink or
smoke, sometimes even at a higher rate, but feels guilty and incom pe
tent. Skinner’s position is th at we are holding accountable the products
o f the environment instead of the environm ent th a t produces these
products. M uch of what maintains this state o f affairs and postpones
the application of science to our problems is a function of our verbal
systems.
Eventually, social and other environmental crises will force action.
Again, these changes, although critical for the survival of our whole
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group, may nonetheless cause mass upheaval. The negative responses
th at are likely to be incurred by sudden, necessary changes will also be
largely a function of the verbal systems that we all share. M uch of this
can be precluded by beginning to talk now a b o u t long-range plans for
our society and about the gradual changes necessary to make our envi
ronm ent a producer of creative, socially successful hum an beings.
The ultimate causes o f our covert and overt verbal behavior lie in
the environment. If societal agencies begin to consider events in terms of
their consequences, and if they also begin to regard punishment, verbal
or otherwise, as a tem porary and injurious expedient, individuals within
the society will also modify the way they talk to, and behave toward,
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themselves and others.
This extrapolation o f op erant principles to thinking, or covert verbal
behavior, smacks of “ thought con tro l.” The term is anathem a to just
abou t everyone. However, the objections to “ th ou ght c o n tro l” are also a
function of our verbal systems. Objections to “ thou gh t c o n tro l” imply
that we are free to think whatever we want. A pparently, we think or
talk to ourselves in ways th at we have been tau ght or reinforced to think
or talk; our thinking is controlled now by our present verbal co m m u n i
ties and society just as it will be by whatever society we devise in the
future.

78 VITALI ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT; AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
C o n tro llin g th e C o n tro lle rs
Even if readers agree with the statements made above, they may resist
m ore efficient “ self-conscious” behavioral control by government. The
question of most concern is this: If we construct m ore efficient behavioral
control systems, who will run these systems and who will determine
what is best for the population? W ho will control the controllers?
We seem to be in relative agreement th a t the present system of con
trolling the controllers is not satisfactory. The pages of the Center
M agazine testify to the dissatisfaction with governmental policy con
cerning international relations and treatm ent of minority and special
interest groups. The need to devise alternative m ethods of controlling
the controllers was expressed in a speech given by John G ard ner in
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December, 1969. G ard ner stated that m any of our present institutions
are unable to respond quickly to the needs of the population that they
serve. He called for the construction of mechanisms that would m ake
possible the evolution of institutions concurrent with the changing needs
of society. He referred to the presence of riots, demonstrations, and
other signs of social dysfunction as an index of the deterioration of the
efficacy of our social institutions. Presumably, G a rd n e r’s initiation of
C om m on Cause was a preliminary step directed toward the solution of
this problem.
The initial step in the process of devising more effective techniques
in controlling controllers is the identification of the controllers th e m
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selves, their areas of operation, their behavior, and the reinforcers that
control their behavior. Controllers are not only public agencies but also
private corporations whose investments and operations alter the physical
and social environment of our society. Identifying significant organiza
tions, their behaviors, and their reinforcers creates conditions under
which their behavior becomes subject to control. A ppropriate applica
tion of reinforcers to organizational behavior in turn can direct their
responses into more productive areas. F o r example, if government
makes monies or other reinforcers available in one area of endeavor
but not in others, organizations will respond by shifting their efforts to
the area of greatest payoff.
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This statement implies controlled economies—controlled, but with an
empirical bias, in that sufficient feedback mechanisms and technology
should be involved to insure rapid adjustment to changing situations.
It also has to involve sophisticated analytic capacity for simulation
studies that would reduce the possibility o f error. Jay W. Forrester
(1971b) describes a computer-mediated social-simulation system that is
capable of analyzing the interactions of various environmental variables
over time and producing predictions about the proximal and long-term

effects of social manipulations. Forrester points out that intuitive solu

tions to social problems often have long-term effects quite opposite to
those desired. The example he cites is that the provision of low-cost
housing alone in an impacted area will, in the long run, greatly exacer
bate the original problem of overcrowding and the excess of unskilled
labor in that area.
Objections to a controlled economy can be answered by the fact that
the economy and consequent environmental changes are already c o n
trolled, as evidenced by present governmental attem pts to control infla
tion, salaries, and prices. The only additional factor would be the utili
zation of a much more sophisticated technology, which is already
within our capabilities.
A nother objection to a behaviorally controlled society is based on
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the assumption that individual initiative and creative nonconformity
will be stifled if such a society comes to pass. Behaviors that we call
creative sometimes result in novel solutions to problems. Because
problem-solving activities appear to be closely related to survival, co n
tingencies could be arranged that would prom ote such activities am ong
individuals and groups, channelled in directions likely to produce salu
tary environmental change with a m inimum of social disruption.
Planned societies can be sterile, stifling, and coercive, but they can
also be creative, free, and open. It seems reasonable to assume that we
are more likely to evolve into a society that we like if we plan for it and
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construct environmental contingencies to increase the probability that
creative and productive behavior occurs, than if we proceed without
plans and without sufficient awareness of what variables control our
behavior.
The question “ W ho shall control the controllers? can be rephrased
W hat will control the controllers? The answer to the latter question is
that different forms of feedback data will control the controllers, who
will themselves be under a set of specific environmental contingencies
designed to increase the probabilities of a ppropriate responses to the
data.
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S o m e C on ting encies C o n tro llin g O r g a n iz a tio n a l Behavior
In political life, it is difficult to identify the actor, much less his behavior
and the consequences of that behavior. In fact, part of the function of
bureaucracy is to diffuse accountability, in order to avoid criticism and
blunt resistance to administrative acts. However, the same system that
protects and reinforces the adm inistrator also makes the system less
responsive to modification if the effects of policy are not salutary. The

80 VITAL! ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT“, AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
tendency of hum ans to avoid criticism and, consequently, to conceal

their behavior or to diffuse accountability often has tragic, sometimes
monumental, consequences. The consequence of concealment or re
striction of information to a select group is that the behavior of that
group is almost entirely controlled by its intragroup verbal behavior.
Such organizations as General M otors, the American Bar Association,
the American Medical Association, and the State D epartm ent are cases
in point. The policy and behavior of these organizations appear to be
but little affected by com munication from outside groups. Problems
and difficulties arise when the behavior of one group impinges on, or re
stricts the behavior or the reinforcers of, people outside these groups.
Because “ outsiders” have neither the opportunity nor the power to
modify an organization’s behavior, th at behavior will continue until a
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crisis occurs, with consequent social disruption. R ichard Barnet (1971)
makes a similar point regarding the State D epartm ent. H e states that
the great majority of State D epartm ent policy makers come from a few
large cities with professional offices within ten blocks of each other;
that they meet together, give each other awards, and, in effect, reinforce
each other’s verbal behavior. W ith little feedback from other com m un i
ties, it is no wonder th at these circumscribed verbal communities often
find themselves in conflict with other groups and, in some cases, with
the conceptions o f reality held by the majority of the population. The
present situation in Vietnam is a case in p oint; the operation of the CIA
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during the Bay of Pigs disaster was a similar case. In these two situations,
relatively small groups of policy m akers—reinforced by, and under the
control of, their specialized verbal com m unities—acted in ways detri
mental to the population at large.
T he solution to the problems of secrecy and diffusion of account
ability is a society in which behaviors are identified, actors specifically
named, the consequences of actions docum ented and revealed, and
contingencies established to define behavioral alternatives. In order for
this concept to be implemented, considerable study needs to be given
to innovative systems of checks and balances, to new and more re
sponsive feedback systems, and to more comprehensive systems of
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m onitoring agencies or organizations engaged in significant behaviors,
the consequences of which may affect both our own and other popula
tions. Rexford G. Tugwell’s (1970) proposal for a new Constitution is
one example o f an alternative system with checks and balances more
attuned to the state of present-day technology. Experiments in this area
will, of necessity, continue indefinitely to insure that governmental sys
tems can stay astride of accelerating technological development and
social change.
But new systems of checks and balances, although necessary, are not

sufficient. M onitoring systems and systems of checks and balances are

dependent upon the willingness of organizations to cooperate. As long as
agencies are subject to severe criticism and the threat of being replaced
because of failure, their cooperation will be difficult to obtain. The
problem then becomes how to insure that individuals and organizations
will cooperate with whatever m onitoring systems may be installed.
Cooperation can be broken down into specific behavioral subsets—
for example, accurately recording events or transm itting an account of
each event to the m onitoring agency. Once critical behaviors have been
identified, contingency m anagem ent can increase the probability that
selected behaviors will occur. However, if the transmission of accurate
information is likely to result in severe public criticism or in the elimina
tion of the reporting agency, the specific contingencies established will
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not produce the desired behavior. In such a case, the d om inant con
tingency will be related to survival, and the information reported will
be invalid, unreliable, or biased.
Some techniques already have been developed to reduce the tendency
of organizations to indefinitely perpetuate themselves. Task forces with
limited scope and tenure are often established; but even the information
reported by task forces is partly a function of the consequences expected
to ensue after the release of the final report.
There has been considerable criticism of the present welfare system
to the effect that the present mode of distributing funds appears to
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encourage and reward nonproductivity. Similar criticisms can be
leveled at governmental and other organizations at all levels. A d m in
istrators frequently are rewarded with additional staff, salary, and in
fluence as the problem with which they are dealing grows larger; they
are punished by reduction of their budgets as the problem situation
declines. U nd er this system, it becomes rather clear that problem
solving activities are not encouraged, while the maintenance of n o n
productive behaviors is rewarded.
If a problem is solved and an organization completes its mission, the
usual result is that a significant num ber of individuals quickly lose their
jobs or, at the very least, a significant source o f satisfaction. It is not
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unusual, with the present set of contingencies, th at the introduction of
novel techniques and problem-solving efforts is resisted. Society has not
developed techniques of smoothly substituting alternative goals, once
the original goal has been reached. N um bers of people find themselves
with outdated skills when their jo bs are eliminated by autom ation.
They do not have a sufficient num ber of alternative skills to maintain
themselves, and, consequently, they experience depression and apathy.
The environment has simply not provided them with readily accessible
alternative sources of reinforcement.

82 VITALI ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT,' AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
Criticism of institutions partially stems from the same set of verbal

statements (concepts) that deter the agency itself from cooperating with
evaluation or monitoring efforts—namely, th a t the organization is fully
developed and capable of solving the problem, and is remiss if it fails.
Organizational attempts to solve problems are rarely conceived o f as a
process that proceeds by successive approxim ations guided by a p p ro
priate feedback measures. Because error is not tolerated, the organiza
tion resists evaluation and deprives itself o f opportunities to correct its
m ethods and to adjust to changing environmental conditions.
In summary, if an organization cooperates with evaluative or m o ni
toring systems, and utilizes novel or experimental techniques, it exposes
itself to criticism and possible extinction. Moreover, if it survives by
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escaping criticism and solves the problem to which it has addressed
itself, it is eliminated, and many of the individuals within it have to face
m ajor dislocations in their lives. On the other hand, if an organization
utilizes established noncontroversial m ethods, and if it conceals—either
by commission or by omission—its failures or limitations, it is less likely
to be criticized and, hence, more likely to survive. It will also be less
likely to solve the problem.
U nder the present contingencies, it is highly likely that the majority
of organizations will fit the second description, because immediate sur
vival is the strongest reinforcer we have available. The survival of n o n
productive organizations, however, is incompatible with the survival of
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society as a whole. Unless the contingencies controlling the behavior of
organizations are altered, the likelihood of our society surviving will be
markedly reduced.
D ividing U p Society’s R einforcers
Organizations, including productive ones, have difficulty in accomplish

ing their missions—even if they are not criticized, and even if they have
ample funding. Tasks assigned to organizations, particularly govern
mental agencies, often include dealing with several groups having c o n
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flicting interests or reinforcers. In operant terms, one grou p’s positive
reinforcers are a n o th e r’s negative reinforcers—that is, one grou p’s o b
taining satisfaction necessarily excludes the possibility of the other
gro u p ’s obtaining satisfaction.
In certain environments, survival requires conflict, and the stronger
group survives at the expense of the weaker. The environments in which
conflict is necessary may be characterized as scarcity environments, in
which certain essential commodities, such as food and water, are suffi
cient only for a limited num ber of people. However, in this country, as

contrasted with the rest of the world, conflict over basic necessities is
unnecessary because an ample supply of these basic necessities exists.
Nevertheless, conflict exists between different ethnic, racial, and p ro
fessional groups, and between sexes. The conflicts between groups are
based on disagreements as to how society’s reinforcers—that is, m a
terial goods, status, and prestige—are to be divided. These disagree
ments are buttressed, maintained, and expressed by attitudes, and they
are manifested by the verbal behavior of society and of the groups in
conflict.
The professional-group conflict with which we are most familiar is
th at between psychologists and psychiatrists. This conflict, over the
years, has included a variety of issues, two of which are (1) who should
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have society’s legal sanction to give psychotherapy, and (2) who should
head mental-health programs. Obtaining official sanction to give psycho
therapy or to head mental-health programs is associated with the receipt
of positive reinforcers—namely, high salaries, prestige, and greater
control over one’s environment. Because mem bers of both professions
do not lack basic necessities, the conflict is entirely based on the distribu
tion of “ surplus,” or social, reinforcers.
Surplus reinforcers become reinforcers as a function of the verbal
behavior of societies. O ur present society’s verbal behavior reinforces
the acquisition of money and power and honors those who have achieved
high positions; yet society provides extremely limited opportunities for
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achieving the social reinforcers that it establishes. In other words, our
present social system has created an environm ent of artificial scarcity.
H um ans respond to socially conditioned reinforcers in a m anner similar
to the way they respond to primary reinforcers. Thus, an artificial-
scarcity environment, like an environment lacking a sufficient a m o u n t
food or water, increases the probability of intergroup and interindi
vidual conflict.
In ethnic or interracial conflicts, the basic disagreement appears to be
similar—namely, how to divide up the available reinforcers. Racial strife
appears to be greatest between groups of people close to each other in
economic or social status. Severe social strife is apparent between blacks
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and groups of eastern-European origin. Both groups occupy adjoining
steps on the socioeconomic ladder, but the eastern-European group sees
the blacks as competitors for jobs, money, and housing. In a scarcity
society, groups must do battle for the few reinforcers available or face
conditions that society itself establishes as degrading.
This situations calls for a different distribution of the reinforcers, as
well as changes in our verbal behavior. If society’s verbal behavior
places value on wealth and status, it reinforces behavior aimed at
acquiring wealth and status. In a scarcity society in which all or most

84 VITALI ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT, AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
groups are reinforced by wealth or status, conflict is inevitable. N o t only

will the lower economic status groups dem and a greater portion of
wordly goods, but, simultaneously, the higher socioeconomic groups will
fight to retain what they have.
Such organizations as the Office of Economic O pportunity find th e m
selves continually caught between groups, each group striving to obtain
its “ share” of the available reinforcers. The verbal behavior of the c o n
flicting groups supports the claim of each group and reinforces a n
tagonism. Psychiatrists and psychologists often talk ab ou t each other
as unqualified, needing supervision, and uneducated in either hum an
relations or medicine. Ethnic conflict is characterized by similar depre
cations, such as lazy, “ uptight,” prejudiced, or uncultured. It is interest
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ing to observe that m any of the terms used by each of the groups in
reference to the other are often considered descriptive when their intent
is clearly pejorative.
W ealth distribution cannot occur, without severe social disruption,
in the absence of a concom itant change in values and attitudes; in other
words, changes in verbal behavior. Verbal behavior creates our reality,
establishes our reinforcers, and, to a great extent, controls our n o n
verbal behavior. In beginning the process of social change so necessary
for the survival of our society, we have to address ourselves first to the
problem of how to change both our overt and covert verbal behavior,
and in what direction.
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P re sc riptio ns fo r C h a n g e
Skinner m aintains that it is necessary, for our society’s survival, to

recognize the role of the environment in controlling our behavior. We
currently stress the im portance of being free and being able to make
our own decisions. W hen we talk and think in this manner, however,
our attention is diverted from a consideration of the relevant factors in
our environment that control our behavior. It is Skinner’s thesis that,
if, instead of talking about freedom, we directed our attention to the
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contingencies in the environment controlling our behavior, we would
be more likely to be able to change it. It is also Skinner’s contention
that changing our environment would, in turn, change our own be
havior in ways that would reduce the probability of the occurrence of a
variety of social and intergroup problems.
The ramifications of talking about behavior as determined and co n
trolled by the presence or absence of reinforcement and punishment are
manifold. Predictions about the consequences of behavior will have to
be different, because the effects of reinforcement and punishment as

determined by scientific experiment differ from prevailing thought and

practice. A ttention will then be directed to a consideration of the kinds
of reinforcers society establishes, as opposed to the kinds and varieties
of reinforcers that are available and, consequently, to the kinds of
environmental changes necessary to attenuate artificial-scarcity situa
tions. Attention will also be directed to a consideration of the kinds of
control that society must exert in order to be able to achieve full p ro
ductivity. This would include a specification of the patterns of incentives
and contingencies that must be available to encourage problem solving
and creative endeavor, as well as to reduce the num ber of social casual
ties produced by the social system. The consideration of different feed
back, control, and m onitoring data systems will also be a necessary
consequence, because the initial stimuli for social change will be those
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data that measure the consequence of institutional and group behavior.
Such changes cannot be achieved immediately, of course, but they will
occur step by step in successive approxim ations, as prescribed by the
data.
Specific examples of societal change due to changes in verbal behavior
may include the following:
1) In a typical interpersonal situation, unruly children may be pu n

ished or scolded less frequently, because the consequence of punishment
is usually only more unruliness and guilt. Instead, attention might be
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directed to the environment in which a child lives—for example, to
opportunities for play in a separate room , to availability of friends or
playthings, and to the parents’ own verbal and nonverbal behavior that
maintains or reinforces unruly behavior. Changes that might result from
this way of talking or thinking abo ut the situation range from spatial
rearrangem ent of the home to changes in the parents’ patterns of rein
forcing their child.
2) In a social problem, such as alcoholism, social action might take

the form of providing for the establishment and the reinforcement of
social activities incompatible with heavy drinking, as well as o p p o rtu n i
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ties for training in social skills and relaxation. Parenthetically, thinking
in terms of behavior consequences would also reduce the number
of moralistic lectures an alcoholic might receive.
3) In prisons in which homosexuality is considered to be a problem,

the environment might be changed to make conjugal visits and visits by
girl friends possible. An even better alternative might be to provide
situations in which inmates would be able to learn to interact with
women in a more rewarding way and in which sexual intercourse might

become available only after certain interpersonal skills have been

learned. The long-term effects of this kind of treatm ent could include a
reduction in the num ber of sexually oriented crimes, as well as a reduc
tion in drinking. (M any people drink heavily in order to interact
socially.)
Prisons also house violent people. Violence is a behavior that ter
minates stimuli aversive to the actor only to result in severe long-term
consequences. Learning procedures can be instituted by which inmates
can learn to identify the aversive stimulation to which they respond
violently and can acquire alternative ways of interacting. As long as
prisons are necessary, appropriate enforced contingencies placed both
on staff and on inmates would also reduce the a m ou nt of punishment
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dealt out in prison, such as solitary confinement, restriction, or physical
assault.
4) In the operation of government, m onitoring systems would become

more reliable and accurate, were criticism sharply reduced and a p p ro
priate incentives installed, and the organization would become more
problem-oriented, successful, and creative. It would also give the organ
ization a greater repertoire and a greater sophistication in dealing with
the problems assigned to it, inasmuch as any problem assigned includes
the control or modification of behavior.
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The alteration of verbal behavior concerned with the distribution of
wealth (different allocation of reinforcers) is unlikely to occur im
mediately because the media are controlled by groups who have a large
investment in the status quo and will naturally protect their interests.
However, the alteration of verbal behavior concerned with social
casualties—for example, criminals, the mentally ill, alcoholics, and
problem children—is more likely. The initiation of different ways of
talking and thinking ab ou t behavior is likely to have a cumulatively
“ self-reinforcing” and exponential effect. People are controlled by rein
forcement: if the novel behaviors are reinforced, if the unruly child
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becomes more pleasant, if criminals begin to reinforce society, then the
behaviors that are responsible for such positive effects will be reinforced
and, therefore, will increase in frequency.
Any behavior, including verbal behavior, undergoes a process tech
nically called stimulus-and-response generalization. If, on the one hand,
the stimulus situation remains unchanged, the same response is still
likely to be emitted. If, on the other hand, the stimulus situation is
somewhat changed, the response also changes slightly. As long as the
response emitted is reinforced, this “ drift” will continue. If thinking and
acting in terms of behavioral principles are effective in a variety of situa

tions, it is highly probable that this practice would spread to different

areas of hum an interaction. If we find th at we are effective with our
children, with prison inmates, or with alcoholics, we will gradually learn
to respond in a like m anner in other problem situations. In this way,
major societal change may be implemented, at first gradually, and then
with increasing m om entum , but with much less accom panying social
disruption, because verbal behavior will have kept pace with, or will have
preceded, social necessity.
P ro b le m s F a c in g O p e r a n t P ra c titio n e rs
Society will not be suddenly “ converted” to an “ operant philosophy,”
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but total acceptance o f operant statements is not a prerequisite for
utilizing operant techniques. Instead, operant technology will be p a r
tially accepted, and such terms as “ successive app roxim ation s” and
“ shaping” are operant ways of talking about partial acceptance. A new
comer to the operant reality can be taught only in a step-by-step fashion,
through a series of partial acceptances. This problem is, of course, not
peculiar to the operant neophyte. All new com ers—be they babies,
students, immigrants, apprentices, recruits, or religious proselytes—a p
pear to go through the same process. The o perant statement abo ut such
phenom ena is not th at the newcomer “ decides” to accept the new
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behaviors, but rather that each “ partial acceptance” (new response or
series of responses) is reinforced. The problem of a limited repertoire
(partial acceptance) is also not peculiar to the student o f operants. A
baby who can only crawl is limited in its travels, an d apprentices are
limited by their level of competence. Generally, we do not speak of this
as partial acceptance but, rather, as partial learning. However, the
person who partially “ accepts” the operant reality is therefore also
limited to that extent in the kinds of phenom ena that he can deal with
successfully.
T he phenom enon of partial acceptance has always been with us and is
perhaps most clearly documented in the history of science. Scientific
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knowledge accretes at a steady pace as a function o f countless observa
tions and experiments. A lthough the lay person may be aware of the
contributions of N ew ton and Einstein, the physicist is also aware of the
hundreds of scientists on whose work N e w to n ’s and Einstein’s theories
are based. Moreover, the physicist is aware of the m any successive a p
proximations (partial acceptances) th at took place in the interval between
the lifetimes of the two men.
In relation to the rest o f the population, a scientist can be said to be
someone who partially accepts abnorm al ways of talking ab ou t the

universe. The problems that the scientist encounters when he makes

abnorm al statements ab ou t the universe depend upon the state of the
norm al world. G io rd ano B runo’s partial acceptance of some abnorm al
statements ab out the relation of the earth to the sun (heliocentrism)
caused him to be burned at the stake. B. F. Skinner’s abnorm al statement
(behavior is determined by environment) has occasioned num erous
verbal attacks by the normal (other than operant) verbal community.
The foregoing are typical examples, and they occur predictability. It
appears, therefore, that the biggest problem of those interested in apply
ing operant principles today is that o f surviving in a norm al environment.
At this time (1972), operant research is respectable in academic set
tings with animals other than humans. By contrast, the operantly
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oriented person experiences m any more difficult problems when he is
immersed in an environment designed to modify hum an behaviors
norm ally—that is, a traditional institution for the mentally ill, or tra d i
tional educational and penal institutions. These environments may also
offer the best opportunities for the operant practitioner, inasmuch as
many of them are little more than custodial way-stations and are rela
tively ineffective in meeting the problems that society assigns them.
However, to survive and expand systematically in such settings, it is
necessary to perform an “ interpretive functional analysis” of who is
reinforcing whom, with what, and to what effect th ro ughout the entire
organization. The informal interpretive functional analysis (IFA ) is used
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in lieu of the more formal and accurate functional analysis, which re
quires an order of cooperation and control of the environment not likely
to be given to an operant interloper, grant in hand or not. The IF A
generates an informal operant “ description,” as contrasted with a
normal “ description,” of the environm ent—that is, “ the person called
a therapist and the person called a patient appear to be mutually rein
forcing each other’s behavior” rather than “ the therapist was helping
the patient work through his problems.” Things are seldom what they
appear to be, and the IF A increases the accuracy of one’s predictions
and, hence, increases the probability of surviving and eventually modify
ing the so-called patient. In most institutions, the IF A will point up the
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fact th a t many of the so-called problem behaviors have either been
acquired through, or are being m aintained by, the normal behaviors
(reinforcing undesirable behaviors or punishing desirable behaviors) of
the staff o f the institution in question. Partly as a function of being
understaffed and partly as a function of the normal orientation, passive
behaviors are generally reinforced and independent behaviors (be
haviors useful outside an institution) are generally punished.
The next task is identifying the staff members who, in fact, would be
reinforced by a change, not simply those who say they would like a

change. Change generally requires more w ork; for many of the staff,
this will be aversive and, therefore, avoided, thus insuring failure of the
project. It is critical, then, to identify the reinforcers (both positive and
negative) o f the staff members with whom one wishes to work. Helping a
staff member terminate an unpleasant or aversive situation is probably
more im portant initially than any other form of behavioral control. It
is only later that positive reinforcement becomes im portant. Staff, like
other hum ans th at survive, terminate aversive stimuli or negative rein
forcers first, be they conditioned or unconditioned. Then, and only then,
can they be positively reinforced. A ttem pts to positively reinforce the
staff for new behaviors can, hence, be wasteful and can lead to erroneous
conclusions th a t the staff are uncooperative, lazy, sadistic, not interested
in their “ charges,” and so on.
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Assisting a staff m ember terminate aversive stimuli is often difficult
because m uch of what is aversive to the staff m em ber is determined by
w hat is aversive to higher-level staff members. In a norm al institutional
setting, even a tem po rary increase in disturbing patient or inmate be
haviors results in aversive consequences for the line staff. In such cases,
responsible staff are often “ counseled,” investigated, or reprimanded.
In order to avoid such aversive consequences, line staff act to im medi
ately suppress disturbing behaviors. The consequences controlling the
behavior o f higher-level staff are similar—namely, criticism from the
“ Central Office” or from the community.
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The greatest difficulty, but also the first requirement in initiating an
operant program in an institution, is to obtain at least partial release of
control over the line staff from higher staff echelons. Some higher-level
staff m embers are able to release control because of expectations that
the project, if successful, will enhance their own positions, status, or
professional reputations. In any case, the effectiveness of alternatives to
aversive control and punishm ent must be dem onstrated piecemeal and,
initially, in noncritical areas.
Controlling and modifying behavior via reinforcement is a bnorm al
behavior for institutional staff because the adm inistration of punishment
for disapproved acts in the prevalent mode of operation. In order to
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change the line staff’s behavior tow ard patients or inmates, the verbal
behavior of the staff has to be altered first. Some alternative statements
to be reinforced include the following: (1) If I punish or criticize be
havior I d o n ’t like, it will suppress th at behavior only temporarily, but
will not change or modify it in the long run. (2) I can weaken behavior
I d o n ’t like by ignoring it and not responding to it. (3) I can also weaken
behavior I d o n 't like by reinforcing incompatible behavior th at I like.
(4) Changing the behavior of another person takes a long time and re
sults are at first slow in coming. (5) Recording behaviors that I like will

90 VITAL! ROZY N K O , KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT, AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
help me in detecting initial behavior changes that, in turn, will help

maintain my own behavior. (6) If the other person does not change, my
own behavior is part of the problem.
The ability of line staif to make the statements listed above and to
behave in a m anner consistent with those statements will increase the
likelihood of staff-client interactions becoming productive of desirable
behavior changes in both parties.
The changes in verbal behavior recommended for line staff can only
be effective if aversive control from higher-echelon staff is significantly
attenuated. If aversive control from above is not attenuated, the most
likely result will be that the newly learned verbal behavior will occur
only in the classroom or in the com pany of the instructor, but no t in
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interactions with the patient or inmate.
Operant theory directs the attention of the behavior modifier to the
environment of the subject. Line staff constitute a significant portion of
the client’s environment, and changes in the staff’s behavior away from
punishm ent and tow ard reinforcement of desirable social behaviors will
change that environment significantly.
When the environment changes, the behaviors of persons within the
environment modify very quickly, because behaviors previously rein
forced are no longer maintained and new behaviors take their places.
Altering the environment of at least part o f the institution, therefore,
becomes the first objective of the operant practitioner. It is a compli
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cated, difficult, but very rewarding task.
S o m e C u r r e n t R e se a rc h F in d in g s a n d Issues
This paper may appear speculative and utopian to many. There is,
however, nothing speculative about the efficacy of behavioral tech
niques in the analysis and modification of a wide range of hum an
behavior.
Over the last quarter of a century, operant conditioning and behavior
therapy have been utilized in a variety of settings. A partial list would
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include mental hospitals, prisons, schools for wayward youths, public
and experimental schools, institutions for the mentally retarded, o u t
patient mental-health clinics, and experimental research laboratories, as
well as the home. O perant conditioning has also been used with success
on a broad spectrum o f populations, including normal and autistic
children; delinquent adolescents; individuals labeled alcoholic, psy
chotic, neurotic, and senile; couples engaged in marital conflict; and
prison inmates. Specific behaviors modified by operant techniques
include smoking, overeating, the drinking of alcoholic beverages, angry

or aversive behavior between marital partners, the frequency of vocaliz

ing certain words or phrases, vocally expressed hallucinations, c o n
fusion and apathy am ong geriatric patients, self-destructive behavior,
and uncontrolled toileting behavior in children. In addition, responses
usually considered as not under “ conscious” control —for example,
blood pressure, heart rate, and muscle tension —have also been modified
and, in some cases, placed under “ voluntary” control.
O perant research grew slowly at first, but more recently it has grown
at a vastly increased rate. The growth rate of operant research is partially
reflected by the proliferation of professional jou rnals devoted to publish
ing the results of such work. In 1958, the Journal o f the Experimented
Analysis o f Behavior was established. Behavior Research and Therapy
started in 1962^ The Journal o f A pplied Behavior Analysis in 1968,
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Behavior Therapy and Behavior Therapy and E xperim ental Psychiatry
in 1970, and the Journal o f Behavioral Technology in 1971.
T H E USE OF POSITIVE REINFORCEM ENT
Behavior change can be accomplished by varying any of several factors

that control and maintain behavior. New responses can be inserted in
an individual’s repertoire or existing ones can be eliminated or weakened
by the adjustm ent o f contingencies. One such adjustm ent can take the
form of providing positive reinforcement after a specific response or
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chain of responses has been emitted. In an early experiment, Fuller
(1949) was able to teach a vegetative hum an organism (a bedridden
idiot) to raise his arm “ in order to obtain milk.” Fuller followed any
incipient arm-raising response with the introduction o f milk into the
subject’s m outh. By gradually raising the requirements for reinforcement,
the experimenter was able to shape the subject’s arm-raising response
to the point where the subject held his arm vertically and responded
three times per minute, a rate that approxim ated the maximum, inas
much as it to ok some time for the milk to be proffered and ingested.
A much more complicated response chain was conditioned by Pumroy
and Pum roy (1965). These experimenters taught their children (1) to ask
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to go to the toilet, and (2) to urinate in the toilet. The positive reinforcer
used was a candy mint given to the children immediately after urination
was completed. The application o f the positive reinforcer (the candy
mint) in this case resulted in a num ber of behavior chains being “ fixed”
in a particular sequence.
Positive reinforcement has also been used to control verbal behavior.
G reenspoon (1955) was able to increase the rate o f using plural nouns
in his subjects by verbally reinforcing them at any time they vocalized
a plural noun. The positive reinforcer utilized by G reenspoon was the

92 VITALl ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT, AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
vocalization “ m m m -h m m m .” Other researchers, Staats et al. (1962) and

K apostins (1963), have used different reinforcers (trinkets and money)
to maintain verbal behavior in their subjects. Similarly, Ayllon and
Michaels (1959) were able to increase the a m o un t o f socially acceptable
conversation in a psychotic person by only paying attention to her when
she spoke “ sensibly.” Further, Pum roy and Pum roy and Ayllon and
Michaels were able to eliminate com peting responses—namely, urinating
in places other th an the toilet and speaking in a psychotic manner,
respectively. Positive reinforcement can, under certain circumstances,
eliminate or reduce the rate of certain behaviors by increasing the rate
of incompatible behaviors.
Several supplementary methods have been used to accelerate learning
complex behavior. F o r example, instructions may be given, or the de
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sired response may be modeled by a person already familiar with the
task. The subject is then asked to perform or to imitate the desired
procedure; if he is successful, he is reinforced. Ayllon and Azrin (1968)
give examples of “ response exposure” procedures, in which the subject
first is asked to observe someone else performing work and then is given
the opportunity to carry out the task himself. If the desired behavior
is very complex or is usually avoided by the subject, behavior rehearsal
may be used in which the participants practice certain difficult inter
actions. The successful accomplishment of the selected task is then
positively reinforced by social approval or other reinforcers.
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A nother adjustm ent possible in contingency managem ent is to present

an aversive stimulus immediately after a particular response has been
emitted. Depending upon other associated conditions, the result can be
the reduction or the elimination of the response. The result may also
be any of a variety of responses leading to the elimination o f the aversive
stimulus—escape or avoidance training.
Punishment was technically defined by Azrin and Holz (1966) as “ a
reduction of the future probability of a specific response as a result
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of the immediate delivery of a stimulus after th at response.” In their
literature review on the effects of punishment, these authors have shown
that punishment is probably the most effective of all the available
techniques in eliminating a response. Perhaps the m ost outstanding
example o f the effectiveness of punishment was reported by Lovaas
(1965). In a series of studies on the problem of suppressing self-destruc
tive behavior in autistic children, Lovaas was able to dem onstrate the
rapid and complete elimination of this behavior in a number of children.
The aversive stimulus was electric shock applied to the body of the child

immediately after the self-destructive response was emitted. Lovaas also

contrasted the results of punishment to the effects of an extinction
procedure on one child. In this case, the self-destructive behavior de
creased significantly after eight 90-minute sessions. D uring this time,
the child was released from restraints and allowed to hit himself without
interference or any reinforcement. D uring these eight sessions, the child
hit himself more than 10,000 times. This experiment was possible only
because this particular child was a “ careful” hitter. With other patients,
the result might have been severe injury or death.
Azrin and Holtz (1966) listed 14 conditions under which punishment
is effective; but these conditions are quite restrictive and are difficult to
obtain outside the laboratory. They also pointed out that the principal
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disadvantages of utilizing punishm ent in hum an interaction are th a t the
punished individual is driven away from the punisher, thereby destroy
ing the social relationship, and th a t counteraggression (or aggression
toward nearby individuals) is also likely to occur. A nother factor not
mentioned by the authors is that, by utilizing punishment, the punisher
is reinforced for punishing and is, therefore, more likely to engage in
similar behavior in the future. Azrin and Holz indicate that the disad
vantages of punishment are particularly critical “ since survival of the
hum an organism appears to be so completely dependent upon the
m aintenance o f harm onious social relations.”
Aversive stimuli can be used to cause the acquisition or elimination
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of certain behaviors, if conditions are constructed so that escape or
avoidance o f aversive stimulation is contingent upon a selected response
being emitted. The aversive stimuli to which people respond may be
unlearned (such as electric shock, cold, or loud noise) or learned (such
as frowns, derogatory statements, or critical comments). Learned
aversive stimuli are acquired by pairing previously neutral stimuli with
aversive stimuli. A child, for example, may learn th a t a frown on the
part of a parent is followed by spanking; thus, in the future, a parental
frown may stimulate the child to emit a response that terminates the
frown. The terminating response—for example, a verbal statement like
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“ I ’m sorry” —may be an avoidance response with respect to the physical
or unconditioned aversive stimulus (spanking) but an escape route with
respect to the conditioned or learned aversive stimulus (the frown).
The escape response, whether it is escape from a conditioned or an u n
conditioned aversive stimulus, is reinforced by the term ination of that
stimulus. If, after saying “ I ’m sorry,” the frown disappears and, at the
same time, physical punishment is avoided, this vocalization will be
reinforced. Consequently, saying “ I ’m sorry” in the presence of a frown
will be m ore likely in the future.
Lovaas et al. (1965) describe a striking series of escape and avoidance

experiments on autistic children. The children who were subjects in this

experiment had never in their lives been able to follow instructions or to
respond positively to social approaches. They spent most of their time
in self-destructive and self-stimulatory activity (rocking, m aking un in
telligible sounds, and so forth). After their self-destructive behavior was
suppressed through punishment, the children were taught to come to
adults when called. Electric shock was administered to a subject's feet,
but it was terminated immediately when the child began to move toward
an adult who was calling him. After the escape behavior (coming to the
beckoning adult) was well established, the contingencies were altered.
In the second step of the training procedure, shock was administered
only if the child failed to respond to the call o f the adult. The approach
behavior became extremely stable after three sessions of 50 trials per
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session. The behavior o f coming to an adult when called was m ain
tained by the children for nine m onths w ithout the necessity of further
training.
In another significant experiment, Erickson and K uethe (1956) utilized
avoidance-training procedures to dem onstrate the “ learning of forget
ting.” Their subjects were asked to give verbal associations to a list
of words provided them by the experimenters. The subjects’ associa
tions to a certain num ber of the presented words were punished (the
subjects were administered an electric shock immediately after the ver
balized association). In further trials, the verbalized associations changed.
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(Changed associations were not shocked.) The experimenters had a p
parently discovered the contingencies under which at least one form of
“ Freudian repression” occurs. Some of the subjects became aware of
the experimental purpose and could verbalize it, but others did not.
In both cases, however, the behavioral response—that is, the tendency
to give other associations instead of the original ones, was similar.
A very im portant characteristic of avoidance responses is that they
are extremely resistant to change. Lovaas’s results, in which responses
learned in several days of training remained constant over a period of
nine months, demonstrate this characteristic. One of the factors that
makes avoidance responses so difficult to unlearn is th at the organism
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rarely has the opportunity to learn that the situation under which the
avoidance response has been acquired has changed. If a rat has been
trained to avoid a shock by pressing a lever, and the training has been
thorough, it will press th at lever very consistently. If the experimenter
alters the contingencies so that the shock is no longer administered if
if the lever is not pressed, the well-trained rat will only rarely be subject
to the novel contingency. Only when the shock fails to be administered
when the rat fails to press the lever can the rat learn that the contingency
has been changed.

M any avoidance responses th at are not beneficial to the individual in

the long run are learned in hum an interaction. Such behavior may
include: (I) the inability to engage comfortably in social interaction
(that is, shyness, indirectness, inadequate a p proach behaviors); (2) n o n
productive aggression or counteraggression (aggression is a com m on
response to aversive stimuli); (3) sexual im potency and frigidity; and
(4) alcoholism and drug abuse. The avoidance behaviors may eliminate
or attenuate the immediate aversive stimulus, but they have severe
long-term effects on the quality of the individual’s life.
T h e C o n d itio n in g o f I n v o lu n ta ry B ehavior
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The concepts of anxiety and depression have occupied a central position
in many traditional theories of psychopathology. The operant model,
however, regards emotions, for the most part, as learned autonom ic
responses th a t may appear concurrently with o perant behavior, not as
causative agents. When unconditioned aversive stimuli (shock, loud
noises, and so forth) are presented to an organism, an activation syn
drom e is evoked. A lthough autonom ic arousal patterns are highly indi
vidual (Lacey et al., 1953) the m odal response includes such events as
increased heart rate, pupil dilation, and higher blood-sugar level. As
learning proceeds, neutral stimuli th at are paired with the u ncondi
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tioned aversive stimulus become aversive themselves. Eventually, a con
dition is reached in which these formerly neutral stimuli (now called
conditioned aversive stimuli) also elicit an activation syndrome. It is
this type of learning process that causes individuals to respond e m o
tionally to certain verbal expressions.
A num ber of experiments have dem onstrated the control of autonom ic
or involuntary responses via operant conditioning. Miller and D iC ara
(1967) were able to raise or lower the heart rates o f rats by stimulating
the pleasure centers in their brains immediately after a m om entary
slowing or speeding o f their heart beats. W ith hu m an subjects, Engel
and Hansen (1966) and Engel and Chism (1967) were able to show slow
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ing of heart beat and heart speeding as functions of positive reinforce
ment, respectively. Crider et al. (1966) reported having operantly co n
ditioned a human galvanic skin response and Sasmor (1966) was able
to operantly condition very small-scale muscle contractions. These
experiments suggest that “ em otions” are also learned, and th a t they
persist as a function of the reinforcement following the appearance of
autonom ic responses.
The recent introduction of sophisticated instrum entation capable of
amplifying normally unreportable responses (biofeedback techniques)

96 V1TALI ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SW IFT, AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
makes possible the learning of “ voluntary” control over a num ber of

autonom ic and involuntary behaviors. K am iya (1969) trained his sub
jects to control their cerebral alpha rhythm, and Budzynski et al. (1969)
reported success in training their subjects to reduce chronic muscle
tension. Other experimenters reported similar successes in training their
subjects to exert “ voluntary” control over a num ber of other autonom ic
responses, including galvanic skin response (Stern, 1970), heart rate
(Brener and Hothersall, 1966), and blood pressure (Brener and Klein-
man, 1970). The techniques now being developed in this area hold c o n
siderable promise for the eventual control of em otional and psychoso
matic problems.
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O th e r Clinical P ro c e d u re s in B ehav io r M o d ific a tio n
The task of the behavioral technologist is to create conditions under

which undesirable emotional and avoidance responses can be unlearned
and replaced with m ore productive behaviors. A num ber of methods
stemming from the behavioral theory have been developed. Some of
these methods are experimental, but they dem onstrate the variety of
procedures th a t have been derived.
DETEC TIN G DISCOM FORT OR TENSION
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Techniques for detecting discomfort or tension (identifying aversive
stimuli) include relaxation training patterned after Jacobsen (1938) and
the autogenic training techniques developed by Schultz and Luthe (1959).
T he subject, trained in relaxation, is thus m ore able to discern sudden
increases in tension as a function of the presentation o f aversive stimu
lation.
SYSTEM ATIC DESENSITIZA TIO N
The technique of systematic desensitization, originally developed by
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Wolpe for the treatm ent of phobias (Wolpe, 1958; W olpe and Lazarus,
1967), requires the client, while in a relaxed condition, to imagine a
series of aversive, anxiety-producing scenes. The aim is to maintain the
relaxed state while visualizing such scenes. In this method, the aversive
scenes are previously identified and graded on the extent to which they
produce tension or anxiety. The client practices visualizing the least
tension-producing scenes first, and progresses to the m ore potent
stimuli as he masters the earlier ones. K raft (1967) has also used a
variant of this technique to reduce social discomfort (Social Anxiety

Hierarchy). The goal o f systematic desensitization is reached when the

aversive stimulus or image is no longer avoided and does no t produce
a utonom ic arousal or tension.
TH E IM PLOSIVE OR FL O O D IN G T EC H N IQ U E
The implosive or flooding technique, introduced by H ogan (1968),

consists of identifying and elaborating a scene th a t is extremely frighten
ing to the client. The client is asked to imagine this scene, and the
therapist supplements the client’s efforts by means of statements de
signed to vivify and further elaborate it. The therapist, thereby, tries to
block any avoidance responses and to insure that the client keeps atte n d
ing to the selected episode until tension and anxiety subside.
INDEXASSERTIVE T R A IN IN G
A variety of techniques has been developed in the area of assertive

training, including the rehearsal o f social situations difficult for the
client to m anage successfully, such as asking for a job, saying “ n o ” to a
salesman, or asking for directions or assistance from a policeman.
Other examples include learning to positively reinforce (R ozynko et al.,
1972) and learning to respond “ em otionally” —for example, with anger,
sadness, or fear (Serber et al., 1969). Assertive training provides the
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client with behavior repertoires alternative to existing unsatisfactory
ones.
E sta blish in g A lte rn a tiv e W a y s o f T a lk in g o r T h in k in g
In any treatment, the therapist trains the client how to talk ab o u t his
problems. Each school of therapy has its own language. The kind of
statement that a behavior therapist is most likely to teach his client is
that the troubles the client has, as well as his anxieties, are learned
habits over which he has no control, and that intellectual effort and
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intelligence have no relation to his problem. Consequently, no person,
the client included, can be blamed for his condition. In addition to such
general verbal training, certain specific affirmations are introduced as
more productive alternatives to existing verbal habits. Garfield et al.
(1969) reported the use of this m ethod in conjunction with systematic
desensitization. A client who was successfully treated for impotence was
taught to stop worrying (talking to himself) a bou t his sex p artner’s
orgasm and to say instead “ I will think of enjoying myself.”
Meichenbaum (1971) evolved a technique of “ self-instruction.” This

98 V1TALI ROZYNKO, KENNETH SW IFT, JOSEPHINE SWIFT^ AND LARNEY J. BOGGS
technique consists of (1) modeling the performance o f a task with vo

calized self-instructions; (2) the performance of the task by the subject
initially with self-instructions said aloud; then (3) performance of the
task with self-instructions whispered; and, finally, (4) the performance
of the task with self-instructions stated silently. The im provement of
performance by subjects utilizing self-instructional techniques in add i
tion to modeling and behavior rehearsal was superior to the im prove
ment observed in subjects utilizing modeling and behavior rehearsal
alone. This technique was first used successfully with impulsive children,
and later with schizophrenic patients, test-anxious subjects, and phobic
clients. Meichenbaum suggested th a t a variety o f techniques of altering
behavior—that is, imitation, behavioral rehearsal, and systematic de-
densitization—may be more likely to generalize to other situations if
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concomitant alternative affirmations are also conditioned.
Society a n d B ehavior C h a n g e
Behavior technology is becoming more effective, and the research and

treatm ent literatures testify to a growing range of discrete behaviors that
now can be successfully modified. The most powerful agent of behavioral
change, however, is society itself. The fate of any new behaviors that
may be established in the laboratory or in a treatm ent situation ulti
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mately depends on whether the contingencies in the environment at
large will support them. Bucher and Lovaas (1968) recognized th at their
formerly self-destructive children would quickly return to self-destruc
tiveness if they were returned to the environment that originally p ro
duced the behavior. It has also been long recognized that former prison
inmates and drug addicts are much more likely to return to their self
destructive, antisocial habits if they return to association with their
former companions. On the other hand, Baer and W olf (1970) d e m on
strated the power of the social environment to shape behavior in its
positive aspects. The two experimenters trained a withdrawn child in
basic social skills. Once the child’s social-skill level enabled him to enter
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his peer group, training was discontinued. From th at point, the peer
group was able not only to maintain the child’s basic social skills but
also to reinforce the development of more sophisticated social behaviors.
The behavior technologist takes into consideration the effect of
society’s contingencies on whatever novel behavior he wishes to install.
Certain behaviors are very likely to be supported. W ithdrawn or so
cially uncomfortable individuals, for example, will probably be rein
forced at a higher rate if they become more comfortable and learn to
hold social conversations. On the other hand, when a person learns to

be more assertive with his employer or his wife, the expected immediate
response is punishment or criticism. The benefits of assertiveness may
only become apparent after some delay. Therefore, new behaviors will
have to be relatively resistant to extinction to m ake it possible for the
delayed reinforcement to become effective.
M eichenbaum (1971) has suggested that the conditioning of altern a
tive instructional sets in conjunction with other types of retraining may
result in greater generalization. It is possible that conditioning o f al
ternative verbal systems may also make newly acquired behavior more
resistant to change. Behavior change in one family member necessitates
change in other m embers; if novel behaviors can be sustained for a
period of time, reciprocal reinforcing change in the behavior of wives,
husbands, and children will be more likely.
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If society at large reinforces incompatible verbal systems, however,
even conditioned changes in an individual’s verbal behavior are not
likely to persist. Certain societal problems, such as alcoholism and vio
lence, are at least partially the product of society’s verbal behavior,
which encourages an d reinforces drinking and displays and models
violent hum an interaction in the public media.
Some behavioral contingencies in society at large must change in
order to lessen the extent o f social dysfunction. A lthough changing
societal contingencies may seem to be a very complex task, some group
behaviors have been altered by relatively small changes in the environ
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ment. Disorderly classroom behavior has been easily controlled by
Madsen et al. (1968) and Osborne (1970), and littering behavior in movie
houses has been controlled through the use of positive reinforcement
(Burgess, 1971).
The alteration of contingencies governing verbal behavior is co n
stantly proceeding in the mass media via commercial advertisement. It
may be possible to utilize this resource also to alter the verbal contin
gencies of our society for our long-term benefit. M uch experimentation
remains to be done, but behavioral technology may be ready to begin
such experimentation in the near future.
C o n c lu sio n
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Consideration of behavioral technology at all levels of society is critical.
Behavior control has always been with us, but now, for the first time,
we are aware of the variables that m ake it work. If we respond to be
havioral control with our outdated verbal systems, we will regard it as a
calamity, when actually it should provide us with great optimism. For
the first time in the history of man, we have acquired conceptual and

technological tools th a t m ake it possible for us to control ourselves and

others to the m utual benefit of society.
In the epilogue to his book Verbal Behavior, Skinner states:
I have been trying to get the reader to behave verbally as I behave. What
teacher, writer or friend does not? And like all teachers, writers and friends,
I shall cherish whatever I subsequently discover of any “influence” I may
have had.
We also will cherish whatever we subsequently discover of any

“ influence” we may have had.
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5
Operant Behaviorism:
Fad, Fact-ory, and Fantasy?
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Karl H. Pribram
Karl H . Pribram, an associate o f the Center f o r the Study o f

Democratic Institutions, is professor o f psychiatry and psychology at
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Stanford University M edical School. Technically a brain surgeon, he
has spent much o f his professional career investigating brain
physiology fr o m the standpoint o f electrophysiology: how the brain
is “w ired ”
Recently, Pribram sum m ed up the results o f his own investigations,
as well as o f the findings o f others, in an extraordinarily
comprehensive treatise, Languages o f the Brain. H e is one o f the very
fe w scientists to have subjected the general theories o f behaviorism,
as well as the special theory o f operant conditioning, to a rigorous
scientific analysis o f how they comport with what is known about brain
functioning. In the follow ing chapter, he sum m arizes the results o f this
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research, adding his own evaluation o f the more general doctrines
contained in Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
Fad?
In 1959, George Miller, Eugene G alanter, and I came to a conclusion

that surprised us. We were completing a b o o k —Plans and the Structure
o f Behavior— and, when we to o k a look at what we had done, we de
clared ourselves (Miller et al., 1960, p. 211) to be subjective behaviorists:

102 KARL H . PRIBRAM
A s our d ebate progressed and our co n c ep tio n o f P lans b ecam e clearer,

a con v ictio n grew on us that w e w ere d evelop in g a p oin t o f view tow ard
large parts o f p sy ch o lo g y . W e then began to w on d er h ow w e m ight best
characterize our p o sitio n so as to contrast it w ith others m ore tradition al
and m ore fam iliar. T h e q u estio n pu zzled us. W e did n o t feel that w e w ere
b ehaviorists, at least n o t in the sense J. B. W atson defined the term , yet w e
w ere m uch m ore co n c er n e d —in that d eb ate and in th ese pages, at le a st—
w ith w hat p eo p le did than w ith w hat they knew . O ur em phasis w as u p on
processes lying im m ed iately behin d action , but n o t w ith a ction itself. O n
the other hand, w e did n ot consider ourselves in trosp ective psych ologists,
at least n ot in the sense W ilh elm W un dt defined the term , yet w e were
w illing to pay atten tion to w hat p eo p le to ld us a b ou t their ideas and their
P lans. H o w d oes o n e characterize a p o sitio n that seem s to be such a m ixture
o f elem en ts usually con sid ered in com p atib le? D e ep in th e m iddle o f this
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dilem m a it su d d en ly occurred to us that w e w ere su b jective behaviorists.
W hen w e stop p ed laugh in g w e began to w on d er seriou sly if that w as not
exactly the p o sitio n w e had argued ourselves in to . A t least the nam e su g
gested the sh ock in g in con sisten cy o f our p osition .
In my case, this declaration followed a decade of work in operant

conditioning—work that resulted both in the first dem onstration that
operant techniques were applicable to primates (Skinner, 1958) and in
a spate of studies on the experimental analysis of behavior and modes
of behavior modification disturbed by selective brain lesions.
W hy then the shift? Simply that the concepts and techniques of
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operant conditioning were too restrictive to solve the problems that were
under investigation. I signalled my departure (Pribram , 1962, pp. 119—
120) as follows:
A s a rule, the extrem e behaviorist has b ecom e overly su sp iciou s i f the

p sych ological co n cep ts derived from behavioral ob servation to o closely
resem ble th ose derived in trosp ectively (th e “ m en tal”). T h e p o sitio n ac
cep ted here is that behaviorally derived c o n cep ts a re to be com pared with
th ose derived in trosp ectively. T w o extrem es m ust be avoid ed , how ever.
W hen the behaviorally derived con cep ts, b ecau se o f a lack o f em pirical
evid en ce, are in d istin gu ish ab le from th o se derived from in trosp ection ,
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c o n fu sio n results; w h en the tw o classes o f co n cep ts are so distinct that no
relation betw een them is recognizab le, the behaviorally derived con cep t is
apt to be trivial.
Specifically, I had found that the procedure of frontal leukotomy (or

lobotomy), so widely applied during the fifties, disrupted the sequential
organization o f behavior. Study of the effect of such lesions on behavior
controlled by various schedules of reinforcement gave insufficient insight
into the mechanisms of disruption; the advent of digital computers, not
operant techniques, provided the key to the problem.

Operant Behaviorism: Fad, Fact-ory, and Fantasy? 103
Psychology as a whole apparently went through a similar experience,

as indicated by the following quotation from G. H. Bower (1970, p. 18):
A m od est revolu tion is a fo o t to d a y w ithin the field o f hum an learning,

and the rebels are m arching under the banner o f “ c ogn itive o r g a n iza tio n .”
T h e clarion call to b attle w as sou n d ed by M iller, G alan ter and Pribram
(1960) in their b o o k , P lan s an d the S tru ctu re o f B ehavior. T h e im m ed iate
precursors to the ideas in th is b o o k were the w ork by N e w e ll, Sh aw and
S im on (1958) o n com p u ter sim u lation o f hum an th in k in g, and the w ork by
C h om sk y (1957) on syn tactic structures in lan gu ages. A lth o u g h there is
little altogeth er n ew under th is p sych o lo g ica l sun, the new er organ ization
m an d o es have a different persp ective and slant o f attack on m em ory
p rob lem s than d o his S - R a sso cia tio n istic p rogen itors. T h e result has been
a changin g em p h asis in w h at research gets d o n e by th e rebels and h ow they
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talk abou t it. T h e nature o f this ch an ged em p h asis w ill be illustrated by
review ing m y recent research on so m e very p oten t o rgan ization factors in
hu m an m em ory.
The result has been this swing tow ard “ cognitive” psychology—cogni
tion, knowing, became the first “ subjective” topic to yield to the experi
mentalists’ attack.
The lessons we learned in the late fifties are applicable today, despite
the undeniable and well-deserved success that operant behaviorism is
enjoying. This occasion thus provides me with a vehicle for undertaking
an exciting journey in criticism on which I have long wanted to embark.
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M y trip is m ade in two stages. One surveys the larger issues of psychologi
cal enquiry and the stance of operant behaviorism within those issues.
The other addresses the specific relationship of op erant behaviorism to
physiology and to measurement. Let me begin the voyage with these
specifics, in part to get them out of the way of the m ore interesting vista.
F a c t-o ry ?
In view of the fact that my own investigative endeavor centers on b ra in -
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behavior studies, what I have to say abou t the relation between psychol
ogy and physiology may come as a surprise. In general, I agree with
Skinner’s main propositions: behavioral science can function (although
at a limited level) independently of physiology; physiologizing is often
deleterious to clear thinking; the neurological and behavioral languages
describe universes of events that ought to be kept separate. My position,
however, is that there is a considerable overlap o f these universes and
that, in order to do justice to the overlap, both neurological (physio
logical) and behavioral data are demanded. M y prejudice is th at one
misses a good deal of the fun and richness o f the field by ignoring the

b rain-behavior interface. F o r an operant behaviorist, perceptual co n

stancy poses little in the way of a problem. F o r one concerned with the
variations o f the retinal image and the reconstructions that have to be
made from them in order to perceive at all, there is a world of investigat
ing to d o —and operant techniques can help in the doing, as shown by
Tom Bower’s classic studies on infants (T. G. R. Bower, 1966). But,
chacun a son gout.
The parochialism of the operant behaviorist is what is dismaying to
encounter. Why, for instance, are references given, with few exceptions,
exclusively from the operant literature? W hen neurological results, cog
nitive-psychological results, or the results obtained by other disciplines
are discussed, they are almost never referenced. Is the work on the fixed-
interval schedule really so overridingly precise, holy, and im portant
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that, when hypothalamic hyperphagia is at issue, the details of procedure,
analysis, and interpretation need not be evidenced?
But so much for physiology. The operant behaviorists’ views of the
role of measurem ent are often confused: although they may have an
excellent grasp of what measurement means in their own discipline,
they seem no t to understand what other disciplines are ab ou t when
they measure. Certainly, measures of response rate are useful, but why
not loosen the usual operant shackles sufficiently to allow measurement
of choice and latency, in addition to m easurement of the canonized
rate? I have had an autom ated discrimination apparatus for discrete
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trial analysis (D A D T A ) working for more than ten years (Pribram et
al., 1963; Pribram, 1969). It is a computer-controlled device that meas
ures response choices, latencies, and —if so desired—rates. Each re
sponse is recorded at the time it is performed, and a summary is collated
at the end of each run by the computer. If one wishes to perform statistical
manipulations on the data, one can; if there are obvious conclusions to
be drawn without the need for statistics (such as the development, or
lack thereof, of position habits), one draws them and goes on. Further,
latency is not to be discarded as completely useless, provided one has
the wit to use it. Lindsley, for instance, has made this measure pay off
in his studies of attention (Lindsley, 1961); and my colleagues and I
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have found latency an effective gauge o f distraction (Douglas and Prib
ram, 1967). I grant the operant behaviorists their fad for interresponse
times (I use such histograms in studying neural-unit activity) but ask,
in return, that they occasionally look a ro un d the world of behavioral
science and see what effective use is made o f other response measures—
yea, even, occasionally, of statistics and of models. For instance, re
sponse-operator-characteristic curves (R O C ) have been extremely useful
adjuncts in psychophysical studies and, more recently, in studies of
verbal learning.
R O C analysis might prove equally fruitful when applied to physio

logical work, as investigators in my laboratory have done) Spevack and

Pribram, in press), and to operant learning. Finally, whether one uses
one or several subjects depends on how many variables one is juggling,
not only on how good o ne’s control over these variables is. If one is
interested, as I am, in the relation between brain and behavior variables,
one usually needs more subjects than one, just to be reasonably sure of
the generality of the results. Mechanization and statistics are two types
of technique by which control can be enh a n c e d —they are neither
inimical, exclusive of one another, nor infallible.
I want now to venture to the larger issue of psychological inquiry.
Operant behaviorism plays two roles in psychological research, and these
two roles so often become confused in the minds of the practitioners
th at the charge of cultism can fairly be levelled against them. Inasmuch
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as operant conditioning encompasses a set of techniques, operant c o n
ditioners serve as behavioral engineers. In this capacity, they have
served well. There is still a tinge of restrictiveness here—but it is hardly
noticeable when I consider an incident th at occurred not so long ago
when, during a meeting that was to lay the foundations for the Journal
o f the Experim ental Analysis o f Behavior, someone suggested that per
haps it might be fruitful for operant behaviorism and ethology to join
forces: this suggestion elicited a stony silence, some polite chit-chat,
and the break-up of the meeting for the time being.
Despite their current excellence as behavioral engineers, I foresee
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some dangers for operant behaviorists even in that role. Already the
equipment they use so fluently is completely out-of-date. Unless they
catch up with com puter technology, with its flexibility enhanced by
facile hierarchical programm ing, better and more varied in p u t-o u tp u t
equipment, and the like, operant behaviorists are likely to become
obsolete, good technicians of an outm oded technology. And by catching
up I mean more than using a Linc-8 to analyze interresponse times.
With the precipitous drops in the price of general-purpose computers,
there is little excuse for failing to seize the opportunity to use fully these
powerful an d flexible instruments.
But operant behaviorism purports to be more than a technology. It
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is also addressed to a set of problems. Yet one must look long and hard
before discovering just what that set of problems is; and when one does,
the confusion is woefully com pounded. One m ust continuously work
on e’s way th rou gh a blinding array of often brilliant applications of
a technology. Animal psychophysics is the stellar example where the
application of this technology to hum an behavior has been used even in
studying subjective (!) processes (see, for instance, Boakes and Halliday,
1970). But what is the core o f interest, the conduct with which o perant
behaviorism is concerned?
The answer is, of course, the problem of reinforcement. The usual

operant behaviorists’ pride is the cleanliness of the operational definition

of reinforcement in terms of its effect on preceding responses. But I
must say that a high point of my journey in criticism came in reviewing
an article on the Skinnerian analysis of behavior. The authors (Boakes
and Halliday, 1970), openly and without shame, displayed their scrubbed
and sterilized conception with the comment, “ Learning is a process
ab o u t which Skinnerians have said little” !
I pointed out to them that they here do a grave disservice to Skinner
(as so many Freudians have done to Freud, and so on). Only a m onth
earlier, 1 had heard a superb talk by Skinner (1968b) on the occasion
of an IB R O meeting on the brain and h um a n behavior sponsored by
U N E S C O . Skinner discussed his theory (his term). H e stated th at it is not
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an S - R theory. It is, in fact, an R theory and, therefore, m uch more de
fensible—inasmuch as stimulus and response mutually imply each other,
unless one is talking exclusively ab ou t correlations am ong “ distal” (that
is, environm ental) events operated upon by the organism. [See Estes
(1959) for a detailed discussion of this issue.] He also portrayed his model
(his term) of reinforcement: he described this as an attem pt to so arrange
the contingencies o f environmental events that reinforcement can and will
occur. N o te that, by this approach, reinforcement becomes a process
internal to the organism, a process th at can legitimately be studied by
neurological methods.
I was, of course, delighted to hear this, because my own interest lies
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in the neurological process produced by behavioral reinforcement. I
have elsewhere tried to m ake the proposal that behavioral reinforcement
is an organizing process that takes place when sequences (that is, tem
poral patterns) o f behavioral outcomes fit into the neurological context
(memory) created by prior such sequences. This view of reinforcement
as consequence is dismissed by many operant conditioners—but just
why it is has never become clear to me. Perhaps it is the reference to a
central organizing process th at is so distasteful to them. But now they
must deal with Skinner himself on this issue, so I wonder whether he
or they would object to my treatm ent of the problem when I suggest
that, neurologically, reinforcement may well proceed by a brain mech
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anism not unlike the one that produces embryological differentiation,
the mechanism of induction (Pribram, 1971).
The point is that neuropsychology (by contrast to what some operant
conditioners say ab ou t operant behaviorism) has a great deal to say
about the mechanisms of learning—both in data and in fascinating
possibilities that need exploring. Yet, neuropsychology—or physiologi
cal psychology in general—would hardly be able to make its co ntribu
tions if it paid no heed to those contributions, both technical and intel
lectual, that operant behaviorism has to offer. Perhaps operant be

haviorism would have m ore to say a b out psychological p ro blem s—

which are, of course, o f a piece, and do not care for our arbitrary dis
tinctions—were its practitioners to attend wholeheartedly to the explora
tions of their n on op erant colleagues.
The experimental analysis of behavior within the framework of oper
ant behaviorism has a great deal to offer to students immersed in
psychological inquiry. As of the m om ent, with few exceptions (for
example, the work of Premack, 1965), the contributions are coming
from those who only use operant behaviorism and stand solidly outside
it. This is, to my mind, due largely to the abysmal provincialism and
cultivated bigotry of so many who remain within the operant confines.
I do not advocate any ab a n d o n m e n t of operant behaviorism as a scien
tific enterprise in its own right. Rather, I want to see it strengthen its
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core by admitting the contributions th a t other disciplines within psy
chology are m aking and by usefully incorporating and im proving them
whenever they are relevant. The problem to which operant behaviorism
is addressed is reinforcement. Reinforcement (by whatever name it is
called: outcome, consequence, law o f effect, feedback, stamping in,
and so forth) is a central problem in psychology. Thus, the dem and for a
sophisticated operant behaviorism pervades psychology. But the c o n
verse also holds, or should hold: psychology must pervade operant
behaviorism, if either is to remain viable.
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F a n ta s y ?
I had hoped that such revisions would come following Skinner’s U N E S

CO presentation, which I mentioned above. Therefore, I followed closely
the operant literature and Skinner’s own productions. W ith the publi
cation of Beyond Freedom and D ignity, this renewed interest came to a
head, and I felt again moved to take up my pen.
My first reaction was anger. There is much good in the book, but 1
felt th a t its mistaken polemics would achieve just the opposite of what
was intended. A second reading confirmed my initial impression, but
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it left me sad rather than angry.
Beyond Freedom and D ignity has two messages interwoven. The first
is that a behavioral technology has been developed th a t can go a long
way tow ard curing the ills that beset men. The second concerns the
m in d -b o d y issue and centers on the conception of m a n ’s autonomy.
Skinner makes a good case for this behavioral technology. F o r those
not acquainted with his achievements, the book could be enlightening.
Skinner has applied to the social good his insights into the control of
behavioral operants—“ Behavior which operates upon the environment

to produce consequences . . [p. 18]1—obtained in the laboratory. He

has been effective in sparking “ behavior the rap y” for obsessional and
compulsive disorders that are resistant to other therapies. He has been
instrumental in providing “ programmed texts” to the educational c o m
munity. Both have been achieved by making immediately clear to the
behaving individual what the outcome of his behavior entails. Behavior
has consequences. These consequences are shaped by the environment
in which they occur. Proper arrangements o f these contingencies produce
the desired “ reinforcement.” The task for the behaviorist is clearcut:
arrange the environmental contingencies of reinforcement and so c o n
trol behavior. All else is irrelevant.
M uch as I admire Skinner’s contributions to our knowledge of the
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environmental contingencies that lead to reinforcement, I was again
disappointed by his limited view of the problem. After all, other forms
of behavior modification exist. As I pointed out to him almost twenty
years ago, our legal system is a reasonably good deterrent of unwanted
behavior. W hat was needed, and what his techniques could provide,
were better methods for rewarding wanted behavior. Our educational
and psychotherapeutic communities, which are dedicated to this task,
have developed rem arkably during this period. Changes in grading sys
tems, computer-assisted instruction, transactional and Gestalt therapies,
and encounter groups are only some of the social inventions that have
occurred since m idcentury—inventions that speak to Skinner’s goal of a
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better behavioral technology for man. It might even be added that
behavior therapy is merely a modification of Reich’s discovery that
psychoanalysis must proceed by “ analyzing” away defenses—the most
superficial defenses first, the deeper ones when they become accessible.
Verbal “ analysis” has been bolstered by more generally effective tech
niques of behavior modification—a major contribution, but not neces
sarily the innovation that its practitioners claim. A careful scientific
analysis o f the occasions for effective use of all these new tools would
serve us better than the one-sided claim.
M uch of the power of Beyond Freedom and Dignity comes not from
Skinner’s behavioral contributions, however, but from his clearcut
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stance on the m in d -b o d y issue. Skinner is against freedom and against
dignity and against feelings and against values. He is against anything
th a t smacks of mind, because mind is soft and ghostly and gets in the way
of clear thinking abo ut the control of behavior. In short, philosophically
speaking, Skinner is a straightforward, naive realist—no ifs, ands, or
buts. We are to go beyond dualism by becoming realists. But, of course,
th r o u g h o u t this paper, page num bers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s
Beyond Freedom and Dignity (A lfred A . K n op f, 1971).

the Cartesian tra p has been sprung: Skinner can only sell his views by
referring continuously (almost to the point o f b oredom ) to the mental —
to feelings, freedom, dignity, values. In his very denial, he acknowledges
the dualist problem. But in his naivete, there is simplicity and strength,
and this can beguile the unwary.
I myself have gradually, th rou gh my research on brain and behavior,
come to a realist position (Pribram , 1970, 1971). My realism is c o n
structional and biological (rather than physicalistic) and suggests that
mental language, brain language, cultural language, and behavioral
language are multiple em bodim ents of basic biobehavioral structures,
m uch as biologically related persons are em bodim ents o f the same D N A
potentialities. (This view differs from a multiple-os/jecz m o n ism —that
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of Feigl, for exam ple—but is, in part, derived from it.) So it is not
Skinner’s realism to which I object but his deliberate cop-out in favor
of the easier “ naive” position —especially when he makes what is then
unfair use of mentalism, in his book and chapter titles, to prom ote his
viewpoint:
The dimensions of the world of mind and the transition from one world
to another do raise embarrassing problems, but it is usually p o ssib le to
ignore them , an d this m a y be g o o d stra te g y , for the important objection to
mentalism is of a very different sort. The w o rld o f the m in d ste a ls the sh ow . . .
[p. 12, italics added].
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According to William James (1931), G. K . Chesterton once remarked that
for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income,

but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general
about to fight any enemy it is important to know the enemy’s numbers, but
still more important to know the enemy’s philosophy. We think the question
is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the
long run anything else affects them.
James, Skinner’s forebear at H arvard, states simply: “ 1 agree with Mr.

Chesterton on this m atter.”
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I want, therefore, to try your patience by showing, in the following
examples, th at Skinner’s retreat to naivete is, in fact, wrong and, there
fore, harmful:
1) Skinner claims that physics and biology no longer concern th e m

selves with “ indwelling agents . . . references to purpose are still to be
found in both physics and biology, but good practice has no place for
th e m ” [p. 8]. Can you imagine what planning the m oon landing would
have been like if we carried out Skinner’s “ good practice” and never

110 K ARL H . PRIBRAM
referred to gravity? Was it really sinister, as Skinner would have us feel,

to describe the weightlessness of men on the m oon relative to the fact
that the “ pull” that the m oon exerts is weaker than that exerted by the
earth? A nd where has Skinner been during development of cybernetics,
which has given rise to the second industrial revolution? T he very word
control, of which he is so fond, has been scientifically shown to be related
to “ purpose,” to teleology. Com puters are machines that can show
purpose, in a very technical sense. It is this revolution in scientific
thinking that, twelve years ago, led George Miller, Eugene Galanter,
and me (1960), into reevaluating what behavioral science is all about.
And, of course, biology, in its adherence to evolutionary conceptions,
is “ purposive,” and has been since Darwin. It is pre-Darwinian biology
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that simply classified (the biology of Linnaeus, for example). It is the
science of genetics that has, since Mendel, developed teleonomics
(W ad ding to n’s very scientific conception) as an explanatory tool with
which we have revamped agricultural practice. I, too, was taught by
R alph G erard in my elementary biology course not to think id e o lo g i
cally—but both G erard and I have a b an don ed old views when they
were superseded. Skinner accuses Koestler [pp. 165-166], and rightly so,
of being “ approximately seventy years out of d a te ” in misrepresenting
behaviorism. Skinner is equally out of date in misrepresenting the physi
cal (especially the information-processing) and biological sciences. Per
haps th at is why Skinner and Koestler found responsive chords in each
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o th er—we are privileged to watch and enjoy an encounter between such
antediluvian titans.
2) Skinner tries to make point after point against mentalism. Let us

look in on him for a m om ent:
A third example, a “cognitive” activity, is attention. A person responds

only to a small part of the stimuli impinging upon him. The traditional view
is that he himself determines which stimuli are to be effective by “paying
attention” to them. Some kind of inner gatekeeper is said to allow some
stimuli to enter and to keep all others out. A sudden or strong stimulus
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may break through and “attract” attention, but the person himself seems
otherwise to be in control. An analysis of the environmental circumstances
reverses the relation. The kinds of stimuli which break through by “attract
ing attention” do so because they have been associated in the evolutionary
history of the species or the personal history of the individual with impor
tant—e.g., dangerous—things. Less forceful stimuli attract attention only
to the extent that they have figured in contingencies of reinforcement.
We can arrange contingencies which ensure that an organism—even such
a “simple” organism as a pigeon—will attend to one object and not to
another, or to one property of an object such as its color, and not to another,

Operant Behaviorism: Fad, Fact-ory , and Fantasy? Ill
such as its shape. The inner gatekeeper is replaced by the contingencies to

which the organism has been exposed and which select the stimuli to
which it reacts [pp. 186-187],
But on another occasion, Skinner (1969, p. 283) rem arked:
In a more advanced account of a behaving organism “ historical” variables

will be replaced by “causal.” When we can observe the momentary state
of an organism . . . [and] when we can generate or change a state directly,
we shall be able to use it to control behavior.
In a recently completed series of experiments, my colleagues and I

did what Skinner proposes. And we did find a brain system th at appears
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to perform the function of a “ causal inner gatekeeper.” The experiment
showed th at the brainwaves of a m onkey reinforced for responding to
the color of a multidimensional pair of cues are different from those
recorded when pattern is responded to. F urther, these differences in
brainwaves occur some 50 milliseconds before any overt behavior is
manifested. So we describe our findings in terms o f selective attention.
W hat is wrong with this? In the opening paragraph of an article on
energy and information, Tribus and M clrvine (1971) stated: “ Science
does not hesitate to give precise definitions to everyday words such as
‘w ork,’ ‘power,’ and ‘inform ation ,’ and in the process to transform
proverbial truths into scientific tru th s.”
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3) I am interested in what goes on inside the organism, but that does
not preclude my interest in how what is inside got there. W hy cannot
Skinner be equally tolerant? He insists that “ the feral child has no
language, not because his isolation has interfered with some growth
process, but because he has not been exposed to a verbal com m un ity”
[p. 141; see also the relevant footnote].
We now know (see Pribram, 1971, chapter 2) th at brain growth is
dependent on appropriate stimulation. Skinner should have left out
some negatives: the feral child has no language because his isolation has
interfered with the growth of his brain, which depends on his being
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exposed to a verbal c om m un ity—much as a child fails to read when,
during the first two years o f life, he suffers, due to a congenital cataract
or severe squint, from a lack of patterned visual input, which has been
shown to be necessary to the development of the hum an visual system.
In summary, proper concern for what goes on inside the human

organism —especially the brain —leads to conclusions opposite to those
drawn by Skinner in Beyond Freedom and D ignity. The brain, in fact,
is modified by experience; w ithout such modifiability, the brain would

112 K ARL H . PRTBRAM
be incompetent to process the environmental consequences of behavior.

T he brain, in fact, is sensitive to chemical influences that determine
dispositions to behave, and these dispositions affect the environment
just as environment affects dispositions (Bandura, 1971; Sidman, 1966).
Designs of cultures, therefore, cannot, in and of themselves, completely
specify behavior. Inherited individual differences in reactivity will assert
themselves, unless the cultural design is so impoverished as to allow
no alternatives. And, to do him justice, this is not what Skinner ad vo
cates. Complexity in design begets options in behavior, and with them
comes the possibility—in fact, the necessity— of choice and autonomy.
The very feelings of freedom (and, I might add, the feeling of responsi
bility that freedom entails) that Skinner wants to deny are part and
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parcel of the consequences of a sophisticated behavioral technology, as
is evidenced by the title of his book and its chapter headings.
F o r Skinner has got it all backward. W h a t behavioral science is all
a b o u t is to use observation of behavior to explain and understand such
feelings as freedom and love; such perceptions as green and red and
circle and square, and memories of such things as faces and phrases.
W hether feelings and images and thoughts are causal in the behavioral
chain is a deep question th a t I am not yet prepared to answ er—but
certainly, once such feelings and percepts and thoughts are c o m m un i
cated, they can become causal in the social scene. That, however, is not
really the point. Science is knowledge; engineering is the application of
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th a t knowledge to hum an purpose. Skinner’s interest is th a t of the
engineer, and we are much in need of good engineering in our culture.
But it is one thing to advocate good engineering and another to try to
m ake it encompass all of science and hum an enterprise. The journey
ends. I am sad.
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6
Great Expectations
Arnold T o y n b e e
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Arnold Toynbee is a distinguished British historian whose m ajor work,
A Study of History, has attracted a wide readership in this and many
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other countries.
W ith this chapter, we leave the expository m aterial on operant
conditioning and move to more philosophical and speculative
treatm ents o f the general implications o f contem porary behaviorism,
with particular reference to the leading themes o f Beyond Freedom
and Dignity. Toynbee's is a dispassionate review o f Skinner's thesis.
H e concludes, “ / part company with the behaviorists over their belief
that behavior is determ ined wholly and exclusively by heredity and
environm ent." In working toward this conclusion, he details aspects o f
behaviorism with which he agrees and others that he takes exception to.
A s an exam ple o f the latter, Toynbee writes, “ / do not think that
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either heredity or environment, or these two fo rc e s together, fu lly
account f o r the behavior o f Hosea, Zarathustra, Jerem iah, the Buddha,
Socrates, Jesus, M uham m ad, and Saint Francis o f A ssisi."
Manifestly, we ought to give the most serious consideration to a doctrine

whose exponents see in it a means of saving m ankind from imminent
catastrophe and a means of guarding ourselves against being treated by
each other with cruel injustice. These are large claims; they hold out

114 ARNOLD TOYNBEE
great expectations; and they deserve to be examined impartially, insofar

as impartiality is attainable by hum an minds when they are engaged on
thinking abo ut hum an affairs.
A great deal o f the behaviorists’ thesis is, today, undisputed com m on
ground between them and other students of hum an affairs who are not
convinced by the behaviorist doctrine in its entirety. Few serious o b
servers and thinkers now deny that our genetic endowment an d our
social setting determine our behavior to a greater extent than we find
it agreeable to admit.
It is now believed that a hum an being’s set of genes contains genetic
information that is as old as life itself on this planet. A gene th at may
determine decisively a hum an being’s capacity and govern his behavior
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may be derived from some palaeolithic hu m an ancestor or, perhaps,
even from a prehum an forebear. It is also true that, now th at biologists
are discovering so m uch more ab ou t the nature, structure, and trans
mission of genes, they are beginning to contem plate the possibility that
some d a y —perhaps before very long —they may become able to bring
the selection and transmission of genes under hum an control. It would
then be within hum an power to decide w hat each new hum an being’s
genetic endow m ent is to be. This suggestion sounds, already, far less
fantastic than it did when it was propo un ded as a je u d'esprit by Aldous
Huxley in Brave N ew World.
However, the control and m anipulation of genes is still only an
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uncertain possibility, and Skinner, therefore, does no t give more than
a passing consideration to it in this book. The book is concerned mainly
with the control and m anipulation o f the social setting, and this is
reasonable; for it is an indisputable fact that we are social animals,
and it is probable th a t our ancestors were already social animals long
before they had evolved into hum an beings. Perhaps all social anim als—
for example, wolves, beavers, and termites, as well as human beings—
are governed to some extent by their social setting as well as by their
genetic heritage. But it is recognized that the relative effect of the social
setting on behavior is so much greater in hum ans than it is in any other
social species of living creature that this am ounts to one of the distinctive
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characteristics o f man. The effect on a hum an being of his social setting
begins at birth and continues throu gh ou t life. It is what we call “ educa
tion,” in the broadest usage o f the word. It is disputable whether educa
tion accounts for everything in hum an behavior th at is not accounted
for by our genetic heritage; but it is acknowledged by everyone that
the effect on us of edu cation—at least in the broad meaning of the word
— is enormous.
H u m an beings are conscious social animals. Consciousness is not the
same thing as freedom, but we may make the mistake of identifying
these two different things with each other. O ur awareness of how we

Great Expectations 115
are behaving may lead us to believe that we are determining our own
behavior. This may or may not be at least partly true, but even its partial
tru th must not be taken for granted. This needs to be prov ed —or at
least we are under the onus of dem onstrating th at self-determination
is an indispensable explanation of some facts a b o u t hum an behavior
for which no alternative explanation can be found.
The fallacy of equating consciousness with freedom is exposed tell
ingly by Voltaire in a passage that Skinner quotes. “ When I can do
what I want to do, there is my liberty for m e; but I c a n ’t help wanting
what I do w ant.” Voltaire’s point is th a t our consciousness of our
desires does not reveal their source. Since Voltaire’s time, the psycholo
gists have tracked down m uch of our volition from the conscious surface
of the psyche to its subconscious depths, but they have not dem o n
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strated that our behavior originates there, either. Is part of it caused
by an inherited “ collective subconscious” ? Is an other part of it caused
by the pressure of a hum an being’s social setting during his lifetime?
W ithout attem pting to give positive answers to these questions, we can
agree th at a large part of our behavior does not originate in, and is
not determined by, ourselves, and that the thesis that our behavior is
determined entirely by ourselves is confuted by incontestable facts.
N o one would disagree with Skinner if he had limited his co un te r
thesis to asserting that a hum an being is only partially free. We might
perhaps all go so far as to agree th at a m ajor part of a hum an being’s
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conduct is not self-determined. The disputable point in Skinner’s thesis
is his denial th a t the hum an being himself may be even a partial, if only
a minor, determ inant of his own behavior.
Skinner m akes effective play with the “ pathetic fallacy.” H um an
beings are conscious th a t they have impulses, desires, motives, and
plans. O ur prescientific ancestors explained the behavior of n onh um an
living beings and of inanim ate objects and phenom ena by attributing
to these the psychic behavior of which we are conscious in ourselves.
The implication was that both hum an beings and other constituents of
the universe are self-determining. We have now come to recognize that
the behavior of inanimate objects and p h e n o m e n a —and of n onhum an
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living beings, too, to a large extent—is determined by forces th a t have
not originated in these entities. In other words, the causes of their
behavior are impersonal. Skinner adroitly turns the tables on hum an
nature. Now th a t the “ pathetic fallacy” has been recognized to be
untenable in respect of nonh um an nature, must we not conclude that
it is also untenable in respect of hum an nature? The supposedly h u m a n
like power of self-determination must, Skinner suggests, be illusory
when attributed to hum an beings, now th at we have conceded that it is
illusory when attributed to the rest of nature. This point of Skinner’s
is as telling as his citation of Voltaire’s dictum.

116 ARNOLD TOYNBEE
Skinner points out th at m uch of the imagery of hum an language,

and perhaps most of its vocabulary and syntax, has been shaped by the
assumption that, in a hum an being, freedom to will, and to plan for
the achievement of what he wills, is a reality, not the illusion th a t Skinner
believes it to be. Skinner, therefore, holds that, in order to give a m ean
ingful explanation of hum an behavior, we must translate the traditional
prescientific way o f describing it that is still prevalent into forms of
words th a t avoid attributing freedom to h um a n behavior. Given Skin
ner’s own assumptions, this procedure of translation is reasonable and
is, indeed, necessary. Yet I am made uneasy by Skinner’s behaviorist
scientific language, as I am by the Christian Scientists’ com parable
language. Both the Christian Scientists and the behaviorists are driven,
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so it seems to me, into linguistic contortions by their theses of n o n
reality (of freedom, for the behaviorists, and o f disease, for the Christian
Scientists). These contortions th at are required in order to avoid making
the admissions th a t are made in traditional language lead me to suspect
th a t the traditional language may, after all, come nearer to expressing
the truth than the artificial language that, so it is claimed, is required
for stating the tru th scientifically.
I know of a case in which a Christian Scientist—confined to his bed
by what would be called, in non-C h ristian Scientist parlance, a feverish
c o ld —sent a message to a committee, in which he was due to take the
chair, th a t he “ preferred to stay in bed.” The discourteous words dic
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tated to him by his creed seemed to his n o n-C h ristian Scientist colleagues
to be further from the tru th than the words th at they would have used
had they been laid up; but, knowing th a t their colleague was a Christian
Scientist, they did not take offense at the apparently discourteous mes
sage; they realized th at he was inhibited by his beliefs from explaining
his nonattendance at their committee in any other language.
Some of Skinner’s language gives me just this uneasy feeling of
unreality.1 F o r instance, he writes, in m ore than one passage, th at a
'It is unfortunate that, in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner has not given explana
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tions, in everyday language, o f his technical terms. I take it that the book is intended to
be read by nonbehaviorists. Yet the meaning o f the technical terms is taken for granted
without being explained, as if this were an esoteric work addressed solely to readers who
are already well-instructed behaviorists. In the language that Skinner uses in order to
avoid attributing any power of initiative or freedom of choice to human beings, the
words “contingencies,” “reinforcers,” and “reinforcement” are evidently key terms.
They are also apparently being used in a technical sense, and the uninitiated reader has
to guess at their technical meaning, at the risk, if he guesses wrong, o f failing to do
justice to Skinner’s argument. I guess that, in this book, “contingencies” means “sets of
circumstances in a human being’s social environment that, in the author’s view, deter
mine a human being’s behavior.” I also guess that “reinforcers” is a substitute for
“rewards” or “incenlives”—words that a behaviorist is inhibited from using because
they imply that a person’s reaction to his environment is at least partly spontaneous.
I hope these guesses o f mine are not too wide o f the mark.

culture “ induces” a hum an being to m ake efforts to change this culture.

In this formula, Skinner has surely been driven into the “ pathetic
fallacy” by the exigencies o f his thesis. Skinner points out th at a culture
is not the aggregate o f hum an bodies that is delineated in the famous
frontispiece to H ob be s’s Leviathan. Skinner holds, surely correctly, that
a culture is not a crowd of hum an beings, but is a network of relations
between hum an beings. N o w we all agree th at a network o f relations
canno t “ induce” anyone to do anything; so how can a behaviorist, of
all people, write that a culture “ induces” ? If it is a fallacy to say th at a
hum an being “ induces,” then, a fo rtio ri, it must be a fallacy to say that
a network o f relations between hum an beings “ induces.” Yet, in avoid
ing the attribution of “ inducem ent” to hum an beings, Skinner has been
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driven into attributing “ inducem ent” to a netw ork o f relations between
people.
It seems to me that, in translating from traditional language into
behaviorist language, Skinner has here failed to avoid using a form of
words th a t is inadmissible according to his own behaviorist thesis.
This makes me d o ub t the validity of the thesis—not as a partial explana
tion of hum an behavior, but as a complete explanation of it, to the
exclusion o f all others.
If a hum an being’s genetic endow m ent and his social setting, between
them, determine the whole of his behavior, how is it possible for a hum an
being to have a policy? Yet Skinner does a ttribute policies to hum an
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beings. “ When an individual engages in intentional design o f a cultural
practice, we m ust turn to the culture which induces him to do so and
supplies the art or science he uses” [p. 210].2 “ He is indeed controlled
by his environment, but we must rem ember th a t it is an environm ent
largely of his own making. The evolution of a culture is a gigantic
exercise in self-control” [p. 215]. “ W hat we need is a technology of
hum an behavior” [p. 5]. “ To refuse to control is to leave control not
to the person himself, but to other parts of the social and non-social
environm ents” [p. 5]. These passages in the book assume that some, at
any rate, am ong the participants in a hum an society design cultural
practices, create cultural environments, control the behavior of other
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hum an beings, and do these things by operating a technology of hum an
behavior. These assumptions are surely incompatible with Skinner’s
fundamental thesis, which is th a t freedom is a delusion; that hum an
beings have no power of taking the initiative; th a t their behavior is
determined wholly by their genetic endow m ent and by their social
setting; and th a t whatever part of their behavior is not caused by one
of these two forces is caused by the other.
t h r o u g h o u t this paper, page num bers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s

118 ARNOLD TOYNBEE
W e can all agree with Skinner that these two forces, between them,
do determine hum an behavior to some extent—indeed, to a large extent
— but this does not commit us to agreeing with him that these are the
exclusive determinants of hum an behavior. Skinner does not present us
with any dem onstration that these two account for the whole o f hum an
behavior, and it is im probable that they do. Taken by themselves, they
leave hum an behavior partially unexplained. In order to explain parts
of it, Skinner himself has been constrained, in the passages quoted
above and in others of the same tenor, to attribute part of a hum an
being’s behavior to the person’s own initiative. It is quite credible that
a person’s behavior, besides being partly determined by his genetic
endow m ent and by his social setting, is also partly determined by the
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person himself.
Self-determination or self-control [the term used by Skinner in the
passage quoted, on p. 117, from p. 215 o f his book] is another name
for life. Every living being is a part of the universe th a t has tried to
separate itself from the rest of the universe in order to erect itself into
a counteruniverse. The individual member of any species of living beings
is striving to keep itself alive by exploiting the rest of the universe for
this purpose. The species th at the individual represents is striving to
perpetuate itself by reproducing individuals on an unchanging pattern.
O f course, this self-determination is never m ore than partial and
tem porary, in any case. The species changes, in spite of its attem pt to
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remain true to type. It has originally evolved out of some other species,
and it will eventually evolve into a n other; or, alternatively, its line will
become extinct. Any individual member o f a species is still more ephem
eral th an the species itself. The individual is procreated and it is fore
doom ed to die. Life on this planet is, of course, younger than the planet.
The planet may survive for aeons after it has once again become unin
habitable for any form of life. M oreover, the earth is a very recent body;
it is younger than its own sun, and it is vastly younger th an the whole
of the cosmos, in which the earth is a physically insignificant speck of
dust. The self-determination possessed and exercised by living beings
on the earth is thus manifestly imperfect or even minimal, but it is not,
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on this account, necessarily illusory or unreal. On the evidence at our
disposal, self-determination has as good a claim as heredity or as
environment to be reckoned as one of the causes of hum an behavior.
An account of hum an behavior that explains it solely by heredity and
environment, to the exclusion of self-determination and any other pos
sible cause, might be plausible were we to cut short our retrospect of
hum a n history at a date, say, abo ut 2700 years short of the year 1972 a . d .
These last 2700 years are a minute fraction of the total span of hum an
history, and, in surveying the millions of years before the eighth century

B.C., we could explain most things in that m ajor period of hum an history
as being products of the environment, with the nonh um an part of the
environm ent p reponderant at the start and the social and technological
environment gradually gaining in importance.
The history of the environm ent’s determination of m an's behavior
is reflected in the history o f religion. Religion may be defined as m a n ’s
attem pt to keep in touch with, and to live in h arm ony with, some
presence, or presences, in the universe that are more im p ortant than
man himself. So long as man was at the mercy o f his nonhum an en
vironment, he conceived of these presences, and worshipped them,
in the form of nonh um an natural phenomena. After man had at last
begun to get the upper hand over n o n hu m an nature through the develop
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ment of his social organization and his technology, he went over to the
worship of his own collective hum an power. A thena, who had been
orginally the deification of the olive tree, was subsequently conscripted
to serve as the deification o f the power of the state of Athens, while
Poseidon, the deification of seas and earthquakes, came to serve as the
deification of the state of Corinth.
The worship o f hum an power is, no doubt, the real religion of most
of m ankind still today, but the nominal religions to which most of m a n
kind now pays lip service tell another story. In the course o f some twelve
centuries, beginning with the age of the prophets of Israel and Judah
and ending in the generation o f the Prophet M uh a m m a d , a n um ber of
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“ great souls” (m ahatm as) proclaimed th at a society’s established beliefs
and practices do not have an absolute claim on the allegiance of the
participants in th at society. They appealed to some spiritual presence
or spiritual objective that has a p ara m o u n t claim on a human being’s
loyalty. All these “ great souls” broke, in some degree, with the society
in which they had been born and brought up. Some of them were conse
quently persecuted and even put to death. They suffered as m a rtyrs—
that is, as witnesses to their conviction th at they were following a
spiritual call that took precedence over their society’s claims and de
m ands upon them.
I do not think that either heredity or environment, or these two
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forces together, fully account for the behavior o f Hosea, Z arathustra,
Jeremiah, the Buddha, Socrates, Jesus, M u h a m m a d , and Saint Francis
of Assisi. I believe that these “ great souls” did have the freedom to take
spiritual action th at has no traceable source. I also believe th at there is
a spark of this creative spiritual power in every hum an being.
These great souls” have influenced the behavior of millions of
hum an beings ever since they communicated their messages. They have
influenced posterity, but they have not “ c o nditioned” us, in the sense
of depriving us of the possibility of refraining from following their

120 ARNOLD TOYNBEE
directives. M an has learned the art of “ conditioning” inanimate m a tte r—

for example, the air in a room , or metal extracted from ore dug out of a
mine. But living creatures cannot be “ conditioned” more than partially.
Try to “ c o ndition” a goat, mule, camel, or horse; you will find that
the exercise is counterproductive. They can be coaxed, but they will
resist being coerced. A nd there is a goatlike, camellike, mulelike vein
in hum an nature th at makes “ a technology of hum an behavior” or
“ a science of social engineering” a forlorn hope. It is true th a t hum an
beings can be partially dehumanized by being subjected to military drill,
but the hypnotic effect of drill is precarious. In a soldier, hum an nature
is inhibited but not eradicated. U n de r provocation, it may reassert itself.
A t the beginning of Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner points out
th a t we are living today under the threat th at m ankind may liquidate
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itself at short notice. When time is short, people look for short cuts,
and the application of a technology of hu m an behavior would be a
providential short cut to the salvaging o f mankind, if the methods of
technology, which have worked such wonders on inanimate nature,
could really be applied effectively to hum an nature, as Skinner holds
that they could be. As I see it, this belief o f Skinner’s is vitiated by an
inner contradiction. A technology of hum an behavior would be prac
ticable only if it were true th a t behavior is wholly determined by heredity
and environment and if it were also true th at techniques could be devised
for m anipulating a hum an being’s genetic endow m ent and his social
setting. But, if hum an freedom is truly an illusion, no hum an being
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would be free to plan and carry out the requisite biological and social
“ engineering.” The blind cann ot lead the blind, and a camel cannot lead
a string of camels. Experience has proved th a t a donkey is needed to
do that.
I therefore believe that the behaviorists’ objective is unattainable.
H u m a n behavior seems to me to be determined partially, but only
partially, by forces outside the hu m an being himself. I part com pany
with the behaviorists over their belief th a t behavior is wholly and ex
clusively determined by heredity and environment.
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7
Behaviorism's
Enlightened Despotism
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C haim Perelman
Chaim Perelman, professor o f philosophy at the Université de

Bruxelles, is author o f Justice and The New Rhetoric, as well as o f
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numerous earlier works.
Continuing the philosophical evaluation o f Beyond Freedom and
Dignity, Perelman finds Skinner's arguments unconvincing. H e objects
particularly to Skinner's thesis that m an's environment, not man
himself, is responsible f o r his actions. Perelman suggests that, in a
Skinnerian utopia, responsibility would be held by those who could
transform the environment to condition their fe llo w men, and finds the
prospect o f a “behavioral scientist's enlightened despotism " frightening.
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In Beyond Freedom and D ignity, Skinner presses his behaviorist views to
their extreme consequences. His answers to the philosophical problems
that his views raise are not philosophically convincing. In order to show
this, I propose to analyze m ore closely some crucial points concerning
his conception of value judgments.
Let us look at this text: “ To make a value ju d g m en t by calling som e
thing good or bad is to classify it in terms of its reinforcing effects”
[p. 105].1 Or,
'T h rou gh ou t this paper, page num bers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s
Beyond Freedom and Dignity (A lfred A. K n op f, 1971).

122 CHAIM PERELMAN
When we say that a value judgment is a matter not of fact but of how some
one feels about a fact, we are simply distinguishing between a thing and its
reinforcing effect. Things themselves are studied by physics and biology,
usually without reference to their value, but the reinforcing effects of
things are the province of behavioral science, which, to the extent that it is
concerned with operant reinforcement, is a science of values.
Things are good (positively reinforcing) or bad (negatively reinforcing)
presumably because of the contingencies of survival under which the species
evolved [p. 104],
Behavioral science is thus the science of efficacious values (operant

reinforcement), philosophy being reduced to the study of inefficacious
conditioning. Only by divesting philosophy o f the fiction of m a n ’s
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auton om y will we be able to build an efficient science of values, to pass
“ from the inaccessible to the m anipulable” [p. 201]. Thus, instead of
reasoning ab o u t freedom and dignity, ab o u t justice and fairness, we
should turn “ to good husbandry in the use of reinforcers” [p. 125].
Consequently, if, in conformity with Skinner’s ideas, we wish to know
whether he has written a good book, we must not ask whether his
argum entation is close and coherent, whether he is not m aking a c o n
fusion about the notion of value itself by reducing it to psychological
states, whether he is not himself introducing value judgm ents of a
nature other than that of those he has defined ; rather we must ask who
has been reinforced by reading the book. The answer is clear: the
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behavioral scientist—he who, relying on efficacy only, becomes the
great m anipulator of m ankind by neglecting “ weak methods of control,”
which do not depend on individuals but on other conditions [p. 99].
The a utho r will not be surprised if those o f us who are not behavior-
ists are not convinced by the argum entation in his book, for he was
only presenting us “ weak m ethods of con trol.” If he wanted to be sure
of convincing us, he ought to have conditioned us so as to m ake us
feel the same sense of power that his book is supposed to give behavior-
ists [see the “ wonderful possibilities” he mentions on p. 214].
Every military leader who has to fight an u rba n guerilla or a resistance
movement cann ot avoid facing the problem of torture. M ust he use the
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most efficacious means, including torture, in order to get information?
The idea of hum an dignity may somehow keep him from using the most
cruel means, but why hesitate if they are indeed the most efficient means?
Why should a doctor be restrained by medical deontology and hesitate
to send men th at are sane but opposed to the régime into lunatic asylums?
If he does hesitate, the men in power may well use some “ bad rein
forcers” on him, and he will think that he is fighting chimeras. The idea
of responsibility seems to be a metaphysical construction that has no
counterpart in reality, when everything is a m atter of more or less

Behaviorism's Enlightened Despotism 123
efficacious conditioning. According to Skinner, man is not responsible

for his actions: “ A scientific analysis shifts both the responsibility and
the achievement to the environm ent” [p. 25]. It is difficult to grasp
what this means, if not t h a t —“ the contingencies of actio n” being alone
efficacious—a change of behavior can only be obtained by working not
on the person but on the factors that condition his reactions. However,
when it comes to “ responsibility” and “ achievement,” the responsible
agent will not be the environment, but those th at have the power to
transform it, while the behavioral scientist indicates in which direction
it ought to be changed. In the behaviorist’s outlook, the latter replaces
the philosopher as auxiliary to the men in power. However, as a matter
of fact, he will only be a tool for them. The ends of action will be deter
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mined not by him but by those having authority to m anipulate him by
all sorts of “ reinforcements” in order to rew ard or to punish him.
Indeed, the point is to know who will m anipulate whom and to what
end [p. 25].
We may wonder who will still bother a b o u t “ good reasons” [p. 137].
The main thing is not to present what is true or right but what is expected
to reinforce the sense o f well-being of those whom one addresses.
Skinner defines a better world as one “ that would be liked by those who
live in it because it has been designed with an eye to what is, or can be,
most reinforcing” [p. 164].
But men yearn for immortality, and the ideas of an everlasting salva
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tion or everlasting punishment in Hell have always seemed highly
“ reinforcing” for the bulk of mankind. So why not favor all efficacious
myths, whether they.be religious myths, the myth of the superiority of
a race, or th a t o f the dictature o f the working class? Should we object
to those myths because they are not in conformity with truth, as Skinner
seems to suggest when he mentions an “ explanatory fiction” [p. 201]?
He has, no doubt, been badly conditioned himself, for the value of
truth consists solely in the way in which it serves as a “ positive rein
forcem ent.” If the myth is well-designed for our aims, the belief in it
m ust be spread by conditioning men to accept it as true. The only
criterion of a value being the way men “ feel a bo ut it,” they must be
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conditioned accordingly. If Skinner does not agree, it must be because
he has been conditioned by a decadent society that rejects traditional
values for the sake o f an ideal of scientific truth. He should be taught
his lesson by being sent to one of those camps where they use brainwash
ing techniques, such as Plato proposed in the Laws more than twenty-
three centuries ago.
It may be th a t Skinner is right and that all ideas of liberty, dignity,
truth, and justice are the result of centuries of conditioning with the aim
of leading men away from the anim al tradition that was originally

124 CHAIM PERELMAN
theirs. But then traditional education has, before him, done no more
than ad op t those methods th a t appeared most efficient for the sur
vival of mankind. Such methods may not be objected to in the name
of truth but only on account of their inefficacy. Should we say that
efficacy is the only consideration that m atters when it comes to action?
If so, why stop at behavioral techniques of reinforcement? Why not
use still stronger manipulations, such as those presented by Aldous
Huxley in Brave New W orld?
Actually, Skinner undertakes to show us that the m ethods he adv o
cates could lead m ankind towards “ wonderful possibilities.” W hy not
towards “ frightening possibilities?” In the course of history, all types
of conditioning have been used by the men in power in order to get
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their subjects to submit. W hy should it be otherwise in this case?
Skinner is guilty of supposing erroneously th a t values express what
men feel, not what they should feel when they are faced with certain
situations. Values are normative. However, though we all agree that
truth, justice, and happiness are values, we do not, by any means, agree
abo ut the way in which they are to be interpreted in particular situations.
W hen disagreement crops up in this respect, are there reasons why
Skinner should resist suppressing it by conditioning the opponents, by
giving them drugs, or by submitting them to a lobotom y so as to render
them less aggressive? We know plenty of means to get rid of our o p p o
nents, but the advancem ent of civilization consists in a desire to convince
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them by arguments instead of by some kind of conditioning; this has
been the age-old ambition of philosophy. I do not think the m ethods he
advocates can solve the fundam ental problem concerning which methods
to use when men disagree ab out what ends to aim at in real situations.
Does he suggest th at we replace the various political systems, m o n a r
chies, oligarchies, or democracies by the behavioral scientist’s enlight
ened despotism?
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8
Some Aversive Responses
to a Would-be Reinforcer
Max Black
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M a x Black is Sage Professor o f Philosophy and H um ane L etters and
a senior m em ber o f the Program on Science, Technology, and Society
at Cornell University. Black is the author o f Models and M etaphors,
The Labyrinth o f Language, and M argins o f Precision. H e is a past
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president o f the American Philosophical Association.
Here is a philosopher's a ttack on Skinner's theories. Black finds
Skinner incoherent and dismisses Beyond Freedom and Dignity as a
“melange o f amateurish metaphysics, self-advertising ‘technology,’
and illiberal social policy [which] adds up to a document that is a
disservice to scientists, technologists, and to all who are seriously trying
to improve the human condition.”
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The spectacle of a convinced determinist urging his readers to save the
hum an race is bound to be som ewhat comic. But Skinner is very much
in earnest in his latest book, and no traces of the irony and self-depreca
tion that occasionally enlivened Walden Two are here allowed to mollify
the urgency of a call to behavioristic salvation. F o r “ we have the physi
cal, biological and behavioral technologies ‘to save ourselves’; the
problem is how to get people to use them ” [p. 158, emphasis add e d ].1
T h r o u g h o u t this paper, page num bers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s
Beyond Freedom and Dignily (A lfred A. K n op f, 1971).

126 MAX BLACK
T h at a requisite “ technology of behavior” [p. 5] is already at our disposal

may be doubted. I shall discuss later whether Skinner can say, c o n
sistently with his own principles, that we should work to achieve such
a technology.
Skinner’s call to action, if that is what it is, is m arred by endemic
ambiguity, repeatedly manifested in his uses of the key terms of his
vocabulary of exhortation. Thus, survival, according to him, demands
“ c on tro l” of the “ environm ent” ; but equivocation upon both of these
terms makes it doubtful whether radical changes are in question.
Consider the following characteristic rem arks: “ A scientific analysis
of behavior dispossesses au to no m o us man and turns the control he has
been said to exert over to the environm ent” [p. 205, emphasis added].
(Here, it should be explained th a t “ a u ton om o us m a n ” refers simply to
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the “ m y th ” of m en ’s responsibility for their actions. We notice that
“ control” is to be assigned, characteristically, to a supposedly impersonal
environment.) “ To refuse to control is to leave control not to the person
himself, but to other parts of the social and non-social environm ent”
[p. 84, emphasis added]. “ When we seem to turn control over to a person
himself, we simply shift from one m ode of control to a n o th e r” [p. 97,
emphasis added]. “ Attacking controlling practices is, of course, a form
of countercontror [p. 181, emphasis added]. “ G o o d government is as
much a matter of the control of hum an behavior as bad, good incentive
conditions as much as exploitation, good teaching as much as punitive
drill” [p. 180, emphasis added]. A nd so on.
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It seems, then, th at “ c o ntro l” is ubiquitous in social relations, and
any attem pt to change oneself or others, whether by conditioning,
persuasion, or argument, is sure to count as “ c ontrol.” In this loose and
obfuscating usage, “ co ntrol” means no more than “ have some effect
up o n ,” and the adm onition to facilitate hum an survival by “ control of
the environm ent” becomes vacuous and som ewhat fatuous, inasmuch
as it urges us to do anything we please, with the assurance th a t we shall
thereby be controlling our environment. O f course, this is emphatically
not Skinner’s intention, as we shall see.
A similar shift from a natural and restricted sense to a vacuously
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inflated one will already have been noticed in connection with the term
“ environm ent.” One might reasonably gloss it as “physical environ
m ent,” because this is the sense th a t Skinner needs, but he repeatedly
renders his call for hum an conditioning persuasive by stretching the
word to cover persons. Thus, “ setting an example” counts as changing
the environment, and counts also, therefore, as controlling those in
fluenced by the example [p. 92]. In this expansive sense, changing others
and ourselves, by whatever means, will count as changing the “ environ
m ent.”

Some Aversice Responses to a Would-be Reinforcer 127
Because “ c o n tro l” and “ environm ent” are used in these reckless ways,
it is not surprising—although, to be sure, it is unintentionally am using—
to find Skinner speaking of the “ c on trol” exercised by a laboratory
animal on his handler. “ His app aratu s exerts a conspicuous control on
the pigeon, but we must not overlook the control exerted by the pigeon.
The behavior of the pigeon has determined the design of the apparatus
and the procedures in which it is used” [p. 169, emphasis added]. It
reminds one of the old jo ke abou t one pigeon boasting to another of
how it had conditioned Skinner to provide food whenever it pecked a
button.
Skinner might seem to have anticipated such objections by admitting
that “ the text will often seem inconsistent” [p. 23]. But he misses the
point when he goes on to say that “ English, like all languages, is full of
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prescientific terms which usually suffice for purposes of casual dis
course.” His own preferred technical terms, being theory-laden only in
a very weak sense, are scarcely more than com m on expressions in fancy
dress (so that a “ response,” for instance, is nothing but a bit of behavior
under a physical description), and he needs the ordinary senses of
“ co ntrol,” “ reinforcement,” and the like for his message to sound
plausible. As for his promise that “ acceptable translations [of ‘men-
talistic expressions’] are not out of reach” [p. 24], we shall see later that
that is merely a bluff.
The increased and more effective control advocated by Skinner is
not merely the taking o f whatever measures may improve society: he
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really intends the special and controversial modes of control known as
“ classical conditioning” and “ operant conditioning,” and especially the
latter. He is able to equate whatever needs to be done with conditioning
because he holds that only conditioning will be effective.
O perant conditioning consists, basically, of the application to animal
subjects of carefully planned schedules of positive or negative “ rein
forcements,” by which the subjects’ favored responses are “ shaped and
m aintained” [p. 169], or “ strengthened,” by being rendered m ore likely
to occur. To such procedures, the term “ con trol,” in its dictionary sense
of “ exercise restraint or direction over,” does apply without dilution or
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extension of meaning. A Skinnerian psychologist, engaged in condition
ing a pigeon or a man, is quite literally shaping, restricting, directing—
in short, controlling—his subject’s responses.
W e must remem ber that, on Skinnerian principles, what the subject
thinks abo ut the routines imposed upon him is causally irrelevant.
(Sometimes, however, Skinner seems willing to adm it the efficacy of the
subject’s “ interpretation” of the situation, with the usual promissory
gesture in the direction of an eventual translation in behavioristic
terms.) Skinner regards serious reference to such allegedly “ mentalistic”

128 MAX BLACK
factors as motive, intention, and the like as being, at best, Aesopian

and, strictly speaking, inadmissible in a truly scientific account. So, it is
reprehensible in the end even to talk abo ut “ m ental” features, and
unw arranted to assign causal efficacy to any of them. The pigeon, we
may presume, cannot reflect upon his conditioning, and if a man under
conditioning knows what is being done to him, that makes no difference
to the administered reinforcements.
Given the postulated irrelevance of the subject’s awareness of his
training, and hence also the irrelevance of his knowledge and consent,
a better label for the procedure would be “involuntary control,” or its
more familiar variant, “ m a nipulation.” Skinner’s true doctrine, barely
veiled by his habitual equivocation, calls for the wholesale manipulation
of hum an beings, willy-nilly, for their own good, or, rather, for the
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survival of the species.
Skinner will retort th a t men are controlled anyhow, whether by
propaganda, the threat of force, education, indoctrination, or love.
Well, all these things affect us, to be sure, but th at hardly am ounts to
control, in the sense of m anipulation. C o m m o n sense would hold th at
men are sometimes m anipulated and sometimes not. The differences,
turning as they do upon the knowledge and consent of those involved,
are crucial. To ignore them is to leave “ c ontrol” without any clear sense.
In its familiar and proper use, “ c on trol” implies a controller or c o n
trollers. Skinner’s right to control pigeons is sanctioned by our society’s
tolerance for scientific research. But who is to choose the G ra n d M a n ip u
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lators of all of us? A nd what is to be their authority to m anipulate us
without our knowledge? This question Skinner repeatedly dodges, by
using his favorite device of speaking of control by the “ environm ent,”
as if the envisaged display of “ reinforcers” were not to be designed and
employed by hidden managers. It is a safe, if somewhat pessimistic,
rule of th u m b that unintended consequences of technological innova
tions are likely to turn out badly. Skinner himself says that “ what is
needed is m ore ‘intentional’ control, not less, and this is an im portant
engineering p roblem ” [p. 177]. He might have added th a t it is also an
im po rtant political and moral problem. F o r if a m anipulator stands
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behind each “ engineered” environment, his moral and political re
straints are of keen interest to his “ subjects.”
Skinner has a short way with the question of control over the social
controllers. He tells us that “ such a technology [the extension of deliber
ate hum an conditioning] is ethically neutral” [p. 150]. Here lurks the old
fallacy that the introduction of “ technology,” even when its hum an
consequences can be reasonably foreseen, is, from the moral standpoint,
neither good or bad. We need some assurance that wholesale condition
ing will not have results as deplorable as the introduction of some

Some Aversive Responses to a Would-be Reinforcer 129
stupefying drug. Skinner says th at “ the great problem is to arrange

effective countercontrol and hence to bring some im portant conse
quences to bear on the behavior of the controller” [p. 171], but he seems
to regard this as a mere technical hitch: he is conveniently vague abou t
who is to exert the requisite “ coun tercon trol” (“ restraint,” in plain
English). F o r the rest, we get the ritual obeisance to democracy: “ In a
democracy the controller is found am ong the controlled, although he
behaves in different ways in the two roles” [p. 172]. Indeed he does, as
the case of Joe M cC arthy m ay remind us. The p rom oter of the G reat
Lie is not deceived (or, if he is, so much the worse) and the controller
of the G reat Social C onditioning Experiment is likely to have enough
sense to stay out of the Skinner box. In evaluating what are, properly
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understood, political proposals, we need specific descriptions of the
envisaged political and social institutions and the restraints under
which they will operate. Faced with Skinner’s skeleton design, we can
only be reasonably sure that m anipulation will be more congenial to an
authoritarian than to an imperfectly democratic form of society—if
only because dictatorships, as we know, pride themselves upo n “ effi
ciency.” Mussolini boasted of m aking the trains run on time; a Skinner
ian dictator may be expected to have all o f us running on time.
As for the allegedly “ scientific” basis for these far-reaching recom
mendations, a lay observer can perhaps do no m ore than register an
impression of implausibly sweeping generalizations from a narrow
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empirical base. Suppose Skinner and his associates to have been c o n
spicuously successful in training pigeons and other experimental animals
—does it reasonably.follow that similar m ethods will be equally effective
with hum an beings? The scope of conditioning may well be wider than
com m on sense suspects, but that is something yet to be established—
and, if necessary, guarded against.
Suspicions of u nw arranted generalization are roused by finding
Skinner using the technical term “ reinforcer” (roughly speaking, any
event that increases the likelihood of occurrence of some associated
item of antecedent behavior) in ways unsanctioned by his own self-
denying methodology. One finds him freely using “ reinforcem ent” for
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social approval (or, strictly speaking, the noises and gestures by which
such approval is expressed), money, friendship, the joy of achievement,
love—indeed, anything that we should ordinarily regard as a reward.
If “ institutions may derive effective reinforcers from events which will
occur only after a person’s d ea th ” [p. 135] (a neat trick, from the stand
point of operant conditioning) we are certainly a long way from the
pigeon in its controlled apparatus. Similar doubts arise when Skinner
claims that “ the accidental appearance of a reinforcer strengthens any
behavior in progress and brings it under the control of current stimuli”

130 MAX BLACK
[p. 176]. T h at what Skinner calls “ superstition” is quite so universal in

its incidence may well be doubted. A nd is there really enough evidence
to show th at “ how people feel abo ut facts is a by-product” [p. 113]?
Does Skinner know this? Does he have reasonable grounds for believing
it? I very much d o ub t it. The extent to which feelings (and intentions,
motives, ideals, and so on) are, in fact, casually effective in particular
situations is a question for detailed empirical investigation. C om m on
sense tells us that feelings sometimes make a difference, sometimes not.
(The anger felt by a father whose child has been killed by a reckless
motorist may move him to commit murder.) Pending the presentation of
relevant evidence to the contrary, uninstructed com m on sense may
reasonably continue to tell us th a t what men feel and believe does often
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m ake a substantial difference, and is not a mere “ by-product.”
When scientists, professionally committed to cautious and well-hedged
hypotheses, indulge in universal generalizations th at denigrate entire
categories o f entities as fictions, one may well suspect some metaphysical
bias. T hat Skinner has such a bias against “ m entalism” is abundantly
clear from his writings. Consider such a revealing rem ark as: “ The world
of the mind steals the show. Behavior is not recognized as a subject in
its own right” [p. 12]. Can the original sin of “ m entalism” be that it
sets bounds to the inferences draw n from empirical associations between
what have been called “ colorless m ovem ents” ? A t any rate, extensive
debates in the past between behaviorists and their philosophical o p p o
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nents have made it very clear that science cannot, on the basis of the
historical record of scientific achievement, be identified with the mere
correlation of observables: the introduction of suitable theoretical
terms, ultimately but only indirectly linked with observation, deserves
to be regarded as of the essence of scientific m ethod. Skinner’s inveterate
propensity to identify his favored m ethodology with “ scientific analysis”
is simply unacceptable. There is also, by now, an impressive body of
testimony to the severe difficulties th a t m ust be overcome by anybody
committed to behavioristic translations of the com monplaces of ordinary
life, for which such terms as “ intention,” “ goal,” “ attitude,” and
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“ feeling” still seem indispensable.
The last point is amusingly illustrated by Skinner’s exercises in tra n s
lating some “ mentalistic” assertions. The assertion th at “ there is nothing
he [a college student] wants to do or enjoys doing well, he has no sense
of leading a purposeful life, no sense of accom plishm ent” is to be
translated, according to Skinner, as “ he is rarely reinforced for doing
anything” [p. 147]. (The man in question might console himself by the
reflection that reinforcement of some sort is always in progress, as we
have seen.) “ H e feels guilty or asham ed ” becomes “ he has previously
been punished for idleness or failure, which now evokes emotional

responses” [p. 147]; and “ he experiences an identity crisis” is p a ra

phrased as “ he does not recognize the person he once called ‘I ’ ” [p.
147]. One wonders what this unfortunate man (like the old woman in
the nursery rhyme who complained “ This is none of I” ) now calls the
person he once called “ I.” Does he perhaps refer to himself as “ H e ” —
or even as “K ”7 Skinner disarmingly says that the “ paraphrases are too
brief to be precise” [p. 147]. Well, some of them d o n ’t even have the
charm of brevity. There are weighty reasons for thinking th at no such
paraphrases, long or short, will be satisfactory, and that the vocabulary
of ordinary life and literature has a genuine point.
Given Skinner’s theoretical com m itm ent to behaviorese—or at least
to ordinary language that is to be ultimately translated into the new
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ja r g o n —it is perhaps unsurprising to find him belittling what he pejora
tively calls “ the literature of freedom and dignity” (that is to say, any
discourse that im putes responsibility and choice). It is, however, dis
concerting to find him displaying such open and steady animus against
what, under a more persuasive description, is merely the com m on
language of ordinary life, literature, and history. (After all, the members
of Walden Two were great readers.) H ow are we to explain such rem arks
as “ [There is a] th reat posed by the literature o f freedom and dignity”
[p. 177]? Perhaps the answer is to be found in the following rem ark:
What we may call the literature of dignity is concerned with preserving due
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credit. It may oppose advances in technology, including a technology of
behavior, because they destroy chances to be admired and a basic analysis
because it offers an alternative explanation of behavior for which the
individual himself has previously been given the credit [pp. 58-59],
So the prime mistake made by humanists is to attach blame and praise

(“ credit” ) to persons. We might say, on Skinnerian principles, that the
fault is not in ourselves, dear Brutus, but in our reinforcers. That we are
on the right track is shown by another rem ark: “ A scientific analysis
shifts the credit as well as the blame to the environment, and traditional
practices can then no longer be justified” [p. 21]. Or, again: “ It is in the
nature of an experimental analysis o f hum an behavior th a t it should
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strip away the functions previously assigned to a u to no m ous man and
transfer them one by one to the controlling environm ent” [p. 198]. Here
is that ostensibly impersonal “ environm ent” again, presented now as a
bearer of praise and blame. Skinner might more consistently have placed
praise and blame on the index. (I seem to recollect that nobody praises,
blames, or even gives thanks in Walden Two.) Once the myth of personal
responsibility has been rejected as superstitition, not even the c o n
trollers can count as responsible. F o r this is what is really at stake in
Skinner’s polemic against the humanistic standpoint. It is disingenuous,

132 MAX BLACK
on his part, to depict the “ literature of dignity and freedom” as a device

for flattering its readers, for he knows as well as all of us how often the
teachings of history and literature have been derogatory and pessimistic.
T he blunder of humanism, according to him, is to hold men to account
for their deeds. It would be interesting to hear a good, or even a per
suasive, argum ent th at absolved Skinner from responsibility for the book
under discussion.
Skinner claims th at purging the “ m y th ” of responsibility (my de
scription, not his) will be a step forward.
What is being abolished is autonomous man—the inner man, the homun

culus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literature of freedom
and dignity. His abolition is long overdue.. . . Science does not de-humanize
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man, it de-homunculizes him, and it must do so if it is to prevent the
abolition of the human species [p. 200].
Here, at least, is one place in which Skinner agrees that ideas (the
myth o f responsibility) m ake a difference. W ould it be “ a step forw ard”
[p. 215] to be in a “ behavioral environm ent” arranged by skillful hidden
manipulators, in which the very language of responsible action had been
expunged by effective conditioning? W ould this be a sanitary removal
of some obfuscating myth? We might justifiably regard the end product
as a dehumanization, in which men were no longer accorded the dignity
o f being treated as persons. A world of well-controlled bodies emitting
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physical movements in response to secret reinforcements, might perhaps
seem hardly worth preserving. It may, after all, be better to be dead
than b re d —like cattle.
T h ro u g h o u t these comments, I have been regarding Skinner as a
reformer who offers adm onitions having the form, “ You (we) should
do such an d such.” T h a t he does wish to “ co ntrol” us in this way
seems plain enough. Given the inconsistency of his language, it is hard
to determine whether he really wants us to do much or little. But let
us suppose th a t he does wish his readers to approve of certain actions,
and to work toward th e m —perhaps by instituting managers trained in
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Skinnerian conditioning techniques and licensed to condition all o f us
to the hilt. Call the advocated actions A. Then how, from the perspective
of a radical behaviorism, are we to understand the admonition “ You
should do A ” ? F o r it is not, on the face o f it, a statement of fact of the
sort th at Skinner admits.
Skinner provides us with the materials for an answer when he says
that we might translate a “ value ju d g m e n t” of the form “ You should
(you ought to) tell the tr u th ” into “ If you are reinforced by the approval
of your fellow men, you will be reinforced when you tell the tr u th ”
[p. 112]. Because the reference to truth-telling is only illustrative, we

may take it that, in urging us to do A, Skinner would be content to have

us understand him as saying “ If you are reinforced by the approval of
your fellow men, you will be reinforced when you do A ." Taken as a
conditional statement, this last statement may well be false. Even the
parallel behavioristic surrogate for the injunction to tell the truth is
false, if it refers to the reinforcement o f all “ fellow m en,” because lying
is approved by thieves, schoolboys, advertisers, and politicians, am ong
others. The co m m an dm ent should presumably be relativized to ru n:
“ If you are reinforced by those who approve o f truth-telling, you will
be reinforced when you tell the tru th .”
T o which one wants to reply, “ O f course!” The translation proposed
is saved from tautology only by the weak presupposition that the man
addressed will, in fact, be in the presence o f those who approve of
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truth-telling. G r a n t that, and the truth of the conditional follows at
once. In that form, it can be cheerfully affirmed, by habitual truth-
tellers and liars alike. A nanias (Acts 5:1-10) might readily have agreed
that, i f he was reinforced by the approval of the approvers of veractiy,
he would try, like other liars, to appear as a truth-teller in the presence
of veracity-approvers. But A nanias might have been negatively rein
forced by the approval o f veracity-approvers, preferring the approval
of his wife Sapphira. Given the falsity of the antecedent in the doctored
com m and, it then gets no grip upon h im —which is perhaps why Peter
needed to intervene with so drastic a negative reinforcement. In this
example, Skinner seeks to reduce the motive force of the “ should,” in
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a way th a t is clearly unsuccessful, to a hypothetical prediction a b ou t
the effects of other persons’ approval.
We are entitled to make parallel responses to Skinner’s own recom
mendations, on his own interpretation of what he is saying. “ If you
are reinforced by the approval of those who approve my reco m m end a
tions, you will follow th em .” I think I am not deceiving myself in
claiming not to be “ reinforced” by Skinner’s recom m endations or by
the approval of those who agree with him, but rather the reverse. So,
I can agree with his hypothetical prediction—and do nothing at all.
It would be wrong to suppose that this argum ent ad hominem dis
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proves the possibility of some more sophisticated behavioristic reduction
of “ should” statements. But the most plausible candidates for naturalis
tic interpretations of such statements invoke the concept of attitude,
which is beyond Skinner’s behavioristic ken. E nough has been shown,
I think, to dem onstrate the incoherence of Skinner’s position.
Such incoherence can be found throu gh out the book. Skinner’s
arbitrary identification of science with the procedures of operant c o n
ditioning, his unsupported and dogmatic rejection of the notion of
human responsibility and, hence, of hum an agency, his extravagant

134 MAX BLACK
testimonials to a “ behavioral technology,” which is, I am confident,

still no more than a future th r e a t—all this mélange of amateurish m eta
physics, self-advertising “ technology,” and illiberal social policy adds
up to a docum ent that is a disservice to scientists, technologists, and to
all who are seriously trying to improve the hum an condition.
If the book has here received more attention than it deserves on its
merits, the excuse may be that it has received wide circulation. In this,
there is little cause for alarm : few of those who buy the book will read
it, fewer still will understand, and even fewer will change their actions
in consequence. If some who favor m anipulation are “ reinforced” by
Skinner’s approval, that need not disturb us much, either, because those
who wish to manipulate and dominate can always find some “justifica
tio n ” or other when they think it politic, even while they decry the very
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notion of justification as an absurdity.
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9
Can Any Behavior
Be Conditioned?
Robert Rosen
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Robert R osen, a visiting fello w at the Center f o r the Study o f
Democratic Institutions, is a theoretical biologist at M ichigan State
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University and author o f Optimality Principles in Biology and
Dynamical Systems Theory in Biology.
Rosen's chapter introduces a group o f analyses by scholars whose
work is in system s analysis. They apply the assumptions and
procedures o f their disciplines to evaluate operant conditioning and
behaviorism fr o m the standpoint o f producing a coherent model o f
human behavior. Rosen exam ines the question o f whether the behavior
o f any system can be conditioned so that it will respond to stimulus in a
predictable way. H e concludes that a technology “based on
conditioning alone is m ost unlikely to accomplish the good results that
Skinner expects o f it; [and] that these results can only be accomplished
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by an appropriate combination o f . . . technologies.”
The thrust of Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and D ignity is, as I understand

it, to offer an intelligent lay readership a glimpse of the kind of “ be
havioral technology” that, he argues, must be developed and im ple
mented if the serious problems facing us as a society are to be solved.
Such a behavioral technology, like any other technology, must rest upon

136 ROBERT ROSEN
an underlying science (in this case, “ behavioral science” ) th a t specifies

the scope and limitations of the technology. Skinner and his school
have been attem pting to develop a set of foundations for such a be
havioral science over the past several decades.
Any behavioral science—and, more particularly, any behavioral tech
nology—is bound to raise a host of im portan t questions of social,
political, philosophical, and scientific nature. This is particularly true of
Skinner’s work, for he clearly articulates a num ber of serious incom
patibilities between the ideas he advocates and some of the prevailing
and deeply held convictions of im portant elements of our society. M ost
of these, im portant as they are, will no t be considered in this essay, but
will be left to others more com petent to deal with them in their full
generality. Instead, I will concentrate on some o f the purely scientific
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implications underlying Professor Skinner’s app roach to be'havioral
problems. In particular, I shall be concerned with analyzing the basic
concept that underlies Professor Skinner’s work: the concept o f be
havior.
The word “ behavior,” like so many other im po rtant words in the
biological and social sciences, defies exact definition; it cannot be
defined formally, but only ostensively. However, unlike most other
im portant ostensively defined concepts, such as “ living,” “ regulation,”
and “ fitness,” it is difficult to give examples of things that are not
behavior in some sufficiently broad sense. As with the word “ system”
to which it is conceptually closely related (because, speaking roughly,
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behavior is what systems do), it is a word of exceptionally broad seman
tic field, and, as such, it is more than usually difficult to speak about it
in useful scientific terms. M ost of the analysis th at follows is aimed at
narrowing the kinds of system properties we want to call “ behavior”
down to the point where it is possible to say sound and meaningful
things a b ou t them.
To do this, it is necessary to specify a definite set of processes, occur
ring in a well-defined class of systems (large enough to be of interest),
and identify these processes with the behaviors of the systems in the
class. In this way, “ behavior” becomes a meaningful concept, relative
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to that class of systems, and its properties can be investigated in detail
and with rigor. (It is, of course, always possible to argue that the word
“ behavior” should be applied to system processes other than those we
have chosen, but this is a m atter of detail; the strategy of approach
remains the same.) Indeed, this is the strategy that was employed in the
creation of a quantitative and powerful physical science out o f its
ostensively defined precursors, and is today being employed to do the
same for biology.
It may be helpful to give a specific example of the way in which this

Can Any Behavior Be Conditioned? 137
kind of approach works, in an area close to that considered by Skinner.

This example concerns our attem pts to formalize and understand the
basis of biological m emory (where “ m em ory” itself is, of course, another
im portant ostensively defined concept). In its broadest terms, we may
say that a system exhibits mem ory if its past experience can modify its
future behavior. As such, we can identify the ostensively defined con
cept of “ m em ory” concretely in many different classes of systems. For
instance, any physical system that exhibits hysteresis can meaningfully be
said to possess a mem ory; by making the identification of the ostensive
term “ m em ory” with the precisely defined term “ hysteresis,” we can
inquire into the detailed mechanisms of mem ory within the class, and
actually use the knowledge thus obtained to devise valuable technologies
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(most com puter “ m emories” involve hysteresis in an essential way). Or,
in the class of neural nets, we can consider any network with a regenera
tive loop as intuitively possessing a “ m em ory,” and identify the ostensive
term “ m em o ry” with the properties of such loops. The mechanisms by
which these two kinds of “ m em ory ” work are entirely different in the
two classes (and in the m any other similar classes that could be p ro
posed), but, in each of them, the term has a precise meaning from which
precise conclusions can be draw n; the problem o f “ biological m em ory,”
then, reduces to a technical question of showing that the biological
systems of interest fall into one or another of the classes we have de
fined, in such a way that the biological behaviors we intuitively call
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“ m em ory ” can be identified with the corresponding precisely defined
concept in the classs. O f course, a certain a m o un t of care must be taken
in such studies; we cannot, for example, learn ab o u t the mechanisms of
hysteresis by studying loops in neural nets, and, indeed, much nonsense
has been generated by extrapolations to other properties of classes of
systems merely because a word such as “ m em o ry” can be attached to
certain of their particular properties.
All this is im portant because it is tempting to generalize ab out osten
sively defined te rm s—to say, for example, that “ memory is an adaptive
response,” or that “ memories inevitably decay.” It is clear that asser
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tions like these may sometimes be true and sometimes false—th at is,
there are classes of systems for which, under the identifications made
between the ostensively defined terms of interest and the specific p rop er
ties of the systems in the class, the assertion becomes true, and there
are other classes of systems for which the assertion is false.
Returning now to the Skinnerian treatm ent of “ behavior,” and in
particular to the generation of technologies for the control of behavior,
we find a parallel situation to that ju st outlined for “ m em ory.” Indeed,
the entire thrust of the proposed technologies o f behavior arises from
a generalization implicit in Beyond Freedom and D ignity— namely, that

138 ROBERT ROSEN
any behavior can be conditioned. (Actually, this generalization is rather

stronger than necessary, as will be discussed below; however, it certainly
implies anything th at Skinner would want for his technologies, and, in
any event, the same kinds of arguments as I shall employ would also
be valid for any weaker assertion). It should now be clear, however,
that a generalization o f this kind must take the form of an existence
argument within well-defined classes of systems, which may hold for
some classes and fail for others. In the next two sections, we shall
consider examples of both types; the final section will be devoted to
the possible implications of this state of affairs for behavioral technolo
gies in general, considered from a general system-theoretic perspective.
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“ B eh aviors” T h a t C a n n o t Be C o n d itio n e d
MODEL I
Let us begin by defining a family of elementary units. These units will

be capable of receiving inputs (“ stimuli” ) from the environment, and
will be capable at any instant of time of producing one of two alternate
outputs (“ responses” ), which will be called on and off'. Such a unit might
be diagrammed as follows:
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The input lines themselves may be of two types, either excitatory or
inhibitory. If an excitatory line is on at a given instant of time (that is,
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if it is actually carrying an input), it is assigned a weight of 1; if an
inhibitory line is on at a given instant, it is assigned a weight of — 1; if
either kind of line is off at a given instant, it is assigned a weight of zero.
An elementary unit produces an on response at time t + 1 if, and only
if, the sum of the weights of the input lines at time t is greater than zero;
otherwise, the unit is off at time t + 1.
These elementary units can be assembled into a variety of networks
by attaching the input lines of some of the units to the outpu t lines of
other units. A behavior of such a network is the response pattern of a

particular family of the units in the network at a given instant. A simple

network is shown in the following diagram :
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The + denotes an excitatory line; the —, an inhibitory line. Let us
consider the behaviors of this network when the line R' is on: Can we
condition this behavior, in the sense of finding sequences of input stimuli
Si, So th a t will always produce the behavior in question? It may be
easily seen from the diagram that, although the on response of R> is
possible, it will extinguish itself immediately th rou gh the inhibitory loop.
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This network may be made more realistic through the use of co n
tinuously variable responses R u R-2 , instead of the all-or-none units we
have employed. In this case, the same network will find it harder and
harder to express the behavior R2\ the more it is stimulated to do so,
the faster the behavior R 2 will disappear. It is, therefore, a network that
c annot be conditioned to exhibit this behavior through any manipulation
of environmental stimuli.
The network in question is not simply an artificially contrived system
designed not to be conditionable. It is, in fact, a network th at was
originally developed as an example of a system th at “ learns” the be
havior Ri. If we call the basic units in these networks neurons, or neuro
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elements, we have, in neural terms, an example of how simple kinds of
“ learning behavior” can arise. It is also interesting to observe that
exactly the same network (with the units called operons) was inde
pendently proposed as an example of how one o f two alternate modes
of genetic expression could be exhibited without any loss of genetic
information. It thus appears to be a com m on type of system organization
in biological systems, manifesting itself at m any different levels of
biological organization.

140 ROBERT ROSEN
T o give these examples some neuristic content, let us suppose that the
response Ri corresponds to a kind of behavior we would call “ agressive,”
and the response R 2 corresponds to a kind of behavior we would call
“ pacific” or “ nonaggressive.” U nder these circumstances, we would
never be able to condition the pacific response, nor could we cause the
aggressive response to fail to be expressed, by any schedule of reinforce
ment. U n der all circumstances, the pacific response will more or less
gradually become extinguished (a result m ore or less in accord with
what has been learned by observing aging mammals).
MODEL II
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Skinner has drawn interesting parallels between the selection o f be
havior by a conditioning environment and the selection of biological
properties (through natural selection) by environments favoring p a r
ticular types of adaptation. In this class of evolving systems, “ behavior”
takes the form of adaptive responses of biological structure or function,
or both, to the particular environmental circumstances. However,
there are many clearly evolutionary behaviors that cannot arise through
the translation of simple reinforcement ideas to the context of evolving
systems. A particularly interesting one is that of a species of insect
possessing two generations a year—a winter generation and a summer
generation. These generations alternate; the winter generation consists
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of the offspring of the summer generation, and vice versa. Their modes
of life are naturally quite different, and each generation is adapted to the
appropriate climate. However, it is clear that such an adaptation of
alternate generations could not arise through ordinary Darwinian selec
tion mechanisms: if the adaptation, say, to warm summ er were heredi
tarily transm itted to the offspring of the sum mer generation, it would
render them totally unfit for winter existence; indeed, the better the
adaptation to the climate in which a particular generation finds itself,
the faster the species would become extinct. Thus, the classical D a r
winian behavior must be selected against in this case (note, for formal
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similarity, the self-extinguishing loop in the previous example). Examples
of this kind could be multiplied at great length.
Thus, we have at our disposal at least two classes of systems that are
biologically significant and realistic, systems in which a reasonable
identification of system “ behavior” in the class leads us to kinds of
behavior that cannot be conditioned. Indeed, in evolutionary biology,
it is frequently the rule that, once a certain kind of “ behavior” has been
selected for (that is, once the evolving organism has become specialized
to survive in a particular set of environmental circumstances) it can no
longer adapt to other environments, and a chage of environments be

comes lethal and leads to extinction. In behavioral terms, this means that
certain kinds of behaviors, once conditioned, lead to an irreversible loss
of other kinds of behaviors, even thou gh these other behaviors might be
essential to survival in a different set of circumstances. This possibility,
if it is manifested in the kinds of systems with which Skinner wishes to
deal, would raise im portant limitations for any behavioral technology
we might wish to construct within the class; and, inasmuch as this seems
to be a general property of biological evolution, we might expect it to be
true of hum an behavior as well, because this, too, has evolved.
Returning to the example o f aggressive versus pacific responses in the
present evolutionary context, it is possible to envision a class of processes
in which the selection of aggressive behavior causes irreversible loss of the
capacity to exhibit pacific behavior, and vice versa. N ote that this class
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of evolutionary models differs significantly in interpretation from the
class considered in the first model. The first model dealt essentially with
a developmental process, considering the changes occurring in a single
individual in the course o f real time. The second model, as an evolution
ary model, deals rather with changes occurring in populations of o rgan
isms in an evolutionary context. Despite the m any formal similarities
between evolutionary and developmental processes (expressed by the
famous phrase “ ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” ), the exact relations
between the two kinds o f processes are far from clear. The point is
simply that the same kind of extinction o f behavior, with corresponding
loss of conditioning ability, arises in both contexts.
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MODEL III
In the previous section, we gave examples of classes of systems for

which it was false to say th at any behavior could be conditioned. It is
equally instructive to seek classes of systems for which this im portant
generalization actually is true. I can think of only one such class;
because this class is also of interest for m any other reasons, it may be
worthwhile to briefly describe it.
An algorithm is a recipe or set of rules for accomplishing a particular
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task. M any mathem atical procedures are algorithmic in character, such
as the ones we all use for obtaining the square ro o t of a num ber or the
quotient of two numbers. M any other com m on procedures are also
algorithmic, such as constructing a building from a blueprint, or playing
m any kinds of games. Typically, an algorithm provides a rote or can on i
cal way for solving all the problems in a particular well-defined class of
problems. A class of problems for which an algorithm can be constructed
that solves them all is called effectively solvable, and any process that
can be put into algorithmic form is called effective.

142 ROBERT ROSEN
The English m athematician A. M. Turing was interested in whether

certain simply statable problems in num ber theory were effectively
solvable or not. To investigate this question, he invented a class of
formal machines that now bear his name, the so-called Turing machines.
He based his constructions on abstractions from the way in which
human beings perform numerical com putations (and, of course, other
mental processes as well). F o r this reason, his machines have found a
central place in the literature of “ artificial intelligence” and “ self
organization.”
A Turing machine consists of a device (the reading head) that can be
in one of a finite num ber of internal states at any instant of time. Serving
as the environment of the machine is a tape (which, in theory, could be
infinitely long) divided into squares. On this tape there can be initially
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printed any string of symbols (such a string is called a word) taken from
a finite set that constitutes the machine’s input alphabet. The machine
scans one square of the tape at a time, and can take a variety of actions,
depending on the symbol it is scanning at a given instant and its own
internal state at th at instant: ( 1) the machine can erase the original
symbol and print another symbol on the scanned square; (2) the machine
can move the tape any num ber of squares to the left or right; or (3) the
machine can change its own internal state. The rules governing these
operations constitute the program of the machine. The fact that the
machine can move its tape to the left or right means, in effect, that it
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has access to what it has already done, and can use this information to
decide what to do next.
It turns out that the Turing machines can carry out any effective
process and, conversely, any effective process can be carried out by an
appropriately program m ed Turing machine. The Turing machines are
thus, in a sense, the most general kinds of machines that can be built.
Two im portant theorems about Turing machines will have a bearing on
our subsequent discussion:
1) There exist (simple) classes of problems that are not effectively

solvable—that is, for which no Turing machine can be programmed to
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solve every problem in the class. Thus, there are (many) things that
Turing machines cannot do. This result is closely related to K u rt G od el’s
celebrated theorem abo ut completeness and consistency of an axiom
system.
2) To each Turing machine, T, we can uniquely assign a numerical

index; we can denote by Tn the machine associated with the number n.
We can describe the operation of Tn by specifying, for any initial word

w written on the tape, what the corresponding output word is—that is,
what is written on the tape when the machine has stopped. This output
word can be denoted by Tn(w). T uring’s most im po rtant theorem is the
following: There exists a Turing machine U such that, if the input tape
to U has written on it the word wn (that is, if the machinc U scans first
the index n and then the word h>) we will have U(wn) = Tn(w), for all
indices n and all words u\ Such a machine U is called a universal Turing
m achine; if we give a Universal machine a description (the index n) of
any particular Turing machine, then U will imitate the com putations of
the particular machine.
N o w there are many different aspects of the T uring machine’s d ynam i

cal organization that can reasonably be called the “ behavior” of the
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machine. We can, for instance, call the “ behavior” of the machine the
total correspondence between whole input words and their c orrespond
ing output words: or we can call the “ behavior” of the machine the
specific action it takes when it scans a particular input symbol: or we
can look, instead of at the output words, at the corresponding sequence
of internal states. Perhaps the most natural selection is to identify the
alphabet symbols with our stim uli, and the corresponding action of the
machine as the response to a given stimulus. The problem of conditioning
then becomes: Is there an input sequence to a particular Turing machine
such that, subsequent to the scanning of that sequence, the machine will
always respond to a stimulus with a preassigned response?
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The answer to this question is clearly “ n o ” for arbitrary Turing
machines, but it is “ yes” for universal T uring machines; for there is
certainly a specific Turing machine that always gives the desired re
sponse upon seeing the proper stimulus. This machine has an index /?;
by showing the universal machine this index and then the stimulus, the
proper behavior will always be forthcoming. Thus, the universal Turing
machines are an example of a set of systems in which Professor Skinner's
hypothesis is true.
Before we turn to a consideration of the implications of these various
examples, it is interesting to note that this very same class of Turing
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machines provides a counterexample to the assertion that any behavior
can be conditioned, if we define “ behavior” to mean a correspondence
between input words and output words. This follows from the existence
of unsolvable problems, which is the first of T uring's theorems stated
above. Thus, even within a given class of systems, the identification of
the ostensive word “ behavior” with a particular kind of system activity
is crucial in ascertaining the validity of propositions concerning it
within the class.

144 ROBERT ROSEN
Im p lic a tio n s fo r B eh av io ral T ech n o lo g y
We have seen, from the examples given above, th at it is far from o b

viously true that “ any behavior can be conditioned.” If this proposi
tion fails, it follows, then, th at there are inherent limitations imposed,
at the outset, on any “ behavioral technology.” F o r instance, some kinds
of “ pacific behavior” we might want to condition may, in fact, fall
outside the class o f conditionable behavior. It m ay be that these limita
tions are not serious, in the sense th a t any kind of behavior that we
might find to be useful is also conditionable; but this proposition is
even more difficult to deal with than the one that we have been examin
ing.
Even if we stay within a class of systems and system behaviors for
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which it is true that any behavior can be conditioned, does it follow
that a useful “ behavioral technology” can be constructed? We shall
now inquire into this question, and we shall see that the answer is “ not
necessarily.” M uch depends on the kinds o f problems that we will
require the technology to solve. T o illustrate this, we shall consider
several kinds of plausible behavioral problems within the class of systems
described in the preceding section, for which we know that any behavior
is conditionable.
1) Can we effectively design a sequence of inputs th at will cause a

universal Turing machine to exhibit a particular behavior? We have not
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yet answered this question affirmatively; all we have shown is th a t there
exists an internal state of the universal machine such that, when the
machine is started in that state, the machine will exhibit its characteristic
imitative activity. In a real behavioral situation, however, we have no
assurance th at the given machine will be in the appropriate initial state.
Thus, we must preface any input word to the universal machine with
another word that will bring it from whatever internal state it happens
to be in to the correct initial state. (This is the form of a standard p ro b
lem in control theory: to bring a system from an arbitrary initial state
to a desired end state at the end of a definite time.) This, in turn, raises
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further problems: (a) can we effectively tell which internal state our
machine is in initially; and (b) does there, in fact, exist a sequence of
inputs that will take our machine from any arbitrary initial state to the
one appropriate to exhibit the required activity? I am prepared to argue
that the problem (a) itself is not effectively solvable; and that, therefore,
even though the behavioral problem (b) is, in principle, solvable in the
class of systems we are dealing with, we cannot be sure we can always
bring our universal Turing machine to the correct initial state, in which
it must be before the conditioning can begin.

Can Any Be/uaior Be Conditioned? 145
In practice, this would mean that the reinforcement schedule required

to condition, say, a pacific rather than an aggressive response must be
prefaced by a separate schedule that will bring the organism being
conditioned from whatever internal state it happens to be in to the cor
rect internal state. This separate prefatory schedule is, in general, a
function o f the organism ’s initial state, and to determine which initial
state the organism is actually in may be a difficult problem. One can
see th at applying a fixed reinforcement schedule when the organism is
in the wrong initial state will not, in general, result in the desired be
havior, and may actually generate the opposite behavior from what is
desired.
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2) Let us suppose that the questions raised in the preceding paragraph
could be disposed of. N ow suppose that, instead of conditioning for a
single behavior, we wish to condition two or more behaviors in such a
way that they do not interfere with each other. Can this always be done
for arbitrary behaviors? N o t in general. Inasm uch as any reasonable
behavioral technology must seek to condition a variety o f behaviors
essentially simultaneously, it follows that the technology can only be
successfully applied in circumscribed situations, which we cann ot be
sure include all the cases of interest.
3) All of the considerations presented thus far pertain to a single
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system. We have seen that, if the given system is in an arbitrary state,
the program required to condition a particular behavior must be
“ custom -tailored” to the initial state. But in any realistic situation for
a behavioral technology, we must deal not with a single machine but
with a population of machines exhibiting a distribution of initial states.
Does there exist an input sequence th at can be presented to every
machine of the population that will simultaneously bring them all to
the required initial state at the end of a definite time? I do not believe
that this kind of question has been investigated, but I strongly suspect
that the answer is “ n o ,” at least in the sense that such an input sequence
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cannot be effectively determined.
4) A behavioral technology must not be concerned so m uch with

conditioning definite behaviors as it is with seeing to it that certain
kinds of behavior never occur. Thus, the question above may perhaps
be rephrased in the following way: Does there exist an input sequence
that can be provided to every machine in a population exhibiting an
arbitrary distribution of initial states such th at particular behaviors are
excluded for all time in every machine of the population? In effect, can
we make every machine in such a population “ forget” the presence of

146 ROBERT ROSEN
certain of its internal states, or, equivalently, those portions of its

programs that involve those states? This is a rather less stringent require
ment than (3) above; again, questions like this do not appear to have
been investigated in detail, but I would conjecture th at the answer to
this question is a qualified affirmative.
The upshot of the above considerations is that the kind of “ behavioral

technology” envisaged by Skinner is liable to be highly circumscribed
in the kinds of things it can do, even under the best of circumstances.
It should be pointed out, however, th a t this envisaged technology
employs a correspondingly circumscribed set of operational techniques.
Using the Turing-machine m etaphor, the operations available to this
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technology involve only a manipulation of the inputs (that is, the
environment) of the machine; the set of internal states and the program
that determines the machine’s activity (which correspond roughly to the
specific wiring of the structures inside the machine) cannot be reached
by such techniques. If we could widen our repertoire of operations on
the machine to include modifications of the state set and the internal
program, we would have at our disposal a much more flexible set of
techniques than simple conditioning schedules can provide. Such tech
niques might involve, for example, the use of chemical agents to selec
tively modify neural pathways, or the modification of underlying genetic
determinants. I would conjecture, on the basis o f the preceding analysis,
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that a technology based on conditioning alone is most unlikely to
accomplish the good results that Skinner expects of it, and th at these
results can be accomplished only by an appropriate combination of a
“ behavioral technology” with other technologies that involves a direct
rewiring of the machinery inside the behavioral “ black box.” And the
problems connected with these technologies are, if anything, orders of
magnitude greater than those raised by “ behavioral technology” itself.
P o stsc rip t
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Much of the heat generated by Skinner’s book, it seems to me, arises
less from the substantive claims m ade by Skinner concerning operant
conditioning as a causal agent in behavior than from Skinner’s further
assertion that the realities of operant conditioning fo rc e us to give up
the idea of a utono m o us internal mental states as a cause of behavior.
Thus, he says (in effect) th at we can only begin to implement operant
conditioning in a systematic way at the expense o f traditional myths of
“ freedom and dignity.” I should like briefly to argue that this whole
argum ent raises a false issue, which has distracted attention from the
real substantive matters raised by Skinner.

Briefly, it seems to me that the language of o perant conditioning, and

the language of “ freedom and dignity” (that is, of real internal states of
mind as a causal agency in behavior), pertain to two different and
distinct discursive levels of explication th a t arise in the discussion of
behavior. It is perfectly possible to use both of them in a meaningful
fashion, without ambiguity or conflict, provided we do not mix them
up, or pretend th at they both refer to the same explicative level. The
existence of such different levels of explication, employing apparently
contradictory modes of discourse, is characteristic of complex, hier
archically organized systems; such systems constantly appear in biology
and hum an sciences, but are unfamiliar in traditional discussion of
systems drawn from physics and engineering.
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A few examples may clarify this point. One can, for example, argue
against Skinner, in the same way th a t he himself has argued against
the level of “ freedom and dignity,” as follows: Every event occurring
in the world has a material, physical basis, and is, therefore, governed
by the laws of physics. These laws are essentially causal laws (even in
quan tu m mechanics) and, therefore, every event in the world is totally
predetermined by the way in which the physical universe was created.
Thus, it is meaningless to talk of “ creating contingencies of reinforce
m e n t” ; in this kind o f determinism, internal states of m in d —and also
the possibility of any event being different from what, in fact, it is—is
denied. Yet one can accept such a thoroughgoing determinism at the
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very lowest level without giving up the capacity for usefully talking
about phenom ena occurring at higher levels—indeed, science does this
all the time. Thus, the fact that contingencies of reinforcement generate
behavior does not imply th at we cannot usefully talk abo ut internal
mental states when it is convenient to do so, any more than N ewtonian
M echanism implies it.
A second example, drawn from physics itself, may also be relevant
here. It is well known that there are at least two different ways in which
we can talk ab out a fluid. Originally, fluids were considered to be
primitive entities, without substructures, and infinitely divisible. W ith
the growth of the atomic theory, an alternate description became possi
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ble: a fluid is an assembly of elementary particles whose aggreagate
behavior is responsible for its gross properties. Clearly, these two de
scriptions are contradictory. But the micro description (the description
in terms of elementary particles) and the macro description (the de
scription in terms of a structureless fluid) can each be applied meaning
fully to appropriate properties of the fluid. At the macro level, for ex
ample, it is useful to talk of properties like pressure or temperature,
even though these concepts become meaningless or nonexistent at the
micro level. Indeed, to attem pt to deal with pressure and temperature
at the micro level, though possible, is cumbersome and unsatisfactory

148 ROBERT ROSEN
for most purposes. On the other hand, we can find micro properties of
the fluid (such as Brownian motion) for which the macro description
is inappropriate and misleading. But as long as we know what we are
doing, we can use the two languages separately and usefully, without
any conflict, or without any necessity for claiming that one of the
languages must be absorbed into the other.
Once this is recognized, we can see th at we can talk ab ou t operant
conditioning and setting contingencies of reinforcement without involv
ing ourselves at all in “ the literature o f freedom and dignity,” and vice
versa. To deny that operant conditioning can be used until the tradi
tional ideas of freedom and dignity (that is, the language pertaining to
the level of internal states of mind as causal agents in behavior) is given
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up is analogous to a physician refusing to prescribe a medication to a
patient until the patient forswears a particular view of physiology. Just
as the act of medication in this example is unrelated to any particular
prejudice on the part of the patient, so to o is the possibility of a behav
ioral technology independent of whether or not it is ever useful to talk
abo ut internal states of m ind; the confusion of the two languages is an
irrelevancy that merely serves to distract from the substantive issues.
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10
How Good Is
Current Behavior Theory?
John W ilkinson
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John W ilkinson is a senior fello w at the Center f o r the Study o f
Democratic Institutions. W ilkinson is the author o f numerous papers on
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physics and the philosophy o f science, especially the philosophy o f
mathem atics, and is the American translator o f Jacques Ellul's
The Technological Society.
W ilkinson s chapter continues the effort to evaluate operant
conditioning fr o m the standpoint o f the mathematician and logician.
It serves as a bridge between the preceding system s analysis o f Robert
Rosen and the explicitly m athem atical treatm ent o f L. A. Zadeh.
The history of the sciences, grossly considered, is simple enough: as
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each young science, having developed appropriate principles and m eth
ods to manage a more or less clearly demarcated subject matter, broke
loose and became a utonom ous, it was bom barded by canonical abuse
from its parent disciplines, which were collectively called Philosophy.
Psychology was one of the last of the academic disciplines to take this
step, and it begins to look as though the rejection of the father was
premature. F re u d ’s work, for example, is in tatters, and other large
areas have been swallowed whole by m ore firmly grounded disciplines,
such as pharmacology and biology. The malaise one senses when

150 JOHN W ILKINSON
speaking with psychologists is overpowering. Only one variety, the one

that passes by the name “ behaviorism,” is widely thought to be “ scien
tific,” even though most psychologists deem it “ narrow ” and even
manifest a certain revulsion toward it. H ow good, really, as science, is
the current behaviorism made controversial by B. F. Skinner? The
observations that follow apply to behavioral theory and not to the more
restricted science and technology of operant conditioning.
T he meagerness o f behavioral theory, its total inability to make
feasible prognoses coupled with a nearly Assyrian contem pt for the
infinite variety of the things in its jurisdiction that need explanation,
make arguments in its defense as meaningless as those in condemnation
of it; and one is tempted to speculate ab o u t the need felt by so many
to take a stand at all. This need may derive from weak ideologies that
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possibly pro m p t bad consciences but seldom appropriate actions.
Behaviorists must have had occasion, in their holy places like C a m
bridge or in travelling the lecture circuit, to hear all the objections to
their speculations that could be raised; and they have sought to anticipate
and to defend against them by denying them, in the way a seminarian
prepares himself not only to com bat the too enthusiastic immediacy of
expectation of the true believer, but also to counter the equally weak-
minded expostulations o f the village atheist, without much conviction
of dam pening the ard or of either. These decanti and cantori have gener
ated such a wide variety of opposing themes that behaviorism has
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become, like theology, more operatic than scientific, and Skinner’s
theories would sound better set to music, a procedure that often makes
us tolerant or unaware of bad libretti.
The rule of requisite informational variety in argumentation, first
proposed by Descartes in his “ existence” proofs, and later brought to a
high degree of definition by information theory and cybernetics, means,
am ong other things, that weak reasonings can overthrow weaker ones;
whereas to establish “ strong” universais requires the examination, or
algorithmic calculation, of a sufficient variety of complicated systemic
properties of wider and wider universes o f discourse. Very often, to cast
down a “ weak” theory requires only that a single disconfirming fact
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be found, or that one necessary condition be shown not to hold. N egat
ing procedures of this kind dem and much ingenuity; and no one could
assert that behaviorism lacks this qualification, nor that its arguments,
as f a r as they are able to go, are, in the main, true. Its conceptual a p
paratus, however, offers no sufficient variety for erecting a science of
hum an behavior considered in all the complexity of its natural and
cultural setting. The behaviorist’s extension, to the survival of cultural
patterns, of the biological “ survival of the fittest,” operating through
some inexplicable and unlikely analogy of m utation and selection, is,

How Good Is Current Behavior Theory? 151
like Darwinism itself, able to clean out a venerable closet of weak

theories that, by being repeated, have become inveterate. But, like
Darwinism, which could easily dispose of Bishop Wilberforce, the
behaviorists have proposed no theory strong enough to account for the
occurrence of “ cultural” mutations, or to explain their “ ends,” much
less to describe the “ origins” of whatever it is they believe themselves
to be describing. The causalities that appear in evolutionary theories of
both sorts probably operate only locally—say, in “ explaining” why flies
quickly become resistant to pesticides, or why one method of irrigation,
but not another, received religious sanction in Babylon. But, they
probably have no reference at all to complex biological evolutions over
incom parably longer periods, or to erecting or controlling whole cul
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tures. Because ends, for example, cannot be descried, it becomes agree
able for latter-day social Darwinists to assert that they are meaningless
entities of speculative philosophy or religion, although most scientists
involved with the consideration of systems have been persuaded that
the richer variety o f feedback theory had once and for all revived
ends-in-view, and even whole hierarchies of ends, as rational concepts.
In general, “ refutations” of behaviorism by the utilization of weak
dogm as drawn from M arx, or from those even weaker “ hidden h a n d ”
ideologies of the liberal bourgeois intelligentsia, are contemptible and,
paradoxically, even dem onstrate some small degree of what behavioral
conditioning they seek to discredit. Knee-jerk liberals—conditioned to
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slaver over “ liberty” and “ dignity” —generally mean that everyone else
should have the courage of their convictions, and they usually cover up
the most heinous crimes with denunciations of scientists like Skinner.
N o t long ago, for example, we heard much of these liberals’ “ New
F ro n tie r” —in practice, the Bay of Pigs was its first landfall and Vietnam
was its second. This is not so much an argum ent ad homines as a simple
illustration of the way in which weak theories overthrow weaker ones.
The im p ortant question is whether or not “ liberty,” “ purpose,” and
“ m ind,” must be revived in “ richer” theories, hierarchically arranged in
the way that richer “ m etalanguages” are always related to their “ object”
languages. One must, for example, ascend to the metalanguage “ g ram
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m a r ” before such useful symbols as “ n o u n ” and “ verb” are generated.
These latter classes are clearly different in kind from the objects—such
as “ chair,” “ Skinner,” and so o n —that are classified. Metalanguages
involve higher levels of organization and explanation, and it is usual to
find that only through their use may any clarity at all be introduced
into the discussion of the subordinate levels, or outright contradictions
be recognized and avoided. In the concrete “ structuralist” logic of
primitive tho ug ht th a t convulsed the fashionable salons of Paris until
the events of 1968 removed their attention to Chairm an M ao and

152 JOHN W ILKINSON
Sartre, “ things” m ay seem to have th at superior reality testified to by

Samuel Johnson when he refuted one version of Idealism by kicking a
stool. But in the technological society, in which we have come to dwell
almost exclusively in symbiotic contact with classes of artifacts o f our
own making, “ classes of classes” have greater theoretical reality, and
we cannot avoid inquiring into whatever it is that rational discourse
about them involves. T h a t means th at we have come to possess an
inescapable “ freedom” denied to savages; for we possess an infinitely
greater variety of “ options” (a good metalinguistic term) that neither
pigeons nor savages ever had much opportunity to think about.
The state of behavioral psychology, and its frequent need to justify
itself to a run-dow n intelligentsia, has led it to water its theses to such a
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degree that, as in the closely related literature of systemic “ city plan
ning,” what emerges is not so much an analysis of the variety and
complexity of hum an behavior in its psychosocial environment as it is
a weak and inadequate “ metaphysic” of these things. These theories,
nevertheless, represent a clear advance over those weak-minded and
incompetent speculations ab ou t cultural matters that are currently
fashionable. Take, for example, explanations of the alienation of the
young. The translation, into behavioral language, of the mental condi
tion of an alienated youth, who has just graduated from a “ university”
into a rapidly changing world for which “ education” has ill prepared
him, is admirable, at least in comparison with the foolish way such
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topics are most often spoken of in academic departments of the modern
political, religious, and social-scientific s o rt.1 Now, all words of natural
language, and certain “ scientific” ones, are what some mathematicians
have begun to call “ fuzzy” sets. But m inor trium phs of behaviorism
should not lead us to perpetuate or to increase fuzziness; the least that
may reasonably be dem anded of dialogue and theory is that their use
not render the things th at they attem pt to explain even fuzzier. The
“ semantic fields” of behaviorist terminology should operate, as they
obviously do not, not only to invalidate nontheories of psychology and
social science but to generate information by the only m ethod possible—
that is, by increasing requisite theoretical variety in an appropriate
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metalanguage, rather than by increasing the ambiguity and the sheer
num ber of “ observable” facts. G o o d metalanguages avoid an entropi-
cally increasing fuzziness of argument by obviating the commonest
sort of “ explication” —th at is, the sort th at operates by inventing
mnemonic devices and m etaphors on the lowest level of discourse,
devices that, unfortunately, always cope with increasing object com
'See Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity (A lfred A . K n op f, 1971), pp. 156 ff.

plexity with less and less precision.2 Control and stability, another pair
of closely related terms, become progressively m ore difficult to build
into a system to o weak to use them.
A scientist or philosopher, then, seeks to evade (often successfully)
these and other problems of complex systems, never by increasing any
merely mnemonic machinery, but by inventing a larger, richer, super-
ordinated and controlling vocabulary of te rm s—both operationally
better defined and algorithmically more easily calculable—to the end
th at unmanageable confusions of fuzzy object languages achieve a
meaningful (and less fuzzy) translation into the chosen metalanguage or
“ metaphysic,” but not inversely. Successful constructions of languages
to talk ab out experimental observables introduces truly useful variety
into theory. Pattern recognition and learning are essential parts of this
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process, abilities that, for the m om ent, are reserved to hum an minds.
W hatever secures better understanding, by putting less strain on our
mnemonics, is always a preferable way of proceeding in science. Be
haviorism has m ade a feeble attem p t to create—or, better, to talk ab ou t
—hierarchical superordinated control theory in psychology, but, un
fortunately, with no recognition at all o f the complexity of the object
and its environment. The test of requisite variety applied to behaviorist
“ metaphysic” suggests th a t it is deficient, and irremediably so, and th a t
what it is really experimenting with belongs to purely associational
mnemonics that merely “ preserve the co n to u rs” o f a proper th e ory.3
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Part of this failure is the result of cutting itself off, right at the begin
ning, by denouncing those very unobservables that would serve it best,
were it ever to elevate itself to the condition o f a really interesting
theory. One might have thou gh t that E. L. T h o rn d ik e ’s failures, those
th at inhered in his dictum that “ everything which exists exists in quantity
and can be m easured,” might have been exemplary. Skinner, like
T horndike, throws out a mass of necessary terms, adds a few dubious
mathematical flourishes, and comes up with what George Miller calls a
“ null” hypothesis, a hypothesis of the sort that makes him hope that
he will be unable to disprove it by facts that are, in effect, random
to it. W hat Skinner calls a “ probabilistic schedule-of-reinforcements”
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that condition operatively is little more than a brute attem pt to catalogue
certain facts by neglecting whatever he chooses. Behaviorism has no
half-way adequate theory o f probability, and it contents itself with
disarming critics by agreeing that it needs one, while rejecting any
2The best mnemonic devices are high-level theories like Dmitri M endeleef’s periodic
table o f the elements, a display that allowed some marvellous predictions to be made.
3Behaviorists dislike the description of their theory as a “ metaphysic.” But “meta
language” seems to mean the same thing and raises fewer hackles.

154 JOH N W ILKINSON
suggestions that are made. As far as the multiple states of a complex

system are concerned—that is, for those conditions th at are supposed
to be reinforced (or the reverse)—we get “ schedules” th at look rather
like “ Thirty days hath September . . . excepting February. . . .”
The lesson one quickly learns from the history of science is that the
sole way of getting requisite variety is by establishing more encompassing
theories with information-generating constraints. The “ variety” of such
a theory (an adequate explication o f its “ strength” ) measures relevant
information by specifying the num ber and the probability of transition
between the independent states in which the system under examination
can exist. Thus, in ecology, greater variety (more available “ niches” )
usually, bit not always, means greater stability—th at is, survival value.
An actor who is able to play a large num ber of roles is less likely to be
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unemployed and, in this im po rtant sense, is more stable than the actor
whose abilities are limited to one sort of role.
In general, information and control are possible only by specifying a
“ b a nd ” —th at is, upper and lower limits to the probable states o f a sys
tem. This band between the too little and the to o much is “ variety.” If one
were to ask “ H ow many genes are involved in what we measure as
‘intelligence’?” and if we were able to specify what percentage of this
useful com m odity were estimated to be the result of genetics and what
of environment, the width of this band could be calculated to be “ not
less than 25 and not more than 100.” This exemplifies the sort of infor
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mation we need ab out systems, and this is exactly the kind th a t current
behaviorism never possesses.
The results of the debates about the foundations of logics, m athe
matics, and the physical sciences (in particular, quantum theory), and
related measurement and experimentation, that began in the 1920s and
are not yet concluded, are compelling. It is unfortunate that the usual
obscure form ulation of these matters renders them unavailable to most
intelligent people; but they are not, on th a t account, less absolutely
constraining of any theory. “ Variety” and information arise always by
imposing constraints on a m uch wider spectrum of a priori possibilities
of states of a system, even though we often naively see constraints as
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acting as a bar to information.
R u do lf C arnap and the Vienna Circle of positivists originally pro p a
gated strongly the thesis of “ physicalism,” according to which all
theory (if clarity and freedom from metaphysical “ obscurantism ” were
to be gained) had ultimately to rest on physical observables. This thesis
is the complete theoretical equivalent, in the physical sciences, of be
haviorism. The positivist program of the 1920s, called Logischer Aufbau
der W elt, had then to rely completely on observables, by constructing
from them the world through long chains of inference of a logical nature.

Almost immediately, however, the physicalists were constrained to invent

new logical categories and structures. Simultaneously, am ong related
groups, a discussion began concerning the applicability of physicalism,
or some version o f it, to quan tu m theory. Because o f the omnipresence
o f nonintuitive and unavoidable limitations on observing data in our
interpretation of the microphysical world (“ uncertainty” ), a long debate
began that issued at last in conclusions that must be stated here perhaps
too summarily. It turned out that the logic of quan tu m states could not
be described with that two-valued logic that was, in its essence, an em
broidery of the logic descended from the Greeks. A “ com plem entary”
multivalued logic (that postulates, am ong other things, that a greater
num ber of values than “ tru e ” or “ false” attach to propositions) seemed
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clearly to operate in the quan tu m domain. On the other hand, conven
tional logic, and classical descriptions m aking use of it, appeared not
only justified but necessary in designing and protocolling experimental
behavior in the laboratory. The irremediable differences between the
two logics was resolved (by Reichenbach and others) by deciding that
the necessary rejection of classical logic in the quantum domain, and its
simultaneous acceptance in the experimental, turned, in great part, on a
distinction between two sorts of entities—namely, the unobservable and
the observed. In particular, the “ law of the excluded middle” described
above had to be put on ice, with respect to m any of these “ unobserv
ables.” 4 This compromise led to a major modification of the original
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physicalist thesis, principally by giving a definite meaning to these
“ unobservables.” This is not too strange a hypothesis if we reflect that
all the entities we habitually call “ observables” are, in fact, shaky infer
ences, involving long logical chains, from what we may be said only
conventionally to observe; and, further, that m any inferred entities indis-
pensible to science, and called “ observations,” have never actually been
“ observed” and possibly never will be. The q u an tu m theory is a strong
metalanguage with respect to billiard-ball mechanics, inasmuch as it
contains conceptual entities that this latter does not, and includes it as a
case limiting our day-to-day experience.
The presence of hierarchically superordinated, but unobservable,
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metalinguistic constraints in quantum theory was, I believe, an important,
universal, historical development th at happened to be studied first
because physical systems are “ simpler” to investigate and replicate and
easier to manage. Because, in the psychosocial sciences, observational
4Other suggestions—for example, those of von Neumann—are even less intuitive and
less grateful to positivists or behaviorists. I use the expression “ put on ice” because it
turns out, rather astonishingly and completely counterintuitively, that this basic “ law”
o f ordinary logic (that states that a proposition must be either false or true and that a
third possibility does not exist) is not affirmed, but that it is always false to deny it.

156 JOHN WILKINSON
uncertainties arising through the interaction of the observer and the

observed are even more ubiquitous than in q u antum theory (think of
the traffic cop who observes fewer violations than anyone else), the
conclusion must be that the richer metalanguage we need to explain
what we crudely observe with the eye and certain c oadjutant m echan
isms will necessarily contain some symbols that are neither observed
nor observable, nor tractable with the use o f ordinary homespun logic.
Some functional equivalent of “ m ind ” must form a part of psychological
science and the behaviorism o f the future, even though it escape the
sufficiently mysterious procedure of direct observation. Thus, we
reasonably speak of a “ state of m in d ” without supposing gratuitously
(and probably falsely) th at such a state is completely explicated by
reference to the wiring of the brains’ neurons. Perhaps even “ G o d ”
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may get back into the ultimate description of sufficiently complicated
behavior. In Descarte’s meditations, with the use of the principle of
necessary metaphysical “ variety” (called by him “ reality” ), that is ex
actly what happened th rough one version of the so-called “ ontological”
argument. The fact that unmeasurable concepts are as intuitively repug
nant to most behavioral scientists as they were long ago to the Positivistic
program (bravely called, at first, V berm ndung der M etaphysik) may
signify as little as R u d o lf C a rn a p ’s original neglect of them. Caution is
advisable with the notion of “ freedom,” too. We very usefully speak of
“ degrees of freedom” in describing any complex system, although we
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must always share behaviorism’s distaste for those unobservables when
they are used by liberals and Fascists alike to confuse our discourse or
to conceal their crimes.
The most powerful tool available to hum an intuition in handling the

complexity and diversity of even moderately complicated psychological
or social systems is high-speed digital simulation plus graphic display.
These devices are already “ m ental,” in the sense th at they are complicated
enough that it is impossible even for their inventors or program m ers to
“ observe” all that they can do. It would be the worst possible mistake
to suppose that computers can only process numbers. Their best use is
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in connection with symbolic processes in general. J. W. Forrester,
Richard Bellman, and a few others have m ade a beginning. The same
scurrilous rabble who attacked Forrester have mobilized their decrepit
ideologies to attack a com petent behaviorism. Forrester’s “ w orld”
dynamics is a strong metalanguage of hum an behavior in its global
environment. It has begun to tease out of the raw data a “ variety” that
is half-way commensurate with a theoretical rendering of society. He
takes as his primitive logical entities a simple but nevertheless incredibly
complicated systemic network o f feedback mechanisms. It agrees with

behaviorism at least in one im portant poin t— namely, th at the indispens

able conditional value for any rational account of society is that it be
“ stable,” and, one forlornly hopes, “ju st.” Stability of systems is a
concept that seems to intersect greatly with Skinner’s and D a rw in ’s
survival of species, cultural and biological. Only a beginning has been
m ade by Forrester, but there is a well-founded hope th at this simulation
method, perhaps after it has been successively refined through many
adaptive additions and iterations, may be able to predict, as unaided
hum an intuition cannot, the effects of secondary changes arising from
“ policy” manipulations, or those of adaptive control processes within
the social order. It is on the level of so-called “ adaptive control proc
esses” that an effective hum an science must operate, and it is on this
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level that the requisite varieties of theories are to be compared. It should
be noted that the “ secondary” effects that always appear in manipulating
complex systems are only “ secondary” in the sense that we d o n ’t want
them and did n ’t previse them. Further, they usually have the disagreeable
property, through being almost totally countenntuitive, of running in the
opposite direction to whatever was primary, or “ planned,” and, what
may be worse, in displaying these effects after long delay. Behaviorist
theories are far too weak to be com pared with the hypersophisticated
digital, analogue (or hybrid), com puterization techniques that alone
seem to be able to aid the human m ind in coping with sheer complexity
of data and the logical relations am ong these data. By speed of operation,
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they allow the mind to foreshorten or compress the time dimension,
and so to allow the framing o f policies indispensable to rational control
of cultures that are evolving with accelerating rapidity.
The im port of these secondary effects, here, is th at a behaviorist might
well find himself in the position of reinforcing, and being himself rein
forced, through the operation o f initially encouraging but finally disas
trous effects of manipulation. W hat will a behaviorist do if secondary
and effectively ran do m results produce m ore aggressiveness in hum an
beings than the rather frightening q uanta of this disagreeable quality
we have recently observed? Or what if he produces an organism that
possesses too little? Should he then proceed to eliminate his mistakes?
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After the m anner of cattle breeders, or that of nature “ red in to o th and
claw” ? Moreover, controlled breeding usually eliminates both variety
and variability, simultaneously introducing instability of one or another
unexpected kind. If behaviorism were to succeed in turning cultural
conditioning into biological breeding (and probably more than half of
all children—the “ go od ” ones—are thought to be biologically docile
and to manifest nonaggressive behavior almost immediately after birth),
the reduction of variety would paradoxically have the effect o f m aking
a bad theory possessing little variety into a “ g o o d ” one, but only by

158 JOH N W ILKINSON
following the path th at would have led men to declare H itler’s race
theories “ g ood,” had he succeeeded in his design of establishing the
1000-year Reich by eliminating all opposition.
It would clearly be infinitely more acceptable first to simulate the
system to approxim ate its behavior over condensed periods of time,
and then to get the behavior modifiers or planners, by jiggling the
c om pu ter’s knobs, to change the psychosocial parameters that control
the rates that regulate the state variables, in order to be able to conjecture
for themselves and demonstrate for others the possible effects of different
proposed policies. One can reasonably be persuaded (without harboring
any excessively strong conviction) that most men have already been
conditioned, by nature and nurture acting in concert, not to choose too
readily to com m it suicide. But, whatever they choose, they are capable
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of exercising through such simulation a greater degree of freedom that
has been allotted to men in history by any culture from the remotest
recoverable antiquity.
T he behaviorist is right in pointing out th a t all of us already live in
systems, like the capitalistic, in some sense almost totally invented by
men; but he is certainly wrong in assuming th at the inventors of these
systems either control or understand even the grosser workings of their
inventions. Mr. N ix on’s economic advisors, were they to become candid,
could easily testify to that. Systems, for want of something better, have
an inherent logic (or a collection of local logics) of their own, which
certainly involve “ unobservables.” A primitive agnosticism concerning
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these unobservables, on the part of behavioral scientists, m ust stand in
the path of any elaboration of feasible policies of hum an behavior or any
conditionings based on these policies.
There is one forlorn hope. Weakness is sometimes strength; and even
if behavior modification, applied to large or complex systems, rests upon
a weak theory, the unpredictable secondary effects of its cultural culling
process of trial and error may conceivably turn out to be more beneficial
than fatal. Biological evolution, for example, could probably never have
“ selected” for survival value the ability to create, or enjoy, Beethoven’s
N inth Symphony. Because genes are highly polyvalent, only incidentally
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can they have enabled men, through m utation and selection, to accom
plish more than merely to survive. “ C ultu re” may be just that totality
of secondary effects that have accrued to us as a bonus above and
beyond survival. Skinnerian behaviorism is less rational than many
other presently available and richer theories of adaptive control, none
of which are without their difficulties. There always exists the possibility
that, by being brutally conditioned for psychic and social survival,
cultural goods may incidentally be added unto us. The arts have most
often flourished under the patronage of one or another despot, who most

often patronized the artist at the expense of everyone but himself. This is
hardly an acceptable version of “ dem ocracy.” But evolution, learning,
control processes, and stability all are achieved only at very high costs,
no m atter what theory or practice is involved. Variety always exacts a
price in time, money, suffering, or resources; and one thing that is
clear about most dem ocracies—which are, in their very nature, plural
istic—is that they are seldom, if ever, willing to pay the price for ex
cellence, or even for survival. Our com fort must probably be th a t real
“ freedom ,” expensive and peremptory though it may be in its own way,
would probably cost much less than behavior modification.
Sum m ary
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A theory is “ weaker” or “ stronger” if it possesses lesser or greater
“ variety.” Variety is a function o f certain probabilities and measurable
data embedded in a complex system. Only a com m ensurably stronger
theory can serve to explicate the facts or predict the future of a given
universe of discourse. Behaviorism, if strong on some levels of explica
tion, is weak on others. The construction of a stronger theory here, as
elsewhere, will involve the addition of “ unobservables” —th a t is, things
unobservable at the level o f the weaker theory, and perhaps even u n
observable in principle. Im provem ents o f psychological theory, in this
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way, will result in the addition of terms that are functional equivalents
of “ freedom ,” “ dignity,” “ m in d,” and so forth. A particularly im p o r
tant addition is the concept of stabilizing “ feedback.” Large-scale c o m
binations of social and cultural feedbacks often result in unpredictable,
costly, and destabilizing effects at long term. So, “ schedules of rein
forcement” may incur the danger of actually reinforcing instability and
prom oting the disequilibration —even the disappearance—of the system.
This is clearly of especial danger in a period of very rapid and accelerat
ing cultural change.
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11
A System-Theoretic View
of Behavior Modification
L. A. Zadeh
INDEXL. A . Zadeh, professor o f electrical engineering and computer sciences at

the University o f California, Berkeley, is co-author o f Linear System
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Theory and editor o f the Journal of Com puter and System Sciences.
This evaluation is o f special value in that it considers Skinnerian
behaviorism fro m a m athem atical point o f view. Zadeh employs
the form alism o f the theory o f 'f u z z y sets" that he developed in
evaluating operant conditioning. H e concludes that “the time is coming,
i f it has not come already, when the society will have much more
effective means at its disposal f o r manipulating . . . its m em bers."
Zadeh concludes that operant conditioning lends itself to form ulation
in a m athem atical model, which would fa cilita te computer analysis.
The work on this paper was supported, in part, by National Science
Foundation Grant GK-10656X.
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To someone like myself, steeped in the quantitative analyses of inanimate
systems, the principal ideas in Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity
are difficult to translate into assertions that are capable of p ro of or refu
tation. Nevertheless, I find them highly interesting and thought-provok
ing.
It is a truism that hum an behavior is vastly more complex than the
behavior of man-conceived systems. This is reflected in the fact that

A System-Theoretic View o f Behavior Modification 161
such basic concepts as control, reinforcement, feedback, goal, constraint,

decision, strategy, adaptation, and environment, which are central to
the discussion of hum an behavior, are much better understood and
more clearly defined in system theory—which deals with abstract sys
tems from an axiomatic point of view—than in psychology or philosophy.
U nfortunately, high precision is rarely compatible with high complexity.
Thus, the precision and determinism of system theory have the effect
of severely restricting its capability to deal with the complexities of
hum an behavior.
Essentially, inanimate systems are amenable to quantitative analysis
because their behavior is sufficiently simple to admit of characterization
by equations containing numerical variables (that is, scalars or vectors
whose com ponents are real or complex numbers). Typically, the state
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of an inanimate system S at tim e 1 /, / = 0, 1, 2, . . . , is an /2-vector, x t,
of low or m oderate dimensionality, whose com ponents are real numbers.
For example, if S is a point of mass m moving in a three-dimensional
space, then its state has six com ponents, of which the first three define
its position and the last three its velocity.
If S is subjected to a sequence of inputs, u0, uu u>, . . . , each of which
is a numerical variable, then the behavior of S is usually characterized
by two equations:
xi+i = f ( x t, u,), ( 1)
y , = g (x t, ut). (2)
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The first equation defines the next state (that is, the state at time
t -f 1) as a function of the present state, x t, and the present input, ut.
The second equation defines the present output, y t, as a function of the
present state and the present input. Thus, the behavior of a deterministic
discrete-time system may be characterized by two functions / and g,
which define, respectively, the next state and the output of the system.
In the past, attempts to describe hum an behavior by equations of the
form of ( 1) and (2) have met with little success because hum an behavior,
in general, is much too complex to admit of description by numerical
variables. However, as suggested by Zadeh (1971) and Bellman and
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Zadeh (1970), apossible way of dealing with the problem of complexity
is to employ fu z z y variables—in place of numerical variables—in
and (2). The values of such variables are not numbers but labels of
fuzzy sets2—that is, names of classes that do not have sharply defined
( 1)
^ o r simplicity, we assume that time varies discretely. Dependence on t will frequently

be assumed but not exhibited explicitly.
2Roughly speaking, a fuzzy set is a class with unsharp boundaries. More precisely, a
fuzzy set A in a space X = {.v[ is a collection o f ordered pairs A = {[*, M^(.v)]), in which
h a ( x ) is the grade o f membership o f .v in A, with 0 < ^ (.v) < 1. A more detailed discus
sion o f fuzzy sets may be found in Zadeh (1971) and Bellman and Zadeh (1970).

162 L . A. ZADEH
boundaries. F o r example, the terms green, big, tired, happy, young, bald,
and oval may be viewed as labels for classes in which the transition
from m embership to nonmem bership is gradual rather than abrupt.
Thus, a man aged 32 may have partial m em bership—represented by a
number, say, 0.6—in the class of young men. The class of young men,
then, would be characterized by a membership function /zy0ung (*) th at
associates with each man a* his grade of membership in the class of
young men. F o r simplicity, membership functions are assumed to take
values in the interval [0 , 1], with 0 and 1 representing nonmem bership
and full membership, respectively.
The use of fuzzy variables to describe hum an behavior is, in effect, a
retreat into imprecision in the face of complexity. This, of course, is
what has been done all along in psychology and philosophy. However,
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the use of fuzzy variables in conjunction with equations such as ( 1) and
(2) may make it possible to deal with hum an behavior in a more system
atic and somewhat more precise fashion than is customary in psychology
and related fields.
In what follows, I shall sketch the rudim ents of this app roach and
relate it, in part, to hum an behavior modification. In my brief discussion
of the equations characterizing hum an behavior, I shall not attem pt to
specify the functions of fuzzy variables that enter into these equations,
nor shall I concretize the meaning of the variables representing state,
input, environment, and so on. Thus, my very limited aim in this paper
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is merely to suggest that some of the aspects of behavior modification
discussed by Skinner may be formulated, perhaps more systematically,
throug h the use of equations and functions employing fuzzy, rather than
numerically-valued, variables. It should be understood, of course, that
the detailed task of characterizing the functions entering into these
equations by tables or flow charts of labels of fuzzy sets would normally
require a great deal of psychological testing and data analysis.
Our point of departure is the assumption th at the behavior of a hum an
— who, for convenience, will be referred to as H — can be represented,
in part, by the following two pairs of equations:
x i+i = h^Xt, Ut, et, /), (3)
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st+i = giO,, ut, y t, t),

(4)
(5)
et = gi(st, ut, y t, /): ( 6)
in which
x t = state of H at time /, i = 0, 1 , 2 , . . . ,

ut = action taken by H at time t, with ut chosen from a constrained (possibly

fuzzy) set of alternatives,
et = input representing the effect of the external influences not under the
control of //( f o r example, the effect of the environment, both physical
and social),
= response of H to action ut and external influences et,
st = state of environment at time t, and
hu h2, gu g 2 = fuzzy and, possibly, random functions.
It is understood th a t some or all of the variables in the above equ a

tions are fuzzy, which means th a t their values are labels of fuzzy sets
(for example, x t = tired, ut = taking a nap, et = hot and humid, and
so on). Thus, a typical entry in a table characterizing (3), say, would
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read: If, at time t, the state of H is a fuzzy set described by a label a
(for example, a = tired), the effect of the environm ent is a fuzzy set
described by a label /3, and the action by H is a fuzzy set labeled 7 , then,
with high likelihood, the next state of H will be a fuzzy set labeled 5,
and possibly, but m uch less likely, the next state will be e.
In effect, the first pair of equations, (3) and (4), serves to describe, in
a very approxim ate (and yet systematic) fashion, the response of H
(or some particular aspect of the response of H , represented by y t) to
the external influences (represented by e t) and the action taken by H
(represented by ut). In a similar fashion, the second pair (5) and (6),
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describes the effect of the behavior of H on the environment. Generally,
the effect of H on the environment is much smaller than the effect of
the environment on H. This is not true, however, in the case of operant
conditioning, where the changes in environment serve to reinforce a
particular m ode of behavior of H.
To m ake the description of the behavior of H more explicit, we need
an additional equation th a t describes the decision principle employed
by H in selecting an action ut from a constrained set of alternatives. To
this end, it is expedient to make use of the notion of the m axim izing set
of a function, which is an approxim ation t o —or, in our terminology, a
fuzzification of—the notion of a maximizing value.
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Suppose th at / ( a ) is a real-valued function that is bounded both from
below and from above, with a* ranging over a dom ain X. The maximizing
set of / is a fuzzy set, M , in X, such that the grade of membership,
hm(a'), of a in M represents the degree to which / ( a ) is close to the
maximum value of / over X , that is, sup / (sup / = supremum of / ( a )
over X .) Fo r example, if nM{x 1) = 0.8 at a = Ai, then the value of / ( a )
at Ai = a'i is ab out 80% of its maximum value with respect to some ref
erence point. In effect, then, the maximizing set o f a function / serves

164 L. A. ZADEH
to grade the points in the dom ain o f / according to the degree to which
f( x ) approximates su p / . 3
N o w let R t(ut) denote the estimated total rew ard4 associated with
action ut at time t, with the negative values of R t representing loss, pain,
discomfort, and so forth. Then we postulate th at the decision principle
employed by H is the following: For each t at which a decision has to
be made, H chooses the ut that is the maximizing set for the estimated
reward. It is understood that, if the membership function of this set
does not peak sharply arou nd some particular action, then H first n a r
rows his choice to those actions th a t have a high grade of membership
in iit and then uses some random or arbitrary rule to select one am ong
them.
To gain better insight into the operation of the decision principle,
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it is advantageous to decompose the estimated reward function into two
components, one representing an immediate reward or gratification and
the other representing estimate future reward (or penalty, if the reward
is negative). M ore specifically, we assume th a t R t is a function of two
arguments: immediate reward function I R t(ih) and estimated future
reward function F R t(ut). Thus, in symbols,
R t(ut) = Gt [IR t(ut), F R t(ut)], (7)
where Gt represents a function5 of I R t and F R t, playing a role analogous

to that of an objective function in control theory. N ote that implicit in
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function f(x ), x £ X, is defined by the following equations (in which inf / = infimum
of /( * ) over X):
if i n f / > 0;
if sup / < 0; and

M .w (-v) -
f ix )
s u p /’
sup / + inf / - /
/-s u p /
inf /
sup / — i n f / ’
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if inf / < 0 and sup f > 0. If / i s a fuzzy function— that is, if, for each x £ X , f(x ) is a
fuzzy set with membership function nf(x ,y )—then the maximizing set for f(x ) is defined
by the preceding equations with f(x ) replaced by sup^u/Cvj’). Although the definitions
given are precise, it should be understood that, in dealing with fuzzy variables, max
imization and other operations performed on functions of such variables are highly
approximate in nature.
4lt should be understood that expressing the total reward as a function of tu alone is
intended merely to single out the dependence o f R t on ut. In general, R t will depend, in
addition, on the strategy used by H as well as on x t, st, y t, et, and, possibly, other
variables.
6As in the case o f Rt, it is tacitly understood that Gt may depend on xh st, y t, t, and,
possibly, other variables.

FRi is a goal (or subgoals) in terms of which the consequence of choosing

ut may be estimated.
We are now in a position to make the description of the behavior of
H more explicit by adding to (3), (4), (5), and (6) the equation
Ut = maximizing set for Gt(J R t, F R t). ( 8)

In words, this equation means that H chooses the action ut that maxi
mizes a specified com bination of the immediate reward IR t and the
estimated future reward F R t, with I R t and FR, understood to be known
functions of the actions. It should be rem arked th a t the description of
the behavior of H by (3), (4), (5), (6), and ( 8) is consistent with the point
of view taken in Skinner's work.
If the variables appearing in equations (3), (4), (5), (6), and (8) were
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assumed to be numerically valued, the task of characterizing the func
tions hu h , g u gi, I R t, FRt, and G would be impossibly complex. The crux
of this idea is to regard the variables in question as fuzzy variables
ranging over labels of a ppropriate fuzzy sets.6 E quations (3) (8), then,
would represent approxim ate (that is, fuzzy) relations between fuzzy
variables. These relations could be characterized by (a) tables in which
the entries are labels of fuzzy sets, or (b) algorithmically—that is, by a
set of fuzzy rules (like a com puter program with fuzzy instructions) for
generating a fuzzy set from other fuzzy sets. In this way, the description
of the relations between the variables characterizing hum an behavior
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could be greatly simplified—at the cost, of course, o f a commensurate
loss in precision. In this perspective, the approach sketched above may
be viewed as a systematization o f the conventional verbal characteriza
tions of hum an behavior (Zadeh, 1973).
When hum an behavior is described by equations of the form (3), (4),
(5), (6), and (8), a modification in hum an behavior may be viewed as a
change in the functions hu h>, Gt, I R t, and F R (. O f these, the changes
in G, I R t, and F R t play a particularly im portan t role because they
influence, in a direct way, the choice of actions taken by H. Thus, in
terms of these functions, Skinner’s operant conditioning may be re
garded as a form of modification of behavior resulting largely from a
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manipulation of I R t through its dependence on the environment.
To clarify the role played by F R t in relation to I R t, it will be convenient
to make a very rough approxim ation to Gt by a numerically valued
convex linear combination,
6Il is understood that the fuzzy sets in question would, in general, be defined in an
approximate fashion by exemplification (that is, ostensively). For example, the fuzzy set
very likely would be defined by a collection o f examples of probability values together
with their grades o f membership—for example, {(1, 1.0), (0.9, 0.9), (0.8, 0.7), (0.7, 0.4),
(0.6, 0.1)}—in which the first element is a probability value and the second element is its
grade of membership in the fuzzy set very likely.

166 L. A. ZADEH
R t = a l R t + (1 - a )F R t, (9)
in which a is a weighting coefficient, 0 < a < 1. Thus, (9) signifies that

the reward at time t is a weighted linear com bination of the immediate
reward and the estimated future reward at time t, with the latter multi
plied by the factor p = (1 — a)/a in relation to the former.
Tho ug h not a constant, the anticipation coefficient p constitutes an
im p ortant personality param eter of an individual. In this connection, it
should be noted that, in a given individual, p will be small when the
uncertainty in the estimate F R t is large. To put it another way, the
influence of the immediate reward tends to be predom inant when there
is considerable uncertainty ab ou t the future consequences of an action.
As an individual m atures and learns from his own experience as well
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as th at of others, his knowledge of the I R t and F R t functions improves
and his anticipation coefficient trends to increase—th at is, he tends to
become more far-sighted. Nevertheless, it is probably true that, judged
over a long period of time, the p of most individuals is not as large as
it should be for their own good, as well as for the good of others. The
acceptance of this premise naturally raises the troublesome question:
T o what extent should society attem pt to coerce its members to increase
their anticipation coefficient if they are unwilling to do so on their own
volition? Obviously, it is this question th at is at the heart of problems
relating to such practices as smoking, drinking, and drug-taking.
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It is im portant to observe th at the effect of increasing p (for negative
F R t) can also be achieved, for fixed p, by decreasing I R t. In other words,
if an individual tends not to give sufficient weight to long-term harmful
consequences of an action that gives him immediate pleasure, then one
way o f inducing him to modify his behavior is to make I R t sufficiently
negative by adding to it an immediate penalty. For example, one possi
ble way o f controlling affinity for excessive drinking might be to implant
an electronic m onitor in a person who is in need of external reinforce
ment of his will power. Such a m onitor could be program m ed to produce
an acute sensation of pain or some other form of discomfort when the
level of alcohol in blood reaches a predetermined threshold. In this way,
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the immediate pleasure derived from having one or more drinks would
be offset by the nearly simultaneous feeling o f pain, with the net im
mediate reward becoming negative when the am o un t of alcohol co n
sumed exceeds a set limit.
Behavior-modifying m onitors of this type are within the reach of
modern electronic technology. Clearly, the potential for abuse of such
devices is rather high: through remote signalling, they could be used
by a totalitarian government as a highly effective means of punishment
and control.

The temporal decomposition o f the reward function into two co m

ponents, one representing the immediate reward and the other repre
senting the estimated future reward, serves to exhibit an im portant facet
of the decision-making process—namely, the way in which an individual,
H, balances short-term gains against long-term losses. In a similar way,
we can perform what might be referred to as a relational decomposition
of the reward function into com ponents that represent the rewards to
other members of a group o f individuals who interact with H. Specifi
cally, suppose that we have a group o f N individuals H \ . . . , H N, with
the reward function and action associated with H l denoted by Réi^Ut1)
and ut\ respectively.
As a very rough approxim ation, we assume that R t{(ut0 admits of the
following d e co m p osition :7
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/V 'O V ) = H’t, R S ' M + u ’,2 R t H u t 1) + • • • + h -v R t * ( u t% (1 0 )
in which
Rtij («<0 = reward accruing to W at time t as a result of action iit{ taken

by H \
wa = weight attached by H l to the reward accruing to H> as a result
of action í/í1', with + wi2 + . . . + u’,.v = 1, 0 < u>i; < 1, and
R ta (uti) = self-reward = reward accruing to //* at time t as a result of the
action u f taken by H l.
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The basic assumption underlying (10) is th at the behavior of W is
governed not only by the self-reward function R tu , but also by a weighted
com bination of the rewards accruing to other members o f the group as a
result of the action taken by H l. M ore precisely, this implies that when
H l is faced with a decision, he chooses the ué th a t maximizes R t\ as
expressed by (10), rather than the ut‘ th at maximizes R ti{.
As in the case of the anticipation coefficient p , the relational coeffi
cients wu . . . , wN constitute im p ortan t parameters of an individual’s
behavior and personality. In what way does an individual weigh the
reward to himself in relation to the rewards to his family, close relatives,
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friends, enemies, coworkers, members o f the same religion, residents of
his community, fellow countrymen, and so on? Clearly, the answer to
this question would be very different for a typical mem ber of a primitive
society than for a person of high level of culture and enlightenment.
Indeed, the evolution of a society is directly related to the changes in
the relational coefficients o f its members, with an individual learning
from his own experience, as well as from that o f others, that it is in his
7As in the case o f (7), implicit in R ^ U i') is the possibility that Rt1 may depend on
other variables and actions in addition to

168 L. A. ZADEH
long-term self-interest to assign greater weight to the interests of others—

not only those who are close to him, but also those who are remote.
In essence, then, once the reward functions I R t, F R t and R tij have
been identified, the behavior modification would involve, in the main,
changes in the anticipation coefficient p and the relational coefficients
w. In the past, changes in p and w were induced primarily by experience,
education, religious training, political indoctrination, and other envir
onmental influences. As implied by Skinner, the time is coming, if it
has not come already, when the society will have much more effective
means at its disposal for manipulating the p and w of its members,
perhaps electronically or th rough systematic psychological conditioning
on a mass scale.
T o give a simple example of electronic m anipulation in a small group,
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consider a group comprising just two members: H l = husband and
H 2 = wife. Suppose that each has a device with a push-button such that,
when the button is pressed, the other party experiences acute pain or
discomfort induced by a probe implanted in or attached to the body.
Thus, if H \ say, takes an action that makes H~ unhappy, then H 2 can
retaliate by pressing her button, and vice versa. To limit the extent of
retaliation, both H l and H - have a quota th a t varies from day to day
in a ra n d o m fashion and is not made known to H 1 or H 2. This rule is
intended to induce H 1 and H 2 to use their push-buttons rather sparingly.
The point of this example is that the availability of means of retaliation
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is likely to have the effect of increasing the values of relational coeffi
cients Wi2 and w-2 i in the reward equations
R t'M = wn R t u M + w12 R t'2(utl) (11)

and
R t 2M = w21 R t21(ut2) + >v22 R t22(ur), (12)
which govern the behavior of H 1 and H 2. However, excessive retaliatory
capability or its misuse may, of course, result in a rupture of the rela
tionship between H l and H 2.
The use of electronic means (rather than some other means) of re
taliation in the preceding example is intended merely to make retaliation
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more convenient to apply and, hence, m ore effective as a modifier of
behavior. The basic point, however, is that, whether in small groups or
in large ones, the threat of retaliation plays an essential role in tending
to increase the values of those relational coefficients that would be small
in the absence of retaliatory capability. This is particularly true of the
m odern technologically based society, in which the degree of com m un i
cation and interdependence between distant individuals and groups is
far greater than it was in the past.

It has been experimentally observed o f inanim ate systems that, as

the degree o f interaction (feedback) between the constituents of a system
increases, the system eventually becomes unstable. The same phenom e
non may well be at the ro o t of the many crises confronting m odern
society, particularly in race relations, pollution, mass transit, health
care, power distribution, m onetary systems, employment, and educa
tion. These crises seem to grow in num ber and intensity as technology—
in the form o f TV, radio, telephone, com m unication satellites, c o m
puters, data banks, ju m b o jets, and the a u to m o b ile—rapidly increases
the degree of interaction between individuals, groups, organizations,
societies, and countries. The “ culprit” may well be the very basic and
universal hum an desire for freedom, which makes it distasteful for most
o f us to accept the degree of control and discipline that is needed to
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m aintain societal and interpersonal equilibrium in the face of rapid
growth in the degree of interdependence brought a bo ut by technological
progress. Thus, we are witnessing what may be called the crisis o f under-
coordination— a crisis that, in the main, is a manifestation of insufficient
planning and control in relation to the extent of interaction between the
constituents o f our society.
W e may be faced with the necessity to curtail our freedom s—perhaps
rather extensively—in order to achieve survival in a technologically based,
highly interdependent world of tom orrow . Perhaps this is the crux of
Skinner’s thesis in Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
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In conclusion, it is quite possible th a t deliberate, systematic, mass-
scale behavior modification employing Skinnerian techniques o f operant
conditioning, electronic m onitors, computers, devices to alter brain
function, and other paraphernalia of m odern technology may become a
reality in the near future. I, for one, do not look forward to that day.
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12
Questions
Fred W arner Neal
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Fred Warner N eal, an associate fello w o f the Center fo r the Study o f
Democratic Institutions, is a professor o f international relations and
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government at Claremont Graduate School. The most recent o f his
many books is W ar and Peace and Germ any.
H ere, a political scientist raises a series o f questions concerning the
social implications o f operant conditioning. N eal fe e ls Skinner left a
number o f important problems untouched in his book. “Skinner could
now perform a very great service,” N eal concludes, “i f he would spell
out how his theory could be applied to society, in concrete ways, to
enhance the freed o m and dignity o f man. I f he, or his adherents, fa il
to do this, the theory o f operant conditioning could become a part o f
the literature o f nonfreedom and nondignity."
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If I understand Skinner correctly, what he is urging is a sort o f systems
analysis of the total environment, of which man is an integral part, to
show us the way to make the hum an condition “ better,” if not ideal.
This is an interesting and potentially useful exercise—made more so,
possibly, by the unusual, if not esoteric, use of certain words. It puts a
peculiarly twentieth-century American Protestant touch to a long line
of concepts about man and society, starting, perhaps, with William of

Questions 171
Occam and including the French Encyclopedists, the later French soci
ologists, the nineteenth-century English and American Utopians, and
K ark M arx and his various apostles. The fact that human society now
faces starkly the impact of exponential change lends both poignancy
and urgency to considerations of this sort.
Skinner’s main contribution, as I see it, is that he has posited a general
theory abo ut the absolute dependence of hum an behavior on environ
mental factors and the ability of man so to alter the environment as to
produce desired kinds of behavior. The debate ensuing over this general
theory may have enorm ous consequences.
At once, a comparison comes to mind between Skinner’s theories and
Marxist concepts. The main difference in underlying thought seems to
be that, although Skinner generalizes about the need and possibility
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of altering hum an behavior through altering the social environment,
M arx is specific abo ut it in terms of application. Marx saw private
ownership of the means of production as the basic negative rein
forcing contingency—to utilize Skinner’s language—responsible for
all aversive controls and blocking all positive reinforcers leading to
human betterment. Men themselves, once they understand this, accord
ing to Marx, could change the total social environment by eliminating
private ownership and, hence, produce totally different—and better, if
not ideal—hum an behavior.
Indeed, the absence of any suggestions for applicability of the “ Skin
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ner a p p ro a c h ’’ to man and society was, for me, the most striking feature
of Beyond Freedom and Dignity. The enunciation of a concept and the
popularization of it can, of themselves, be significant. The lack of
specifics of applicability in Beyond Freedom and D ignity does not,
therefore, necessarily negate its value, even if it may limit its usefulness.
But surely applicability, the possibility of applicability, of a social theory
has to be involved in any consideration of the theory. After reading
Beyond Freedom and Dignity, I turned with eagerness to Professor
Skinner’s earlier and more detailed work, Contingencies o f Reinforce
ment. Here, even though this book is subtitled A Theoretical Analysis,
I hoped I would find some indication of the a u th o r’s ideas about how
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his theory might be used to bring abo ut the utopian conditions he
asserts are possible. Again, I was disappointed. A lthough he spells out
in more scholarly details some of the experimental work underlying the
general concept, and deals with the concept itself in a somewhat broader
way, nothing is said or suggested about how we might utilize it in terms of
the social environment. We are simply told, in both works, that we can
do so.
The question arises as to whether the proponents of operant condi
tioning as a means of bringing about human betterment are not obli

172 FRED W ARNER NEAL
gated, at some point, to deal with this matter. It has been characteristic
o f the physical scientist simply to fool a rou nd with natural laws and
properties in the hope of discovering something new abo ut them. The
traditional attitude of the physical scientist, when the results of his
experiments are translated into some terrible social p ro d u c t—nuclear
weapons, for example—is to say, as Tom Lehrer quotes W ernher von
Braun as saying, “ T h a t’s another d e partm en t.” And in one way, of
course, the physical scientist is right. The social uses o f his experimenta
tion are “ another d epartm ent.” But a social scientist is in a different
category, especially if, as is true of Skinner, the purpose of his theories
is to change man and, further, to change him in certain specific ways.
M an, after all, cannot be chang ed—and especially changed in p a r
ticular ways—simply by setting forth theoretical concepts, even if they
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are “ scientifically” developed and their potential applicability tested by
both “ micro-logic” and “ m icro-laboratory” experiments. Indeed, to rest
the effort here would seem to be procedurally faulty, inasmuch as the
objective is “ m a c ro ” in n a tu re —that is, the environment of society as a
whole. Because the objective is, more specifically, “ hum an betterm ent,”
is there not a gap between Skinner’s claim th at his concept is broadly
applicable to a society and his failure to deal with the question of how a
society operates qua society? I have no quarrel with the idea that experi
ments on pigeons and dogs can tell us m uch abou t hum an behavior.
Maybe such experiments can even tell us everything abo ut the behavior
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of hum ans as individuals, although such a conclusion still must rest on
faith rather than on scientific proof. Even if it were true, however, does
it necessarily follow that contingencies which reinforce an individual
man will also reinforce, in the same way, a large group of men, a human
society? May there not be laws according to which a society moves
which are different from those governing the behavior of individuals?
Might not a society, once it starts moving, develop a m om entum of its
own which would, or might, create contingencies different from those
envisaged by the “ culture designers” ? I d o n ’t know, nor, I think, does
Skinner. M aybe the answers are unknowable. But does not the m atter
have to be dealt with? Is it not necessary to raise the questions and deal
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with their implications? There is, of course, a considerable literature
dealing with the difference between individual and social psychology,
but it does not, as far as I know, give us answers which could be utilized
in conjunction with Skinner’s theories.
Aside from methodology, the absence o f treatm ent of applicability
involves serious risks. I am sure Skinner is cognizant o f them. If operant
conditioning can be utilized for hum an betterment as he defines it—
and I suspect most of us would be in general agreement with his defini
tio n —could it not also be utilized for hum an betterment according to

Questions 173
some other definition, a definition which might not be to our liking at all?
Could it not, in fact, be utilized for selfish aggrandizement by a powerful
few? Obviously, both questions must be answered positively.
The last question takes us back to the question of the nature of
societal development. We are all creatures of our environment, to an
im portant degree. This is the essence—or one essence, at least—of
Skinner’s concept. H ow much are we prisoners of our social environ
ment? Here, the time factor may be significant. Assuming that it is
possible, theoretically, to tinker with the social environm ent so as to
produce reinforcing contingencies beneficial to all mankind, at what
point do the environmental changes so dom inate the society that new
directions are irreversible? The operant-conditioning theory posits that
the existing social environment is flawed because it has produced un
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desirable reinforcing contingencies. These, in turn, produce various
modes of undesirable behavior on the part of individuals, not because
these individuals are “ evil” in themselves but because they are resp ond
ing to certain kinds of reinforcing contingencies. As I understand the
theory, once the right kind of reinforcing contingencies are established,
the right kind of human behavior will be produced. But this is not an
overnight process. The possibility of instant social revolution is not
asserted. Skinner himself implies that it would be a gradual process.
Is it not likely that, long before man were made over, individuals repre
senting the old man, reinforced by contingencies in the old society,
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would be te m p te d —if not absolutely impelled—to utilize, for their own
ends, whatever operant-conditioning techniques were being utilized?
This is one problem the modern-day Marxists have to contend with,
both conceptually and practically. Practically, the desired hum an be
havior anticipated from a new general contingency—an end to private
ownership of the means of production —has not materialized universally
(within the Marxist-oriented societies). The social lag—if one may call
it this—has been so persistent that it has, up until now, been an impedi
ment in the development of the desired new contingency itself. Moreover,
to make sure the desired contingency obtains, those who believe in it
have been forced to take m any steps which gravely distort the nature
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of the new society. This, if one assumes Stalin was a sincere M arxist
Leninist, can be considered a Skinnerian explanation o f Stalinism. If
one assumes that Stalin was simply a self-seeking ogre, then do we not
have an example of an individual reinforced in the old ways taking
advantage of the new contingency to prevent the goals originally antici
pated. Either way, something unforeseen happened and produced u n
foreseen results.
O f course, it can be said—and it is true, to some extent—that the
whole Soviet experiment, the whole socialist experiment, is so c o m p a ra

tively new that what has happened in the Marxist-oriented countries is

no basis for generalization. It could be argued also that the Soviet
U nion aban don ed Stalinism (although some would dispute this) and is
again back on the slow but correct road o f developing the new rein
forcing contingency in the proper way. There is another difficulty,
however, both of a theoretical and practical sort. The Marxist-Leninist
definition of socialism—the system produced, or produceable, by the
new reinforcing contingency of state ownership of the means of p roduc
tio n —envisages political equality but economic inequality; th a t is, to
each according to his ability, which is, in part, the pattern of the old
contingency. Lenin wrote, for example, th a t it was necessary to utilize
the desire for personal gain developed under capitalism in order to
create the economic plenty needed for Com m unism , the end social result
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of the new reinforcing contingency. But some students of socialism,
including certain Marxists, have queried whether this does not build up
and “ reinforce” in individuals the very kind of behavior—individual
rather than group-oriented—which the system is attempting to over
come. Vladimir Bakaric, the Yugoslav Com m unist leader, has argued
that patterns of behavior which had one effect in a “ capitalist environ
m en t” would have a different effect in a “ socialist environm ent.” Maybe.
Perhaps probably. But th at the problem can be posed argues for the
necessity of dealing with it in connection with a theory of social engi
neering like Skinner’s.
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In addition to the confusion engendered by Skinner’s methodology
and his neglect of specifics, I find also a problem in his idea abo ut the
survival of a “ culture.”
Is a “ culture” something beyond a social environment? Does it involve
certain values? If so, what values? For Marx, for example, culture seems
to be ultimately a part of the superstructure. N o t only should it not
survive, it could not survive once the infrastructure—that is, the material
basis of society—changed. W hat does Skinner mean by culture? Is it
not a part of the social environment? Does it not have to be changed
fundamentally, if behavior is to be changed fundamentally? If it is
changed fundamentally, can it be said to have survived? H ow cultural
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survival and changes in the social environment necessary to affect hum an
behavior can both be goals is not m ade clear. The difficulty might be
cleared up if culture were defined, in some way, as separate and different
from environment, or if the types of environmental change considered
necessary or desirable were spelled out. Or, it could be that only a
behaviorally designed culture—th at is, one with the right kind of c o n
tingencies—can survive. In the absence of clarification about these
points, are we not left with some confusion between cause and effect?

Questions 175
The m atter is im portant, as far as Skinner’s concept goes, because so

much emphasis is placed on “ cultural survival.”
Skinner sees the idea of “ a u to n o m o u s m a n ” and the “ literature of
freedom and dignity” as impediments to conscious social engineering
to produce hu m an betterment. H e m akes an impressive case against
the concept of the a u to nom o us man. But does he really dispose of it?
Fo r example, if man can consciously alter his environm ent in desired
ways, is this not an example of autonom ousness? It is m a n ’s role as a
thinking creature th a t is at question. In Contingencies o f Reinforcem ent,
Skinner deals with Descartes’ dictum “ Cogito ergo sum ” as follows:
“ Descartes could not begin, as he tho ugh t he could, by saying, ‘Cogito
ergo sum .' He had to begin as a b a b y —a baby whose subsequent verbal
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environm ent eventually generated in him . . . certain responses of which
‘cogito’ was an example.” Is Skinner here saying th at the thinking
process itself is determined by environmental factors? Or is he only
saying that the results of the thinking process—the behavior—is deter
mined by environmental factors? If the latter, does he mean th a t the
thinking process has no independent function under any circumstances?
If so, is this the same as saying that all hum ans will th in k —and re a c t—
in the same way, provided they are subjected to the same stimuli? If
he is, indeed, saying this, then does not his conclusion rest largely on
faith? And, if so, is not another conclusion resting on a different faith
equally valid?
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It is beside the point, it seems to me, to hypothesize a bo ut a Robinson
Crusoe m aroo ned as a baby. W hat we are concerned ab ou t is man in
society, not a m an on a desert island. Given society, there is an ipso
fa c to social environment to which his thinking a p paratus responds.
But this is not the same as saying that, once stimulated, m an 's thoughts
are absolutely controlled by environmental factors. M aybe they are.
M aybe they are not. I can appreciate Skinner’s concern th at myth and
superstitition, arrogating to m an a special place in the nature of things
and clothing him with values supposedly free of environmental influence,
may stand in the way of man trying meaningfully to improve his c o nd i
tion. But even if we could prove this, it would not necessarily prove the
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totality of environm ental dom inance or the manageability of it.
Finally we come to the question o f freedom and dignity. Here, it
seems to me that Skinner is beating a dead ho rse—or at least the wrong
horse. He himself is not opposed to freedom and dignity but to the
misuse of these concepts in the “ literature.” I d o u bt if one can generalize
ab o u t this. The “ literature of freedom and dignity” can be divided into
at least three kinds. One is the use o f these concepts in a reactionary,
if not dishonest, way. Selfish interests, desiring to perpetuate the status

quo in their own interests, throw up the ideas of freedom and dignity
as a m ethod o f preventing social change. A second kind is well-inten
tioned but emotional, if not mystical. It is claimed that there is a “ divine
spark” in man which sets him ap a rt from all other beings and gives
him, as an individual, the potential to rise above all environmental
factors, at least spiritually. One can see how both of these kinds of
freedom-and-dignity literature oppose social engineering of the kind
proposed by Skinner. A third kind o f this literature, however, is not
necessarily opposed at all, as far as the general idea is concerned. It sees
both value and limitations in man but believes that it is environmental
factors which keep him from fulfilling his potential. It defines freedom
and dignity as something really to be attained only when the noblest
ideals of man are put into practice and made applicable to m ankind as a
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whole. If this kind of freedom-and-dignity literature looks askance at
Skinner’s ideas, it is more because of fear or uncertainty ab out their a p
plicability than because of dissent on a theoretical plane. N o t only does
it not oppose changing the hum an environment so as to affect behavior,
it insists on such a c o urse—but only to preserve and enhance hum an
values. The writings of T. H. Green, am o ng others, come to mind as an
example of this kind of literature of freedom and dignity.
This third kind of freedom-and-dignity literature occupies a much
more significant part of the total product than is apparent from reading
Skinner. Indeed, his own works could be a part of this third kind, if they
were more closely and explicitly tied in with the hum an values its expo
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nents uphold and seek to enhance. One of the reasons why I would
hope th at Skinner will develop the practical side of his theory, and co n
sider its pitfalls, is that, if he would do so, he could have this third kind
of literature of freedom and dignity as an ally, rather than as an o pp o
nent.
Skinner could now perform a very great service if he would spell out
how his theory could be applied to society, in concrete ways, to enhance
the freedom and dignity of man. If he, or his adherents, fail to do this,
the theory of operant conditioning could become a part of the literature
of nonfreedom and nondignity. In that case, it may have done nothing
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more th an open P a n d o ra ’s box and help usher in a more nightmarish
future than the one which Skinner fears will come abo ut if things go on
as they are.

13
Skinner and Human Differences
Arthur R. Jensen
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Arthur R. Jensen is a professor o f educational psychology at the
University o f California, Berkeley, and a contributor to m any
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journals and books. Jensen is perhaps m ost widely known fo r his
theories about the impact o f genetic fa c to rs upon intelligence.
W ith this chapter, a developmental psychologist not entirely
unfriendly to operant conditioning explores Skinner's behavioral
assumptions. Jensen separates Skinner's views fr o m those o f his
over-enthusiastic disciples and establishes that Skinnerism is fa r fro m
incompatible with views widely accepted by nonbehaviorists. This is a
useful corrective to the generalizations and inaccuracies about
Skinnerism that have been published both by its supporters and by
its critics.
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If a thinker wants to guarantee that he will be misunderstood and mis
interpreted to the world, he should have many disciples and followers.
It also helps to have plenty of critics. They are often most expert at
inventing and spreading misconceptions about the things they criticize.
A m ong living psychologists, B. F. Skinner has had, by far, more than a
fair share of disciples, followers, and critics. (In this respect, he is scarcely
rivaled only by Jean Piaget, who also pays a similar price.)

178 A RTHUR R. JENSEN
So we have to distinguish carefully between the real Skinner and the

Skinnerism of disciples and critics. I wonder how many others have
noticed, as I have, th a t it is m uch easier to find fault with Skinner on the
basis of writings about h im —and I mean even the most sympathetic
accounts—than on the basis of Skinner’s own writings. My own dis
agreements with Skinner, on analysis, turn out to be merely disagree
ments in emphasis rather than any essential disagreement with his
views of behavioral science or of man. I had long hoped that sooner or
later I would get the chance to connect Skinner’s work with some of
the kinds of psychological and educational problems I have become
involved with in recent years. Fortunately, his latest book, Beyond
Freedom and D ignity, gives a num ber o f direct leads for tying him to
some of my own concerns.
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My strategy here is to rectify (as I believe Skinner has not done
loudly enough himself) what seems to me one of the most entrenched
popular misconceptions of Skinnerism; and, to the extent that I may be
wrong, I trust this will be rectified by Skinner himself. I am referring
to the notion that all individual differences in hum an behavior, with
the exception of those produced by brain damage or pathological
conditions, are solely a result of differences in individuals’ histories of
reinforcements. T h a t is to say, persons differ in their behavior wholly
because of differences in their past environmental contingencies. I
have had to argue against this notion with a num ber of true-blue
Skinnerians. Skinner himself, as far as I am aware, has never made this
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claim. I do know that he has, in num erous writings, explicitly stated
the contrary, but, until Beyond Freedom and Dignity, it has been in
such hushed tones and surrounded by so much other seemingly c o n
tradictory material that, I admit, it is not hard to see why so m any of
his less critical readers have m isunderstood him on this point. Skinnerism
has been grasped by many ideological environmentalists as their scien
tific rationale, and I think the case could be argued th at much that is
made of Skinner’s relevance to educational practices and policies
really derives, not from the analytical applications of his laboratory
research to the technology o f teaching, but to his misconstrued en
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vironmentalism. The famous “ Hollow O rganism ,” which is so often
ascribed to Skinner but is actually an artifact of Skinnerism, is, of course,
also empty of genes, or at least any genes that could make for intra
species behavioral differences. Thus, hum an differences can be viewed
as am ounting to no m ore than the individual’s history of environmental
contingencies, as accidental and imposed externally, thereby preserving
the illusion of inherent equality. The apparently supreme im portance of
this belief to many persons may be based on what I maintain is a mis
taken conception —namely, th at “ inherent equality” (like “ auto no m o us

Skinner and Human Differences 179
m a n ” ) is a fundamental premise for the validity of the “ equality”

referred to in the phrase “ All men are created eq ual” in the Declaration
of Independence.
I hope that Skinner has not been too reinforced by the obvious signs
of comfort that some persons seem to have derived from m isunder
standing him on this point. I have discovered a m ost interesting thing
ab ou t h u m a n s’ reactions to individual differences. It may even have a
more profound significance for understanding the hum an condition
than I am yet fully aware of. This is the fact that other persons warm
up to us whenever we do or say anything that ignores or minimizes
individual differences. And this is very reinforcing, believe me. Like all
reinforcement, it shapes our behavior. But it is an interesting thing to
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observe, when one becomes conscious of it; it seems to be alm ost an
instinctive hum an emotion (my apologies to Skinner). I wonder why?
One can see it (and feel it) on a large scale in lecturing to an audience;
one’s statements that point up hum an differences or try to analyze
them evokes glum, tense expressions. But then say something that
minimizes differences and you feel a rushing glow from the a u d i e n c e -
such reinforcement, and such inducement to continue in the same vein!
Tell them th at Einstein, as a child, was a late talker, and that he d id n ’t
do too well in gram m ar school, either, and the audience will love you.
So we have to watch it, and be careful not to let our beliefs about
reality be shaped by such scientifically irrelevant reinforcers. This inter
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esting hum an tendency probably accounts, at least in part, for the
relative unpopularity of differential psychologists, whose business it is
to study hum an differences, when they try to be objective scientists.
And popular prejudice casts “ hereditarians” as the “ bad guys” and
“ environmentalists” as the “ good guys.” Thus, m any who preach p o p u
lar Skinnerism are in for certain rewards th at may not be accorded to
Skinner himself or to those who take the trouble to read him thoroughly.
The most insistent message running th rou gh nearly all of Skinner’s

works, one that he keeps ham m ering away at in many forms at every
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conceivable opportunity, is the abolition of “ a u to n o m o u s m a n ” from
behavioral science, indeed, from all our thinking. Skinner’s position is
nicely epitomized in the following statement:
What is being abolished is autonomous man—the inner man, the homun

culus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literatures of freedom
and dignity.
His abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man is a device used
to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed
from our ignorance, and as our understanding increases, the very stuff

180 ARTHUR R. JENSEN
of which he is composed vanishes. Science does not dehumanize man, it

de-homunculates him, and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of
the human species. To man qua man we readily say good riddance. Only
by dispossessing him can we turn to the real causes of human behavior.
Only then can we turn from the inferred to the observed, from the miracu
lous to the natural, from the inaccessible to the manipulable [pp. 200- 201],1
Because I seem to have grown up with this view, it does not appear
startling to me. And I think it is a view th a t is now taken more or less
for granted by perhaps the majority of psychologists of my generation.
It is part of the mainstream in the history of American psychology
coming thro ugh W atson and Thorndike and Skinner. But the gross
Skinnerian misconception th a t so many psychologists have derived
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from this view is that, by getting rid of a u tono m ou s man, we can explain
all of hu m an behavior in terms of external (that is, environmental) cir
cumstances in the individual’s personal past history and his current
situation. I emphasize external because it is deemed “ Skinnerian” to
eschew the “ inferred” in favor of the “ observed,” and the “ m anipulable”
in favor of the “ inaccessible,” in describing the causes of hum an be-
heavior. I doub t th a t Skinner would knowingly endorse the kind of
gross sensory-motor positivism th at some of his followers have read
into these kinds of statements. Other sciences that are m ore highly
developed than psychology have not found it profitable to eschew
inference or that that is inaccessible to direct observation by our u n
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aided senses, least of all nuclear physics. So I see no reason for imposing
any such restrictions on behavioral science.
The fact is th at all of hum an behavior, and particularly individual
differences, need not be explained and cannot be explained solely in
terms of external contingencies in the e n vironm ent—at least not the
external environm ent of the individual. If we want to bring in the
environmental contingencies th at have shaped the evolution of the
species th rou gh genetic selection, th at is another matter. “ A uton om ou s
m a n ” is, of course, no more acceptable to the evolutionist’s or the
geneticist’s view than to Skinner’s. In fact, what I am ab ou t to point
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out is that these views are all essentially the same. We might call them
the biological view of man. As far as I can see, it is the only conception
of man and behavior that we can say or do anything about scientifically.
We find buried inconspicuously in one of Skinner’s earlier works the
following hint of his recognition of genetically conditioned behavioral
differences. He points out interspecies differences in capacity to be rein
^ h r o u g h o u t this paper, page num bers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s

forced by certain kinds of events—“ W h a t is reinforcing to a horse need

no t be reinforcing to a dog or a m a n ” (Skinner, 1953, p. 75). These are
clearly seen as inherited characteristics. A b ou t intraspecies differences,
Skinner (1953, p. 196) wrote:
D ifferences in hereditary en d ow m en t, w h ich are to o co n sp ic u o u s to be

ov erlo o k ed w hen we com p are different sp ecies but presum ab ly are also
present to a lesser exten t betw een m em bers o f a single sp ecies, accou n t for
other differences in repertoire, as do differences in age . . . or in d e v e lo p
m ent. . . .
Skinner finally surfaced completely on the issue of the genetic aspect

of behavioral differences in his article “ The Phylogeny and Ontogeny
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of Behavior” (Skinner, 1966), but apparently the substance of this
rather difficult essay was not enough like Skinner’s other writings to
have become assimilated as an integral part of Skinnerian behaviorism.
This is unfortunate, because the view put forth in th a t article, I think,
affords a proper perspective for hum an behavior genetics and the study
of hu m an differences.
In a still more recent work, Skinner (1968, p. 241) is quite explicit in
what he says a b ou t individual differences, acknowledging but minimizing
their genetic aspect:
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D ifferences in sp eed o f learning and forgetting, and as a result in the size
o f the repertoire w hich m ay be acquired and m aintained, have p olitical
and other im p lication s w h ich have m ade them the subject o f con tin u in g
debate. T hese are p resum ab ly the m ain differences sh ow n by m easures o f
intelligen ce. Their nature is n ot clear. Sp eed o f learning is hard to define.
It can easily be sh ow n that the b ehavior o f a p ig eo n changes as the result
o f on e reinforcem en t, and the hum an organism can presum ab ly not learn
m ore rapidly than that. T here rem ain, how ever, great differences in such
asp ects as the exten t o f the ch an ge w h ich m ay take place u p on a single
occa sio n , the sp eed w ith w h ich com p lex repertoires m ay accu m ulate, the
extent to w h ich th ey can be m aintained w ith ou t m utu al interference am ong
their parts, and their durability. T he practical q u estio n is not so m uch
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w h ether these differences are gen etic or en viron m en tal as w h eth er en v iro n
m ental con tin gen cies m ay be designed to reduce their sco p e. . . . If the
differences are genetic, different m eth od s o f instruction m ay be n eeded, but
a great deal can probab ly be d on e to reduce the range o f differences o f this
kind th rou gh environ m en tal m easures.
Now , in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner gives full, though not
detailed, recognition to genetic behavioral differences, and he lists the
denial of a genetic basis of behavioral differences as one of the mis
representations of behaviorism [p. 166]. The “ environm entalism ” of

Skinner is essentially no different from th a t of m odern genetics, inas

m uch as Skinner traces genetic variability to differential environmental
influences through genetic mechanisms in the evolution of the species.
In a sense, an organism carries with it, in the genetic code and gene
frequencies, the effects of distant environmental contingencies in its
evolutionary past. In Skinner’s words, “ As a science of behavior adopts
the strategy of physics and biology, the a utono m o us agent to which
behavior has traditionally been attributed is replaced by the environ
m e n t— the environment in which the species evolved and in which the
behavior of the individual is shaped and m aintained” [p. 184, emphasis
added]. Skinner extends this view to include “ cultural” differences:
A culture, like a species, is selected by its adaptation to an environment: to
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the extent that it helps its members to get what they need and avoid what
is dangerous, it helps them to survive and transmit the culture. The two
kinds of evolution are closely interwoven. The same people transmit both
a culture and a genetic endowment—though in different ways and for
different parts of their lives. The capacity to undergo the changes in be
havior which make a culture possible was acquired in the evolution of the
species, and reciprocally, the culture d eterm in es m any o f the biological
ch aracteristics tra n sm itte d [p. 129, emphasis added].
This theme has been greatly elaborated upon with a wealth o f examples
by a leading British geneticist, C. D. D arlington (1969). T hough it is
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probably no surprise to Professor Skinner, we may wonder how many
Skinnerians could have imagined th at “ environmentalist” Skinner and
“ hereditarian” D arlington would be found espousing essentially the
same view on fundam ental issues. A nd when Skinner writes as follows,
there are shades o f Sir Francis G alton and the British eugenicists who
followed him, to say nothing of William Shockley!
The designer of a culture is not an interloper or meddler. He does not step

in to disturb a natural process, he is part of a natural process. The geneticist
who changes the characteristics of a species by selective breeding as by
changing genes may seem to be meddling in biological evolution, but he
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does so because his species has evolved to the point at which it has been
able to develop a science of genetics and a culture which induces its members
to take the future of the species into account [p. 180].
At this point, I am reminded of the concluding paragraph of a most

interesting essay by sociologist Kingsley Davis (1964, p. 204):
If and when it does come, the deliberate alteration of the species for sociologi
cal purposes will be a more fateful step than any previously taken by man
kind. It will dwarf three of the previous most revolutionary steps: the

emergence of speech, the domestication of plants and animals, and the

industrial revolution. The reason is simple: whereas these other changes
were socio-cultural in character and thus subject to the limitations of man’s
capacities, the new development would be both socio-cultural and biological.
It would, for the first time, enable man to overcome the sole limit on
socio-cultural evolution, the limit set by his innate capacities. These capaci
ties would change very slowly, and quite probably in a downhill direction,
under present conditions of inadvertent selection. On the other hand,
deliberate control, once begun, would soon benefit science and technology,
which in turn would facilitate further hereditary improvement, which again
would extend science, and so on in a self-reinforcing spiral without limit.
In other words, when man has conquered his own biological evolution he
will have laid the basis for conquering everything else. The universe will be
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his, at last.
So now that I have established Skinner’s bona fides in the genetic-

behavioral analysis of hum an differences, I should like to push the matter
a bit further in order to force some consideration of problems th at I
think are im p ortan t and quite germane to the topics of Beyond Freedom
and D ignity but that are rather shirked therein.
Individual differences in behavioral characteristics are a central fact,

both to psychologists and to people in general. Differences are fun da
mental data, in the sense th at all people have always noticed them and
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wondered a b ou t their causes, and they are conspicuously related to the
reward systems of every society we know anything a b o u t—which, of
course, makes them very im portant to everyone. N ote th a t it is not just
the particular behavior that is im portant (though it may be im portant,
too), but the fact of hum an differences itself that is im portant. This is
true, whether we like it or not. One type of differences th at are of such
im portance in many societies are those behaviors and all their correlates
th at are measured by what we happen to call “ intelligence tests.”
Skinner (1953, p. 198) has expressed his disappointm ent with the IQ as
a behavioral datum because it does not describe or quantify any be
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havior per se, and this, of course, is true. The score yielded by a test has
meaning only in reference to a population; it is a comparative index,
not an absolute measure of the individual’s behavior. Skinner correctly
likens it to the scale for expressing the hardness o f minerals, which are
ordered in terms of which mineral can scratch but not be scratched by
another mineral when they are struck together. The degree of hardness
of any one mineral is meaningless without reference to another. In fact,
the notion of hardness might not even occur to us in this context if we
did not first notice differences in hardness between minerals. But Skinner
says that “ such a scale is unquestionably useful for technological p u r

poses, but it does not greatly advance the study of the hardness of m in
erals,” as would, for example, an explanation of hardness in absolute,
noncom parative terms, by reference to molecular structure and the like.
True, an explanation of hardness must probably resort to some form
of description at the molecular level. But I think this misses the point
and mistakenly belittles the comparative scale. For the observed differ
ences is where the question of hardness began in the first place, and the
differences are every bit as m uch a basic datum as the molecular struc
ture o f any particular mineral. Moreover, the explanation of hardness
at the molecular level must, in the final analysis, accord with the findings
of our comparative scale, or we might conclude there is something wrong
with the explanatory theory. In short, the fact of observed differences
and our comparative scale of measuring them not only poses the ques
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tion of their explanation but provides the criterion for the validity o f the
answer. I believe this is a good parallel to the whole problem of ability
testing and the study of individual differences in general.
If we are concerned mainly with controlling behavior by operant
techniques, we quickly realize th at practically any bit of behavior re
sponds to reinforcement contingencies. This is impressive raw fact:
reinforcement contingencies change behavior. But the next step, taken
by so many Skinnerians, is not fact: that is, when we observe a behavioral
difference between two organisms, we may say the difference must be
due to different histories of reinforcement. A nd one can always point to
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circumstantial differences in individual histories, which adds to the
plausibility. But this second step, we know, is both logically and factually
wrong.
Concern with shaping behavior by means of reinforcements u nd e r
standably gives the investigator in this field a rather particularistic view
of behavior. Having this particularistic view of behavior is probably one
of the more com m on characteristics by which we might identify psy
chologists who turn out to call themselves “ Skinnerians” or one of the
impersonal synonyms that mean much the same thing. We find that
these persons have little or no use, usually even a dislike, for more
general behavioral terms like “ traits,” “ abilities,” “ aptitudes,” and so
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o n —terms that figure so prominently in the technical vocabulary of the
differential psychologist. It is usually in terms of traits and abilities that
psychologists describe and measure individual differences. Behaviorists
originally decried these terms, probably because they identified them
with the “ mentalistic” inner homunculi they were trying to get rid of in
the study of behavior. But most present-day differential psychologists,
it should be noted, are behaviorists, too. I, for one, have no use for
mentalistic homunculi, any more than Skinner has. Yet I think it is
beating a dead horse to eschew traits and abilities, which are probably

the most valid and useful terms for the description of individual differ
ences. All we mean by such terms, essentially, is th a t we are dealing with
behaviors that have a high degree of reliability (that is, in the same
circumstances, the individual’s behavior is consistent from one time to
another) and generalizability (that is, the individual’s behavior is c o n
sistent in a wide variety of circumstances). These characteristics of
behavior can be treated in ways that, in principle, are just as empirical,
just as operational, as is change in response rate under a schedule of
reinforcement. So behaviorism really has no justification for excluding
differential psychology, other than the legitimate grounds of a division
of scientific labor, or for presupposing that all the subject matter of
differential psychology can simply be subsumed under the study of
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reinforcement contingencies. Hardly anyone disputes the idea that skills,
abilities, aptitudes, and all their behavioral correlates are acquired (that
is, learned) in an environment and depend upon various contingencies
of reinforcement or feedback—this is granted. W hat are not entirely
attributable to environmental contingencies—and, in some kinds of
hum an behavior, are hardly attributable at all —are differences in rates
of acquisition, in the age at which rate is maximal, in the relative ef
fectiveness of reinforcing contingencies, and in the asym ptote of per
formance. All of these may be influenced by environmental contingencies,
but they are also attributable to organismic factors—th at is, causal
factors that are not referrable to the subject’s personal experiential
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history. Interspecies differences in these respects are obviously so great
as to require no further com m ent, and they are acknowledged th ro u g h
out the writings of Skinner and other behaviorists. Fro m these writings,
however, one might easily gather that the magnitude of intraspecies
differences of this sort is so minute, by comparison with interspecies
differences, as to be practically insignificant, and minute also in c o m
parison with the differences that are attributable wholly to environ
mental contingencies. This, I believe, is a mistaken belief. It may be true
of a particular behavior or a particular subject. As a general rule,
however, it is most doubtful. At Berkeley, for example, it has been
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possible, by selective breeding, to obtain different strains of laboratory
rats that differ in maze-learning ability by four times as much as any
differences the investigators have been able to induce by a combination
of environmental means, including direct training on mazes.
There are wholly objective, operational means for determining whether
differences are attributable to external contingencies or to genetic factors
and for determining how much each source contributes, on the average,
in a given population. These are the methods of quantitative genetics.
We have learned from the application of these methods to the study of
hum an behavioral differences that, in the case of some traits and abilities,

a m ong these being the kinds of behavior we classify as intelligent, a

large part of the variance indeed is attributable to genetic factors. If
a particular class of behavior has what is called high heritability, which
can be objectively ascertained by some specified set of operations, we
know that a large part of the observable differences in that behavior
is caused by genetic factors rather than by differences in the external
environment. T ho ug h differences in the external environment may ac
tually exist, they are not, in such a case, the major cause of the observed
behavioral differences. Genetic variation is the rule in nature. W ithout
it, there could be no biological evolution; it is the mechanism by which
natural selection operates and by which environmental contingencies
leave their m a rk on future generations. The elimination or denigration
of hum an diversity is inconsistent with evolution and negates the possi
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bility of biological adaptation to the changing dem ands of the environ
ment.
Apparently, however, there is some price to pay for behavioral vari
ability, especially in those behaviors deemed im portant by society, such
as intelligence, and we have not yet learned really how to handle this
problem. Individual differences in socially valued behaviors have always
been too conspicuous to ignore. But, in a sociopolitcal sense, they are
benign, as com pared with group differences in such behaviors. G roups
are the result of classification—whether in terms of geographic origin,
physical characteristics, economic status, occupation, sex, or w hatever—
and can be quite arbitrary. A lthough group mean differences in any
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characteristic are really just an average of individual differences classified
by some particular rubric, they can, when viewed in this collective form,
be social dynamite, if the behavior in question is socially valued and
economically rewarded and if the mean differences between groups are
large relative to individual differences within groups. The problems are
magnified when group membership is rigidly imposed and the group
identity of individuals is highly visible, as in the case of physical char
acteristics associated with racial classification. Yet there is no funda
mental distinction, in a genetic or behavioral sense, between group
differences and individual differences; the former are produced by some
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arbitrary classification of the latter. If there are a number of correlated
characteristics and we classify on the basis of one, we thereby a u to
matically classify also to some extent on the basis of the others. We can
urge doing away with classification and groups, we can make laws
against discrimination in educational opportunities, employment, and
housing on the basis of group membership, we can insist upon equality
before the law, and we can advocate considering only persons’ indi
vidual characteristics rather than their group membership as a basis for
social relations. All well and good. W h at we may not accomplish by

these m eans is equality of performance in those behaviors that are

deemed valuable by society and are rewarded accordingly. If we repeated
ly look for the causes of differences in ability to acquire a socially valued
skill (such as reading, for example) in the external environm ent and are
hard put to find a convincing explanation there, but we also refuse to
consider any factors other than external ones as possible causes of these
differences, perhaps we sow the seeds of a kind of social p a ra n o ia —a
need to find an external cause to blame for the observed differences, a
cause on which to vent the frustration and aggression that arise as a
consequence thereof.
General intelligence—a large class of correlated behaviors—is the
most embattled of psychological concepts just because of its im p ortant
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social consequences and because individual differences in intelligence are
so large and so obvious to the pragmatic man in the street. If intelligence
tests had never existed, it would not make the least bit of difference
socially. T h a t is why it always seems so fatuous to talk ab ou t doing
away with IQ tests, as if it would make any real difference. H ow else to
explain the fact that the average correlation between the IQs of m arriage
partners is almost as high as the correlation between various standard
intelligence tests? (H usbands and wives are more alike in IQ than
brothers and sisters reared together in the same family.) And how
else to explain the fact that, when people are asked to rank-order various
occupations in terms of their own subjective impression of their “ pres
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tige” and “ desirability,” they come out, on the average, with a ranking
of the occupations th a t correlates between .70 an d .90 with the ra n k
order of the actual mean IQs found for members of those occupations?
L et’s face it: we are'dealing, here, with a prime reality.
A division of labor in science is necessary, and it would be foolish
to criticize Skinner or any o f his followers for concentrating their atte n
tion on a particular aspect of the study of behavior. But when what
began as a division of labor gets generalized to the broad aspects of
social philosophy, as we see happening now with Skinner’s work, the
com parative lack o f emphasis on those im p ortant phenom ena of be
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havioral science that are subsumed in other divisions of labor becomes
uncomfortably conspicuous. I would propose that people’s realistic per
ceptions of individual differences (and perhaps group differences, too)
have extremely im p ortant behavioral consequences. They can act as
positive or negative reinforcers or as punishment. Here, I venture, is
grist for Skinner’s mill that he has not yet begun to grind. Assuming
that my analysis is not altogether amiss, I would hope his creative
intellect will sooner or later go to work on it. Let me mention some of
the specific issues that I think need to be considered in this hoped-for
extension of Skinner’s thinking.

Differential psychologists speak of behavior as having structure. It is

something more than a mere cumulation of everything one has learned,
something more than a history of operant contingencies. Structure means
there are relatively stable patterns of correlations am ong many behaviors,
and m any previously unobserved behaviors may be predicted prob-
abalistically from a knowledge of this structure. Moreover, all behavioral
correlations are not merely a product of co m m o n learning—that is, the
overlapping of num erous smaller units of behavior with com m on rein
forcement histories, or a result of transfer due to “ identical elements.”
There are four main causes of correlations am ong behaviors in the
dom ain o f skills, abilities, aptitudes, and so on, and these causes are not
at all mutually exclusive: ( 1) dependence of the behavior upon com m on
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sensory or m o to r capacities (this is trivial in most so-called mental
tests); (2) part-w hole functional dependence—th a t is, one behavior may
simply be a subunit of some other behavior, such as («) shifting gears
smoothly being a subunit of (b) passing a driver’s test consisting of
driving your car around in city traffic with an examiner present; (3) hier
archical functional dependence—that is, one behavior is prerequisite to
another, or, conversely, one is functionally dependent upon the other,
as skill in working problems in long division is dependent upon skill in
multiplication; and (4) genetic correlation am on g behaviors, apparently
due to com m on assortment of their genetic underpinnings through
selection and homogamy, and to pleiotropism (one gene having two or
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more seemingly unrelated phenotypic effects). M ethods are available for
distinguishing purely functional correlations from genetic correlations.
Factors derived from the m ethods of factor analysis no more deserve
to be dismissed as mere “ mentalistic fictions” than the physicist’s u n
observable pi mesons and neutrinos can be dismissed as “ physicalistic
fictions.” A factor is not any specific observable bit of behavior, and
I ’m not sure anyone would know how to go ab ou t reinforcing factors,
but I imagine one could, to some extent, change a factor structure or
create new factors thro ugh operant techniques. It is surely possible to
do so through genetic techniques. One can, for example, selectively
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breed in or breed out factors in a given population, or markedly increase
one factor and decrease another, which shows that some factors (but
not all) have a strong genetic basis—th a t is, the behavioral intercorrela
tions from which they are derived have a substantial genetic component.
The well-known g factor (g for general) of hum an abilities is quite clearly
of this nature. One of the most impressive phenomena to the differential
psychologist is the high degree of correlation found between seemingly
quite different behaviors, each of which, presumably, must have de
veloped under exceedingly different histories and types of reinforcement
contingencies—for example, the high correlation found between such

seemingly diverse and unrelated behaviors as defining the meaning of

words in a vocabulary test, completing such num ber series as 2, 5, 8,
11, _?_, and copying geometric forms, such as those shown in the accom
panying figure (The Gesell Institute’s Figure Copying Test). All of these
disparate tests, when factor analyzed am ong m any other tests, have their
largest loadings (that is, sources of variance or differences am ong per
sons) on the g factor.
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/ /
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\
The ten simple geometric forms used in the Figure Copying Test. In the actual test
booklet, each figure is presented singly on the top half o f a 5±" X 81" sheet. The
circle is If" in diameter.
A nother thing: there is something abo ut the behaviors on such tests

th a t can lead one who studies them to have such seemingly heretical,
nonbehavioristic, not to say antibehavioristic, th oughts as “ behavior is
the medium, not the message.” N ow I may really be getting into trouble
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with Skinner; but I think this has to be cleared up. I think there are
structures inside the organism, presumably in the brain, th at may get
laid down in conjunction with particular o perant contingencies, but
that then become quite independent of them. F o r example, we find that
a child can spontaneously perform up to a certain level on the Figure
Copying Test illustrated here, but then practice on the test, and even
direct instruction, will not m uch improve his performance; merely get
ting six m on th s or a year older will do a lot more. Is this because he has
picked up more skill at drawing, through practice and environmental

feedback, in the intervening m onths? I doubt it. M ore likely, some

a u to no m o us growth process has taken place in his brain. It is an interest
ing thing that drawing skill—th a t is, the sheer behavioral act of copying
these figures—seems to be the “ medium, not the message,” in the sense
that the essential of the child’s performance remain the same if he
copies with his nonpreferred hand (with which he has had so much less
practice in drawing) or even with the pencil held between the toes of his
foot. The artistic or draftsmanlike quality suffers, to be sure, but the
essentials of the drawing do not. If a child c a n ’t copy the diam ond with
his foot, he c an ’t do it with his preferred hand, either. The behavior,
in other words, seems to be guided by a central p r o g r a m ; it is conceptual
rather than just behavioral. Shaping the behavior by operant techniques
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may shape the “ m eans” but not necessarily the “ message.” All u n
tutored children who can copy the cube, for example, can also copy the
diam ond without any trouble. But take a child who c a n ’t draw the
diam ond (he w on ’t be able to draw the cube, either) and train him (if
you can) to draw the cube (it will be fantastically more difficult than
your most pessimistic expectations), and then see if he can copy the
diamond. The child usually c a n ’t do it, when this sort of thing has been
tried. An older child does not have to be taught any of this. If he learns it
(beyond learning how to work a pencil), we do not known when, where,
or how. I think most behaviorists have no t paid sufficient attention to
these kinds of behaviors (I hesitate to call them “ cognitive” ), which are
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not so readily shaped by operant contingencies.
Similarly, I think the behavioral handicaps of the retardate or the
psychotic are not merely a product of their reinforcement histories, and,
although some of their behavior may be shaped to conform to certain
standards by operant conditioning (often a valuable thing, indeed), they
will not become “ n orm a l” persons th rou gh these behavioral techniques.
Their problems are essentially structural or biochemical—inner, a u to n o
mous mechanisms gone awry. Again, the behavior is the medium, not
the message.
This brings me to the whole subject o f mental development. (As a
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behaviorist I have no more dread o f saying “ m ental” than has the
astronom er in saying that the sun “ rises,” even though he knows all
school children are taught that the sun do esn ’t “ rise,” but that the earth
revolves.) I believe th at behavior has a kind o f biological integrity,
such that, in the long run and to a large extent, it is not at the mercy
of a capricious environment. Genetic mechanisms are a kind of gyro
scope for stability in the long-range course of development. From
m om ent to moment, day to day, perhaps even week to week, behaviors
are wafted hither and thither by environmental contingencies, but, in
the long haul, the most im portant behaviors (which usually turn out to

be those strongly conditioned by genetic factors) show an increasing

stability and predictability that there is good reason to doubt can be
attributed to a consistent piling up of a reinforcement history. The
genetic endow ment that the individual starts out with in life is a capri
cious thing, the total parental genes having acted as a pure random
lottery from which the offspring got its shake (o f one-half the parental
genes), for better or worse. But beyond that point, genetic capriciousness
ends. From then on, the environment is the capricious factor in the
individual’s development, and, in most cases, he can thank his lucky
stars for the long-range stability of the course of his development laid
down by the genes. This is true, to a large extent, of physical growth and
also, I believe, of behavior. It is interesting, for example, th at children
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who are subjected to a period o f famine, such as the year or two of ex
treme famine in Poland and Holland near the end of W orld W ar 11, show
a retarded growth rate and stunted development, but then quickly catch
up when adequate food rations become available; and, as adults, these
children are indistinguishable in statute from those who never underwent
starvation (H arrison et al., 1964, chap. 21). There are parallels in be
havior. The most dram atic illustration is the famous case of Isabel, the
girl who was reared, for the first six years of her life, by a deaf-mute
m other in a semidarkened attic and had no other hum an contacts until
she was found by the authorities at the age of six (Davis, 1947). She had
no speech, no language, and the behavioral development of an infant,
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with a Stanford-Binet mental age of less than two years and an IQ of
a bo ut 30. Removed to a norm al home where she was cared for by a
nurse, she gained about six years of mental age (an enorm ous gain in
behavior repertoire) in only two years. This is a rate of gain in behavior
repertoire that would be found in a normal environm ent only in a child
having an IQ of at least 300! The gain lasted, but the fantastic rate did
not persist: at eight years of age, Isabel was able to keep up with her
age-mates in school; from there on, she simply progressed at the rate
of an average child.
In H ead Start programs, we typically see the other side of this phe
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no m eno n; workers in com pensatory education call it “ fade-out.” That
is, quite often the dram atic short-term accelerated gains in behavioral
repertoire induced by especially intensive instruction and environmental
m anipulation simply “ fade-out” in the course o f the next year, and the
children are soon found to be right back on the same mental or scholas-
tic-achievement “ grow th” curve th at is found for the control group,
which received no induced behavioral spurt some m onths earlier. It is
interesting to me that achievements (that is, scholastic-behavior reper
toire) measured at regular short intervals thro ugh ou t the course of the
children’s schooling, when intercorrelated, form a matrix of correlations
that fit beautifully what is called a simplex model. Th at is to say, the

192 ARTH U R R. JENSEN
growth in achievement, when measured at m any points along the way,

can be interpreted in terms of the cumulative addition of random incre
m en ts—so capricious are the short-term environmental influences affect
ing rate of gain over short intervals. But, for the individual growth
curves to fan out and approach quite different asymptotes, another fea
ture must be added to the model: the ra nd om increments, /, before being
added into the cumulative total at each point, must be multiplied by a
constant, c, which has a different value for different individuals. It might
be called a coefficient of consolidation—th a t is, how much of the gain
from point 1 to point 2 actually “ sticks” or gets “ consolidated” so as to
have a discernable influence at point 3. “ Mental age” is indexed in
terms of behavioral repertoire; it is ci plus the i of the immediate past.
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The c, in this case, is the individual’s IQ. Notice th at I said “ gain from
point 1 to point 2” ; I did not say “ from time 1 to time 2,” because
time along a linear scale is merely incidental in this context. T he essential
underlying continuum , of which points in chronological time are merely
a correlate in the individual’s development, is increasing complexity of
behavior, or of “ cognitive structures,” as Piagetian types might prefer
to say. The asymptotes toward which the processes tend in these kinds
of behavior are quite strongly conditioned by genetic factors; this we
now know with considerable certainty.
I think there can be little doub t abou t the fact of “ readiness” for
acquiring behaviors of various degrees of complexity, and I doubt that
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all differences in readiness are due to differences in prior histories of
reinforcements or other external environmental factors. The degree to
which it is, for any given class of behavior, is an empirical question to
be answered by evidence, not debate. I w onder about the effects on a
child lacking readiness for acquiring a certain complex behavior of
subjecting him to environmental contingencies designed to shape up the
desired behavior. The behavior may appear to be shaped up today, but
will it be consolidated in such a way as to be available tom orrow , to
transfer to the acquisition of still m ore complex behaviors? 1 d o n ’t
know. But I think I have seen, in some school learning situations, what
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look to me very much like experimental extinction, conditioned inhibi
tion, experimental neurosis, and the emotions of frustration and ag
gression that often are a part of these phenomena. The more enduring
consequences of repeated early failures are not so much of an intellectual
nature as they are emotional and motivational. “ T urn-off” occurs, and
then further learning does not take place at all in a particular domain.
The subject learns, instead, to avoid the very contingencies that would
make for successful learning. “ Intelligent behavior,” in some spheres,
might be extinguished.

There are great individual differences in readiness in acquiring such

complex behaviors as reading, for example. The extent to which this is
viewed almost as a national calamity is seen in such lofty pron oun ce
ments as the U.S. Office of E d ucatio n’s “ Right to R e a d ” campaign.
M any people wonder why the countless millions spent on research on
reading instruction has not been more effective—meaning why d o n ’t all
children learn to read more or less equally well when taught (as the
majority are) at abou t six years of age? (Fewer people ask this question
in the Scandinavian countries, where reading instruction is postponed
till age seven; yet, as far as we know, Scandinavians finally read as well
as the French, who begin at age five.) Some people c a n ’t understand why
the schools c a n ’t teach all children to read at a b o u t the same age just as
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easily as all children learn to talk at a bo ut the same age. Surely, speaking
a language is very complicated behavior, to o ; yet virtually all children
learn it between two to three years of age, merely throug h exposure and
without any special instruction. Only a very few children suffering from
severe brain dam age or rare single-gene or chrom osom al defects fail
to acquire language. But I think there is an im p ortant difference—a
difference one would not suspect, if he viewed all behavioral repertoires
equally as the cumulative result o f operant conditioning. If some chil
dren have so m uch more trouble learning to read than they had in
learning to talk, the argum ent goes, we must be doing a rotten jo b of
teaching reading. In fact, some children do learn to read as readily as
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they learn to talk, and it is partly because of this, perhaps, that so few
questions were asked ab out reading until the enforcement of universal
education. In bygone days, only the good readers survived long in school.
But with universal education and a social order that is avowedly
intolerant of illiteracy, learning to read becomes a critical matter, and a
large spread of individual differences, for those in the lower quarter of
the distribution, becomes a calamity.
Vocal language, on the other hand, seems to be a species-specific
characteristic. It does not need to be built up or shaped laboriously
through the conditioning and chaining of myriads of behavioral units.
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Language is learned, to be sure, but learning a species-specific form of
behavior is quite different, in terms of individual differences, from the
learning of m any other kinds of behavioral repertoires. In species-
specific behaviors, learning capacity for a class of behaviors has been
more or less maximized and individual differences have been more or
less minimized; there is little genetic variation, but so much genetic
determination for the ease of acquisition of certain behaviors that
capricious environmental contingencies, within very wide limits, have
little effect on the acquisition of the behavior. (We often therefore tend

to call it “ development” rather than “ acquisition.” ) Lenneberg (1969,

p. 638) has reported studies of language acquisition in monozygotic and
dizygotic twins, permitting analysis of genetic influences. The age and
rate of language acquisition, and the specific types of problems encoun
tered, show a high degree of genetic determination. [To those who have
read Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (1957), I recom m end also Lenneberg’s
Biological Foundations o f Language (1967).] I suspect the same is true
for reading, although the range of individual differences is much greater.
Some children pick up reading as easily and inconspicuously as most
children learn to talk or walk. Others must be carefully and laboriously
tutored and coached. The difference can be much like teaching speech
to a child who has suffered damage to Broca’s area: he must learn .with
another part of his brain, a part th a t is m uch less adpated for language
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learning. Some teachers com m ent that children who have to be explicitly
taught to read, rather than learning it from rather casual exposure,
seem to have to learn something different from what is learned by the
child who doesn't require careful teaching. The final behavioral result
may, of course, be rather indistinguishable. But the effort involved surely
is not, nor are the chances for extinction and frustration. The problem
of teaching reading to all children at the same age is that the contin
gencies that work so well for some pupils do not seem to work much
at all for others, or they work so poorly that the jo b they must do cannot
be accomplished in the little time available for such instruction. “ H um an
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freedom and dignity” become a question, too, when we ask about how
much time a child should be forced to spend in order to acquire a p a r
ticular behavioral repertoire by a certain age. W hat price equality of
performance? we might ask. We might also ask whether instructional
time schedules and methods that evolved to some reasonably satisfactory
degree of effectiveness in one culture, or in a limited range of genotypes
for certain abilities, can be transplanted wholesale to other cultures or
populations and still be effective for the majority of subjects. With
universal education, there are only a few fields in which teachers can
simply look for pupils who can learn practically without being taught
(they are called “ talented” ) and can let the others fall by the wayside—
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music, the arts, higher mathematics, and chess. A rth ur Rubinstein, the
famous pianist (who was also a child prodigy), made an interesting
comment in a recent interview. He said, “ T o become a great pianist, you
have to practice a great deal. But there is really nothing to learn. So
there’s nothing much you can teach anyone abo ut it. You have to
practice only in order to develop your talent.” M any music teachers say
similar things; the elite am ong them simply drop or w on’t accept those
pupils who need to be taught. Fortunately, society doesn’t dem and that
everyone become a musician. It does dem and that everyone acquire the

content of the basic curriculum of the school and that they spend ten
to twelve years or more of their lives expressly for this purpose. Anyone
who reads the daily papers knows of the problems this generates.
In Beyond Freedom and Dignity [p. 6] Skinner asks the rhetorical

question: “ Was putting a man on the m oon actually easier than im prov
ing education in our public schools?” The answer will seem obvious to
the many who interpret the question to mean that education must be
quite lacking, for what should be so difficult about improving education
as com pared with the astounding feat of putting a man on the m oon?
But 1 think the answer is really not so obvious. Putting a man on the
m oon, at least, is a clearly defined criterion, of which the failure or
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success of attainm ent is easily assessed. As for “ improving ed ucation,”
it is not clear to me just what criteria Skinner has in mind.
W hat most educators, government officials, and writers in the popular
press who talk ab o u t the present problems o f education are, in fact,
referring to is not dissatisfaction with some absolute level of achievement,
but rather with the large group differences in educational attainm ents
that show up so conspicuously in our educational system—the achieve
ment gaps between the affluent and the poor, the lower-class and the
middle-class, the majority and the minority, the urban and the suburban,
and so on. It is differences, not absolute level o f performance, that
seems to be the cause of all the concern. Skinner, in his concern with the
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control of individual behavior per se, hardly faces this problem at all.
Yet the problem of differences is, apparently, where the action is, where
the billions of dollars in educational funds are being spent, where the
heat is on, and where the schools are being torn apart. A careful study
of to d a y ’s popular literature of injustice and inequality, it might be
noted, shows that it appeals not so much to dem onstrated inequalities
of rights and opportunities as to inequalities of perform ance, from which,
usually, inequality of opportunity and other injustices are inferred. This
seems especially true today in education. W hat has behavioral technology
a la Skinner to offer to the solution? 1 would not be surprised that it
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might have a great deal to offer—but it may not be obvious, so 1 wish
Skinner would spell it out, if only programmatically.
When teaching machines and program m ed instruction, backed up by
Skinnerian rationale, made their appearance in the 1950s, it seemed to
me that they generated great enthusiasm. (I was an enthusiast myself,
though 1 never got into the mainstream of their development.) This
approach, teaching machines and programmed instruction, was hailed
by some as the solution to our educational problems. From w hat 1 have
seen, they do work, they are an effective and efficient means of teaching—
certainly more effective than most ordinary classroom instruction—and

children like them and seem to learn more effortlessly from them. These
techniques are not used enough, certainly far less than their merits
would warrant. But as far as I am aware, their applications have given
no hint th at they are capable of solving the problems connected with
differences in educational performance. W here I have seen teaching
machines and program m ed instruction in apparently competent and
systematic use in school settings, it slightly raises the overall level of
achievement and greatly magnifies the spread of individual and group
differences. It appears that any new instructional technique that proves
good for the educational “ have nots” proves even better for the “ haves.”
O ne of its main virtues, however, may be that it permits children to
learn on their own at their own pace, with little or no knowledge of
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what their classmates are doing, so that the child’s learning behavior
is not afflicted by the punishing contingencies of perceived differences in
performance.
One might simply dismiss the whole issue, urging th a t performance
differences are inevitable. If there is no solution, there is no problem:
there is simply a state of affairs. But this attitude just w on ’t do. Society
sees this as one of its major problems, a crucial one, and is in turmoil
over it. A large part of the trouble is th at individual differences so often
get tabulated so as to show up as group differences—between schools in
different neighborhoods, between different races, between different cities
and regions, and so on. They are then a political, not just a psychological,
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matter. To reduce the social tensions th a t arise, we see proposals to
abolish aptitude and achievement testing, grading, grade placement,
special classes for the retarded and the gifted, neighborhood schools,
the classroom as the instructional unit, the academic curriculum, or
even the whole school system. There is probably a good deal of merit
to some of these proposals. But I think they are too often aimed at
covering up problems rather than at coming to grips with them.
Inasmuch as whatever instructional technique aids learning for the
“ slow learners” usually turns out to do even more for the “ fast learners,”
the particular philospher’s stone now being sought by m any educational
psychologists, myself am ong them, is what has come to be called A p ti
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tude X Training Interactions, or A TI for short (also called aptitude X
instruction interaction.) W hat ATI means, simply, is that no single
instructional m ethod is best for everyone; th a t optimal performance will
result only by matching a diversity of instructional m ethods with the
diversity of individual aptitudes. If Bill an d John are both taught by
m ethod A and Bill does m uch better than John, perhaps there is a
different teaching method, B, that will permit John to learn as fast as
Bill. T hat is the hope of ATI researchers. The only trouble, so far, has
been that, when you find a m ethod B that boosts Jo h n ’s performance a

little, it usually does so even more for Bill. Hence, back to the drawing
board. Bracht (1970) recently reviewed a large num ber of studies in the
A TI field that met certain methodological and statistical criteria to per
mit rigorous evaluation, and he found that, out o f 90 studies that were
specifically designed to yield aptitude X treatm ent interactions of the
kind that would solve the performance difference between Bill and John,
only five actually yielded such an interaction, and none of these aptitude
differences was of the IQ variety—they were personological variables
unrelated to intelligence. Bracht (1970, pp. 636-638) says a num ber of
interesting and im portant things:
When a variety of treatment stimuli, especially conditions not controlled
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by the experimenter, are able to influence performance on the dependent
variable, it is unlikely that a personological variable can be found to produce
a disordinal interaction with the alternative treatments. . . . Success on a
combination of heterogeneous treatment tasks is predicted best by measures
of general ability [i.e., IQ tests], and the degree of prediction is about equally
high for alternative treatments. . . . The degree of task complexity may be a
major factor in the occurrence of ATI. Although the treatment tasks for
most of the 90 studies were classified as controlled, the treatments were
generally relatively complex tasks. Conversely, four of the five experiments
with disordinal interactions [ATI] were more similar to the basic learning
tasks of the research laboratory. . . . Despite the large number of compara
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tive experiments with intelligence as a personological variable, no evidence
was found to suggest that the IQ score and similar measures of general
ability are useful variables for differentiating alternative treatments for sub
jects in a homogeneous age group. These measures correlate substantially
with achievement in most school-related tasks and hence are not likely to
correlate differentially with performance in alternative treatments of com
plex achievement-oriented tasks.
In view of these conclusions, unless we come up with something

drastically different from anything th at has yet been tried, the prospect
of substantially minimizing the overwhelming influence of IQ differences
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(whether measured or not) on scholastic achievement seems quite dim.
O f course, scholastic differences get reflected in the occupational market,
and IQ does even more. As H arv ard psychologist Lawrence K ohlberg
recently put it, “ Scholastic achievement merely rides on the back of IQ .”
In terms of society, the absolute level of “ have-not-ness” does not
constitute the most aversive contingencies; it is rath er the perception of
differences between the “ haves” and the “ have n o ts” th at leads to frus
tration and aggression. Punishment is relative poverty, not absolute
poverty. A society that truly creates equality of opportunity and en
courages a high degree of social mobility in accord with individual

abilities and drives but allows very unequal rewards for unequal perform
ance may find itself in serious trouble. Yet how m uch can rewards be
equalized w ithout risk? If high abilities are a rare and valued resource
to a society, can it afford not to provide every inducement to attract
scarce ability into those pursuits in which it is m ost needed for the well
being of the society? Is our culture’s system of rewards and punish
ments all wrong? Should we attem pt to decrease the spread of some
kinds of hum an differences, and, if so, which ones and how? Or must we
accept them and learn to live with them, and, if so, how? Is perhaps a
complete reorientation of societal values in order, a new orientation
th a t somehow takes the sting out of differences in the abilities to c o m
pete and achieve? W hat will be the resolution? The answers are not
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clearly inferable from Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
N o w th at B. F. Skinner has taken the mantle of social philospher as
well as th a t of behavioral scientist, we should like know how he thinks
a bo ut these questions. W hat he might have to say is likely to be en
lightening and worthwhile.
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14
Skinner's New Broom
Alexander Com fort
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Alexander C om fort, an associate fello w at the Center f o r the Study o f
Democratic Institutions, describes h im self as a “m edical biologist,
writer, and pam phleteer, dividing tim e equally between science,
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literature, and politicosocial agitation o f various kinds, chiefly
connected with anarchism, pacifism, sex-law reforms, and application
o f sociological ideas to society generally.” H e is the author o f a number
o f novels, poem s, plays, essays, and texts.
Comfort, whose special interest is gerontology, contributes an
evaluation o f operant conditioning that, among other things, finds it
compatible with certain assumptions characteristic o f philosophical
anarchism. H e credits Skinner with constructing an important
generalization about human behavior and with presenting it in a
scholarly and "forbearing" style. Nonetheless, C om fort fe e ls Skinner
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has fa ile d to deal satisfactorily with a number o f fa c ts o f human life,
and he uses a computer technology to m ake clear some o f his
objections to behaviorist theory. H e concludes by stressing the
importance o f understanding the value o f Skinner s “real insights
without losing sight o f other causes o f human behavior that he fe e ls are
not dealt with in Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
Rebuking the “ excesses” of classical behaviorism (oversimplification,

extrapolation from rats in boxes) has become something of a formality
for writers ab out hum an behavior. Skinner’s boo k is highly salutary,

200 ' ALEXANDER COMFORT
because it reminds us that the excesses were not of his sponsoring. The
reservations on the totality of his model are real enough, but they do not
spring from narrowness of view. We need to begin with a clear idea of
the reservations; but when we have made them Skinner still confronts
us with an im portant generalization for which a place must be found.
N o t m any possessors of so wide a generalization present it in so scholarly
or forbearing a style.
The reservations in regard to hum an behaviorism are Freudian in
form but biological at roo t: they are, essentially, that Skinner tends to
overlook the substratum or “ wiring” on which memory-based re p ro
gram ming is imposed. In other words, he tends to assume,' though
obviously he doesn’t think, that the system is being programmed from
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scratch, and infers th at all of the software o f hum an behavior is added
by simple experiential stimuli, aversive or reinforcing. (M ore accurately,
he nowhere infers that it is not.) To this, one has to point out that:
1) Certain behaviors are probably laid dow n in the h ard w are—by way
of the epigenesis of the nervous system—an d since this hardw are in
cludes a developmental clock, they may be exposed serially or turned on
and turned off, rather as animal sex behaviors are turned on or turned
off by simple hormones.
2) Part of this ongoing program may well be the inclusion of p ro
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grammed “ spaces” in which experience writes in further program prefer
entially—like the gaps in a printed w orkb ook which the student is
expected to fill in for himself. “ Ethical” behaviors other than altruism
in defense o f mate or progeny, the substratum of H a ld a n e ’s “ moral
biology,” are practically confined to social animals: they occur in dogs,
for example, but not in cats. (Dogs relate to other conspecific indi
viduals, and to man, who is an honorary member of the club, in a way
that cats do not, though by intensive training they might well come to
do so.) This could be because social animals are subjected thro ugh ou t
life to special reinforcement of these behaviors; or because genetic selec
tion has short-circuited this learning process by printing out much of
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the required “ text” in the anim al’s hardware, leaving spaces which are
especially readily filled, at a particular m om en t in development, by
minimal reinforcement. This is a special case of “ evolution making
organisms more sensitive to the consequences of their actions.” In other
words, Skinner ignores the possibility of im printing—special, high-speed
learning at a particular point in development and facilitated by built-in
arrangem ents—and o f archetypes, or preferred patterns of association.
H ad he worked initially with ducks rather than rats I think this element
would have bulked larger in the Skinnerian view. The male duckling

Skinner s New Broom 201
imprints m aternal plumage with minimal experience and uses the re
sponse later in mate slection: if male h o rm o ne is given to an adult
female, she will then im print like a newborn and androgenless male.
H um an imprinting is less easily pinned down by reason of complexity
(this is much the same problem as that which agitated our predecessors
over hum an instincts), but the early fixity of abnorm al hum an sex
objects, and the presence o f the Oedipal anxiety period as a tem porary
organ like the tadp ole’s tail, when aversive stimuli are extra effective,
if not endogenous, make any biologist highly suspicious th at such p ro
grammed critical periods do exist.
3) A h ardw are-softw are interplay as complex as th at in man may
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carry a fair a m o u n t of its behavioral conditioning in an internal form —
that is, wholly endogenous mental events can be aversive or reinforcing
by continuous playback, once they are set in motion. A well-developed
system of this sort in man, and the special neurology of pleasure or
reward centers, may well explain why one critical aversive experience
plays back and generates anxiety, the name we give to the introspection
of the playback process, and could explain the Freudian consequences
of infantile program s persisting out of time.
4) In disposing of gremlin-type mentalism, which sees us as a spirit

thinking thou gh t and initiating behaviors, Skinner underplays the im
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portance o f the identity sense, which is an experience even if it is an
illusion (or rather, it is a potential but society-generated mental “ organ,"
like the body image), and the hum an capacity to scan part of the p ro
gram and its printout, as it were, downwards. It is not certain, as Skinner
asserts, that the intelligent man doesn’t experience his intelligence or
the disturbed teen-ager his disturbance; I would have thou gh t th at they
did. Rejection of the a u to no m ous “ I ” also raises difficulties over the
exact meaning he attaches to “ environm ent,” but this is a m atter for
arbitrary definition.
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I worded this preamble in this way on purpose. Both the reservations
on Skinner and the great im portance of the issues he raises can be
expressed without falling foul of biologically based, as opposed to
metaphysical, neo-Freudianism, and this is the pattern Freud himself,
as a pretty hardheaded biologist, would certainly have preferred. Ac
cordingly, if we take in the reservations, Skinner’s new broom can do
nothing but clear the fairies out of depth psychology, a task which
primatologists, and biologists generally, have long waited to see under
taken. The reservations and the importance of the issues can also be
discussed in com puter terminology, though Skinner avoids this. It is

202 ALEXANDER COMFORT
the analog model most suited to this kind of basic and operational
analysis of a learning system. Moreover, it emphasizes the first major
Skinnerian proposition —which was there before, but needs hammering
into arts graduates and biologists who hav en ’t done too much thinking
ab o u t thinking, or who like Aristotelian entelechies. This is, quite
simply, th at if we could construct a fully mechanical system which
exactly replicated the complexity of hum an m entation, either it would
show all o f the attributes (conation, spontaneous behaviors, free will,
neurosis, the lot) which exist in the biomechanical system that is writing
this piece, or there are fairies at the bottom of our garden. Accordingly,
a mechanistic evaluation of behavior at some level, provided it isn’t
naive and is based on a knowledge of what mechanical analog systems
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can already do, is intellectually obligatory, and we had better come to
terms with it. All of the m ajor hangups of philosophy (free will, values,
aesthetics, and so on) must be incorporable into, and soluble by, a
sufficiently subtle recognition of the interplay by which existing, and
developing, mental circuitry, incorporated into our genes and nervous
systems, program s experiential exposure and is in turn further p ro
grammed, and altered, by it. Skinner doesn't to my mind stress this
complex model nearly enough. H e is so concerned with the effect of the
input on behaviors from the environment th a t he treats experience as a
mold impressing itself on wax rather than as a dialogue between h a rd
ware and input which both alters the hardw are and generates p ro gra m
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ming. Both the hardw are’s capacity for generating initiatives which the
environment “ answers” and its serial character (it asks appropriate
experiential questions at appropriate moments, and has a space to write
down the answers, which modify its future wiring plan) seem to be left
out. This neo-Pavlovianism is already out o f date in dealing with our
own relatively simple mechanical systems. The more sophisticated
model is harder to handle but far more rew arding—there is nothing
difficult, if we use it, abo ut the idea that values represent a “ space”
in the program of social animals, which evolution selected because it
shortens learning, and which is filled by conditioning; or that “ free
will" can represent a process of selection (partly programmed, partly
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conditioned) acting on a process of ra n d o m variation. N o b o d y need
now get sleepless over how a process can be both indeterminate and p ro
g ram m ed—any electronics buff will make a simple Skinnerian free-will
system to order for the confused philosopher to play around with.
On the other side, it is the answer, though Skinner doesn’t make suffi
cient use of it, to the perfectly valid objection that what is aversive or
reinforcing in man can be pretty complex, because o f the virtuosity of a
two-way system in converting pain to pleasure or pleasure to pain by
avoidance, equivalence, symbolism, and an evening-out of tensions.

Skinner's New Broom 203
Freud recognized the “ acceptance of pain in the devious pursuit of

pleasure,” and this is not confined to the man who can only get an
orgasm by being beaten or insulted. (It is also the answ er—a Sherring-
tonian o n e —to the old psychoanalytic argum ent over hedonism: for
“ pleasure” read “ balancing up central excitatory states for minimum
tension” ; most animal psychologists would read “ libido” as “ the pursuit
of a minimum-tension, rather than a maxim um -tension, econom y,” and
the reward mechanisms are superimposed on this, “ drives” of various
kinds being endogenous, program m ed states which tilt the balance and
initiate further equilibrative behavior. This, at least, is how one would
build an experimental analog.)
One extremely im portant aspect of operant conditioning, not fully
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discussed on this occasion, is its use in enabling subjects to control
involuntary body processes (heart rate, blood pressure, alpha rhythms,
penile erection, peristalsis) by voluntary effort. The subject cannot
verbalize the nature of the operation —all that is necessary is th at the
“ feedback loo p” is completed by providing a visual or sound display
which indicates to him when the desired change is taking place. It has
been claimed that, in yogic meditative states, internal sensing suffices
without any external cyb-org sensor. If the change, whenever it occurs,
is reinforced, the subject becomes rapidly able to control the “ involun
tary ” process at will. The medical potential of this use of body image to
manipulate the body has not yet been assessed (it has already been used
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to control brain potentials and prevent resistant fits), but it may be
large. Any development in this field would tend to bring operant con
ditioning into still greater clinical use and familiarity—even, if success
ful, into controlling states such as tension or insomnia, into competition
with drug therapies, and, possibly, into military or political abuse.
The system in this type of physiological control, which is a special
use of operant conditioning, is really analogous to that used in a simple
dem onstration given by Skinner, in which a dog is taught to ju m p by
m arking lines on the wall and rewarding it whenever its head rises above
the lowest line. The function of the display loop is simply to make the
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subject continuously aware of changes in the variable and of the direction
of those changes. In the case of the dog, the feedback loop is provided
by the experimenter; in the case of heartbeat control, the subject must
be given a scaled indication of change on which reinforcement can
operate. In the use of operant conditioning to treat impotence, the sub
ject may desire a particular physiological end result which would be
reinforcing if it occurred, but has no m o m ent-to-m om ent index of the
appropriateness of his own internal states, so th a t he inhibits erection
by anxiety, and the result is self-defeating through aversion. Introduction
of a mechanical readout of, for example, skin tension or penile blood

flow provides a continuous m onitor on which operant conditioning can

act to reinforce a ppropriate inner behaviors and bypass central inter
ference. Erection at will or control of alpha rhythm s are perm anent
physiological maneuvers, once learned. It is still arguable how far co n
trol of, say, blood pressure could be m ade perm anent if continuous
m onitoring were provided.
Physiological states are not com m only classed as “ behaviors” and
controversy over their control (uses, abuses, hazards) is likely to follow
the same lines whether drugs or training methods are employed, al
though training m ethods have both the advantages and drawbacks of
not being time-limited by natural breakdown. M ost controversy abou t
the use of operant conditioning in society is likely to arise over the alter
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ation of behaviors recognized as behaviors, and its uses and risks are
those of education, of which it is a form, but from which it appears to
differ in being specifically m ore effective. I am concerned in this paper
solely with the more usual application—th a t is, the alteration of be
haviors ranging from alcoholism to com m uter travel h a bits—but the
more practical, physiological use is worth stressing because, if it proves
effective, the change in techniques of dealing with physical dysfunctions
will accelerate both research and acceptance, and affects any technologi
cal forecast. In behavioral contexts, o perant conditioning is likely to
spread if it first proves efficacious and side-effect free in psychiatry and
criminology. In both of these contexts it will be tested against longstand
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ing irrational attitudes, as it would be in more political contexts.
So much for the biology—I have gone th rou gh it telegraphically so as
to avoid a long paper, but the point of it is th a t Skinnerism is reconcil
able with the totality o f present knowledge, though Skinner, even in a
highly scholarly book, doesn’t here do the extra expounding which is
needed to reconcile it. If we built a m an-analog incorporating all of the
models I have outlined, it would probably work in a hum an manner.
In the analysis of all less complex social interactions, Skinner’s basic
extrapolation, though simple, is highly valuable. It goes beyond a new
angle on “ G od is Love.” It is the universal experience of all studies in
empirical hum an relations—education, penology, pyschiatry, manage-
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ag em en t—that reward works and punishm ent does not, that reinforce
ment is more effective than aversion and avoids its ill effects. But all our
institutions, except the consumer economy, are designed on the reverse
assumption. People with knowledge in this field and people with power
are basically two different tribes—one can pardon Blake for wondering
if they were not two different species. Skinner is not alone in failing to
come to terms with the biology and psychopathology of the extraordinary
hum an phenomenon of power-seeking. It is far more complex than sim-

pie dom inance behavior, and may well, as Freud thought, express p ro
gramming derived from the family situation. The fact that Skinner goes
on to make social assumptions, to foresee the end of “ a u ton om o us m a n ,”
and to make suggestions which will at least be interpreted as proposals
for social m anagement, makes only too evident the gap left in his psy
chology by the absence of a perception of the structured nature of hum an
irrationality. A pessimist view would read the future differently than he.
Some of the hum ane insights of what he has to say may get (are already
getting, by other routes) an expression in such things as m anagement
and education: in wider contexts—society in general, political life—
they risk being applied only to misuse, because organizational power
lies only with professional mismanagers, who reward the short-term
INDEX
nondisturbance of their own roles, and might be able to m anage a
nonaversive velvet-glove facade. In spite of his attack on other Utopians,
Skinner is the daddy of them all. The crunch is real enough. On the one
hand, we must both be social and accept planning of nonindividualis-
tic kind in order to survive; on the other, given the selection of psycho
paths to office and of office by psychopaths (pardon, by people condi
tioned to kick other people a roun d and manipulate them for antisocial
or frankly deranged ends), there is no more likelihood that such planning
will be rational or constructive than there was th a t constitutions would
be written by philosopher kings, or, when written, observed by their
officials. This being the case, Skinner could be seen as the philosopher of
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repressive tolerance, of keeping them happy for the public good. There
are two possible ways out of this difficulty. First, there is the fortunate
fact th a t individuals subjected to nonaversive patterns in education, the
family, and their own life style will also, and in a m ore m arked degree,
respond to coercive authority by extreme aggression. This may indeed
be already happening. Second, nonaversive techniques, being purposive,
select against self-destructive personalities and power-seeking psycho
paths, while our present techniques actively favor, if not create, them.
Punishment, for prohibitive persons, is an end in itself. Skinner stresses
the seriousness of a situation in which a high proportion of youngsters
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refuse military service. I myself would stress the far greater seriousness
of the situation in which they did not. Unless the antiaversive sieve is
fully effective, however, it is really no letout to say th at we should c o n
centrate our insights on the circumstances in which nations go to war.
Can he see Brezhnev or Kissinger actually backing this? And is not his
behavioral technology m ore likely to be enthusiastically researched by
them for ways of keeping conscripts from mutiny, voters from protest,
and underdeveloped countries from resenting exploitation? Just as, at
the biological level, Skinner, for all his range, has bitten off a fraction

m ore than he can chew, so with his social extrapolations, hum ane as they
are, he might eventually be aghast at the operational outcom e of what
he writes, and its takeover by that irresponsible old harridan, Laura
N order, because his capacity for intuitive (that is, nondiscursive) intake
of social events is basically poor. He lacks the aptitude of the primitive
wizard and the mystically unscientific psychotherapist to respond to
complex social signals, and, since theories, even when true, are the
product of personality, one must wonder if a Skinnerian generation
w ouldn’t lack the same aptitude and if this wouldn’t basically alter the
character of man. This capacity for highspeed nondiscursive intake, or
sensing of society, is another faculty of social animals, and an analog
capacity of the hum an com puter program, which Skinner’s book almost
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wholly lacks (which is possibly why it d id n ’t convert its critics, or dis
arm them, by reinforcement). It is hard to say which came first, the
chicken or the egg, but the theory both reflects the lack and could per
petuate it —theory and deficiency reinforce each other, thou gh Skinner,
like his creation Frazier, is not a product o f Walden Two. Anyone with
psychoanalytic training will be deeply impressed, here, by the interplay
between the man and the con struct—and not simply ad hominem, be
cause Skinner gives depth psychology a rough ride; what is urgent,
since they are dealing, from different aptitudes, with the same material,
is some kind of dialogue between them directed to the exchange of
insights.
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At the same time, Skinner survives both ignorant misrepresentation
and rational reservations by sheer force of intellect and genuine and
unparano id hum anity of intention. By devoting this paper to possible
reservations, I neither can, nor wish to, dismiss what he says. His ch a p
ter on values is memorable in particular. As an anarchist, I find the
time-stressed need for planning, and for getting events and people into
shape to plan, as m uch my nightmare as anarchy is the nightmare of
administrators. I cannot answer the original-sin problem any more than
he. The difficulty is not that man is “ sinful” as an innate attribute, but,
m ore probably, that having evolved in a small-group, food-gathering
culture, his organizational needs have outrun his adaptations. They
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probably did so at the time, less than one thousand generations ago,
when he invented cities and kings, when adaptations designed to stop
male infant primates falling foul of their fathers combined with domi-
nance-behavior to create institutional and basically aversion-maintained
power. A traditionalist, and this includes Skinner, often makes the u n
spoken assum ptio n—far closer to “ original sin” as originally taught,
but at variance with the rest of the b o o k —that men, being as they are,
cannot afford to dispense with institutional power, at least at the m a nip

Skinner's New Broom 20 7
ulative level. The anarchist view is that men, being as they are or are
likely to be, cannot afford not to dispense with it. The anarchist, like
Skinner, is dedicated to a socially oriented autonom y, and he also
regards the experience of sociality as itself highly reinforcing, once it can
be a tta in e d —that is, he hopes, like Skinner, that a truly social society
would be self-maintaining through its own feedback, if only enough of
us experience it (compare Walden Two with Aldous Huxley's Island).
T h a t men have survived so long is partly due to the effect, that Skinner
mentions, that aversive and coercive techniques generate revolutionary
aggression. H u m a n countersuggestibility, though it is itself learned, is
an adaptive character. We have survived so far through sheer bloody-
mindedness and the fact that, if the managers dig holes in Irish roads
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to stop gunrunning, people fill them in overnight. We are not rationally
com mitted to the defense, at all costs o f “ o u r ” —possibly lethal—
culture. There is nothing in this book which tends to the abolition of
man. A one-shot revolutionary would probably say that our culture
would come into its own after the revolution: those who believe that
revolution is a continuous process with no further side, including both
the conservation of a culture and its radical reform, have to undertake
the m ore difficult task of integrating its very real insights with the things
it leaves out.
It is hard to know what aspect of the academic environm ent is to
blame for the fact that Skinner on paper is aversive to some, while
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Skinner the man is not. Fear, no doubt, plays a part. So does Skinner’s
wry sense of humor. Some readers found the book abrasive. I must say
1 do not. It could be argued that Skinner is reinforced by criticism and
tends to invite it. If he had substituted the word “ education” for “ con
trol,” or even the word “ training,” he might have lubricated the ac
ceptance of his ideas. It is worth pointing out to quaking traditional
liberals that, though he himself is not an anarchist, the society he
postulates could be truly in line with anarchist (not totalitarian) in
sights, and his data explain why nonviolent experiments have tended to
work until suppressed by society. Anarchists are opposed, in principle,
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to aversive government, not to education, and they favor the inner-
directed man, substituting m utual aid for free competition and direct
action for centralism. In essence, Skinner is answering the libertarian
or anarchist dilemma —how to educate men to be social without the
use of a coercive ap paratus generative of abuse and of acting out. In
being antiaversive, his pattern includes an im p ortant and unique sieve
mechanism against precisely the abuses which anarchism rejects in
democracy. O p eran t conditioning is no diabolical device invented by
Skinner. It is only the mechanism by which many human behaviors

have always been program m ed (whether it is a sufficient paradigm for all

behaviors is beside the point: it is a useful one for some of those most
socially important). W h at he offers is the attem pt to make their use
insightful instead of random .
The problem of norm ation remains. Walden Two described an agree
able society, reminiscent of the Amish and dedicated to the propagation
of Skinner’s own personal life-style. A nother com m unity adopting the
same techniques could have adopted an other style—one more sexual-
ized, for example. Were operant education to be confined to c o m m unity
sized experiments, the individual could choose, but such communities
would be bound to diverge and encounter com m unication and inbreed
ing interface problems, since, if the techniques worked, they would be
homeostatic for their differing mores and society might become tribal-
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ized. I d o n ’t, however, see this as a likely model. A more likely one is
the application of Skinnerian, noncoercive m ethods of socializing be
havior first to psychiatry (chiefly am ong groups ab o u t which society
is in d espair—the anomic, the autistic, the alcoholic); then to practical
problems such as patterns of com m uter travel. (W hat reinforces our
insistence on the one-man private car? If it is enclosure, isolation, and
sense of control, plus doo r-to-door convenience, then modular, not
mass, transit, is a thinkable answer.) Then to the key problem of coercive
societies, the self-defeating and self-propagating penal system; and
finally to the abolition of play-therapy-type politics. Such politics
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can solve no existing urban problem s; a technique which could would
have an overriding necessity behind it. Population is another educa
tional field where government is traditionally unable to think beyond
aversive forms of social instruction. I have set out a possible techno
logical forecast for the time-scale of changes th at a comprehension
of these factors in forming behavior might generate. I have omitted the
intriguing idea that the constituency, or a scientific part of it, faced with
psychopathic acting-out in office, might try to zero in on particular
leaders by operant techniques going beyond sending a box of Cuban
cigars to the President every time he withdraws more troops from
Vietnam. The forecast assumes a 75 percent correctness (the approxi
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mately likely limiting value for a single experimental insight, however
far-reaching) for the idea th a t the operant paradigm alone will modify
hum an behaviors.
Operant Conditioning—APossible Scenario

{N ote: Bear in mind th at we comm only overrate effects of 5- to 10-year
applications and underrate effects of 15- to 20-year applications.)

209
Years Effects
> 5—< 1 0 Psychiatric, educational, and industrial experiments on

an increasing scale.
> 7 - < 15 First semimacro experiments in civic use, up to city, but

not to state, scale (for example, reform of com m uter
traveling habits). First examples o f abusive use (for
example, for military or commercial ends).
> 10-<20 Wider abuse, exciting protest from a scientific and public
constituency increasingly alerted by success in construc
tive use. Control mechanisms evolving. Launching of
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environmental and antiaversive “ parties” or movements,
themselves using operant nonaversive methods. Vogue of
nonaversive and operant child-rearing. O perant Dr.
Spocks and R alp h N aders become prominent. Operant-
reared persons begin to become com m on.
approx. 20 Conflict stage: A ttem pts at takeover by opposing interests;

attem pts at employing suppression; simultaneous acute
intensification of resistance from those responding to
operant m ethods leads to failure of such attempts. O perant
New Deal, based on an educated, environmentalist,
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scientific, and libertarian-anarchist constituency (liber
tarian here meaning those who oppose aversive co ndition
ing, favor education and inner-direction, and oppose co n
ventional power structures). H a h n -S tra ssm a n point for
macro use equals end of conventional penal system (this
is probably the test change in attem pting to dynamite the
conventional establishment). International applications
outside the scope of this forecast, but relations with U.S.
clients will already have shifted by fo rc e majeure from
backing military-fascist regimes. People least impressed
may well be a growing cadre of u rba n guerrillas who see
> 20-< 25 GROUPS

operant conditioning as bourgeois revisionism.
Early macro experiments, state and federal scale, starting

with population, education, and penology. Massive
growth of decentralization, ad-hocracy (that is, officials
appointed ad hoc for a particular co ntract and removable
in terms o f success/failure). Integration of new style into
frame of conventional U.S. democracy.
> 2 5 -< 5 0 Transition of present political structures to a new operant-
conditioning-anarchosocial style.

Likelihood: Reasonably strong (10-year forecast, 75 percent probability:

50-year, 90 percent; 100-year, 97 percent). I base this on the following
consideration:
A critical point of operant conditioning is that it substitutes rein
forcement for hostility. If operant conditioning worked well, it would
be the answer to the “ anarchist bind ” I foresee between the need for
intensive, planned, group action to avoid major systems failures, the
growth of a public which is ungovernable by aversive, coercive, or
malarkey techniques, and the tendency o f present institutions to rein
force antisocial behaviors in office. It could get its constituency by a
fusion of growing environm ent threats, anger over irresponsible policies
of industry and politics, mutiny against overseas war, unmanageability
of urban problems, the basic wish o f Americans to avoid unproductive
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civil violence, and the now emergent “ libertarian” (antipolitical, anti-
aversive, concerned) style. If operant techniques worked, they could end
or limit acting-out in public life. I suspect that there will be less rewriting
of constitutions and democratic rituals than reinterpretation of their
meanings. Legitamacy and democracy will persist and mean something
different, being experienced differently with a different life-style of the
culture, as British m onarchy now is something diametrically opposite
in sense to British m onarchy in the time of W ashington. The British
monarch is now a bung or blocking piece to prevent any other person or
persons from occupying a position of pow er—for example, C om m ander-
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in-Chief, source of a pp ointm ent and dismissal of judges. Institutions
can be preserved and titles m aintained to guarantee a power vacuum,
and this may occur in the U.S. In fact, there is only a limited number of
public contexts in which an ideological devotion to operant conditioning
is likely to pay off, and these (which aim chiefly to substitute cooperation
or “ mutual aid ” for coercion and “ free enterprise,” and intelligent
purpose for play therapy in office) will need blocking-off mechanisms
to prevent an abusive counterrevolution from emergent new sources
of power.
Marxism is right in saying that, on most past occasions, this sort of
change has involved an emerging class. This new class will be a c o n
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stituency of those now getting aversive vibrations, not Skinner’s fixers.
W hether you call these neoproletarians (who have nothing to lose but
everything) “ workers” or “ intelligentsia” seems beside the point. They
represent a new dispossessed constituency which is acquiring power.
Psychoanalytic critics might ask why operant planning would be less
likely to be irrational than any other. My forecast is based on the follow
ing consideration: The attraction of an operant scenario is that it should
exclude many acting-out opportunities and personalities from public
roles via the antiaversive “ sieve.” This point is critical. W hether anti-

antiaversive education and child-rearing would also exclude the genesis

of neurotic behaviors in the long term remains to be seen. It should, at
least, reduce them. I want to stress this point, since I accept both depth
psychology and behaviorist paradigm s as simultaneously relevant to the
forecast.
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15
Beyond B. F. Skinner
Lord Ritchie-Calder
INDEX L ord Ritchie-Calder, a senior fe llo w at the Center fo r the Study o f

Democratic Institutions and fo rm erly a professor o f international
relations at Edinburgh, is the author o f 32 books, most o f them on
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science or its social implications.
L ord Ritchie-Calder continues the exploration o f the social and
political implications o f operant conditioning. H e would “bracket
together Ellul {the means swallow up ends), M cLuhan {the medium
becomes the m ethod), and Skinner {the end o f autonomous man) as
latter-day determinists who are ‘hooked' on technology. . . . Their
forebodings, given the weight o f scientific findings, become predictions
that confirm trends, inasmuch as policy-m akers start planning for, and
not away from, the conditions they fo re se e ." Lord Ritchie-Calder
considers this a bleak proposition and finds comfort in the
observation that young people and m any others are “questioning
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the . . . technological system . . . . This is a return to real {human)
values, as against artificial {machine) values
A t the Paris Conference on Information Processing in 1959, Dr. Edward

Teller expounded as follows: “ If you give a machine a large enough
memory, and give it enough random trials, it will remem ber those trials
which are successful. It will thus learn. I believe that the machine can

Beyond B. F. Skinner 213
be given the powers to make value judgm ents and, from that, I construct,
mathematically, a model for machine em otions.” I intervened to ask
him whether his machines would ever make love, and he replied, “ Yes—
dispassionately.”
In this banter (if one can connect th a t word with Edward Teller), it
was pretty clear that the “ value ju dgm en ts” he had in mind were
logical conclusions that a self-educated machine might arrive at inde
pendently of its hum an p ro gram m ers—but scarcely the values of morals
or ethics, or of freedom or dignity, or of passions, good or bad. Now
that B. F. Skinner proposes to abolish these, Teller can get down to
the drawing board.
Frankly, I should rather have his version than Skinner’s—machines
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thinking like hum ans rather than hum ans thinking like machines.
“ W hat is needed,” says Skinner, “ is more ‘intentional’ control, not less,
and this is an im portant engineering problem .” T h a t is the understate
ment of the megalennium: “ im portant engineering pro blem ” refers not
to transistors, circuits, and feedback but to persons, societies, and
cultures; and the answer is to be found in the “ technology of behavior,”
although, as he admits, behavioral science on which such technology
could be based is a poor foundation because it “ continues to trace
behavior to states of mind, feelings, traits o f character, hum an nature
and so o n.” H e says,
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It will not solve our problems, however, until it replaces traditional pre-
scientific views and these are strongly entrenched. Freedom and dignity
illustrate the difficulty. They are the possessions of autonomous man of
traditional theory and they are essential to practices in which a person is
held responsible for his conduct and given credit for his achievements.
A scientific analysis shifts both the responsibility and the achievement to
the environment. . . .
In the pigeon-loft o f my persona, the aversion conditions and rein

forcements seem to have produced a perversity that may justify Skinner’s
worst misgivings a bo ut “ a utono m o us m a n .” I cannot understand how
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shifting the responsibility redeems the hum an predicament.
As Harvey Wheeler remarked in a discussion of Ellul’s The Techno
logical Society at the Center, “ He [Ellul] leaves the reader with a strong
feeling of methodological paranoia. . . .” Fo r me, Skinner does the same
with Beyond Freedom and Dignity. It is eloquently written and vigor
ously argued. It is aggressively defensive, as it must be when its very
title deliberately "asks for tro ub le” and periodically troubles the author.
In the end, to assuage the wounded vanity of man, the self, he says man
can “ prom ote a sense of freed o m and dignity by building a sense of
confidence and worth.” Which brand washes whiter?

214 LORD R1TCH1E-CALDER
I would bracket together Ellul (the means swallow up ends), M cLuhan

(the medium becomes the method) and Skinner (the end of auto no m o us
man) as latter-day determinists who are “ h o ok ed ” on technology. They
chose a field. They analyze selectively. They write persuasively. They
produce obiter dicta that become slogans for the credulous. Their fore
bodings, given the weight of scientific findings, become predictions that
confirm trends, inasmuch as policy-makers start planning fo r , and not
away fr o m , the conditions they foresee.
In a previous symposium at the Center, the one on Ellul, we exam
ined the bleak proposition that technology had become a closed circle
and that the answers to the problems created by technology would have
to be found within technology. Technology had become an auto nom ou s
INDEX
force, invading not only our working lives but our entire society. T ech
nology, which was to produce the means to free men from drudgery
and the material means to better well-being, was in process of robbing
workers of their jo bs and decision-makers of their power to make
decisions. Ellul’s examples were disquieting, and all of us could think of
many more, including the President of the United States being left with
a computer-dictated decision a bo ut nuclear war. One consolation I
finally derived from our discussions was th at technology was not a
closed circle—it was a spiral, moving so fast th at it looked like a closed
circle, but still open-ended. Similarly, it is easy to be impressed by
M c L u h a n ’s examples, and by com m on experience, that the com m unica
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tions systems, by their technical ingenuity and pervasiveness, were
ritualizing our behavior and usurping our powers of self-determination.
This was the new mythology, the submission to depersonalized powers.
N ow we have Skinner arguing that the m an-m ade environm ent has
taken over and th a t the individual will have to submit his personality
(freedom and dignity) to a synthetic culture and become a creature of
his own creation. In this sense, “ environm ent” has become a H umpty-
D um pty word (“ W h e n I use a word it means ju st what I choose it to
m e a n —neither more or less” ). He is concerned with that “ part of the
social environment called culture.” He goes on to say,
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Our culture has produced the science and technology it needs to save itself.
It has the wealth needed for effective action. It has to a considerable extent
a concern for its own future. But if it continues to take freedom or dignity,
rather than its own survival, as its principal value, then it is possible that
some other culture will make a greater contribution to the future.
The “ o u r” and the “ other” are revealing. Some of us are concerned

abo ut the fate of the hum an species if “ o u r ” culture continues to impair
or destroy the physical environment, the biosphere, but he is concerned
with the survival of “ o u r” culture, in which the Ellulian prediction can

Beyond B. F. Skinner 215
fulfil itself, provided th at the “ literatures of freedom and dignity” do

not encourage a “ lethal m u ta tio n.”
“ W h at is being abolished,” he says, “ is a u to n o m o u s m a n —the inner
man, the homunculus, the possessive demon, the man defended by the
literatures of freedom and dignity. His abolition has long been overdue.
A u to no m ou s man is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in
any other way.”
As Tolstoy wrote in his postscript to W ar and P eace:
If the concept of freedom appears to the reason as a senseless contradiction,

like the possibility of performing two actions at one and the same instant of
time, or the possibility of effect without cause, that only proves that con
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sciousness is not subject to reason. It is this unwavering, certain conscious
ness of freedom—a consciousness indifferent to experience or reason
recognized by all thinkers and felt by everybody without exception—it is
this consciousness without which there is no imagining man at all, which
is the other side of the question. . . . Only in our conceited age of populari
zation of knowledge—thanks to that most powerful engine of ignorance,
the diffusion of printed matter—has the question of freedom of will been
put on a level on which the question itself cannot exist.
Those latter-day determinists invoke “ scientific analysis” to give

cause-and-effect inevitability to their findings, with what Sir Frederick
G ow land H opkins called “ the lusty self-confidence of 19th Century
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scientists.” Then, scientists were reinforced by N ewtonian certainty,
which gave them a sense o f Scientific Predestination, of unalterable
processes leading inexorably from one event to the next. This sense
affected social thinking. M althus, by projecting his analysis, predicted
that the population would inevitably increase beyond the capacity of
the soil to feed the people and this, in turn, determined the “ inevitability
of poverty.” K arl M arx could predict the “ inevitability of socialism”
based on what his follower Rosa Luxem burg described as the “ granite
foundation o f objective historical necessity.” H erbert Spencer (not
Darw in) applied causality to “ the survival of the fittest” and, as an
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economist, used it to sanction the extreme form of laissez fa ire . Science
was travelling on the rails of certainty.
Twentieth-century science (if not all scientists) is much more humble:
chance is back, probability is perfectly respectable, and indeterminacy is
not a confession of faltering. In the nucleus of the atom , we find un
certainty in a philosophically insoluble form. It is impossible to predict
how an individual electron will behave, and it never will be possible;
it is not a question of improving methods or instruments, it is u n kn ow
able. W h at scientists would w ant to know with certainty is what the
position and velocity of any electron is; only therefrom might they predict

216 LORD RITCHIE-CALDER
what its path is likely to be. They never can. If they use X rays or other
intensive rays, they are so energetic that they will displace the electron,
thus changing its speed or its position and, possibly, its direction. Thus,
it is impossible to predict its future behavior. The mere act of observation
thus changes the behavior. But it is possible, by observations of mil
lions of particles, to discover th at the behavior of an average electron
will be.
This seems a fair analogy with the nature of a u to no m ou s man.
Reason, reconciled to indeterminacy, can remove “ the senseless c o n tra
diction of the possibility of performing two actions at one and the same
instant of tim e.” The contradiction, in terms of m odern science, is no
longer senseless; and, when Skinner says th a t “ it is the nature of the
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experimental analysis of hum an behavior th a t it should strip away the
functions previously assigned to a u to n o m o u s man and transfer them
one by one to the controlling environm ent,” it is rather like saying that
we will abolish the electron, which is inconveniently unpredictable, and
call it electricity, which we can control with a switch.
The hum an predicament is sufficiently discouraging without the
dystopians claiming scientific inevitability for their scenarios. F o r
tunately, we are not all literate ignoram uses—Tolstoy’s dupes of the
printed w o rd —nor hum an cassettes imprinted by Skinner’s learning
machines, nor simpletons brainwashed by M c L u h a n ’s medium.
There is now plenty of evidence of powerful forces running contrary
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to the trends that would justify these predictions. It is not without
significance that young people are reasserting the hum an values that
Skinner is seeking to abolish and are concerning themselves with the
individual’s place in the total environment, not ju st with the technology-
dictated cultural environment. A nd not only young people: many others
are strongly reacting to the Ellulian determinants, the technological
means th at are usurping our ends. They are the heretics who are ques
tioning the “ economic grow th-rate” that is the mainspring of the
technological system that relies on production for its own sake. (Even
The Times of London, the organ of economic orthodoxy, had a leader
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headed “ Can We Afford to be R ich?” ) This is a return to real (human)
values, as against artificial (machine) values. This is a case of Skinner’s
“ d a em o n ” breaking out before he can suppress it.
Two hundred years ago, the philosopher David H um e argued that a
radical distinction should be made between the “ is” and the “ ought,”
between “ fact” and “ value.” Science is the “ is.” M oral philosophy, not
the technology of behavior, must decide what is the “ ou ght.”

Skinner and
"Freedom and Dignity"
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Nathan Rotenstreich
N athan R otenstreich, professor o f philosophy at H ebrew University o f

Jerusalem, is the author o f various books in H ebrew and English, the
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three most recent being On the H u m a n Subject: Studies in the
Phenom enology o f Ethics and Politics, Jewish Philosophy in
M odern Times: From Mendelssohn to Rosenzweig, and
Tradition and Reality.
Rotenstreich resumes the philosophical a ttack on behaviorism and
criticizes Skinner fo r fa ilin g to come to grips with problem s raised in
philosophical system s (particularly those o f Spinoza, K ant, and Pico
della M irandola) whose form ulations depend upon the concepts o f
freedom and dignity. H e confronts Skinner's theories with some o f
these problems and, after detailed analysis, concludes that Skinner has
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not been able to resolve them satisfactorily.
The direction of Skinner's argum ent in Beyond Freedom and D ignity

seems to be clear: “ A scientific analysis shifts bo th the responsibility
and the achievement to the environm ent” [p. 25].1 But what sort of
T h r o u g h o u t this paper, page num bers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s

21 8 ■NATHAN ROTENSTRE1CH
environment does this imply? Is it the cosmos, nature, society, culture,

or mores?
In order to present his argument, Skinner uses two or three categories:
those of freedom, dignity, and, possibly, values. These are philosophical
categories, but their systematic connotation is by no means clear.
Skinner refers several times to the “ literature of freedom ” [pp. 30, 31];
he also refers to the “ literature of dignity” [p. 54]. But to what literature
is he actually referring? It seems that, when he refers to the “ literature
of freedom,” the reference is to the various pamphlets o f what he calls
the freedom m ovem ent; it is less clear what the literature of dignity
may be. I would expect to be directed to Spinoza, and the question of
necessity and freedom in his system; to K an t, and the problem of de
cision and predetermination by a universal law; or to Pico della Miran-
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d o la’s “ O ration on the Dignity of M a n ,” for a delineation of the scope
o f the concepts employed. But no such direction is to be found. Is it a
mere oversight, or is it professional bias on my part to evaluate a text
employing certain concepts with the classic formulation of these con
cepts in mind? One need not necessarily subscribe to the direction of
those classical formulations to believe that a real attem pt to deal with
the issue has to come to grips with the problems raised in those philo
sophical systems whose very formulation depends upon these concepts.
Let us start, following the structure of the book, with the concept of
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freedom. Insofar as it is possible to find a systematic explication of the
concept, freedom, in Skinner’s presentation, connotes a release from
harmful contacts [p. 26]; as a release, it may be viewed as an escape
from, for example, the heat o f the sun [p. 27] or an escape from an
attack [p. 30]. In general terms, “ Escape and avoidance play a much
more im po rtant role in the struggle for freedom when the aversive
conditions are generated by other people” [p. 28]. W ha t is not clear is
whether the act of escape is itself an act of freedom, or whether the act
of escape takes place in order to feel free: Skinner states that, once a
man feels free and “ can do what he desires, no further action is recom
m ended and none is prescribed by the literature of freedom, except per
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haps eternal vigilance lest control be resum ed” [p. 32].
These quotations make me wonder to what extent preference or choice
is taken into account. To be sure, when Skinner refers to the protest
that would arise if prisoners were forced to participate in a dangerous
experiment [p. 39], he presumably means that those who protest are
expressing a preference. In other words, they would prefer not to be
forced. But preference is an act of ranking or, from another view, it is
an act of selection from am ong choices. As such, preference is, despite
Skinner, a state of mind, and his objection [p. 42] to defining freedom

Skinner and “Freedom and Dignity" 219
in terms of states of mind does not hold good. This is so not only
because, as Skinner has it, our language is imbued with mentalistic
terms, but also because the phenom enon of preference involves pon der
ing, weighing one situation against another, and possibly m aking a
choice. M aking such a choice is not only an overt act; it also acknow l
edges the choice as being preferable, gives assent to a proposition, or
admits something as being valid. Even when it is freedom that is desired,
that choice is selected.
In Skinner's discussion of freedom, there is no mention of the notion
of a norm in general, or of a norm of freedom in particular. A norm is a
standard, and is thus different from whatever is being evaluated by that
standard. The standard may be freedom as an ideal, or equality, or the
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removal of hum an aggression, or even harm ony between man and his
environment (which seems to be Skinner’s underlying norm). Yet, by
its very definition, a norm is abstract, and there is no way yet to grasp
abstractions except by thinking, cognitive activities— precisely the activi
ties th at Skinner questions.
In his rand om presentation of the concept of freedom, Skinner m en
tions purposefulness as one of its aspects [p. 20]. H e is correct in doing
so, because freedom is shown not only in running from a situation, but
also in anticipating something to come, something to be created. This
being so, Skinner is bound to assume th a t man anticipates the future.
But can he consistently do so, in view of his questioning of cognitive
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activity because of its mentalistic bias? Skinner speaks of culture and
its evolution; he speaks about new practices furthering the survival of
those who practice them [p. 134]. T o speak of survival is to refer to a
time that is not the present; it is, to some extent, taking into account
future generations. In addition to that, it involves com parison: there
are practices that further survival, practices that do not, and —within
each of these two categories—practices of varying degrees of efficacy,
such as child hygiene and nutrition. Could man take all these factors
into account without the cognitive activity proper, not merely the
“ cognitive” activity called thinking [p. 193]?
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Does it blur the lines of the analysis to refer to anticipation and the
cognitive activity even though we started with freedom? I do not believe
so. Freedom is rooted fundamentally in the cognitive activity, and two
characteristic features of cognitive activity are: negatively, it is not a
continuation of the object taken cognizance of; and, positively, the
cognitive activity has its own m om entum , by which it directs itself to
its own objects, and thus is self-directed — which is but another expression
of the concept of freedom. It is to this aspect of freedom, totally neg
lected by Skinner, that we referred at the beginning of our presentation
to Kant.

220 NATHAN ROTENSTRE1CH
The major point in K a n t’s analysis and presentation is precisely the

notion th at freedom is a correlate of objectively determining grounds;
or, as Prolegomena, paragraph 53, has it, “ freedom in which reason
possesses causality according to the objectively determining grounds.”
It is in freedom th at one’s determinedness by circumstances is overcome
and one’s determinedness by norms emerges. The whole idea of rein
forcement can m ake sense only in the context of compulsions and over
coming of compulsions, but does not face up to the notion of norms.
T hat is why reason proper is the agent of freedom in K an t: only reason
can entertain universal notions or grasp abstractions. Now, again,
reason is a mentalistic term. Possibly such terms should be removed
when they are inessential or confusing, but, in cases where we use them
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to point to phenomena that should not be disregarded, there is no way
to escape them without ignoring factual evidence.
For these reasons, we cannot follow Skinner when he stresses what
he calls “ the inner m a n ,” or agree with him that “ the function of the
inner man is to provide an explanation which will not be explained in
turn. Explanation stops with him ” [p. 14]. Freedom proper, in K a n t’s
sense, is not what he calls “ spontaneity” (spontaneitas) in one of his
precritical writings. Referring to spontaneity as an action performed
because of what he calls “ internal principle,” he suggests a distinction
between liberty (libertas) and spontaneity, liberty being determinedness
by the representation of the best (K ant, 1755, p. 409). The distinction
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suggested here is a telling one, because freedom is not presented as
being identical with a sm ooth outpouring from one’s internal life, but
rather as an opting for the best (and “ best,” being a superlative, can
only be grasped by a c om parison —that is to say, through the medium
of reflective acts).
Indeed, Skinner seems to be perplexed a bo ut the phenomenon of re
flection, if we take reflection to mean thinking about the thinker or
perhaps ab ou t the act of thinking itself. H e does not deny, from the
outset, the existence of reflection; in fact, he speaks about the role of the
environment as being particularly subtle when what is known is the
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knower himself [p. 190]. Nonetheless, he lists several instances that make
me wonder whether he really attributes to reflection the status that he
most certainly does not deny in another context. For example, “ The
possessed man does not feel the possessing demon and may even deny
th at one exists. The juvenile delinquent does not feel his disturbed
personality. The intelligent man does not feel his intelligence or the
introvert his introversion” [pp. 15-16]. (We do not quote Skinner on
grammatical rules; the problem of language is a very controversial
issue, and one may refer here to C ho m sk y’s critical writings.) D o the
phenomena listed here have a family resemblance? T he demon and the

Skinner and “Freedom and Dignity ” 221
disturbed personality are to some extent generalizations of obsessions or

states deviating from the normal or regular; one does not necessarily
have to assume that, when one is driven by an anxiety or attracted by
something th at does not conform to normal standards, one is neces
sarily aware of the deviation and its generic name (although one cer
tainly could be and still refrain from identifying the deviation with
disturbance). We can see exactly this situation in homosexuals who are
aware of their deviation but who do not grant th at they are disturbed.
This makes their case a borderline one, inasmuch as they reflect upon
themselves but do not acknowledge the standard allegedly to be fol
lowed. There is reflection here, there is even acknowledgement or c o n
sent, but these do not lead to acknowledging the prevailing standard.
But intelligence is certainly of a different character. One applies in
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telligence whether one knows it or not, and it is not by chance that
intelligence knows itself; one of its functions is to deal with new situa
tions or to invent rules; these activities certainly force intelligence to
mobilize itself, to direct itself, and even to rely upon itself. All these are
only different expressions of the reflective character of the cognitive
activity; they dem onstrate that reflection cann ot be disregarded, re
gardless of whether or not it fits any given vocabulary. It is not enough
to say, as Skinner does [p. 180], that
The geneticist who changes the characteristics of a species by selective

breeding or by changing genes may seem to be meddling in biological
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evolution, but he does so because his species has evolved to the point at
which it has been able to develop a science of genetics and a culture which
induces its members to take the future of the species into account.
One may grant that a branch of science develops in a certain climate of

opinion or in spite of certain cultural conditions; but the science of
genetics is not a continuation of the subject m atter of genetics. The
science of genetics presupposes a general cognitive or interpretative
attitude, which may or may not focus itself on certain subject matters,
themes, or technologies. The cultural environm ent may explain the
focus of interest, but it cannot explain the emergence o f the interpreta
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tion itself. A nd the same applies to the reactions of young people who
drop out of school, refuse to take jobs, and so forth [p. 15]. They react
or respond because of their interpretation of what can or cann ot be
done. The reaction is not a continuation of the situation. The statement
“ The inner man has been created in the image of the outer” [p. 15] is a
bon m ot, but it can not be accepted as an adequate account of the position
of man in the environment (man is an interpreter, whether or not he is
aware of it), nor does the phrase give a generic or categorical form ula
tion of m a n ’s condition.

Let us now turn to the concept of dignity. Again, it is not easy to

define the concept as it is employed in Skinner’s book. Still, dignity
seems to be used, by and large, in a social context. T h a t is why Skinner
speaks of blaming or punishing a person when he behaves badly and of
giving credit to him and admiring him for his positive achievements
[p. 21]. T h a t is why he connects such expressions of applause as “ A gain!”
“ E ncore!” and “ Bis!” [p. 45] to the concept of dignity, as well as (in a
negative way) to loss of status [p. 46]. H e equates dignity with credit
[pp. 47-48]: “ We recognize a person’s dignity or worth when we give
him credit for what he has do n e ” [p. 58]. Only by establishing these
relationships could he make the far-reaching statement that dignity
concerns positive reinforcement [p. 43]. (It goes without saying that
positive reinforcement is the leading concept in the theory before us.)
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Moreover, the total shift tow ard a social context is m ade most explicit
in a discussion of what can be viewed as the most sensitive issue of all:
“You should (you ought to) tell the truth” is a value judgment to the extent
that it refers to reinforcing contingencies. We might translate it as follows:
“ If you are reinforced by the approval of your fellow men, you will be
reinforced when you tell the truth.” The value is to be found in the social
contingencies maintained for purposes of control. It is an ethical or moral
judgment in the sense that ethos and mores refer to the customary practices
of a group [pp. 112-113],
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It is rather easy to start the critical analysis from this point, where truth
is defined as a custom in a social context, and telling the truth is defined
as a customary practice within a group, a practice whose validity lies in
reinforcing contingencies. The flaw in Skinner’s logic is so obvious that
I hesitate to point it out. After all, the a u th or of any book of this sort
strives to describe a situation adequately, and is thus, willy-nilly, tied
up with truth as a principle or as a norm, regardless of reinforcing co n
tingencies. The reason we quote this far-reaching statement of Skinner’s
at all is because of our didactic concern to bring the exclusiveness of
the social context into prominence when we speak abou t dignity, in
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Skinner’s sense, as credit qua reputation, honor, or commendation.
To be sure, the etymological roots of the term “ dignity” do lie in the
social context (in addition to the rhetorical or stylistic context): dignitas
consularis means “ being worthy of the office of Consul,” and dignum
est is sometimes understood as “ being fit.” But the concept of dignity
of man went far beyond these ornam ental connotations, and that fact
cannot be disregarded. Pico della M irandola saw the dignity of man as
lying in the indeterminedness of his nature. G od assigned man a place
in the middle of the world and told him th a t “ neither a fixed abode nor

Skinner and “ Freedom and Dignity ’ 223
a forum th a t is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we

given thee, A dam . . (Pico della M irandola, 1486, pp. 224-225). For
this reason Pico referred to m an as a being of “ varied, manifold, and
inconstant na ture " (ibid., p. 227). Paradoxically, S kinner—in placing
the dignity of man in a social context and disregarding the traditional
cosmic context of m a n ’s indetermined n a tu re —is bound to presuppose
that cosmic aspect. After all, were it not for the fact that m a n ’s nature
is inconstant, he could not be managed or controlled, directed or rein
forced. Only a flexible being can be open to the technology of control.
But Skinner, who presupposes the indeterminedness of hum an nature,
takes this simply as a fact or as a point of departure, not as something
evoking esteem or respect in itself. In the traditional approaches to the
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notion of the dignity of man, we find a com bination of discernment of
m a n ’s unique characteristics and evaluation of those features as they
concern dignity or stimulate respect. Skinner presupposes the uniqueness
but gives away the esteem. It is essential for him not to disregard a
notion that has significance in the history of ideas. The objective dignity
of m an in terms of his characteristics would not justify this, nor would
Skinner’s subjective response to those characteristics in terms of the
perhaps unconscious reverence he betrays for the objective dignity of
man. Here again it is apposite to refer to K ant, who, as is well known,
com bined dignity with purpose or worthiness, eventually assuming that
dignity, absolute value, and the end in itself are identical. Skinner
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seems to be concerned with the position of m a n —otherwise he would not
seek his im p rov em ent—but we d o n ’t know why he makes this effort;
he presents his case only in the context of social interaction (again, see
the telling example involving truth). There is no room for the p h eno m
enon of respect in the presentation before us. It is rather interesting that
K a n t says (“ Metaphysik der Sitten,’’ paragraph 24) the principle of re
spect (A chtung) dem ands limiting our own self-esteem so we can recog
nize the human dignity of the other person. These concepts are totally
missing in Skinner’s presentation. And this is not a historical but a
conceptual criticism th a t takes advantage of the reservoir of motives to
be found in classical literature.
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One last point relating to freedom and dignity before we move on to
the notion of values: the statement that “ one of the great problems of
individualism, seldom recognized as such, is d e a th —the inescapable fate
of the individual, the final assault on freedom and dignity” [p. 210] is
factually incorrect. If we take only the c o ntem porary E xistenz philos
ophy, we cannot but notice that it is both individualistic and very much
concerned with death. But m ore im portant is the relevance of death
to the notions of freedom and dignity as features of hum an nature.
Freedom and dignity refer to m an as he is in his finitude. One may

resent finitude and wish th at death were not one of its expressions, but
it remains just th at and no more; it certainly is not an assault on free
dom and dignity. One may say th at m an is free and has dignity in spite of
his finitude, but this does not mean that freedom and dignity are incon
sistent with death. The ontological position of m an is not identical with
his freedom and dignity, even th ou gh they may be am o ng his assets.
The cosmic uniqueness of man does not free him from the chains of
nature, and no traditional philosopher who has spoken of the dignity
of man has said that it does. The contrary is true. K ant, for instance,
stressed freedom precisely because he had seen the sensuous or natural
character of man. Only an identification o f both freedom and dignity
with limitlessness, in terms of endurance in time, could be viewed as
relevant in the context that Skinner describes.
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We have, thus far, deliberately confined our analysis to Beyond
Freedom and D ignity, but two issues m ake it appropriate to refer to a
nontechnical book: Richard 1. E vans’s B. F. Skinner: the M an and his
Ideas. The reason will become clear as the argum ent goes on. One issue
is that of creativity. Evans (1968, p. 86) quotes Skinner in the dialogue
as saying: “ If I were to try to isolate the events in my own behavior
which have led to original behavior, I would look for them in certain
techniques o f self-management.” W ho, we must ask ourselves, is the
self involved in self-management? And what is the difference between
self-management, which has somehow a professional sound, and self
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control, which is rather a com m on term? O f course, the question arises
out of curiosity, but, in addition, it relates to a very im portant substan
tive issue. There is no way to attribute responsibility to man without
assuming a kind of self, be the interpretation of the latter notion what
it may. And Skinner, in advocating control and m anagement, proposing
reinforcement as a means, must face the issue, willy-nilly, of whether
or not there is an agent to be reinforced. Either that, or we are involved
in an infinite regression from one reinforcement to another, ultimately
not only missing the addressee, but not even intending to reach him.
Here the questions dealt with before—th a t is, those of cognitive ac
tivity, spontaneity, norm, and freedom —re-emerge. Let us refer again
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to Kant, with the proviso that we do not consider any system —and
K a n t’s is a system—as an em bodim ent of tru th but rather as a carrier
of the formulations of problems. K a n t makes this point in one of his
“ Reflexionen” (4220): (1) the expression “ I th in k ” itself shows, with
respect to the representation ( Vorstelhing), that I am not passive, that
the representation is ascribed to me by myself; and (2) the capacity to
think a priori and to do is an absolute condition of the possibility of all
other phenomena. The ought (das Sollen) would not have any meaning
whatever (“ Reflexionen” 5441). W hat we notice in these two “ reflections”

Skinner and “Freedom and Dignity' 225
is a kind of continuity or convergence between "1 th in k ” and “ I d o .”

Any ascription presupposes the “ I,” whether the ascription has a
cognitive or a moral meaning in terms of accountability (though per
haps the G erm an term Zurechnung is more apt than the usual English
word accountability). Skinner struggles with the question of hum an
responsibility—he cann ot avoid doing so in suggesting the control of
hum an behavior. T o be sure, he says that “ the problem is to induce
people not to be good but to behave well” [p. 67]. And we know, from
the religious vocabulary, th at this is called orthopraxis. Yet he still says:
“ We give him instruction in safe and skillful driving. We teach him
rules” [p. 69]. The question we cannot escape is: W ho is being taught
here, and why should those who are taught be taught rules? Rules can
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be grasped only insofar as they have intrinsically abstract content. If we
assume that there is somebody to be taught or somebody to be c o n
trolled, we surmise his qualities by ascribing ideas to him, or representa
tions, or merely rules. But once we allow for a cognition in relation to
rules, we are bound to allow for the “ 1” engaged in the cognition, and
who will tell us which direction the “ I” will take in his cognition?
D o n ’t we come back to the “ I ” through the back door?
We are led, at this point, directly to the question of values. “ U nd er a

‘perfect’ system no one needs goodness” [p. 67]. We take the quotation
m arks accom panying the term “ perfect” to be a kind of understatement
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or self-criticism but, ju st the same, the underlying notion of the whole
system seems to be that there is indeed an overriding value—th at of
harm ony between m an and what is expected from him —and that this
harm ony can be achieved by a shift tow ard environm ent: “ A scientific
analysis shifts both the responsibility and the achievement to the envi
r o n m e n t” [p. 25]. W ould it be totally inept to interprt the trend of the
doctrine as an attem pt to achieve, through the intervention of the
environment, what man cannot achieve th rou gh his own initiative or
effort? If this interpretation is at least partially w arranted, we must co n
clude th at Skinner knows what is g o o d —and the emphasis is to be laid
on knowing. The reason for that emphasis lies in Skinner’s own presen
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tation of values. Let us consider what he says on this very topic: the
most frequent concept used by him in his discussion of values [pp.
101 ff] is the concept of “ feel” : “ . . . to raise questions not a b out facts
but how men feel about facts, not about what man can do, but ab o u t
what he ought to d o ” [p. 102]. Is it really so? Are values f e l t ? Obviously,
they are not recognized, as facts are in the simple sense of the word
fa c t, like the hardness of the table; but they are not theoretical entities
like electrons; and they are not known because of having been m eth
odologically, and thus deliberately, introduced into the discourse.

226 •NATHAN ROTENSTRE1CH
Values are acknowledged, and this is a different sort o f intentionality

involving neither feelings nor knowledge proper. Indeed, knowledge is
implied here for the simple reason that there is a difference between
things th at are valuable in themselves and things th a t are valuable
in relation to norms. Skinner says th at “ the social contingencies, or the
behavior they generate, are the ‘ideas’ of a culture; the reinforcers that
appear in the contingencies are its ‘values’ ” [p. 128]. Further, “ telling
the truth . . . is the right thing to do, and telling lies is bad and wrong.
The ‘n o rm ’ is simply a statement of the contingencies” [p. 115]. This
would mean that a norm corresponds to ideas and not to values, and
that the principle of tru th would be an idea and not a value—and the
distinction is rather vague. But just the same “ goods are reinforcers”
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[p. 145], which means that Skinner adheres to a view that goods are of
an instrumental significance. Were it not for this interpretation, he would
not be in a position to say that “ survival is the only value according to
which a culture is eventually to be judged, and any practice that furthers
survival has survival value by definition” [p. 136]. Now, suppose th at
this value of survival (incidentally, value appears here without the usual
quotation marks) is the only value of a culture: why do hum an indi
viduals subscribe to this value or acknowledge it? After all, if this is a
value of a culture, it has a transpersonal position. Even if it reinforces
the individual, the individual has to take into account a culture that
goes beyond him and survives his individual existence. Even when a
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value has an instrumental validity in terms of a culture, it has to be
acknowledged by the individual for the sake of the culture. Along with
the reinforcement, a kind of foregoing would take place; or perhaps, to
call a spade a spade, a sort of self-sacrifice for the sake of cultural
survival. Even when we assume the goodness of the harm ony between
m ankind and the environment, it does not follow that every individual
composing mankind achieves th a t harm ony in his own individual orbit.
The awareness of the norm or the value o f the culture is not only an
abstract awareness in the sense th at something distant is evaluated; it
also has an additional connotation in terms of abstractness. It abstracts
from the individual. With all the emphasis laid on reinforcement, the
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conclusion cannot be escaped th at Skinner presents a kind of social
ethics: the reinforced individual is an instrument of, or an agent for,
society. And here Skinner’s criticisms of mentalism, autonom y, and
such concepts as inner agent cease to have a methodical connotation
and become substantive issues, and im portant ones.
Before going into some of the unavoidable political or social conse
quences of this doctrine, we must recognize the far-reaching relativism
that goes along with the theory of values th at Skinner explicates or
implicitly suggests. Evans (1968, p. 55) quotes Skinner as saying that

Skinner and “Freedom and Dignity' 227
“ the Nazis made good use of the social sciences, even though they had
driven out most o f the good people. It was ‘g o o d ’ from their point of
view, of course; dangerous from ours.’’ 1 am aw are of my special
sensitivity to this issue, but ju st the same it seems to me that it is more
than bias that leads me to ask some rather pertinent questions:
1) W hat is “ good use” ? Is it effective use, efficient use, consistent use

up to the extremity of destroying hum an beings?
2) In what sense can “ use” be good and people be “ g o o d ” ? Isn't
there an implicit understanding that use can be good when it serves a
purpose efficiently, even if the purpose be that of driving some human
beings outside the boundaries of hum anity and using them as raw
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material? And because the Nazis decided who was a hum an being and
who was not, didn't all those they classified as hum an belong to the
category of good people?
3) Was the Nazi's application of the social sciences only dangerous
from our point of view, or was it just simply bad? Does not our aw are
ness of the danger follow our awareness of the badness?
N o w perhaps the expressions used lack precision. But, com paring

Beyond Freedom and D ignity to the Evans qu otation and noticing the
tendency so clearly visible in the book to see a relation between values
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and feelings—and, further, seeing as the only absolute value (if this
expression is permitted for didactical reasons) the value of survival—
I wonder whether the relativistic consequences are not only a memento
of the consequences but also o f the doctrine as a whole.
Skinner indicates some hum an or political consequences. But, as so

often happens, the consequences he indicates call for some reservations,
to say the least, ab ou t his whole doctrine:
1) “ W hat we need is a technology of behavior” [p. 5]. After all, we

know by now th a t technology engenders its own problems. W hy are we
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to be naive about one kind of technology, that o f behavior, when we
are experienced, skeptical, and know full well th at technology, in
solving a problem, creates new ones. W ho can promise us that there
will be no pollution o f the technology of behavior?
2) It may be th at we w o n’t have to wait to see the pollution coming.
The pollution is already present in the mode). “ As to technology, we
have made immense strides in controlling the physical and biological
worlds, but our practices in government, education, and much of
economics, though adapted to very different conditions, have not

greatly im proved” [p. 6]. There is an implied imposition of one model,

that of technological control, on different areas of hum an behavior or
“ practices,” as it is called in the present context. There is a fundamental
difference between the technological enterprise run by experts and the
educational process. The educational process is directed toward every
hu m an individual. When man lands on the m oon, m ankind lands on
the m oon. Any technological achievement is a vicarious achievement for
everybody within the hum an realm, even for those who themselves
benefit from the fruits of the achievement. One can benefit from the
fruits without understanding the tree. But this is not so in education
proper. There is no vicarious education. Education addresses itself to
every hum an individual, relies on his potentialities, attempts to increase
them, helps to shape him by letting him shape himself. The fact that
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there has been a Socrates does not make m ankind Socratic or educated.
The level has to be achieved. Moreover, the fact that Socrates did what
he did creates a post-factum continuity; every deed appears individually,
even atomically. There is no guarantee that a person who has done a
good deed once will do it again, even when we attribute to the person
what is called a character—th a t is, a kind of consistency. Skinner, by
suggesting a technology of behavior, suggests eradicating the differences
between levels of hum an existence and what is called die Sachlogik of
these different provinces. Supposedly we know not only what is perfect
but also th at the perfect is uniform.
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3) “ The problem is to free men, not from control, but from certain
kinds of control, and it can be solved only if our analysis takes all the
consequences into account” [p. 41]. W ho knows all the consequences?
Will those in control of hum an behavior be a sort of sociopolitical elite
(the only ones who will know with all the concomitants of the cognitive
activity, while the others will not know but will be subject to control)?
And who will control the controllers? (It sounds like a restatement of
M a rx ’s famous question: “ W ho will educate the educators?” ) After all,
the technology of behavior is grounded in a certain view of human
nature and in certain skills mastered by hum an beings. The assumption
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that they will know all the consequences has to be rejected from the
beginning: who knows the consequences o f the consequences? But what
is humanly and politically even more im portant is the question of gov
ernment. Governm ents control hum an beings; the criterion of the legiti
macy of control by a government is related to the question of whether
or not the government allows humans, physically and in terms of the
climate of opinion, to criticize its control. The criticism could be directed
at control in general (because of convictions related to a sort of a n a r
chism) or at the direction the control takes; it could try to change the

Skinner and “Freedom and Dignity ’ 229
control fundamentally or piecemeal. Skinner says th at “ a permissive

government is a government that leaves control to other sources” [p. 97].
W hether or not the term “ permissive” is the most suitable one in the
context is not very relevant; more im portant is the point th at a legiti
m ate governm ent is a government th a t controls w ithout prohibiting
changes in its control. The technology of behavior does not provide any
built-in device to maintain that possibility, because it addresses itself
not to behavior but to dignity and freedom and formulates a view where
by there can only be behavior that does not call for awareness of norms,
cognitive activity, and ascription of ideas and deeds. But there is a vicious
circle here—to control behavior is to shift the hum an being from his
inner forum to the commonplace of behavior. T o do this, one has to
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eradicate the inner forum, or to control behavior to such an extent that
the inner forum eventually becomes a replica of overt modes of behavior.
The last sentence of Skinner’s book reads: “ We have not yet seen
what man can make of m a n ” [p. 215]. It sounds like Nietzsche, not in
terms of superman driven by the dionysian élan but in terms o f man
controlling man. There is a paradoxical pride in being man, though it
is not clear whether the pride is taken in being m an as a controlling man
or in being man as subject to control. The pride in being a controlling
man brings us back to freedom and dignity. The pride in being man as
subject to control leads us to behaving well without knowing why or
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for what purpose. W hat kind of justification is possible for this kind of
pride, unless we assume that somehow convictions will follow? And,
if we make this assumption, we find ourselves back at the point of
departure.
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Is He Really a Grand Inquisitor?

M ichael Novak
INDEX M ichael N o va k, a professor o f religion at the State University o f New

York at O ld W estbury, is the author o f several books, including
T h e E x p e r ie n c e o f N o t h in g n e s s (1970) and A s c e n t o f th e M o u n t a in ,
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F lig h t o f th e D o v e (1971).
Here, the professional theologian wrestles against behaviorism.
In the end, however, N ovak is not disparaging o f Skinner's work. The
reaction against B e y o n d F r e e d o m a n d D ig n it y , N ovak points out, is
“religious in its in te n sity "; yet he acknowledges that a remarkable
number o f Christian theologians praise the book. N ovak suggests and
analyzes three reasons why this should be so. The reason he stresses
m ost emphatically is that “Skinner s sense o f reality, the story he
believes the universe to be living out (he calls his view ‘the scientific
picture'), reaches back in time to m ake contact with a more ancient
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vision. It is as i f the Enlightenment were, . . . in its philosophical
‘picture,’ a temporary aberration. . .
N ovak also takes up, as his title implies, the relation between the
doctrines o f fr e e will and Skinnerism .
A r e m a r k a b le num ber o f C h r is tia n t h e o l o g ia n s are p r a is in g B. F.

S k in n e r ’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity. A n u m b e r o f o th e r s b e lie v e h is

Is He Really a Grand Inquisitor? 231
work incompatible with Christianity. Both may be wrong.

Professor Skinner would be the last person to claim a uton om ou s
credit for Beyond Freedom and Dignity. It was not he, it was the environ
ment that controlled the b ook's coming into being. And if we suppose
that Skinner is a latter-day T hom as Aquinas, we might well imagine on
his lips the echoes of an ancient outlook: “ It was not owing to anything
in me; everything was gift. Yes, 1 set hand to paper, but only through
G o d 's grace sweetly disposing all things. . . We recall the countless
unsigned medieval masterpieces, the anonym ous achievements of C h a r
tres, and that now lost social and cultural sense th at did not attach much
significance to whomever it was who expressed best the artistic genius
of the age. It was enough, in those days, that the people, the culture,
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flowered. So remembering, we recover more fully the shock of the sudden
birth of ego: the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Age of the
Individual.
If we suppose, with Whitehead, th at science flourished in the West
because of centuries of habituation in the confidence th at every single
historical phenom enon springs from one intelligible source—no lily
blooms, no sparrow falls, no hair on a single head is lost, save G od
knows of it —then we may trace a fairly direct line from the Logos that
is identified with the G o d of A braham , Isaac, and Jacob to the Logos
of whom Freud wrote so affectionately in The Future o f an Illusion:
th at Logos no longer personal, no longer G od, but effectively exhibiting
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interconnectedness even in slips of the tongue, in dreams, in seemingly
“ irrational'' aspects of behavior of all sorts.
We may say (with a roughness appropriate to brevity) that, from
belief in a single intelligent Creator of all things, inseparable twins were
spawned. The first was confidence in the au to no m y of every individual
will (which K a n t identified as the essence of Enlightenment) and the
second, confidence in the rational, experimental procedures of scientific
method. And we may further say that, as the children rebelled from
the parent, so now, with Skinner, the second twin devours the first.
For Skinner demythologizes autonom y, the individual, freedom, and
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dignity in conscious parody of an earlier demythologizing of the Creator
and Redeemer. As G od died, so now must the a u tono m ou s individual.
It is not surprising that the reaction against his work is religious in its
intensity.
But why on earth would theologians see merit in what Skinner is up
to? There are at least three reasons. I would like to analyze them, to
raise questions abo ut problems of translation from a Christian to a
Skinnerian world view, and to raise some political and institutional
issues.

232 MICHAEL NOVAK
H um ans A re Social A nim als
There is a widespread belief, in this Protestant nation, th at Christianity

is a religion of individualism, each man his own priest and pope, each
conscience inviolable, each person a potential source of a utonom y and
dissent. “ The Protestant principle,” Paul Tillich was wont to boast,
lies at the heart of the m odern period and overlaps with the principle
of the Enlightenm ent—it is the principle of the free, auton om ou s c o n
science. W h at Christianity adds to Enlightenment is chiefly the convic
tion th at hum an auton om y is G o d ’s presence in m an: whoever acts
autonom ously is acted in by God. Theologians influenced by Heidegger
and the existentialists “ demythologized” the New Testament, to show
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that what Jesus dem anded was authenticity, engagement, decisive acts:
an exercise of genuine autonomy.
Classical theologians and broad popular movements in American
Christianity both stress the importance of the individual and his “ deci
sion.” The New England Puritans and the Southern and Southwestern
populists have been at one in their fierce attachm ent to categories and
rhetorical devices th at accent the individual. (One of the bitter lessons
that Catholic immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe had to
learn, in order to be “ Americanized,” was to pursue loneliness and
laissez faire: “ Y o u ’re on your ow n,” “ It’s up to you,” “ Each man for
himself” —a rhetoric, and some little reality, of individual opportunity,
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dissolving such native social solidarity as their families once had known.)
Three critical factors tell against the model of Christianity as indi
vidualism : the teachings of the Scriptures; the practice of early Christian
ity; and the actualities of Christian life. The reaction against an exag
gerated and errant, although in some ways helpful, emphasis on indi
vidualism has been well underway for several decades. It culminated,
for example, in “ the Social G ospel” ; in the C onstitution on the church
agreed upon by the Second Vatican Council; in many initiatives of the
W orld Council of Churches; in ecumenism; in liturgical revivals; and
in the acquisition of social modes of thinking on the part of individual
theologians. Reinhold N ieb u h r’s career, for example, may be viewed as
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a struggle to break free from merely individualistic categories to a
larger, social conception of m a n —and it is a very long voyage, in this
respect, from his early books, such as M oral M an and Im m oral Society,
to M a n s N ature and his Communities. A nd surely nothing is more
obvious to the sociologically tutored eye than the social character of
actual religious attitudes and practices today.
Professor Skinner’s emphasis upon the social character of human
existence is thus, from a theological point of view, confirmatory of a
well-established trend. For Christian theologians, one of the more

influential books in recent years has been The Social Construction o f

Reality, by Peter Berger and T hom as L uckm ann. The sociological
viewpoint of Parsons, Bellah, and others has contributed to “ systemic”
analysis; and the recent disaffection with liberal W ASP “ superculture”
(with its misleading appeals to individualism) have convinced many that
social factors are central to an accurate grasp of hum an reality.
A second reason why many theologians find Skinner’s position con
genial concerns Christian images of Providence and grace. To speak
merely from a Thomist standpoint [most thoroughly elucidated by
Bernard Lonergan in Grace and Freedom (Lonergan, 1971)], nothing
of good that a hum an does is deserving of credit; everything is grace.
(The dam nable thing abo ut Aquinas, Chesterton once observed, is that
he leaves nothing for a man to boast of.) M a n ’s freedom, in this view,
is thoroughly conditioned: (1) no one chooses his parents, economic
situation, childhood setting, nation of origin, or historical era; (2) no
one chooses his natural (we would say, genetic) endow m ent; (3) no one
chooses the networks of circumstance in which he finds himself, or the
laws or contingencies governing their behavior; and (4) no one chooses
the insights, aspirations, or inspirations that emerge in his or her c o n
sciousness.
Aquinas notes that one can resist or “ turn away fro m ” creative
inner lights and urgings, given by grace or graced nature. One can “ turn
aw ay,” for the world still belongs to “ the father of lies.” He defines sin
as aversio— a turning away from those possibilities th at attract one
toward self-realization (that is, total knowing and total loving), a turning
away, that is to say, from the G od within. Thus, to be good is to align
oneself with creative, life-giving tendencies; to be evil is to subtract
oneself from them consciously and willingly.
All hum ans can take “ credit” for is aversio. When they prom ote c o m
munity, increase understanding and intellect, develop their talents,
achieve authenticity and caritas, all this has been sweetly disposed on
their behalf by G o d th ro u g h —striking linguistic e c h o —“ operant grace.”
When other conditions enable them to do so, but they (from past habit
or inclination) turn away, they are responsible—they prefer familiar
reinforcers to more difficult, weaker ones. Their “ sin,” of course, is not
merely personal; the entire social order is flawed and damaging to all.
At no historical time was the cultural tissue of hum an life solely sup
portive of humane, creative acts; the reinforcers often bring out the
worst: the “ sin” is original, the sickness—the plague—is inescapable.
Skinner would perhaps find this one-way relation to reinforcers u n
fair: no credit if you do, dam ned if you d o n ’t. But there is at least a
certain plausibility in the notion th at the reinforcers of the spirit are
w eak—they are not, for example, tangible, immediate, or sensually
234 MICHAEL NOVAK
competitive. And, interestingly enough, in the medieval imagination,

“ blame” is slight for those to whom the reinforcements of the flesh are
stronger than those of charity but severe for those guilty of “ spiritual
pride” —those who manifest an exaggerated notion of their own a u to n
omy and importance.
In this respect, the Thom ist hum an is, like the Skinnerian hum an,
entirely conditioned. F ar from depriving the individual of liberty, how
ever, these cumulative networks of antecedent conditions (for Aquinas)
enable h im —and, in particular, enable him to gain insight or to avert
his “ eyes” (“ to sin against the light” ), enable him to extend himself to
others or to withdraw. The range of m a n ’s possibilities includes loving
his neighbor (acting truly toward him) and also murdering him.
Professor Skinner, to be sure, seems to have a stronger notion still.
N o t only do environment and its many reinforcers “ enable,” they also
“ co ntrol.” Later in this paper, we must note the amplitude and the
ambiguities in Skinner’s use of “ con tro l” ; it is not a word Aquinas uses
of God. For our purposes, it suffices to note that, in Aquinas, because
no person can act without being “ enabled,” both by “ outer” and
“ inner” conditions, at no point is m a n ’s autono m y such that he may
take credit for it. Such as it is, it has been given him, both in its abiding
tendencies and in its actual exercise. It is “ grace” or “ gift,” rather
than his own creation. Hence, “ th e onom y,” rather than “ a u to no m y ,”
is a more accurate name for the hum an reality. The emphasis of autos
upon the atomic individual is not appropriate to the Skinnerian or the
Thomist functioning of the self. “ A u to n o m y ” is an exaggeration. It
suggests that hum ans in their intimate constitution are less social, less
embedded in the world, than they are.
In The Experience o f Nothingness, for example, I was constrained to
argue against the sense of reality that pictures within each of us an
“ auton om ou s self.” Influenced by T. S. Eliot's “ Tradition and the
Individual Talent,” by Lasswell’s work on the effect of capitalist-
democratic political symbols on the self-image of individuals, by Schiitz’s
demonstration of the social character of perception, by L onergan’s
m etaphor of “ horizon,” by skeptical observation, and, no doubt, as
well by religious traditions nonverbally absorbed into my sensibility.
I wished to speak of the hum an not as a “ self” but as a “ worldself,”
a horizon, a two-poled organism in which world and self mutually
constitute each other, in which neither world nor self is ever isolable in
a pure state. I A m an Im pure Thinker, Rosenstock-Huessy entitles his
meditation on a similar theme. The rejection of the sense of reality in
which there figures an autonom ous, separate self is not, in a word,
peculiar to Skinner; and it has connections to Oriental views, which see
the Western conception of self as illusory.
Skinner is aware of the parallelism between his theoretical construct

and those of ancient argum ents ab ou t predestination, grace, faith,
works, and free will. One can imagine him, indeed, rebelling in a fairly
systematic way, first against the dom inance of a Calvinist view of the
world, and then against an Enlightenm ent-Individualist view of the
world. Against Calvinism, he wants to eliminate the “ magic” of appeal
to unseen and unverifiable actions on G o d ’s part. Against the Enlighten
ment, he wants to eliminate the “ m agic” of appeal to unseen and u n
verifiable actions by an a u ton om o us self. He writes, for example, that
“ being good to someone for no reason at all, treating him affectionately
whether he is good or bad, does have Biblical support: grace must not
be contingent upon works or it is no longer grace. But there are be
havioral processes to be taken into ac cou nt” [p. 99].1
At such points, the intellectual structure of Skinner’s world view—
with G o d left o u t —is rather more like that of A quinas than like that of
Luther or Calvin. For Aquinas, grace operates (except in the rarest
cases) through the ordinary contingencies and processes of nature,
th rou gh “ secondary causes” —there are always “ behavioral processes
to be taken into account.” The whole environment, the whole “ schedule
of contingencies” that constitutes history, is graced. (Skinner merely
believes it to be melioristic.) Simply by being what it is, it manifests
G o d ’s presence, slowly building brotherliness and tutoring humans
through suffering, irrationality, and pain. Were Skinner G od, no doubt,
the design of the universe would be less faulty, less wasteful, more
economical. But it would operate no less through “ secondary causes.”
W h a t I want m ost'em p hatically to stress is that Skinner’s sense of
reality, the story he believes the universe to be living out (he calls his
view “ the scientific picture” ), reaches back in time to make contact
with a more ancient vision. It is as if the Enlightenment were, not in
its political gains but in its philosophical “ picture,” a tem porary aber-
beration—a necessary stage, perhaps, but a magnificent exaggeration.
Skinner concludes his book by saying:
Science has probab ly never dem and ed a m ore sw eep in g ch an ge in the

traditional [let us rather say, “ recen t” ] w ay o f think ing ab ou t a su bject, nor
has there ever been a m ore im portant su bject. In the tradition al picture a
person perceives the w orld around him , selects featu res to be perceived,
discrim inates a m o n g them , ju d ges them g o o d or bad, chan ges them to
m ake them better (or, if he is careless, w orse), and m ay be held responsib le
for his action and ju stly rew arded or pu nish ed for its con seq u en ces. In the
scientific picture a person is a m em ber o f a sp ecies sh ap ed by evolu tion ary
t h r o u g h o u t this paper, page num bers in square brackets refer to pages in Skinner’s
236 MICHAEL NOVAK
co n tin gen cies o f survival, disp layin g behavioral processes w hich bring him
under the con trol o f the environ m en t in w h ich he lives, and largely under
the con trol o f a social environ m en t w h ich he and m illion s o f others like
him have con stru cted and m aintained during the ev o lu tio n o f a culture.
T h e direction o f the con trollin g relation is reversed: a person d oes n ot act
u p on the w orld, the w orld acts u p on him [p. 211].
It is undesirable, as well as impossible, merely to go backwards

intellectually. Whereas, in the ancient West, men could say “ There is
nothing new under the sun,” we have, in our age, seen marvels of
invention almost annually. The astonishing fact is th at inventions and
discoveries that were intended to glorify hum ans in their individual
a uto n o m y have returned us so rapidly, and so unexpectedly, to an
almost tribal and surely com m unal image of our identity.
Once it was the Leibnitzian monad that gave primary shape to western
liberal perception: the whole world was viewed through the lens of the
atom ic individual. N ow the m etaphor “ spaceship E a r th ” directs our
perception to our com m on dilemmas, our com m on fate, our common
interconnectedness. The feeling John Stuart Mill seemed to have, that
feeling of independence attainable at least by rural landowners, has been
replaced by a new awareness. Each hum an is implicated in the racism,
poverty, pollution, and other diseases of his world.
Skinner cannot imagine the individual pure, free, autonom ous, and
healthy: in the very center of his being resides his whole environment.
His “ a u to n o m y ” is a function of social conditions, in which he is
thoroughly implicated. Whereas the m etaphors that fired the hearts of
many in the Liberal era were “ breakthrou gh ,” “ liberation,” and “ be
yourself,” we are entering an era in which we recognize that, for the
individual, there is no escape from the species, no breaking through the
tissues of a com m o n environment, no uninvolved, impermeable, u n
implicated self. There is no place to hide. This social and com m unal
awareness is congenial to Christianity.
But the third theme that Christians may find attractive in Skinner’s
work is his emphasis on earthy, bodily, environmental supports. Chris
tianity is an incarnational religion. The dom inant symbol through which
it shapes perception is th at G od does not appear as G o d (pure, dazzling,
overpowering, and inescapable) but as flesh. The godly way is not by
way of escape from flesh, but through the flesh. Hence, there are sacra
ments, church buildings, bells, incense, music, paintings, processions,
dram atic representations: there are holy days, ashes, external acts of
penance, purple vestments for penance and white for days of jo y ; at
prayer, one kneels or faces eastward or extends the arms. Monastic
life, for example, is full of “ reinforcers,” designed so that one begins
the practices even before one has the a ppropriate feelings—and, indeed,
the feelings are held by some masters of the “ interior" life to be ir
relevant. The D ark Night o f the Soul is a journey past feelings, memories,
images, and other accustomed reinforcers. In a powerful way, the wis
dom of the Benedictines—who have successfully been building and
multiplying utopian communities since the sixth c e ntury—is a sort of
Skinnerism in advance. Ora et Labora: prayer and labor are not acts
solely of some au to n o m o u s self but acts of an embodied social animal.
W ork in the fields is social, and so is the chanting of the liturgy. And,
ironically, this high social emphasis on “ reinforcers” produces not
uniformity but a highly developed individuality, as anyone who has
known the angularity of individual Benedictines can attest.
Some Sources of Uneasiness

Still, Professor Skinner’s polemic against individualism seems more
successful than what he would put in its place. I note, for example, that
argum ents against Skinner tend not to center upon his scientific theory
but upon his world view. Few question the technical validity of his
laboratory work, or even the technically expressed theory interpreting
it. M any do question Professor Skinner’s extrapolation therefrom. They
question the depth, range, and precision of his insights into the actual,
concrete behavior of individuals, especially in its more complicated
phases; and they question his social and political sophistication, his
understanding of group or institutional behavior. Sometimes, it is true,
critics also question his m otives—not necessarily his conscious ones,
but his unconscious ones. F o r it can scarcely escape attention that, in
his future world, behavioral experts like himself will acquire a power
rather greater than they have at present. Inasm uch as humans are,
from a theological point of view, habitually and normally deceived by
their own motives, the questioning of one a n o th e r’s motives is seldom
fruitful. So we may confine our attention to the two chief sources of
uneasiness: the complex phases of individual behavior and institutional
behavior as Skinner portrays them.
It is a great achievement to accomplish original laboratory work with
intelligence and even brilliance. It is still greater to derive, from such
work, successful applications in several areas of animal and human
behavior: in dealing with retardates, alcoholics, mental patients, prison
ers, and even certain features of child rearing and education. As befits
a young science, the field Skinner has helped launch is most successful
at elementary problems, at the lower end of a scale of complexity, and
most successful, so far, in elements of individual, rather than group,
behavior. This is to be expected.
23 8 MICHAEL NOVAK
But Skinner has found his theorem s—and m ore than his theorems,
his approach and perspective—so instructive th a t he thinks he sees
clues to an extension of such theorems throu gh ou t the full range of
hum an behavior. He sees the whole field of hum an behavior reduced to
a science and, more than a science, to a technology. Unavoidably, such
a vision is, as yet, an act of faith, a project rather than an accomplish
ment. To accept it, one must suspend deeply reinforced traditions, well-
confirmed practices, and even, indeed, the patterns of com m on speech.
To argue against someone else’s entire world view is a most arduous
sort of argum ent. T hose within world view A have a way of handling
virtually every difficulty that comes their way; and when absolutely
necessary, they make adjustm ents in order to preserve their scheme.
Those who perceive and act throug h world view B can no t voice objec
tions entirely in the language and with the images familiar to them.
Fo r the two systems, world view A and world view B seldom lie, so to
speak, on the same plane or along the same axis. It is extremely difficult
to “ translate” from the language of the one to the language of the
other. T he hermeneutical problems are severe.
Consequently, we tend to try new world views on for size—at first,
they hardly ever fit. Usually, we return, reinforced, to our familiar world.
Often, we do not “ learn” m uch from our critics. They seem to us to
miss the point. Almost necessarily so.
In reading Skinner as a Christian philosopher and as a person of
political curiosity, I found myself undergoing a num ber of changes.
My profession encourages me to suspend my own world view and to
try to enter into the sense of reality, basic stories, and im p ortant sym
bols in which others live. In Skinner’s case, however, several additional
problems arose. I had to hold in check my resentment a t —it seemed
to m e —alm ost deliberately insulting shortcomings in his argument. A
professional critic of world views can hardly help resenting poachers
on “ his” terrain. If a theologian were to write as sweepingly of scientific
theories as Skinner does of theories in the humanities (he calls his last
two chapters “ W hat Is M a n ? ” and “ The Design o f Cultures” ), the
offense would be unmistakable. But the artificial boundaries of p ro
fessionalism do not ordinarily operate for me as taboos; what troubled
me was harder, at first, to diagnose. I had again and again to overcome
my sense that, in fairly clear ways, Skinner does not really understand
what he is doing once he wanders onto the new terrain. His sentences
become a mixture of the astute and the naive, the precise and the gross.
I felt myself alternating between sympathy and anger, adm iration (he
was often better than I expected) and revulsion. A nd the text itself
alternates between a kind of hubris and a winning modesty, a set of pure
intentions and outbreaks of arrogance. T he verbal behavior of Skinner
himself is a study in ambiguity and complexity; it is the work of an

unintegrated, at least dual, sensibility.
For one thing, when Skinner asks “ W hat Is M a n ? " he is not talking
ab ou t laboratory specimens but abo ut w e —and everyone else. Why,
then, does he not tread more carefully? There is, no doubt, a sharp
difference between discourse in the humanities and discourse in the
sciences. In the sciences, one expects neutral, objective, impersonal dis
course. All who approach scientific measurements, procedures, and care
fully controlled realms of discourse are expected to be impressed rather
univocally by the “ evidence." In the humanities, by contrast, one
expects a certain degree of variety—and of the courtesy, dispassionate
analysis, fair and due sympathy, and other painstaking efforts required
to com prehend a viewpoint not one's own. H um anists specialize in the
diversity of world views accessible to hum an beings. They expect the
question “ W h at Is M a n ” to be addressed in countless different ways;
and they expect a certain sophistication in rendering viewpoints not
one's own, a certain sense for nuance, a certain hesitance.
By lumping together hundreds of diverse and mutually contradictory
viewpoints in the phrase, “ the literature of freedom and dignity,”
Skinner ought certainly to have expected an angry outcry from p ro
fessionals in such fields. H o w could he have been, as he claims, surprised
by it? On some points, all would agree with him ; on others, some; on
yet others, perhaps no one. But precise discussion was short-circuited.
A bright electric explosion resulted: a public controversy th a t might
not otherwise have happened. All opponents felt herded into the same
camp, that of “ the literature of freedom and dignity.” Skinner, m e a n
while, asks to not be judged for the mistakes made by other behaviorists.
He seems to be asking for treatm ent for himself as an individual, while
treating grossly, even if unintentionally so, those who might disagree
with him.
To a certain extent, then, Skinner manifested a naivete one h a d n ’t
expected, a certain innocence ab ou t other fields and how they work.
Philosophical discussions of “ g o o d ” and “ value” that are sympahtetic
to his own intention, and that derive from a similar world view, he does
not clearly draw upon. M uch in Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, Stevenson,
and Ryle might have been aptly borrowed, for the sake of precision.
A philosopher or a theologian would not properly take such liberties
in Skinner's profession as he takes in theirs.
Still, once the feathers of ruffled professionalism have been duly
calmed, there remain serious difficulties with Skinner’s provocative thesis.
Jean-Paul Sartre once remarked that, m ore than any other nation,
America is a fertile soil for behavioralism. I imagine the reason for this
predisposition to be twofold. First, nowhere else does the national sense
240 MICHAEL NOVAK
of reality so deeply anticipate continual progress through science. The

American religion is not so much Protestant as social Darwinist, m elio-
ristic, and deferential to white-coated experts. Secondly, Americans are
psychically prepared for personal mobility. They change rather easily
even their profound personal convictions. They have often discovered
that inherited or personally acquired views turn out to have been erro
neous. David Riesman long ago described this different address to
reality on the part of our national psyche as “ other-directed.”
In two short years of massive advertising, for example, the percentage
of Americans who hold that abortion is a form of m urder dropped
from something like 85 percent to less than 50 percent. It is difficult
to believe that the American “ conscience” is not malleable. The prag
matism often acclaimed as our national philosophy may, in its theory,
be high-minded, but in its practice—by Nixon, for example—it accepts
signals from its environment rather uncritically. O ur H oratio Algers
are less “ men of principle” than “ men of flexibility.” They are less
men of a profound, stubborn, a u ton om ou s “ interior” life than men
alert to changes in trends external to themselves. They are plastic and
adaptable. There is a sense in which Skinner merely codifies one-half
of our national working practice.
And he does not really neglect, although he treats in a lower key, the
other half. For example, liberals in America have, for some time, tried
to emphasize the social and environmental factors “ responsible for”
crime. They tend to be identified with planning, control, deference to
experts, and spreading bureaucracies. But liberals are also very em
phatic ab ou t defending civil liberties, academic freedom, and the rights
of individuals. Conservatives, on the other hand, although often strong
on teamwork, corporate responsibility, and loyalty, love to appeal to
the rugged individual, his sense of responsibility, his will to succeed,
his uniqueness, and his resistance to planning and bureaucratization.
With half their soul, then, whether they are liberals or conservatives,
Americans tend to believe devoutly in personal uniqueness, originality,
fulfillment, and rights. Skinner affirms this American sense of reality,
even while placing it in a social context:
A culture has n o existen ce apart from the behavior o f the ind ivu als w h o
m aintain its practices. It is alw ays an ind ividu al w h o behaves, w h o acts u p
on the environ m en t and is ch anged by the con seq u en ces o f his action , and
w h o m aintains the social co n tin gen cies w hich are a culture. T h e individual
is the carrier o f b oth his sp ecies and his culture. C ultural practices, like
genetic traits, are transm itted from ind ividu al to individual. A new practice,
like a new genetic trait, appears first in an individual and tends to be trans
m itted if it con trib u tes to his survival as an ind ividu al.
Y et, the individual is at best a locu s in w h ich m any lines o f d evelop m en t
co m e togeth er in a un ique set. H is ind ividu ality is u n q u estion ed . Every cell

in his b od y is a un ique genetic prod u ct, as un ique as that classic m ark o f
ind ividu ality, the fingerprint. A n d even w ithin th e m ost regim en ted culture
every person al history is unique. N o in ten tion al culture can destroy that
un iqueness, and, as w e have seen , any effort to d o so w o u ld be bad design
[p. 209].
Thus, Skinner defends individuality in theory. He also defends it in

practice. By all reports, he is an idiosyncratic man, a highly developed
individual, a dissenter from conventional wisdom, a man who goes his
own way. He has not lived in a commune, a utopian community, or a
closely controlled environment, and probably would not tolerate it.
A nd he likes to see highly individualized traits developed in others. He
wants to see a culture so designed that it will encourage variety and so
that each individual will develop up to his or her entire inimitable
capacity. He does not want to see conformity, drabness, or sameness;
he wants to see diversity.
Why, then, does the actual conduct o f his argument make m any
uneasy? For one thing, the images and symbols of science no longer
sound salvific. G o d has died (it is said), the individual has died (Skinner
says), but science, too, has died; it has lost its purity and its credibility.
W hat the church is to Christianity, technology is to science, and by
their fruits both have been harshly judged. The appeal that the cure for
bad design is good design is on a homiletic par with the claim that
“ the only thing wrong with Christianity is th at men have never tried it.”
Again, never has the behavior of a younger generation been so
thoroughly studied and controlled as during the past fifteen years in
the U nited States. Never has American education been so thoroughly
designed by experts. And now there is an almost universal revulsion
against experts, controls, and scientific designing. The spokesmen for
“ progress” have led us into pollution. The actual practice of technology
had made of science a revolting, plastic cheapness. Thus, a scientist
who has trained pigeons and rats, and even had some success (through
his disciples) with retardates, alcoholics, prisoners, and the mentally
ill, can hardly expect a trium phal entry into Jerusalem. There is more
than a faint sense that “ we have heard all this before.”
Skinner miscalculated enormously by employing words, images, and
symbols t h a t —despite his explicit disclaimers and despite his own
noble intentions—called to mind Hitler’s scientist, G oebbels’ tech
niques of information control, Chinese brainwashing, Stalinist “ con
fessions,” American police “ crowd c o ntrol,” and other memories too
fresh not to be enflamed. The central symbol of his b o o k —the word
“ con trol” —functions as a specimen of aversive conditioning. It is not a
242 MICHAEL NOVAK
reinforcer ap t to draw converts through its beauty and attractiveness.

One who would give us a science of behavior, and yet not recognize
the symbolic weight of his own language, diminishes our confidence in
his leadership.
The Words “Control” and “Environment”

It is a standard practice of humanistic scholarship to note the various
“ influences” upon persons of genius, upon practices of liberty, and
upon conceptions of dignity. 1 know of no one who supposes that the
a u tono m ou s self operates wholly in a vacuum. Perhaps K a n t’s dis
cussion o f the a u ton om ou s will acting solely for the categorical good is
as high an expression of individual a utonom y as appears in our litera
ture; but critics who note the social origins of K a n t’s intuitions on that
point are not wanting. As for the extreme individualism of the early
Jean-Paul S artre—the Sartre who said that “ for m an there are never
excuses” and that “ man is condem ned to freedom,” the Sartre of the
breathtaking apostrophe to freedom under total G erm an occupation in
the early 1940s—the later Sartre of the Critique de la raison dialectique
struggles in a more dense and complicated way than Skinner to replace
the self with the group and the environment.
Thus, were Skinner to argue that, in every instance of purported acts
of freedom, contingencies of reinforcement are at work, who would
argue? W e all know th at our freedom is learned from the look in the
eyes of others, raised eyebrows, words, images of heroism and of com
promise, training of the instincts of honesty and courage, education,
honors, embarrassments, social punishments, hunger, torture, sleepless
ness, anxieties, and troubles. We try hard to educate our children to be
brave, truthful, honest. We speak o f peoples who “ have not developed
the social preconditions” for western conceptions o f liberty. On this
point, defenders of Skinner, like John Platt, point out that there are
unnecessary misunderstandings between Skinner and various humanists
and social scientists; but the fundamental argum ent is not based on
misunderstandings, merely.
Nevertheless, two sources of misunderstanding need to be clarified.
One is the sweeping use that Skinner makes of “ c o ntrol,” the other his
sweeping use of “ environm ent.” W hen words are employed in an u n
usual way, or when they are used over an extraordinary range, they
require special examination.
The word “ control,” in ordinary English, comes from a family of
words and phrases like “ d om inate,” “ impose one’s will u p o n ,” “ guide”
(in the way rails guide), “ m anipulate,” “ use as an instrum ent,” “ govern
the movements of,” and so on. Skinner, however, intends to call our
attention to a scientific, technical po in t—namely, th at behavior is a
function o f variables. Technically speaking, this is what he means by
“ co n tro l.” Such functional language has a certain utility. Borrowed as
it is, however, from the realm of machines, it suggests an imaginative
context in which many will hesitate to speak of hum an beings. It seems
like a faulty perspective from which to launch a study of behavior.
Even leaving these objections aside, and tentatively accepting a view
point that requires looking at hum an behavior as if it were am enable
to a functional language, we can no t help noticing th at hum an behavior
“ is a function o f” a great m any variables o f various kinds. Variables
“ controlling” hum an behavior are brought to bear from at least three
significantly different directions: the physical environment, the social
environment, and the individual hum an organism itself. Thus, men on
the m oon must take oxygen with them. A raised eyebrow, a legal sanc
tion, a silence, an argum ent, an insult may affect behavior. Finally, the
organism ’s genetic endowment, its acquired skills and tendencies, and
its history may limit its present options. U nder each of these headings, a
wide array of “ reinforcers” or “ contingencies” may be discerned. How
complex the interactions of these sources of “ c o n tro l” are may be seen
in artistic achievement.
A good sculptor allows his fingertips to be “ c o ntrolled” by the
qualities o f the stone on which he works. Thus, every art, requiring
enorm ous respect for its material, induces a rem arkable docility in the
artist. On the other hand, only persons of a certain endow m ent and a
certain apprenticeship have skills sufficient to follow the subtle “ signals”
of the material. And besides these skills developed in the artist’s past
history, the artist requires, as well, a kind of “ vision,” an inventive
capacity, a capacity for evoking, through his work, symbolic echoes in
the perceptions of others. For we regularly distinguish between expert
craftsmen of technical cunning and artists who “ touch our souls” —
that is, artists who evoke the symbolic materials of our own history.
In a certain perspective, a great artist is “ co ntrolled” by all these
expectations. He is “ controlled” even by the further expectation that he
“ surprise” us. In an other perspective, artistic achievement furnishes the
classic instance of what we mean by “ free.”
First, the artist practices an activity that serves no other function but
that of expressiveness. Second, he expresses, with his material, that
com m union of his own symbolic world (and ours as well) to which his
own instincts lead him. All of these instincts are, no doubt, genetically
and socially derived. But, third, they also represent his own individuality
brought —not least by mastery of long social traditions of technique
and sym bol—to its unique fulfillment and signature.
244 MICHAEL NOVAK
The social conditions under which the arts flourish are, of course,
not always attained. It would help us to know what they are and to
realize them. The paradox is that to “ design a culture” in which the
arts might flourish is, at one and the same time, (1) to “ c on trol” and
(2) to maximize “ individual freedom.”
It is this paradox upon which Professor Skinner regularly plays.
Because most persons in our culture stress the second pole, his very
heavy emphasis upon the first generates resistance. M any artists and
other defenders of “ individual freedom ” tend to believe th a t the methods
of behavioral control already introduced by technology are obliterating
the instincts of craftsmanship, vision, individuality, and even personhood
from the repertoire of huge majorities. “ The people” are becoming “ a
mass.” Such critics see a homogenization, impersonality, and blunting
of differences flowing from what has been called scientific “ progress.”
Thus, when Skinner calls for still more efficient, less wasteful, an d more
thoroughly designed controls, they are loathe to trust still one more
proposal on the part of scientists promising “ progress,” even when those
scientists say that they, too, desire to prom ote individual fulfillment,
artistic diversity, and personal vision. Experts are necessarily special
ists; when acting upon complex societies, they quite literally d o n ’t know
what they are doing. Too often they destroy what they would save. One
doesn’t trust experts, even those who com e fresh from scientific la bo ra
tories.
One source of misunderstanding, therefore, lies in the aversive sym
bolic reverberations given off by the words th at Skinner finds so attrac
tive: “ control,” “ technology,” “ progress,” “ experts,” “ perceptions
tutored by work in the la boratory,” and so on. Com m on, ordinary
experiences of daily life suggest to many of us that the more the new
technologies multiply am ong u s—automobiles, television sets, assembly
lines—the more sloppy and unreliable grows the craftsmenship around
us. New clothes come apart at the seams, machines constantly m al
function, fewer and fewer people seem to love what they are doing.
These tangible experiences provide the context in which many listen to
the new cry of salvation thro ugh behavior control. Naturally, Skinner’s
disciples promise to do better, learning from previous mistakes.
In the interim, a second m isunderstanding surrounds the other favor
ite Skinnerian word. Professor Skinner’s use of the word “ environm ent”
is as sweeping as his use of the word “ co ntro l.” H e seems to include,
under its very large umbrella, any variable that may influence behavior.
Thus, the entire universe is my environm ent; so is the more narrow
ecosystem of E a rth ; so are my geographical surroundings here and
now, and the lamp over my desk; so are ball-point pen, paper, and
newsprint; so is the history of my cultural com m unity until now, my
family history, my personal memory, and the traces upon my organism

of every past experience; so are those others whose views and values
are significant to me, as well as my opponents, imaginary and real; so
is the language 1 speak; so are the ideals, images, and symbols that
move me. There is no d o u b t that all that I have and own has been given
to me. “ E nv ironm ent” is a very large name for my benefactor, indeed.
And yet there is also a unique, individual organism, with a distinctive
and inimitable history, called by a proper name, and endowed with a
consciousness only m ore or less in tune with the organism itself: my
organism in its individuality. This conscious organism seems to be, in
William Jam es’ phrase, a source of “ resistance” to som e features of its
surrounding environment. (Perhaps it resists even its own endowment).
It seems to be the subject of actions that have an individual signature,
significance, and symbolic meaning. N o doubt, every aspect of its
uniqueness is attributable to some interchange or other with some part
of its environment. It is a “ worldself,” and not merely an a uton om ou s
particle of self.
The statement, then, that all hum an behavior is “ controlled” by the
“ environm ent” may be translated in several different ways. One may
decide that an appeal to an “ a u ton om o us self,” subject to “ magic” or
“ miracles” of initiative, self-origination, or responsibility, is no longer
required for scientific explanation. On the contrary, one may decide th at
a scheme of scientific explanation in terms of variables of control will—
if widely adopted —soon induce a self-image in its employers that will
undercut their own capacity for creativity, self-development, and self
expression. As a third alternative, one may suggest that much more
precise conceptual tools are required for speaking o f hum an behavior,
in the light of the relativization of the w orld’s cultures, through their
increasing knowledge of one another. It is possible that Skinner's
language, speaking so familiarly of a “ technology o f behavior” and of
“ progress,” is a western bias—an illusion, perhaps even specifically
W A SP in its aspiration. He pictures, no doubt, an orderly, clean,
economical world not familiar to the imagination o f any other culture.
Some gain in conceptual precision is m ade if we notice that, whatever
the variables of hum an behavior, some are weightier than others. The
state of the weather may “ c o ntro l” some decisions of mine at some
times; at other times, it may count hardly at all. Opposition from p r o
fessional scholars may, at times, lead me to a b and on an hypothesis; at
other times, even without the support of a single other, I may obstin
ately but conscientiously hold firm. At one time, a loaded pistol may
move me as a convincing “ persuader” ; at another, no t even a pistol can
“ c o ntrol” me. Is it possible, then, that, once we have accepted an ideal
as part of our symbolic reality, we can resist other features of the
246 MICHAEL NOVAK
en vironm ent—prison or to r tu re —un to death? On one occasion, a r a

tional argum ent may lead me to a sweeping change of m ind; on another,
even though defeated in argument, I continue to think my position
correct and only my defense faulty. If “ environm ent” covers every such
feature, what light does it shed?
If Skinner did not claim so much for his technology of behavior, we
might be willing to concede him more. So complex is “ environm ent,”
so variable are the “ controls,” that, in assenting to the fundamental
Skinnerian principle that environm ent controls behavior, we do not
know what we are agreeing to. W hatever the preliminary successes in
elementary, rudim entary behavior, the fascinating complications of
hum an behavior—no t yet exhausted even in song and fiction —have
hardly yet been addressed by science. Shall a science of behavior arrive
before the Parousia, the “ end of tim e” ? To trust in it requires great
faith.
In these respects, Skinner’s work is more like theology than like
science. The burgeoning of such speculation, if it continues, may well
bring about, from an unexpected direction, that rebirth of metaphysics
that accompanies each new cultural age.
18
A Quiver of Queries
Joseph J. Schw ab
Joseph J. Schwab, professor o f education and o f the biological

sciences at the University o f Chicago, is the author o f several books,
including B io lo g y T e a c h e r ’s H a n d b o o k and T h e T e a c h in g o f S c ie n c e
a s In q u ir y .
W ith this chapter, we present a cogent sum m ary— analyses o f the
debate Skinner has stim ulated throughout the intellectual world.
In the course o f the conference on Skinnerism at the Center, the need
fo r a synthesis o f the stands taken by the various speakers became
apparent. Schwab undertook this task and, in executing it, developed
this sum m ary o f questions that had been raised about behaviorist
theories. H e also categorizes the various opinions expressed by
conference participants so that, in this one paper, one can review the
favorable and unfavorable com m ents made on Skinner s work. It
prepares the way f o r Skinner's own concluding response, with which
this book ends.
I s h a ll s u m m a r iz e t h o s e o f th e c r itic a l p a p e r s o n S k in n e r th a t a r e a v a il
a b le t o m e . 1 I s h a ll su m m a r iz e b y w a y o f t w o s c h e m e s th a t a re r o u g h ly
t h o s e examined are by Max Black, Alexander Comfort. Arthur Jensen, Chaim

Perelman, Dennis Pirages, Lord Ritchie-Calder, Robert Rosen, Arnold Toynbee, and
L. A. Zadeh.
24 8 JOSEPH J. SCHWAB
orthogonal to one another. The first scheme is concerned with those

facets of the text, of the argum ent as such, that are questioned by the
critics. The second scheme is concerned with those assertions by Skinner
that are called into question by virtue of the critics’ doubts abo ut the
argument.
Scheme 1
T he span of Skinner’s argum ent rests, on one side,2 on a series of
premises concerning the nature of science or, at least, the n a tu re vof the
best and most reliable science. First, for Skinner, a science must treat
its subject m atter in its own terms. In his case, behavior itself must be
examined. A study of the substrate of behavior (neurons, synapses, the
organization of the brain, hormones) will not do. A study of some
larger encompassing subject m atter of which individual behavior is a
part (society, culture, institutional structure, the flow of history) will
not do. Second, a science must seek to establish “ laws” and limit itself
to such laws, statements o f predictable uniformities of observable be
havior. It must disavow conceptual structures (m om entum , energy) in
accessible to observation. It must go beyond description, however exact
and extensive.
Given these premises, Skinner can assert his own mode of scientific
enquiry as a privileged one. In the light of its conclusions, deviant co n
clusions from other sources th at have used other modes of enquiry
(personality theory, social psychology, sociology) can be rejected or
submitted to the dom inance of Skinner’s law-seeking and law-stating
science o f visible behavior as such.
The criticism of these premises is, in general, that the matters dealt
with here are issues of principle and not of fact. They are not issues of
fact, inasmuch as the choice of the level of enquiry, and the choice of
the form that the account of enquiry should take, determine what facts
are relevant to enquiry. It follows, then, that an argum ent th a t one
level of enquiry is better or more appropriate than others can be matched
by equally strong arguments for enquiry at other levels. Arguments and
facts stressing the rightness of descriptive laws as the proper outcome of
enquiry can be matched by arguments and facts stressing the rightness
of coherent conceptual structures or even of meticulous running de
scription.
This is to say th at an investigator concerned with individual behavior
2The other side rests on Skinner’s scientific work. N o critic questions it. Some do not
out o f ignorance o f it; others, because they know it and recognize its high quality.
A Quiver o f Queries 2 49
may, as Skinner has done, choose an originating enquiry th a t treats

such behaviors in their own terms. He may also, however, choose
originating enquiries that treat these behaviors in terms of the enveloping
context in which they occur; or he may seek the basis of his account in
the underlying substrate of behavior. There are no prior principles,
agreed upon by all, that establish one order in which these researches
should be done, nor any arguments, acceptable to all, th at establish
one as better than the others.
W hat holds for the level at which enquiry should be pursued holds
also for the form that the account of the enquiry may take. It may be a
statement of uniform antecedent-consequent chains of events. It may
be the construction of a complex equation in which only a few of the
terms can be referred directly to visible, measurable constants and
variable quantities.
I hasten to add that these criticisms do not constitute a mere relati
vism. There is better and worse research in the eyes of these critics
(and Skinner’s ranks am ong the best), but the criteria of better and worse
concern the soundness with which the work that is required by a choice
of principles of enquiry is carried out, and do not concern the choices
o f these principles.
Criticisms aimed at this part of Skinner's argum ent are made, sug
gested, or illustrated by Black, Ritchie-Calder, Rosen, and Zadeh.
Black asserts, for example, th at the question of the appropriate m ode of
enquiry poses problems th at are difficult and complex, that the pattern
of enquiry pursued by Skinner is entirely defensible—but not defensible
as excluding others. Rosen points to the possibility of multiple universes
of discourse. Zadeh illustrates what might be done by pursuing a
pattern of enquiry vastly rem ote from Skinner's: construction of a
mathematical model that deliberately uses “ fuzzy” (that is, loosely
defined) variables. Ritchie-Calder points to the roles of chance, uncer
tainty, and indeterminacy in m odern physics to counter Skinner's
insistence on predictable uniformity as the proper outcom e of scientific
investigation.
The second most com m on concern am ong the critics in question is

for factors affecting behavior th at they feel Skinner, by virtue of his
exclusivist premises, has dismissed, displaced, or underemphasized.
Comfort, for example, names four factors, each of which may pre
empt some part of the field of behavior and thus reduce, to an extent
as yet undetermined, the potency of Skinner's operant conditioning.
Com fort points, first, to the clear existence of behaviors laid down
during embryogenesis of the nervous system, and, as we shall see, this
is much more than a statement of the existence of some discrete “ in
250 JOSEPH J. SCHW AB
stinctual” behaviors (for example, patterns of sheep herding in certain

varieties of shepherd dogs). Second, he points to the possibility that
some of the conditionable spaces in this genetic program o f behavior
may have shapes of their own —that is, that some new behaviors may
be inducible, and others may not. Third, he suggests that Skinner, in
rejecting unobservables, may well have thrown away a few to o many,
especially the identity sense, the experience of “ m e,” which (it is implied,
though not stated) may be the beginning of a process of self-chosen and
self-executed conditioning (freedom). His fourth point is an outright
statement of part of what is implied in the th ir d —the possibility of a
considerable a m o u n t of wholly endogenous conditioning. In general,
Com fort points out that what we know -from biology forbids our treating
any organism —and especially m a n —as clay in the hands of the potter-
conditioner. O rganism s—and especially m an —have a say in the process.
They engage in a complex dialogue with the environment.
To his num bered four, Com fort adds a frightening fifth: the existence
of a variety of men who are inveterate and unalterable seekers and
users of power. If this is true, the countercontrols invoked by Skinner
as the means by which his proposed program is to avoid dictatorship
may be far less powerful than he conceives them to be.
Jensen and Pirages similarly draw attention to factors minimized in
Skinner’s treatment. Jensen is concerned with the extent to which our
genetic endow m ent sets limits and determines directions for conditioning.
Pirages raises a possibility inherent in the D urkheim ian origination of
sociology—th at there are social facts (facts a b ou t the structure of
society) that are quite distinct from facts about individuals, and that
these social facts exhibit aspects of hum an behavior that are not mere
aggregates of behaviors o f individuals taken singly. If this is true, a
program of operant conditioning developed for the modification of
individual behavior will encounter problems it does not anticipate. It
will need, as supplement, a program based upon knowledge of institu
tions and communities as such.
Black is especially concerned with Skinner’s sweeping discard of
“ mentalistic” terms, especially the terms “ intention,” “ (deliberate)
action,” “ motive,” and terms that refer to feelings (love, rage, shame,
guilt)—the terms directly concerned with freedom and responsibility
(dignity?). Black’s concern, moreover, is not grounded in a sense of
philosophical proprietorship in such matters, nor in a doctrinaire
philosophy. It rises out of the substantial and surprisingly rigorous body
of analysis of such terms, undertaken by philosophers in the last ten
years, as the terms are used, both in com m on language utterances and
by well-trained experts concerned with such matters. This body of
philosophical analysis—which is a far cry from the doctrinaire stance
A Quiver o f Queries 251
com m only associated with “ philosophy” —has disclosed a surprisingly

large burden of defensible meaning and effectiveness in such terms.
Jensen's concern with omissions partly overlaps C o m fo rt’s. He raises
the desirability o f bringing into the account of behavior a concern for
the ways in which genetic factors may not only reduce the scope o f
behaviors amenable to operant conditioning but also determine those
mom ents in the development of an organism when conditioning can
occur and those periods when conditioning cann ot be effective.
The third aspect of Skinner's treatm ent seriously questioned by his

critics concerns his use of language in the intermediate steps of his
argument. These criticisms, by no means ad hominem, point to ambigui
ties (ambiguities th at Rosen gently calls “ broad semantic fields” ) in
such key words in Skinner’s argum ent as “ co ntro l,” “ responsible,” and
“ environm ent.” The ambiguities are seen as permitting num erous
equivocations and occasional beggings of the question. By “ equivoca
tion,” the critics mean that, in a series of propositions that constitute
the steps of an apparent argument, a key word, such as the word th at
stands in the position of the subject of each of the series of propositions,
changes its meaning from proposition to proposition. The word is a
“ hat check" for one “ h a t” in one proposition, and a check for quite a
different one in a later proposition of the sreies. Hence, the series,
which appears to lead to an inference concerning the first referent of
the word, ends with a conclusion abou t something else. By question
begging, the critics mean th at a question is so phrased that it foredooms
the answer: the answer is inherent in the question.
Black is especially concerned with equivocation on “ responsibility,”
seeing it used, at one m om ent, in the sense of deserving of praise or
blame, and seeing it used later to mean no more than “ being the source
of a determiner.” H e is concerned with similar shifts in the meaning of
“ environm ent” and “ control." Toynbee is concerned with equivoca
tions in the passages in which Skinner claims to translate from the
language of mentalism to the language of behavior, equivocations th at
lead to Skinner’s denial of the existence of freedom. Perelman is con
cerned with equivocations in those passages that translate value state
ments to reinforcement statem ents—translations th a t p u rp ort to show,
that is, that utterances of value statements are merely symptom s of
effective conditioning. And Ritchie-Calder, like Black, is concerned
with equivocations on “ environm ent."
T he fourth aspect of the argum ent to which criticism is addressed is

that crucial interface at which Skinner passes from scientific knowledge
to exhortations concerning choice and action. This criticism points out
25 2 JOSEPH J. SCHWAB
the extent to which the discursive and inductive logics of science are
not, as a rule, applicable to problems th a t concern the concrete and
particular (as against the abstract and generalized subject m atters of
scientific statements). U nfortunately, neither scientists nor logicians yet
know very much ab out the processes of deliberation that carry us from
knowledge to defensible decision abo ut concrete and particular action.
We are especially ignorant ab ou t the ways in which scientific knowledge
is modified and brought to bear in the process of m aking decisions.
We are sure th a t scientific knowledge does not, by itself, dictate policy;
we are equally sure th at it is germane to the making of policy; we are
not at all clear as to the transform ations th a t lie somewhere between
these two, except th at what some call values and others call conditioning
are somehow involved.
Scheme2
I turn now to the targets, those conclusions of Skinner’s that suffer most
from these criticisms. (Some repetition, unfortunately, is unavoidable.)
Standing first in frequency of criticism is Skinner’s estimate of the
efficacy o f reinforcement techniques. It is a crucial target, because the
whole argum ent tow ard policy and action stands or falls on the extent
to which reinforcements will determine hum an behavior. It is, however,
an uncertain criticism, because (in my scrutiny, at least) the text of
Beyond Freedom and D ignity nowhere m akes an unequivocal claim
concerning this efficacy. T he critics, therefore, enjoy a certain freedom
in assigning claims to criticize. (In Skinner’s oral statements at the
seminars held at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
the claims were modest and m arked by the qualifications proper to the
scientific habit; in the uncertain statements in the published work, there
is ground for reading any claim from the extreme of universal applica
tion downward.)
At any rate, C om fort points out, as earlier indicated, th at the scope
apparently claimed is variously foreclosed in some unknow n degree by
imprinting, endogenous programming, inveterate and recalcitrant power
seeking proclivities, and genetic program s laid down in the nervous
system.
Rosen demonstrates, by construction o f a well-based mathematical
model, th at one behavior may be conditionable, an alternative not. He
develops a second well-based model illustrative of the possibility that
some operant conditionings, once successfully established, can be ir
reversible. Rosen proceeds, then, to develop models after the Turing
machine, both a specific one and a universal one, th at exhibit two
matters of great importance. First, he shows th a t it may not be possible,
in a reasonable tim e—or even, perhaps, in a finite tim e—to discover,

by ra nd om trial, the key by which the internal state of the organism
can be placed in susceptibility to a specific conditioning. (Thus, Rosen
raises, once more, the question of whether the one m ode of enquiry
c om m ended by Skinner suffices, because the alternative to random
search for the key to readiness is knowledge of the substrate, of the
inner system of the organism.) Rosen proceeds, finally, to point out
that, although it is possible to conceive of the existence of a collection
of Turing machines such th at there is one th a t can solve any class of
nameable problems, a well-established theorem demonstrates that,
nevertheless, there are some specific problems th a t the machines cannot
solve. Consequently, Rosen suggests, there may be some social and
political behaviors, perhaps crucial ones, th at are unconditionable.
As a coda, Rosen also raises the problem involved in the very large
scale of conditioning activity required for its sociopolitical use. He
points out that, if there is grave difficulty in finding the appropriate
initial state o f any one universal Turing machine, it is a problem a
fo rtio ri for a great many, each in an unknow n and probably different
initial state.
Pirages points out th at the num bers of men who would be involved
in political-social scaled conditioning are m ore th a n numbers of men,
that they constitute structures and substructures (societies, bureaus,
institutions) that may be subservient to laws of their own, over and
above the laws of conditioning discovered by Skinner. (Again, this is
the m atter of levels of enquiry.)
The second target of criticism is Skinner’s elimination of freedom.

Toynbee argues, for example, th a t the work we are considering, Beyond
Freedom and D ignity, is itself a plea for a new policy and a departure
from the past and, therefore, is itself an instancing of freedom. He also
points out that historians record, with considerable authenticity, the
existence of a substantial num ber of conspicuous social deviants (rebels
and saints) who appear to have escaped the net of conditionings of their
culture.
Ritchie-Calder points out th at indeterminacy, chance, and uncer
tainty, legitimate conceptions in some sciences, will, if taken into account
in a science of behavior, provide scope for the discovery th a t freedom
may, indeed, exist in some degree.
Others argue to similar purpose. Black finds the argum ent against
freedom vitiated by equivocations. Perelman points out that, to the
extent th a t Beyond Freedom and D ignity fails to persuade, its failure is a
failure of the reinforcement process. (Perelm an’s own expertise co n
cerns rh etoric—persuasion—and is comm itted to action undertaken as
the measure of a persuasion’s success.)
254 JOSEPH J. SCHWAB
The third target is Skinner’s cavalier treatm ent of the problem of

reciprocal control of the controllers (his defense against the charge of
fascism). Three critics— Perelman, Black, and C o m fo rt—each differing
from the others in training and expertise —are agreed, to a surprising
extent, on the existence and obdurateness of a variety of men bent on
the exercise of power over other men. They hold, in consequence, that
countercontrol will not control. The controllers will.
I close with one com m ent of my own.

The source of many of Skinner’s difficulties lies in the passage from
his scientific work to the book under discussion, not in the book itself.
The difficulty is a biological classic: the extrapolation from knoNvledge
of things in vitro to conclusions abo ut things in vivo, from the glassware
of the laboratory to “ life.”
In the typical instance, the biologist excises an organ or bit of tissue
from a living body, places the living part, thus isolated, in the experi
mental situation dictated by his problem, and observes and reports
the behavior of the isolated part truly and well. Then he asserts, with
or without qualification, th at the doings and undergoings of the organ
in the laboratory glass will characterize those o f the organ in its place
as one organ am ong many in the complex system called the organism.
The unvoiced premise is that the organ beneighbored is the same as
the organ alone: that the factors permitted by the experimenter to react
with the organ in its laboratory setting adequately represent the factors
operative in and on the organism as a whole.
The experimenter may have m ade every effort to make this premise
true. But whether he has succeeded or not depends on the completeness
of his knowledge of the organism intact. T h at his knowledge is not
complete is evidence by the very fact th a t the experiment in vitro was
perform ed.3
An indubitable parallel exists in the case of Skinner. He and his
cohorts may have made every effort to include, in their “ experimental
space,” all the factors th at operate in hum an life. Individual differences
in genetic background may have been included. Organisms that interact
and form a social structure may have been employed. Subgroups of
3For the purposes o f scientific enquiry, a questionable transition from laboratory to

life is not an error but a difficulty to be overcome. For experiment in vitro gives leads
for observations in vivo. Further, assertion o f sufficient congruency o f the two provokes
enquiries to resolve the question of whether they are sufficiently congruent or not. In
Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner makes it clear that he is aware o f bolh these
points. Indeed, he remarked more than three decades ago (Skinner, 1938) that “it is
presumably not possible to show that behavior as a whole is a function o f the stimulating
environment as a whole. A relation between terms as complex as these does not easily
submit to analysis and may perhaps never be demonstrated.”
organisms with widely different histories of earlier training may have

constituted the experimental group. Effort may have been made to note,
record, and report differences in response to reinforcement efforts to
shape behavior. It remains true, however, th a t neither Skinner nor
anyone else knows enough ab out hum an behavior, hum an culture, and
hum an society to be sure th at an experimental space so designed dupli
cates all the complex facts of hum an life.
W hat, then, can be concluded a bo ut hum an behavior in vivo, taking
account of the results obtained by Skinner in his experimental space?
Certainly, that much behavior of many men is the consequence of
operant conditioning—by parents, sibs, peer groups, and significant
adults beyond the family, by usages of ethnic groups and social classes,
and by the laws. We may even conclude a la Ivory Soap, that 99.44
percent of the behavior of 99.44 percent of men is so determined. But
the 0.56 percent remains and, with it, the possibility of freedom and
dignity.
19
Answers for My Critics
B. F. Skinner
B. F. Skinner, the author o f Beyond Freed om and Dignity, is

regarded by m any as the m ost influential and controversial living
behavioral psychologist. H arvard professor Skinner is the author o f
T he Behavior of Organisms, W alden Tw o (a novel), Science and
H u m an Behavior, Verbal Behavior, Cumulative Record, The
Technology of Teaching and Contingencies of Reinforcement.
Skinner, who was present throughout the conference, delivered his
response after the presentation by Schwab. This chapter provides
Skinner's m ost complete response to his critics.
The preparation o f this chapter was supported by the National
Institutes o f M ental H ealth, grant no. K 6-M H -21, 775-01.
Beyond Freedom and D ignity is based on nearly forty years of research

on the behavior of organisms. I have long been concerned with its
implications, and my first paper on th at them e was published seventeen
years ago. 1 spent three years on the present version. It comes as some
thing of a surprise, therefore, to have the boo k described as a “ melange
of am ateurish metaphysics, self-advertising technology, and illiberal
social policy.” I feel that there must be some mistake.
A nd indeed there is. M ost of my critics have shown a surprising
misunderstanding of the science on which the book is based and of the
Answers for M y Critics 257
nature of my treatm ent of the subject. The almost inevitable com m ent of
my friends is, “ But that is not what you were saying!” The fault, of
course, may be mine. For many readers, I have obviously not developed
my position logically or presented it clearly. 1 may claim some exonera
tion, however. 1 am touching a sore spot. N o one who values a d e m o
cratic way of life can be very happy a b ou t what is happening in its name
today, and any critique of its basic principles is therefore likely to
evoke an angry response. There must be something wrong with the
book, and the easiest way to find something wrong is to misunderstand
it. Paraphrase certain premises inaccurately, draw some absurd conclu
sions, and you may then rush on to call what 1 am saying nonsense or
gibberish. This headlong dash to dismiss the book without dealing with
its argum ent is fortunately not conspicuous in the present papers.
Nevertheless, there are misunderstandings which call for comment.
The argum ent of the book rests on the existence, or at least the im
minence, o f a science of behavior. I believe th at such a science exists,
but 1 made no effort to prove it. 1 assumed that my readers would either
look up the references at the end of the book or take my word for it
for the sake of argument. But that was not what happened. Instead, one
finds frequent allusions to the “ science of behavior” th a t prevailed half
a century ago, with its rats in mazes, its dogs and dinner bells, and its
formulation of behavior as a bundle of reflexes. Then, hum an behavior
seemed, indeed, not unlike the behavior of a ro b o t or a marionette.
W h at has come to be called the experimental analysis of behavior is a
highly advanced science, as rigorous as any part o f biology dealing with
the organism as a whole. In hundreds of laboratories th ro ug ho ut the
world, complex environments are arranged, to which organisms from
a fairly wide range of species, including man, are exposed. The research
is not statistical or actuarial; it is almost always the behavior of a single
organism that is being analyzed. Yet the results are highly reproducible
from laboratory to laboratory. Certain measures are taken to simplify
the design of such experiments, but the situations under analysis are
far from simple. It is difficult, if not impossible, to discover what is
happening in a typical experiment through casual observation alone.
This is perhaps only a small part of what could be called “ behavioral
science,” but it is particularly relevant to our problem. The analysis
differs from reflexology by emphasizing the consequences of behavior,
the significance of which will appear later. The word “ o p e ran t” is used
to emphasize the fact th at behavior operates upon the environment to
produce consequences, certain kinds of which “ reinforce” the behavior
they are contingent upon, in the sense th at they m ake it more likely to
occur again. So-called contingencies of reinforcement represent subtle
and complex relations am ong three things: the setting or occasion
258 B. F. SKINNER
upon which behavior occurs, the behavior itself, and its reinforcing
consequences. Suitable contingencies generate behavior which, in man,
is said to show the operation of higher mental processes. Consider, for
example, the cognitive process of attention. W hy do we not respond to
all the stimuli impinging upon us at any given time? It is easy to say
th at we act upon the environment selectively, as if some Maxwell’s
dem on opens and closes a gate, allowing some stimuli to enter and
keeping others out. But how are we to explain the dem on? An internal
gate keeper is a fiction. All we know is th a t we respond to some stimuli
and not to others, and we can explain that fact by looking at the co n
tingencies. An experiment will demonstrate.
In an experimental space, a hungry pigeon pecks at a small disk on
the wall, and when it does so, food occasionally appears from a dis
penser. As a result, the pigeon is m ore likely to peck the disk again.
There is a complication, however. The disk may be either red or green
and it may have a triangle or a square projected upon it. If food appears
only when the pigeon pecks a disk which bears a given set of these
properties, the pigeon will come to peck only that set. F o r example, if
we reinforce pecking a green disk but never a red, the pigeon will stop
pecking the red disk and continue to peck the green. If we reinforce
pecking triangles but not squares, the pigeon will peck triangles and stop
pecking squares. If we reinforce pecking only a green square or a red
triangle, it will stop pecking the green triangle and the red square. But
now a further complication: we slowly weaken the stimuli —washing
out the color by adding white light and putting the pattern out of focus.
The pigeon finds it more and more difficult to make the discriminations.
But suppose we provide two other disks which, if pecked by the pigeon,
will cause the color to improve or the figure to clarify. U n der these
conditions, the pigeon will keep relevant properties clear. If color is
essential for the discrimination, it will peck the disk which keeps the
color strong. If the pattern is essential, it will peck the disk which keeps
it in focus. If both are needed (if only the red square and the green
triangle are reinforced, for example), the pigeon will keep both form
and color clear. In other words, the contingencies induce the pigeon to
maintain ju st that condition of the stimuli under which it behaves
successfully. The pigeon “ looks a t ” the form and not the color, or at
the color and not the form, or at both, depending upon the contin
gencies of reinforcement. This is very much like what we do when we
observe stimuli, although the behavior th rough which we control their
properties is by no means so conspicuous. Other contingencies can be
arranged to produce behavior which could be said to show self-knowledge
or self-management.
As our knowledge of the effects of contingencies of reinforcement
increases, we can more often predict what an organism will do by
Answers for M y Critics 259
observing the contingencies; and by arranging contingencies, we can

increase the probability that an organism will behave in a given way.
In the latter case, we may be said to “ c on trol” its behavior. The term
does not mean forcible coercion or the triggering o f a jack-in-the-box
kind of reflex action. The biologist who “ co ntrols” a disease does not
wrestle with it physically. He simply changes some of the conditions
under which the disease flourishes. H u m a n behavior is controlled not
by physical m anipulation but by changing the environmental conditions
of which it is a function. The control is probabilistic. The organism is
not forced to behave in a given way; it is simply made more likely to
do so.
It is dangerous and foolish to deny the existence of a science of be
havior in order to avoid its implications. It is equally dangerous to dis
miss its technological uses. M any of these may be seen in other experi
ments on behavior. A pigeon, for example, can be induced to behave
in ways which, if the subject were hum an, would be said to rep ort its
sensations or perceptions. Special techniques m ake it possible to “ ask
a pigeon whether or not it sees a faint spot of light,” and, with them,
the spectral sensitivity of the pigeon has been determined with almost
as much precision as that of man. Psychopharm ocology, experimental
psychiatry, and neurophysiology have also made extensive use of operant
techniques.
In the world at large, the most impressive results have been obtained
in certain relatively closed systems, as in the m anagem ent of institu
tionalized psychotics, in the care o f retardates and autistic children,
and in training schools for juvenile delinquents. But more and m ore is
being done in open systems, such as in the care of children in the home
and in day-care centers, in classroom m anagem ent, in the design of
instructional materials, and in incentive systems in industry. M uch of
this still has a long way to go, and some of the reasons why we are not
taking greater advantage o f the technological power of a scientific
analysis are discussed in my book. Certainly, it will not do to dismiss
the implications by saying th at the promise of a behavioral technology
is a mere bluff and th at we have nothing to fear. (That contention,
incidentally, is effectively counterbalanced by some critics’ predictions
of a tyrannical or totalitarian misuse of control.)
The analysis shifts to the environm ent a causal role previously as
signed to a person’s feelings, states of mind, purposes, or other a t
tributes. But what ab ou t the subjective evidence? Are we not aware of
the feelings which prom pt us to act, or the ideas we eventually express
in words, or the intentions or purposes we later carry out? Can we not
say th a t this evidence is ignored by any analysis which assigns causality
to the environment?
Behaviorists do not “ ignore” consciousness. On the contrary, they
260 B. F. SKINNER
have developed reasonably successful ways of talking ab o u t it. A small

part of the universe is enclosed within the skin of each of us, and we
can observe some of this as we observe the world around us. But in
spite of their teeming intimacy, we do not discriminate successfully
am ong the states or aspects of our own bodies. The reason is expressed
in the old philosophical notion th a t nothing is different until it makes a
difference. When a person turns a handspring, he responds to various
stimuli coming from his body, and he could not turn a handspring
successfully without them, but he does not know these stimuli simply
because he responds to them. K now ing arises from a different kind of
contingency. We teach a child to “ know his colors” by reinforcing
verbal responses in the presence of colors. W e show him red, and if he
says “ G reen,” we say N o ,” and if he says “ R ed,” we say “ Yes.” The
result is different from such a practical response as picking a red apple
instead of a green one; it might be said to show the possession of “ a b
stract knowlegde.” We cannot follow the same procedure in teaching a
child abo ut his internal states. We canno t show him diffidence, for
example, and correct him if he says, “ E m barrassm ent.” N o m atter how
closely he may be in contact with his own body, we are not in contact
with it to anything like the same degree and, hence, cannot set up good
discriminative repertoires.
Even though our knowledge of our own bodies is defective, the
stimuli we receive from them are salient, and, at any given moment, they
may be stronger than what we can recall of the personal histories which
were responsible for them. Moreover, they seem to be in the right te m
poral position to function as causes. If I say th at I came to this meeting
because I felt like coming, I may seem to give some sort of explanation.
But can I explain why I felt like coming? If I try to do so by pointing to
what has happened in my life with respect to similar meetings, then I
must ask whether that explains why I felt like coming or the fact that
I actually came. Will not certain past circumstances explain both why I
came and why I felt like coming? It is a reasonable view that both self
knowledge and self-management must be derived from society, because
contingencies which give rise to them require a verbal environment.
When, therefore, an experimental analysis shifts the emphasis from an
au to no m o us man to the environment, no subjective evidence can stand
in its way.
Beyond Freedom and D ignity does not use a scientific analysis o f be
havior for purposes of prediction or control. The science lies behind the
book rather than in it. It is used merely for purposes of interpretation.
Other sciences interpret nature w ithout attracting attention. W hen a
physicist gives a quick explanation of what is happening when a tennis
ball behaves strangely during a game, he can be challenged; he doesn’t
Answers fo r M y Critics 261
have the facts. But his account is m ore likely to be correct than that of
someone who is not familiar with trajectories, air friction, Venturi
forces, and so on, under the controlled conditions of the laboratory.
Interpretation is a substantial part of m any fields of science, including
geology, astronomy, subatomic physics, and evolution. When phenomena
are out of reach in time or space, or too large or small to be directly
manipulated, we must talk ab ou t them with less than a complete account
of relevant conditions. W hat has been learned under m ore favorable
conditions is then invaluable.
As I have pointed out, casual observation is seldom enough to explain
what is going on in an operant laboratory, even when the organism under
analysis is as “ simple” as a pigeon. Looking into an experimental space,
one sees stimuli appear and disappear, responses being made, and rein
forcers occasionally appearing and being consumed. But in a modern
experiment, the interrelations am on g these three events may be very hard
to detect. A dditional information is to be found in the log of the ex
periment, which tells us something ab o u t the genetics of the subject and
its environmental history; in a visual display, such as the standard
cumulative record, which shows, at a glance, changes in rate of resp ond
ing over a period of time; and, above all, in an inspection of the a p p a r a
tus which arranges the prevailing contingencies of reinforcement. An
observer who has had experience in the use of such additional inform a
tion is m uch more likely to interpret correctly what he sees when he
looks into an experimental space for the first time.
My Verbal Behavior was an exercise in interpretation. In it, I pointed
to similarities between the contingencies of reinforcement which gener
ate verbal behavior and the contingencies which have been analyzed
with much greater precision in the laboratory. T he account is, I believe,
more plausible than those proposed, without benefit of laboratory
experience, by linguists and psycholinguists when they are dealing with
the same kinds of facts. Beyond Freedom and D ignity is also an exercise
in interpretation. It is not science as such, bu t it is not metaphysics,
either. It analyzes certain behavioral processes which have played a part
in the struggle for freedom and dignity. When 1 question the supposed
residual freedom of a u ton om ou s man, I am not debating the issue of free
will. I am simply describing the slow demise of a prescientific explanatory
device. A u ton om o us behavior is treated simply as uncaused behavior.
The argum ent is, I believe, quite similar to th a t against vital forces in
biology. U ntil biochemistry could account for all bodily processes, a
prescientific agent was said to be operative. It was not a m atter of dis
proving the reality of vital forces through metaphysical disputation
which made the concept unneccessary; it was, rather, a m atter of making
steady advances in biochemistry.
262 B. F. SKINNER
My discussion of values is also not metaphysical. It is a behavioral

analysis of the things people call good, for reasons to be found in the
evolution of the species and in the practices of a social environment. O f
special importance are the “ goods” which arise when a culture contrives
immediate reinforcers which generate behavior having certain deferred
consequences. The culture “ makes the future im p o rta n t” by analyzing
contingencies, by extracting rules from them, by reinforcing people
when they follow the rules, and so on.
It would be absurd to claim th at such an interpretation is now fully
adequate, but the objections most often raised are not always cogent.
The translation of traditional terms into what is often contemptuously
called “ behaviorese” may still be awkward. Traditional terms have
acquired many meanings, and the reader who takes a given translation
to stand for more than one may complain of equivocation. A word like
“ contingency” is conspicuous, and its repeated use may lead to c o m
plaints of unnecessary repetition, but my book is ab ou t contingencies,
and it would be costly to introduce synonyms simply for the sake of
variety. Again, operant behavior is, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the
field of purpose, but although we may repeat the word “ purpose” with
impunity, to repeat such an expression as “ reinforcing consequences” is
to run a considerable stylistic risk. Such risks must be accepted, if we
are to get on with the analysis.
My treatm ent o f freedom can be summarized briefly. (It is said that 1
do not sufficiently identify the authors of the literature of freedom; 1
mention some of th e m —Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, J. S. Mill, and a
few m o dern s—but I do not “ review the literature” ; I am concerned with
certain kinds o f statements, such as were, or might have been, part of
the literature, and those who have insisted th a t “ no one talks that way
any m o re ” and that I am attacking straw men have, in fact, supplied
many other examples.) T hrough certain processes of escape and avoid
ance, extensively analyzed in the laboratory, we respond to those who
treat us aversively either by moving away from them or attacking and
weakening them. We may then “ feel free,” and say that we can now do
only what we want to do. But the experimental analysis of behavior has
clarified the process of positive reinforcement which induces us to do
what we feel like doing. It is particularly dangerous to dismiss this
evidence, because the control exercised through positive reinforcement
has no built-in source of countercontrol.
The argum ent with respect to dignity appeals to the same kind of
evidence. We give a person credit for his achievements when we can see
no other explanation of his behavior, but a scientific analysis reveals
unsuspected contributions from the environment which naturally dimin
ish the role supposedly played by the person himself.
These are not academic issues. The literatures of freedom and dignity
have strongly defended and aggrandized the individual, and he fights
doggedly to protect his supposed prerogatives. I have pointed to two
unfortunate consequences. One is the support of punitive practices. If we
simply punish bad behavior, we can give the individual credit for be
having well; but if we build a world in which he naturally behaves well,
the world must get the credit. He is being automatically good; he is
exhibiting no inner goodness or virtue. It is said that the nations of the
world are spending two hundred billion dollars every year in the name of
defense, all in the form of potential punishments to be used if other
people behave badly. Possibly as much is spent in maintaining domestic
order. Yet, in spite of this staggering waste, the suggestion that we should
direct ourselves to the construction of a world in which people will be
“ naturally” good will be rejected by most defenders of freedom and
dignity. When we turn to nonpunitive measures, we permit ourselves to
use only the least effective, because we thus leave something for which the
individual can take credit, something which testifies to his freedom of
choice.
I simply ask my reader to consider the possibility th at hum an behavior
is always controlled, and by conditions which we are slowly coming to
understand. As I have noted, control does not mean physical restraint or
m anipulation in the etymological sense. The behavioral scientist simply
changes the environment in such a way that behavior is changed. The
literatures of freedom and dignity have not been concerned with freeing
m an from control but merely with changing the kind of control. We
still have a long way to go to get the best results.
But that, of course, raises a basic issue. W h at are the best results?
W ho is to use the practices derived from a scientific analysis of behavior,
and to what end? I have tried to answer those questions, not by giving
names or specifying values, but by applying a behavioral analysis to what
has happened and is likely to happen in the evolution of cultures. It
will not be any person or any kind of person, benevolent or com passion
ate, who will determine the use to be made of a behavioral technology.
T o look for assurance to a kind of person is to m ake the same old
mistake. We should look instead to the culture of which such a person’s
behavior will be a function, switching again from a supposedly origina
ting individual to a controlling, largely social environment. In the past,
individuals have emerged to seize power and use it to advance their own
interests. They have done so because the culture has permitted them
(indeed, induced them) to do so. In a different culture, power will be
used in a different way. W hat way is a question to be answered by
looking at the consequences.
It is a difficult kind of answer, and I have obviously failed to make it
264 B. F. SKINNER
clear to m any of my readers, who have offered a different answ er—

namely, that a science of behavior and its technology can lead only to a
totalitarian despotism —and, as usual, have implied that a Cassandran
prediction needs none of the factual support dem anded of anyone who
prophesies a better world. Selection by consequences raises the question
of how the future can figure in the “ decisions” which affect it. Somehow
or other, living things have circumvented the rule against final causes. It
is the future of a m utation which “ decides” whether it is good or bad.
Genetics and ecology point to the mechanisms which make this possible
in natural selection. In the field of behavior, it is the reinforcing co n
sequences which alter the probability that an organism will subsequently
behave in a given way. The physiological mechanisms which make this
possible (themselves a product of natural selection) are not yet known.
Presumably, the consequences must, to some extent, overlap ongoing
behavior, but reinforcers may be conditioned to permit the shaping and
maintaining of behavior under circumstances in which relevant co n
sequences are long deferred. The social environment we call a culture
plays an im portant part in mediating deferred consequences for the
individual.
Both in natural selection and in operant conditioning, consequences
take over a role previously assigned to an antecedent creative mind. Be
fore Darwin, the word was spelled with a capital M, and it was supposed
to have produced the millions of diverse creatures found on the surface of
the earth. In operant conditioning, the selective action of consequences
generates behavior traditionally attributed to another creative mind.
Both in natural selection and in operant conditioning, the purpose or
design attributed to a creative agent also changes place. As I have pointed
out elsewhere, the field of operant behavior is the field of purpose.
The question of who is to control, and to what end, must be answered
by still an other process of selection —in the evolution of cultures. New
cultural practices are like mutations. A practice which contributes to the
survival of those who practice it survives when they survive. This third
circumvention of the rule against final causes becomes possible when, by
virtue of the two other circumventions, a species reaches the point at
which it builds a culture. The hum an species has obviously reached such
a point, but it has not been necessary th at anyone plan or design a culture
in advance, because the notion of selection dispenses with the need for
design. N o one designed the anatom y and physiology of the hum an
species and no one designs the behavior which emerges under natural
contingencies of reinforcement. Similarly, no one need design a given
stage in the evolution of a culture.
At some point, however, design becomes possible at all three levels.
Changes can be made either by changing the conditions of selection or by
introducing new mutations. Breeding practices have changed contingen

cies of survival and have modified the evolution of various species.
Geneticists are now talking abo ut the possibility of introducing m u ta
tions to speed evolution or change its course. In operant conditioning,
it has long been possible to change the top og raphy of behavior by
changing contingencies of reinforcement, and we may produce novel
forms of behavior by changing the provenance o f the behavior which
undergoes selection. Similarly, the evolution o f a culture may be affected
by changing the contingencies of survival (for example, by m aking it
possible for less effective practices to satisfy contingencies) or by in tro
ducing new practices as mutations.
In the evolution of a culture, up to the point at which design becomes
feasible, new practices may arise for reasons which have no bearing on
their survival value, and this may be true even when practices are “ de
liberately” designed for the sake of future consequences. The survival
of a practice may have no connection with the consequences responsible
for its introduction. It is only when the survival of the culture is taken into
account that a special kind of design emerges, a design in which the
contingencies of that survival shape and m aintain the behavior of the
members of what Harvey Wheeler has called a new profession.
U p to the point of explicit cultural design, a social system emerges as a
compromise between would-be controllers and those they would control.
Some kind of uneasy equilibrium is maintained between nation and
nation, nation and citizen, capital and labor, therapist and patient,
teacher and student, or parent and child. C o ntrol and countercontrol
explain the behavior of the parties involved—although, traditionally,
such behavior has been mistakenly attributed to personal traits, such as
compassion or benevolence. We m ake the same mistake when we look to
personal traits for assurance th at the power of a technology of behavior
will not be misused. I have argued elsewhere th at certain classical ex
amples of m istreatm ent—in homes for young children or the aged, in
prisons, in hospitals for psychotics, and in homes for retardates—arise
not because those who run such institutions lack compassion but rather
because those who live there cannot exert countercontrol.
Some balancing of control and countercontrol may be a first step in
the design of an effective culture, and a successful result may be said to
yield the greatest good of the greatest number. But such a design will not
necessarily have survival value, and those who are concerned for the
future of a culture must go beyond the countercontrolling pattern. The
good of the culture may be quite unrelated to the personal goods of
controller and controllee (although this is not likely to be the case,
because the culture depends ultimately upon the strength of its members).
We might say that the person who designs entirely for the good of the
266 B. F. SKINNER
culture should be untouched by personal go od s—but this is impossible,

because the good of the culture can act only when it has been converted
into personal goods. Nevertheless, some sacrifice of personal goods may
be needed, and, in the extreme case, the sacrifice may be total. The
soldier who gives his life for the good of his country or to make the world
safe for democracy or comm unism is under the control of a particular
kind of social environment, and religious m artyrdom shows a similar
pattern. It is not too difficult to show how such environments arise or
why they are likely to survive. But can we escape from the jingoistic
devices which, although they make for survival, suggest some kind of
social Darwinism? W here are we to find the conditioned reinforcers
which will work for the future of m ankind?
It may be, as it has been so often in the past, that we m ust look to
aversive contingencies. Almost everything now being said ab ou t our
global problems is designed to strengthen behavior having the form of
escape or aviodance: we must save m ankind from an overpopulated,
impoverished, and polluted earth and from nuclear destruction. The
cultural designer who proposes measures clearly designed to save m a n
kind is not likely to be challenged. But should we overlook the possibility
th a t we can move tow ard a world in which people will be not only safe
and in possession of the goods they need but m ore likely to show the
kinds of creative achievements of which the hum an species is capable?
If we are to make sure that no individual or small group will emerge to
use despotically the power conferred by a science of behavior, we must
design a culture in which no one can emerge in such a position. A system
of control and countercontrol is a primitive device which may contain
depotism, and it is supported by powerful contingencies affecting all
parties, but it must be supplemented by practices which bring people
under the control of a more remote future. This is not a choice to be
m ade; it is a m atter of selection. If despotic rule is bad, immoral, or
unethical, then it is the sign of a bad culture, and another kind of culture
will be m ore likely to survive—if it can get its chance. Such a chance
could conceivably arise by accident, but we have reached the point at
which it may come from explicit design. Those who have been induced by
our culture to be concerned for its future have the opportunity to change
the evolution of th a t culture in a most im portant way.
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INDEX BOOKS GROUPS 22/02/2015

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INDEX OPERANT CONDITIONING:

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Papers presented at a symposium organized by J. H.

N o part o f this book may be reproduced by any

Printed in the United States o f America

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February, 1973 H a n e y Wheeler

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Behaviorism's Enlightened Despotism

Some Aversive Responses to a Would-be Reinforcer

How Good Is Current Behavioral Theory? 149

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13 Skinner and Human Differences 177

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22/02/2015 INDEX BOOKS GROUPS

22/02/2015 INDEX BOOKS GROUPS

H arvey Wheeler, ci senior fe llo w at the Center fo r the Study o f

B. F. Skinner’s Book Beyond Freedom and D ignity discusses some of the

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leading nations are engaging in large, secret research projects in be­

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liberalism, a philosophy as well as a prescription for the construction

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intrepid, if not more skillful, criminals. We attack the prison system,

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W hat, then, is operant conditioning? Perhaps the best way to find

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effect. The result is a society characterized by punishing; repressive

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such as alcoholism and drug addiction, seem to respond better to

Suppose we now enter, ever so tentatively, the world of operant

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beings th ro u g h o u t all time have possessed language. In every natural

22/02/2015 INDEX BOOKS GROUPS

operant-conditioning system. Stimulus-response leads us to concentrate

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Behavior can be suppressed as well as reinforced. This is done by

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at preventing persons and groups from interfering with the liberty of

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would rule throug h operant conditioning and maintain his authority by

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tioning. H aving disposed of his beliefs to their own satisfaction, they

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vidual organisms; that is all he sees. When he looks at society, he does

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reinforcements than they do to punitive (aversive) measures. As Skinner

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Suppose we ad o p t this qualified view o f the application of operant-

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calculate ecological effects more accurately and, thus, avoid what

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changing practices pioneered in China may appear. This will obviously

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My own conclusion is th at this is an erroneous interpretation. I have

INDEX A p p en d ix : A T e n ta tiv e Logic o f O p e r a n t C o n d itio n in g

1) We begin with an organism responding in an eventful environment.

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12) Positive suppression is a decrease in the probability of the same

leading nations are engaging in large, secret research projects in be

Thus, in “ contingency-contracting” classrooms, larger problem solv

of steps, starting with themselves as “ outside consultants,” first o b

A nd yet not entirely. Skinnerian objective determinism, like the deter